DEFENCE REFORM
IN THE BALTIC STATES:
12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

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We are grateful to all those involved in making this seminar a great success.
"Let's believe in miracle"

In 2004 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have achieved both of their main security policy priorities - memberships in NATO and the EU. This remarkable turning point also encourages us to take a look back to the initial development of the three young Baltic States in the beginning of the nineties.

For me, as the representative of Ministry of Defence, this time first of all associates with building of the revived armed forces. It was the farseeing policy in the Baltic States to develop armed forces in accordance with the best practice of the Western countries civil-military relations. These strategic political decisions have facilitated the development of Baltic States defence systems and put them to path of NATO integration.

In this publication I have a great pleasure to present reports of the Baltic States defence agencies' experts presented during the conference "Defence Reform in the Baltic States: 12 years of experience" held in Rīga, Latvia on 17-18 June, 2003, and organized by Latvian government and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Let this publication be the outstanding evidence of the successful defense reforms in the Baltic States.

Mr. Jānis Karlsbergs  
Deputy State Secretary for Defence Planning  
Latvian Ministry of Defence
OPENING OF THE SEMINAR

Mr. Jānis Karlsbergs
Deputy State Secretary for Defence Planning
Latvian Ministry of Defence

This round-table discussion on Baltic security sector reform and democratic control of armed forces was organized with the support of the Latvian government and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The suggestion to hold such a seminar was expressed in a meeting held by DCAF, and the initiative was supported by the Director of the organization, Ambassador Theodor H. Winkler, and the Latvian Defence Minister, Mr. Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis. This roundtable is the first regional meeting of the DCAF Foundation Council. We thank the other states of the Baltic Sea region for giving their support in organising and conducting this seminar.

The idea behind this particular meeting is to take an inventory of the experience that has been accumulated during the 12 years that independent armed forces and defence ministries have existed in the Baltic States. By now, having already emerged from several waves of reform, an acceptable level of stability and maturity has been reached. Now, just before Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania join NATO and the EU - before we become fully integrated into these systems and structures - it is the right time to look back at what has been done and what has been achieved.
The seminar will deal mainly with defence sector reform. Therefore, a substantial part of other security sector issues - judicial system reform, police reform, reform of secret services, etc. - will be put aside. Defence sector reform will be treated starting with governmental aspects such as legislation and parliamentary oversight, and then followed by the military aspects of reform. Finally, international and regional cooperation will be examined.

At the time the decision was made to apply for membership to NATO and the EU, few believed how rapidly we would be able to join these organisations. Thus, our old defence concepts, such as total defence and territorial defence, were still on the agenda. It will be important to examine, in the context of NATO membership, the pathways we have taken in transition from these former concepts to new ways of thinking.
ADDRESS TO THE PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Girts Valdis Kristovskis
Minister of Defence
Latvian Ministry of Defence

We have gathered together to discuss the experience of military reform gained by the Baltic states over the course of the last twelve years. It can be said that some goals have been reached, such as becoming a member of NATO, but at the same time there is always the question of whether there are other capabilities that should be developed.

It is important to remember that many of those involved in the daily work of the Ministry of Defence, those who are deeply engaged in the process of reform, could not be here today. Unfortunately, practitioners are often too busy to examine their experiences and to systematize what they have learned.

At this time, Latvia lacks a sufficient corpus of research addressing defence and security sector reform. The views of academics who are not involved in the work of reform on a daily basis can be a bit too removed from reality. It is my hope that current practitioners will alleviate this lack of research by taking the opportunity in the future to write and reflect on their experience.

I myself do not have a military background; I am a civil engineer with a Master's degree in law. I became involved in the Ministry, as did many others, as a young person active in seminars and
debates. In the beginning I found it very confusing and difficult. And yet, one day, I came to hold the position of Minister of Defence.

To me, this demonstrates just how democratic Latvia is. It isn't only the people in uniform who have something to add to the process of military reform; people with civil experience also play an important role. This is the essence of civil control of the armed forces.

Many different people and institutions have participated in the process of developing the armed forces, the defence establishment, and the defence concept. Obviously, this includes the National Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet of Ministers, the President, Parliament and its different committees, NGOs, society-at-large, the families of our soldiers and the mass media. So many different people and different sorts of institutions have contributed their opinions and voices to the debate on defence reform.

Latvia can be seen as a success story. We reformed our military from scratch, and now we have already participated in a number of international peacekeeping missions and we are about to join NATO and the EU. A critical component of this success was the introduction into our armed forces of transparency and openness to society in order to demonstrate that our military is committed to the security of society as a whole, and is not some alien segment with ulterior motives.
Even if at times the military has been criticized for not being actively engaged with civil society, the principle of openness is becoming more and more familiar and accepted by the members of the defence establishments.

This roundtable will treat many terms and issues - such as interoperability, mobility, membership action plans and force goals - all to the ends of assuring security, enhancing stability of our territories, and bringing prosperity to our peoples. Unfortunately, these terms are not always understood by society as a whole. For this reason we must find a way to explain the importance of the work of reform to all people.
THE ROLE OF DCAF

Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler
Director, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is a very young institution, having only been founded in 2000. Nevertheless, when I look back at the work we have done and then look ahead to what is already on the agenda, I feel quite proud. The Centre was founded by the Swiss government together with 22 other governments. Today we have 44 members including, with very few exceptions, nearly all the countries from North America to Russia.¹

The main idea and objective of the Centre is to foster democratic control and oversight, as well as reform of the security sector. Along with the armed forces, this includes the police, the border guards, intelligence agencies, etc. We also look at governmental and parliamentary oversight and control structures.

These two aspects - democratic control and reform - are actually two sides of the same coin, as many countries in transition towards democracy know all too well. If war leaves behind land

¹At the time of publication, Turkey has joined DCAF bringing the number of members to 45. The member states are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Canton of Geneva.
mines and unexploded ordnance, then totalitarianism leaves behind overblown security sectors that are inefficient, costly, and riddled with infighting. It also leaves behind power ministries that actually restrict access to information, because to them information is power. They do not communicate with each other easily and they are not able to adapt to new challenges. These are no longer the challenges of large-scale armed conflict of the past, but rather more complex challenges like terrorism, and regional security and stability.

