



December 2022

Maximising the internal security benefits of international police missions

What Works



EUROPEAN CENTRE
OF EXCELLENCE
FOR CIVILIAN
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Table of Contents

Abbreviations.....	2
Introduction.....	3
What Works.....	6
Conclusion.....	15
References.....	17

Cover Photo: © hlehnerer via Canva.com

Photo on p.11: © davelogan via Canva.com

Photo on p.14: © Niklas Emmoth via Canva.com

Abbreviations

CivCom	EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Civilian Crisis Management Center
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission
EUMS	European Union Member States
HQ	Headquarters
IFSH	Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KMar	Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (the Dutch gendarmerie)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOJS	Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP	National Police
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	EU Political and Security Committee
SMO	Steering Group Missions and Operations
SPA	Swedish Police Authority
UN	United Nations

Introduction

In a changing strategic environment characterized by a trend towards the militarization of security, several countries are keeping their commitment to civilian crisis management and to multilateral police missions in particular. At the European Union (EU) level for example, the 2022 EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence emphasizes the EU-wide commitment to strengthen civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and to renew the civilian CSDP Compact.

While demand for officers to participate in missions is rapidly growing, the supply of available officers has stagnated or even declined. Several studies have demonstrated that one of the reasons is that police institutions do not yet fully recognize the internal-external security nexus and fail to fully maximize the benefits of seconding staff to international missions.

The governments of France and the Netherlands have commissioned this study to contribute to the sharing of good practices and experiences, and to initiate further discussions between interested countries.

This report presents a range of good practices employed by states to maximize the benefits of mission participation to police institutions and serve internal security objectives when making officers available. It also aims to inform discussions around ongoing efforts to develop the roadmap towards the Civilian Compact 2.0 by EU Member States (EUMS).

The Internal-External Security Nexus

The notion of the internal-external security nexus has evolved over time, encompassing different meanings and security contexts. This security nexus is most often defined as the **interlinked nature of internal and external security**, wherein **events that occur outside of the EU's border have repercussions for the internal security of the EU**, thereby highlighting the transnationality of current threats.

Adapted from Stefanie Mavrakou, 2021. » The Internal - External Security Nexus « - A Contribution to a Better Understanding and Operationalisation of Cooperation between Civilian CSDP and JHA.

Methodology

The leading question for this short report is:

What are good practices among the selected countries in maximizing the internal security benefits of participating in international police missions?

From March to August 2022, DCAF gathered information on countries' approaches to international police secondments from the perspective of internal security. Eight states and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have contributed to find and share information [1].

[1] Belgium, Czechia, Finland, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the CPCC

Interviewees came from institutions ranging from ministries to police institutions, including returned police officers. DCAF conducted interviews with EU officials from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) located in the EEAS. Specialists from the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) were also interviewed virtually. Additionally, policy documents and available literature were reviewed through desk research.

The information was processed and analyzed to highlight best practices. In parallel, DCAF conducted a deep dive with regards to police secondments in the Netherlands. All these elements are captured in this final report.

What issues are at stake and where are the main bottlenecks?

Previous studies have shown that throughout the mission and secondment cycle, there are a variety of opportunities for contributing to achieving internal security objectives.




Figure 1: Issues at stake and main bottlenecks

Addressing the root causes of crime and reducing spill-over effects

A natural connection between police secondments and internal security objectives lies in tackling crime phenomena, sometimes called upstream disruption. This requires missions to take place in countries that have relevant crime links with the sending countries, mission mandates that thematically engage relevant reform areas, and selected positions that are relevant to criminal phenomena. In other words, the immediate benefits to European police organizations are clearer when mandates concern a policy priority issue (e.g. trafficking in human beings, terrorism or organized crime) in a mission country that has strong linkages to domestic crime phenomena.

Secondly, beyond their immediate impacts on crime, in the long-term police missions can create opportunities for improved police cooperation, as well as the benefits of reducing spillover effects from destabilized regions. This can be done through their contribution to stabilizing partner countries and professionalizing their security sectors.

Improving the information situation

While there are obvious limits to sharing sensitive or operational information, the systematic collection, analysis and sharing of relevant strategic information and general open-source observations can significantly improve a country's information situation. Moreover, practically all internal security interviewees confirmed that more relevant and operational information would be a selling point for domestic institutions.

