

# **Tracking the Development Dividend of SSR**

Research Report

Project supported by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and  
the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

February 2018

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## **Acknowledgements**

The authors are most grateful to Lea Ellmanns for her substantial support in the final editing phase of this report.

The authors would also like to thank all other colleagues, including former and current employees, who contributed with their comments and constructive feedback to this project.

Finally, the authors would like to take this opportunity to thank the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for their financial contribution to this project.

## List of Abbreviations

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFID	the UK's Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy
FCS	fragile and conflict-affected situations
EU	European Union
HDI	Human Development Index
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOFA-ODA	Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Section on Official Development Assistance (MOFA-ODA)
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBF	the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
RBM	results-based management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSG	security sector governance
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	US Agency for International Development

## **1 Introduction**

### **1.1 Background**

Despite use in different contexts, the term *good governance* has always been understood to include the concepts of justice, security and development. At the core of this is the assumption that an effective and accountable security sector is necessary for sustainable development, and that such a security sector should adhere to the principles of justice, human rights and the rule of law in order to achieve this. As a result, good governance of the security sector is crucial, drawing an intrinsic line of interdependence amongst justice, security and development. In line with this, it seems evident that security sector reform and development are indeed correlated. While this is a convincing narrative, the assumed has not been proven.

Security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reform (SSR) refer to the process of transforming the security sector of a certain state to act in accordance with the principles of good governance. SSR has therefore been considered crucial in building a security environment that is conducive to sustainable development. SSR and development both aim to promote peace and justice through inclusive institutions, which require multi-stakeholder mechanisms for sustainable outcomes. This project aimed to analyse how and to which degree SSR could impact development either positively or negatively. Hence, the following questions remain: *Does SSR result in measurable development impacts? How and to what extent are SSG/R and development interdependent, assessed through a large-N SSR context?*

Understanding the linkages between SSR and development would allow the researchers to generalise and produce comparable data necessary to assess and improve the suitability of SSR in helping societies achieve their development and peacebuilding objectives. This project also aimed to develop a shared database that would allow users to save information for their own research needs and a network of experts, which would facilitate the design and implementation of development-sensitive SSR initiatives.

### **1.2 Initial approach**

This report first introduces the methodological risks and challenges, before providing a structural outline of the report. It then develops a conceptual analysis in Part A by first examining linkages between SSR and development are analysed based on one of the authors' contribution entitled "The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument", published in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr, eds., *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012. It then addresses the main research questions and sub-questions by drawing on a series of assumptions, claims, observations and conditions of the interrelations between SSR and development.

Part B focuses on the methodological analysis and outlines the development of the project. This section establishes the SSR activities samples, identifies survey criteria and design, and explains the database. To facilitate understanding of this database, progressive explanations

are offered. In addition, the large-N and the small-n samples for comparative studies are presented.

### ***1.2.1 Assumption and claim***

This report argues that SSR has the potential to advance development objectives. In order to do so, SSR activities should be designed in response to clearly-defined development goals. It is further crucial that SSR actors are mindful of, and aim to mitigate, any potential negative impacts on development.

### ***1.2.2 Main tasks of this project's attempt to address research, policy and practical needs***

This report first outlines the potential of SSR to serve as a development tool. It then analyses the extent to which past and on-going SSR activities have or have not been designed, implemented and evaluated in terms of their expected contributions to development. Systematically surveying and mapping representative samples of major stakeholders involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of SSR activities can contribute to this analysis.

### ***1.2.3 Types of SSR programme to be assessed***

This project considered a range of SSR activities, including comprehensive cross-sectoral programmes, encompassing several security and oversight institutions. It also examined partial and quasi-SSR activities to address particular components of the wider SSR agenda. Thus, the report considered both SSR and non-/quasi-SSR activities, while noting the differences in the focus and impact of such activities with regard to development.

### ***1.2.4 Empirical evidence of the development dividend of SSR to be sought***

The project aimed to generate comparable data on a significant number of SSR activities and contexts (large-N study). It specifically designed the methodology, data collection and analysis to examine stakeholders' experiences and perceptions of the intended and actual impacts of SSR programmes' on national and local development objectives. Data collection focused on the nature of the SSR programmes, the actions and inactions of the actors that implemented them, as well as under which circumstances the activities were carried out. This was done to evaluate whether SSR programmes were designed and implemented in a manner sensitive to development.

### ***1.2.5 Intricacies of SSR-development linkages to be understood***

A study of multiple SSR experiences allows the researcher to produce generalisable data that goes beyond the limited findings produced by a small number of case studies. However, it might not capture some important particularities. The results are expected to identify specific patterns, however additional in-depth country case studies carried out in future studies could reveal the accuracies of observable trends. Thus, the information generated by this project benefits continuing work on assessing and improving SSR's suitability for helping societies achieve development and broader peacebuilding objectives.



### **1.2.6 The findings are presented and shared**

The results of the study's mapping exercise are stored and can be shared with interested parties in a user-friendly database. Later in this report the findings are tested for their ability to generate policy-relevant information, patterns and practical value for activities to plan, implement and evaluate SSR.

### **1.2.7 Project team's qualifications and preceding work**

The study builds on a DCAF report, conducted by the research team, which examined the relevance of the security-development nexus for SSR-development linkages (*Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*). This project was concluded in October 2011 and the results were published in January 2012. Amongst other findings, it emphasised the need for a large-N empirical study as to assess the relationship between SSR and development. Examining different SSR contexts (SSR and "SSR-like" programme activities) would allow the successes and challenges of associating SSR platforms with development objectives and mechanisms to be analysed with more accuracy. An external reviewer called on the research team to examine multiple SSR experiences in order to generate insights beyond the assumptions that still dominate analyses of SSR-development interactions, which are largely not empirically sound. The project also draws on and contributes to previous work done by DCAF and other organizations on the theory-reality gap of SSR, the implementation of SSR in challenging environments, SSR's contribution to sustainable development, as well as policy-relevant and SSR-relevant aspects of the security-development nexus.

## **1.3 Adjustments to the initial approach**

Throughout the course of this project, it became evident that this area of research has mostly been neglected by the international research community. Very little background literature has been published; the research team could therefore not build on well-established research methodologies and databases with relevant information. Rather, it had to elaborate its own procedural method. As a result, this project placed more emphasis on choosing a useful methodology, creating adequate indicators and establishing a sound architecture for the database.

## **1.4 Final approach and outline**

This research report focuses on a conceptual analysis (part A) and a methodological analysis (part B). In the conceptual analysis, the report examines the security-development nexus and argues that security sector reform is essentially a development tool. In the methodological analysis, the report presents details on our survey approach for the large-N case study and provides information on the nature and design of the initial database (Database 1.0) and its upgraded version (Database 2.0). Furthermore, the report outlines possibilities and limits for qualitative and quantitative manipulation of the data.

DCAF's previous research identified considerable difficulties in identifying and applying an appropriate set of indicators to measure a potential correlation between SSR development, in terms of their respective objectives and outcomes. This project used different indicators to overcome this challenge.

Initial research has shown that case studies would become too extensive to be meaningful, going beyond the scope of the project. Thus, the research team decided to concentrate their efforts on collecting data for a large-N study. The aim of collecting data on 50 to 100 SSR activities and programmes has been largely surpassed: The final sample covers 174 SSR activities and programmes (subsequently also named 'SSR interventions').

The databases (Database 1.0 and 2.0) contain factual background information on the SSR interventions chosen for the study, as well as survey results of the large-N study. These databases allow users to retrieve information and manipulate the dataset to meet their own research needs, and evolved significantly throughout this project.

Database 1.0 is made up of five spreadsheets containing all 174 SSR activities and programmes. In order to facilitate comparison, a taxonomy with different variables has been introduced, including location; duration; funders; objectives; written statements; the question if national development strategy was included; perceived development impacts and intended and unintended development spin-offs; implemented in a post-conflict context, etc. (see Figure 3). Database 2.0 offers the opportunity to store and share the results of qualitative mapping results, to code binary and to design simple quantitative assessment tools.

In addition to generating comparable data on SSR activities and contexts, the project's applied methodology and subsequent analysis provides insights into the intended and actual impacts on national development objectives.

## **PART A: Conceptual Analysis**

### **2 The Security-Development Nexus and SSR as a Development Tool**

The purpose of this section is to situate the SSR-development nexus in the context of the broader security-development discussion. It further aims to establish the development objective of SSR and highlight the need for analysing SSR as a development instrument. This section also addresses the current lack of sound reflection about hypothesised and verifiable empirical evidence of SSG's and SSR's connection with development outcomes. The development impact of SSG and SSR are neither understood nor empirically established. This section attempts to highlight the need to further examine the SSG/R-development link and (inter-)dependence.<sup>1</sup>

More than a decade after 9/11, the world is in the midst of mass uprisings across Northern Africa and the Middle East. It appears evident that it is ineffective to pursue humanitarian assistance, development assistance and security sector reform as part of larger political and military campaigns to counter potential threats to national, regional or global security. One has to focus first on the development and security needs of the affected populations. An exclusively outward focus does not lead to locally supported and owned, and thus sustainable, results. Moreover, as the wave of uprisings known as the Arab Spring shows and the recent World Development Report 2011 (WDR) confirms, effective, democratically controlled and legitimate security and justice institutions are crucial for peace, stability and sustainable development. Furthermore, development and security assistance must prioritise the needs and interests of the country's population, rather than those of the state or elites. This is critical to achieve locally owned and sustainable results.

The security-development nexus posits that there is an interaction between the security situation and development outcomes, between the development situation and security outcomes, and between performance and outcomes in security and development assistance. SSR contributes to making this interdependence mutually beneficial. It further helps to ensure that the security and development communities interact constructively, without compromising their respective mandates. Ideally, this interaction would be closely coordinated from the planning to the implementation and the evaluation phases.

This volume examines some of the recent experiences with SSR in fragile, often post-conflict states. These experiences reinforce the need to commit to full-scale strategies instead of cutting short key objectives and principles by settling on light or quasi-SSR approaches. These all too often renege on the governance dimension and cross-sectoral, holistic approaches needed for the hoped-for 'reform' aspects to take hold and flourish. Attention must also (re)focus on the core contribution of SSR as a development assistance instrument. This requires honest efforts to reassert evidence of how development is affected when SSR is conducted as a development exercise rather than a traditional defence reform or civil-military assistance project. SSR is a tool to achieve both security and development by synchronising security with development objectives so that both support, not harm, each

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<sup>1</sup> The following section draws on Schnabel, A., 'The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument', in: Schnabel, A. and Farr Vanessa (eds.) *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, (Switzerland: Geneva, DCAF, LIT, 2012).

other. The interdependence between development and SSR is significant and mutually beneficial. If SSR is pursued according to its original objectives, advantages of closer cooperation between security and development communities will outweigh possible disadvantages.

To support this argument, this report examines three puzzles: the relationship between security and development, the role of SSR as the foundation of the interaction between security and development, and the contribution made by SSR to development objectives and outcomes.

SSR is examined as a hybrid activity that improves a society's capacity to pursue both security and development. Yet the security-development nexus does not mean conflating security and development goals, activities and timelines. SSR advocates the ideals of a security- development nexus in practice and follows, a very simple logic: without the provision of a minimum level of security, safety and stability, the pursuit of development objectives is ineffective. However, ensuring that inputs into security simultaneously advance development prospects is a more complex endeavour. If the right balance is not found, long-term security and stability are threatened. Despite this, SSR can yield benefits for both security and development communities. In the human security paradigm, both safety and economic well-being are key ingredients of a stable society with a promising future. SSR ensures that a nation's security institutions are effective, provide for the safety and security of the population and the state. It further provides that security sector institutions are overseen and controlled by civil society organizations and democratically elected representatives. The intention is to ensure that the security sector offers protection from external and internal threats without itself becoming a threat. SSR in theory results in an environment that is safer, and less prone to violence and instability, and thus encourages economic growth, poverty reduction and human development.

In reality, SSR's security mandate has been more pronounced than its development mandate. This has been evident particularly in post-conflict societies. It is commonly considered to be an activity only for the security community. In addition, it is sometimes perceived as being little different from earlier interventions on civil-military relations, rather than a genuinely new activity designed to meet both security and development objectives. The focus is therefore on the substantial gap between assertions of SSR's contribution to the security-development nexus and its actual contribution to development on the ground. Does SSR provide an effective bridge between security and development, advancing both for mutual benefit? From a policy perspective, and in the way it has been embraced by national and international actors in their security and development policies for transitional states in need of security sector reforms, it could be argued that SSR does provide an effective bridge between security and development. This is further reinforced when considering that the frequently mentioned fear of development actors of undue securitisation is not as pronounced as is often argued. In reality, many development actors support SSR activities. The practice has been recognised and accelerated by the OECD's decision to make many aspects previously characterised as security support now qualify as official development assistance (ODA) activities. This has been done to recognise the importance of security-related contributions as a base activity for development actors. Moreover, such initiatives by development actors significantly increase the chance for

development-sensitive security interventions taking shape.

## **2.1 Security, development and the security-development nexus**

SSR as a concept, process and practice has evolved from attempts within the development community to engage with security-related challenges that have become increasingly relevant to its activities in fragile and post-conflict societies.

While the security-development nexus is of considerable relevance to SSR, it is not necessarily easy to grasp. As Stern and Öjendal point out, ‘Understanding, responding to or enacting a security-development nexus promises to be a daunting project.’<sup>2</sup> This supports the assumption that there is in fact a security-development nexus, that SSR is an embodiment of this nexus serving security and development objectives both separately and concurrently, and that SSR can therefore be considered a development project as much as a security project.

The different relationships in the nexus are discussed here, beginning with a brief examination of the concepts of security and development – what each is or is not, and how each can be understood and utilised conceptually and practically. The notion of a nexus between security and development will be then discussed, before turning to the relationships between SSR and security and, the main subject, between SSR and development.

### **2.1.1 Understanding security**

The end of the Cold War commenced in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A range of ‘new’ security threats emerged, triggering a number of major changes in the security debate. First, the concept of ‘security’ was expanded, as the preoccupation with a bipolar world order between East and West, the arms race and a potential nuclear Armageddon gave way to a focus on intra-state conflicts. This shift was accompanied by increased public and official focus on ethnic and minority conflicts, and expanded later to include environmental and other (root) causes of armed violence. Greater emphasis was placed on the prevention of violent conflict as well as on something new and bold: attention was given to options for external efforts to prevent internal conflict. These efforts were in part spearheaded by the United Nations (UN). Prominent advocates of this new thinking were UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’ defined much of the subsequent policy and academic debate. This was followed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who wanted the United Nations and the international community of states, as well as other actors such as the business community, to move from a ‘culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?’, *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 5 (2010): 6.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization’, Supplement no. 1 (A/54/1) (New York: United Nations, 31 August 1999), available at [www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/54/plenary/a54-1.pdf](http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/54/plenary/a54-1.pdf): para. 61.

A better understanding and appreciation emerged about the significance of structural violence, such as the inequalities and injustices between the rich and poor, North and South, men and women, in contributing to conflict. These newly accentuated facets of insecurity brought about a new understanding of how security is perceived and experienced by different sexes, ethnic groups, elites and individuals. It became evident that multiple forms of insecurity affect different people at different times and for diverse reasons. The idea that 'security' could be delivered in the same way, at the same time, but in different locations, began to be questioned. Such an examination of cause, effect and remedy was more suited to expose the real, interlinked origins of many violent conflicts. As a direct result, the multi-layered nature of insecurity and underdevelopment was understood as both the roots and the triggers of social tensions, conflict escalation and armed violence. Broader, more comprehensive definitions and approaches to security began to emerge.

Nonetheless, there are drawbacks to this broadening of the concept. The simplicity of characterising the so-called 'long peace'<sup>4</sup> of the Cold War as a bipolar struggle between two easily discernible ideologically, geo-strategically and geo-politically opposed camps has given way to a much more complex security concept. This also makes it more difficult to analyse security and insecurity. It also complicates the designing of complex strategies for security provision. Further, the increasing number of international and national actors, whose security inputs need coordination, is emerging as a new challenge.

However, a considerable shift has taken place. Threats are no longer only identified in terms of national security and insecurity; and response strategies no longer focus exclusively on serving ideational and ideological security objectives defined by political elites, into which all other security dimensions and actors are simply subsumed. Furthermore, human and group security needs at home and abroad are no longer of secondary concern to national political security concerns.

Traditionally, the security and rights of individuals and groups could be sacrificed for the sake of national security objectives, even in democracies. This occurred without much resistance from populations that trusted, or did not engage much with, the arguments of their political leaders. A similar dynamic developed in the aftermath of 9/11. Civil liberties were sacrificed for what were perceived to be larger national and global security interests. Likewise, resources for security provision focused on the political and military aspects of security: the defence of borders, investment in the quality and quantity of military personnel, material and equipment, and the support of countries that belonged to the same ideological camp. Other needs, especially structural security, were only addressed when resources were available and populations claimed the right to argue for responses to different needs and entitlements through democratic decision-making processes. In countries with less wealth and political participation, structural insecurity was at best a distant secondary priority for their governments.

Such approaches are now clearly outdated and have given rise to a widespread shift in thinking and argumentation. New security debates helped us to refocus on the multidimensional nature of security, away from a politically and ideologically motivated

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<sup>4</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', *International Security* 10, no. 4 (1986): 99–142.

oversimplification to the empirically and reality- driven complexity of security provision that we see today. Comparing, understanding, matching and merging security and development concerns and responses are the only logical consequences of such new thinking. Human security, as a holistic concept, has the simple goal of making people safer at the core of the organizations, institutions and processes that were created to meet our human needs and offer protection from threats to our survival and well-being.

In such 'new security' thinking, both horizontal and vertical dynamics are at play. The horizontal encompasses different thematic dimensions of 'security'. The militaristic dimension refers to the role of armed forces; military doctrine; defence; deterrence; arms control; military alliances; demilitarisation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); the wider scope of the security sector; SSR, and security governance. The political dimension includes norms and values, democracy and the stability of the political system. The economic dimension refers to public finances, currency stability, trade balance and access to or dependence on resources. The environmental dimension relates to the depletion and use of natural resources, climate change, biological diversity, the greenhouse effect, global warming and access to water. The social dimension includes issues of culture, religion, identity, language, minorities, gender equality, human rights and health. Lastly, the personal dimension of security includes issues of crime, domestic violence and human trafficking.

The vertical dynamic of security alludes to the different dimensions of insecurity and our analytical responses to them. Firstly, there is global security, meaning those threats that are relevant across borders and require international, even global, responses. The globalisation of world trade exacerbates local vulnerability to fluctuating global economic dynamics. Financial or political instability in one country affects the wider region and the world. The United Nations was created in part to address such global threats. Secondly, regional security addresses conflicts that have cross-border and regional repercussions in terms of causes and responses. Most regional organizations were created to enhance regional security by means of support to their members' national security and/or economic growth and development. Thirdly, national security is the main preoccupation of national decision-makers who are, at least in democracies, mainly accountable to their fellow citizens. The challenge with national security interests is that at times they are misunderstood or seen too narrowly, so that larger dynamics, such as regional and global perspectives, get lost. A narrow focus on national security can also cause local-level distortions when it prioritises the security and well-being of the state, the government and the ruling elite at the expense of the population. The human security concept, which works both at home and abroad, aims to correct this problem. It articulates well with the assumption that when human security is provided for, national, regional and global security will also benefit.

Differential interpretations of whose security matters – or matters most – are not new. However, focusing on the individual and communities as the main referent objects of security – rather than the state – is novel and potentially very sensitive. It challenges state sovereignty and forces new questions, for example on the role of the state vis-à-vis its citizens. How can human security concerns be met when political authorities and elites prioritise their own interests and cannot or do not want to focus on the needs of the population? From the perspective of states, international organizations and many

researchers, the answer is uncontested: the state remains in its current, central position but acknowledges its responsibility and accountability both to the population and the international community of states. Thus new security thinking has paved the way for a new approach to state sovereignty, with human security as the essential ingredient. Concepts and emerging norms such as the 'responsibility to protect' are among the outcomes of such new thinking.

Human security is based on the assumption that threats to the basic human needs of individuals and communities cause human suffering, as well as social and communal deterioration. Ultimately, they can trigger direct and structural violence, possibly leading to armed violence. This, in turn, increases human frustration and feeds into a vicious, cyclical relationship. In contrast, if individuals and communities feel secure and protected from the existential threats that emerge from social, political and economic injustice, military violence, environmental disruptions or natural disasters — then individual human suffering and communal, regional and international conflict can be significantly reduced. In other words, if their human security is protected and guaranteed, then conflict can be mitigated. The concept of human security focuses not only on armed conflict and its consequences for civilians, but also on many non-traditional security threats, including disease and economic, environmental or inter-group security threats. Moreover, the human costs of non-traditional security threats – those not related to armed conflict, which reportedly has been declining – are devastating. It is now understood that such threats can escalate into armed violence and conflict.

When the concept of human security was introduced in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR), it was used as a comprehensive approach to encompass all threats to human rights, security and development experienced by individuals and communities. Human security was intended to represent a key instrument or agenda to fight poverty and improve human livelihoods. It was seen as providing both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. Furthermore, human security introduced, from a development perspective, the security and development conundrum to a larger global community of practitioners, policy-makers and researchers.

Since then, many governments and international organizations have acknowledged the concept of human security as an important item on their national and international security and development agendas. As Brzoska notes:

*the concept has given somewhat more intellectual depth to the development donors' idea of reducing military expenditure. Here was a concept that justified looking hard at the level of military expenditure, taking into account all threats to the survival and health of people. In fact, the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report unabashedly argued for deep cuts in military expenditure ... On the other hand, by arguing that violence was but one threat among many to peoples' lives, it helped the development donor community take all threats – including those from violence – seriously. If development policy needed to address all threats to life and health, the development donors could also claim responsibility for all such*



*policies, including those addressing protection from the threat of collective or individual violence*<sup>5</sup>.

Human security has been promoted particularly by governments and non-governmental organizations that put less emphasis on traditional power politics, especially geostrategic politics. This includes countries such as Sweden, Norway, Japan, Switzerland, Canada and other members of the Human Security Network, an informal group of countries that is devoted to the promotion of the human security concept. Former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy's introduction of the concept in the UN Security Council during Canada's 1999–2000 presidency of the Council and Japan's initiative of the Commission on Human Security have given it prominence and worldwide recognition. The call for a return to a human security focus expressed in the recent WDR 2011 has revitalised the concept after some years of silence in academic and policy debates.

Human security has been at the forefront of the debate on the security-development nexus. The OECD acknowledged this shift in its 2001 guidelines, arguing that the new conceptualisation of security 'includes the responsibility, principally of the state, to ensure the well-being of people. As a consequence, discussion of security issues, "systems" and actors has become comprehensive and no longer refers to military systems only.'<sup>6</sup> Human security focuses on the individual and the population as the 'referent objects' of security, which in the first instance refers to individuals, communities and populations. Two important dimensions define responses to human security threats. Firstly, measures need to be put in place to reduce or prevent them, as prevention has also been reintroduced as an important approach to security and development by the WDR 2011. Secondly, people's coping capacities need to be strengthened to adapt to ongoing human insecurity. As Mark Duffield so pointedly observes:

*In order to understand the nature and implications of the contemporary development-security nexus, development and underdevelopment are reconceived biopolitically. Rather than a labour of theory, however, this is more a question of drawing out how aid policy itself now attentively focuses on issues of life and community; on how life can be supported, maintained and enhanced; and within what limits and level of need people are required to live. In terms of development discourse, the emergence of concepts such as human development and human security are important. UNDP, for example, launched its annual Human Development Report in 1990, dedicating it to 'ending the mismeasure of human progress by economic growth alone' ... Where human development marks the formal shift from an earlier economic paradigm to a 'people-centred' frame of development for the global south, human security effects a*

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<sup>5</sup> See Michael Brzoska, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform', DCAF Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva: DCAF, November 2003) : 20.

<sup>6</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), *DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris: OECD, 2001): 37. Cited in Brzoska, note 4 above: 19.

*similar change in relation to security.*<sup>7</sup>

Some protagonists of human security favour a narrow definition of the concept, which focuses only on freedom from fear. As it is politically more expedient and intellectually simpler, personal security, immediate threats of violent conflict are the main focus and objective of the provision and maintenance of a negative peace. Under such conditions there would be no armed conflict, and little or no violent crime. However, people would continue to suffer from structural violence. They might not run the risk of getting killed by an armed group or government forces, but they might die or suffer from hunger or lack of medical services. Others have taken a different approach. The 1994 HDR and the Commission on Human Security's report 'Human Security Now' both argue that a broader range of threats, including existential threats to individuals, must be addressed regardless of their source<sup>8</sup>. The Commission on Human Security argues that 'Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that, together, provide people with the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.'<sup>9</sup> This broad approach to human security overlaps heavily with the human development agenda and embodies the intersectional dynamics observed in the security-development nexus.