If the security sector is lacking democratic oversight, one might have only vague ideas about how it actually operates and what it does. This becomes a strong obstacle to democracy, economic activity, prosperity, and cooperation. And if there is no reform of the security sector, these power ministries will continue on unchanged.

DCAF’s role is twofold. On the one hand, we would like to collect the lessons learned and the experience gained by those who have been coping with the problems associated with building a modern security sector. The goal is to document good practices and to provide them to the broader community.

On the other hand, we do not aim merely to describe what is happening, but to effect change as well. Thus, we have our Project Division which is, at any given moment, involved in some one hundred projects on the ground - mostly in Southeastern Europe, Ukraine, and Russia; and increasingly in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and in Africa.
It has been only twelve years since the Baltic States regained their independence. Every visitor coming to Riga, and this region in general, is deeply impressed with how much has changed and how much has been achieved in such a short time. On the surface, and more deeply as well, colour has returned to the region. For reasons that escape me, totalitarian regimes do not seem to indulge in good taste. The preferred colours of the past were black, dark grey, dark greens and dark browns. Now when one looks at the city and its inhabitants there is a much wider variety. I believe that this is typical. The people throughout this region are visibly alive and on the move.

The Baltic States will soon join NATO and the European Union. In a very short time, a great deal has been achieved. Thus there is good reason today to review what has happened, how it happened, and why it happened. It is important to examine the lessons learned and the experience gained. This should be done not simply with a sense of pride and achievement, but also with a keen and analytical eye to determine which lessons will be most helpful for those who have only embarked on this journey of reform more recently - from Russia, Ukraine, through Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and beyond.

These young democracies face daunting problems. The transfer of knowledge to them is of crucial importance. I believe that no one can offer a more interesting collection of analysis than the Baltic region, which has done so much so well in such a short time.
PROVIDING FOR
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT,
THE CASE OF LITHUANIA

Ms. Rasa Jonusaite
Senior Analyst, Defence Policy and Planning Department
Ministry of National Defence, Lithuania

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, as well as states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), started a difficult period of transition towards democracy. The significant changes of the political environment created appropriate conditions allowing for these states to integrate into transatlantic security structures and to implement common principles of democracy, including democratic civil control of the armed forces.

Parliaments are regarded as the keystone of democracy. No area or institution of the government, including all components of the defence sector, can be exempt from parliamentary oversight. The relationship between the military and elected politicians is that of subordination and supremacy. The aim of this presentation is to discuss one of the most important aspects of reform - that of parliamentary oversight.

Parliamentary tasks may be divided into four categories - ensuring accountability (of the government to the Parliament); exerting influence (direct or indirect over the decision-making process); promoting transparency (implemented through parliamentary debates, hearings and reports); and providing a link
to society-at-large (an important role in the broader dimension of civil-military relations - acting as a link between the military and the society they serve).

**Legal Framework of Parliamentary Oversight in Lithuania**


The Constitution clearly establishes that the Government, the Minister of National Defence, and the Chief of Defence are directly accountable to Parliament for the management of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. It establishes the Chairman of the Parliament as a member of the State Defence Council, the body which defines the main principles and directions of national security and defence policies. The State Defence Council also considers and presents recommendations to the President, the Parliament, and the Government concerning the conclusion, signing, and ratification of international treaties and agreements dealing with defence.

Among other important provisions, the *Constitution* establishes the right and duty of the Parliament to declare mobilisation, adopt the budget, ratify or abrogate international treaties, decide on the use of the armed forces for the defence of the Homeland,
and decide how to implement international commitments.

The *Law on the Basics of National Security* states that all decisions on defence policy and the armed forces have to be taken by a democratically-elected civilian government. The law also states that defence policy and defence expenditures must be made public.

According to this law, the Parliament has the right of oversight, regulating by law the activities of the armed forces as well as other national security institutions.

The legal foundation of the national security structures of Lithuania, as well as of parliamentary control, is further consolidated in the *Law on Organization of the National Defence* and the *Military Service*. Taking into account the existing defence structures, the law requires that Parliament annually establish a general number of military personnel for the regular force and the active reserve, as well as the exact number of officers in the senior ranks.

The *Statute of the Parliament* also establishes detailed measures for the implementation of parliamentary oversight.

It provides the Parliament with a standing National Security and Defence Committee which has the right to:

- consider and elaborate the drafting of legal instruments relating to national defence establishment issues;
- present proposals concerning the formulation of national
defence policy, the establishment of appropriate structures, etc.;

- evaluate the necessity of adopting new laws or amending existing laws;

- exercise parliamentary control over the institutions of the national defence establishment, and over the implementation of national security and defence law;

- present recommendations on possible improvements to the activities of the institutions of national defence.

Parliamentarians may also request information, clarification, and briefings from Ministry of National Defence (MND) officials on relevant security- and defence-related issues.

**Practical Implementation of Parliamentary Oversight**

During these 12 years of independence, a sufficient quality and quantity of legal instruments establishing procedures for parliamentary oversight have been created. However, problems arise in the practical implementation of these procedures.

One of the most obvious illustrations of these problems is the approval and control of defence expenditures. The final approval of the Lithuanian defence budget is given by the Parliament, but in practice this institution has limited ability to make changes as MND officials have more specific knowledge and information about particular financial needs and requests of the defence sector. This insufficient control over budgeting may (and
sometimes does) result in inefficient and irrational allocations of defence funds.

The recent political consensus over the long-term direction of Lithuanian defence policy deserves special mention. In 1999 the Parliament passed the Agreement of Parliamentary Parties according to which 2.0% of GDP was allocated for state defence from 2001 to 2004. This agreement assures a stable foundation for the enhancement of the defence system and of Lithuania's readiness for membership in NATO. The agreement ended a decade-long dispute over the direction of Lithuanian defence policy and the planning of the defence budget.