Using the newly acquired skills of police officers

This report sees further evidence that reverse capacity building takes place, and the sense that skills development takes place was confirmed in a survey with Dutch former secondees (see Figure 2). Interviewees mentioned benefits in terms of improving soft skills as well as hard skills. Soft skills that were mentioned include increased confidence, progression with regards to cultural sensitivity and understanding, increased leadership skills, and an increased sense of responsibility and motivation. In terms of hard skills, examples are officers with a clearer understanding of transnational organized crime.

For maximum benefit to domestic police work, these new skills need to be appraised and put to good use upon return. Ideally, returning secondees are assigned to positions and functions which take into account the new skills and expertise they acquired during the mission.

The pool of experts as a strategic asset

The pool of pre-trained police officers and group of former secondees can be a strategic asset if used well. Practically speaking, it can form a ready and experienced roster of civilian/police experts that have the skills and expertise for crisis management (e.g. in the aftermath of disasters or civil unrest situations). Additionally, the pool of returned experts has a variety of extensive country and regional expertise, as well as the value of established personal networks and access in locations where information might be scarce.

Which skills did you acquire/develop during your secondment? (N = 28)




Figure 2: Dutch National Police secondees' views on skills development from survey

What Works

Enabling institutions

Consistent political commitment and resourcing

Police commanders function in a system with limited resources and competing priorities. They need to justify the decision to make officers available for international secondments. It is helpful to have a clear political commitment to international police missions, ideally with an indicative target number. This provides a reference point for managers in police organizations, as well as ministries, and creates a pressure to comply. This is extra useful in federal systems like Germany, where police organizations also have to comply with cantonal or state-level authorities.

Some countries have permanent guidelines and targets for police missions, sometimes with reporting requirements. For example, Germany committed in a 2016 parliamentary decision to strengthen its engagement in multilateral police missions. The government now has to regularly report to parliament about the number, type and nature of police missions that it participates in. The coalition agreement also commits to extra civilian crisis management capabilities and seconding more staff.

A dedicated budget line is another way to demonstrate political commitment. In Sweden, every year the Swedish Police Authority (SPA) receives special earmarked funding for peace

operations through dedicated regulatory letters from the government that set annual targets, assignments and funds. This both sets a clear political course and signals a political commitment.

Moreover, this dedicated budget, that is separate from the operational police budget and goes directly to the unit for international police work from which secondees are paid, means that there is no tension in budget allocation with different police responsibilities. Other countries, such as Germany, make a special budget available to pay the units of seconded officers for replacements.

Another possibility is by erecting dedicated institutions. Finland has an Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (2004), which outlines in detail what the Finnish policy on civilian secondments in crisis managements is, and led to the creation of the Civilian Crisis Management Center (CMC) Finland. The Finnish police have made a commitment to make available up to 2% of the Finnish police service for international secondments. The same commitment gives CMC Finland the authority to approve police secondments independent of police line managers.



Sweden

- SPA receives special funding for peace operations from government
- Dedicated budget, separate from operational police budget, which avoids budget allocation tensions



Germany

- Parliamentary decision to strengthen engagement in multilateral police missions (2016)
- Government reports to parliament on participation in police missions



Finland

- Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (2004) created CMC Finland
- 2% of police service available for international secondments

National policy that understands police missions as a security policy instrument

Given the complexity of the internal-external security nexus, and the range of stakeholders, it helps when there is policy coherence between stakeholders and a joint understanding of police missions' function as a security instrument and where/how it can be most successfully applied.

One successful approach is to have an intergovernmental joint strategy document. In Belgium, the Civilian Crisis Management Strategy pays close attention to police missions. This strategy also includes a mix of external and internal security objectives, with thematic priorities around organized crime, counterterrorism, prevention of violent extremism, and irregular migration. Similarly, Sweden has a dedicated strategy on international civilian crisis management and peace support with both internal and external security objectives. Additionally, the regulatory letters for the SPA with earmarked funding for peace operations sets annual targets, assignments and funds. These function as de facto integrated strategy documents, which are prepared with support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as well as the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).

