National Security Policy-Making and Gender

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International Alert is a London-based NGO that has worked for over 20 years to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict. International Alert’s multi-faceted approach focuses both in and across various regions; aiming to shape policies and practices that affect peacebuilding; and helping build skills and capacity through training.

International Alert’s regional work is based in the African Great Lakes, West Africa, the South Caucasus, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Colombia. International Alert’s thematic projects work at local, regional and international levels, focusing on cross-cutting issues critical to building sustainable peace. These include business and economy, gender, governance, aid, security and justice.

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The Gender and SSR Toolkit
This Tool on National Security Policy-Making and Gender is part of a Gender and SSR Toolkit. Designed to provide a practical introduction to gender issues for security sector reform practitioners and policy-makers, the Toolkit includes the following 12 Tools and corresponding Practice Notes:

1. Security Sector Reform and Gender
2. Police Reform and Gender
3. Defence Reform and Gender
4. Justice Reform and Gender
5. Penal Reform and Gender
6. Border Management and Gender
7. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
9. Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
10. Private Military and Security Companies and Gender
11. SSR Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender
12. Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel

Annex on International and Regional Laws and Instruments

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DCAF
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) promotes good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre conducts research on good practices, encourages the development of appropriate norms at the national and international levels, makes policy recommendations and provides in-country advice and assistance programmes. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security services and the military.

OSCE/ODIHR
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the main institution for the OSCE’s human dimension of security: a broad concept that includes the protection of human rights; the development of democratic societies, with emphasis on elections, institution-building, and governance; strengthening the rule of law; and promoting genuine respect and mutual understanding among individuals, as well as nations. The ODIHR contributed to the development of the Toolkit.

UN-INSTRAW
The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) is the only UN entity mandated to develop research programmes that contribute to the empowerment of women and the achievement of gender equality worldwide. Through alliance-building with UN Member States, international organisations, academia, civil society, and other actors, UN-INSTRAW:

- Undertakes action-oriented research from a gender perspective that has a concrete impact on policies, programmes and projects;
- Creates synergies for knowledge management and information exchange;
- Strengthens the capacities of key stakeholders to integrate gender perspectives in policies, programmes and projects.


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# ACRONYMS

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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
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Introduction

As part of the Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, this tool provides an introduction to the benefits and opportunities of integrating gender issues into national-level security policy making. As strategic documents, security policies are critically important in establishing a coordinated response to security threats, and can serve as a platform for security sector reform (SSR) processes. This includes national security policies (NSPs) as well as sector-specific policies, such as a white paper on defence. Ensuring that gender issues are integrated into security policies may increase participation and local ownership, and create policies and institutions that are more likely to effectively and sustainably provide security and justice to men, women, girls and boys on an equitable basis. This tool is designed to be a resource for staff responsible for initiating security policy-making processes within the executive branch of government, including those responsible for drafting, implementing and evaluating security policies. In addition, the tool may be useful to a variety of other actors involved in security policy-making processes, including parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, ministerial staff, civil society organisations, municipal-level government, international and regional organisations, and donor countries supporting the development of security policies.

Specifically, this tool provides:
- A brief introduction to security policies, including NSPs and sector-specific policies
- Discussion of the significance and benefits of applying a gender perspective to security policy-making
- Practical actions to integrate gender dimensions into security policy-making
- An introduction to development of security policies in post-conflict, transitional, developing and developed countries
- Key recommendations
- Additional resources

On the critical issue of policy implementation by specific actors encompassed by the security sector please refer to the other tools of the Gender and SSR Toolkit. The focus of this tool is policy-making, and how gender may best be incorporated into the process. It should be mentioned that a policy of itself has little value. Only when it is implemented will it impact on how security and justice are provided in a given country.

What are national security policies?

A national-level security policy sets out a government’s perception of threats to the security of the state and its population and its responses to these threats. A policy differs from rules or laws. A law, for instance, can compel or prohibit certain behaviours, while a policy merely guides actions that are most likely to achieve a desired outcome. As such, a policy designates a deliberate plan of action to guide decisions on the part of the executive. Developing a security policy involves establishing an approach to security issues, prioritising security threats and making major decisions about the security sector. Security policies at the national level, including national security policies and institution-specific policies, address both internal and external threats to security and are developed within the framework of international and regional legislation to which the state is party.

Many different actors are involved in the production of security policies:
- The executive branch of government, including government ministries, initiates the process of establishing new security policies or amending existing ones. The executive appoints the members of security coordinating bodies and policy drafting committees.
- Parliament may approve, propose changes to or reject a security policy. In many democratic states, the parliament also has the final say on the budget, and monitors and evaluates the implementation of security policies.
- Local government includes state or district government and mayoral offices. In collaboration with local security sector institutions, they can be key implementers of national-level security policies.
- Non-state security actors, such as paramount chiefs, village councils and non-statutory armed forces, are in many post-conflict and some developing countries the main providers of security...
and justice. Non-state security actors should therefore be included in processes of developing and implementing security policies.

- **Civil society organisations (CSOs)** may participate in the assessment, design, implementation and evaluation of security policies.

Figure 1 outlines the process to be followed and key questions to be asked in producing security policies. It can be adapted to assist the development of NSPs as well as sector-specific security policies.

### 2.1 A national security policy

DCAF proposes a broad definition of a NSP as ‘a framework for describing how a country provides security for the state and its citizens’. This policy document can also be referred to as a plan, vision, strategy, concept or doctrine. A NSP is often presented as an integrated document that delineates how the security sector is to be structured to address both external and internal security threats. Because NSPs seek to encompass national security as a whole, they tend to be hierarchically superior to sector, agency or issue specific policies such as those which address military doctrines or policing. Box 1 describes the process of developing NSPs.

#### Box 1: Developing a national security policy

1. Conduct a **strategic environmental analysis** and identify a ‘national vision’ for the country and its people through broad-based consultation. This process should encompass consultations with CSOs to discuss perceived and actual security concerns – e.g. through written submissions and direct participation in public meetings.

2. **Analyse and prioritise current and future threats and opportunities** to the achievement of objectives outlined in the ‘national vision’.

3. **Determine and prioritise national capabilities**, both within the security/justice sectors and beyond, that can address security threats and deliver key security services to citizens. This includes the financial basis for implementing the NSP, and the general financial management procedures of a given country.

4. **Undertake a gap analysis** to assess the current capability of national security/justice institutions to address threats and deliver key services, compared with required capabilities. A gap analysis should, where appropriate, be based on sources both within and outside state institutions.

5. **Establish a prioritised and budgeted NSP** to deliver improved security and justice in support of broader national development objectives.
Box 2 | Content of Lithuania’s National Security Strategy

Lithuania’s National Security Strategy provides a good example of the broad issues that NSPs may address. It provides a ‘national vision’ for the state’s development, its national interests and actions required to move them forward. Importantly, it encompasses political, diplomatic, defence, economic and other spheres of state policy. ‘Lithuania perceives its security as preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity, internal security and order, democratic foundations, economic security of all legal entities and population and protection of its natural environment.’ The sections of the National Security Strategy are:

- **Basic assumptions of security policy:** this section outlines the current international security system as favourable, and deems the majority of existing traditional and new challenges as transnational in nature. There is no immediate military threat to Lithuania’s national security.

- **Security interests of the Republic of Lithuania:** these are divided into vital and primary interests. The former include state sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic constitutional order; respect and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; and peace and prosperity of the state. Primary interests include global and regional stability, freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States; ensuring alternative energy supplies and supply of resources that are of strategic importance; and a region free of environmental dangers.

- **Challenges, dangers and threats:** included under this heading are terrorism, organised crime, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, illegal migration and epidemics, as well as Lithuania’s dependence on resources and energy supplies from only one country. Economic conditions, including the well-being of the population and avoidance of uneven social and economic development and independence of the state, are also acknowledged as possible threats to national security.

- **Security policy of the Republic of Lithuania:** included are the major goals and objectives of national security; strategic concepts and implementation guidelines; circumstances that would justify the use of military force; and the importance of domestic stability and prosperity.

- **Primary actions and means for implementation of strategy:** included are integration into NATO and the EU, strengthening international cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally, participation in international peace operations and crisis management, etc. Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of strengthening internal, economic and social security, crime control and prevention, environmental and cultural protection, and strengthening intelligence, counter-intelligence and protection of classified information.