### **2.1.2 Understanding development**

In order to grasp the role security and SSR play in development, we need to understand what development stands for and what the development community hopes to achieve through its assistance in countries that require support in meeting minimum human development standards. The term *human development* shows that development is not merely about economic growth and poverty reduction, but also addresses people's humanity and their political, economic and social rights as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The analysis of a number of key definitions and approaches to development and the recollection of some major indicators used to measure it would give an impression of the human condition that is to be affected and improved by development assistance. This also applies to the definitions used by some donor nations' development agencies, particularly those which already embrace security and SSR-related issues in their approaches to development assistance.

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<sup>7</sup> Mark Duffield, 'The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide', *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 53.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP, note 14 above; Commission on Human Security, 'Human Security Now' (New York: CHS, 2003), available at [www.resdal.org/ultimos-documentos/com-seg-hum.pdf](http://www.resdal.org/ultimos-documentos/com-seg-hum.pdf): 4; Albrecht Schnabel and Heinz Krummenacher, 'Towards a Human Security-Based Early Warning and Response System', in *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*, eds Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, John Grin, Czeslaw Mesjasz, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou and Heinz Krummenacher (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2009): 1253–1264.

<sup>9</sup> Commission on Human Security, *ibid.*: 4.

Since its first publication in 1990, UNDP's annual HDR has significantly shaped development thinking globally and, with regional human development reports, in specific regional contexts. Its Human Development Index (HDI) presents agenda-setting data and analysis. The HDI calls international attention to issues and policy options that put people at the centre of strategies aimed at meeting the challenges of development'<sup>10</sup>. UNDP's 1996 HDR, entitled *Economic Growth and Human Development*, notes that 'Human development went far beyond income and growth to cover the full flourishing of all human capabilities. It emphasized the importance of putting people – their needs, their aspirations, their choices – at the centre of the development effort.' The report argues that 'human development can be expressed as a process of enlarging people's choices'. The 1997 HDR, *Human Development to Eradicate Poverty*, defines human development as 'widening people's choices and the level of well-being they achieve'. It explains that 'regardless of the level of development, the three essential choices for people are to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. Human development does not end there, however. Other choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive, and enjoying self-respect and guaranteed human rights.'<sup>11</sup> The HDR's indicators of human development reflect a broad range of factors that measure the economic condition, livelihood and various aspects of structural security and insecurity.

As a global initiative to focus attention worldwide on building a safer and more prosperous and equitable world, 189 world leaders at the UN endorsed the Millennium Declaration in September 2000. The declaration was translated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), consisting of eight time-bound and measurable goals that were to be reached by 2015. The first goal envisions the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, including the reduction of the proportion of people whose income is less than US\$1 a day and the proportion who suffer from hunger by half. The second goal targets the achievement of universal primary education, ensuring that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. The third goal focuses on the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015. The fourth goal envisions the reduction of the mortality of children under five by two-thirds. The fifth goal focuses on improvements in maternal health by reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters. The sixth goal aims to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases by halting and reversing their spread. The seventh goal addresses the need to ensure environmental sustainability by integrating principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes, reversing the loss of environmental resources, halving the number of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, and improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. The eighth goal is dedicated to the creation of a global

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<sup>10</sup> See '20 Years of Global Human Development Reports', available on UNDP's website at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/>.

<sup>11</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1996: Economic Growth and Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); UNDP, *Human Development Report 1997: Human Development to Eradicate Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Cited in Sabina Alkire, 'Human Development: Definitions, Critiques, and Related Concepts', Human Development Research Paper 2010/01 (New York: UNDP, June 2010), available at [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP\\_2010\\_01.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP_2010_01.pdf): 7–8. These concepts in the HDR were very much influenced by Amartya Sen's concept of entitlements. See Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

partnership for development by building and expanding an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system; addressing special needs of the least developed countries, landlocked countries and small island developing states; dealing with developing countries' debt; cooperating with developing countries; implementing strategies for decent work for youth; and, in cooperation with the private sector, making available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.<sup>12</sup> Notably, the MDGs do not mention traditional security threats, direct violence or their impacts on development. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to imagine how many of these objectives can be reached outside an environment where the safety and security of the population and the state are guaranteed. Moreover, even where progress has been made, internal instability, organised crime, armed violence or even large-scale conflict reverses improvements that may have been made towards meeting the MDGs, as well as more general human development and human security objectives. A supportive security sector, along with a stable, functioning and well-governed state, is a crucial element to create an enabling environment for achieving and maintaining sustainable human development. Development agencies have recognised this, yet this recognition alone has not put to rest their critical and sceptical attitude towards collaborating closer with the security community in a common pursuit of presumably common goals.

As Brzoska noted in his influential 2003 study, development agencies showed different degrees of enthusiasm for SSR: 'The willingness of development donors to engage and work with the new concept of security sector reform has differed markedly from agency to agency in the years since it was first coined. The UK government, which took the lead, has found a number of followers in the Nordic countries, as well as in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and the United States.'<sup>13</sup> However, in recent years development ministries and agencies around the globe have incorporated security issues into their definitions of and criteria for development aid. This has included activities very specifically related to SSR, presumably following the OECD's decision to make SSR activities ODA-eligible, as discussed below. The following highlights a small selection of development donors' approaches to development and SSR activities.

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) focuses on accelerating economic growth, fostering functioning and effective states by investing in people and promoting regional stability and cooperation. Its aid categories include disability, disaster risk reduction, economic growth, education, environment, food security, gender equality, governance, health, human rights, infrastructure, the MDGs, mine action, regional stability, rural development, as well as water and sanitation. Specific SSR projects include, among others, aid to strengthen Vanuatu's police services (2002), the Australia-East Timor Police Development Programme (2008– 2010), and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands since 2002.<sup>14</sup>

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) invests in advancing food security,

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<sup>12</sup> UNDP, 'Fast Facts: Millennium Development Goals' (New York: UNDP, 3 March 2011), available at [www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/librarypage/results/millenniumdevelopment-goals.html](http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/librarypage/results/millenniumdevelopment-goals.html).

<sup>13</sup> Michael Brzoska, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform', DCAF Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva: DCAF, November 2003) : 4

<sup>14</sup> The information is drawn from the AusAID website, available at [www.ausaid.gov.au/](http://www.ausaid.gov.au/)

securing the future of children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth. Among its specific goals, it aims to reduce the frequency and intensity of violent conflict, and to increase civilian oversight, accountability and transparency of security systems. CIDA's specific SSR projects range from training and professional development of the Haitian National Police's managerial staff (2008–2015) to assistance in reforming the correctional system in Serbia through a grant to the Council of Europe<sup>15</sup>.

The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) offers development support to ensure people's freedom from poverty, fear, degradation, powerlessness and abuse, but also freedom to take charge of one's own destiny and responsibility for one's own life. DANIDA focuses on growth and development; freedom; democracy and human rights; gender equality; stability and fragility; as well as environment and climate issues. Within its programmatic area of conflict prevention activities, DANIDA contributes to nation-building and democratisation, both from the top down (involving state institutions and local authorities) and bottom up (involving civil society organisations and the private sector). It expects to achieve this through the promotion of and respect for human freedom and human rights, strengthening the rule of law, reform of the security sector, inclusive political processes and a responsible and more efficient state. DANIDA is currently engaged in setting up a whole-of-government stabilisation, security and justice sector development and peace-building programme in the East Africa/Horn of Africa/Yemen region<sup>16</sup>.

Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) promotes freedom and development for all, and assistance in securing a life without poverty, fear and environmental destruction. SSR is one of its key activities, designed to transform the state's entire security system through multi-stakeholder processes, the promotion of democratic norms, the enforcement of the state's monopoly of force, and democratic control of the security sector. BMZ is involved in a wide array of SSR and SSR-related activities, ranging from justice sector reform training of police and ex-combatants to support for former child soldiers. German International Cooperation (GIZ) is involved in promoting civilian security and community policing, improving accountability and quality management in the judicial sector, advancing democratic control of security institutions and DDR programming. It is active in a number of countries, ranging from Cambodia to Afghanistan, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Morocco, Uganda and the Occupied Palestinian Territory<sup>17</sup>.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Section on Official Development Assistance (MOFA-ODA) defines its objectives as contributing 'to the peace and development of the international community ... thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity'. Few donors formally link their development activities so closely with national security and economic interests. Priority areas include poverty reduction, sustainable growth, addressing global issues and peace-building. MOFA-ODA recognises SSR as 'one of the critical foundations of a state and ... an essential element for the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as for rebuilding the life of the local population'. Its activities focus on DDR in Afghanistan (especially of armed groups), military, police and justice reform in the

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<sup>15</sup> The information is drawn from the CIDA website, available at [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/home](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/home).

<sup>16</sup> The information is drawn from the DANIDA website, available at <http://um.dk/en/danidaen/>.

<sup>17</sup> The information is drawn from the BMZ website, available at [www.bmz.de/en/](http://www.bmz.de/en/); and the German International Cooperation website, available at [www.giz.de/en/home.html](http://www.giz.de/en/home.html).

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), human resource and infrastructure development in East Timor and public sector reform in Mongolia. The Japan International Cooperation Agency is also actively involved in SSR programmes, particularly in Afghanistan and Cambodia<sup>18</sup>.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' International Development Programme (with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) focuses on fighting poverty and bringing about social justice. In its understanding of development, one of the key factors is 'a well-functioning state that safeguards peace, security and human rights, delivers basic services to the population, and ensures that there are good conditions for healthy economic activity and trade'. SSR cooperation programmes exist with Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Indonesia. Activities include various SSR programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2011), Liberia (2008), Afghanistan (2005), the DRC (2009), Ukraine (2007) and Sudan (2005– 2010)<sup>19</sup>.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) aims to 'help create conditions that will enable poor people to improve the quality of their lives'. It asserts that 'by reducing injustices and poverty throughout the world, better opportunities are created for development, peace and security for all people and nations'. Among SIDA's five key areas for development, peace and security feature prominently. This is because the organization considers armed conflict and post-conflict situations as some of the main obstacles for development and poverty reduction in the world. It approaches SSR as one of the tools available to promote peace and security, and has been supporting SSR-related institutional reforms and capacity-building activities in South Africa, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, the DRC and Liberia, among others<sup>20</sup>.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has been instrumental in developing the SSR concept. DFID broadly focuses on furthering sustainable development and improving the welfare of populations. Reducing poverty, guaranteeing respect for human rights and other international obligations, improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency, and fighting corruption are key issues in reaching these goals. It defines security and justice sector reform as 'a people-centred approach to justice and security', with rule of law, accountability, transparency, accessibility and affordability as central components on this agenda. DFID highlights the establishment of democratic control over the security sector; capable, professional and accountable security services and justice systems; and a supportive culture for these reform objectives with the political, security and justice leadership. DFID is currently involved in over 20 SSR projects in Sudan, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and numerous other countries<sup>21</sup>.

Similar to Japan, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) openly links its development goals to its national interests. It defines development assistance as 'programs,

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<sup>18</sup> The information is drawn from the MOFA-ODA website, available at [www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/)

<sup>19</sup> The information is drawn from the website of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Development Programme, available at [www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development\\_cooperation.html?id=1159](http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development_cooperation.html?id=1159); and the website of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, available at [www.norad.no/en/](http://www.norad.no/en/)

<sup>20</sup> The information is drawn from the SIDA website, available at [www.sida.se/English/](http://www.sida.se/English/).

<sup>21</sup> The information is drawn from the DFID website, available at [www.dfid.gov.uk/](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/).

projects, and activities carried out by USAID that improve the lives of the citizens of developing countries while furthering U.S. foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth'. USAID has been active in SSR and SSR-related programmes in numerous countries spanning the entire globe<sup>22</sup>.

This brief review of several donors' self-proclaimed development objectives shows that not only are many of those objectives closely linked to the stabilisation and improvement of government services for the poor, but that security-related activities – including SSR – are considered critical in facilitating the provision of development assistance and making the results of such assistance sustainable and impactful. Nevertheless, concerns remain about reaching too far beyond one's core development activities.

### ***2.1.3 Securitising development and/or developmentalising security?***

The overview of development donors' engagement with security related issues highlights frequent engagement with these issues, which attests to the centrality of justice, security, violence and conflict management for development work.

Yet, both security and development actors are wary of working so closely with the other community due to uncertainty about the impact, possibly through joint activities, that it has on their preparedness and capacity to address their core business. There is a tendency among policy-makers to merge political-military and humanitarian- development activities with a broader trend towards the politicisation of aid. Humanitarian and development action is treated as a political instrument in violent conflicts or a substitute for political action in regions that are peripheral to national strategic interests. Military support of such assistance activities might be seen as a legitimate instrument in the toolbox of conflict management. In some cases, however, humanitarian or development 'labels' are abused to justify political or military action – a development characteristic of international actors' post-9/11 campaign in Afghanistan<sup>23</sup>.

The early academic debate on 'securitisation' in the 1990s highlights a similar phenomenon: a horizontal broadening of a plethora of security issues, from poverty to health and the environment, combined with efforts to establish the direct or indirect links of such issues to a potential escalation to armed conflict. This approach has elevated some of these threats, which were previously not at the centre of traditional security thinking, to the level of serious national security concerns. Addressing them would, in turn, require and possibly trigger responses equal to those that meet traditional major national security threats, such as nuclear arms proliferation. Securitising a 'non-traditional' security threat would thus

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<sup>22</sup> The information is drawn from the USAID website, available at [www.usaid.gov/](http://www.usaid.gov/). See also Nicole Ball, 'Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States', PPC Issue Paper 11 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2005).

<sup>23</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, Marc Krupanski and Ina Amann, 'Military Protection for Humanitarian Assistance Operations – Roles, Experiences, Challenges and Opportunities', report for Directorate for Security and Defence Policy of Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (Geneva: DCAF, May 2010): 40. See also Albrecht Schnabel, Marc Krupanski and Ina Amann, 'Military Protection for Humanitarian Assistance Operations? Guidelines, Experiences, Challenges and Options', paper presented at 16th International Humanitarian Conference: Humanitarian Space, organized by Webster University Geneva with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 27–28 January 2011.

attach enough significance and urgency to raise it to a top national security concern. Critics could not help but notice an inherent danger in such reasoning. In cases where a particular threat – such as poverty or HIV/AIDS, for example – could not be convincingly linked to an eventual outbreak of violent armed conflict, its significance as a key issue for immediate preventive action may in fact decrease. It was feared that threats not obviously correlated with potential armed conflict would fall through the cracks of national and international security and conflict management, thus drawing less, not more, attention to a number of the new threats identified in new security thinking.

On a more practical level, there is great fear that the collaboration of security and development communities in the design and implementation of joint projects, including jointly planned and administered SSR programmes, may lead to a ‘takeover’ by one agenda and one set of actors. While a lead actor often takes the initiative to provide guidance for the purposes of expediency and efficiency such leadership can skew the nature of the joint activity. It is feared that due to its organisationally more rigorous structure and culture, financial capacities, access and territorial reach; members of the security community will dominate and possibly take over. More research is needed to generate empirical knowledge on this tension and address the extent to which this actually occurs. This is crucial to either confirm or disprove the validity of fears within the development community that development assistance is being securitised and militarised. Strong evidence for the likely domination of the security community over the development community in shared missions could end joint initiatives, re-create silos, add parallel tracks in the pursuit of similar objectives, and create considerable duplication and confusion in the implementation of joint programmes for the common good.

The security community also has its concerns. In modern multidimensional and complex peace operations, the military and civilian components are increasingly tasked with delivering humanitarian assistance and aid. Security actors are not necessarily interested in closer cooperation with development actors: military forces in particular fear the developmentalisation of their missions. They fear that merging their tasks and operations with development (and humanitarian aid) activities will pressure them to move beyond their initial mandates to provide public security and protect the personnel of civilian humanitarian and relief missions. In complex emergencies, this might complicate or even compromise their military missions. This is particularly concerning in early stabilisation phases after the formal conclusion of an armed conflict. Moreover, military troops are not always fully trained for and sensitised to the needs of humanitarian and development activities, thereby increasing the risk of unintentionally engaging in inappropriate behaviour towards civilians in these activities and triggering public relations disasters in the mission and at home.

Still, the securitisation debate needs to be more balanced. Depending on what one considers to be the hallmarks of the ‘security’ concept, securitisation is not necessarily synonymous with militarisation. If we perceive it as encompassing both structural and direct security, particularly in the context of the broader security (sector) community, securitisation may be as much about improved justice provision and reducing government corruption as it is about providing military assistance to stabilise post- conflict situations.

Security and development – as well as their ‘offspring’ SSR and human security – are



concepts and activities that do not have to compromise each other's objectives as long as they are not pursued as part of highly politicised or misappropriated agendas. If the latter is the case, and unfortunately the ongoing military engagements in both Afghanistan and Iraq are strong cases of misappropriated SSR, the common bases for otherwise constructive and fruitful joint objectives and collaboration, supported by complementary modes of operation, are jeopardised. If development activities become militarised and military operations become developmentalised, both SSR and human security objectives will be eroded, and lose their legitimacy and utility for both donor and recipient communities.

#### **2.1.4 Understanding – or envisioning – a security-development nexus**

In a volume on the linkages between security and development, its editors argue that while 'The call for greater convergence between security and development policies emerged in response to the complex and interlocking humanitarian, human rights, security, and development crises that confronted international policymakers in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War ... interestingly, academic researchers initially had little to offer to the international policy debates and were slow in removing the blinders of their particular disciplines so as to better examine the linkages between security and development.'<sup>24</sup> All the same, there has been a continuous 'stream of policy documents by international institutions and bilateral and multilateral donors ... [calling] for concerted international action to address these complex and multidimensional challenges' since the 1990s<sup>25</sup>.

The terms 'linkage', 'interdependence', 'connection' and 'relationship' crop up often in debates on development and security. However, the term 'nexus' is also increasingly used in academic debate. What is a nexus – particularly in the context of the linkage of multifaceted concepts? The lead authors of a special issue of *Security Dialogue* on 'The Security-Development Nexus Revisited' defined the term as 'a network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects; alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relations'<sup>26</sup>. This definition does not simplify the concept. Accordingly, the authors struggle to make sense of what the security-development nexus could possibly entail, explain or suggest. They point to an emerging literature on issues ranging from peace-building to complex emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction, human security and intervention. This reflects 'a seeming consensus that "security" and "development" are interconnected, and that their relationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-economic landscape'<sup>27</sup>.

The security-development nexus seems to explain the inexplicable, the assumed and the incomprehensible. Yet, it is seen as common sense, dictating a seemingly undeniable linkage. Security and development are linked through relations, dependencies, interdependencies, causal links, claims, perceptions, convenience, sensations and similar assumptions about cooperation between and among communities and organisational structures. Stern and

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<sup>24</sup> Neclâ Tschirgi, Michael S. Lund and Francesco Mancini, eds, *Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010): 5.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, 'Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?', *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 5 (2010): 11.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.: 6

Öjendal make sense of this confusing, necessary and potentially saving relationship in the following way:

*The notion of a 'nexus' seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, an ever-growing amount of economic resources and political will is being poured into the 'security-development nexus' and the attendant revamping of national and multilateral institutions and actions designed to address it. Hence, 'the nexus' matters.<sup>28</sup>*

Heidi Hudson describes 'intersectionality', a very similar phenomenon. Sometimes complex relationships cannot be simplified without losing the challenging and sometimes frustrating richness and depth of their very meaning and utility.<sup>29</sup> However, it is often difficult to understand complex concepts and relationships in practice. This critique is also raised against the concepts of human security and SSR. The programmatic agendas and activities of these concepts need to be demystified in order to generate confidence in their practical relevance.

Recognising a security-development nexus and policy responses to it might help prevent unstable, poor or war-torn societies from descending into chaos. It might allow the security and development agendas to be merged in order to achieve the common goal of bringing peace and stability to otherwise fragile societies. Does the recognition of this nexus – and acting on this recognition – help make development assistance and security provision more sustainable? While the nexus could take the form of a social contract for those to whom security and development support is provided, it may also contribute a sense of accountability and responsibility for those providing the support. As is the case with any external intervention, initiatives are at some point handed over to national and local actors, while international actors for the most part retreat. Activities that are based on the existence of a security-development nexus, such as SSR, will have to be continued by governments that enjoy a minimum of trust and legitimacy, yet are 'entrusted' with coordinating both development and security activities.

The goals, objectives and benchmarks for security and development activities need to be negotiated ahead of launching externally-supported programmes and before handing them over to national actors. The security-development nexus is a conceptual puzzle, an empirically-questionable reality and a policy agenda. However, to turn the nexus into a set of specific points that can reliably inform the design and implementation of policy priorities, which straddle both security and development objectives, such as SSR, more than a vague realisation that, by default and possibly under most circumstances, investments in security benefit development and vice versa, is required.

An assessment of the nature and utility of the nexus will wrap up this discussion on the security-development nexus. As Stern and Öjendal conclude:

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Heidi Hudson. 'A Bridge Too Far? The Gender Consequences of Linking Security and Development in SSR Discourse and Practice' in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds). *Back To the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, (Switzerland: Geneva, DCAF, LIT, 2011):77-114.

*First, [we draw] attention to the claims that there is an empirically real and growing 'nexus', which is reflected in the increased usage of the term 'development-security nexus'. Although timely, we aver that this borders on the banal: 'the nexus', however conceived, reflects a reality that resonates in the experiences and imaginations of many, it is being used to 'describe' a growing realm. Second, and perhaps more intriguingly, the 'content' or form of 'the nexus' is not clear. It is therefore open for all kinds of (illicit) use under the guise of progressive and ethically palatable politics. We believe that ... different discourses imbue 'the nexus' with different meanings. Third, as 'the nexus' is being and can be used as a 'recognizable' and seemingly comprehensible narrative, various processes can be pursued in the name of (more or less) in/compatible combinations of security-development.<sup>30</sup>*

Put more simply, the authors confirm that the exact nature of the security-development nexus is hard to grasp and might thus be considered a condition rather than a set of easily visible interconnecting factors and processes. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the importance of the security- development nexus for workable, sensible and effective security and development assistance activities. Comprehensive and holistic, security- and development-sensitive SSR occasionally engenders similar confusions and uncertainties about its empirical value and practical utility. Yet, such a sense of complexity and 'intersectionality' does not make it any less important – or any less workable.

## **2.2 Security sector reform and the security-development nexus**

Conceptual and practical debates on SSR at times suffer from a bewildering and counterproductive diversity of definitions of the institutions and actors that make up a security sector. This also applies to the specific tasks and activities that define the process of reforming the security sector. In contrast, the UN Secretary-General's 2008 report on SSR I offers a solid framework for a common, comprehensive and coherent approach by the UN and its member states, reflecting shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of SSR. The report notes that:

*It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered*

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 24-25.

*part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.*<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, according to the report, 'Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.'<sup>32</sup>

As is characteristic for UN reports of this kind, the definitions put forward by the UN Secretary-General are the result of extensive consultation processes that generate broadly supported UN norms and guidelines for its member states. While reflecting the result of a similarly careful and inclusive consultation process, the definition of SSR provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is slightly more comprehensive and demanding in terms of its coverage of actors, processes and principles. The OECD/DAC's Handbook on Security System Reform, a much-referred- to standard elaboration on the concept of SSR, calls for a holistic approach to the security 'system' and offers helpful elaborations on the roles and tasks of all state and non-state institutions and actors that contribute to the provision of security for the state and its people.

These actors encompass the following: *Core security actors* include the armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitaries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve and local security units (civil defence forces, national guards and militias). *Management and oversight bodies* include the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and select committees; ministries of defence, internal and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers and financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions). *Justice and the rule of law* includes the judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions; ombudspersons; and customary and traditional justice systems. *Non-statutory security forces* include liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private security and military companies; and political party militias.<sup>33</sup>

In addition, although not specifically mentioned in greater detail beyond their inclusion in the group of management and oversight bodies, there are civil society actors with considerable influence, such as professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy groups, religious bodies, non-governmental organizations and community groups.

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<sup>31</sup> United Nations, 'Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform', Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/62/659-S/2008/392 (New York: United Nations, 3 January 2008): para. 14.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.: para. 17.

<sup>33</sup> Albrecht Schnabel. 'The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument' in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds). *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*. (Switzerland: Geneva, DCAF, LIT, 2011): 50-51.

### **2.2.1 Objectives of SSR**

First, SSR aims to develop an effective, affordable and efficient security sector, for example by restructuring or building human and material capacity. Second, it wants to ensure democratic and civilian control of the security sector, for example through strengthening the management and oversight capacities of government ministries, parliament and civil society organizations.

SSR encompasses the following categories of operational activities: Overarching activities, activities relating to security- and justice-providing institutions, activities relating to civilian management and democratic oversight, activities related to SSR in post-conflict contexts, activities relating to cross-cutting issues. Overarching activities include reviews of the security sector, developing needs assessments, as well as the formulation of strategies and national security policy. Activities that relate to security and justice provision include the reforming and restructuring of national defence, police, law enforcement agencies, judicial and prison systems. With regard to civilian management and democratic oversight, activities include management and control of parliamentary oversight, judicial review, oversight by independent bodies, as well as oversight provided by civil society. In post-conflict environments, activities include DDR, control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), mine action and transitional justice activities. Lastly, activities relating to intersectional issues include gender and child protection.<sup>34</sup>

In addition, SSR's contribution to peace-building has specific political, economic, social and institutional dimensions. The political dimension entails the promotion and facilitation of civil control over security institutions. The economic dimension ensures appropriate consumption and allocation of society's resources for the security sector. The social dimension holds that the provision of the population's physical security should in all cases be guaranteed, and not additionally threatened, by the assistance of the security sector. Lastly, the institutional dimension focuses on the professionalisation of all actors in the security sector.