Others use decentralized approaches, such as in the Netherlands, where stakeholders such as the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security (MoJS), National Police (NP) and Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar, the Dutch gendarmerie) all have international strategies with clear references to their policing objectives. Policy coherence is ensured however through guidelines on the integrated approach to security and stability in fragile states and conflict areas.

It also pays off to understand the difference between United Nations (UN) and EU missions. This is especially so with regards to the potential for shaping mission mandates and selecting strategic positions. UN mission mandates, due to the political dynamics in the Security Council, are much harder for individual member states to influence than the mandates of CSDP missions. UN positions also do not have with the same detailed job descriptions as CSDP positions, which reduces the room to select those of the highest relevance for criminal phenomena.

This also underlines the importance of internal security stakeholders not being perceived as/seeing themselves as an implementer of foreign policy, but as equal partners in the application of a joint internal-external security instrument. Although at the ministerial level the linkage to domestic security is quite commonly understood and mentioned (e.g. in strategy documents), this is not always true at the implementation level.

Belgium

- Civilian Crisis Management Strategy
- Includes a mix of external and internal security objectives with thematic priorities

The Netherlands

- MoJS, NP, KMar all have international strategies for their policing objectives
- Policy coherence is ensured through guidelines

Sweden

- Strategy on international civilian crisis management and peace support
- SPA funding for peace operations has annual targets, assignments and funds

Awareness raising and sensitisation

There is a need to foster a mindset that sees international police work as more than primarily a foreign policy domain, but one that requires internal security actors' engagement. Raising awareness of the links between security at home and international police missions can help bring on board internal security stakeholders that are mainly concerned with domestic phenomena, such as police institutions.

The line ministry in charge of police institutions has an important role to play here. For example, in Sweden the MOJ engages in continuous dialogue and regular meetings with the SPA. The MOJ and SPA both have position papers and strategies on their priorities for international mission participation. For the SPA this internal strategy contains clear references to the countries which are perceived as of interest to Sweden, and it defines thematic areas for police mission participation that are relevant to Sweden. Examples include transnational organized crime, counterterrorism and irregular migration.

Bilateral police projects, where Sweden or Germany have longstanding experience in, can also be effective at upstream disruption and raise institutions' awareness of the potential benefits of international police missions. This is a balancing act between seconding country interests and hosting country interests and priorities. These projects can help translate seconding country interests (from a crime prevention perspective) into concrete support missions. Sweden is a good example of this approach, where several police projects fall under the development cooperation budget. These projects take a long-term state building lens and also allow the Swedish police to systematically develop international profiles and international experience for their own staff.

Coordination and institutional arrangements

Clear coordination structures and processes that provide internal security actors like MOJs, ministries of interior (MOIs), and police organizations with a (strong) say in the selection of relevant mission countries, shaping of mission mandates as well as strategic positions increase the relevance and benefits of international police mission as a security instrument.

There are several ways of organizing communication channels between police, MOIs and MFAs. For most countries reviewed, it works to have the MFAs as lead on international police missions and coordination with line ministries. Line ministries such as MOIs and MOJs are responsible to consolidate and transmit inputs from police institutions to include internal security considerations.

One way of reducing the complexity of coordination is by creating an umbrella organization for all civilian secondments, such as CMC Finland. The CMC (which is under the MOI) is the central actor that handles recruitment, training, communication, finances (through a single common budget), strategy and policy together with the MOI and MFA, debriefing, and in practical terms controls the where, when, who, why, how, and what of police secondments in Finland.

Other countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden do not have direct relationships between their respective police organizations and the MFA, but instead go through the MoJS or MOJ (respectively) or the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in the KMar's case. However, in Sweden the MOJ cooperates closely with the MFA and maintains a close relationship with the unit for international police missions in the SPA. It consolidates feedback before providing inputs to the MFA. This cooperation is supported by appropriation letters, the strategy for international civilian crises management and peace support as well as internal position papers. In addition, seconding agencies, including the SPA, meet with the MFA and the MOJ at a regular basis. In the Netherlands, there is a high-level body, the Steering Group Missions and Operations (SMO), to advise the government on the selection and mission countries and mandates a whole-of-government approach. Led by the MFA, the MOD (for KMar participation) and the MoJS (for the NP) respectively have the opportunity to bring internal security perspectives onto the agenda.