Another practical problem is ensuring transparency in procurement as the Parliament has little role in the procurement process. When a pending purchase of weaponry amounts to a considerable portion of the defence budget, the Parliament should at least be notified and, ideally, should take the final decision on procurement. This is a common practice in many Western states and some of the CEE states. Although this method may result in postponements and cancellations, it would encourage transparency. Unfortunately, so long as Parliament lacks the necessary expertise to participate in the procurement process, the Lithuanian Armed Forces will suffer at the expense of transparency and allegedly "better" democratic oversight. If improvements could be made within Parliament in terms of civilian expertise on military matters, a role for the Parliament in the procurement process would be imperative.
The oversight of the security services and intelligence is another problematic area of parliamentary control. The activities of these services often deal with sensitive issues of state security, and especially with state secrets; thus, parliamentary access to information is often limited. Therefore, civil control of these services requires different arrangements than do other elements of the defence sector. The Second Department of Operational Services under the Ministry of National Defence is an institution responsible for military intelligence and counterintelligence. To date, the Parliament has no role in oversight of this unit, which instead is directly accountable to the Minister of National Defence. The absence of any parliamentary control over such institutions - not only within the defence system, but also within the entire security sector - may allow for the concentration of uncontrolled political power which may be used in inappropriate ways. While the likelihood of such a situation is small, mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of security institutions must nevertheless be found.

Last but not least, the act of legislation itself is a problematic issue of parliamentary oversight. The Parliament plays the most important role in controlling the military because it must approve all main decisions related to the functioning of the Lithuanian defence sector. But in reality, the Parliament is unable to make a significant impact. Any attempt on the part of Parliamentarians to amend proposals made by the MND face strong opposition from the representatives of the Ministry. Usually they assume that any amendment might be crucial for long-term defence planning and, therefore, to the whole national defence sector.
Lacking specific knowledge of military issues leaves Parliament unable to make significant amendments to important defence sector legislation such as the approval of the structure of national defence, the overall annual numbers of the regular armed forces and active reserve, etc. For example, the Parliament had little opportunity to influence the process of drafting and adopting the National Security Strategy. On one hand, the actual drafting of the Strategy was carried out by a small group of experts from various governmental institutions (the MND, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Security Department) with little public awareness or significant interaction with the Parliament. As a result, Parliament's approval of the final text was merely symbolic.

As mentioned before, the Parliament must endorse all decisions regarding the participation of Lithuanian troops in peace support operations (PSOs). To date, all such proposals have been approved. However, there are many who criticise the process of reaching these decisions. Often, proposals for participation in a PSO are submitted for approval under tight deadlines, and parliamentarians do not have enough time to formulate a common position, to find alternative independent information on the subject, or to listen to public opinion. Furthermore, as participation in PSOs can result in heavy expenditures, a proper dialogue within Parliament should be insisted upon due to the potential impact of these expenses upon the rational allocation of defence expenditures and the balancing of the state budget as a whole. Obviously, a balance must be found between efficiency and legitimacy; but it is imperative that the former not be sought
at the expense of the latter.

It may seem that sometimes the defence sector, in seeking to maintain autonomy in certain defence policy matters, behaves like a lobbying group rather than an impartial governmental institution. Still, the officials of the national defence sector have never infringed the rules of lobbying for the legitimate interests of their institution. This should be regarded as a positive trend in the ongoing formation of the political system; however, time is needed for such behaviour to become embedded in the political culture of Lithuania. Nevertheless, the line between legitimate lobbying and unlawful interference is extremely thin and should be observed with due caution.

In summary, the difficulties in implementing parliamentary oversight can be reduced to three basic factors.

The lack of the military knowledge. This results in the inability of Parliament to make significant amendments to important defence legislation. Furthermore, this factor decreases the ability of Parliament to exercise legislative initiative.

The drive for secrecy. The democratic oversight and control of the activities of security organisations, especially intelligence services, does not receive due consideration among leading decision-makers and parliamentarians, and therefore may pose difficulties in the future to the democratic political processes of the country.
The absence of an independent pool of information. In the case of Lithuania, there are no independent sources of information about national defence or the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Legislators have to rely on the information provided by the MND or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Such a situation makes Parliament dependent on these state institutions. It is also difficult to find independent civilian or military advisors, as well as NGOs or "think tank" centres, which could provide information or guidance.

Conclusions

The civil democratic control of the military has been successfully established in Lithuania during the last dozen years. However, certain unresolved issues of civil-military relations remain a
matter of further consolidation of the democratic political system and the formation of civil society. Some of these issues have to do with the specific socio-political context of Lithuania, while other issues are common to most democratic societies and states in transition. Notwithstanding all the present shortcomings of democratic control of the defence and security sectors, the overall situation of civil-military relations and the role of the armed forces in Lithuanian society is as positive as never before in the modern history of the country.
What is the meaning of democratic control? It is that the armed forces, and the entire security sector, are fully integrated into the normal democratic processes of the state. The armed forces exist in order to help leaders direct their country. Despite their specific nature, they are nevertheless a part of the government and must be subject to popular control mechanisms.

When Estonia began the struggle of instituting such mechanisms, difficulties arose from having an obsolete legal framework. In 1999, it was decided that a fundamental change of national defence legislation was needed.

The overhaul of defence legislation began with drafting a new Peacetime National Defence Act (PNDA). The Estonian constitution requires that two laws be used to define the national defence organisation. These are the PNDA and the Wartime National Defence Act. However, the PNDA is the primary legal instrument for organising national defence in that it delineates the authorities and responsibilities of the controllers from the Parliament down to the Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, the Act also covers the critical issues of training and mobilisation. In drafting the PNDA, it was decided that to ensure effective
democratic control there must be at least one accountable, democratically-elected civilian who is able to stop or to overrule any command or decision made by any military commander, even the Chief of Defence. The Minister of Defence is specified as this civilian.

Another important feature of the PNDA is the introduction of the Governmental Committee of Security. It consists of the so-called power ministers, led by Prime Minister, and is responsible for assessing Estonia's security situation and for operating as a forum for national security and defence matters.

The PNDA also established the procedures of discussion and consultation between the Government and the Parliament in regards to drafting and adopting the three main security documents specified in the law. The first is the National Security Concept, adopted by Parliament; the second is the National Military Strategy, adopted by the Government; and the third is the Operational Plan of Defence of the Country, a classified document adopted by the Chief of Defence. Prior to presenting the National Security Concept to Parliament, the Government is obligated to sit in a closed session with Parliament, in order to be made aware of any problems or concerns the public body may have with the draft. Before adopting the National Military Strategy, the part of the government responsible for Defence issues must meet with the Parliamentary Committee of Security, also to be made aware of any potential issues. Furthermore, before the adoption of the Operational Plan of Defence of the Country, the Chief of Defence must obtain the advice and
consent of the Governmental Committee of Security.