In addition to these technical objectives of SSR efforts, the academic and practitioner literature, as well as official statements and operational and institutional statements such as the OECD/DAC guidelines and the UN Secretary-General's report, argue that SSR should embrace the following principles:

- SSR should be people-centred, locally-owned and based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. This will allow it to provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime. These principles must be upheld in both the design and implementation of SSR programmes, and should not simply remain at the level of proclamation and intention.
- SSR must be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, through more integrated development and security policies and greater civilian involvement and oversight. National, broad and public consultation processes as well as a national security

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 51-52

strategy are thus inherent requirements of feasible SSR strategies.

- SSR activities should form part of multi-sectoral strategies that are based on broad assessments of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state. They have to respond to the needs of all stakeholders.
- SSR must be developed in adherence to basic governance principles, such as transparency, accountability and other principles of good governance.
- SSR must be implemented through clear processes and policies that enhance institutional and human capacities to ensure that security policy can function effectively and justice can be delivered equitably.

How does one know if a security sector is in need of reform? Put simply, if the sector is not inclusive, is partial and corrupt, unresponsive, incoherent, ineffective and inefficient and/or unaccountable to the public; then it (or any of its affected institutions) is in need of reform. The term 'reform' describes an institutional transformation that leads to the improved overall performance of a legitimate, credible, well-functioning and well-governed security sector, which serves society in providing internal and external, direct and structural security and justice as public services.

The extent of the reform required depends on how much is needed to make the sector fulfil its roles accountably. This rarely calls for a total overhaul. Certain components and aspects of a nation's security sector might be functioning particularly well, while others might be in need of extensive improvements. Thus identifying where, how and when individual components must be (re)built, restructured, changed and/or fine-tuned is an important step and requires a solid assessment of the sector's roles, tasks and requirements in light of national and local assessments of society's security and development needs. SSR processes therefore vary from country to country, with each SSR context being different and unique.

### **2.2.2 *The fallacy of 'SSR-light'***

The full range of tasks and options ideally covered in SSR processes is comprehensive and demanding, but certainly possible if planned, prepared and implemented in collaboration with all relevant actors in a sensible, sequenced, phased and context-responsive strategy. SSR is a long-term exercise that does not lend itself to quick-fix approaches, although there are some aspects that can be completed fairly quickly. For example, a short-term activity such as a 'train and equip' programme for armed forces, police or border guards, or some other technical measure to address immediate security and stabilisation needs, will only succeed if it is seen and implemented as part of a longer-term reform approach. Development actors should judge how serious and genuine a SSR activity is in light of how it contributes to longitudinal change.

Taking an 'SSR-light' approach may be tempting because it might ensure quick approval by national actors who stand to lose influence, power and privileges as a result of full-fledged SSR programmes. However, such approaches are often counterproductive to the improvement of stability, peace, security and development. If SSR is implemented in a consistent manner with its' own goals, approaches and principles; it strongly matches the objectives and approaches preferred by development actors. Neither should disagree about what needs to be done – or how – to support a society's transition process comprehensively.

If only partial and quasi-SSR activities are being offered, development actors should not engage because they would risk being instrumentalised to implement a set of activities that cannot deliver what they claim. The same applies to SSR actors. They should accept all offers to engage with development donors, and match and implement joint or complementary strategies and programmes to further their joint objectives. If development actors do not comply with generally respected standards of development assistance, for instance by prioritising one particular group over another or advocating a particular ideology or donor nation's strategic aims, collaboration should be avoided.

It is important to ensure that only genuine SSR is implemented as a companion to development assistance. This means that it is pursued as a long-term project, designed in a participatory and inclusive manner in collaboration with state and non-state actors. It should make a strong commitment to local ownership and good governance, among other key principles. Quasi-SSR activities that do not meet those qualifications will do more harm than good.

### **2.2.3 SSR as a security and development 'project'**

After this brief discussion of definitions of and approaches to SSR, SSR as both an embodiment and a driving force for security-development nexus is examined. Being a development 'project', yet working primarily with security institutions, what can SSR do for development?

The concept of SSR became prominent through former UK secretary of state for international development, Clare Short, who argued that 'A security sector that is well tasked and managed serves the interests of all, by providing security and stability – against both external and internal security threats. And obviously security is an essential prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty reduction.' Moreover, she insisted that 'a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed, is a key issue. We are therefore entering this new area of security sector reform in order to strengthen our contribution to development.'<sup>35</sup> These statements reflect DFID's commitment to engage in SSR to facilitate poverty reduction through development assistance. Short created the momentum for this development with a speech she gave at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London in May 1998, where she called for 'a partnership between the development community and the military' in an effort to address the 'inter-related issues of security, development and conflict prevention'.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Clare Short, 'Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty', speech at Centre for Defence Studies, King's College (London, 9 March 1999), available at [www.clareshort.co.uk/speeches/DFID/9%20March%201999.pdf](http://www.clareshort.co.uk/speeches/DFID/9%20March%201999.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Clare Short, 'Security, Development and Conflict Prevention', speech at Royal College of Defence Studies (London, 13 May 1998). Cited in Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice and Research', paper presented at workshop on 'New Directions in Security Sector Reform', Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, Ottawa, 3–4 November 2005, available at [www.idrc.ca/en/ev-83412-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-83412-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)

Herbert Wulf argues that:

*One criterion for using the term security sector reform is that this assistance is integrated into an overall strategy of development and democratisation of the society. This implies that security sector reform can never be implemented as a stand-alone programme but has to be embedded in a general peace-building and development programme. The military assistance programmes, implemented during the Cold War, which were essentially ideologically motivated, did not as a rule comply with the concept of security sector reform in use today, since they aimed merely to strengthen or modernise the armed forces in question and consolidate the influence of the donor countries. But they did not seek to help establish a democratically controlled security sector that would be conducive to development.<sup>37</sup>*

The next subsection explores the evolution of SSR as a joint security and development 'project' in more detail. SSR is a highly intersectional concept. Thus, defining SSR priorities depends on effective collaboration and linking of security and development needs assessments, conducted and implemented by actors from both communities. It is necessary to reflect on past experiences and improve opportunities for learning how to do SSR right.

#### **2.2.4 The origins of SSR in the development discourse**

*It would seem obvious that there was a need to find a new term for a plethora of phenomena and activities related to reform of the sector of society charged with the provision of security.<sup>38</sup>*

In tracing the evolution of the debate on SSR's relevance for the development community, a study written for DCAF by Michael Brzoska in 2003 is extensively referred to. While somewhat dated, his analysis still offers one of the best examinations of the role SSR began to play for development actors. Little has been written on the subject since then – and it makes sense to develop further debates from Brzoska's observations. As he notes, in the early 1990s 'Security sector reform has its roots in the development donor debate, an on-going discussion among various groups of practitioners and theoreticians on how best to target and implement development assistance ... previously, the donor community had largely refrained from discussing security-related issues. Many actors in the donor community have had, and continue to have, a strong bias against working with security sector players, particularly with the military.' Brzoska notes that with the lifting of the political and ideological constraints of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the development donor discourse began to shift to embrace security-related issues- At the same time, expectations grew that development actors would engage with issues such as conflict prevention, post-conflict peace-building and, after 9/11, anti-terrorism. Thus, 'Security sector reform can be understood as an attempt to connect, in one concept, the

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<sup>37</sup> Herbert Wulf, 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries' (Berlin: Berghof Research Center, July 2004), available at [www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue2\\_wulf.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue2_wulf.pdf) : 3

<sup>38</sup> Michael Brzoska, 'Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform', DCAF Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva: DCAF, November 2003) : 1



opportunities of expanding development assistance into security-related fields and the challenges of new demands on development donors, and to provide both with a common vision.’<sup>39</sup>

Development agencies, who saw themselves in conflict with legal regimes that would limit the ‘wider adoption of security sector reform as an element of development donor programmes’ by development agencies, had considerable scepticism about such activities. In addition, Brzoska argues that other ministries feared that development ministries would encroach upon their traditional overseas assistance and peace-building work. He notes:

*What is more, the ministries’ primary local partners in the developing countries themselves may vary, and may sometimes even be in conflict with each other, thus reducing the coherence of the assistance offered. Whereas development ministries may well be perceived by the so-called ‘power ministries’ as being politically weak and full of ‘do-gooders’, there is often an aversion in development assistance circles to the ‘command approaches’ to problems with which such ‘power ministries’ are identified.*<sup>40</sup>

### **2.2.5 Triggers of development communities’ security commitments**

Brzoska identifies the roots of the evolving SSR discourse within development circles as debates on military expenditure, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and public sector governance.

*Military expenditure in development donor policy:* As donor countries decreased their military spending in the 1990s, they felt morally justified to ask developing countries to do the same and thus generate a peace dividend that could be invested in development activities. ‘The concept of security sector reform came in quite handy for development donors to keep the concern with “overspending” alive, [while] at the same time it relieved their policies of a possible “neo-colonialist” taint.’<sup>41</sup>

*Post-conflict peacemaking and conflict prevention:* A number of changes moved security issues up the development agenda, including the tremendous cost of wars and post-conflict rebuilding activities. The growing number of international peacekeeping missions, ‘along with a wider spectrum of activities by development donors in post-war situations, led to new challenges that brought development donors into contact with uniformed forces, eg in demobilisation, demining, small arms control and policing’. In the aftermath of armed violence, all security actors, including the armed forces, non-state armed groups, police, the justice system and other actors within the security sector, need to be downsized, reformed and put back into the service of the entire population. Moreover, ‘Wars also regularly leave a legacy of surplus weapons which can prove to be an impediment to development. Without de-mining, areas may remain inaccessible or unusable for productive activities such as agriculture. Widespread illegal use of small arms, in criminal acts and personal violence,

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.: 2–4.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.: 4.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.: 9.

reduces economic growth and development.<sup>42</sup>

In the complex peace operations of the 1990s, many of these tasks were addressed by peacekeepers, whose short-term mandates were not created to carry out long-term peace-building tasks. After their departure, development actors seemed to be their natural successors in contributing international support, if required. However, as Brzoska notes, 'While in theory, there is a "peacekeeping-to-development" continuum in security-related activities, similar to the "relief-to-development" continuum on the humanitarian side, in practice a gap has opened up in many cases between activities begun (or not begun) by peacekeepers and continued (or not continued) by development donors.'<sup>43</sup> While some development actors became involved in post-war peace-building activities, particularly DDR (as in the case of the World Bank) or police reform (as in the case of UNDP), as Brzoska notes, 'it soon became clear that more coordination, more cooperation and a certain degree of conceptual clarity were needed ... Again, the concept of security sector reform came in handy to describe a range of activities about which peacekeepers, UN administrations and development donors needed to talk.' As a result, 'Slowly, if reluctantly, at least some development donors expanded their envelope of activities to include those with security relevance, generally from judicial reform issues to police forces and, at least in a few cases, the control of military forces.' In that way, SSR was also 'well suited to describe both the content and the objectives of security-related activities in conflict prevention'.<sup>44</sup>

*Governance and public sector reform:* As governance has emerged as a major concern of development policy since the early 1990s, reforming the provision of public services has become a major instrument of development policy. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public services includes the provision and governance of security services, which would thus quite naturally become a matter of concern for development actors.

### **2.2.6 Formal recognition of SSR as a development instrument**

While development actors were increasingly recognising the merits of SSR, legal constraints as well as political and institutional resistance limited the extent to which SSR activities could be included in – and funded by – development donor programmes. Yet scholars and practitioners have been calling for donors to make resources available to support SSR programmes and incorporate SSR activities in their own poverty reduction and public expenditure work. Since the mid-2000s, considerable progress has been made in that direction.

### **2.2.7 ODA eligibility of SSR programmes**

A significant step towards formalising the development community's foray into the traditionally problematic area of security politics was taken by the OECD. As Wulf notes, in 2001 it 'published a Conceptual Framework with six broad categories of recommendations for members of the Development Assistance Committee to develop security sector reform policies and more integrated approaches to security and development'. The OECD suggested

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid.: 9 - 10.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.: 11.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.: 13 - 14.

recognising the developmental importance of security issues; conceptualising a comprehensive security system reform that outlines the appropriate roles for actors; identifying the required capacity and institutional reforms in donor countries; developing an effective division of labour among development and other relevant international actors; working towards the integration of security system concerns in overall foreign and trade policy; and providing assistance to enhance domestic ownership of and commitment to reform processes.

Giving official blessing to an area of activity that has long been part of many development actors' work, particularly in post-war societies, the OECD widened 'the extent to which donor countries should be permitted to report as official development assistance (ODA) their spending in areas where development and security issues converge'<sup>45</sup>. At the DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies on 3 March 2005, a number of activities were accepted as ODA-relevant following 18 months of deliberations. Consensus was reached on technical cooperation and civilian support for six items: management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure; enhancing civil society's role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance; supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control; civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The impact of the OECD/DAC's initiative is still felt and recognised years later. The World Bank, along with UNDP, another international 'trendsetter' in the debate and practice of development assistance, had for the most part remained relatively silent.

### **2.2.8 The World Development Report 2011**

With the WDR 2011, the World Bank published an impressive discussion on the linkages and mutual significance of conflict, security and development. The report is based on the realisation that 'threats to development gains from organized violence, conflict, and fragility cannot be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of legitimate institutions that provide all citizens equitable access to security, justice, and jobs. Thus, international engagement in countries facing fragility, conflict, and violence must be early and rapid to build confidence, yet sustained over longer periods, and supportive of endogenous efforts and institution building.'<sup>46</sup> The Bank admits that:

*The 20 years of working to support institutions in post-transition countries (e.g., in Africa and Eastern Europe) and a decade of efforts to rebuild the state in high-profile environments (in particular Iraq, Afghanistan, and post- earthquake Haiti), have yielded uneven results.*

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<sup>45</sup> Tillmann Elliesen, 'Security or Development Efforts?', *D+C: Development and Cooperation* 48, no. 5 (2007), available at [www.inwent.org/ez/articles/054114/index.en.shtml](http://www.inwent.org/ez/articles/054114/index.en.shtml): 206.

<sup>46</sup> World Bank, 'Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development' (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011): 1.

*This discomfoting realization is reinforced by new pressures for political transition in the Middle East, themselves a reflection of the need to review the accepted principles of institutional performance. It has become increasingly urgent for the WBG [World Bank Group] to position countries facing fragility, conflict, and violence at the core of its development mandate and to significantly adjust its operations model.<sup>47</sup>*

Yet the informed reader cannot help but notice that very little in the report is new. Much of what is said, for instance with regard to security, development and SSR, could be found in even more detail in OECD/DAC documents almost a decade ago. Nor was the report designed to present new insights to the world community. It was significant, because an organization as influential as the World Bank, which has traditionally been reluctant to address issues of conflict and security head on, decided to focus on the interlinkages between conflict, crime, security and development by picking up on established debates that have emanated from research and practitioner communities. In fact, the WDR was preceded by an extensive research, fact-finding and ‘debate-finding’ exercise, in an attempt to elevate these debates and arguments to a level at which policy communities in particular could not avoid engaging with them. Concepts and issues that seemed to lose significance in international policy debates – such as human security or conflict prevention – have been given new impetus by the report. Moreover, it shows that progress is possible – and has in fact been made – in lowering the number and impact of conflicts and increasing security and development options for even the poorest societies.

At least as interesting as the WDR itself are the World Bank’s plans to implement its findings and recommendations. For this purpose, the WDR 2011 team drafted a report entitled ‘Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development’. What does this report say – directly or indirectly – about SSR’s significance for development? The short answer is that it makes no explicit mention of SSR. It emphasises the importance of focusing on fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), creating jobs in these states, forging links with external organizations, convincing donors to provide consistent funding and redefining risk tolerance, risk management and expected results. However, considerable importance is placed on institution-building as the key to enabling development, which is a critical component of SSR. The report’s premise is that ‘violence and other challenges plaguing FCS cannot be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice, and jobs’<sup>48</sup>. It notes that:

*today’s realities engage development agencies in protracted periods of sustained violence or transition – and require an approach to restoring confidence and building institutions that is adapted to the local political context. Broadly, the main development challenge in countries facing fragility, conflict, and violence is a mismatch between*

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.: 9.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.: iii.

*the development community's current business models and the realities in these situations.*<sup>49</sup>

The report emphasises the importance of building institutions that are both legitimate and functional, and calls upon development agencies to reform their strategies, behaviours and results metrics in countries facing fragility and risks of violence. This is significant, as it presumes that development agencies need to change their traditional approach to providing assistance to FCS. The same applies to the World Bank. By making the strengthening of 'institutional capacity, inclusion, accountability and legitimacy' one of its main priorities and positioning fragility, conflict, and violence at the core of its development mandate, the Bank seeks to 'significantly adjust its operations model while remaining within its established mandate and focusing on development and poverty reduction'<sup>50</sup>.

A number of innovations can be observed. For instance, there is the call for long-term financial and political commitment because 'it takes a long time to build legitimate and capable institutions (it commonly takes a generation or more for a fragile national institution to achieve reasonable functionality and legitimacy)'. The report also recognised that blueprints based on the experience of stable, prosperous, developed countries may not work everywhere, as 'many of the most appropriate approaches for countries facing fragility, conflict, and violence are found in the experiences and expertise of other practitioners with experience in similar contexts, rather than in the "best practices" of more developed, more complex economies'<sup>51</sup>. The World Bank recognises and builds on the original initiative taken by the OECD in creating the momentum for the actualisation of much closer cooperation between security and development communities – a taboo issue not long ago – within less than a decade. It highlights its close cooperation with the OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility, and it co-chairs the network's Task Team on State-building.

The report refers to the WDR's recognition that, particularly in the context of peace- and state-building, 'improved security and justice establish a context of credible exchange that can encourage markets, allow human development to proceed, and provide space for innovation'. A concrete action that is directly relevant to both SSR and development objectives is to 'integrate the role of security actors to fully inform Bank strategies and operations in FCS and in countries faced with violent criminal networks'<sup>52</sup>.

### **2.2.9 Development agencies' activities on SSR**

Similar to the World Bank, despite perceptions and sometimes assurances to the contrary, many development ministries and agencies feature a significant record of security and SSR-related work. Documents such as the OECD/DAC guidelines or handbooks or the WDR 2011 will not necessarily serve as the impetus or driving force for more security-directed work of the development donor community. Rather, perhaps at least as importantly, will make such work acceptable internally and externally and highlight its significance in supporting core

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.: 1.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.: iii.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.: 4.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.: 5 – 8.

development activities. Moreover, they draw attention to the fact that conflict and security challenges, along with associated risks and relevant responses, are part and parcel of the development discourse and practice. They cannot be disassociated and left to be dealt with by others – unless they do so in collaboration and partnership with development actors.

Earlier a brief review of the security and SSR-related work of a number of development ministries and agencies was offered. The degree to which security and SSR issues have been embedded in these organizations' work is impressive. It proves that many, although not all, such agencies and ministries have evolved in the five to ten years since Michael Brzoska conducted his research on the early engagement of the development donor community with the evolving SSR agenda and after the OECD/DAC officially recognised that many security-related tasks – including SSR – are an integral part of development assistance.

### **2.3 Moving towards development-sensitive SSR: The security-development nexus in action**

Examining the role of SSR within the security- development nexus as – originally – a development concept triggers a number of suggestions that may be valuable to the development, security and overlapping SSR policy communities.

The development community should more openly stand by its original ownership of the SSR concept. In doing so, it would be worth returning to the OECD/DAC's initial ground-breaking work on SSR. It will also be advantageous to engage fully with the WDR 2011 and join the World Bank's various initiatives in implementing the lessons and suggestions that emanated from this report. Among many messages, renewed emphasis on conflict prevention, human security and SSR has the potential to serve as a major impetus for a return to some critical debates that, after the diversions caused by 9/11 and subsequent global responses and preoccupations, have become side-tracked. Re-engaging with these debates and concepts, and learning lessons from experiences in implementing these concepts so far, will help the development donor community strengthen its relationship with the security community and facilitate joint ownership, perhaps in the spirit of 3D (defence, diplomacy and development), 3C (coherent, coordinated and complementary) and whole-of-government approaches.

Nevertheless, some caution is warranted. Future cooperation on SSR within a larger context of security-development activities should be reflective of a broader security approach, spanning a breadth of themes and actors when it comes to defining what security means and for whom, who should be involved in providing security and what role security plays for human development and vice versa. Such preparedness to look beyond one's own professional horizon will be required from all participating actors. Moreover, SSR needs to be respected for its most fundamental principles – these include commitment to democratic governance, accountability, the rule of law, human rights, inclusive approaches and adherence to other good governance principles. Defaulting on comprehensive SSR in favour of quick-fix, politically opportunist approaches to do 'something' with 'someone' will not win the trust of either the development or the security community. It will not lead to a serious long-term, and thus sustainable, venture to assure eventual good governance of an effective and accountable security sector that is capable of creating and safeguarding the best

possible environment for sustainable human development.

Glitches, problems, inconsistencies, turf wars, seemingly irreconcilable organisational cultures and modes of operation, historical misgivings, fears and perceptions, and other factors stand in the way of effective and efficient cooperation between security and development communities. These factors should be accepted for what they are – dynamics that need to be taken seriously and worked out cooperatively from case to case. SSR covers a range of activities that were previously pursued in isolation, bringing together activities and actors to increase the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the provision of security and development – for the state, the community and the individual. It is not necessarily a complex undertaking, but certainly one that requires all involved parties to think beyond usual patterns of action and interaction. With new objectives in mind, one needs to do things differently than before. Working out how to do business sustainably is the task of researchers and decision-makers. Most importantly and with guidance from the former two, those reforming, operating and governing a new type of security sector that sees its main role as improving and sustaining both security and development for the state and society, within and beyond national borders, must work on guaranteeing this sustainability.

#### **2.4 Moving beyond assumptions: The need to assess SSR's security and development impact**

SSR activities are rarely explicitly geared towards meeting specific development objectives. In addition, close linkages to national security policies, which are frequently still limited to traditional state security concerns, are often neglected. While it is assumed that SSR makes contributions to security and development objectives, their precise extent remains largely unknown. In addition, despite intentions to the contrary, donor-initiated SSR programmes tend to be primarily donor-driven. These often see input from beneficiaries at planning and implementation phases. Commitment to inclusive, representative and sustainable approaches in project planning and consultation practices tends to be weak. Further, nationally initiated programmes inadequately focus on the impact on local beneficiaries and the satisfaction of their security and development needs.

The insufficient impact of SSR in terms of security and development dividends can be traced back to poor planning and, more so, poor implementation. There are no mechanisms for assuring mutual accountability in SSR processes. For the most part, beneficiary populations have no means to hold donors accountable to their stated commitments to provide sustainable and effective development-sensitive SSR support. In turn, donors cannot hold national state authorities and beneficiary populations accountable for ensuring that reforms are effectively implemented, and security and development objectives are met. Further work on the security- development nexus and the role of SSR in development should focus on creating mechanisms to assure mutual accountability in synchronising SSR programmes with security and development objectives, building specifically on the findings of our present book.

Such work could translate into and inform the creation of *a global compact for mutual*

*accountability in supporting security and development through security sector reform* and its subsequent implementation and maintenance. Member-donors of the global compact would be responsible for adhering to and implementing norms and guidelines they have produced and agreed to. They would be held accountable in fulfilling the obligations and commitments they express in statements and documents accompanying and underlying the global compact. Similar commitments would be required from the beneficiary community. Donors and beneficiaries of SSR would be required to live up to their respective promises. Both sides would be careful not to begin programmes they are unable to complete, or raise expectations they are unable to meet. Moreover, beneficiaries would play an oversight role in monitoring and checking the accountability of donors' own assurances.

The objective of such work would be to achieve more effective, meaningful, impact-oriented and measurable provision of security and development through SSR. This implies that overall security and development objectives benefit rather than suffer from SSR. In addition, it entails that the security and development needs and expectations of a broad spectrum of society are solicited and well understood before SSR programmes are designed and implemented. This approach would result in improved policy, programming (design and implementation), training and impact, supported by sustainable and inclusive security and development-responsive SSR programming.

A second and related priority should be a focus *on tracking and analysing the development-related roots, objectives and impacts of SSR programmes*. While SSR is expected to significantly improve both security and development in transition societies, thus far the main focus of programmes – in both design and implementation – appears to have been primarily on security dividends, while development dividends remain unspecified or vaguely defined as implicit and immeasurable outcomes of improved security conditions. This characteristic mirrors the broader work on the security-development nexus, which asserts (without much empirical basis) that increased security and stability are favourable conditions for economic growth, poverty reduction and human development and vice versa. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the presumed correlations between security, development and SSR seem common sense and convincing. However, such rhetorical assertions constitute a weak basis from which to develop convincing, empirically based conclusions about the symbiotic relationship between security provision and development, and more specifically the role and impact of SSR in enhancing and supporting this relationship.