Belgium

Monthly "PolCiv consultations" with representatives from the MFA, police, MOJ, MOD, MOF, customs, PSC, NATO, OSCE and UN.



Sweden

MOJ cooperates closely with the MFA and maintains a close relationship with the unit for international police missions in the SPA.

Federal states face the extra barrier of state-level policymaking: Germany alone has 19 different pools for federal and state police officers to be seconded, and all receive the call for contributions. However, interviewees report excellent and regular informal cooperation at the working level between the MFA and the relevant MOI unit. It is a sign that the institutional arrangement giving joint responsibility to the MFA and MOI of the CSDP portfolio in its National Implementation Plan of the Civilian CSDP Compact works reasonably well. The MOI also organizes a working group on international police missions with all German federal and state police institutions (Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Polizeimissionen). There is another working group within the permanent conference of ministers/senators of the interior.

Integrating police specific indicators into formal decision-making criteria can also be effective. In Belgium, the decision-making process weighs the geographical priorities for mission participation against its international commitments, Belgium's national interests, as well as the mission's interests. Concretely, this means that the Belgian Federal Police uses a multicriteria matrix with up to 70 indicators for a full analysis every 2-3 years to define what countries are most important for internal security. This leads to a ranking of priority countries. In addition, there are set periodic meetings to shape management at a political and strategic level. This monthly "PolCiv consultation" normally contains representatives of the MFA (chair), police, MOJ, MOD, Ministry of Finance (MOF), customs, representatives of the Belgian EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) delegation and desk officers for EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UN civilian crisis management missions.

Then there is the issue of feeding internal security considerations into the mission set-up and mandate shaping processes. In Germany, coordination is ensured through a direct channel of communications between the MOI and the EU CPCC. While it falls into the responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office to issue guidance / instructions to the CivCom delegates (one of them a secondee from the MOI) and PSC Ambassador, the MOI maintains informally direct contacts with the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) and the EU PSC.

There are alternatives that can reduce transaction costs. For CSDP missions, in addition to efforts by internal security actors to influence mission mandates, one suggestion is to pursue a more direct inclusion of Europol's Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment. This does not put additional demands on EUMS internal security actors and ensures that CSDP missions reflect member states' internal security interests. This can help raise interest of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) authorities to participate in these missions. Even at the EU level there is a perception that JHA actors and the EEAS do not coordinate very closely in the shaping and implementation of CSDP missions. This was also explicitly noted by the European Council in 2021 for improvement.



Germany

19 different pools for federal and state police officers to be seconded

Working groups on international police missions with all German federal and state police institutions



Finland

CMC is the central actor that handles recruitment, training, communication, finances, strategy and policy together with the MOI and MFA

Enabling people

Preparing candidates

Preparation before deployment makes a big difference in the way secondees understand their own role, their expected and possible contributions to foreign policy, internal security objectives and their ability to proactively shape their own professional development.

One good practice is to train and sensitize officers during the pre-deployment stage about how their work fits into the larger picture. This includes showing them how they can contribute to improving security at home through, for instance, information sharing. This goes beyond the more practical aspects of traditional pre-deployment training, or even preparing a domestically focused law enforcement official to become an interculturally sensitive strategic advisor. From an internal security perspective, what matters are briefings that clearly unpack the relevance of the secondment to immediate criminal phenomena, as well as a longer stabilization goals.

The pre-deployment preparation is also the stage where discussions around career paths, competences to be acquired and learning opportunities can happen. Ideally, post-secondment reintegration starts before officers have left. Clear learning objectives for the secondment and an idea of how secondments fit into individual careers can smooth the post-deployment process and maximise the benefits of the secondment experience.



Sweden

Several countries reviewed provide detailed briefings as part of pre-deployment training that is being delivered by internal and external security stakeholders. For example, in **Sweden**, secondees receive a briefing that explains in detail the relevant Swedish policy objectives, what to look out for and what to report on.