NSPs are also distinguished from other security policies by the range of subjects that they address. NSPs have tended to focus on external threats to security that demand a national response. This continues to be the case, for example, in the **United States (US).** The NSP of the US deals with issues ranging from military force preparedness, nuclear strategies and terrorism to chemical and biological weapons. However, NSPs increasingly include a comprehensive evaluation of both domestic and international security environments (see Figure 2). For example, **Bulgaria’s 1998 National Security Concept** is based on the premise that there is no direct military threat to national security. The focus is instead on issues such as organised crime (transnational and cross-border), trafficking (drugs, arms and human beings), illegal trade (mostly trade in arms in violation of UN embargoes), terrorism and environmental degradation.

Another model is the **Afghan and the Azerbaijani NSPs,** which are divided into external and internal security issues. In the Azerbaijani case, the external issues included are territorial integrity, integration within European and Euro-Atlantic structures, strengthening defence capabilities, and so forth. Internally, the policy focuses on issues such as strengthening democracy, protection of national and religious tolerance and information security.

In **Sierra Leone**, a post-conflict country, a NSP has been called for as a follow-up to the two-year process of conflict resolution and national reconciliation.

### Understanding current and future security needs

- What type of security provision do citizens, government, parliament and so forth want?
- What types of security do neighbouring countries, countries in the region and other countries expect?
- What is ‘national security’ or ‘security for all citizens’?

### Understanding change

- How have the nation, region and the international environment changed?
- What does the future security environment look like?

### Understanding threats to security

- Where do the most important future threats to national security come from?
- Does a national consensus on threat perceptions exist? If not, how should the lack of consensus be addressed? If it does, who was consulted?

### Understanding strengths and weaknesses

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the security and justice providers?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the system of control and oversight mechanisms?

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Figure 2: Locating external and internal security needs

**Analysis of the internal and external security environment**

**Understanding current and future security needs**

**Understanding change**

**Understanding threats to security**

**Understanding strengths and weaknesses**
of producing a Security Sector Review. The Security Sector Review makes a number of recommendations, including the need for greater coordination across the security sector. Significantly, it highlights the dangers of internal instability rather than external threats as the potential source of renewed conflict.

### 2.2 Sector-specific security policies

Sector-specific security policies such as defence white papers or homeland security strategies differ from NSPs by addressing national security concerns as they relate to specific agencies or issues. As a rule, a sector-specific policy provides more substantial guidance on the role, organisational structuring and responsibility of an agency, and on how it should address particular security needs. At the same time, sector-specific policies have to be set in the context of national policy as a whole, thereby harmonising and unifying government policies and bodies dealing with security-related issues. Therefore, as with NSPs, sector-specific security policies are important platforms from which to launch systematic and coordinated SSR efforts.

A security policy may be presented as a ‘white paper’, which is essentially an informal name for a parliamentary paper articulating government policy (see Box 3). It is a document issued by the government laying out policy and/or proposed action in an area of current concern. While not binding by law, a white paper may at times be seen as part of an open-ended consultation process. However, a white paper does tend to signify a clear intention on the part of a government to pass new legislation. A ‘green paper’ is usually more open-ended and may merely propose a strategy or be formulated as a discussion or consultation paper.

### 3 Why is gender important in security policy-making?

Gender and SSR Toolkit

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Defence White Paper places specific emphasis on defence reform and identifies key threats to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s security environment (globally, regionally and internally). It then focuses on:

- **The defence policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina**, including strategic principles, integration into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Partnership for Peace/NATO standardisation and interoperability and contribution to regional cooperation in South East Europe.
- **The defence system of Bosnia-Herzegovina**, including democratic control of the armed forces, civilian command, parliamentary oversight, transparency in defence planning and budgeting, operational and administrative chains of command and size of the armed forces.
- **Human resources and capacity-building**, including individual and collective training, professional development, employment of the armed forces, peace support operations, assistance and support to civilian authorities’ operations, the officer corps, soldiers, reserves and personnel management systems.

Lithuania’s Defence Policy (White Paper) outlines the changing overall security environment of the country and the new role and new missions of the armed forces. It then focuses on:

- **The main directions of Lithuania’s defence policy**, including strengthening of Euro-Atlantic security, projection of stability, and international, multilateral and bilateral defence cooperation.
- **Defence reform**, including the shift from territorial to collective defence principles, new tasks and requirements for the Lithuanian armed forces, and review of the armed forces structure.
- **Personnel management and training**.

The following section presents a number of reasons why gender is important in the process of national security policy-making, and how it contributes to enhancing local ownership and broad-based participation. Fundamentally, gender perspectives are important because they help to recognise that a population is not a homogenous group, but constitutes a broad range of needs and interests. Given that the security sector has the task of protecting all groups within the population, it is imperative that security policy-making includes gender perspectives. This will help to develop strategies for security sector actors that identify a broad range of needs – not just those of the most visible and privileged communities or demographic groups in society.
Institutions and personnel in the security sector can at times be sources of insecurity, in particular for disempowered groups in society. However, violence can also derive from legislation and policies that make up the rule of law. Where policies are gender-blind, they may both directly and indirectly condone gender-based violence against women, men, boys and girls; gender inequality and exclusionary practices. This in itself requires that policy-making processes are inclusive and incorporate the perspectives of all groups in a given population.

### 3.1 Local ownership through participatory policy-making processes

In order to create legitimacy and local ownership of national-level security policies, as well as consensus on security priorities, there needs to be a participatory process of assessing, designing, implementing and monitoring/evaluating the policy. Participatory processes also enhance accountability, transparency and sustainability, three key principles of SSR. One of the key steps to ensuring participatory security policy-making processes is the inclusion of both women and men in decision-making (see Box 4). The equal participation of women and men in local, national and international security policy processes is in accordance with international norms and instruments, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and makes the structures of governance more representative of society’s composition.

#### Compliance with obligations under international laws and instruments

Integrating gender into national security policy-making is necessary to comply with international and regional laws, instruments and norms concerning security and gender. Key instruments include:

- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)

In many countries, women continue to be excluded from decision-making processes. For instance, rebuilding and enhancing the security of Liberia has required a complete restructuring of the security forces, including the formulation of a NSP and sector-specific security policies. While the Liberian Government established a 20% quota for the

### Box 4 Benefits of participatory security policy-making in South Africa

South Africa’s process of post-apartheid transformation of security policies and institutions is often presented as a good practice of participatory and locally owned SSR. For instance, the 1996-1998 Defence Review process included a national consultation which ensured the participation of religious and community leaders, activists, NGO representatives and women’s organisations. Within this process, grassroots women’s organisations were vital in drawing attention to key security issues such as the environmental impact of the military and sexual harassment of women. In response, two new sub-committees were formed in the Defence Secretariat. Ultimately, the participatory nature of the Defence Review was credited with assisting the process of building national consensus around defence issues and generating public legitimacy for new security structures.¹⁶

Consultation with women within civil society and political parties also ensured that security policies were gender-responsive and highlighted the role of women as consumers and providers of security. This, for instance, was illustrated in the 1994 White Paper on Intelligence, the 1996 White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa and the 1998 Safety and Security White Paper.

The South African experience indicates that the inclusion of women and representatives from women’s organisations in security-related debates can lead to an expanded understanding of what should be included in security policies and statements.

**Key findings from this process, which all impacted directly on policy-making, included:**¹⁷

1. South Africa went beyond mere reform to transform the security sector by taking steps to consult the public about the role of the security sector and placing human security and development at the centre of its national security framework.
2. Women with differing views and values and of all races were central to articulating the vision and shaping the process by which the security of the people became a priority of the state.
3. Women from across the political spectrum mobilised to attain 50% representation in negotiations leading up to the 1994 election and 28% of parliamentary seats. They continue to encourage public participation in policy-shaping and remain the strongest proponents of human security.
4. Within the security establishment, it is increasingly acknowledged that women:
   a. Bring a critical perspective to the planning and implementation of programmes.
   b. Have a positive influence as members of security forces.
   c. Are critical to building peace and security.
5. Security sector transformation will remain incomplete if the institutional culture is not changed. Overcoming gender-based discrimination, as with racial discrimination, is a key component and indicator of transformation.
A gender-responsive, participatory approach to security policy-making processes thus ensures equal access by a variety of groups, both to the policy itself, and the process whereby it is being developed, implemented and evaluated. This is particularly critical in a post-conflict context and in a number of transitional countries where security architectures have been built from scratch due their abrupt or gradual collapse.

