OPERATIONALIZING HUMAN SECURITY
TOOLS FOR HUMAN-SECURITY-BASED THREAT AND MITIGATION ASSESSMENTS

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In Memory of

George Khutsishvili

- Friend, Colleague, Inspiration -
Preface and Acknowledgements

Much has been said and written about the opportunities and limitations of using human security as an academic paradigm and a practical tool to improve the security and well-being of individuals around the world. Despite the concept’s aim of steering the focus of security from states to individuals and communities, in practice the concept has not changed the means and ways in which states provide security to their populations.

Serious engagement with the ideas that are inherent in the human security approach, however, invites several new perspectives that should lead to more relevant understanding of both the threats that compromise individuals’ security and the measures which should be taken to mitigate those threats. Utilizing the human security concept for better threat assessment and mitigation means operationalizing human security to achieve improvements for individuals and populations at risk. Risks and threats are highly contextual and depend greatly on the specific geographic, political, cultural and/or economic context that defines an individual’s immediate neighbourhood. A better understanding of the nature and impact of the risks and threats, paired with suitable mitigation measures and workable implementation strategies, should translate into improved security.

The Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project upon which this publication is based attempts to bring to life the link between human security analysis and human security provision to improve the lives of individuals living in threatened communities, and to sensitize those responsible for providing security to the threats at hand and ways to channel existing resources most effectively towards the alleviation of as many serious threats as possible.

In two companion publications, Operationalizing Human Security: Concept, Analysis, Application (Cahier 20) and Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human-Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments (Cahier 21), conceptual discussions and practical findings of the OPHUSEC project are shared with a larger audience. The authors hope that many readers of these two cahiers will pick up where they left off – in further developing the OPHUSEC approach and using its methodology to improve their own threat and mitigation efforts. While Cahier 20 offers analyses of the project’s evolution, its argumentation and potential, along with sample case studies and reflections on the project’s implementation and findings, this second publication offers a series of practical suggestions and tools for easy replication of some or all of the project’s practical assessment and mitigation components.

The Operationalizing Human Security project and this publication would not have been possible without the kind support of a number of institutions and individuals, who are acknowledged for their contributions in Cahier 20. I would like to reiterate my deep gratitude to all of them. Four individuals in particular have assisted in shaping this particular publication: Marc Krupanski, Gustav Meibauer, Yves Pedrazzini and Raphaël Zaffran. I thank Joana Aleixo for typesetting the manuscript. The preparation of this work has benefited greatly from financial support from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), and institutional support from swisspeace, the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South project on “Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change” and, in particular, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and EPFL, the latter of which offered the opportunity to publish project results in the form of these two cahiers. I thank Hans Hurni and Urs Wiesmann, directors of the NCCR North-South, Laurent Goetschel, director of swisspeace, Heiner Hänggi, head of research and assistant director of
DCAF, and Vincent Kaufmann, director of EPFL-LaSUR, for their encouragement and support. Finally, I thank Cherry Ekins for doing an excellent job in copyediting the final manuscript and preparing it for publication. This publication is dedicated to George Khutsishvili who, among countless accomplishments, was the founding director of the International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN) in Tbilisi, Georgia. Our friendship goes back 20 years, when I was still a student and he was visiting Queen’s University in Canada. Committed with all his heart to bringing peace and security to his country and the Caucasian region, he continues to be a great inspiration to all those who had the fortune of meeting him. His work and lasting legacy very much encapsulates the essence of human security, successfully translated into practical, positive change.

Albrecht Schnabel

Geneva, March 2014
About the Author

Albrecht Schnabel is a senior fellow in the research division of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). He was the head of the transversal package project (TPP) “Operationalizing Human Security”, carried out within the context of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South project on “Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change”. The present publication results from this project. Trained in comparative politics and international relations in Germany, the United States and Canada (where he received his PhD in 1995 from Queen’s University), he subsequently held teaching and research positions at universities, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. He works on security sector reform and governance, with a focus on peace processes, armed non-state actors, human security, urban dimensions and the interaction of security and development, as well as on women, youth and children as peacebuilding agents, early warning systems and evolving non-traditional domestic and international roles of armed forces. His current training and policy assistance activities with international organizations, governments and civil society actors focus on southern Thailand and Myanmar. E-mail: a.schnabel@dcaf.ch
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>HISC</td>
<td>human insecurity cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSHW</td>
<td>multistakeholder workshop</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPHUSEC</td>
<td>Operationalizing Human Security project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>security sector governance</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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1. **Overview**

1.1. **Introduction**

Human security has emerged as an analytical and policy concept that puts the security of individuals, communities and populations at the centre of security analysis and provision. Instead of state-centred security, the focus is in the first instance on people-centred security.