The Netherlands

In **The Netherlands**, interviewees mentioned the utility of bringing in returned secondees to brief and exchange with those who are to be deployed. Further, the Dutch police's intelligence unit gives several lessons (as part of the course) to raise awareness and help secondees get a sense of what information could be useful. This is a good example of how an integrated approach can help maximize the information value of secondments.



Encourage the acquisition of new skills

Skills acquired during missions are most useful to seconding institutions when they are recognized and when learning opportunities during deployments are used to maximum benefit.


A useful approach to appraising skills is to identify and measure, to the extent possible, both soft skills, such as leadership and intercultural skills, as well as hard skills, such as investigations methods and a better understanding of the international dimension of criminal phenomena. Ideally, this reverse capacity-building is not only recognized at the strategic level, but also among line managers and the middle management. Examples include an officer with a clearer understanding of transnational organized crime, allowing him to “see the bigger picture” around Swedish gangs.

The survey among Dutch former secondees is likely the richest data: well over 80% said they acquired new skills that were useful to their tasks at home. Figure 2 gives an indication of the breadth of new skills that officers identified as having developed and helps validate conclusions from the interview process. It also highlights the crucial gap: although over 80% of officers agree that their new skills were useful at home, less than 40% said this was taken into account for their next position.

Successful examples of how to measure progress towards the development of these skills include Netherlands’ NPs discussing with their supervisor what concrete competencies would be required for the next career move. This then led to setting up concrete learning/development objectives that were measured during and after deployment, including a clear idea of how it would amount to management experience relevant to a national career. This helps visualize what skills are being acquired and how they can be useful for professional development.

Awareness of the learning opportunities on the side of the seconding institution as well as the individual officers helps to maximize the acquisition of new skills. Interviewees noted a range of such learning opportunities (e.g. learning about transnational crime from conversations and exchanges with embassies, other EU and UN projects, as well as international experts in the duty station). Other interviewees mentioned knowledge exchanges with international colleagues, with the example of learning specific tactics and approaches used elsewhere to counter narcotics trafficking. Finally, the opportunity to critically reflect on domestic practices in comparison to the host country was mentioned as formative.

Finally, in terms of career development, to avoid secondees perceiving their deployment as an obstacle to their careers at home, some countries (e.g. Germany) have recently established the possibility of receiving a promotion to a higher domestic rank while being deployed.



80% of secondees said they acquired new skills that were useful to their tasks at home

from a survey with Dutch secondees

Maximise the relevance and utility of information

Despite police officers first and foremost serving the mission they are seconded to, solid feedback loops at this stage show the potential for gathering relevant information at the general, “open source” level. Positive feedback from headquarters (HQ) increases both the understanding and motivation of secondees to provide relevant information. Good practices further include the compilation and strategic analysis of the information obtained at HQ level and disseminated via the right channels.

Most countries that are part of this study have systems where secondees have roughly weekly contact with a desk officer or so-called mission manager from the seconding institutions. When the secondment begins, learning objectives, career planning, training, and similar relevant “mission dividend” elements should already be in place. The degree to which this information exchange happens, and includes relevant intelligence, varies widely. In general, interviewed police officers seem unsure what happens with the information they provide and whether it is used. Regular official reports have been institutionalized in most of these cases.

In Sweden, SPA mission managers collect information from contingent leaders, and maintain direct contact with mission members (the intensity of which depends on context), and compile information into monthly mission reports. The reporting is required by the SPA with the main purpose to monitor how the Swedish contingent contributes to the work of the respective mission and to give a short up-date on the security situation and the working environment of the Swedish staff. Every mission that Sweden participates in (even if it is only one individual) has a mission report that is supported by the SPA. Although the quality varies and the reports do not contain sensitive information, it usually includes short security assessments, political updates and the work of different contingent members. Mission reports are then used to shape the Swedish position on mission reviews, bilateral engagements, etc.

Another example is the Netherlands, where the NP shared 52 situation reports and two so-called “flash reports” in 2021, based on 477 reports that came from the secondees. These focus on issues like trafficking in human beings, terrorism, drugs, and irregular migration, and are made by several intelligence staff working for the NP with special focus on international secondments. Additionally, the KMar conducts an intelligence debriefing upon return of candidates to capture more sensitive information. In Germany, beyond official reporting, there is also the possibility of frequent contact with secondees both on the MOI and MFA side, improving the perception of national elements as a direct channel for obtaining information.