3.2 Comprehensive security policy that addresses diverse security needs

As mentioned in Section 2, security policies are increasingly designed to address both internal and external threats to security. In line with a human security focus on meeting the security needs of individuals and communities, a comprehensive security policy takes into account the different security needs of women, men, girls and boys, including internal security threats such as gender-based violence (GBV).

GBV is perhaps one of the most obvious manifestations of the need for different approaches to the delivery of security and justice. It is a global phenomenon, affecting women and girls, as well as men and boys. Statistically, UNIFEM estimates that one in three women across the world will be subjected to some form of GBV, such as assault, rape, trafficking or beating. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention state that every year in the US 1,500,000 women and more than 800,000 men are raped or physically assaulted by an intimate partner. In Jamaica, the National Security Strategy recognises that domestic violence contributes to a general pattern of crime and violence, due to its debilitating effects on the social fabric and its role in socialising youths to use violence as a means of dispute resolution. The financial implications of GBV are also substantial, impacting directly on the effectiveness of service delivery as well as other sectors of the state. According to the United Kingdom (UK) Home Office, domestic violence is the leading cause of morbidity

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**Box 5 Gender-based violence committed by the security forces in Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone’s ten-year conflict was officially declared over in January 2002. Armed forces and police committed sexual violence during the conflict, and men remain over-represented in both institutions, which limit reform efforts along more gender-responsive lines. The militarised culture within the Sierra Leonean security sector can exacerbate and institutionalise GBV within the rank and file of the armed forces and police.

In response, human rights issues have been integrated into the training offered to the armed forces by the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team, and to the Sierra Leone Police (initiated by the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project). Training, codes of conduct, enforcing disciplinary measures, developing protocols and institutional mechanisms to handle complaints of GBV, and increasing the representation of women can help to address GBV within security sector forces.
among women aged 19-44, costing £23 billion a year in the UK.\textsuperscript{21}

Gender issues, in particular GBV, are often equated with women and girls. However, gender issues are equally relevant to men and boys, and taking into account their particular security needs in policy-making processes ensures a comprehensive approach. For example, sexual violence against men within the armed forces and prisons is a highly taboo issue but one that merits attention. A study of prisons in four states in the \textit{US} found that approximately one in five male inmates reported a pressured or forced sex incident while incarcerated.\textsuperscript{23} GBV against men and boys is also an issue during conflict, where they are subject to sexual violence, sex-selective massacres and forced conscription. Despite this prevalence, GBV programming that targets men and boy survivors is virtually non-existent in post-conflict contexts.\textsuperscript{24}

Considering the high prevalence and heavy social and financial implications of GBV, it is a security issue that should be addressed in national security policies – both NSPs and sector or issue specific policies.

3.3 Non-discrimination in security policies and security sector institutions

Reducing discrimination by security sector personnel on the basis of religion, sex, race, sexual orientation or other improper bases can build trust, increase legitimacy and improve the provision of security and justice. As a strategic document, a security policy commits a government to address issues of security and justice, both in the public sphere and within the rank and file of the security forces themselves. As such, a security policy can establish protective rules against discrimination within security sector institutions. Gender-responsive security policy-making helps to ensure that policies do not include wording that perpetuates discrimination. By also including specific statements on the issue of non-discrimination, security policies can have a positive impact upon the structures and personnel of the armed forces, the police, intelligence services and other security sector institutions.

4.1 National government

It takes the executive’s political commitment to initiate the development or modification of a security policy. For instance, the minister of defence will usually oversee the realisation of a revamped defence policy. Thus, commitment to an inclusive security policy-making process and addressing gender issues must be embedded at the highest levels of government and amongst senior ministerial staff, to ensure a gender-responsive process and outcome.

In the case of Canada’s NSP,\textsuperscript{25} drafting was kept firmly in the hands of the Privy Council Office. The Prime Minister decided that the formulation process should not be interdepartmental because it was believed that this would delay the drafting process. Actors both within and outside government, including those with gender expertise, were thus excluded. Including different perspectives on what security means is time-consuming, but necessary to produce strong and embedded security policies. If exclusionary policy-making processes are established, this narrows transparency, democratic oversight and entry points for addressing gender issues.

A number of steps can be taken, either by ministerial staff, parliament or CSOs, to build the gender capacity and commitment of senior-level government and staff involved in security policy-making:

- Awareness-raising among the head of state, ministers, senior ministerial staff and key personnel in security sector institutions on international and national commitments to gender equality and human rights.

- Arrange gender briefings and reports for senior management on policy issues, enhanced service
delivery and operational effectiveness of applying a gendered approach in policy-making.

- Draft speaking notes on security-related matters for senior level staff, which appropriately address gender issues.
- Provide briefing notes to senior management demonstrating where gender issues may be included in security policies, and contribute to the aim of the policy.
- Lobby for the appointment of qualified women in management staff and for the inclusion of an understanding of, and demonstrated commitment to gender equality, in terms of reference. 26
- Initiate mentoring programmes that place gender experts together with senior staff in order to build their gender capacity.

Security coordinating bodies

National Security Councils (NSCs) ensure coordinated action and the integration of a wide range of security-related policy, legislative, structural and oversight issues. The NSC – or a similar body – may also be called upon to coordinate policy, to implement policy, to assess or advise and to allocate resources to deal with security threats. These coordinating bodies are therefore a crucial, if not easily accessible entry point to ensure that gender issues are put on the agenda and that women participate in security decision-making.

The NSC in Sierra Leone, the Cabinet Office in the UK, or the Advisory Council on National Security in Canada have various functions, but all have the objective of centralising senior-level government thinking about national security issues. 27 However, in new democracies and post-conflict countries the capacity in government to manage and coordinate responses to national security concerns may be weak. Similarly these bodies are at times dominated by the armed forces and lack a civil-military balance.

Though NSCs, or similar bodies in different countries have a variety of members and different mandates, they rarely include women or address gender issues:

- In Nepal in 2004, the NSC was comprised of army personnel and representatives from the Defence Ministry and the Prime Minister’s office, but women were not included (indeed, there were no high-ranking women in the police or key ministries of the Nepalese Government).
- Pakistan’s NSC has a similarly limited set of members because national security is defined narrowly under the headings of sovereignty, integrity, defence, security of the state and ‘crisis management’. 28 The NSC of the US also has a narrow set of members, formally including the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence, with regular attendance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the President’s National Security Adviser. The gender balance of the Pakistani and US NSCs is poor, and issues relating to insecurities of men and women are generally not differentiated or taken into account. One of the reasons for this is that these bodies primarily deal with macro-political concerns, not distinguishing individual groups in society.

As outlined in Section 3.1, a variety of benefits flow from increasing women’s participation and integrating gender issues into security decision-making. For example, consulting with representatives from a parliamentary women’s caucus is likely to broaden the debate within NSCs on which security concerns to prioritise. Taking gender issues into account can initiate a productive discussion on accepted approaches to security and security priorities, and effective methods of providing security and justice.

Steps that can be taken to integrate gender issues and increase the participation of women in security coordinating bodies include:

- Appoint female representatives to NSCs as a matter of priority.
- Include or consult with representatives from the ministry focused on gender and women’s issues, other government gender machinery or parliamentary women’s caucuses.
- Build the gender capacity of NSC members through training, briefings, mentoring and other initiatives. See Section 4.5 on Gender Training.
- Institute mechanisms to ensure consultation with external gender experts and representatives from women’s organisations.

One of the challenges of increasing the appointment of women to NSCs is that women are still marginalised in most countries from high-level political office, and therefore few women attain the positions included in these councils. For instance, in 2005 there were only 12 female ministers of defence and veteran affairs (6.6%) and 29 (15.8%) female ministers of justice in a sample of 183 countries. 29 Initiatives to increase the number of women in senior political positions are therefore also necessary, such as: scholarships for women to attend relevant university programmes, capacity building for female members of parliament and quotas within political parties. Inclusion of women in security coordinating bodies will not necessarily mean that more attention will be given to gender issues, but diversity of opinion and experience amongst NSC members will bring a greater number of perspectives to the table.

Security policy drafting committees

If gender is to figure robustly in security policies, the specific bodies that draft security policies should have the capacity to understand the different security needs of men, women, girls and boys, and how a proposed security policy will impact these needs. Security drafting bodies can be either standing or ad hoc committees. Policies can be designed by a team of people from a single government department (e.g. policies on policing) or from several departments (e.g. for a NSP).