It is important to investigate and substantiate this assumed relationship. Without full recognition of SSR's design and capacity to support development, development actors often find it difficult to embrace SSR as a tool that is both necessary and worthy of their engagement. Similar scepticism – or mere lack of knowledge – about SSR's stated development mandate prevents SSR planners and practitioners from explicitly incorporating and engaging long-term development needs and objectives into their efforts. It would be helpful, from a policy planning and programme implementation perspective, to analyse the extent to which SSR activities have been designed, implemented and evaluated in terms of their development contributions. This will require systematic surveying and mapping of representative samples of major stakeholders involved in delivering SSR activities. This will either be those conducted as holistic and comprehensive cross-sectoral activities that



encompass several security and oversight/governance institutions, or quasi- and partial SSR activities that address only select components of wider SSR reform agendas.

## **2.5 Conclusive remarks: SSR and the security-development nexus**

SSR can be considered both an expression and an application of the security- development nexus in practice – in planning, implementing and evaluating both development and SSR activities. The fact that it often is not perceived as such cannot be blamed on faulty design or a lack of commitment from those dedicated to materialising the intentions in SSR concepts and policy, but results from shortcomings in translating these into programme designs and implementation. Failing to tie very specific development objectives and priorities into SSR programming deprives SSR of its opportunity to live up to its potential and help transitional societies meet both their security and their development objectives. Similar to the assumption that more security is good for development, simply assuming that SSR is good for security *and* development is not enough to establish specific expectations and objectives, set goals and design programmes, implement these and, finally, assess them for their effective contributions. The lessons we can learn from a decade of SSR activities and their still mostly unknown impact on development, as well as the ambivalent interactions between security and development actors when it comes to joint contributions to SSR, match similar discussions and experiences in assessing the assumed security-development nexus. Clarifying these relationships would help researchers and practitioners get a better understanding of how to design development- enhancing SSR programmes and activities. Structures and processes need to be put in place to ensure that SSR serves the overall security and development goals of transitional societies and their human security and human development objectives. Initially, this should be with the support of external actors, but in the long run by empowered and committed local and national actors.

### **3 Exploring and Defining the Underlying Research Questions**

#### **3.1 Underlying research questions**

Following an in-depth analysis of SSG's role for, and impact on development, the research team's approach was guided by the following underlying research question:

*Does SSR result in measurable development impacts?*

From this fundamental question, three sub-questions have been deduced:

1. *'Can we expect SSR outcomes to be an asset to development?'*  
An affirmative answer leads to question 2 and 3.
2. *'Did development issues matter when SSR was designed?'*
3. *'What difference has SSR made for development?'*

A number of assumptions, claims, observations and requirements condition the answers to these research questions.

#### **3.2 Assumptions**

*ASSUMPTION #1: SSR is meant to support development*

- SSR is expected to improve both security and development in societies that experience various forms of economic, political and security transitions.

*ASSUMPTION #2: SSR is a means towards meeting the development community's security needs*

- The evolution of SSR as an academic concept and policy tool for envisioning and planning reforms towards desirable national security governance objectives has its roots in the development community's desire to assure that security institutions support, rather than threaten, economic growth, poverty reduction and human development objectives.

#### **3.3 Observations**

*OBSERVATION #1: 'SSR' grew out of the development community, but was developed within the defence community*

- Beyond the initial support given to the concept of SSR by development actors (*push factor*), much of the conceptual evolution has taken place within research and policy

communities located within more traditional security and defence circles. The latter recognised the utility of linking the reform of security institutions to broader peacebuilding agendas, including democratisation, good governance, economic growth or human rights promotion (*pull factor*).

*OBSERVATION #2: SSR was further developed and promoted by OECD-DAC, which legitimised it as a development activity*

- The fact that international discussions on SSR were sparked by the development community and advanced in particular by OECD-DAC as part of its development mandate appears easily forgotten. Thus, tracing the roots of SSR to an initiative emanating from the development community seems surprising to some, including contemporary development actors themselves. Without recognising (or by neglecting) SSR's development roots, however, the supposed responsibility and professed enthusiasm of the SSR/G community towards upholding and serving broader development goals through SSR remain ambivalent at best.

*OBSERVATION #3: SSR's contribution is mostly viewed in terms of its direct impact on security; however its main contribution is in fact a long-term structural security.*

- The initial research directed by DCAF shows how the main focus of SSR programmes – both in design and implementation – appears to have been on security dividends. Development dividends remain unspecified or are treated as implicit outcomes of improved security conditions, which cannot be measured. Even the scope of security dividends appears narrow and inaccurate given that the security impact of SSR tends to focus on 'direct security', not 'structural security'. However, security dividends and SSR's impact remain largely elusive, mostly assumed and not empirically proven. This finding is not limited to SSR programmes alone; it is also highlighted in broader academic and policy discussions (and assertions) on supposed linkages between security conditions and development potentials, often referred to as the "security-development nexus". Despite the lack of a strong empirical basis, the security-development nexus is often seen as an act that produces security and stability, as a favourable condition for sustainable development, and vice versa.

*OBSERVATION #4: The SSR-development link is asserted, assumed and taken for granted. As a result, it is not adequately defined.*

- The correlations and causalities between SSR, security and development are often not questioned. However, if merely asserted and not proven, they may reflect anything from realistic assessments to educated deductions or wishful thinking. Without further, empirically-informed explanation, the presumed SSR-security-development dynamics thus constitute a weak basis to establish convincing, empirically-based conclusions about the symbiotic relationship between security provision and sustainable development.

### 3.4 Claims

CLAIM #1: *The case for mutually beneficial interdependence of SSR and development must be more convincingly established. It needs to be substantiated with (at minimum) anecdotal and (at best) factual evidence.*

- It is important to investigate and demonstrate the assumed relationship between SSR activities and its' impact on development prospects. Without a better understanding of this relationship, SSR actors would find it difficult to attune their activities to development priorities. Scepticism, rejection, or lack of knowledge about SSR's development "mandate" might prevent SSR planners and practitioners from explicitly incorporating long-term development needs and objectives into their SSR programme designs. On the other hand, without full recognition of SSR's capacity to benefit development processes and outcomes, development actors may find it difficult to embrace SSR as a tool that is both necessary and worthy of their engagement.

CLAIM #2: *Evidence of mutually beneficial results of SSR-development interdependence supports mutual recognition of increasingly conscious SSR-development interaction in planning and design of both SSR and development interventions*

- This apparent impasse between development and SSR practitioners needs to be reconciled before SSR programmes can effectively meet their development potential. Evidence of the mutually beneficial potential generated by the relationship between SSR and development would help breach this impasse. Once mutual appreciation of SSR's development capacity is achieved – if such a capacity exists – a more concerted effort must be encouraged to design, implement and analyse SSR with regard to its obligation to facilitate and support sustainable development. In this case, it would also be necessary to assure that SSR's development contribution is recognised as a core mandate, as opposed to merely a welcomed, but unintentional by-product.

### 3.5 Requirements

REQUIREMENT #1: *Correlation and causality between SSR and development objectives and activities have to be established; appropriate indicators have to be designed to measure such correlation and causality*

- Our previous research found considerable difficulties in identifying and applying an appropriate set of indicators to measure a correlation between SSR activities and objectives on the one side, and development objectives and outcomes on the other. Proper tool and indicators to measure SSR-development links and interactions should be identified, and means to provide evidence of the nature of such linkages to SSR and development researchers, designers and practitioners to allow them to

synchronise SSR programmes with development objectives - and vice versa – should be determined. Moreover, looking at on-ground-experiences, it would be important to examine the consequential costs of not tying SSR to development outcomes and the benefits resulting from making SSR development-sensitive. Do past SSR programmes help us in answering these questions?

*REQUIREMENT #2: A replicable methodological framework and instrument needs to be designed in order to allow the measurement of SSR-development interactions and the development dividends of SSR*

- This project aimed to create both a framework and an instrument for meeting theoretical and practical needs to increase clarity in regards to the benefits of integrally linking SSR programmes to development objectives.

### **3.6 Identifying and measuring dynamics**

The methodological tool, which assesses actual SSR-development linkages, only makes sense if the existence of the following three dynamics can be established:

*IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC #1: Supposed influence of development aims on SSR design: Are development objectives supposed to inform SSR planning – which ones and how?*

*IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC #2: What could or should be the potential development dividend – if any – of SSR activities and programmes?*

*IDENTIFYING DYNAMIC #3: How should those findings about SSR and potential development impact inform future SSR and development programme design in order to maximise the development-sensitivity of SSR?*

Establishing these dynamics responds to the first sub-research question (see 3.1): ‘*Can we expect SSR outcomes to be an asset to development?*’ If the answer is negative, any further steps in assessing SSR’s development impact would be futile because it is impossible to map, track, assess and measure something that does not exist. However, if the answer is affirmative, further assessments, including the development and application of the proposed methodological tool, are required.

Once these dynamics have been established and SSR is in fact assumed to be ‘an asset to development’, the proposed methodological tool needs to be designed to permit the mapping, tracking, assessment and measurement of the following three dynamics. The tool should then respond to the second and third sub-research questions of 3.1.2, related to the analysis of actual SSR activities: ‘*Did development issues matter when SSR was designed?*’ and ‘*What difference has SSR made for development?*’:

*MEASURING DYNAMIC #1: Influence of development aims on SSR design: Do development objectives inform SSR planning – which ones and how?*

- In order to develop useful questions to solicit relevant data regarding development dividends of SSR activities and subsequent SSG performance, it is crucial to first establish the extent to which SSR activities have considered or integrated development objectives and outcomes. This includes identifying which development objectives in particular SSR were designed to promote and what programmers deemed as SSR's comparative advantage in regards to development promotion.
- What are the main development expectations, objectives and tasks identified by local, national and international actors in the context of a particular society's long-term future?
- In what ways are, or can be these expectations, objectives and tasks supported by SSR programmes and achievements, and threatened by a lack or a failure of SSR activities?
- Who are the champions – if any – in assuring that development objectives are not forgotten when SSR projects are designed? What are the obstacles that prevent such collaboration?

MEASURING DYNAMIC #2: *What is the impact and development dividend – if any – of SSR activities and programmes?*

- How can a development dividend be expressed and visualised in figures and numbers?
- Does one require baseline levels of development against which positive and negative developments can be measured are necessary?

MEASURING DYNAMIC #3: *How can results be translated into lessons for future SSR and development programme design as well as to maximise the development-sensitivity of SSR?*

- How can we learn from patterns drawn from large-N studies to inform future SSR design?
- How can we use lessons from large-N studies and individual case studies to improve existing SSR programmes and design new ones?

### **3.7 Guiding questions**

What are we assessing, tracking and measuring? Which causalities and correlations are we trying to identify and measure?

Although this study is for the most part a qualitative one, it presents two databases that permit to store and share the results of qualitative mapping results. This provides the opportunity to code information that is 'code-able' and to design simple quantitative assessment tools. Particular key variables or sets of variables needed for a multiple set of queries have been identified: location; duration; funders; objectives; written statements; the question if national development strategy was included; perceived development impacts and intended and unintended development spin-offs; and others).

There are various ways in which SSR-development interactions are manifested, and can be assessed, tracked and measured. These include:

- Intentions and actions of those planning, funding, implementing or observing SSR activities;
- Intentions and actions of those within the development community and generally outside SSR circles who encourage or discourage investment in SSR and/or intentional links between SSR and broader development and peace-building agendas;
- Perceptions of various actors regarding the actual, potential or missed opportunities for SSR-development interactions;
- Output – the number, size, objectives and ‘reach’ of SSR activities themselves;
- National budgetary design and analysis for the security and development sectors and whether they have been designed and analysed in tandem or in isolation;
- Impact of SSR activities on development outcomes;
- Impact of specific ‘development-sensitive’ SSR activities designed for development purposes on development output;
- SSR impact on SSG performance and the latter’s actual and potential impact on development outputs and dynamics;
- The actual or potential *costs* of not tying SSR to development outcomes and the *benefits* of making SSR development-sensitive.

### 3.8 Considerations on causalities and correlations

The idea of a cause-effect relationship reflects the process through which one action causes another, where “A” is either SSR as such or a specific SSR activity and with “B” being development as such or a specific development activity, expressed by a relevant indicator:

- A causes B;
  - A is related to B;
  - A has an effect on B;
  - A may have an effect on B;
  - A has a specific effect on B;
  - A may have a specific effect on B.
- Changes Correlations:
    - Changes in A are associated with changes in B;
    - Changes in A may be associated with changes in B;
    - Changes in A are associated in specific, traceable ways with changes in B;
    - Changes in A may be associated in specific, traceable ways with changes in B.
  - Inter-Correlations
    - A has an effect on (impacts on) B, which in turn has an effect on A.


## PART B: Methodological Analysis and Development

### 4 Selection Rationale, Criteria, Utility: SSR Interventions, Survey & Consultation Design, Comparative Case Study Analyses, Data Base

#### 4.1 Identification of sample SSR activities/programmes

The aim of the project was to survey between 50 to 100 SSR interventions designed and implemented during the past 10 years. Thanks to a thorough analysis of the SSR landscape, both the size of the sample and the length of the observed timeframe could be improved. A total of 174 SSR interventions constitute the representative sample of SSR programmes. The interventions have been conducted within a timeframe spanning from 1998 to 2012, with the exception of an intervention conducted in 1976 and of those programmes that were still ongoing in 2013 (cf. Figure 1).

**Figure 1:** Sample distribution in time




The largest share of cases has been chosen from SSR programmes conducted between 2002 and 2011, including those previously analysed in DCAF studies and publications. Selection criteria include the existence of reform programmes covering one or more security institutions (security providers and oversight institutions), preferably in the context of a specifically designed SSR programme; the disposal of information; accessibility of respondents to be surveyed; and accessibility to information in terms of language and communication tools either electronic and/or via local partners<sup>53</sup>.

The SSR cases stem from 79 countries. In almost half of these countries, more than one SSR case has been included in the database (cf. Figure 2). Liberia (13 cases), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (10 cases) and East Timor (8 cases) are best represented in the sample.

<sup>53</sup> Selection criteria will be outlined in more details in chapter six.



Figure 2: Countries with  $n > 1$  SSR cases



**Figure 3:** Countries covered by the large-N study



#### **4.2 Standardised survey, questionnaire to conduct multi-stakeholder analyses**

Building on the background work undertaken for our recent book project, a standardised survey directed at a multi-stakeholder group made of security and development actors involved in providing and receiving security sector reforms had to be designed. The survey was intended to examine the weight and the role of development objectives in SSR planning and implementation. However, due to time constraints, the database was prioritised over the survey, which eventually could not be designed.

#### **4.3 Considerations on monitoring and evaluation methodologies**

Over the past two decades, a steady number of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methodologies have been introduced and adapted within the international development field, and to a lesser extent in the security and justice or SSR fields. However, despite their increased prevalence they have not always been met with open arms. Actors engaged in activities seeking social change, especially in the fields of human development and security sector reform, have often expressed scepticism toward M&E schemes as these ambitious social change objectives are difficult to measure exactly and may not materialize within the often short timeframes demanded by donors and evaluators.

Having reviewed a wide collection of existing and prominent literature regarding M&E methodologies employed by international development, security and SSR practitioners, it was found that no existing methodology exactly fitted the needs, purpose or design of this research project. While certain elements may be useful, most M&E activities require a combination of significant funds, field research, and a focus on a single or limited (and connected) number of activities. Thus, our limited finances and resources combined with the large-N nature of the project do not match well with most existing methodologies.

In the same period, the elaboration of new monitoring and evaluation methodologies and frameworks, particularly in relation to development and good governance, has seen a sharp increase. As Michael Ignatieff remarks, there has been a “measurement revolution” underway in the fields of development and governance.<sup>54</sup> This includes a range of metrics designed to capture particular or composite elements of wellbeing, development, governance, and security such as the Gini coefficient (measuring social inequality), Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (measuring corruption), Freedom Houses’ Freedom in the World country rankings (measuring civil liberties), and UNDP’s HDI (measuring human development). In addition there has been a flowering of various monitoring and evaluation frameworks, ranging from results-based management (RBM) to theory of change to outcome mapping to a rights-based approach.

This M&E “revolution” is considered to be motivated by increased citizen concerns for security and justice as well as international bodies’ quest for reliable measurements of progress. In addition, with economic tightening, austerity measures and competition for funds donors have demanded greater scrutiny over investments often seeking to secure measurable deliverables within ever-shorter timeframes. At the same time, local stakeholders have continued to demand accountability in donor-driven interventions and clearer demonstration that programs are addressing their needs and not exacerbating or creating new tensions.

This section reviews some of the central elements to M&E frameworks in order to provide an overview of the various approaches, tools and considerations commonly deployed in development-related interventions. Such a mapping is useful to determine best options in measuring SSG/SSR interventions for their human development impact.

#### **4.3.1 Discussion**

The literature reviewed consists predominately of M&E handbooks, guides and literature produced by and/or for development practitioners and agencies. The lessons and methodologies developed by development agencies are relevant to this project due to the rigor and depth in which they have been developed as well as the fact that this project looks at different approaches to measure a potential measurable development impact of SSR interventions.

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<sup>54</sup> Ignatieff, M. and Desormeau, Kate, *Measurement and Human Rights: Tracking Progress, Assessing Impact*, A Carr Center Project Report, (2005) Harvard University:  
[https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/carrcenter/files/measurement\\_2005report.pdf](https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/carrcenter/files/measurement_2005report.pdf).

### **4.3.2 M&E in development, post-conflict and peacebuilding contexts**

Evaluation is needed in order to assess efficiency and effectiveness. However, particularly in fragile states and complex environments – including most SSR contexts – it is difficult to “attribute” positive effects and impacts (impact assessment) to one particular project due to the wide range of projects and activities by a range of donors and actors typical in such an environment, not to mention additional external variables related to environmental or political changes, for example. This challenge could be resolved by moving from an “attribution paradigm” to a “contribution paradigm”. Given the complex settings and the involvement of many different stakeholders in the implementation of projects, many international institutions have opted for the semantically looser term of “contribution”. As a consequence, in various reports authored by stakeholders in the development as well as in the security community it is now written that a project has “contributed” to a positive change.

In addition to that, most SSR contexts pose additional challenges for quality M&E and impact assessments, including:

- Rapidly challenging environments;
- Difficulties in obtaining reliable data;
- Capacity limitations.

Furthermore, the evaluation process itself can have unintended consequences that influence the behaviour of conflict protagonists and this could be the same within SSR activities as well.

Despite these challenges, development practitioners in particular have attempted to create and refine M&E methodologies that can be useful within complex, post-conflict or fragile contexts. Although there is not an established or one-size-fits-all approach, various M&E techniques have been developed that can also be used to provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of development activities, such as SSR. There are a broad range of methodologies and frameworks, such as the OECD’s “Managing for Development Results”, the “Conflict Transformation Evaluation Framework”, the “Most Significant Change” framework, “Results Based Management”, and “Impact Evaluation”, amongst others.

### **4.3.3 Setting up a survey methodology**

Based upon the analysis of the various documents and further reflections, this report offers the following suggestions related to the set-up of a survey methodology.

As a starting point when an assessment survey is developed, a research team should keep in mind the following key points as a means for both framing the approach and articulating it in reports:

1. Object	(What is measured and for what purpose?)
2. Methodology	(How to measure impact in practice?)
3. Actors	(What actors should be engaged? Why? How?)
4. Indicators	(What is the indicator's role in measuring impact? Why choosing one indicator rather than another?)

### **Object**

When fully implemented, a project such as this one should attempt to measure multiple elements – which would require measuring at multiple stages of the SSR activities. While development dividends are most likely discernible over the long-term, one would also assess activities and outputs shorter down the results chain in order to assess for development-sensitivity or intentions.

The first object is in regards to the SSR design stage. The following questions have been identified: To what degree are “development” priorities incorporated within SSR design? How are the priorities and frameworks included? Who are the actors partnered with? What are the documents referenced? At what stage of the SSR design do these concerns enter? In essence, the first level of analysis assesses the degree to which SSR activities are strategically aligned with national and local development strategies and activities. Not only does it assess shared goals and objectives, but also design stage management and administration.

The second object is to provide an implementation process appraisal. The following questions have been raised: To what degree are development partners included within SSR implementation? Who are the development partners in the activities? Are the development actors specifically included in the implementation according to the SSR design? If not already present at the design stage, do development actors enter the SSR activity at this stage? Is the SSR activity monitored for a potential development impact?

The third object is in regards to development contribution (not attribution, cf. above: 4.3.2). The subsequent set of questions has been identified: How successful have these activities been at advancing development goals? Were these contributions intentional or unintentional consequences? What enabled impact? If there is no positive contribution or if the result is negative, what prevented positive contribution?

### **Methodology**

The project's data collection and subsequent analysis emanate from an extensive analysis of research conducted on the topic. The largest share of data has been harvested through report reviews and research project reviews, while practitioner surveys would have ideally been added.

The report's assessment is mostly qualitative in nature. The quantitative component of the report comes with the cumulative number of studies observed (large-N sample of SSR

activities) rather than within the measurement (i.e. quantitative-based analysis for measuring development impact). Thus, it is a mixed methods approach, but a predominately qualitative one. If more fully developed, this project should rely upon surveys, and as such, perceptions of impact and inclusion would have been most accurately measured. As a consequence, the results would provide a useful assessment as to how 'developmental elements' are conceived by SSR actors and included within their projects.

### **Actors**

The issue of actors is most relevant for design and dissemination of the survey. The aim was therefore to determine key participants and knowledge holders of SSR activities. This includes both donors and local actors who participated in design and implementation of SSR interventions but also researchers and scholars of a particular activity. In this process, the research project found that the following questions should be addressed: How can continuity amongst respondents be ensured? Should development actors in a region be surveyed regardless of their engagement with the SSR activity in order to assess their knowledge and perception of it? Should the actors' responses be weighed? Are participants responses valued the same (donor vs. local)? Are participants valued the same as researchers? How can authenticity be ensured within the survey responses? Does it make sense to treat information differently depending on whether it has been harvested from surveys or from document reviews? Should untrue or irrelevant survey responses be eliminated?

### **Indicators**

Clear indicators are required in order to measure and assess the degree and quality to which SSR activities engage and impact development objectives. Indicators assist the measuring of progress towards or achievement of, expected outcomes and objectives, in order to re-design programmes and recommendations, to improve decision-making for on-going programmes, to ensure accountability for resources and enable comparison of performance, to enhance coherence on reporting, to advocate on the programming, and to enable policy forecasting.

However, indicators do not account for how or why changes occurred. They also do not substitute for M&E or careful analysis. More accurately, they serve as landmarks or road posts to guide progress. In addition, a specific activity could be positive and successful, but the indicators may not account for this. This could occur, for instance, if the indicator does not provide an appropriate measurement or if there is an off-setting regression that pushes success of the activity backward. Further, it is likely that a dichotomous variable (definition) cannot be used to produce *the more x, the less y* statements.

For purposes of this project, the indicators are included as "fields" or "variables" presented in Database 1.0 and Database 2.0.

#### **4.3.4 Methodological challenges and limits**

This report suggests that there are limits to the assessment of one particular SSR activity's impact on overall security or development conditions. It is particularly difficult to isolate a single activity from the range of aggravating and contextual factors that maintain influence. This is well acknowledged in literature that examines M&E methodology, but often remains forgotten in policy rhetoric as well as general security-development academic literature.

In line with leading M&E methodologies, particularly RBM, activities should be accountable to the specific objectives detailed in the project. Still, conceptually SSR is considered to be a valuable tool for development progress. Thus, it is still useful to try to better understand which activities have contributed to what extent to specific or general development objectives.

Furthermore, this project was confronted with the question whether it should also assess quasi-SSR or SSR-light activities in order to determine whether these include or exclude 'developmental elements' and whether they have a perceived or projected impact on development conditions. Given that the project has not been conducted in an isolated laboratory but is actually embedded in a social setting, this report suggests that donors and practitioners should be held accountable for broader societal effects, intended or unintended. Therefore, even if developmental elements are not explicitly stated objectives in a given SSR intervention, quasi- or light-SSR activities should still be accountable to fundamental and underlying principles of do no harm, respect local communities, human rights, development and security. As a consequence, both databases contain SSR activities and programmes that could be considered as quasi-SSR or light-SSR.

Amongst other challenges, sampling errors and non-sampling errors oftentimes represent the main reasons of concern when designing and implementing a survey leading to the nonconformity of a survey response from its true value. Deficiencies in the survey frame (when using surveys for a project as this one), design and implementations are amongst the challenges in the application and assessment of the survey. Respondents' diverse characteristics and attitudes, as well as different survey contexts and project activities, could lead to poorer research outputs. In this case, internal validity would be threatened.