An element of the PNDA that raised concern in Parliament was that it made the Chief of Defence the highest military advisor to the Government and to the Minister of Defence. While the Parliament was reluctant to accept this arrangement, it is not unusual as there are several other countries using this formula. Their reluctance was based on worries that the Chief of Defence would become a political advisor. But, the PNDA makes clear that the Government and the Minister of Defence are obliged to consult the Chief of Defence on military matters alone.

Thus, the procedures established in the PNDA allow public involvement, by way of parliamentary representatives, to become a vital component of military planning and operation. This is also the case in cooperation with other countries, such as Estonia's integration into NATO. For this reason Estonia adopted the International Military Cooperation Act, which defines procedures to ensure that participation in international military affairs is also conducted in an open, democratic manner. Nevertheless, implementation is always a challenge.

The drafting of legislation to establish effective and proper procedures and structures for decision-making and control is of paramount importance. With the asymmetric threats prevalent in the modern security environment, governments may be tempted to be overly flexible in their use of armed forces. However, properly constructed procedures will operate to prevent the principles of democratic control from being overridden.
MODERNIZATION IN THE LATVIAN ARMED FORCES

Lt. Col. Igors Rajevs
Chief of the Operational Planning (J-5) Department
National Armed Forces Staff, Latvia

The development of the Latvian armed forces can be divided into three broad periods. The first lasted from 1991 until approximately 1998, when Latvia began seeking NATO membership. This second period lasted until 2002, and the third period began after receiving the invitation to join NATO.

Latvia began the first period without any significant resources; the truth of the situation was that all military planning was completely unrealistic. Although thinking in terms of artillery support groups and armoured divisions, Latvia was incapable of organising a single infantry battalion. There was a need to ground military thinking and planning in reality.

An understanding of the situation grew during the second period, and thus the planners were able to take a more 'mature' approach. It was recognised that Latvia needed to lay a foundation for defence reform, and this began with three basic documents - the Military Threat Analysis, the Defence Concept, and the Operational Concept. A study was then conducted which looked into the existing wartime structure in order to determine the resources and units that Latvia needed to defend itself. New plans for wartime structures (as well as the peacetime structures which
serve the purpose of training and mobilisation) were then developed and evaluated according to this study.

After devising these structures, it was necessary to perform a cost analysis. It is no surprise that there was not enough money to fund all the units and capabilities desired, and so again the structures had to be reformulated.

The results of this reexamination were incorporated into the Force Structure 2002 - 2008, which was presented to NATO at the end of 2001. NATO accepted the proposal and acknowledged the proposed structure as realistic, affordable and sustainable.

Some argue that the old structures were based on the wrong conclusions and therefore were faulty. But this is not a valid argument; these structures were developed according to the basic documents - the Threat Analysis, the Operational Concept, and the Defence Concept. And, since these documents embodied Latvia's core principles of total defence, territorial defence, and large-scale mobilisation, the structures properly reflected them.

But the invitation to join NATO completely altered Latvia's international situation and its approach to national defence. The principles of total defence and territorial defence have become obsolete, thus making the maintenance of large reserve units - which are poorly manned, trained and equipped - irrelevant.

The Latvian armed forces are now in the third period, facing challenges not encountered before. First of all, there must be
compliance with the Government's *Timetable for Completion of Reforms*, which details the capabilities that must be developed as NATO accession draws nearer. This timetable is not a NATO requirement; rather, it is intended to demonstrate Latvia's commitment to becoming a member state.

Planners also face the task of revising the Defence Concept to comply with NATO's principle of collective defence; they also are in the process of revising the *Force Proposals*. This document will not concern itself with organisations designed for large-scale mobilisation, but rather with smaller, capability-oriented armed forces.

Planners must again recreate military doctrine and the basic documents, reevaluate the organisational and structural elements,
and perform a cost analysis in order to make sure that plans are affordable and sustainable.

The outcome of these processes is that planning methods have matured significantly. Military planners have realised the importance of formulating their plans according to available financial and personnel resources. Moreover, Latvia has realised the importance of fully integrating NATO requirements into military planning.
MODERN FORCE STRUCTURING IN LITHUANIA

Mr. Robertas Šapronas
Director, International Relations Department
Ministry of National Defence, Lithuania

The first major steps in the development of the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia came in 1990. There were no independent armed forces, no Ministries of Defence, and no resources. After the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops, there remained only a rudimentary military structure. These years saw a desire to establish national armed forces not merely for the purpose of demonstrating our will, but also for matters of security because, at the time, Russia was seen as a threat.

The first steps were to organize and equip as many units as possible, and to establish ties with the West. After recognition of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, they enjoyed much sympathy and support internationally.

Since 1994, Partnership for Peace and various bilateral agreements provided many opportunities for cooperation and assistance. Military forces of the Baltic States were initially equipped with surplus matériel from the downsizing of forces in Western States following the end of the Cold War. But as there was little coordination among the states offering aid, a flood of assistance created severe logistical problems - in 1994 the amount that was offered could not be absorbed.
NATO has been the most important external factor shaping Lithuania's defence sector development. The desire to join the Alliance was declared in 1994 and this raised many issues concerning the nature of the armed forces. The main dilemma was whether it was best to pursue self-defence capabilities in territorial forces, or to develop deployable forces. Although it was a major departure from what had been done in the past, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) became convinced that territorial defence is of no use to the Alliance - highly mobile units are the key.

Lithuania's current problems arise from restructuring the armed forces. The country is following the trend of force development in Europe, which is focused on mobile units. It is vital that the capabilities of these units be tailored to the needs of NATO. Similar to other European states, Lithuania needs to develop greater mobility and deployability in its forces to face current challenges which call for operations in distant areas. It is important that the Baltic States be able to contribute in order to refute the belief that they will only be 'consumers' of security.