Members of the drafting committee must have the technical skill to prepare policies that are
comprehensive, precise and unambiguous. The main criteria for selecting members of the committee should be:

- Technical skills and knowledge – including in integrating gender issues.
- Representation in relation to the implementing agencies and key decision-makers – potentially including a representative from the government ministry responsible for gender issues.
- Commitment to democratic reform – including promotion of gender equality.

Oversight bodies such as parliament or CSOs can play an important role in advocating for the inclusion of gender expertise on the drafting committee, or that committee members undertake training that includes gender-related components.

To ensure a gender-responsive security policy the drafting committee should both explicitly address gender issues and use gender-sensitive language.

**Explicitly address gender issues**

Depending upon the type of security policy under development, gender issues that should be highlighted include (see Box 6):

- The importance of achieving equality between men and women, and social, religious and ethnic groups as a matter of national security.
- Affirmation of the equal right of all men and women to participate in security sector institutions.
- GBV against men, women, girls and boys as a key internal threat to security; and strategies to prevent, respond to and sanction GBV, with allocation of appropriate human and financial resources.
- Eliminating discrimination within security sector institutions or in the provision of security services on the basis of sex, race, religion, sexual orientation or any other improper basis.
- Institutional codes of conduct, including specific provisions on discrimination, sexual harassment and other forms of GBV.
- Establishing mechanisms that ensure the participation of civil society in oversight of the implementation of security policies, SSR processes and security sector institutions.

Various types of security policies in different countries have addressed gender issues in this manner. **Sierra Leone**’s Defence White Paper states that ‘the Ministry of Defence together with the RSLAF [Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces] is committed to recruiting and retaining high calibre personnel irrespective of tribe, region, gender, religion …’ **31** Trafficking in human beings is included in the respective National Security Strategies of Romania and the Ukraine. In **Ukrainian** policy it figures under the heading ‘Ensure Favourable External Conditions for Development and Security of the State’ **32** In **Romania**, ‘the Strategy ascertains the need for implementation of some means to stimulate national solidarity and civic responsibility, an interest in labour equality between men and women, equal opportunities for access to education and training and social protection’ **33**

**Use gender-sensitive language**

It is also important to use ‘gender-inclusive’ and ‘gender-specific’ language within security policies in order to avoid discrimination or exclusion. The generic use of ‘he’ or ‘man’ excludes women. Many security-related policies, from **Sierra Leone**’s Defence White Paper to **Ireland**’s White Paper on Defence, acknowledge this by, for instance, referring to ‘servicemen and women’. Other NSPs, such as those of **Russia** and the **US**, make no differentiation between men and women. While using ‘gender-neutral language’ – e.g. ‘people’ instead of ‘men and women’

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**Box 6 Gender responsiveness in South Africa’s security policies**

South Africa’s White Papers on Intelligence, National Defence, and Safety and Security include gender-sensitive language, and address GBV and discrimination, and equal participation within security sector institutions.

**White Paper on Intelligence (1994):**

*The compilation of a national intelligence service shall endeavour to reflect the gender and racial composition of society whilst also taking into consideration the objective criteria of merit. To this end, an affirmative action programme shall be implemented to address imbalances.*


*In order to secure the legitimacy of the armed forces, the DOD [Department of Defence] is committed to the goal of overcoming the legacy of racial and gender discrimination. It will ensure that the SANDF [South African National Defence Force], and its leadership in particular, is broadly representative of the South African population.*

*The DOD acknowledges the right of women to serve in all ranks and positions, including combat roles.*

**White Paper on Safety and Security (1998):**

*Makes special mention of treating sexual offences, rape or domestic violence with ‘extra dignity, compassion and care’. It also calls for crime prevention strategies towards those groups most at risk of either offending or becoming victims of crime, including ‘poor communities, the youth, women and children and the disabled’.*
– is appropriate in many circumstances, it can limit the acknowledgement of gender differences, and can leave in place the assumption that all security groups in society have similar security needs.

Finally, there are NSPs such as those of Jamaica, Georgia and Ukraine, which continue to use language such as ‘manpower’ and ‘man-made hazards’. These are arguably discriminatory terms emanating from an idea that only men (not women) are active in public life.

Examples of gender-sensitive language include:
- Servicemen and women – not servicemen
- Police officer – not policeman
- Humankind – not mankind
- Artificial or manufactured – not man-made
- She/he or he/she – not he
- Staffed – not manned
- Labour, staffing, workforce – not manpower
- Chair or Chairperson – not Chairman
- Specify men, women, girls and boys where appropriate – rather than people

4.2 Parliament

The executive proposes security policies and the parliament usually accepts, amends or rejects policies; controls the budget; and can monitor and evaluate its implementation (see Box 7). While the function of parliament differs from country to country, it is expected to include two tasks when it comes to policy development: monitoring the executive and representing the interests of the citizenry. This means that parliament can play a key role in ensuring that the policy responds to the particular needs of men, boys, women and girls, including through: participatory policy-making processes and the equal representation of men and women, including different social, ethnic and religious groups.

In emerging or new democracies and post-conflict countries, neither the concept nor practices of democratic and financial oversight are likely to be appropriately in place. One consequence is lack of coordination and information-sharing between civilian and military authorities, and reluctance on the part of government and parliament to accept civilian oversight. Accountability, transparency and civilian inclusion in designing responses to national security concerns are as a consequence limited. However, even if parliaments in emerging democracies lack substantive decision-making power, they are potentially vital forums for transparency and can contribute significantly to executive accountability and checks on executive power.

Similarly, in political systems where strong party discipline prevails within the legislature and its committees, the oversight role of parliament may in practice be highly constrained. In Canada, parliament has been criticised for being a rubber stamp for policy decisions made in a centralised way by the Prime Minister and political and senior cabinet advisors. In
defence and security policy, the legislative committees and subcommittees have not served as effective oversight mechanisms, and it has been alleged that there are no truly substantive discussions of defence policy taking place in the Canadian parliament.38

Participatory policy-making processes

Parliamentary involvement in security policies is critical to ensuring transparency and accountability to the public. This is achieved through open debate, consultation and public availability of information on government security policies.

Consultations with relevant parliamentary committees on NSPs – and other security policies – will be most successful if carried out at an early stage in the drafting process so that changes and redirection of policies can take place. Parliamentarians and parliamentary committees should not merely be presented with a final document, which they can either accept or reject.

Parliaments – including defence and security committees – should also be at the forefront of ensuring that security policies go through appropriate public consultation. Although these processes are not necessarily financially costly, they require time, funds, human resources and political will that may not be available domestically in post-conflict or developing countries. Donor support may therefore be required to cover the costs of, for example, workshops in rural areas. Donors could also fund consultation processes that are specifically designed to maximise the participation of women and other groups that are often marginalised during the development of security policies.40

Mechanisms to ensure participation may include:

- Structured consultations with a representative segment of CSOs, including urban and rural women’s organisations (see Box 10).
- Municipal town hall meetings with direct interaction between political leaders and the public.
- Parliamentary hearings and open debates.
- If necessary, separate meetings with marginalised groups at the local level, which may not participate in public meetings with the majority population.

To ensure broad-based and representative participation specific measures should be taken to include:

- Rural and urban women’s community organisations
- Labour unions
- Religious organisations
- Community leaders and activists
- Youth organisations
- Indigenous, ethnic and other minority associations
- Associations for people with disabilities
- Children’s advocacy groups
- Academics and researchers
- Associations for migrants
- Gender experts
- International organisations
- Social justice and service organisations

Equal representation of men and women

Parliamentarians are in regular and direct contact with the general population, in practice more so than the executive, and are therefore well-placed to ascertain public security concerns. From an equal representation perspective, however, the ratio of women and men in most parliaments worldwide is one of inequality. In 2006, 83.1% of parliamentarians globally were men.41 In addition, female parliamentarians rarely sit on defence and security-related committees. Therefore, to ensure input from female parliamentarians in security policy-making it may be appropriate to:

- Increase women’s participation on defence and security committees, including as chairpersons.
- Encourage women to meet across party lines on security-related issues and to develop shared
Platforms and common strategies for input into broader policy discussions.