Another methodological challenge that this research project identified is the transformation of qualitative case studies and standardised surveys into useful datasets. Qualitative results of case studies need to be collected in a feasible yet meaningful manner. Eventual analysis benefits from a detailed, comprehensive and well-structured collection of relevant information. The broader the representation and coverage of the survey in each case study and the larger the number of the overall case studies, the higher the chance to produce results that accurately describe situations and dynamics of SSR-development correlations in each case study. Also, the broader the representation and coverage of the survey in each case study and the larger the number of the overall case studies, the higher the chances for generating generalisable patterns and recommendations with policy relevance.

## 5 The Mechanics of the Survey and the Database

Drawing on section 4.2, this section of the report will further elaborate on the underlying mechanics of the survey and the database.

### 5.1 Details on the nature and design of the database: Requirements and selected approach

The database, including all the collected SSR cases, evolved significantly with the progress of the project. Microsoft Office's Excel was used for the design and amendment of the spreadsheets (cf. Figure 4).

**Figure 4:** Database 1.0 (top) and Database 2.0 (bottom)

	A	B	C	D	E
1	Unqie identifier	Name of activity or programme	Is this a postconflict context?	Ongoing conflict	Is this a democratic consolidation context?
2	Afghanistan_mult_2007	"EU Police Mission in Afghanistan" (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) (6.1)	No: The HIIK registers allout war in Afghanistan from 2007 until 2011(3.3)	Yes: The HIIK registers allout war in Afghanistan from 2007 until 2011(3.3)	No: Afghanistan is classified as a failed state by Polity 4. (3.3)Coalition involvement in Afghanistan is, nevertheless, geared towards a regime transition.
3	Afghanistan_PolCo_r_2002	"Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)" (6.1)	No: HIIK data recognizes all out war in Afghanistan since 2003 (6.2)	Yes: HIIK data recognizes all out war in Afghanistan since 2003 (6.2)	No: Afghanistan is classified as a failed state by Polity 4. (3.3)Coalition involvement in Afghanistan is, nevertheless, geared towards a regime transition.
			No mention of a post-conflict		Yes: "the country is making efforts to comply with requirements for



	A	B	C	D	E
1	Unique ident	Country	Year	Leading organisation	Kind of activity
2	Afghanistan_m ult_2007	Afghanistan	2007	European Union	Police mission
3	Afghanistan_P olCor_2002	Afghanistan	2002	UNDP	Law and Order
	Albania_Pol_2				

In order to comprehend the respective advantages of the two databases, both of them are briefly described and subsequently compared.

## 5.2 Description of Database 1.0

Database 1.0 consists of five spreadsheets: 'Context', 'Specifics', 'Components', 'Contacts' and, 'Colour code key'.

The information retrieved from the 174 SSR cases, including the raw information, e.g. quotes from research papers, has been included in the spreadsheet as originally stated in the text sources. The information has been categorised and attributed to the corresponding SSR case (see Figure 5). The original text sources can be found in the literature appendix in this document.

Figure 5: Database 1.0 – spreadsheet ‘Context’

	B	C	D	E	F
10	"Appui à la modernisation de la justice" (134.1), under MEDA/MEDA II/EuroMed	no: developed out of civil war in the 90s (134.3), ongoing latent conflict with islamists	Yes: HIIK data registers a highly violent conflict with islamist groups throughout the project period. For data see HIIK data from 2003 – 2010 at (134.4)	No: The Country is not democracy in the time span at hand (134.2)	Data not clear: Polity 4 merely registered regime factionalism (134.2)
11	[KRM: Should it be assessed as part of the whole programme?] "Support to the Reform of Justice" (under the auspices of the MEDA II Programme that started in 2000) (64.1)	No: Latent violent conflict between Islamist Groups and the Algerian Government. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict studies (HIIK) rates Algeria as being between "Serious Crisis" and "War" in 2004 (65.6). "Algeria is not involved in any territorial conflicts, although there are border disputes with its neighbours in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco," a European Commission assessment states (64.4 p 8) , but the hiiK registers continued violent conflict with islamist groups until today. (64.5)	Yes: Latent violent conflict between Islamist Groups and the Algerian Government. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict studies (HIIK) rates Algeria as being between "Serious Crisis" and "war" in 2004 (65.6). "Algeria is not involved in any territorial conflicts, although there are border disputes with its neighbours in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco," a European Commission assessment states (64.4 p 8) , but the hiiK registers continued violent conflict with islamist groups until today. (64.5)	No: According to the Polity 4 project Algeria cannot be called a democracy, although significant improvements are being made since the early 90s. (21.2)	Data not clear. "In the case of Algeria, the EU prefers stability over promoting democracy, and the authoritarian regime is in fact tolerated or even welcomed, regarded as the lesser of two evils, given the possibility of the likely alternative: a radical Islamist regime." (21.5, p 183) Anyhow, Algeria is making a "slow, uneven, and incomplete transition from a military-dominated state toward democracy." (21.1 p 8) However: Polity 4 does not register a regime transition, but merely regime factionalism (21.2)
12	"Support to the Modernization of the Police (Police II)" (under the auspices of the MEDA II Programme that started in 2000) (21.1p 2f)	No: Latent violent conflict between Islamist Groups and the Algerian Government. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict studies (HIIK) rates Algeria as being between "Serious Crisis" and "War" in 2001 and 2002 (21.2 p 2)/(21.3, 2). It can thus be described as a context of conflict.	Yes: Latent violent conflict between Islamist Groups and the Algerian Government. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict studies (HIIK) rates Algeria as being between "Serious Crisis" and "war" in 2001 and 2002 (21.2 p 2)/(21.3, 2). It can thus be described as a context of conflict.	No: According to the Polity 4 project Algeria cannot be called a democracy, although significant improvements are being made since the early 90s. (21.2)	Data not clear: Algeria is making a "slow, uneven, and incomplete transition from a military-dominated state toward democracy." (21.1 p 8) Polity 4 registers improvement in democratic quality but registers "factionalism" instead of "transition" (21.2)
13	"Supporting the Human Rights Defender's Office in drafting an ad hoc report on application of disciplinary actions in the army" (27.1)	No mention of a post-conflict context	Yes: HIIK Data registers a violent armed conflict of the government vs. the opposition in 2008. (27.2)	No: "Armenia's road to democracy has been hampered by a dominant executive branch, citizens who are still learning their roles and responsibilities in a democratic system, and corruption" (23.4) Polity 4 data shows, that Armenia cannot be called a democracy in the time span at hand. (23.5)	No: Armenia is not in a transition phase (23.5)
14	"Police Reform Programme." (23.2)	No: The war with Aserbaidshchan ended long ago, in 1994. Since then only low intensity non-violent conflict has been registered (HIIK) (23.3)	NO: The war with Aserbaidshchan ended long ago, in 1994. Since then only low intensity non-violent conflict has been registered (HIIK) (23.3)	No: "Armenia's road to democracy has been hampered by a dominant executive branch, citizens who are still learning their roles and responsibilities in a democratic system, and corruption" (23.4) Polity 4 data shows, that Armenia cannot be called a democracy in the time span at hand. (23.5)	No: Armenia is not in a transition phase (23.5)

### 5.2.1 Spreadsheet ‘Context’

The main spreadsheet of Databases 1 is named “Context” and consists of 175 rows (one *title* row and 174 *cases* rows, one for each SSR case) and 9 columns, (from A to I) aimed at describing the categorisation criteria.

The following are the 9 criteria:

- Unique identifier (column A)
- Name of activity or programme (column B)
- Is this a post-conflict context? (column C)
- On-going conflict (column D)
- Is this a democratic consolidation context? (column E)
- Is this part of a political transition? (column F)
- Is it a development context? (column G)

- Is this a post-natural disaster context? (column H)
- Is this part or a result of a peace agreement or other in/formal peace process? (column I)

For each SSR case, a *unique identifier* (column A) had to be found in order to distinguish it from other projects.

The *unique identifier* consists of three elements: the country where that specific SSR case project was conducted, the overarching institutional field(s) of the project, and the year the project was initiated. The overarching institutional field(s) of the project, the second element of the unique identifier, employs the following coding:

Arm	Army
Bor	Border Control
Cor	Correctional System
Cus	Customs
Ins	Intelligence services
Jus	Justice System
MoD	Ministry of Defense
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
Mult	Multiple institutions
Pol	Police
Sec	Security Sector

The combination of the three aforementioned elements results in the unique identifier. For instance, the “Governance, Justice, Law and Order Reform Programme” conducted in Kenya in 2010, can be found in the database under the unique identifier “Kenya\_Jus\_2010”. The security sector reform mission implemented in Burundi in 2007 was named “Burundi\_Mult\_2007”.

In the column of the unique identifier, references to literature, case studies or surveys have not been included. With regards to all the other columns (B to I), the sources for entries in the spreadsheets are marked in brackets, e.g. (84.1) in cell B97 for the aforementioned case in Kenya (Figure 6) and can be found in the appendices of this report.

**Figure 6:** Extract of the literature appendix

<p><b>84) Kenya_Jus_2010</b></p> <p>84.1) UNDP projects in Kenya: <a href="http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/access-to-justice-and-human-rights">http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/access-to-justice-and-human-rights</a></p>
<p><b>85) Malawi_Jus_X</b></p> <p>85.1) BICC (2006). 'Inventory of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Efforts In Developing and Transition Countries', Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); <a href="http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ssr_complete_list.pdf">http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ssr_complete_list.pdf</a></p>
<p><b>86) Malawi_ParliamentaryOversightBodies_X</b></p> <p>86.1) BICC (2006). 'Inventory of Security Sector Reform (SSR) Efforts In Developing and Transition Countries', Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); <a href="http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ssr_complete_list.pdf">http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ssr_complete_list.pdf</a></p>

In column B, the name of the activity or of the programme is listed either in English or in French, usually accompanied by a reference to the source in the literature annex.

Column C highlights whether or not the project took place in a post-conflict context. Despite the close-ended nature of the question, alternative answers could be given where absolute affirmative and negative answers could not be provided. For instance, *no post-conflict context was mentioned* (cell C172), *no assessment was possible, time frame was not given* (cell C143) or *no information could be found* (C123) were some of the solutions. Columns information was taken from formal agreements ending hostilities prior to the SSR case.

Similar to column C, columns from D to I pose close-ended yes/no questions. Similar to column C, where mere yes/no answers could not be established, alternative responses were given. However, while the additional amount of information might provide an enriching insight into the various projects, in some cases excessively extensive explanations could endanger the clarity of the database.

Column D 'Ongoing conflict' supplements column C.

The main source used for the collected data is the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's (HIK) Conflict Barometer<sup>55</sup> that maps, calculates and categorises conflict

<sup>55</sup> Source: [http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer\\_2008.pdf](http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2008.pdf).

intensity across the world. This category is important because many formal agreements or post-conflict contexts do not reflect specific countries situations. The Conflict Barometer sets disputes and non-violent crisis with an intensity level of 1 or 2 as non-violent conflicts, whereas *violent crisis*, *limited wars* and *wars* with intensity level of 3 or higher as violent conflict (cf. Table 1).

The terminology used by HIIK Conflict Barometer to categorise conflict intensity has slightly changed with years; see below Table 1 and Table 2 for a proper understanding of the database.

**Table 1: Conflict intensities (2008 Terminology)**<sup>56</sup>

Intensity Level	Terminology	State of Violence	Intensity Group
1	Latent Conflict	Non-Violent Conflict	Low Intensity
2	Manifest Conflict		
3	Crisis	Violent Conflict	Medium Intensity
4	Severe Crisis		High Intensity
5	War		

**Table 2: Conflict Intensities (2016 Terminology)**<sup>57</sup>

Intensity Level	Terminology	Level of Violence	Intensity Class
1	Dispute	Non-Violent Conflict	Low Intensity
2	Non-violent crisis		
3	Violent Crisis	Violent Conflict	Medium Intensity
4	Limited War		High Intensity
5	War		

Transferring this categorisation in the database, it is possible to identify the conflict situation for each unique identifier. For instance, the entry for “EastTimor\_Jus\_2008b” (D53) is “scale 3 violent crisis [...]”.

Column E, “Is this a democratic consolidation context?”, is to assess whether an activity has a country context of democratic consolidation. The data source is the Polity data series, more precisely Polity IV Project<sup>58</sup>. According to its authors, the Polity IV dataset “covers all major, independent states in the global system”<sup>59</sup>. It is “a living data collection effort” which “constantly monitors regime changes in all major countries and provides annual assessments of regime authority characteristics, changes and data updates”<sup>60</sup>. The resulting index, the so-called “Polity Score” captures the “regime authority spectrum” ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated monarchy). In between these extremes there

<sup>56</sup> This chart is based on the HIIK’s ‘Conflict Barometer 2016, p. 6,

[https://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer\\_2016.pdf](https://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2016.pdf).

<sup>57</sup> [https://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer\\_2016.pdf](https://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2016.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> Center for Systemic Peace, ‘The Polity Project’, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

are three categories: -10 to -6 (autocracy), -5 to +5 (anocracy), and +6 to +10 (democracy) (cf. Table 3).

**Table 3: Regime authority spectrum**

	Minimum Polity Score	Maximum Polity Score
Autocracy	-10	-6
Anocracy	-5	+5
Democracy	+6	+10

For the database, a country is assumed to undergo democratic consolidation if marked as democratic. In case of differing perspectives on regime quality, it would have been mentioned in the appropriate cell, e.g. cell E49 on “EUPOL Kinshasa” project. This divergent takes are given by a reference suggesting that the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were the first free elections since its independence in 1960, whereas Polity IV data claims that the DRC was an open anocracy (Polity Score between +1 and +5).

Column F’s criteria shows whether SSR case is part of a political transition. Polity IV is also the main source of information for this column data and country authority trends highlight whether a country is undergoing regime transition. When available, additional independent information would complement the retrieved information.

Column G, informs whether the SSR case takes place in a development context. Data is mostly based on the UNDP country profiles<sup>61</sup>.

Column H assesses whether the activity has a post-natural disaster context, the source of information is PreventionWeb<sup>62</sup>, a project of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). Entries to column H would be yes/no, complemented with the number of overall deaths caused by natural disasters, the average number of deaths per year, the most frequent and the worst forms of natural disasters, and the number of people it affected. The data collected comprise all the years from 1980 to 2010 included.

For instance, the cell H24’s entry regarding the 2004 Bosnia Police Reform reads as follows: “No post-natural disaster context. Bosnia has had an average of 1 person killed per year since 1980 and an overall death toll of 16 people from 1980 until 2010. It has had 8 floods”.

Column I, the last column of the spreadsheet ‘Context’, examines SSR activities as part or result of peace agreement or other in/formal peace processes. In order to answer the question for every case, various data and sources accessed. For instance, cell I30 acknowledges that the Cambodian project “Access to Justice” (unique identifier: Cambodia\_MoJ\_2006) was the result of a peace agreement, more precisely “The Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1991 ended violence in the country and sparked UN involvement”.

<sup>61</sup> United Nations Development Programmes, ‘International Human Development Indicators’, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries>.

<sup>62</sup> PreventionWeb, ‘Home’, <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/>.

### 5.2.2 Spreadsheet ‘Specifics’

‘Specifics’ is the second spreadsheet of Database 1.0. Unlike the spreadsheet ‘Context’, it covers 173 cases and 13 columns that run from A to M, to describe the categorisation criteria. The criteria that applied to unique identifiers in the spreadsheet ‘Context’ applies also to ‘Specifics’. However, because the total number of cases is different in the two spreadsheets the row numbers do not coincide, shifting row 40 from “Coted’Ivoire\_X\_2003” in Context up to “Croatia\_PolMol\_2010” in Specific<sup>63</sup>.

There are 13 categorisation criteria for the spreadsheet ‘Specifics’ that are significantly different from ‘Context’ criteria:

- Unique identifier (column A)
- Name of activity or programme (column B)
- Donor(s) involved (column C)
- Years of activity (column D)
- O: Current (column E)
- Planned years of activity (column F)
- Budget (column G)
- Size of the activity (H)
- Security Institution(s) subject to reform (column I)
- Who initiated activity? (column J)
- Who carried out activity? (column K)
- Who are local partners? (column L)
- Inclusive planning? (column M)

In column B, the names of activities or programmes are listed either in English or in French followed by their acronym and by a reference to the source in the literature annex.

Column C describes the donors involved in the activities. These could be countries, international agencies, institutions or groups. For instance, the donors for ‘Burundi\_MoDMinistryofPublicSecurity\_2009’ (unique identifier) are the ‘Government of the Netherlands, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)’.

Column D highlights the length of the activity in years. Data in this column could either be given in number of years (e.g. 2 years) or with the precise initial and final year of activity (e.g. 2006 – 2010). The length is usually complemented by a reference to the source in the literature annex.

Column E refers to the current situation of the programme. It is either completed, ongoing, or future steps were planned. Reference to the source in the literature annex could follow.

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<sup>63</sup> This is a major issue and complicates data analysis unnecessarily. It is one of several reasons why the final database limits itself to one spreadsheet.

Column F refers to the planned years of activity that can be given either in months or in years with additional information where necessary.

Column G, on budget, clarifies the financial plan of the activity with respective time and expected period. References to the source in the literature annex follow.

Column H, labelled “Size of the activity”, tries to acknowledge the extent of the activity in all its complexity. It includes the diverse elements, from the number of people, to the sites touched by each particular activity, focuses, objectives and achievements; in order to specify the setting. This greatly helps in the understanding of the whole project.

The following five columns, from I to M, outline those security institutions that were subject to reforms (I), who was at the origins of the activity (J) and who carried it out (K) and local partners. Column M includes questions about the inclusiveness of the activities (M), with *Yes, No, Partly* or *No info* responses.

### **5.2.3 Spreadsheet ‘Components’**

‘Components’ is the third spreadsheet of the Database 1.0. It covers 174 cases and 10 columns, from A to J, for the categorisation criteria. With regards to the unique identifiers, these remained consistent in the spreadsheets ‘Context’, ‘Specifics’ and ‘Components’. However, Row numbers of this spreadsheet do not coincide with those of the two spreadsheets already analysed<sup>64</sup>.

There are 10 categorisation criteria for the spreadsheet ‘Components’, mostly different to those of ‘Context’ and ‘Specifics’:

- Unique identifier (column A)
- Is it part of a specifically designed SSR programme? (column B)
- Are there other “related” SSR activities in the country? (column C)
- SSR-proper or SSR-light or quasi-SSR? (column D)
- Is there mention of a development plan/strategy? (column E)
- Are development “issues” mentioned? (column F)
- DDR? (column G)
- Gender? (column H)
- Human Rights? (column I)
- Other human development components? (column J)

Regarding column D (whether a case can be considered as SSR-proper, SSR-light or quasi-SSR), our assessment was based on free available information. In case of uncertainties with respect to the categorisation of an activity, a question mark was added behind the entry (e.g. cell D83). If there was insufficient information available and no judgement could be made, this was indicated (e.g. cell D139).

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. Antecedent footnote.



**Figure 7: Example of column D**

D	
SSR-proper or SSR-light or quasi-SSR?	
	SSR-proper
83	Quasi – SSR
	SSR-light
	SSR – light (partial)
	SSR related project, monitoring
139	

#### **5.2.4 Spreadsheet ‘Contacts’**

‘Contacts’ is the fourth spreadsheet of Database 1.0. It covers 171 cases, as “components” does and row numbers of the two columns coincide. It has 7 columns, from A to G, to categorise the criteria. There are 7 categorisation criteria for the spreadsheet ‘Components’, mostly different to those of three spreadsheets previously described:

- Unique identifier (column A)
- Has the activity been evaluated? (column B)
- Has the activity been written about (not evaluation)? (column C)
- Has DCAF written on it (if so, who)? (column D)
- Has DCAF engaged in operations (if so, who)? (column E)
- List of key individuals involved in design, setting up, implementation, review (column F)
- Miscellaneous (column G)

The distinguishing aspect of this spreadsheet is the collection of points of contact regarding the 171 SSR activities. These key individuals involved in the design, setting up, implementation or review of the case have been registered in column F (cf. Figure 6). The idea behind this index of points of contact is to enable researchers and policy makers to easily reach out to peers in case of queries.

The other columns add useful information on the activities as potential future entry points.

**Figure 8: Detail of spreadsheet 'Contacts'**

Tracking the Development Dividend of SSR: Research Points 5 6  
 Identification of SSR programmes and activities to be surveyed (large-N and small-N)






List of key individuals involved in design, setting up, implementation, review	Misc.			
Contact E-Mail: presse.psd@eeas.europa.eu, Fatima Ayub (Open Society Foundation), Mr. Kees Klompenhouwer, Interim Head of EU Civilian Missions	Fatima Ayub: invited expert in UK commission			
Sandeep Kumar, Project Manager sandeep.kumar@undp.org +93 (0) 700 277 084, Norman Sanders CTA/Project Manager a.i. Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, norman.sanders@undp.org Cell: +93 (0) 790 509 152				
Vladimir Malkaj, Programme Specialist, E-mail: vladimir.malkaj@undp.org, DCAF specialists on Southeast Europe	The SSSR programme builds on the achievements of Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) (120.1)			
Eno Ngjela, Programme Officer E-mail: eno.ngjela@undp.org, DCAF specialists on Southeast Europe, ALBANIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (AIIS) Deshmoret e 4 Shkurtit No.7/1 Tirana Albania Phone: (355) 4 248853 Fax: (355) 4 270337 Email aiis@aiis-albania.org www.aiis-albania.org	AIIS could serve as experts for all other Albanian SSR activities!			

**5.2.5 Spreadsheet 'Colour Code Key'**

The fifth and last spreadsheet of Database 1.0 serves a different purpose than the four aforementioned spreadsheets.

It explains the meaning of the different fill colours used throughout the database (cf. Figure 7) and suggests possible improvements to the database.

**Figure 9: Fill colours and their meaning**

Needs information	
Follow-up/good point/good case	
Question with his point	
Possible for small-N, based upon available information/informant	
Possible removal from large and small-N sample	

### **5.3 From the initial (Database 1.0) to the final database (Database 2.0)**

The initial database pools 174 SSR activities conducted between 1998 and 2012 and sorts them into four spreadsheets according to 35 criteria/questions. While great care was taken to be as detailed as possible, the database is not complete and often lacks clarity and accessibility. The initial database (Database 1.0) has dense and text-laden spreadsheet entries, which challenge the interpretation and understanding of the reader on the spreadsheet. The text-laden entries hamper the quick extraction of information and the aforementioned inconsistencies regarding the row numbers makes comparisons between the different spreadsheets tedious.

Gradually, with the progression of the project, the need for a revised database emerged. Major deficiencies of the initial database have been addressed, improved and subsequently incorporated into the final database.

### **5.4 Description of Database 2.0**

The inconsistent row numbers, which were considered one of the major shortcomings in regards to data distribution in Database 1.0, was addressed in Database 2.0. It consists of one single spreadsheet named "Context" and all the analysed SSR activities are listed in the rows of the spreadsheet. The columns in the spreadsheet cover the 35 final categorisation criteria from A to Z and from AA to AI. Most of the categorisation criteria have not changed materially, but formally:

- i) The majority of the categorisation criteria or questions have been reformulated in order to allow, where possible, for a binary answer, i.e. yes, no.

- ii) The titles of the columns enable text filtering and/or colour filtering of the results.
- iii) Four columns were added and four columns deleted.

**Figure 10: Excerpt from Database 2.0**

Unique identifier	Country	Year	Leading organisation	Kind of activity	Postconflict conte	Ongoing Conflict	Democratic consolidation	Part of political transitio	Development context
Afghanistan_mult_2007	Afghanistan	2007	European Union	Police mission	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan_PolCor_2002	Afghanistan	2002	UNDP	Law and Order	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Albania_Pol_2003	Albania	2003	UNDP	SSSR	No information found	No mention	Yes	No	Depends (see W1)
Albania_X_2003	Albania	2003	UNDP	Early Warning	No information found	No mention	Yes	No	Depends (see W1)

Regarding point i), concise answers are surely more suitable and less confusing, allowing for a more immediate understanding of the database. Reasonably, binary answers could not fit all the questions (i.e. country) in which case the given answer is kept short and immediate (cf. Figure 10).

With regards to point ii), filters were introduced for a more practical use, and a first-sight grasp. They provide a rapid way to find specific data in such large database.

Concerning point iii), the following four criteria from the initial database have been deleted:

- Name of activity or programme
- Size of the activity
- List of key individuals involved in the design, setting up, implementation and review
- Miscellaneous

The criteria “Name of activity or programme” was removed because of its low informative value. In some cases, official titles could not be found and were substituted with very general names (e.g. Database 1.0, ‘Specifics’, B23 - “Bosnian Police Reform” or cell B77<sup>65</sup> - “Security Sector Reform Mission”). However, given that each activity already had its unique identifier, these names were not necessary for analysis and simply acted as placeholders. Likewise, when activities were given official names like “EUPOL Kinshasa” or “EUPOL RD Congo” (cells B49 and B50), the information added was very marginal. Entries in other columns clearly showed that the activity was about a police reform in the DRC in partnership with the EU.