In Finland, secondees write a monthly report to CMC Finland. This can include open-source information and inform about the political situation to improve overall situational awareness. There is also the practice of encouraging experts to provide more sensitive information while they are on leave in Finland to have a chat at the ministerial level.

477 reports came from
secondees
of which 52 were shared by the Dutch
National Police in 2021

Put new skills to good use

To make the most out of newly acquired skills and expertise, it pays off to, when possible, match positions and functions upon return.

In most countries, officers are technically guaranteed the ability to return to their previous position. However, in practice their previous positions tend to get filled, which creates internal human resources/administrative issues. Countries are experimenting in different ways with solutions. One approach is to have a more flexible “roster” of officers that can plug emerging gaps (as officers get seconded) as substitutes. An alternative to this substitute strategy, is the Finnish push to temporarily promote more junior officers to gain experience in the temporarily vacated function. The Netherlands for instance has a working group in place to specifically address this issue.

Another approach altogether is to match returning secondees with certain new tasks. In Sweden, officers returning from Somalia were positioned to work in neighbourhoods with significant Somali diaspora populations (with a similar situation in Germany concerning Afghans). Sweden has also tried to develop its “pipeline” of international talent: it supports officers in taking on accessible first missions and uses these as a base to build up significant (and in increasingly heavy-burden duty stations) international experience that can later translate into influential international senior policing positions.

Beyond what seconding institutions can do, successful reintegration often comes down to the returning police officers themselves. This alone is good advice and stimulating officers to be proactive in formulating learning objectives and to secure a post-secondment future can be a useful additional solution.



Finland

In Finland, more junior officers are often temporarily promoted to stand in for secondees while they are deployed. This allows them to gain valuable experience and can boost their careers.



Sweden

Officers returning from Somalia were positioned to work in neighbourhoods with significant Somali diaspora populations

Treat returnees as a strategic asset

Internal security organizations benefit from seeing returnees as a valuable resource by themselves. As a strategic asset, they can bring several key benefits with them if accessible records are maintained of who has served where and on what topics.

Returned secondees form a valuable pool of trained and experienced officers and experts who can function in international crisis environments at short notice. Examples where civilian crisis managers or specialized civilian expertise abroad or at home can come in useful include situations like the immediate aftermath of disasters or public order disturbances. In the Netherlands, this pool became an overnight strategic asset when Hurricane Irma hit St-Martin in 2018, or when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down above Ukraine in 2014. Most police officers are not trained to deploy within days for such international, often politically sensitive crisis missions.

Secondees generally build up extensive networks during their mission and strengthen relationships with many relevant stakeholders. This can prove useful as a future door-opener, should a country aim to engage its bilateral or multilateral engagement in a certain country or region (as was the case with experts seconded to EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya who were able to open doors for FRONTEX), or informal channels for police cooperation through providing access to relevant authorities.


Finally, secondees develop extensive in-country and sometimes thematic expertise that goes beyond local networks in their home country. For example, a returned secondee having worked on irregular migration in the Sahel can be an invaluable resource for policymakers working on these topics back home. Dutch interviewees provided some tangible examples of how valuable counterterrorism mission experience became in a period when Islamic State related terrorism incidents increased in Europe, while a Swedish interviewee who had previously been seconded in Eastern Europe mentioned the solid information/access to the networks that had been built up locally.

Conclusion

In addition to the foreign policy rationale, the benefits of seconding officers to international mission for police organizations has compounding benefits. These include the ability to tackle the roots of transnational criminal phenomena and avoiding spill-over effects from fragile countries (upstream disruption); an improved information situation and access to on-the-ground information of political, security and crime related patterns; significant skill development for secondees that directly benefits their professional tasks upon return; and the creation of a crisis-ready pool of experienced civilian experts to be deployed at short notice.

However, this added value for internal security does not come automatically. Maximizing the benefits takes active engagement at the policy, planning and operational level: enabling institutions, as well as enabling people, to pursue domestic security and foreign policy objectives.