Providing security for people involves the effective and successful prevention and mitigation of both direct and structural security threats. However, threats can only be prevented or mitigated if they are recognized as actual or potential threats – and if their source, nature and impact are known. Of course, these vary greatly from context to context. Yet only after thorough and effective identification and assessment of threats are effective and successful prevention and mitigation possible.

The *Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC)* approach has been developed as an instrument to help ease the task of identifying priority threats and priority response measures. It puts security providers in a more comfortable and confident position to detect key threats early and accurately enough to allow for their effective and timely mitigation, and aids in defining security priorities.

While this cahier’s companion publication (Cahier 20) reflects on the findings, lessons and implementation aspects of the OPHUSEC project, this publication offers a practical toolset that will help replicate OPHUSEC’s main steps towards context-sensitive threat assessments and mitigation advice. Cahier 20 is designed to stimulate interest in learning more about this analytical and practically applied effort to use a human security approach in identifying and mitigating highly context-specific threats with equally context-driven and resourced response measures. The toolkit presented in this cahier is designed to help readers apply and improve upon the practical application of OPHUSEC’s threat and mitigation assessment exercises by investing different levels of resources in terms of time, personnel, stakeholder input and longer-term political commitment.

This publication presents and discusses a range of practical guidelines (subsequently referred to as individual “tools” of an overall “toolkit”) that can be used to replicate and implement different components of the OPHUSEC approach. The tools have been developed after careful reflection on, first, the original intentions and objectives of the OPHUSEC project (see the companion Cahier 20) and, second, experiences with the implementation of various components and stages of the OPHUSEC approach (see Part Three of Cahier 20), particularly in terms of the practical challenges encountered and lessons learned (see Chapter 13 of Cahier 20).

This cahier is designed as a stand-alone toolkit that can be used in the practical application of all or parts of the OPHUSEC threat and mitigation assessment approach. It offers basic information about the approach and template-style guides on implementation of the various components and the application of different versions of OPHUSEC “packages” – ranging from basic analyses to in-depth assessments and efforts to institutionalize ongoing threat and mitigation assessment, implementation, monitoring and warning systems. The template-style tools are accompanied by tips and hints for the practitioner, drawing on lessons learned by the original OPHUSEC research team. The cahier offers detailed writing guidelines for those interested in producing written reports on the three main steps of the OPHUSEC exercise: assessment of threats and responses; development of strategic mitigation measures; and examination and design of effective knowledge transfer options. Thus, following a brief summary of the OPHUSEC toolkit’s objectives (section 1), as well as an overview of the human security concept and the OPHUSEC
methodology (section 2), tools are provided for each step of the OPHUSEC approach (section 3). This is followed by guidelines on drafting reports at each stage of the assessment (section 4), along with worksheets that can be used during assessment exercises (for instance during multistakeholder working group sessions) and to guide the work of involved research teams (section 5).

1.2. Objectives and Goals

This toolkit is designed to achieve the following objectives:

- Offer a self-explanatory guide that allows application of the toolkit in full or in part without the involvement of the original authors and developers of the tools. The authors’ own experiences in developing and piloting the tools are presented in the companion Cahier 20.
- Offer support in carrying out context-relevant, people-focused threat and mitigation assessment, applying a methodology that is informed by a strong focus on human-security-based threat identification and mitigation.
- Produce an objective analysis of context-relevant threat scenarios that is not driven mainly by the assessor’s specific disciplinary or professional subject knowledge or the availability of existing, previously used and familiar mitigation instruments.
- Generate basic information for subsequent actor- and sector-specific human security threat and mitigation assessments, such as in the areas of security sector reform (SSR), humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, by internal as well as external actors.
- Offer a range of assessment “packages”: from quick, hands-on, inclusive stakeholder consultations to resource-intensive academic studies; from brief “snapshot” assessments to ongoing, periodic long-term analyses.
- Allow immediate application of the toolkit by interested parties to carry out meaningful, practical and policy-relevant analyses and generate sensible recommendations ready for implementation.
- In case of the comprehensive packages included in this toolkit, allow for periodic repetitions of the OPHUSEC assessment process, through rigorous analysis and multistakeholder consultations, enabling continuous updating of knowledge and recommendations in light of new developments.
- Assist in the generation of information on threats and mitigation options, which offers opportunities for comparative analyses. If used for periodic analyses in a particular location, this allows the assessment of changes over time; and if carried out within a similar geographic context in different locations – such as several urban centres in different parts of a country or across different countries – results can be tested for variations caused by diverse situational contexts.

1.3. Approach

The focus of this analytical and policy-relevant tool is comprehensive in terms of thematic coverage and inclusive in terms of stakeholder involvement; yet it calls for pragmatism in terms of the extent to which both can be realized in a given context.

Comprehensiveness and inclusiveness mean that in a specific context all relevant stakeholders are consulted in the process of assessing, first, the nature, source, location and extent of threats and, second,
existing and required mitigation measures, and their implementation and evaluation. The key questions of the assessment are what is the nature of the threat, and by whom, when, where and how can it be fixed?