The column “Size of the activity” was constantly text-laden with very heterogeneous entries. In some cases, the number of the staff reached during the activity was reckoned, for

<sup>65</sup> The cells mentioned in this paragraph refer to the same spreadsheet.

instance cell H2 had “321 international staff and 197 national staff [...] 7,000 ANP officers and almost 700 judges”. In some other cases the entries described the aims of the activity, e.g. cell H9: “Aims are to modernise the prison system, [...]”. Still in other cases, examples of seminars, tasks or assessments forming part of the SSR activity were reported, e.g. cell H63: “a Defence Advisory Team [...] visited Ethiopia to assess defence reform requirements”. Visibly, the diverse entries could not produce comparable data.

The reason for not including the ‘list of key individuals involved in design, setting up, implementation and review’ (cf. Database 1.0, spreadsheet ‘Contacts’) was to improve overall clarity of the database. Furthermore, it is highly probable that contact details have changed, points of contact have become obsolete, or people have changed their mandate.

The column “Miscellaneous” was deleted because it was made up of additional information introduced without clear specific criteria, which could eventually hinder a clear understanding of the database.

In regards to point iii) yet again, the following columns have been added to the final database:

- Country
- Year
- Kind of activity
- Leading organization

Despite the fact that both the country in which the SSR activity was performed and the year of initiation were already included in the unique identifier, it was necessary to add them also as distinctive criteria in separate columns to sort data in a less complicated manner.

The “Kind of activity” describes the nature of the activity undertaken. Either it is a SSR, or a police reform, an early warning system, and so on. It is crucial to clearly define the kind of activity to allow for proper understanding of the project, and to avoid confusion.

The column “Leading organization” highlights who is leading each activity, i.e. the European Union, UNDP, national governments, or others. Where this specific information is missing, the cell will be filled with “no information found”.

## **5.5 Details on the possibilities for qualitative and quantitative manipulation of data**

The manipulation of data means resorting and rearranging the available data without altering it. The only thing that changes is the relationship between data to help identify patterns that otherwise may not have been recognised.

A qualitative approach would surely give a perspective that is more context-specific. ‘Qualitative’ implies an emphasis on something that is not strictly measurable in terms of quantity, but rather gives more focus to the social dimension that is not able to be quantified. The quantitative approach would instead translate the activities and their

outcomes into variables for a deductive analysis putting emphasis on the capacity and inquiry of a causal relation between variables.

In this project, due to the heterogeneous nature of data, a qualitative approach to manipulate them could represent an alternative to usual probabilities. The use of quantitative methods would see the usage of computational techniques to manipulate the data.

## **6 Conclusion**

### **6.1 Findings**

Security sector reform (SSR) is expected to improve both security and development in societies that experience various forms of economic, political and security transitions.

The supposed “security-development nexus” is often seen as a dynamic that produces security and stability as favourable conditions for sustainable development, and vice versa, despite the lack of a strong empirical basis. The presumed SSR-security-development dynamic thus constitutes a weak basis from which to establish convincing, empirically-based conclusions about the symbiotic relationship between security provision and sustainable development. This project aimed at investigating and substantiating the assumed relationship between SSR activities and their impact on development prospects in order to reconcile the apparent impasse between development and SSR practitioners. “Tracking the development dividend of SSR”, or in other words, producing evidence of the potential benefits of a mutually supportive relationship between SSR and development would help breach this impasse.

DCAF’s previous research identified considerable difficulties in identifying and applying an appropriate set of indicators to measure a correlation between SSR activities and objectives and development objectives and outcomes. This project tried to ease these difficulties by analysing and utilising different indicators.

In order to allow comparisons between the results produced and practical utility of conducting large-N surveys and small-N comparative case studies, the aim of the project was to survey between 50 to 100 SSR activities and programmes. Thanks to a thorough analysis of the SSR landscape, both the size of the sample and the length of the observed timeframe could be improved. A total of 174 SSR interventions constitute the representative sample of SSR programmes. The interventions have been conducted within a timeframe spanning from 1998 to 2012, with the exception of an intervention conducted in 1976 and of those programmes that were still ongoing in 2013 (see Figure 1 above).

In combination with factual background information on the SSR programmes considered and eventually chosen for the study, survey results are included in two databases (Database 1.0 and 2.0) that allow users to retrieve information and manipulate the dataset to meet their own research needs. The databases including all the collected SSR cases evolved significantly with the progress of the project. Database 1.0 is made up of five spreadsheets containing all of the 174 SSR activities and programmes. In order to facilitate comparison a taxonomy with different variables has been introduced, such as location; duration; funders; objectives; written statements; the question if national development strategy was included; perceived development impacts and intended and unintended development spin-offs; implemented in a post-conflict context, etc.

Once all the collected data was fed into the Database 1.0, it became apparent that the spreadsheets were too text-laden due to relatively long qualitative descriptions. The

Database 1.0 is extensive and complete, but to the detriment of its user-friendliness. These deficiencies have been addressed and resulted in the creation of Database 2.0.

The major advantages of Database 2.0 compared to Database 1.0 are that i) all necessary information is included in one single spreadsheet, ii) categorization criteria have been reformulated to allow for a binary answer (yes/no), iii) a text filtering function is added. These additional features make Database 2.0 more user-friendly to retrieve information or to manipulate. For instance, thanks to the pivot-table function, it is possible to extract and visualize information with only a few clicks:

Database 2.0 offers the opportunity to store and share the results of qualitative mapping results, to code binary and to design simple quantitative assessment tools. Neither Database 1.0 nor Database 2.0 is web-based. However, both databases are only a step away from being web-based thanks to the (free) services of several Internet search engines that allow for making spreadsheets accessible and editable by simply sharing a URL. The larger the number of case studies included in the database, the greater the chance will be of creating results that accurately describe situations and dynamics of SSR-development correlations in each case study, while boosting chances for generalizable patterns and recommendations with policy relevance.

Apart from generating comparable data on SSR activities and contexts, the projects applied methodology and subsequent analysis provides answers to pointed questions about intended and actual impacts on meeting national development objectives. The information generated by this project will benefit continuing work on assessing and improving SSR's suitability for helping societies meet development and broader peacebuilding objectives.

## **6.2 Suggestions for future research**

Nowadays still, there seems to be a perception, not only at the field level, that the development and SSR communities have incompatible agendas with opposed objectives. As a consequence, it is argued that the two communities should use different tools to achieve those objectives. The evidence collected during this project cautions against this view, buttressing the claim that the 'development paradigm' and the 'security paradigm' are not incommensurable. This project's review of SSR activities and programs, resulting in the creation of Database 1.0 and Database 2.0, is a first attempt to "track the development dividend of SSR". From this point on, further analysis is needed to corroborate the findings.

First, the databases developed during this project provide an inventory of SSR activities and programs conducted between 1998 and 2012 with each activity being reviewed with regards to its intended or non-intended effects on developmental aspects. It is a solid inventory that can be used by practitioners and scholars the like as a work of reference. However, a database is only useful if it is easily accessible and regularly updated. A free, speedy and easy access could be guaranteed by uploading the spreadsheet on one of the different platforms provided by several Internet search engines. Subsequently, a peer-review mechanism would have to be integrated in order to avoid mistakes or 'fake reporting'. Once the access and editing issues have been resolved, more research is needed to cover SSR



programs and activities conducted after 2012. The international research community is therefore invited to complete and update the large-N study with data retrieved from their own surveys. Such surveys could, even with a relatively limited number and coverage of respondents, buttress the existing data and fill gaps in the database. Apart from such standardised questionnaires, more efforts are needed to conduct more detailed and comprehensive surveys along with qualitative country case studies. This would allow for comparisons between the results produced and practical utility of conducting large-N surveys and small-N comparative case studies. Initial analyses could, for example, focus on examining the data for overall patterns and other significant information with relevance for SSR policy, planning and implementation processes. The invitation to contribute to the update and completion of the database is extended to practitioners, especially SSR officers involved in project implementation. Information retrieved on the ground during ongoing SSR interventions could be fed directly into the database without a delay in the timeliness of the information provided (real-time data collection).

Second, a potential follow-up to this research project could explore the feasibility of operationalising on-going efforts to track and analyse SSR programmes. Such efforts could aim to go beyond the usual pilot phase and lead to a full project implementation (including field studies and on-the-ground data collection and analysis), along with follow-up activities.

Third, from a practical perspective, the project could be used as a stepping stone to generate a network of country, security and/or development experts, both outside and within a specific SSR context, with the ability to appreciate, understand, design and implement development-sensitive SSR activities.

Fourth, in order to introduce research on the topic to the wider development community and to share experiences, it is highly recommended to organize outreach and consultation conferences. Such practitioners' consultation conferences could review and fine-tune the research methodologies applied, their usefulness and appropriateness, as well as the contents and choice of survey samples.

Finally, since the adoption of the post-2015 Development Agenda, the concept of the security-development nexus has gained increased momentum. The targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 'gender equality' (SDG 5), 'sustainable cities and communities' (SDG 11) and 'peace, justice and strong institutions' (SDG 16) have been identified as key objectives for SSG/R activities. In this context, several DCAF-funded projects will further contribute to emphasize the interdependence of development and human security. DCAF would like to encourage FBA and the international research community to join forces in this endeavour and to continue research and providing policy advice as part of these activities.

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[http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/2011/WSSI Plus Phase 2 signed ProDoc.pdf](http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/2011/WSSI_Plus_Phase_2_signed_ProDoc.pdf)

175.3)

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/kos2.htm>

175.4)

[http://www.balkandevlopment.org/edu\\_kos.html](http://www.balkandevlopment.org/edu_kos.html)

**176) DemocraticRepublicofCongo\_Pol\_2009b**

176.1)

<http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200385>

176.2)

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/con2.htm>

**177) Liberia\_Mult\_2011**

177.1)

[http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/PDF/Annual\\_Report\\_JSP\\_2011\\_Final\\_Jan\\_26\\_2012\\_%282%29.pdf](http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/PDF/Annual_Report_JSP_2011_Final_Jan_26_2012_%282%29.pdf)

177.2)

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/lbr2.htm>

177.3)

<http://www.lr.undp.org/ssr.htm>

177.4)

[http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/PDF/Justice\\_Security.pdf](http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/PDF/Justice_Security.pdf)

177.5)

Judy Smith-Höhn: *Rebuilding the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies: Perceptions from Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone* (DCAF)

**178) Liberia\_X\_X**

178.1)

<http://www.lr.undp.org/sgrl.htm>

**179) Liberia\_X\_X**

179.1)

<http://www.lr.undp.org/cst.htm>

**180) Algeria overall**

180.1)

[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/external\\_relations/relations\\_with\\_third\\_countries/mediterranean\\_partner\\_countries/r15006\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r15006_en.htm)

180.2)

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm)

**181) Kenya\_Jus\_2004**

181.1)

<http://www.gjlos.go.ke/>

181.2)

<http://ppja.org/countries/kenya/governance-justice-and-law-and-order-sector-reform-programme-administrative-data-collection-and-analysis-report>

181.3)

[http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002961/Kenya\\_GJLOS\\_2007.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002961/Kenya_GJLOS_2007.pdf)

## Appendix 1:

### Evaluation of reports of collected SSR interventions

This document served as a heuristics to collect the extracted information from different SSR activities' reports. The relevant paragraphs or excerpts of these reports were first broadly categorized and earmarked with the tags 'output', 'result', 'impact' or 'challenges of SSR'. In a subsequent step, the harvested information was fed into the databases.

#### Categories:

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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The categorization is not mutually exclusive: e.g. it was found that the SSR activity with the unique identifier "India\_Department of Justice Ministry-of Law and Justice\_2008" shows 'output elements' but also 'result elements' (cf. below).

The underlined number, e.g. 61.2, refers to the corresponding source(s) listed in the bibliography.

#### Afghanistan\_mult\_2007

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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from 61.2:

"In terms of civilian policing, the EU has provided a unique and vital capability for the stabilisation of Afghanistan society. We welcome this and applaud the work undertaken by EUPOL staff under very challenging conditions. However, the level of that capability remains a problem." (paragraph 78)

"The planned size of the EU mission of 400 was always too small to make a major difference to civilian outcomes in Afghanistan. This compares badly to the American and NATO commitment to the broader police training effort and has affected the relationship. We believe that this also has the wider effect of bringing the EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions as a whole into disrepute.

The reputational problem is compounded by the EUs' failure to reach even the limited target of 400 personnel and the mission is severely understaffed. The low degree of EU commitment to providing staff, combined with problems of illiteracy, corruption and desertion in the Afghan police and the overall security situation, means that there is a real risk that the EU will fail in an area where it should show leadership. We consider that the original mission should have been undertaken with a much greater level of commitment or not undertaken at all" (p.36-7)

"Without a major reduction in, or cessation of, the insurgency, there will not be an environment in which civilian policing can develop, and there is a danger that a vacuum may

develop in law and order and security. Even with such conditions—and an expansion of militarily secure areas—EUPOL will not be able to complete its task either in the remaining two and a half years of its extension, or within the timetable set by the international community for the withdrawal of combat forces” (p.38)

“This has been a troubled mission undertaking a vital task in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Despite achieving local successes, overall there is a strong risk of failure” (p.38)

### **Afghanistan\_Pol\_Corr\_2002**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### From 6.4:

“Overall, and measured against established targets, LOTFA has had some notable successes in ensuring an effective mechanism is in place for the reliable payment of salaries. The initiation of LOTFA-V has also seen a further increase in the Fund’s levels of support to a broader range of activities as compared to previous Phases” (p.5)

“Phase V saw a number of notable achievements by the Fund. Key among these are:

- ▶ Its work in rolling out the already established Electronic Payroll System (EPS) and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) to uniformed personnel in the Central Prisons Department. By December 2010, 50 per cent of eligible personnel were covered under both EPS and EFT.
- ▶ Continued success in advancing penetration of both the EPS and EFT mechanisms for ANP personnel. By the end of December 2010, the Fund attained 99.4 per cent coverage of police numbers, with EFT penetration reaching 80 per cent.” (p.5)

“This continued progress is significant in demonstrating a level of maturity in the establishment of payroll mechanisms, and particularly so in the context of a sharply expanded force size. This grew from the envisaged 82,000 projected for the end of 2010 to the mandated 1389 tashkeel strength of 122,000 by its end. LOTFA’s positive work in this issue remains at risk of being undermined by more strategic concerns over the lack of sustainability of the increased tashkeel and ongoing concerns over verification of tashkeel numbers” (p.5)

“This progress and the positive results of LOTFA’s efforts extend beyond its primary goals in the area of police remuneration to providing benefits that include improved morale, facilitating the inclusion of women through enhancing recruitment processes and promoting awareness of gender in policing, and the perceptions that are formed of the ANP’s credibility” (p.6)

“These successes notwithstanding, there are a number of persistent challenges that constrain LOTFA from improving its impact. As in the past, the inability to attain a multi-year planning framework due to the short term funding horizon of donors, the limited interventions in institutional capacity building outside of payroll related functions, and the constraints faced in addressing financial risk (particularly in relation to sustainability) are critical drawbacks. It is disappointing to note although these concerns were highlighted in

our previous review, their resolution during Phase V was limited. Nonetheless, on a more positive note, LOTFA-VI recognises some of these issues and goes some way in addressing them. We continue to caution that a failure to address these problems will undermine any efforts in attaining fiscal sustainability and administrative capability within the MOI” (p.6)

From 6.11:

“The concluding finding, though, is cautiously positive, and the next Phase of the Fund has reprioritised its activities in recognition of some of the pressing issues in improving the performance of the police” (p.1)

### **Albania\_Pol\_2003**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 120.1 (Final report 2007):

“The SSSR programme has also successfully utilized the relationships it has built as so far both with institutions and individuals during the previous phase to make its CBP initiatives effective and meaningful. Noteworthy, the SSSR have been expanded beyond the pilot areas including other geographical locations. So far, the SSSR’s efforts to build CBP at the grassroots level in Albania have been met with both enthusiasm and successful achievements. Although, great efforts have been done in terms of recomposing the CPSGs gender wise and youth wise, this issue remains still a challenge for SSSR to meet its objectives” (p.4)

“In order to receive feedback from CPSGs and measure their operational efficacy, the SSSR contracted an international consultant to assist in this process. The study assessed the CPSGs in terms of representation, relevance and interest and concludes that the project has made some real changes in the lives of ordinary people and that SSSR has yielded a number of resources to engage in grassroots level” (p.7)

“The SSSR Programme believes that during the reporting period through its work and activities has been able to implement the community based policing in pilot areas. The establishment of human contacts and the refreshing of CPSGs compositions have been very effective and beneficial to the objective of transferring the CBP practice to the local communities and authorizes. Building capacities through trainings and exchanges of practices will serve to further enhance the infrastructure and the philosophy of CBP among the Albania Police, local communities and the local authorities. The second phase of AE activities in general proved to be very successful because they build upon previous achievements and made new entries in other regions. The SSSR Programme believes that during this period has fulfilled the necessary steps to reach the overall objective of 2007, consolidating already made gains and ensure the sustainability of the programme when SSSR would be completed. During the implementation of the activities the general approval and commitment of the stakeholders was gained.” (p.14)

## Armenia\_Pol\_2010

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### From 23.2:

“The OSCE Office in Yerevan began working in close co-operation with the Armenian Police in 2003 and since then has successfully implemented a number of projects focusing on the introduction of democratic policing practices.”

## Bangladesh\_Mult\_2001

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### From 112.1:

“Results as of March 2011 include: Significant achievements in building the capacity of the National Legal Aid Services Organization (NLASO). The first, full-time National Director was appointed with a permanent allocation under the national revenue budget. NLASO is collecting statistical information from all districts based on newly developed reporting formats, District level offices are more regularly reporting on legal aid services (this year 70% reported while last year only 45% reported), NLASO has developed and implemented numerous laws and policy level directives, establishing sub-district level legal aid committees, reforming the legal fee structures to take inflation into account, reforming legal aid eligibility, and increasing funding for public awareness raising of the availability of legal aid services at district level. Additionally, collaboration between District Legal Aid Committees (DLAC) and NGOs has improved in all pilot districts, resulting in net gains for client access to justice: about 200-300 clients per month have been receiving legal aid. The model for legal aid offices developed by the project (a dedicated office plus three full time staff including a coordinator from the judicial cadre) has been accepted by the government and is being rolled out to all 64 districts of the country”

## Bangladesh\_Pol\_2005, Bangladesh\_Pol\_2009

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### From 96.11 (Annual Report 2012):

“Within the Bangladesh Police, the ratio of women police officers increased significantly in the last three years. During 2012, a total of 1,524 women were recruited into the Bangladesh Police, representing 11.88% of the annual number of recruits in 2012-525 more than in 2011. A day-care centre, operated by the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, was established at the Rajarbag Police Lines in Dhaka, providing a safe and secure environment for up to fifty police officers' children. The PRP supported a ToT initiative on gender awareness, allowing trainers to successfully conduct twenty-one gender orientation workshops for 1,007 police officers” (p.8)

“A total of 1,679 investigators, accounting for about 17% of all investigators, were trained in crime scene management and basic investigations while 136 court officers were trained during 2012. This training was supplemented by the provision of crime scene kits to one hundred (16.6%) police stations, enabling trained investigators to collect an increasing amount of evidence from crime scenes, shifting from confession-based to evidence-based investigations” (p.9)

“A total of 278 Community Policing Forums (CPFs) were strengthened through distributing grants to support CPF initiatives” (p.9)

“According to the project's financial status, the overall budget for 2012 was USD 7,015,361. Based on the ATLAS IPSAS report, the PRP has utilized 81% of the allocated funds. Total findings indicate that the PRP has achieved noteworthy progress in 2012” (p.10)

From 96.11 (Mid-Term Review 2012):

“The purpose of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) was to evaluate the implementation progress of the PRP at the mid-point of the current Phase II between Sept 2009 and Oct 2014. Within the evolving planning context of BP and the broader priorities of the GoB, it provides a timely opportunity for stakeholders to assess the current performance of PRP and implementation approach for the remainder of Phase II and a consideration for a possible Phase III.

The MTR review was conducted through an intensive and consultative process and considered all aspects of the project’s work both at policy and institutional level. It involved review of the programme’s objectives and planned activities against the expected results, and consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. The independent MTR Team consulted with and obtained feedback from partners, stakeholders and others who have been associated with this UNDP/DFID supported PRP Phase II. The MTR specifically addressed the following OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria: Relevance; Effectiveness; Efficiency and Value for Money; Results and Impacts; and Sustainability. These were considered within a framework of a number of key areas for the project including strategic orientation, implementation performance, integration of cross-cutting issues and partnership strategy. Additionally, the MTR identified the challenges and lessons learned during this period of Phase II implementation, and reviewed the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategic Framework with recommendations for enhancement. Consideration was also given to the feasibility and rationale of a possible PRP Phase III” (p.7-8)

“Overall PRP has contributed to a number of achievements within the Bangladesh Police in its two and a half years of Phase II implementation and has been effective in building on the platform provided in Phase I, particularly by strengthening engagement and ownership with the Bangladesh Police. The incoming Phase II Team faced a number of challenges inherited from Phase I and through an effective problem solving and project management approach systematically addressed these and PRP II has generally gained traction.” (p.8)

“The programme strategy has generally been appropriate and effective in moving towards achieving the programme outcomes” (p.8)

“There are no corrective actions required for project design apart from continuing update of indicators and minor wording adjustments for a small number of activities which are noted in the MTR report” (p.11)

“In terms of program management and administration PRP II is functioning well, particularly areas of financial management, accountability systems, oversight of procurement and reporting” (p.11)

“Results delivered against resources expended generally show value for money and resources allocated across the range of activities demonstrate management commitment to cost-effectiveness. A closer look at budgetary allocations in the Project Document however, shows that original costing estimates provided for personnel costs may be less than current requirements and would benefit from revision” (p.11)

“The perception of the community and key stakeholders on benefits derived from the PRP II to date are generally positive, particularly with regard to community policing initiatives such as model Thana, community policing forums, crime prevention centres and victim support centres” (p.11)

“Outcome 5 on ‘Promoting Gender Sensitive Policing’ has been particularly successful with achievements and outcomes resulting from this component directly, and its integration and mainstreaming across other components” (p.11)

“Although the project is generally on track with a number of successes there are several areas where progress is slow, superficial or stalled (mostly due to external factors)” (p.14)

### **Belarus\_Arm\_2007**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 121.6:

“The first phase of the programme, designed to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Defence of Belarus to safely guard SALW at five storage sites, was successfully completed in the summer of 2010” (p.9)

### **Bosnia\_ArmDefenseSector\_2003**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 7.3:

“Defence reform in BiH represents a significant step, making plain that ‘defence’ is a state function. It has made clear that the conflict conditions in which the entities had defined themselves along ethnic lines, rather than territorially, could not be perpetuated indefinitely. By drastically reducing the basis for the entities’ claim to a form of sovereignty, it also paved the way for a further strengthening of the state’s authority that might lead BiH



towards a ‘normal’ federal structure with a workable division of powers between the central authorities and the subordinated entities. Defence reform could thus be regarded as a relative success. It does, however, display shortcomings. While necessary to concentrate on overcoming the legacies of the war and to establish state control over defence functions, the reform did not address the persistence of old, pre-democratic thinking in the entities’ defence laws, which were left substantially the same. These laws were basically carbon copies of the old communist Yugoslav laws on defence and armed forces and were frequently incompatible with basic human rights, fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law”(p.40)

“When comparing the achievements of defence and intelligence reform, intelligence reform emerges slightly more effective in theory. As regards implementation, however, appointments of leading functionaries and establishing state structures in the realm of defence appear to have been relatively unproblematic, whereas in intelligence reform, problems persist” (p.41)

“Police reform has to be assessed in terms of reducing forces and of structural reform (...)The IPTF achieved the limited goals of overhauling local police forces; retraining senior police officers and training over 1,000 young cadets. However, police officers were still underpaid, and police work still suffered from fragmentation of jurisdictions among entities and cantons.” (p.41)

#### **Bosnia\_Pol\_2004**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### From 4.7:

“To put it in a nutshell, EUPM I contributed significantly to the reform of the police in BiH in a number of areas. However, and in reference to the original debate pertaining to the nature of the EUPM I mandate (executive powers or advisory capacities), the police mission was continuously criticized by officials from the EU member states and international community representatives for its weak interpretation of its mandate regarding its monitoring, inspection and advising tasks, but also for not taking the lead in BiH police reform and in the fight against organized crime” (p.8)

“EUPM’s concrete achievements have closely depended so far on the poor level of cooperation with the Bosnian authorities at State level to pass the laws required (internal affairs, police officers for instance). The key variable allowing for significant improvements as regards the police reform process and other rule of law related measures appears the political willingness” (p.15)

“In line with its mandate, the EUPM has been fostering a number of projects and initiatives to encourage local ownership, with relative success” (p.20)

“In that regard, it is worth highlighting the discrepancy – both in terms of the perception of what has been performed but also as regards the reality of the changes expected to be

brought about – between the mission’s “technical” achievements and the broader objectives that civilian operations conducted in the framework of the ESDP are intended to pursue (...) At a technical level, most strategic objectives pursued by the Mission have been satisfactorily achieved with significant results, at least on paper, and not least thanks to the valuable contribution of local police, whose quality of work and improved practices have been repeatedly highlighted by our interlocutors. However, it appears that the major enduring obstacles to the implementation of State level reforms, as regards police restructuring and police reform-related measures in particular, are primarily of a political nature. As many past and current cumbersome political negotiations and processes already discussed in this paper testify, police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina has indeed been governed so far by political decisions and the interplay of competing interests. This overall context means that it is no easy task to evaluate how effectively the EU Police Mission has performed its duties so far in the absence of clearly measurable goals and delineated competencies among EU stakeholders” (p.22)

### Brazil\_Pol\_X

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 24.2:

“UNDP has contributed to the successful development of the programme by providing innovative methodological processes, in two cases:

First, through the promotion of courses on “Citizen Security and co-existence”, where the concept systematised by the UNDP of an integral approach to public security is presented. In approximately 4 months, around 700 people – from security professionals to community leaders, from all regions of Brazil – where trained on the concept that violence is a multi-dimensional issue, thus must be dealt with in the same way. This opportunity lead decision-makers adopt a new perspective in order to construct public policies or implement field actions in security. In addition to that, a broader demand for these courses was noted and they will be transformed on modular courses for distance learning in a partnership with the Ministry of Justice, using the distance learning platform they already have in place. With this technology, the UNDP concept of citizen security will reach the majority of professionals dealing with security in the country.