- Support the establishment of women’s caucuses and coalitions in parliament and within political parties (see Box 8).
- Encourage the establishment of national or party-based quotas for minimum female and male participation.

In addition to ensuring equal representation, it is important to build the awareness and understanding of gender issues amongst parliamentarians, especially the men and women sitting on defence and security committees.

### 4.3 Local government

In order to ensure the full implementation of national-level security policies, initiatives must be taken at the local level. In addition, local-level security committees, for instance, can provide essential input into national-level security policies, making sure that they reflect local security realities and priorities. Experience shows that locally embedded security analyses and strategies are vital to guarantee that community-level insecurities are robustly addressed. These initiatives can constitute key entry-points for integrating gender issues into the implementation of security policy.

Examples of initiatives that can be taken by municipal government, local security sector institutions, or civil society include:

- Security/safety audits
- Citizen/Community security plans
- Security/safety committees or councils
- Community police forums

**Community police forums, security plans and safety audits**

In **South Africa**, the local government and the South African Police Force participate in, and collaborate with, Community Police Forums (CPF) to set joint priorities and objectives on crime prevention. CPFs involve CSOs in formulating local policing priorities and crime prevention initiatives. CPF activities are based on community security plans, which identify programmes, projects or actions that the CPF will implement; where the CPF will get funds for the projects; and how the project will promote the aims of the CPF. In turn, the community security plan is based on a community safety audit that helps to:

- Focus on the most serious problems when you have few resources.
- Give people facts when they disagree about the most serious problems.
- Coordinate the work of different organisations to prevent duplication.

A community safety audit is carried out through a five-step process to identify:

1. **The crime problems in the community**: e.g. domestic violence.
2. **Which organisations are doing what**: Some organisations may already have crime prevention projects, and there may therefore already be activities to prevent domestic violence and support those affected directly and indirectly.
3. **The physical and social characteristics of the area**: To understand the causes of crime in a community, you must know the physical and social characteristics of the area. For example: young people are often more likely to commit crime; women are more at risk of domestic violence and sexual assault; young men are more at risk of other violent crime; and young men are also most likely to commit crime.
4. **The problems which are most important**.
5. **Details of the most important problems**.

**Box 9 Local security committees and early warning mechanisms in Sierra Leone**

In Sierra Leone, the Office of National Security (ONS) set up Provincial Security Committees and District Security Committees as local level consultation forums to assess and respond to security threats throughout the country. They have also been put in place to ensure that security policies reflect actual security needs and gather input from the community level. Decentralised security committees located in the interior of the country can serve as a conflict early warning mechanism for the government, because they report directly to the ONS.

The inclusion of women or representatives from women’s organisations in these bodies has so far been limited, but would improve the ability to collect data as part of the early warning mechanism. A bottom-up approach of this nature could be combined with the recruitment of a gender adviser to the ONS who would be able to analyse and structure the data received from Provincial and District Security Committees, and ask relevant questions such as:

1. Are security sector institutions responding adequately to the security needs of men, women, girls and boys?
   a. Do men and women have freedom to leave their homes or travel outside their district?
   b. Are men, women, girls and boys vulnerable to human trafficking and sexual exploitation?
   c. What services are available for men and women suffering from domestic violence?
2. What types and rates of GBV exist? Is GBV increasing or decreasing?
3. Are there sufficient resources in the community to respond to the differentiated security threats that men and women and different societal groups experience?
Local security committees and citizen security plans

Different types of bodies have been created to plan, coordinate and monitor initiatives to improve local security (see Box 9).

In Peru, the parliament created a National Citizen Security System to promote local participative crime prevention initiatives and make police more responsive to communities. This system relies on local-level institutions, with the establishment of Local Citizen Security Councils (LCSC) (Consejos Distritales de Seguridad Ciudadana). In the LCSCs, local police commanders work directly with local authorities and community representatives on crime prevention. The LCSCs can be described as bottom-up mechanisms to hold police accountable for their conduct and service quality and offer an important opening for community participation in local security issues. They are mandated to design a citizen security plan at the municipal level on the basis of an assessment of local safety and security issues. The security plan is implemented by mobilising local cooperation and resources. LCSCs are also in charge of evaluating the plan’s impact and monitoring the performance of public employees implementing the plan, including the police.48

Similar bodies, such as Local Security Councils (Consejos de Seguridad) have been established in Chile, Colombia and Guatemala. In Colombia, members of the Local Security Council have included the local police and military chiefs, the mayor and representatives from the academic and private sectors.

Examples of measures to take to integrate gender issues into local government security initiatives:

- Involve gender experts and representatives from women’s organisations in community security committees/councils.
- Ensure that community safety audits include: consultation with women, men and different societal groups on an equal footing; a focus on GBV; data disaggregated by sex, age, ethnicity and neighbourhood; and specific questions regarding the different security needs of the groups comprising the area under the local government’s jurisdiction. See Section 4.6 on Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation.
- Take into account the different security needs of men, women, boys and girls when developing and implementing crime prevention and response initiatives.
- Communicate the results of safety audits and planning processes to regional and national security bodies. This data is critical to ensure that regional and national security policies reflect local security realities, and in some contexts as a conflict early-warning mechanism.
- Provide training and guidance to build a gender-responsive approach among those engaged in drafting community-level security plans. See Section 4.5 on Gender Training.

| Box 10 | Jamaica’s National Security Policy – an inclusive process 50 |

In mid-2007 the Government of Jamaica adopted a comprehensive National Security Policy – Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation. This policy was based on a National Security Strategy Green Paper, which was first tabled in Parliament in January 2006, and a subsequent National Security Strategy White Paper. The White Paper was developed after numerous consultations with Jamaican communities and stakeholders, including CSOs. The NSP is aligned with the holistic and sector-wide policy objectives of current SSR thinking and initiatives, and was the result of collaboration between the Jamaican Government and Canadian, UK and US advisors.

Initially the Jamaican Government planned to conduct a defence review. However, it was quickly realised that a broader approach was required to address the existing range of potential threats to national security, including organised crime, gang violence, socio-economic concerns and environmental disaster. A broad-based consultation was initiated, involving all potentially relevant branches of government and state agencies and CSOs, including women’s groups.

The result was a national security policy that addresses all the main security and justice institutions including the armed forces, the police, the Ministry of Justice and non-state stakeholders. It integrates the country’s major security policies, goals and responsibilities into an overall master plan for the fulfilment of a ‘National Vision’ for Jamaica. The NSP prescribes the combined use of the political, economic, social, and informational and security instruments to increase security and justice. It clarifies the institutional framework within which the armed forces and civil institutions of the state will coordinate their activities to create an integrated, cohesive security network to safeguard national interests. It also addresses the complementary roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors, as well as CSOs.

Under the heading ‘The Effects of Violence on Communities,’ the NSP calls for close attention to the impact of violence on individuals, communities and society. ‘Domestic violence,’ it is noted, ‘is one of the more pervasive and common forms of violence plaguing the society. It contributes to the overall pattern of crime and violence due to its debilitating effects on the social fabric and its role in socialising the youths to violence as a means of dispute resolution. Women and children are disproportionately at risk from domestic violence.’

Following the approval of the NSP, the challenge is now its implementation. A National Security Strategy Implementation Unit has been established, which works on behalf of the National Security Council. It is tasked to coordinate the work of relevant ministries.
4.4 Civil society organisations

A significant reason for the involvement of CSOs in the development and implementation of security policy is to ensure a democratic, transparent, accountable and inclusive process. CSOs do not by definition represent these principles of good governance, and, needless to say, are not homogenous regarding their economic and political interests. However, civil society potentially provides the space for building up expertise and capacities to independently evaluate, challenge or endorse governmental analyses and decisions on defence and security matters. CSOs encompass a multitude of different organisations, including women’s organisations, labour unions, religious groups, ethnic or minority or indigenous associations, professional business associations, advocacy organisations, NGOs, think tanks and foundations, research groups, media groups and training institutions. This variety is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it has the potential to represent a wide variety of groups in society that do not necessarily have a voice in policy-making processes. It is a weakness because finding common ground is a challenging and time-consuming exercise, particularly with respect to the issue of security policy-making.