Defence policy must be reevaluated in light of all this. For the last decade, Lithuania has emulated the Nordic model of territorial defence, and we have developed all the necessary parts of the system - territorial structure, mobilisation, refreshment training, etc. However, the utility of this system is doubtful. It is not that reform began on false assumptions, but rather that Lithuania now finds itself in a different environment politically, fiscally, and internationally. A transition plan must be put in place to move
from forces based on concepts of territorial defence to forces embracing the concept of cooperative defence. Furthermore, expenditures must be reconsidered - the current 2% of GDP will be unsustainable as economies begin to grow more slowly and as European Union membership adds financial stress.

A further needed reform is to move away from conscription. Many European countries are doing likewise. With the aim of becoming more active internationally, Lithuania must move toward professionalisation of the military. Volunteer systems tend to be more popular in society and they tend to produce more suitable soldiers. And while it is more costly to equip such forces, they would be better prepared for the tasks now at hand. It could be that conscription will be partly retained, with a reduction of total conscripts from 5000 to 2000. However, it would be difficult to administer this dual system, and it would be unfair to those who were still drafted.

The final issue to be faced is that of specialization. It is difficult for the Baltic States to offer large-scale capabilities, so specialised niche-units are an attractive concept that fits in with current thinking about cooperative defence. By focusing on the development of such units, realistic goals may be set and from there concrete plans may be laid.
When Estonia began to create its military structure 12 years ago, there was no infrastructure, armaments, nor equipment. The people held a strongly negative perception of all things military, which had arisen from the experience of compulsory service in the Soviet armed forces. The memories of an independent Estonia defence force were too distant, and the memories of abuse in the Soviet Army too recent. Nevertheless, there existed the desire to reunite with Europe after years of forceful separation.

The General Staff was established in November 1991, and the Ministry of Defence in July 1992. But there was a lack of sufficiently qualified personnel, as well as a mixture of differing staff procedures, of management cultures, and of experiences. The armed forces consisted of a few Soviet-trained officers, some very old officers from pre-war times, officers who had switched to the military from a civilian career, and former expatriates who had returned home in the hour of need. Only the inauguration of the Baltic Defence College began to unify the educational and training backgrounds of Estonian officers.
Connected with the lack of qualified personnel was a conceptual weakness. It was only in 2001, at the urging of the United States, that legislation such as the National Security Concept and the National Military Strategy was adopted. With these cornerstones for the development of the armed forces in place, Estonia charted its strategic direction and put an end to discussions of where and how the country should proceed.

**Cooperation**

It is a simple fact of life that the smaller a state is, the more it depends on cooperation, trade, multilateralism, and integration. Many countries, especially Denmark and Finland, have invested heavily in the build-up of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF). But the driving force behind this development was cooperation among the Baltic States. Yet there was nothing inevitable or preordained in this cooperation as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are quite different. It was a conscious political decision that was necessary because each is too small to accomplish many things independently. Furthermore, there was the will to demonstrate that the cooperative approach could work in the Baltics, and also pressure from supporting states.

International cooperation and integration into NATO have beneficially transformed the EDF, allowing the development of a mind-set of consensus seeking and providing experience operating in an international environment.
Integration and the Incentive of Membership

In recent years, planning has focused on attaining NATO membership. The Membership Action Plan has made plain that the Alliance values not only military ability, but also democracy, the Rule of Law, appropriate legislation, and integrity. While defence planning is nothing but the process or marrying defence policy to available resources, it is more difficult than it sounds. During the first years of the EDF's development, planning was haphazard with little thought to resources or reality. NATO's main impact has been fostering the development of realistic defence planning.

The need to coordinate the activities of various ministries and state agencies led to the creation of a ministerial commission on NATO chaired by the Prime Minister, as well as a working-level commission. They have played a substantial role in steering Estonia towards membership.

What has been accomplished thus far did not descend ready-made from the sky - it was done through the incentive of membership, pressure from supporting states, tough feedback and assessment from NATO, and the determination and cooperation of the Baltic States. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Toomas Hendrik Ilves has said that the "...implementation and transposition of the aquis communitaires by the [three Baltic States], Vishigrad countries and Slovenia is one of the great transformations of Europe. It is one of the great revolutions. And it has been benign. The deal was, if you want to be with [NATO] then become like [the NATO members]."
The resulting processes of reform and integration have energised society, allowing the government to institute unpopular but necessary reforms. Keeping the budget in accordance with the criteria for membership in NATO and the EU has taken the highest priority. Proper budgeting has allowed defence spending to increase from 1% in 1994, to 1.4% in 1998, to 2% in 2002. Let it be clear - no one likes defence spending; politicians would no doubt favour spending tax monies on retirement benefits, schools, hospitals and roads - projects that win votes. But the political elite made a conscious decision to bring Estonia into the Alliance; it is a universally accepted and promulgated goal shared by all major political parties. During the last two years, the 2% allowance for defence has been clearly written in to all coalition agreements in Parliament.

**How to Increase Support**

How can public support for the EDF and the appreciation of NATO processes be increased? This can be done by encouraging participation in society-at-large. The High Executive Defence Education Courses are an excellent example. Held biannually, these week-long programs draw together around 40 to 50 opinion leaders - MPs, higher civil servants, business leaders, journalists, leaders of local administrations, etc. For the Ministry of Defence, these courses have served the purpose of explaining policy to the socially active segment of the population and channelling this message through them. As the participants are indeed opinion leaders and makers, the message will be widely disseminated. The Ministry of Defence has conducted the courses for four years
now and the results have been astonishing.

The Reserve Officer Courses are another example. There are three types of courses. The first is for promising conscripts who, after the completion of the course, will be commissioned as officers in reserve. The second is for university students who can opt for the Reserve Officer Courses instead of the draft. The third type is the Voluntary Reserve Officer Course - it is the shortest of these and exists mainly for purposes of public relations. These classes have included a former Prime Minister, a former Minister of Education, a presidential advisor, ambassadors, and university professors. All of these courses have drawn much media attention which has helped to bring much prestige to Reserve Officers.

