Since 2011, DCAF has worked with key ministries, parliament, oversight institutions, the media and many other partners. Tunisia joined as a member state of DCAF’s Foundation Council in the same year. DCAF’s programs include assisting the Ministry of Interior to implement its action plan on good governance and integrity building; contributing to criminal justice reform; and addressing security needs of women and youth, including the prevention of violent extremism.
Every year, DCAF also supports the OSCE Focus Conference, which was developed as a flexible instrument for reflection and analysis of the OSCE.
Find out more about our work in Tunisia: Download DCAF Tunisia Country Strategy
In the first weeks following the Tunisian Revolution, DCAF offered its expertise to the transitional government. Since February 2011, DCAF has been reinforcing its cooperation with the Tunisian government through concluding agreements and developing assistance programmes with several ministries (Interior, Justice and Defence).
In July 2011, Tunisia joined the DCAF Foundation Council and became its 60th member state. In order to facilitate the implementation of its cooperation programme, DCAF opened an office in Tunis in October 2011. This office has been part of the Trust Fund for North Africa (TFNA) programme since June 2012.
The objective of the TFNA’s programme in Tunisia is to assist the authorities in establishing good governance of armed forces, police and security forces which are to:
All of our activities in Tunisia are funded by the TFNA. To learn more about the Trust Fund, please visit www.dcaf.ch/trust-fund-north-africa.
Effective parliamentary oversight is crucial to ensuring that the mandates of security sector institutions and security providers are devised and implemented with full transparency and accountability. In its absence, there is a danger of them misinterpreting their mission and acting like a state within the state, either placing heavy strains on scarce resources or exerting excessive political and economic influence. They may hamper democratisation and even increase the likelihood of conflict.
Beside parliamentary oversight, other formal independent oversight mechanisms that exist in differing forms from one country to another, such as National Anti-Corruption bodies, Access to Information or media watchdogs etc., perform important control functions with direct links to the security sector in line with their thematic mandates.
In order to keep citizens informed about security issues in a transparent and timely way, and to be transparent about how state institutions in charge of providing security are organized, funded, and operated, professional communication and access to information regulation and practice aiming at the highest possible standard of open government are essential . Access to information, as well as citizen participation in the development of security policies, enhances the transparency and accountability of the security sector and helps building trust.
Furthermore, effective complaints and feedback mechanisms concerning the security services can apport an important element of control and information to authorities in charge of internal and external oversight of security providers. This is particularly important for complaints related to police misconduct.
A good regulatory framework for the security sector:
Given the nature of the term “security” (e.g. human, national), there may be different views of what ‘security’ means for citizens and the state. The understanding of ‘security’ also differs between urban and rural areas, as it does for different social classes and professional interest groups. Developing a vision of security that is as inclusive as possible, and agreeing on how to achieve this security, requires extensive and inclusive dialogue.
National political reform plans, often linked to democratic transitions typically involve the need of broad reforms to the armed, police and other security forces.
Those in charge of steering the reform processes often need to address challenges in the legal and institutional setup and re-define missions and mandates. There may be a need to review the allocation and development of human, material and financial resources, and address issues of corruption. This complex process often takes place against the background of a highly volatile and challenging security environment.
In order to succeed, security providers need to be able to set clear goals and objectives, and to devise strategies for reaching them. These strategies must also take into account expectations of citizens, and mobilise domestic and international political support.
The Tunisian Security Sector Legal Database is one of the first collections of legislation relating to the security sector in the Arab world. It contains all the legislation governing the security sector in Tunisia - around 3,500 texts - which have been adopted since Tunisia's independence in 1956 to date.
In order to offer a historical perspective on the evolution of security sector legislation in Tunisia, the database also contains references to texts that have been repealed, as well as those that have not been published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (JORT) and / or are not publishable.
The database thus covers the main providers of security (the armed forces, ISFs, etc.) and justice (courts, prison services, etc.), but also the formal supervision and management institutions (the government and its ministries, Parliament, etc.). In addition, it includes all legislative and regulatory texts covering and authorizing the work of informal control actors (political parties, media, NGOs, etc.).
To learn more about the platform, please visit https://legislation-securite.tn/
In setting up this database, the authors have gone to great lengths to ensure that it is as complete and error-free as possible. Nevertheless, given the scale of the task and the sometimes difficult access to texts - for example, with regard to decrees that have not been published in the JORT - the authors encourage any comments, observations or corrections. Likewise, the authors decline all responsibility for the potential consequences caused to third parties that may result from errors in this database. For any official reference, please consult the authoritative JORT (Arabic version).
|Samir Marmouri||Head of Office|
|Wided Boujeh||Programme Manager|
|Zeineb Mansour||Programme Manager|
|Aliya Melki||Programme Assistant|
|Zied Nouir||Programme Assistant|
|Balkis Ben Gamra||Finance Assistant|
Samir Marmouri, Head of Office (email@example.com)