The development of policies relating to national security has in the past been surrounded by secrecy, which the demands of national security do require to some degree. However, if the process is cast strictly as an intra-governmental process, it is going to be counter-productive. Secrecy may cover up financial mismanagement through corruption or lack of expertise. One way of overcoming this problem is to ensure that the types of information and documents that can and should be classified are dealt with unambiguously in statutory law, while at the same time upholding freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

CSOs can take any number of the following actions in support of gender-responsive security policy-making:

- **Influence** public policy through advocacy regarding new policies and laws on policing, intelligence, defence reform or national security.
- **Create** a conducive and participative policy climate by raising the awareness of the public on NSPs and security policies, and their gender dimensions.
- **Provide** a pool of technical experts for policy-makers to draw upon who have specific capacity and skills in gender analysis.
- **Support** security policy development through research on community level security needs, differentiating between the needs of men, women, girls and boys.
- **Monitor** the implementation of security policies and actions of security sector institutions to ensure transparency and public accountability.
- **Represent** the views and preferences of citizens relating to security – including marginalised groups – which are critical components of inclusive NSP/security policy development and can broaden the debate on what ‘security’ is.
- **Encourage** local ownership of the policy process outside of the state institutions.
- **Build the capacity** of government staff and parliamentarians by producing and distributing information such as policy briefs relating to community level security concerns and needs.
- **Promote** public oversight of the development of security policies through media reports and building the capacity of journalists on security policies and gender issues.
- **Facilitate** and participate in public debate on core defence and security matters.
- **Draft and distribute** independent analyses and information on the security sector to parliament and the public.
- **Offer** capacity-building to government, parliament and other CSOs on gender and security policy through workshops and training.
- **Conduct** gender audits and assessments, including gender-budget analysis, of security policy and security sector institutions.
- **Lobby** for public debate on security issues and making certain information accessible to the public.

**Women’s organisations**

Women’s organisations and organisations that work on gender issues have specific expertise and access to information that make them valuable partners for other CSOs, parliaments, security sector institutions and government in the process of elaborating security policies. They can often serve as a critical link between the reality of community level insecurities that men and women experience, and policy-makers at the national, regional and international level. Gender-focused organisations operating at the community level often have grassroots networks that allow them to identify crucial security needs of disparate groups in society. Such data will be of critical significance, both in the process of producing security sector reviews and as conflict early warning, which in turn are vital for determining national security priorities.

Ways of engaging women’s organisations in security policy debate and formulation include:

- Facilitate interaction between women’s groups and local security providers, for instance through their inclusion in local security committees.
- Build the capacity of women’s organisations on security policy issues including advocacy and oversight.
- Include representatives from women’s organisations as gender experts in parliamentary hearings or conduct gender training.

CSOs can be more powerful when speaking with one voice. One example of the influence a CSO network can have is the NGO Working Group on Women,
Peace and Security. It was formed in May 2000 by 11 different organisations to advocate for the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution on women, peace and security. Due to the Working Group’s intense lobbying and activism, UN SCR 1325 was unanimously adopted on 31 October 2000. Since then, the focus of the NGO Working Group has shifted to supporting the implementation of UN SCR 1325 through promoting a gender perspective and respect for human rights in all peace and security, conflict prevention and management, and peace-building initiatives of the UN and member states.49

4.5 Gender training

Gender training should be provided to all the different actors involved in security policy-making in order to support gender-responsive policy development and implementation. The call for gender training can come from policy makers themselves or from oversight bodies such as parliaments and CSOs. For training to be effective, it should be tailor-made to fit the needs and tasks of the particular audience, focus on practical examples, be accompanied by relevant materials and resources, and be monitored and evaluated.

Key target groups for gender training amongst security policy-makers include:

- Staff of relevant ministries, including the ministries of defence, interior, and foreign affairs.
- Members of NSCs.
- Parliamentarians on defence and security committees and their staff.
- Members of local citizen security councils or community police forums.
- CSOs working on security policy.

Various actors can provide gender training, from CSOs with specialised expertise in the area to government gender experts. Potential gender training topics might include:

- Different security needs of men, women, boys and girls.
- Reducing discrimination, sexual harassment and GBV by security sector personnel.
- Strategies to eradicate GBV.
- International, regional and national legal and normative frameworks that emphasise equal rights and access of men and women.
- Increasing the recruitment, retention and advancement of women within security sector institutions.
- Mechanisms to increase the participation of civil society, including women’s organisations, in security policy-making processes.

4.6 Assessment, monitoring and evaluation

Comprehensive assessment, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes help ensure that security policy meets the needs of men, women, girls and boys and that the formulation and implementation process fulfils its identified objectives. Gender issues can be integrated into existing security assessment and M&E frameworks, or specific gender audits and impact assessments can be undertaken (or both). These processes should be undertaken as part of official security policy-making processes but can also be used as a tool for oversight by parliamentarians and CSOs.

Gender impact assessment

A gender impact assessment of security policy helps to determine the potential or existing impact of security policy upon men, women, girls and boys (see Box 11). Though it is better to conduct the assessment while the policy is still in draft form and changes can be made, it can also be a useful tool to determine whether a revision of the policy is necessary.

Gender and socio-economic analysis

An adapted gender and socio-economic analysis (GSE) may also be employed, both in developing security policy and as an instrument to monitor and evaluate its implementation. Through gender analyses, existing gender roles and relations are better understood, in particular differences in activities, access to resources and decision-making, and the economic, social, political and other constraints faced by women and men.

A GSE analysis takes into account the multiple challenges experienced when gender intersects with other inequalities facing women and men such as class, ethnicity, culture and religion. Therefore, GSE analyses applied throughout the development and implementation of NSPs and other security policies can help to ensure the policy’s effectiveness for all members of an institution, country or community.
### Box 11 Gender impact assessment of security policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps:</th>
<th>Questions to ask:</th>
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</table>
| **Step 1:** Define issues and goals | - What is the policy trying to achieve, and who will it benefit?  
- Does the policy meet the different security needs of men, women, boys and girls? Are GBV issues, such as domestic violence and human trafficking, being addressed? Is prevention included?  
- Is the emphasis on national or human security?  
- Is the policy in line with international, regional and national mandates on gender issues?  
- Is the policy meant to overcome gender inequalities or eliminate barriers and, if so, should there be a gender equality objective?  
- Is gender-specific and gender-sensitive language included?  
- What do men and women, including gender/women’s CSOs or the Ministry of Women, say about the issues and outcomes? |
| **Step 2:** Collect data | - How are stakeholders and different groups of women and men going to be consulted?  
- Do representative organisations truly reflect the voice of the men and women expected to benefit from the policy? If not, what is the strategy for reaching them?  
- What is the gender make-up of the people affected by the policy?  
- How can data and statistical information be collected by sex, ethnicity, disability, age, religion and sexual orientation?  
- What other information apart from sex-disaggregated data is needed to understand the issue?  
- What are the risks of early consultation – how are expectations and conflicting interests going to be managed? |
| **Step 3:** Develop options | - How does the recommendation or each option impact positively or negatively on women and men?  
- Do the recommendations or any of the options reinforce or challenge traditional or stereotyped perceptions of women and men?  
- Which option gives men and women real choice and an opportunity to achieve their full potential in society?  
- Is there a need to consider mitigation where there will be a negative impact on one group over another, and what action can be taken to reduce the impact or to create a more gender-balanced policy? |
| **Step 4:** Communicate | - What message needs to be communicated?  
- How will the message reach different groups of women and men?  
- Are separate approaches necessary?  
- How does the policy reflect the government’s commitment to equality and is a specific message about equality to be included?  
- Have gender-sensitive language, symbols and examples been used in the materials communicating the policy?  
- How will you communicate with women and men who speak other languages or who are illiterate? |
| **Step 5:** Implement | - Will the policy or service be experienced or accessed differently by a woman or man, and will the difference be affected by ethnicity, disability, age, religion or sexual orientation? What arrangements are in place to reach those who may be excluded?  
- Can the service be delivered jointly – i.e. can other government departments, local, nationally and internationally-based organisations help deliver the service to the women and men targeted?  
- Do those implementing/delivering the policy or service represent the diversity of the community being served? Are women equally involved in implementation?  
- Have specific and sufficient resources (financial and human) been allocated to enable the achievement of gender equality objectives?  
- Are the implementers gender-responsive and aware of the specific gender issues? |
| **Step 6:** Monitor | - Do female and male beneficiaries participate equally in the monitoring process?  
- Do monitoring requirements include a measure for gender equality, a measure for customer satisfaction and do they reveal the extent to which the policy is successfully addressing the different needs of women and men?  
- How can external organisations representing different groups in the community help in monitoring the policy outcomes?  
- Are measures in place to initiate an investigation or to change the policy if it is not delivering either the equality objective defined at the outset of the project or equality of opportunity for women or men? |
| **Step 7:** Evaluate | - Is the policy promoting and delivering equality of opportunity for women and men? Have the objectives been met for women and men?  
- Did one group receive greater benefit than others – if so how will the imbalance be addressed? Were inputs allocated equitably?  
- What was the overall impact on the status and quality of life for women and men?  
- Did the process involve women and men? Did it seek out and value their views equally?  
- Is there a need for additional data collection and do targets and indicators need adjusting in the light of experience?  
- What lessons are there for improving future policies and services, who needs to be informed and how is the information to be presented? |
Box 12 is a list of areas that it would be relevant to cover when assessing security needs.