**The Way Ahead**

What are the limits of NATO and EU enlargement and how is it best to help countries outside of these organisations to pursue and sustain their reforms? It must be up to these countries to achieve and maintain conformity with membership requirements. What should be avoided is the bending the rules for political purposes. Ronald Asmus describes in *Opening NATO's Door* how Romania undermined its chance to be invited to join the Alliance by warning that if they were left out then their reforms would collapse. Reform should not be used as a bargaining chip. Rather, it must be perpetuated in transition states for their own sake. The incentive of membership should be preserved so that the zone of stability may be pushed further to the East. For
example, Estonia has become a trusted partner of Georgia. They see that 12 years ago Estonia started from scratch and has struggled to the verge of membership, demonstrating that reforms can and do succeed. The propagation of positive change will benefit all Europe, since the failure of distressed states to address their problems would diminish the stability of the entire region. The United States helped to rebuild Western Europe after World War II. Western Europe helped to rebuild Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. Perhaps the Baltic States, leading by example, can contribute to the development of those states left out of the most recent rounds of NATO and EU enlargement.
FORCE MODERNIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN LATVIA

Mr. Jānis Sārts
Defence Adviser to the Mission of the Ministry of Defence to NATO
Latvia

In 2004 Latvia will become a member of the European Union and we certainly desire to see the EU's role in the world increasing. Yet this is unthinkable without improved cooperation among the member states in military issues and crisis response operations. However, it must be emphasized that nothing done to develop the EU's military capabilities can be allowed to detract from NATO's central role in European security. This is the basic assumption that guides the Latvian representatives at the European Union's Intergovernmental Conference as they work on the EU's Constitutional Project.

Current reforms in defence and military areas reflect a rethinking of Latvia's principal approach towards defence development in order to meet the requirements of being a full member of NATO. To this end, Latvia will revise its National Defence Concept to make collective defence, professional armed forces, cooperation with society, and international military cooperation the core strategic principles of national defence.

For July 2003, the Latvian Government plans to propose and support the development of a professional military force. In keeping with this, the Latvian National Armed Forces will focus
on the development of small, effective forces that can ensure readiness and provide capabilities for contribution to collective defence. The Ministry of Defence has been tasked by the Government to continue evaluating the Armed Forces' transition to a professional force, and soon will present a detailed report suggesting further actions to take. Currently, it is planned that the National Armed Forces will be fully professional by the end of 2006.

The structure of the National Armed Forces was adjusted with the aim to enhance their interoperability, deployability, sustainability and combat effectiveness. It is planned to establish a force structure that will enable the Latvian Armed Forces to participate in the full range of NATO operations abroad and to provide significant support to Alliance reinforcements if needed for the territorial defence of Latvia. The focus of development will shift from a territorial defence oriented, large mobilisation structure to a smaller, deployability and capabilities oriented structure.

Our Force Proposals play a significant role in the development of a new force structure. The proposals also place a great emphasis on Latvia's future contribution to the Alliance. The requirements to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment and NATO Response Force development targets are taken into account. It is important to emphasise that effective human and financial resource management will allow us to increase significantly the number of military personnel contributed to international operations (in 2003 Latvia joined operations in Afghanistan and Iraq).
Also of importance is the issue of reorganisation of the National Guard within the context of reform of the National Armed Forces. The number of National Guard units has been reduced from 32 to 20. The tasks and missions of the National Guard will be reevaluated, emphasising effectiveness and capability improvement. Taking into account the National Defence Concept and the Force Structure Review, the National Guard will provide support to the Armed Forces and the Civil Defence System and will specialise in air defence, logistics, transportation, civil-military cooperation, and Host Nation Support. At the same time, National Guard units will continue to support society in crisis response situations and protect vital objects of national security.
In light of the described reforms, particularly the shift from territorial defence to collective defence, the questions of reinforcement plans are still high on the agenda. Latvia would like to assess how NATO is prepared to assist in case of crisis. It is even more important in the wake of public debates about the Force Structure Review which will eliminate most of the territorial structures and will focus on deployable forces. The development of such plans would give Latvia more flexibility in taking important decisions about its contribution to the Alliance.

The *Law on Defence Spending* requires 2% of GDP for defence and NATO integration through at least 2008. This gives some sense of stability and ensures the continuation of reform and development of the defence sector, and the Latvian Armed Forces in particular. Actual defence expenditures are increasing year to year as the economy is growing annually at a rate of 5-6%. But NATO's definition of defence expenditures and the different practices among current NATO member states in defence allocations leave the Ministry of Defence in an unfavourable position when it comes to budget discussions. Currently, the Ministry of Defence is initiating debates within the Government on changing the methodology of defence allocation. The reevaluation of NATO's definition of defence expenditures will help Latvia to continue debates on defence allocation and to reallocate resources to provide greater military capabilities.
THE BALTIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORUM

Ms. Sintija Višņevska
Director, Planning and NATO Integration Department
Latvian Ministry of Defence

The Baltic Security Assistance forum (BALTSEA) was established for discussions on issues of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Baltic States and 14 supporting countries. BALTSEA has proved to be a useful tool to achieve the objectives of Baltic security policy and military development. It forms a solid base for cost-effective international cooperation, aiming to achieve interoperability of the defence systems of the participating states, making a notable contribution to stability and security in the Baltic region.

It must be noted that Latvia's security cannot be separated from that of the other Baltic States, and intensive cooperation in the fields of security and defence is central to Latvia's approach to reform. The joint projects under BALTSEA not only are the most effective means for developing national defence capabilities and a national defence system interoperable with NATO, but they also demonstrate the resolve of the Baltic States to do their utmost for regional security.

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2 These are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The BALTSEA forum was conceived in 1997 as a means to coordinate cooperation in the Baltic region and the rapidly increasing volume of external security- and defence-related assistance to the Baltic States.

The purposes of BALTSEA are to:

- support the development of a Baltic defence system,
- review the development of these efforts,
- avoid the duplication of support and advice rendered by the supporting nations,
- enhance the exchange of information among participants, and
- provide a framework for joint military projects of the Baltic States.

In six years of existence, BALTSEA has done outstanding work in tailoring outside support for the achievement of security and defence policy objectives in the Baltic States - the first and foremost of these being the NATO integration efforts.

BALTSEA is also an ideal forum in which to keep the Baltics' non-NATO partner states - Finland, Sweden and Switzerland - continuously engaged in cooperative projects in the region.