Second, through the promotion of a new methodology of knowledge transfer – the Knowledge Fair. This methodology, developed by the UNDP LAC Knowledge Centre, aims at identifying, documenting, certifying and disseminating promising and/or innovative practices developed by the public sector or the civil society, motivating knowledge exchange. During this programme, a Knowledge Fair on Public Security with Citizenship was promoted – the first knowledge fair in Brazil, the first on the public security topic in the world and the biggest so far promoted. In this fair, experiences from all over the country went through a public contest. According to a set of criteria aligned with the citizen security approach, 41 practices were selected out of 226 subscribed. The selected practices had the opportunity to showcase themselves to 3.700 national and international visitors during the 4 days of fair activities. The experiences’ representatives were trained on how to best use this

opportunity not only to inform people about their projects, but also to establish letters of intention for exchanging knowledge between governmental and non-governmental organisations. A number of 707 letters of intention were signed during the fair. UNDP also provided the Ministry of Justice with a methodology to follow-up these intention letters as the possibility of federal funding to support those proposals of knowledge exchange appeared. In addition to that, a national database of practices in public security was started with the identification of those 226 practices that subscribed to participate in the fair”

“This was a project with a very focused objective, which can successfully show how new methodologies can develop the government’s capacity on promoting social engagement and knowledge exchange by providing the population with democratic and well-established channels of communication and state-of-the-art knowledge and training”

**Burundi\_ArmPol\_2011, Burundi\_MoDMinistryofPublic Security\_2009, Burundi\_Mult\_2007**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 39.18:

Plenty of results and numbers, but no objective assessment of the success of the mission/projects possible (no benchmarks).

**Cambodia\_MoJ\_2006**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 129.1:

Plenty of results and numbers, but no objective assessment of the success of the project possible (no benchmarks).

**CentralAfricanRepublic\_JusSec\_2011, CentralAfricanRepublic\_mult\_2008**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 19.4, 19.5:

Table with evaluation indicators/benchmarks on page 22, but no results available.

**Coted'ivoire\_ArmIns\_2004, Coted'ivoire\_PolGen\_2004**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 46.6 (attention: report is from after the Ouattara coup 2011):

“The creation of the preconditions for security sector re-form remains the country’s biggest problem. Very little progress has been made in this area. Six months after the inauguration

of Alassane Ouattara, the army, the police and the gendarmerie are still confronted with worrying divisions, inadequate resources and a profound hierarchical imbalance” (p.7)

“The disarmament operations conducted by UNOCI have allowed the recovery of only a very small proportion of the weaponry that proliferated in the Côte d’Ivoire during the post-electoral crisis.<sup>63</sup> The UN mission has to contend with the ill-will of those that still carry weapons. The political and ethnic tensions that remain in the country encourage people to retain arms just in case, especially in the west. UNOCI’s work is also hindered by a lack of resources” (p.9)

“The prime minister and minister of defence, Guillaume Soro, has the heavy responsibility of laying the foundations of security sector reform (SSR). A working group attached to his cabinet has been created to help him carry out this important mission. However, very little has been achieved in this field so far. There is a list of problems to tackle but no clear plan for reform. There has been no comprehensive move to begin disarmament or return former combatants to the barracks. Implementation of SSR is currently held up for two main reasons.

First, the ineffectiveness and lack of expertise of the teams created to manage this reform. Several partners in the international community are finding it very difficult to identify an interlocutor among the many often competing structures that are supposed to be managing disarmament and the reintegration of combatants. Moreover, donors do not trust some of the officials in these structures because of their inexperience or questionable management of previous projects. Donors are therefore hesitating before releasing funds” (p.10)

### **Coted'Ivoire\_X\_2003**

From 156.4:

Only partial assessment of PASU projects (citizen security/community policing), overall, the projects still lack considerably, but are on a good path considering the circumstances

### **DemocraticRepublicof Congo\_JusCor\_2009**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From \_\_\_\_\_ 151.2:  
 comparison between “resultats attendus” and “resultats obtenus” shows partial success, most of the sub-projects have been concluded or at least started; assessment difficult

### **DemocraticRepublicof Congo\_JusCor\_2011**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 152.2:

Halfway through the project, most sub-projects have not even been started, very few obtained results, but also around only 1/16 of the budget spent; assessment difficult

**DemocraticRepublicof Congo\_Mult\_2009**

From 153.1:

Halfway through the project, most sub-projects have been started or concluded, plenty of additional activities (but no clear benchmarks available, goals are rather broad); assessment difficult

**DemocraticRepublicof Congo\_Pol\_2009a**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 154.1, 154.2:

Two-thirds into the project, most results correspond to the goals, some sub-projects are still ongoing, around two-thirds of the budget have been spent; assessment difficult

**DemocraticRepublicofCongo\_mult\_2008**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 49.3, 49.4 (ISSAT review report 2011):

“Total Impact Score: 53.75, Output Risk: High”, Overall tendency of the assessment/logframe seems to be that the project is still considerably lacking in coherent planning and particularly M&E, but otherwise is on a solid path (assessment only 8 months into the project); no detailed assessment of successes and shortcomings available.

**EastTimor\_Jus\_2008b**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 117.3:

“Ratings against shared outcomes: 1. Helping to build the foundations of a more effective and accountable police service (green), 2. Achieve fair and timely access to justice for children, women, and men in Timor-Leste (yellow)” (p.30), where green means that the objective will be reached and yellow that it will be partially reached within the time frame of the project

“In 2010, positive progress was made by the Government of Timor-Leste, PNTL and the AFP towards creating an effective and accountable police service (...) There have been incremental improvements in the organisational robustness and effectiveness of the PNTL

throughout 2010, with improvements to basic training, investigations training and greater opportunities for advanced police management training” (p.30)

**EastTimor\_Pol\_2006, EastTimor\_Pol\_2011**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 11.2:

“UN support to SSR in Timor-Leste has proven ineffective and unsustainable. There are four reasons why: 1. Delay in recruiting security sector expertise. 2. Failure to balance technical expertise with political acumen. 3. Inability to develop a clear strategy for engagement. 4. A failure to play an advocacy role for wider public interests in favour of maintaining access and good relations with the political elites” (abstract)

**ElSalvador\_Mult\_2008**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 70.8:

some results, but no clear benchmarks for assessment; assessment difficult

**GeorgiaMoldova\_Mult\_2005**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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59.8:

“EUBAM, hand in hand with its Moldovan and Ukrainian Partners, has been able to establish a professional cooperation, a partnership in which the border authorities are assisted on the path to European standards and modern border management. Several joint EUBAM, Moldovan and Ukrainian projects have been implemented, which have delivered considerable results in the area of integrated border management contributing to regional security. Examples include joint border control operations; elaboration of common border security assessments; joint working groups; joint public information activities; exchange of customs pre-arrival information and exchange of information between the Border Guard Services” (p.5)

Lots of numbers and success stories in the report, but not objective (EUBAM report on its own mission); actual assessment difficult.

**Guinea\_SecuritySector\_2011**

44.15, 44.16:

most success in disarmament, other aspects still considerably lacking or only planned; full assessment difficult because information is not very detailed

### GuineaBissau\_Mult\_2008

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 52.11:

“Launched in June 2008, the mission has provided advice and assistance to the local authorities on security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau. The mission, which was conducted under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), notably assisted Guinea-Bissau in developing a complete package of basic laws and some secondary legislation. The Guinea-Bissau authorities now have a solid legal framework to start implementing the national SSR strategy, restructure the Armed Forces and establish new police bodies. Specific projects have also been prepared, in cooperation with the European Commission and other international stakeholders, and are now ready to be presented to international donors for funding.

Although the mission has achieved significant results, political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law in the country make it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as originally foreseen, without compromising its own principles” (p.1)

### Haiti\_Mult\_2004

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 63.8:

“Haitian SSR included introducing of the concept of human security policing, demobilising the army (FADH) and simultaneously creating an interim security force and permanent national police force (HNP). However, the sheer complexity of this effort and the country’s legacy of political/institutional chaos yielded the following results:

- FADH demobilisation was compromised by the failure of the Haitian government and the US to resolve the issues of which soldiers to retain, and pay and pensions for demobilised soldiers.
- HNP training did not address arrest/detention procedures and human rights law. While trained to be honest and effective, the new police force soon found itself sucked back into the culture of corruption, incompetence and politicisation in which it was embedded.
- Police, court and penal reforms occurred in isolation from each other. In spite of substantial judicial reform funding, rule of law remains nascent; a functional legal system does not exist.
- Security forces’ involvement in drug trafficking remains a central problem for police and state and local governments.
- The country’s political elite did not support the reform process” (abstract)

## Haiti\_Mult\_2005

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### 108.3:

Overall assessment difficult, only results, no benchmarks

“Results achieved by this project, which ended in December 2010, include:

The project improved access to justice by supporting the École du Barreau de Port-au-Prince in its provision of legal aid and facilitated the work of peace tribunals. As a result, 645 cases were treated, representing 80 percent of the defendants of criminal proceedings in Port-au-Prince at that time. A national training program provided training to 454 justices of the peace, thus upgrading the skills of Haiti’s judiciary and building its human resources capacity. Equipment was provided to 64 peace tribunals, the École de la Magistrature (EMA), and the École du Barreau de Port-au-Prince, enabling these institutions to improve their operations.

Legal information is now better disseminated, with Haitian laws from 1804 to the present scanned and digitalized, a compendium of offences and penalties published, and penal and criminal codes updated and published.

The project also helped prepare three key justice reform laws in Haiti : the School of Magistrature Act, the Act on the Status of Magistrature, and the Act Creating the Supreme Council of Judiciary”

## India\_Department of Justice Ministry of Law and Justice\_2008

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### 130.1:

Overall assessment difficult, only results, no benchmarks

- “Legal literacy modules integrated in National Literacy Mission’s adult literacy programme, Sakshar Bharat
- State-level justice delivery institutions have begun a first-ever assessment of their needs to effectively deliver justice to marginalized communities
- Greater legal awareness to 150,000 people on laws related to women’s rights, tribal communities and the poor through a range of outreach material
- Over 4,600 legal aid lawyers, paralegals, elected women representatives from minority communities trained to assist marginalized people access justice
- About 100 paralegal workers trained in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, are now closely linked to the District Legal Services Authorities in assisting marginalized communities
- Two hundred fifty radio spots have helped disseminate information on a range of legal rights
- Over 12,000 existing and/or potential litigants are now accessing free legal aid and justice in three districts of Jharkhand



- District level forums created in select districts of all project states except Odisha with a view to facilitate access of the community to justice providers”

**Iraq\_Arm\_2004, Iraq\_Jus\_2004, Iraq\_Mult\_2004b**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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31.4:

Based on a threefold model of progress in security sector reform that includes change at the level of individuals, institutions, and integrative tendencies, we can make some tentative, qualitative generalizations as to how much progress was made in the Iraqi security sector. At the level of individuals, the coalition did make a major effort to remove Saddam-era officers and senior officials steeped in the abusive and corrupt ways of the old regime. These individuals would otherwise have been a brake on reform, as has indeed happened in the interior ministry, where many Saddam-era personnel remained in place. The coalition also had some success in informing Iraqi political leaders and senior officials about the principles of good security sector governance.

The bulk of the coalition’s reform work concentrated on building effective security sector institutions, notably the ministries. The primary focus was on building their managerial and administrative capacity, but efforts were also made to inculcate reformed practices. There is a striking difference, for instance, between the defense ministry—rebuilt from scratch along U.S.-UK lines—and the interior ministry, which has been only marginally touched by reform efforts. Institutional reform has therefore been patchy but in any case is a very long-term process that will only succeed if future Iraqi leaderships champion the cause.

“Integration across the security sector and with the wider society is also a mixed story. The MCNS and to some extent local-level joint coordination centers were partial success stories. The coalition, however, failed to overcome the rigid ministerial compartmentalization inherited from Saddam. As for wider integration with society, the CPA and its successor Iraqi government did make some progress in reorienting the security sector into one that services society rather than one that preys on it.

Thus, although the security sector capacity-building and reform program was behind in many of its targets, in the longer view it was moving in the right direction and laying the foundations of what is likely to remain for some years a tremendously ambitious reconstruction and reform program” (p.xvi)

**Kenya\_Jus\_2004**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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181.2, 181.3:

“Transition continues to generate mixed responses within and beyond GJLOS, from enthusiasm to fear and anxiety. Reform energies seem to have dipped, the mood is low,

while implementation and absorptive capacities have risen. Many key achievements have been won, but many critical gaps remain, outlined in the final part of this report. Many old battles are still being fought (some over and over again), while new challenges arise each month” (p.6)

“If we combine the total number of all GJLOS activities recorded as either 75% or a 100% implemented it is found that roughly half of all planned activities (48%) fall into this category. It can be argued that the programme is about where it should be, half way through completing the planned activities, and just over halfway through its own planned lifespan. Building on this positive finding, we have tabulated some key (completed) activities in the main body of the report, at paragraph 58 below. This table records key successes under each of the key results, demonstrates the breadth of the achievements by the programme in a relatively short time and highlights the depth of activities that have been completed. It is clear that in addition to many (fairly straightforward) activities, the programme has also achieved some far more complex activities for which it deserves recognition. The STPP and MTS 1 and 2 have managed to lay the foundation for a successful reform programme in the sector – so long as activities are focused and cluster around key issues and themes rather than being ‘sprayed’ across a very broad spectrum as in the past” (p.7)

“GJLOS has been characterised by relatively low funds absorption. This has been mainly attributed to delays in procurement, low capacity within MDAs, and the complexity of procurement procedures. In addition, GoK and basket fund donors did not resolve internal issues around the procurement of civil works. Absorption rates have, however, increased dramatically from 2005/6 to 2006/7” (p.11)

“There have been significant instances of non-adherence to agreed work plans. In addition, some work plans were overly ambitious and may not have considered capacity constraints at the conceptual stage – perhaps due to lack of baseline data on capacity requirements” (p.12)

“There is a sense that the GJLOS Reform Programme is making steady progress towards achieving its overall aims” (p.13)

Evaluation methodology: “In order to meet our Terms of reference (ToR), the advisory team used the following methods:

- Documentary analysis/secondary data analysis: this informed all aspects of the AT work, and included documents, reports, minutes, data sets and the like.
- 3 MDA-level case studies: all aspects of the ToR were studied in minutiae in focused department-level case studies.
- Site visits: as part of both the case studies and the broader review, site visits were undertaken in and beyond Nairobi to assess issues *in situ*. This also allowed us to interview end-users of GJLOS services.
- GJLOS-wide MDA survey: a survey of all MDAs allowed all MDAs to answer questions dealing with all aspects of the AT ToR.

- Group meetings were held with civil society organisations (CSOs), donors, the PCO and others.
- In-depth interviews were held with a wide range of key stakeholders including PSs, MDA staff, GJLOS staff (PCO/FMA), NSAs, donors, beneficiaries, commentators and critics, and others” (p.14)

### Kosovo\_Mult\_2008

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 60.10:

annual progress reports framed as success stories rather than objective evaluation, but considerable progress visible from 2009-11; objective assessment difficult

#### 60.15

“EULEX, in its role as »guardian of democracy and the rule of law«, has only modest achievements to show for its first six months. Closer scrutiny of the objectives, legal mandate and activities of the new EU mission gives rise to the rather sobering realisation that, basically, the previous, failed policy of UNMIK is still being pursued” (ex.summ.), more details (pp.17-20)

### Liberia\_Arm\_2003

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 2.6:

“Both the UN and the United States have made a promising start with police and military reform, but they have not done nearly enough towards accomplishing the SSR goals laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Liberia (...) Since 2004, UN Police officers (UNPOL) have assisted the Liberian National Police (LNP) in trying to maintain law and order, at the same time as they were mandated to restructure, retrain, and reequip the police service. However, UNMIL had no money to fulfill its mandate to rebuild the police from scratch” (p.ix)

“The United States pledged \$210 million to the task of creating an effective 2,000-strong Liberian army, contracting DynCorp and PAE to help dissolve the old army and recruit and train a new force. While the DynCorp-led recruiting, vetting, and training process is ongoing and some recruits have completed a basic training course, they are not yet integrated into units under effective command. Weak and erratic funding from the U.S. Department of State is the main cause of the slow pace of AFL development” (p.x)

“Moreover, the UN should ensure that future benchmarks for the drawdown of UNMIL police officers and military forces are determined by qualitative criteria, not based on numbers trained. This will require enhanced efforts to produce reliable crime statistics and the conduct of victimization surveys among the population of Monrovia and the rural areas.

It should also entail a shift in mindset from quantity to quality of human resources, including the development of personal performance appraisal systems” (p.xi)

### Liberia\_Mult\_2011

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 177.1 (annual review, not final evaluation):

Lots of results, most projects (mainly infrastructure, buildings and equipment) at least 50% completed (success measured mainly in delivery deadlines or building completion), no explicit assessment, but seems to be good trajectory, SALW disappointing

### Liberia\_Pol\_2004b

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 158.3:

“UNDP’s achievements during the period under review are extensive and are both catalogued and reviewed in this report. It argues that, in many instances, UNDP’s contribution has taken the form of administrative and operational support that laid the foundation for effective technical or substantive support by other partners. In the interest of urgently needed humanitarian action, UNDP has been called upon to adopt a number of modalities that are detrimental to long-term sustainability and could even undermine national ownership. Most of such decisions have been justified, because in the immediate post-conflict period, Liberia did not possess sufficient capacity to satisfactorily manage donor resources” (p.x)

“UNDP’s approach has remained highly project-based and could have benefited from a more coherent strategic approach that capitalized on synergies between country-office and UNCT programmes and more effectively coordinated at the local community level, which is seeing a number of largely parallel interventions. In addition, the efficiency and timeliness of UNDP’s procurement were repeatedly criticized by virtually all government counterparts. While it is clear that delivering on UNDP’s fiduciary commitments while meeting programming deadlines poses a challenge in the difficult institutional environment of post-conflict Liberia, cumbersome UNDP procedures have often resulted in goods or services being delivered late, sometimes even beyond their date of usefulness. The relative lack of monitoring and evaluation activities in the country office during 2004–2011 and the unavailability of data (including the data sources originally set forth in UNDP project documents that were to be used as measurement of stated indicators) continue to hinder efforts to assess the efficiency of UNDP programming—especially from a cost-benefit perspective” (p.x)

“UNDP has had relatively little in-house technical advisory capacity in areas of security sector reform, rule of law, elections, policing and microfinance. Where such capacities exist, they are stretched thin” (p.xi)

## Liberia\_Pol\_2006a

### 163.3 (mid-term review):

Evaluation methodology: “Over the course of a nine-week consultancy (23 May – 26 July 2010), the mission met a wide range of stakeholders either on an individual basis or collectively. In total no less than 88 meetings of a substantive nature were held. Meetings were held jointly with UNFPA, including one site visit. In addition, the mission visited implementation sites and local UN offices in four counties (Bomi, Bong, Grand Bassa and Nimba). For completeness and given the move towards “Delivering as One”, it was appropriate to look briefly at the five joint programmes currently being undertaken by members of the UN Country Team, as there is an independent review of these shortly”(p.v)

“In summary, AWP are progressing but not at the same rate. This is not surprising given the different nature, scope and complexity of each AWP across such a range of focus areas and differences in funding levels. Nevertheless, good progress can be seen, with some AWP doing better than others. Probably the one common challenge remains the constraint issues in terms of counterpart capacity and financial resources for operations. At the top in ministries and agencies, there is a strong sense of national ownership and leadership of the overall work being supported by each AWP and UNDP being perceived as a valued partner” (p.vi)

## Liberia\_Pol\_2007c

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 161.4: Only results, actual success/achievements hard to assess, rather small scale  
“The project helped to build and fully equip five new police stations and depots in Salayea, Zorzor, Voinjama, Kolahun and Foya. Since these rural areas mostly have no access to the national electricity grid, solar panel systems were installed to increase the functionality of the stations. The project also carried out training sessions focusing on maintenance and repair to ensure the sustainability of the project’s work. In addition, the increased police presence has improved the image of the LNP in the eyes of the local population. There is now a greater level of trust between the LNP and local communities. These measures are therefore contributing to improving the security situation in rural areas. The vehicle fleet garage at LNP headquarters was upgraded with new infrastructure, IT equipment and software programmes. The necessary tools were supplied to improve the maintenance of the police vehicles. Staff also received training on using the new software programmes. As a result, the LNP is now able to maintain the infrastructure and manage its vehicle fleet professionally”

## Liberia\_Pol\_2008

### 164.2, 164.3:

List of results on websites and in executive summary, but no overall assessment, no benchmarks

### Macedonia\_PolBor\_2005

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### From 56.10:

“Proxima was a one-year programme that was extended to two-years. Its priorities were to fight organised crime, improve relations with ethnic minorities, and to ensure that institutional and procedural police reforms were sustainable. EUPAT continued these activities in the context of bridging the gap before a European Commission stabilisation and reconstruction programme. Successful monitoring systems were developed, initially an activity ‘benchmarking’ system in Proxima followed by an improved consultation mechanism in EUPAT. These helped to create openness and transparency between Macedonian authorities and the EU, and leverage for reform.

However, both programmes faced internal and external coordination challenges.

- Proxima’s short planning phase, cumbersome EU procurement regulations and inflexible recruitment procedures resulted in capacity constraints, high staff turnover, and loss of precious relations with local police.
- Infighting between different EU institutions hampered coordination and reduced morale. Coordination improved in November 2005 when the Head of the EC Delegation and the EU Special Representative positions were combined, but ‘turf wars’ continued in Brussels.
- Donors supporting justice and penal reform were included in the formal coordination mechanism for police reform. However, programmes focusing on regional policing were not.
- The slow pace with which Macedonian authorities adopted necessary legal reforms hindered work” (abstract)

### Mauritius\_Pol\_2009

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 170.8 (p.44):

Results, but no more detailed assessment possible

“Assisted in the formulation of the National Policing Strategic Framework, covering fundamentals such as strategic planning capabilities, improved community police work and greater public accountability; Police Reform and Strategic Planning Unit subsequently set up to implement the framework --Reforms are well underway, including steps to strengthen investigative capacities, upgrade human resources management and design local crime prevention strategies” (p.44)

## Mongolia\_Jus\_2000

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 99.1:

“During the eight year implementation period for the Strategic Plan, much of the justice system has been transformed. In assisting in this transformation, NCSC through the JRP has followed a comprehensive approach, simultaneously recommending changes to the legal framework, building training capacity, raising ethical standards, introducing modern court management practices, and increasing public awareness about the workings of the justice system. Specific activities and strategies varied over the life of the project, but the basic components, the fundamental themes of the assistance, did not. This continuity of focus is a key factor contributing to the success of the USAID’s assistance program to Mongolia’s justice sector. Since its inception and continuing through its final weeks, the project conducted scores of training sessions reaching thousands of individuals; organized study tours abroad to bring back ideas on best practices; purchased and installed over one thousand five hundred computers; produced a wide variety of educational materials, television programs, public service announcements and radio episodes all designed to raise public awareness of the justice system. By all accounts, this long- running partnership between the United States and the institutions of Mongolia has elevated the justice system to a higher level of professionalism. The judiciary enjoys respect within the community, greater independence, and is no longer viewed as simply an instrument of state power. Mechanisms designed to ensure high ethical standards among judges and prosecutors are in place. New institutions, such as the Special Investigative Unit and more recently the Anti-Corruption Agency have been created, equipped and trained to investigate wrongdoing among justice sector officials. No system is ever perfect, but Mongolia has made significant progress in creating the basic structures necessary to maintain the rule of law” (p.5)

## Mongolia\_MoJ\_2007

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 132.2:

“As of 30th of June 2009, the Project’s actual expenditures were \$US 507.240, which is 101.4 per cent of the planned budget of \$US 500.000 with the following major outputs:

- Lobbying campaigns, workshops to advocate the rights of people with disabilities were supported which resulted in the accession of the UN Disability Convention by the Parliament in December 2008. A mutual agreement on cooperation between law enforcement agencies and NHRCM was signed to strengthen their joint efforts in combating torture and promoting accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. Public awareness on human rights related issues is being improved through targeted advocacy campaigns.
- For strengthening capacity to implement the NHRAP, a set of different initiatives were carried out, including the Annual Human Rights Forums, policy dialogue on

gender-based violence, launching of the national human rights website, justice sector research capacity enhancement, special HR courses, media training.