There are a variety of good practices among the countries reviewed for this study. What is clear is that the police and internal security stakeholders interviewed agreed that a higher integration of domestic security rational in police missions will further incentivize police institutions to make officers available. Hopefully this report can serve as a starting point for increased dialogue and awareness on where and how secondments to international police missions can add value for security at home.



References

Belgium Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. 'Belgian Civil Crisis Management Strategy'. Belgium Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, January 2022.

Council of the European Union. 'A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union That Protects Its Citizens, Values and Interests and Contributes to International Peace and Security'. Council of the European Union, 21 March 2022.

———. 'Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting Within the Council, on the Establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact'. Council of the European Union, 19 November 2018.

———. 'EU Council Conclusions on Security and Defence 8396/21'. Council of the European Union, 10 May 2021.

DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. 'SSR Backgrounder - The Police: Roles and Responsibilities in Good Security Sector Governance'. DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2015.

Finland Ministry of Interior. 'Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (1287/2004)'. Finland Ministry of Interior, 2004.

Fiott, Daniel, ed. *The CSDP in 2020: The EU's Legacy and Ambition in Security and Defence*. Paris, France: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2020.

German Bundestag. 'Antwort Der Bundesregierung Auf Die Kleine Anfrage Der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, Weiterer Abgeordneter Und Der Fraktion DIE LINKE - Polizei- Und Zolleinsätze Im Ausland (Stand: Drittes Quartal 2020) (19/25444)'. German Bundestag, 18 December 2020.

———. 'Deutsches Engagement Beim Einsatz von Polizistinnen Und Polizisten In Internationalen Friedensmissionen Stärken Und Ausbauen (18/9662)'. German Bundestag, 20 September 2016.

Government of the Netherlands. 'Note on Dutch Contribution to International Civil Crisis Management'. Government of the Netherlands, 2017.

International Security Sector Advisory Team, DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. 'Mapping of EU Member States' Systems of Secondment to Civilian CSDP'. DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 11 November 2018.

Laan, Franca van der, Luc van de Goor, Rob Hendriks, Jair van der Lijn, Minke Meijnders, and Dick Zandee. 'The Future of Police Missions'. Clingendael Report. The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, February 2016.

Mavrakou, Stefanie. » The Internal - External Security Nexus « - A Contribution to a Better Understanding and Operationalisation of Cooperation between Civilian CSDP and JHA. Berlin, Germany: European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in Berlin, 2021.

Nationale Politie - Team Internationale Politie Uitzendingen. 'TIJU Jaaroverzicht 2021'. Nationale Politie, 2021.

Netherlands House of Representatives. 'Kamerbrief Minister van Justitie - Bijlage 3: Internationale Politiesamenwerking'. Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security (DG Police and Safety Regions), 2 December 2021.

Smit, Timo. 'Towards a More Capable European Union Civilian CSDP'. SIPRI Policy Briefs. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2019.

SPD, Grüne and FDP. 'Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025 Zwischen SPD, Grüne Und FDP: Mehr Fortschritt Wagen - Bündniss Für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit Und Nachhaltigkeit'. Socialdemocratic Party of Germany (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens, Free Democratic Party (FDP), 7 December 2021.

Swedish National Police Board - Division for International Coordination. 'International Development Cooperation of the Swedish Police - Vision, Objectives and Working Method'. Swedish National Police Board, April 2009.

The Swedish Police Authority. 'International Cooperation'. [polisen.se](https://polisen.se/link/401e7c0237b041d0a3f6d6dc94750f20), 2019.
<https://polisen.se/link/401e7c0237b041d0a3f6d6dc94750f20>.

United Nations Police. 'Police Contributors'. United Nations Police, 27 May 2022.
<https://police.un.org/en/police-contributors>.

About DCAF

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and gender equality. Since its founding in 2000, DCAF has contributed to making peace and development more sustainable by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders.

© 2022 DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. DCAF encourages the use, translation, and dissemination of this publication. We do however ask that you acknowledge and cite materials and do not alter the content. All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-92-9222-668-8

In partnership with:



DCAF - Geneva Centre
for Security Sector
Governance
Maison de la Paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
CH-1202 Geneva
Switzerland

 +41 22 730 94 00

 info@dcaf.ch

 www.dcaf.ch

 [@DCAF_Geneva](https://twitter.com/DCAF_Geneva)