Projects implemented with the support of the forum include not only joint military units and structures for joint mobilisation, but also working groups relating to officer education, logistics,
medical support, and command and control issues. These projects include:

- Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT),
- Joint Air Control System (BALTNET),
- Baltic Navy Squadron (BALTRON),
- Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL),
- Baltic Joint Command and Control Information System (BATLCCIS),
- Baltic Joint Personnel Accounting System (BALTPERS),
- Baltic Medical Unit (BALTMED), and
- Baltic Virtual Military Academy (BATLVIMA).

Looking into the future of BALTSEA, the members have outlined several options for developing the forum in a way that would reflect the new situation in the Baltic region brought about by the next round of NATO enlargement in mid-2004. These options are not mutually exclusive - more than one of them could be agreed upon and successfully implemented. They are as follows.

- The BALTSEA evaluation process, scheduled for the spring of 2004, may indicate that there are still benefits in maintaining the organization in its present form. In that case, the objectives and targets of the forum would be redefined to reflect the progress of the Baltic States. It is understood that such adaptation may encourage new nations to join in the work of the forum, while others might consider suspending their participation.
• BALTSEA could evolve into an annual conference on security and defence cooperation issues in the broader Baltic Sea region, where the participants could address the entire scope of political and practical issues.

• BALTSEA's cooperative format could be used for providing coordinated support to other countries and regions in transition - first and foremost to the countries of the South Caucasus with which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are developing close cooperative relations. Senior officials from the South Caucasus have expressed interest in establishing a forum modelled after BALTSEA. Such a forum would be an important element in developing regional security cooperation with and among the countries of the South Caucasus.

Even though BALTSEA countries face different challenges, and hence progress differently, there are many areas of cooperation from which they may profit. Military cooperation, for example, is of primary importance. For smaller nations, participation in multilateral formations with 'plug-in' units is the most realistic and efficient approach for contributing to allied operations. The goal is to develop these capabilities and to improve joint crisis management and readiness systems within the Baltic States. Moreover, whereas the forum has been known as an institution of 'donors' and 'recipients' of assistance, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seek to enhance their role as assistance providers to other countries and regions. Taking into account our efforts and achievements in developing equitable partnerships, the future of BALTSEA will be one of equal states.
The Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) is a joint infantry battalion comprised of troops from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. BALTBAT was established in November 1993 with an agreement signed by the Chiefs of Defence of the three states. That same month the Ministers of Defence signed the first agreement with a number of supporting states\(^3\) outlining the project.

Initially designed as a lightly-armed peacekeeping unit, BALTBAT was transformed in October 1996 into a permanent infantry battalion with enhanced fire support capabilities for use in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). By the end of 2000, BALTBAT was fully equipped and trained.

The components of the force are three national infantry companies and a common logistics and headquarters company. BALTBAT staff officers are trained in Latvia at what is informally called the BALTBAT Staff Training School. Troops are trained in their home countries. While BALTBAT companies remain part of their national battalions, they train together in the BALTBAT Field Training Exercise, nicknamed Baltic Eagle. The supporting

\(^3\) These states are Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
states provide assistance in the areas of matériel, training, management advice, and deployment.

The overall management of BALTBAT projects is conducted by the Political Steering Group in which all participating countries are represented. Below this group is the Military Working Group, composed of military authorities from the Baltic States. Next comes the Baltic Training Team which is a group of advisors and instructors from the supporting states. Governmentally, BALTBAT is directed by a committee made up of the Ministers of Defence of the Baltic States, then by a committee of the Chiefs of Defence. There are also smaller groups that handle issues of coordination and logistics.

BALTBAT was established with the purposes of increasing interoperability of the Baltic defence forces and NATO forces, acting as an instrument for military standardization and demonstrating the will and ability of the Baltic countries to cooperate among themselves and internationally. At the same time, BALTBAT supports and contributes to the development of the national armed forces, as the nurturing of the self-defence capabilities of the Baltic States was recognized as a major objective of the project. The high standards of BALTBAT are spread throughout the Baltic forces by periodically rotating personnel through the Battalion. Aside from the experience and cross-training this provides for troops, rotation is also quite valuable at higher levels of command in that it allows officers from different countries to establish more efficient lines of communication.
During these years, a few of BALTBAT's notable achievements are:

- efficiency - the force uses the same tools, standards, and locations to train the specialists of the three member states, thus enhancing interoperability and cost-effectiveness;
- mobilisation - two waves of deployment for BALTBAT sub-units, assisting in NATO's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR), and in Kosovo (KFOR);
- standardisation - training standards and procedures, as well as field and administrative standards and procedures have been developed within the force. These are also used by the national armed forces as guidelines for developing similar regulations;
- cooperation - the existence of a functional multinational battalion has shown that such joint projects are possible and profitable despite the fact that a multinational unit of any size poses certain organizational and cultural challenges, such as differing national regulations and standards, or differing cultures. BALTBAT soldiers and commanders take at least 6 to 9 months of training to reach the common understanding necessary for joint operation.

BALTBAT has faced its share of problems, of which the main ones are:

- language - in the early 1990s, it was not easy to find qualified personnel with good English skills, as at that time English instruction in the educational systems was not at an
appropriate level;

- legal issues - this has been quite a sensitive subject seeing that it touches on all national regulations from the highest level down to more mundane issues such as border crossing;

- logistics - while battalion equipment has been standardized on paper, procuring the desired matériel and equipping the national units according to regulation has proved quite demanding;

- management - in the initial stages, many problems arose with integrating soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers into a system aiming to operate multinationally, as this demanded much flexibility in thought and procedure.

Nevertheless, the Battalion has accomplished its original mission. It is now recommended that the Baltic States structure their national forces more or less according to the same standards introduced by BALTBAT. As for the future of the Battalion, the military authorities of the member states are currently considering organizing more than one joint battalion. Thus, BALTBAT continues to expand and to improve cooperation among the land forces of the three states.
THE BALTIC DEFENCE COLLEGE

Brig. Gen. Michael H. Clemmesen
Commandant, the Baltic Defence College

The Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), in an agreement between the Baltic and Nordic states, was established to instruct senior officers in defence strategy and proper civil-military relations.