- The most significant achievement of the Project was the establishment of Legal Aid Centres in all 21 provinces and 9 districts of the Capital city, which provide free legal aid services to the vulnerable groups” (p.2)

“In April 2009, the UNDP Country Office invited Mr. R. Sudarshan – Legal Reform and Justice Policy Adviser of the UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok (RCB) for a mid-term outcome assessment of the Project. The review report (15 May 2009) covered the assessment of the Project’s relevance to previous UNDP projects on human rights, the recommendations of the RCB internal review of the Mongolia CO governance portfolio as well as the outcome evaluation of the previous human rights projects, the Project’s progress against its stated objectives, UNDAF and CPAP outcomes. The Regional Adviser’s provided detailed recommendations which included suggestion to redesign the project outputs for its next phase” (p.2), changes included: “The original outputs are reduced to two outputs: 1) Normative framework for the protection of disadvantaged groups enhanced: 2) Capacity of the justice system and service providers enhanced for improved protection and access to justice by disadvantaged groups” (p.2)

### Nepal\_Sec\_2009

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 15.4:

Broad background, but no detailed results of the program, assessment difficult

“DFID has a range of innovative and effective programmes in place, including support for livelihoods and economic growth. However, governance, justice systems and the security sector remain weak and open to corruption. Additional support to strengthen these systems is required. DFID should move quickly to agree new programmes in these areas, particularly given the commitment in the White Paper to treat justice and security as a basic service” (p.3)

### Palestine\_Jus\_2010

#### From 169.5:

Logframe for evaluation on p.20, but no results yet (program factsheet rather than report); no assessment possible.

### Palestine\_PolJus\_2006

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 9.9 (attention: no official review):



“Nevertheless, despite the failure of accompanying political efforts to reach an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement, security assistance efforts appear to have yielded some favourable results for the international community, both in establishing a level of basic law and order within the West Bank and in countering terrorism. Urban public order has improved and militia activity has decreased. It is still uncertain what lasting value the technical successes claimed might deliver to the Palestinian people” (p.6)

“The EUPOL COPPS mission has no realistic concept of the impact of its reform mission, although there are indications that some of the outputs produced are measured (numbers of police trained, amount of equipment issued, and so on)” (p.6)

“The concept of EUPOL COPPS as a CSDP mission is perhaps flawed from the beginning. EUPOL COPPS, with its 53 international personnel, is performing in ways unlike previous CSDP missions. The mission is accomplishing a lot; they are embedded with the police at a central level and now have access to reform mechanisms within the PCP. As one European official noted, “EUPOL COPPS is doing a reasonable job and it is an interesting experiment,” but not necessarily the correct composition for the job of reforming the PCP and the criminal justice sector in the broader scheme” (p.6)

“Due to EUPOL COPPS insistence on separating the technical mandate of its mission from the political reality in the West Bank, the trend of Palestinian police officers having improved police skills without a true awareness of how a police officer should function in this environment will continue” (p.7)

“In this regard, although the real failure is one of the peace processes, the EUPOL COPPS mission has failed. The insistence on separating the teaching of technical skills from the political reality and the overall security system has created a police force that is highly skilled and yet easily co-opted by political leaders. Without comprehensive, simultaneous institutional reform of the MoI, which remains weak compared to the executive branch leaders, the police are a tool used discriminately. Additionally, without any attempt to change the behavioural aspect of the police, to create a sense of core policing, EUPOL COPPS has failed to develop a truly professional police force that caters to the demands of the Palestinian population” (p.13)

**Rwanda\_Mult\_2008**

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 10.17:

Results only, no assessment of success possible

“In the course of 2010, 16 additional Maison d'Acces a la Justice have been opened with the project's funds and 14 other MAJ were opened in 2008 and 2009 with other funds. This has further broadened access to justice to the population where received 4 504 cases were handled.

UNDP effort to support in capacity building continued with 3 331 Abunzi and bailiffs were sensitized in legal advice. Furthermore, our support contributed to regular radio emissions called UBUCAMANZA, in total 14 emissions were realized and 20 publications of newsletter UBUTABERA were produced.

In its support to the Supreme Court, UNDP has funded the training of 337 judges, the equipment of 26 courts with archiving infrastructure and 16 courts received funds for field trips for judges and registrars who travel to remote areas to deliver summons and judgments. This has further helped to increase access to justice and speed up the process of clearing of backlog cases.

With the Rwanda National Police UNDP has continued working on community policing. The RNP, with the support of a consultant has developed a communication strategy to improve communication and interaction between the RNP and the communities and sensitization in crime and genocide ideology prevention :- 100 secondary schools (20 from each of the 5 regions) have been sensitized against genocide ideologies and other related crimes; - 68 anti crime clubs in the mentioned 100 schools since other 32 schools had anti crime clubs which have been reactivated; - 2 anti crime debates among 10 schools in central and northern region respectively had media and interactive events on human rights promotion and crime reduction; - 5 interactive meetings (1 each region) with Community Liaison Officers (CLO'S) and Community Policing Committees debated of human rights and crime reduction;- 1 documentary produced on the progress made by RNP in the last 10 years highlighting adoption and progress of the community policing concept; - 2 live television talk shows and 4 radio talk shows on themes: role and progress of the community in partnering with RNP in crime prevention and reduction; - 250 police officers trained under specialized units in the community policing concept; - 150 police officers were trained in GBV cases prevention, response and handling; - 900 community policing committee members trained as trainers”.

### Seychelles\_Mult\_2009

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 171.6:

“The terminal evaluation took place between the 5<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> December 2011. The main purpose of the terminal evaluation was to provide project partners with an independent assessment of the key achievements of the project against intended outcomes, to synthesize lessons learnt and make recommendations for the future.

The methodology consisted of documentary analysis, focus group discussions and interviews with key stakeholders and beneficiaries from the judiciary, Bar Association and Civil Society and questionnaires for project partners such as UNODC. The consultant also made site visits to the courts, library and recording rooms to observe infrastructural improvements.

One of the major drawbacks of the project design was the lack of a logic frame to accurately measure achievement against intended outcomes. Evidence from the three sources;

documentary analysis, site visits, and interviews/discussions were therefore triangulated to arrive at an overall professional judgment”

“The DGTTF has played a crucial role in penetrating a much closed and highly sensitive organisation such as the Judiciary which up to the present day has been cut off from major reforms operating in other sectors of the public service. Although not all outcomes have been met, the project has succeeded in institutionalising the need for change. It is the first time staff of the judiciary have come together with local partners to work on common projects and build capacity. The project has also facilitated contacts with international organisations and law associations. These links must be further expanded and opportunities provided for all judges and other support staff to benefit from these exchanges. These gains must not be lost” (p.34)

### SierraLeone\_JusSec\_2010

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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From 168.7:

“The Review Team mapped the available documents on SJSR interventions to identify any trends that might emerge. The main findings of the mapping exercise, given some constraints as to accuracy and availability of data, are as follows:

- A large number of the activities are stand-alone projects and many of those do not appear to be related to broader programmes. Most stand-alone projects are found in countries in the early stages of recovery from violent conflict. Stand-alone projects are less likely to reflect all the attributes of a coherent approach or have the impact of programmes.
- ACPP resources are allocated primarily to defence-related projects. With the exception of Sierra Leone, DFID bilateral resources are allocated primarily to SSAJ programmes.
- Good international practice suggests that making choices about the most appropriate SJSR interventions and obtaining value for money in difficult political environments can be facilitated by the adoption of a coherent strategic approach. A rigorous political analysis that is regularly updated and supplemented by a risk mitigation strategy can help UK programming decisions reflect political conditions. A review of the documents suggests this is lacking from most SJSR programming in Africa” (p.ix)

“The most serious problem emerging from discussions with UK officials relates to the tension within DFID between the security and justice functions of policing. This has raised questions about whether justice is, or should be, part of the same sector as security, despite existing UK Government policy that clearly states that it is. This leads, in some cases, to uneven application of the policy within DFID. DFID selectivity in policy implementation in turn has led to confusion, particularly among field workers and practitioners” (p.x)

“Overall, this review has found that UK SJSR interventions have been partially effective within different programmes (with the possible exception of Sierra Leone). ‘Partial effectiveness’ means that programmes generate some useful outcomes but cannot produce a multiplier effect given political blockages. For various reasons, it is often difficult to make course corrections in large, expensive programmes even when it becomes obvious that the political environment is not conducive to the pursuit and achievement of the desired outcomes. In this regard, Sierra Leone stands out as offering the most positive outcomes in terms of effectiveness. The main interventions – Justice Sector Development Programme, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) and the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) support – were clearly designed to achieve SJSR outcomes and they have increasingly connected all strategic-level actors that have a role to play in the delivery of overall SJSR outcomes. It should be stressed however that this is the result of incremental progress and continuous learning of lessons” (p.x-xi)

### SierraLeone\_Sec\_1999

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### 5.3:

(List of rather broad insights and recommendations)

“The Office of National Security (ONS) and associated British advisory support is a success story. The ONS has established itself as one of the most effective Government agencies in Sierra Leone and is now fully capable of performing the core requirements originally envisaged for it” (p.6)

“DFID funding for the Security Sector Reform Implementation Plan (SSR-IP) is administered by the ONS with decisions on allocation made by the NSCCG. This process has achieved significant buy-in from the agencies, who have prepared robust spending proposals to secure money from the fund” (p.7)

“SILSEP has developed a reputation for being flexible and quick to respond to need across the security sector, but the management load this places on the DFID office is not to be under-estimated. A great deal of DFID management time is spent in dealing with the various advisers/consultants involved in the programme, together with all the necessary paperwork and administrative tasks. The complex programme arrangements, and disparate institutions making-up SILSEP, may be creating a disproportionate management load upon an already sorely stretched DFID office” (p.19)

#### 5.11:

“The security sector reform (SSR) work has been described by reviewers as ‘cutting edge’, learning lessons and developing policy that has since been applied elsewhere. DFID has made a significant contribution to the restoration of peace and stability across Sierra Leone. Major investments were made in demobilisation of combatants from the civil war; a new security architecture has been developed (as part of wider HMG efforts) and budget support restored GOSL’s presence throughout the country. There has been a positive trajectory in human security since the end of the conflict but Sierra Leone remains fragile and the ‘peace

dividend' is wearing off. Access to justice for the poor has not improved significantly but strategies and systems are being developed that should address this over time. Cross Whitehall coordination has developed and worked well according to officials from the FCO, MOD and DFID. Harmonisation has been less effective and there is a lack of clarity about how departmental strategies fit together and the extent to which business plans are or need to be harmonized" (p.x)

### SierraLeone\_Jus\_2005

#### 8.6-8.9:

List of results compared against broader goals, most sub-projects seem to have made "significant progress", but no clear overall assessment available

### SolomonIslands\_mult\_2003

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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#### From 12.11:

Methodology: "The Independent Experts Team (the Team) visited Solomon Islands between 31 January and 12 February, 2011 in order to prepare the annual review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) achievements during 2010. The team reviewed performance reports and met with a wide range of Solomon Islands government (SIG) and RAMSI officials" (p.i)

"Progress was also made in capacity development and organisational change. RSIPF, however, remains fragile and is unlikely to be self-sustaining by 2013. At present around 60% of logistical and financial resources are provided by RAMSI directly to the RSIPF for the provision of policing services The Justice component of RAMSI has made good progress through supporting and linking with the Justice Sector Consultative Committee (JSCC) and Justice Sector Technical Operations Group (JSTOG) which have been set up independently by SIG. These are promoting greater transparency of decision making and are the foundation of a justice sector which is more than the sum of the justice agencies. A significant achievement is the development of a coherent set of new indicators to maximise better reporting against targets. Capacity development has continued but, in the face of a very high proportion of professional vacancies and problems in retaining qualified and experienced personnel, the Technical Adviser model of capacity development has been unable to realize sustainable gains (p.i)

The Machinery of Government pillar had a number of positive achievements in the various sub-programs which operate under its auspices. Significant achievements include the ongoing rollout of the new payroll system – Aurion – which has led to a number of important savings and better information capture and use across the public sector; the successful running of the national election; and the completion of audits of entities such as of Solomon Airlines which had previously always been contracted out to private sector organisations. However, further progress within this particular program is dependent on the

consolidation of the gains made so far. Examples of this loss of capacity if consolidation does not occur include the loss of staff experienced by the Office of the Auditor General which effectively means that the Office has already lost much of the capacity built over the previous year's operation of the sub-program. Without explicit political support the fragile gains made across the various sub-programs of this pillar could easily be rolled-back (p.i)

"Gender Equality moved forward with a Gender Stocktake which provided, for the first time, an overview of how gender equality is being addressed in RAMSI. It showed that the gender targets of the Partnership Framework are not underpinned by an overarching concept of what needed to be achieved in gender and why. It also showed that 63% of RAMSI activities are in alignment with the new SIG Gender Equality and Women's Development Policy" (p.i)

"Anti-corruption, as a cross-cutting issue (compared with individual activities under the pillars) made little progress in 2010. This is mainly a result of political instability since the election and the absence of an attempt to reconstitute the Anti-corruption Task Force. The lack of progress, on one of the important drivers of conflict in Solomon Islands, is a significant limitation to the stabilising effect of RAMSI" (p.ii)

"Overall RAMSI has continued to build on the achievements of previous years. Preparations for the national election, and the political instability that followed, have resulted in less political commitment to the SIG/RAMSI Partnership Framework than in 2009. This highlights the limitations of RAMSI support, which is essentially technical in nature and require political debate and action to realise potential gains. In some areas, notably components of the Machinery of Government pillar, there have been, and continue to be diminishing returns on investment. There are now various systems in place but the extent to which they can realise sustainable benefits depends critically on several factors. Some require urgent political action including reform across the whole of SIG. Others are limited because they are technical solutions to problems which are political or cultural. Some require deeper discussion about the appropriateness and sustainability of the model upon which they are based. As RAMSI moves into a period of transition, and resources are drawn down, it is likely that a capacity deficit will emerge" (p.ii)

### **Somalia\_Jus\_2009, Somalia\_Pol\_2009**

From 140.7:

List of results, but no assessment of actual success possible (no benchmarks)

### **SouthSudan\_Mult\_2006**

From 47.6:

List of results, but no assessment of actual success possible (no benchmarks)

## SouthSudan\_PolCor\_2007

### From 42.6:

List of results, but no assessment of actual success possible (no benchmarks)

## SouthSudan\_SecuritySector\_2009

Output	Result	Impact	Challenges of SSR
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### From 167.2:

“Output 1: GOSS supported to develop: a national security decision-making architecture which is more effective, and underpinned by a legal and policy framework enshrining the principles of civil control, accountability and transparency; and a security strategy for South Sudan to which activities of government agencies at national and state level are aligned. Output 1 score and performance description: B – Outputs moderately did not meet expectation” (p.4)

“Output 2: SPLA supported to develop and deliver a transformation strategy designed to develop adequate, appropriate, affordable and accountable armed forces capable of providing a source of security for all the people of South Sudan. Output 2 score and performance description: B –Outputs moderately did not meet expectation” (p.7)

“Output 3: MoDVA supported to develop its ability to fulfil its agreed mandate, particularly including Ministry & SPLA financial management capability. Output 3 score and performance description: B – Outputs moderately did not meet expectation” (p.11)

“Output 4: The Specialised Standing Committee for Defence, Security and Public Order of the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly supported to provide effective oversight of the defence sector and security structures. Output 4 score and performance description: A – Outputs Met Expectation” (p.14)

“Output 5: Selected civil society organisations supported to improve capacity to engage constructively in defence and security debates, contribute to policy development and the monitoring of performance of security apparatus  
Output 5 score and performance description: A – Outputs met expectation” (p.17)

“Output 6: Internal security structures at state level in South Sudan supported to plan and implement human security, underpinned by an information processing system which provides timely, accurate, comprehensive, relevant and analysed information to decision makers within state and federal government. Output 6 score and performance description: B – Outputs moderately did not meet expectation” (p.21)

“Overall Output Score and Description: B - Outputs moderately did not meet expectation” (p.26)

“This was the third annual review of a project that has been the subject of numerous extensions, and is currently due to end in December 2012. The programme employs high quality, effective personnel, whose efforts are being constrained by a poor logframe, with over-ambitious objectives. Although the ACP investment has been iterative, and in relative terms modest set against the rest of its Country Programme, the project deserves greater HMG management attention due to the political context in which defence and security transformation is taking place, and the need for the programme’s indicators, and risk management and mitigation mechanisms to be regularly updated in light of the opportunities and constraints the context provides. The increasing presence of other international actors in the defence and security transformation process also requires that the programme regularly adapts to accommodate and guide newcomers. We are confident however that both personnel and processes are in place to demonstrate progress between now and the end of the programme, and for an effective baseline for a second phase to be set (...) Qualitative evidence suggests that the project is extremely well regarded by both direct beneficiaries and the wider international community. The project has been successful in delivering high quality advice and support throughout an extremely difficult period in South Sudan. The programme should therefore be viewed positively: substantially meeting expectation, rather than moderately not meeting expectations. Although some outputs are on track greater demonstration of impact could be achieved by revising the log frame, lowering excessively high ambition and refocusing activities towards more clearly definable outcomes” (p.27)

### **SouthSudan\_Jus\_2012**

#### From 67.1:

List of results, but no assessment of actual success possible (no benchmarks)

### **Sudan\_Mult\_2004**

#### 143.5:

List of results, but no assessment of actual success possible (no benchmarks except for lofty goals in 143.6), overall seems positive though

### **Sudan\_Jud\_2006**

#### From 144.3:

“From our review of committed project costs, disbursed funds and expenditure levels as at 31 March 2010, we observed that some projects were lagging behind significantly in implementation of planned activities. These include NETREP/NHA, PSCAP, Microfinance, Abyei, BEP and Livestock projects. These projects had a slow start up due to slow procurement processes, slow mobilization of contractors and project implementation units and delayed counterpart funding. Outstanding planned activities may therefore not be completed within the remaining implementation period for the respective projects, the majority of which close on 30 June 2011, and the MDTF-N scheduled closure period of 31



December 2011. Projects may not fully utilise the remaining funds and/ or achieve the intended objectives” (p.1), “Declined rate of grant disbursements”, (p.1), “Inadequate capacity and retention of staff at project level: Though there has been significant progress in training and capacity building of implementing agencies’ staff since the MDTF-N inception in 2005, there is still need to consolidate the gains made in this area by ensuring that the continuous process of training need assessment and identification is maintained” (p.2), “The World Bank requires each project to put in place appropriate and adequate environmental, social and other safeguards to ensure compliance with regulations. Although guidelines for respective environmental, social and other safeguards were established, they were not implemented consistently in all projects” (p.2), “Inefficient or lack of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system” (p.2), “Lack of effective management tools at the project level: For effective planning and monitoring of project activities, project management teams are encouraged to have in place management tools to facilitate these functions. These tools are supposed to be updated on a monthly and quarterly basis, to ensure currency in planning and execution. In the recent past, a few of the projects updated the annual work plans and budgets, procurement plans and disbursement plans. This was also emphasized during the CPPR meetings held in March 2010. However, it was noted that subsequently, the frequency with which projects updated the management tools lagged behind, resulting in outdated schedules that did not capture the accurate position on the ground. This resulted in difficulties in planning and effective project monitoring” (p.4)

### **Sudan\_IDP\_2006**

#### From 145.3:

“Means and methods of data collection: A desk review of official project documents, progress and final reports and monitoring and evaluation reports (secondary data). Primary data: Individual in-depth interviews, focus groups discussion, group discussion, and telephone contacts were conducted among selected members of the project partners, key stakeholders, targets and beneficiaries. A total of 20 paralegals, 10 community leaders, 21 beneficiaries were interviewed at the six project IDP camps and spattered areas” (p.9)

p.15/16: table with logframe; detailed results but no overall assessment

### **Tajikistan\_Mult\_2005**

#### 125.6:

“Project activities have made considerable progress during the period, such that outputs begin to complement each other. In particular, the functional review of the Anticorruption Agency and developed recommendations by the consultant has created a momentum for other project interventions. It provided a creation of the Corruption Prevention Department that would coordinate all joint efforts among all parties such as government agencies as well as international donor’s community on fight against corruption. It will be complemented with the second component of the project, i.e. introduction of Public Complaints Mechanism into Ombudsman office. It also provides a firm basis for the media strategy to promote public awareness of anti-corruption” (p.5)

Additional list of results for review period, seems to be overall successful

### **Tanzania\_LegalSector\_2008**

#### 114.12:

“Donor support directly to the PCCB has been useful, but more work is needed to develop a shared understanding of the needs of the Bureau so that donors can provide appropriate support in technical expertise and knowledge. This has begun with DFID’s Tackling Corruption Project (TCP). There has been more success in capacity building of some institutions. Significant gains have been made in the performance of Parliamentary Oversight Committees (POCs) and the NAO, with strengthened legislative frameworks, mandates and leadership. Domestic events have been critical to success, and donors have supported the process” (p.xv)

“The long running Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) is now seen to be central to Tanzania’s fight against corruption, but it has achieved little. A clear focus on anti-corruption was never a part of the programme. But plans within the LSRP, for example, to improve case-load management, train the judiciary, strengthen investigation and prosecution and support the work of the Ethics Secretariat, are central to anti-corruption. Like most of the other governance programmes, implementation has largely been disappointing. Corruption within the judiciary remains a key issue” (p.xv)

### **Turkey\_MoJ\_2008**

#### From 127.4:

“The evaluation found that UNDP in Turkey contributed to the development of corporate capacities in the country, integration of international development principles and rise of many sectors to European standards. UNDP was particularly effective in its support at the policy level and played a crucial role sustaining the local government reform through participative approach to local decision making. Besides supporting the least developed regions, the country office also focused on vulnerable groups such as women, youth, disabled and internally displaced persons. The strong advocacy on youth issues for example, gave a more prominent place to youth on the political agenda. Yet, regarding administrative and managerial accountability, UNDP is criticized for having, at the corporate level, heavy procedures hence advised to align with the country systems (including evaluation and monitoring systems). Moreover, the country office is advised to link successful projects and non-project activities with UNDP’s potential strategic positioning in the country; and to make sure its support contributes to change. In sum, the UNDP country programme would be more effective to pursue a more strategic and programmatic approach” (p.i)

“In delivering the country programme, UNDP has been highly responsive to accommodate emerging needs, both at the sectoral level (for example, in the area of justice), as well as within ongoing interventions (through a pragmatic approach to adapting project activities to needs identified during implementation).

Conclusion 2: UNDP assistance has effectively contributed to development results in Turkey. However, in some cases, it has been constrained by a lack of thematic concentration as a result of UNDP being too responsive and because of comparatively small-scale UNDP support which is very much focused on pilot and preparatory assistance projects and complementary initiatives.” (p.43)

“Conclusion 3: UNDP outcomes have in general a high degree of sustainability, with exceptions (...) Conclusion 4: Despite the strong 2004 Assessment of Development Results recommendations, the overall UNDP monitoring and evaluation practice remains weak; this hinders UNDP from doing justice to its generally effective contribution to development results” (p.44)

### **Vietnam\_Mult\_2006**

#### 113.1, 113.6:

List of results, but no benchmarks, assessment difficult

“Results achieved as of March 2012 include: enhancing the capacity of a core lecturer group in the design and delivery of skills-oriented courses on Conciliation in the Settlement of Marriage and Family Cases, Management Skills in Administrative Cases, and Generic Courtroom Management within the Judicial Training School (JTS) of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). The JTS demonstrated its commitment to institutionalization by replicating the delivery of the courses to 1,624 judges throughout Vietnam, and organizing and funding this itself without further assistance from the project. The Judicial Academy (JA) of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) also made positive strides in improving curriculum development, producing teaching materials, using student-centred inquiry method, and introducing a quality assurance system as a performance measurement tool within the institution. Substantial work on court administration and procedural reforms with three provincial courts in Hue, Vinh Long and Hung Yen has contributed to more efficient, accessible, and service-oriented courts. A court clerk’s manual was developed, distributed and training was provided, a one-stop shop front office for citizens was established, and much-needed local area network and digital audio recording technology was implemented in the three provincial courts. These activities have contributed to increased transparency and timeliness of court operation and services”