**Gender budget analysis**

Budget analyses can be a powerful instrument for oversight institutions to use in the development and M&E phases of security policies. Though it is often the parliament that takes the lead in calling for a gender budget analysis as part of opening up the debate on how state revenues are to be spent, CSOs may also initiate a gender budget analysis. A gender budget analysis can determine whether adequate funding is allocated to addressing the different security and justice needs and priorities of men, women, girls and boys.

Key questions to ask as part of a gender budget analysis of security policies:

1. To what extent did the general allocations equally provide for the security of women, men, boys and girls?
2. To what extent did the budget specify funds for women, men, girls or boys? (For instance through earmarking funds for domestic violence prevention programmes targeting men, or support to girl survivors of trafficking.) Was resource allocation adequate for effective implementation?
3. To what extent did the budget specify gender-related activities, inputs and costs? (For instance through earmarking funds for gender training or a gender focal point position.)
4. To what extent did gender specialists/advisors and women’s organisations participate in the different steps of the budget cycle (e.g. preparation, auditing)?

On the basis of the budget analysis, oversight bodies may provide input to discussions by:

- Generating debate in the media.
- Publishing budget framework papers.
- Making available reports to members of parliament, especially those on relevant defence, security and budget committees.
- Providing parliamentarians with technical assistance in analysing the proposed allocations to the security sector. This may be done through training or through CSO advocacy activities.

5 Integrating gender into national security policy in specific contexts

This section describes some of the key ways in which gender may be integrated into national security policy-making in post-conflict, developing, transitional and developed countries. At the same time it should be noted that there is no ‘one-size fits all’ model for creating security policies in different contexts. Each country’s own conditions influence its security context and processes of policymaking, and if the specific political, economic and social context is not taken into account, policies are likely to fail (see Table 1).

5.1 Post-conflict countries

In many conflict-affected countries, initially the actors and institutions necessary to develop and implement security policies may not exist. The security sector, the armed forces in particular, often has powers above the law. Instead of serving the population, security sector actors are often used by the state to oppress any form of opposition and increase the militarisation of society. In some places, powerful militaries have destabilised civilian governments. In others, the security sector receives a disproportionate amount of the national budget, in effect, redirecting resources from development to military expenditure. It is highly likely in such circumstances that resistance to reform will be strong.

In the reconstruction and transformation of any post-war country, SSR is a key priority. Security policies will form an important basis for structuring this process. For example, national security strategies have formed the basis – and continue to do so – in the Sierra Leone SSR process. While considerable time and resources are usually necessary for reforms to take root, the post-conflict context offers an opportunity to renegotiate the role and responsibility of state and non-state actors alike through the process of policy-making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 12</th>
<th>Gender and socio-economic assessment techniques for security policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaggregated statistics</td>
<td>The collection and analysis of data by categories (e.g. sex and ethnicity) in order to identify security/socio-economic gaps and patterns of discrimination in a given situation, such as those between women and men, or between women and men of various ethnicities. This data will help to identify security needs and priorities of different groups in society, and help shape the focus of security policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical needs assessment</td>
<td>The measurement of the immediate security needs of women and men as they arise due to their status in society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic needs assessment</td>
<td>The evaluation of the broader needs of women and men, including the risk of insecurity related to inadequate legislation or lack of employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Challenges for the integration of gender issues include:

- State institutions and infrastructure may have collapsed or been severely weakened. There may therefore be limited capacity and limited financial resources to conduct broad-based consultation processes, to the detriment of including gender perspectives in policy-making.
- Generally low levels of education and lack of technical expertise are barriers to public engagement in policy-making processes, impacting women and certain ethnic groups in particular.
- The executive and security institutions often see CSOs as political opponents, and are therefore reluctant to work with them, creating barriers to the inclusion of perspectives from women’s groups, for instance.
- There may be resistance among personnel in security sector institutions that are being rebuilt, in the executive, and among politicians in general to focusing on gender in policy-making when there is a lack of basic resources and a perception that more pressing issues need to be addressed.
- When working in very poor countries, it is necessary to ensure that gender initiatives that are mandated in legislation and policies are sustainable and make sense financially.
- Legislation and policies are often not implemented when developed (in particular if driven by external actors).

Tips/recommendations for integrating gender into security policy-making in post-conflict countries:

- **Peace agreements**: Where SSR is mentioned in a peace agreement, explicit reference should be made to the intention of drafting a NSP that is gender-responsive.
- **National dialogue**: In post-conflict contexts where a unifying security vision can form the basis of a NSP.
is lacking, it will be beneficial to commence a comprehensive, national dialogue on security that includes a focus on gender issues.

- **Rural consultations:** The rural-urban divide in post-conflict countries is often significant, and the involvement and needs of men and women outside the capital require particular attention.

- **Commitment:** Donor support for the development of inclusive security policies is critical because of the usual lack of resources in post-conflict contexts. Developing and publicising gender-responsive security policies will help a sitting government to indicate political commitment to address security and justice issues in the post-conflict setting.

- **Local ownership:** While local ownership has become a catch-all phrase, it still equals legitimacy and long-term sustainability of the policies that are being developed. A gender-sensitive NSP is only viable if it is shaped, driven and implemented by local actors, both men and women.

- **Acknowledging GBV in policy-making:** In many conflicts, GBV is used as a strategy against civilians, and the aftermath of conflict sees rising rates of GBV, for instance in the form of domestic violence. It is essential that men and women participate on an equal footing in defining their own security needs in policy processes.

- **Women in official positions:** Increase the participation of women through advocating for upper-level appointments or establishing strategic targets or quotas. Also strengthen the capacities of women in official positions in order to raise their profile on security issues and ensure that they integrate gender issues and meet with civil society groups.

### 5.2 Transitional and developing countries

Transitional and developing countries straddle a wide range of polities that differ significantly in terms of socio-economic, technical and human resource capacity. While, for example, Bulgaria and Ukraine have developed NSPs, this is not the case in many developing countries. At the same time, transitional and developing countries share certain similar challenges and issues in developing security policies including:

- Lack of expertise – and at times political and social cohesion – to deal appropriately with organisational, managerial, planning, financial and policy matters

- Corruption

- Challenge of regulation of private security companies

**Transitional countries**

In some transitional democracies, sometimes referred to as post-authoritarian countries, it may very well be that technical capacities to undertake SSR are significant, and that the main priority will be to build up accountable, legitimate and transparent government structures vis-à-vis security and justice provision. Challenges may persist, such as the legacy of an authoritarian, a criminal and/or corrupt regime, and unaccountable segments of the security apparatus. Or there may be strong bureaucratic opposition to building governmental and parliamentary oversight of security actors, and allowing CSOs to play an oversight role. In many of the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, the issue of ethnicity has played a significant role in security institutions. A large number of policies may therefore have to be changed simultaneously; these changes are likely to be substantial.

In the Euro-Atlantic context, the incentives of EU and NATO membership play a significant role in opening up the political system to external scrutiny. NATO has largely focused on the external security environment, including the armed forces and defence reform. In turn, the EU has focused on various aspects of internal SSR, including policing and border management, and has played a key role in broadening the debate on SSR.

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**Box 13 Women’s groups in post-conflict fragile states**

In a report commissioned by the OECD Development Assistance Committee Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, it is suggested that women’s groups show notable flexibility in coping with changing and deteriorating situations. In Nepal, informal providers of justice, mostly men, were displaced by the conflict and in many cases replaced by women’s groups. In the cases of Guatemala and Somalia, women have been at the forefront of peace movements. This has similarly been the case in the Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) where a sub-regional network of women effectively led to trilateral talks among the three countries’ presidents. The network was also able to lobby successfully for peace negotiators to ensure the inclusion of women’s issues in the Liberian peace accords.