In the past there were many distorted perceptions in the Baltic States about the proper relationship between the military and the government. For example, there was a Chief of Defence who felt that the Government - especially the Minister of Defence - was responsible for obtaining money from Parliament for him to use as he wished. There was a Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee who considered himself superior to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence, and who insisted on being the one to inspect and command the military. And there were Ministers of Defence who felt their command authority was hampered by restrictions of the Constitution and legislation concerning the armed forces. Furthermore, many officers felt that they, and not politicians, were the proper representatives of the people.

To correct these misperceptions, BALTDEFCOL was given the task of making its students not only understand, but also accept the necessity of democratic control of armed forces, as well as the pre-eminence of democratically-elected political leadership in
guiding defence development and operations, in both peace and war.

Officers are taught the proper nature of the political-military relationship. The essential element of this relationship is dialogue among politically responsible civilians and expert military professionals representing the refined experience and consensus of the profession - not interest groups. Officers are shown that they are not in the position to decide what is best for the people. Rather, they must implement the tasks given them by the elected representatives of the people. Without this relationship, one cannot have a military that effectively serves the state and its citizens.
To nurture interaction between civilians and the military, BALTDEFCOL also established courses for civil servants, which integrate with military staff courses to provide a concrete foundation for future real-world relationships. The goal of these courses is to educate civilians in military issues so that they can become more effective decision makers on matters of defence and security.

As membership in NATO draws near, BALTDEFCOL exists to train its students - civilian and military - in the necessity and wisdom of transition from a territorial defence model to a new model emphasizing deployability and interoperability - one therefore compatible with the Alliance. In doing so, BALTDEFCOL will remain one of the leading reform-oriented war colleges in Central and Eastern Europe.
CLOSING REMARKS

Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler
Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Allow me first to thank the Latvian Government and Ministry of Defence for organising this roundtable. And, of course, I thank all of you, the speakers, and the moderators.

The Baltic States have been through several stages of defence reform in the past twelve years, each with totally different needs and objectives. It should be acknowledged that this was not a linear development, but rather proceeded according to the political environment and to political objectives.

These various stages of reform have given the Baltic States a variety of valuable experience which has direct relevance to other countries.

The importance of regional cooperation is perfectly clear. The Baltic example should be studied because it is a regional success story rivalled only by the Nordic experience and the Franco-German partnership. Today, in the Western world, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, the need for regional cooperation needs to be understood and examined more closely. What was heard this afternoon about multilateral military activities - and how such experiences impacted the process of seeking NATO membership - is of great importance. These lessons could yield benefits for other countries not only during the first few difficult years of reform, but also at later stages of higher military development.
One of the important issues addressed today is the imbalance between the amount of assistance being offered and the ability of recipients to absorb that assistance. Those countries offering assistance need to be more aware of the need for coordination among themselves. While rendered assistance is of great value, an overabundance of assistance and a lack of coordination can be counterproductive.

It is my belief that one of the key ways in which other countries can profit from the experience of the Baltic States is in observing how to defend national interests, preserve common sense, and remain selective when faced with great amounts of aid. In short, others can learn how to find good advice, how to make use of it, and when and how to say no.

Another point is the necessity of ensuring the continuation of reform once a transition state has become a member of the European Union or of NATO. In many Central European countries, there has been a slowing of reform after they obtained membership. How is it best to mould these membership objectives and security sector reform into a sustainable, long-term plan for transition?

A question of utmost importance to Central and Eastern Europe is that of the interrelation of defence reform and the non-military elements of the security sector. If you restructure the military, how does one deal with the consequences implied for the border guards, the police forces, or the intelligence services? How best to coordinate the reform of a system that is so intertwined?
There is also the question of training and information dissemination. In order to make reform more straightforward and sustainable, one needs to have an informed civil society, NGOs that are capable of contributing to the political debate, political parties that have security sector experts, and parliaments, both members and staffers, who can contribute seriously to the debate.

Finally, I must comment that, as I look out into the room, all of the people in charge seem to be distinctly younger than I am. It is reassuring to see that the Baltic States nurtured a whole generation of capable young people that have come to hold responsibility in these countries.

I am quite happy that Switzerland has been able to contribute to the reform we speak of by way of the International Training Courses conducted by DCAF's sister-organisation - the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. It should be noted that we have had participants from the Baltic States since shortly after they regained independence. I also hope that the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces has contributed to the process of reform through its various research programmes and practical projects on the ground.

This roundtable, and the publication resulting from it, should only be the first step in a longer process. We must continue what has begun here today and continue to share this knowledge and experience with others.
ABOUT DCAF

Mission

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation made up of 45 governments including Switzerland, 40 other Euro-Atlantic States, 3 African States, and the Canton of Geneva⁴.

DCAF was established in October 2000 with the support of the Swiss government to encourage and support States and institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian oversight of armed and security forces, and to promote security sector reform in accordance with democratic standards.

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⁴ Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Canton of Geneva.
DCAF's key areas of analytical work include:

- standards, norms, and best practices in the field of democratic governance of the security sector;
- theory and practice of security sector reform (including defence reform);
- parliamentary and civilian oversight of armed forces, police, internal security forces, intelligence, and border guards;
- the legal aspect of security sector governance (including documenting relevant legislation);
- civil society building as a means of strengthening democratic security sector governance;
- security sector reform as a means of ensuring human security, sustainable development, and post-conflict reconstruction;
- challenges of security sector governance in regions beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, especially Africa and the Middle East;
- emerging issues in security sector governance (e.g. the treatment of women and children; mechanisms of civilian control of nuclear weapons, etc).

DCAF's key operational projects include:

- providing advice and practical assistance to governments, parliaments and international organisations in the field of security sector reform;
- interacting with parliamentarians and civil servants to
promote accountability and effective oversight of the security sector;

- funding and training expert staffers in support of parliamentary oversight structures, such as parliamentary defence and security committees;
- assisting in drafting legislation related to defence and security;
- providing advice and practical guidance to governments on ways to organise professional and accountable border security structures;
- providing advice to governments on demobilisation and the retraining of down-sized forces;
- assisting governments in encouraging openness in defence budgeting, procurement, and planning.

Detailed information on DCAF can be found at www.dcaf.ch