Paradoxically, deteriorating environments may provide a unique opportunity for donors – and state actors however fragile they might be – to strengthen women’s rights by supporting their participation in non-state justice institutions. The report goes on to suggest that efforts should be made to encourage the recording and registering of disputes addressed in the non-state justice system as women in these contexts appear more conscientious than men in keeping records. In the short to medium-term, this will be a crucial first step in creating linkages between non-state and state systems.

For the very reason that groups of women end up playing a key role in the delivery of justice during and immediately after conflict, it will be vital to take their views and experiences into account when/if developing a national security plan.
Developing countries
As in transitional countries, there are significant challenges in the respective political systems of developing countries, including the legacy of military or authoritarian rule, and a strong bureaucratic opposition to building governmental and parliamentary oversight. In addition, CSOs are seldom regarded as partners, but rather as opposition groups to the state.

Due to the particular role of donor agencies in many developing countries, local ownership of reform processes is of key importance. Policy-making pushed by donor agencies may end up inhibiting ownership of the process by the recipient government and population. This is particularly the case if receiving assistance is conditioned on reaching certain reform benchmarks or promulgating policies that are to be implemented by a variety of institutions. Donor agencies nonetheless have an important role in advising on how to ensure the participation in policy-making processes of all groups affected by the policy. In this context, gender may be promoted as a key component in the policy-making process.

In many developing countries, as in post-conflict contexts, non-state actors are important providers of security and justice, and intersect with formal state systems. These may include traditional courts, paralegal services and local defence units. Security policy-making should emphasise how authority is managed, how services are delivered, and what their legitimacy is in the eyes of men and women.

Challenges for the integration of gender issues in transitional and developing countries include:
- In transitional states, elites in power are often those that were in power during authoritarian rule, and there may therefore be significant opposition to change.
- The legitimate role of CSOs to participate in security policy-making processes may be contested, which can create barriers to the inclusion of gender perspectives, and differentiation between the different needs of different groups in society.
- Donor agencies that do not take gender into consideration in their advice to developing countries may unwittingly reinforce disregard for gender perspectives in the policy-making process.

Tips/recommendations for integrating gender into security policy-making in transitional and developing countries:
- **Capacity-building:** In transitional and developing countries, state institutions may be in place, but their transformation into accountable, democratic institutions is a difficult, long-term undertaking. It requires commitment by the executive and, in some cases, support from the international community. The building of capacity regarding gender-related aspects must take place on multiple levels:
  - **Executive:** Ensure that senior officials such as the Head of State and ministers are aware of international and national policies and commitments in relation to gender equality and human rights. Trusted external actors might assist.
  - **Parliament:** Parliamentary committees in transitional and developing countries lack expertise on the technicalities of security and defence issues and military budgets, let alone how they relate to gender issues.
  - **Civil society:** In transitional and development countries where the political establishment is weak and the security sector is strong, politicians in the executive and parliament might rely on overt or tacit support of the security services. They might therefore avoid substantial reforms for fear of provoking a coup. Building the capacity of CSOs to oversee actions of security actors and their sensitivity to gender concerns can therefore, in the short to medium-term, prove the most efficient oversight mechanism. Even if CSOs, as part of the oversight bodies of the security sector, are not well-versed in technical matters relating to defence and security, they can still play a significant role regarding representation of ordinary men and women.

5.3 Developed countries
Increasingly, developed countries such as the UK and the US view the most immediate threats to their national security as questions that are dissociable from the well-being and stability of society, as reflected in their NSPs and other security policies. National security nevertheless continues to revolve around macro-political/security concerns. The US has defined its national security threats as the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat to peace from terrorism, the use of missiles against the US, and natural disasters. Similarly, major national security concerns for the UK have broadly been identified as terrorism, espionage, the impact of weak states on global stability, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It can be difficult to make visible the gender dimensions of national security concerns at this level.

At the same time, an enhanced gendered approach to the development of national security priorities in developed countries would broaden the debate on what national security is, and more importantly what response mechanisms should be put in place. As it stands today, men are highly over-represented in the police, military, border guards, judiciary, government and other security sector institutions and oversight bodies in developed countries. Increased representation of women in the institutions that provide security and/or the institutions that govern these institutions could potentially have implications for what providing security means in developed countries, and thus for policy-making processes.

Similarly, developed countries – including the UK and the US – are at the forefront in delivering advice and technical expertise to countries undergoing SSR, including on NSP and security policy processes. Increased gender expertise within donor SSR teams
can increase the gender-responsiveness of support and advice on security policy formulation.

**Challenges for the integration of gender issues include:**

- The tendency to focus on external and macro-political threats to the state is often maintained at the expense of internal security threats, which impact differently on different groups in society.
- Aversion to actively include gender perspectives in states where the executive – and the general population – consider that gender equality has already been achieved.

**Tips/recommendations for integrating gender in security policy-making in developed countries:**

- **Broaden the debate on what national security is:** open the space for public participation in defining national security needs. This is a matter for the executive to consider and oversight bodies to advocate for.
- **Inclusive policy debates:** well-functioning technological means and high levels of education ensure that a broad-based segment of society can participate in debates on security and defence. By extension, space for gender can be ensured, which requires willingness on the part of the executive and parliament, and advocacy campaigns by CSOs.
- **Inclusive policy development:** developed countries are usually characterised by vibrant civil societies, including the activities of think tanks, academics and NGOs. Traditionally, however, central government policy-making has only selectively solicited advice from ‘external parties’. Public hearings would make the policy-making process inclusive, and constitute an entry-point for gender issues.
- **Gender as a key component of SSR assistance:** pooled capacity in developed countries to assist other governments in SSR and appropriate policy-making should include gender experts and advisers.
Key recommendations

1. Initiate a consultative and participatory national dialogue on security issues when national-level security policies are being modified or drafted.

2. Conduct a gender-responsive assessment of national and local-level security needs, including the different security needs and resources of men, women, girls and boys.

3. Adopt a comprehensive approach to national security within security policies, including both external and internal threats to security, such as GBV.

4. Build the gender capacity and commitment of security policy decision-makers within the executive, ministries, parliament and political parties through gender training, mentoring, information distribution and lobbying.

5. Ensure equal appointment and promotion of men and women to security decision-making bodies such as National Security Councils, as well as to senior level ministerial and security sector institution positions.

6. Include gender expertise in security decision-making bodies, for instance through representation of the parliamentary women’s caucus or ministry responsible for women and gender issues.

7. Establish participatory local security bodies to provide information for national level security policy-making and ensure the local-level implementation of national security policies through security audits, plans and coordinated activities.

8. Allocate sufficient resources, as part of the implementation of national security policies, to effectively prevent, respond and penalise the specific insecurities facing women, men, boys and girls and fund gender specific initiatives such as gender training.


10. Establish mechanisms for the increased participation of civil society organisations, including women’s organisations, in proceedings such as parliamentary hearings and consultations by the National Security Council.

11. Build the capacity of civil society organisations to participate effectively in security policy-making processes, including building the technical capacity of women’s organisations.

12. Develop networks of civil society organisations, including women’s organisations, working on security-related issues in order to ensure their strategic input into national security policy-making.
7  Additional resources

Examples of national security policies


Romania’s National Security Strategy.

Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

Ireland’s White Paper on Defence.
http://www.statehouse-sl.org/policies/defence-white-paper.htm

Sierra Leone’s Defence White Paper.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf

The Uganda Defence Review – Learning from Experience.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/

Practical guides and handbooks


Online articles and reports

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR289/

http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=18417&nav1=4

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/security-decision-making.pdf
ENDNOTES

1 For ease of reference within the tool, the term ‘security policies’ refers to national-level security policies.
17 Anderlini and Conaway, vi.
24 http://www.spc.org/pdf/distruckman.pdf
29 The operational implications of crisis management are not fully explained, but the concept was introduced as a replacement in the NSC bill, which proposed ‘matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony’.
33 Romania’s National Security Strategy, paragraph 5.3.
39 Fluri, K. and Conaway, vi.
40 Nathan, L., p. 38.
41 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments, IPU, 31 Oct. 2006.
42 Anderlini and Conaway.
47 DfID, p. 30.