The threat and mitigation assessment also offers suggestions as to the suitability and feasibility of options for particular measures, strategies and specific actors’ involvement.

Depending on how much time and effort (i.e. resources) are invested in the assessment exercise, the process of carrying it out and the results can be used to create spaces and opportunities for broader professional, policy and public debates; to raise awareness and interest; to forge contacts; to build networks; to initiate confidence-, trust- and credibility-building; and to trigger joint multistakeholder efforts towards the provision of people-centred human security support activities. The more time and effort are invested in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of such an assessment exercise, the more significant are the results and likely impacts.

1.4. **Concrete Output**

**Networks:** An assessment exercise based on the OPHUSEC approach can assist in creating lasting processes and structures for inter-/intra-stakeholder communication among those affected by human insecurity and those responsible for providing conditions for human security. This can be achieved through the following steps.

- Building local and national multistakeholder networks of affected and concerned parties, including those who are experiencing human insecurity and those who are in charge of mitigating it (and who are thus responsible for the provision of human security).
- Facilitating the experience of joint analyses accomplished as part of a multistakeholder group during intensive workshop discussions.
- Creation of long-term inter-agency and interpersonal contacts.

**Reports:** An assessment exercise can result in reports and similar summaries of findings and recommendations, including the following.

- Externally and/or locally researched threat and mitigation assessments in the form of background studies. These can be used for multistakeholder human security consultation workshops and as the basis of more comprehensive and thorough reports that incorporate subsequent consultation results.
- Policy reports that identify the main human security threats, the most promising (i.e. workable, feasible and sustainable) mitigation options and the most promising entry points and implementation strategies; and advise on multi-actor cooperation in taking mitigation action.
- Comprehensive threat and mitigation assessments can serve as the basis for additional sectoral, actor-specific or thematic assessments (such as SSR, humanitarian or development assistance assessments; or assessments for local, national and international actors).

**Follow-up reports and assessment activities:** Both networks and written summaries of assessment results can serve as the basis for subsequent institutionalized commitment, assessment and networking/lobbying activities. This includes the establishment of a “human security threat assessment and mitigation team” responsible for the long-term continuation of the assessment, advising and monitoring exercises described
in this toolkit. The transformation from a seed activity to an institutionalized, ongoing activity can be assured only with:

- continued and sustainable commitment, including financial and political backing by local, national and international partners
- the willingness of a local actor (such as a non-governmental organization (NGO), university programme or other institution trusted by the multistakeholder group as well as potential mitigation actors) to host a human security threat assessment and mitigation team.

1.5. **Suggested Follow-up Activities (Following Standard OPHUSEC Assessments)**

*Institutionalization of assessment activities*

- A particularly useful option is the formation of a human security threat assessment and mitigation team – a research and advocacy office that would provide analysis, policy recommendations and continued monitoring of threats and mitigation activities.

*One- to three-day thematic follow-up workshops* for multistakeholder groups on the relevance of the initial OPHUSEC analysis results for specific thematic programme activities, with a specific focus on, for instance:

- security sector governance (SSG) and SSR
- development cooperation project and programme planning
- human rights protection
- “dealing with the past” activities.

*One- to three-day actor-specific follow-up workshops* on the relevance of the initial OPHUSEC analysis results for – and targeted at – specific actors, institutions, organizations or sectoral groups, including, among others:

- armed forces
- police
- judges
- parliamentarians
- international actors
- community groups
- local government officials
- NGOs
- development community
- donor community
- humanitarian assistance community
- security sector institutions.
1.6. **Resource Requirements**

Funds are required to cover, among other things, office rent and equipment; staff salaries; travel and accommodation; meeting/workshop expenses; and publication costs.

The level and extent of resources required depends greatly on the number of individuals involved in professional functions; the length of a project; the number and size of meetings and workshops; the amount, location and length of research travel; and the nature and number of outputs and potential follow-up activities.

Resources might be provided through local, national and international partners' financial contributions, including the provision of in-kind offerings (such as conference facilities, accommodation or meals) or seconded personnel (including research and administrative support staff).
2. **THE OPHUSEC APPROACH**

2.1. **Human Security as an Evolving and Important Concept**

Solid and thorough threat assessments depend in large part on the object of security. Whose security are we concerned about? Whose security needs to be defended and improved? The academic and policy debates on the subject, particularly during the years following the end of the Cold War, have broadened and deepened our understanding of security.

The horizontal dynamic of security focuses on “dimensions” or “themes”, such as military, political, economic, ecological, socio-cultural and personal dimensions.

The vertical dynamic of security focuses on different “levels of analysis” – from the global to the regional, state, group and individual levels. Human security has emerged as an important focus of today’s security analysis and provision.

2.2. **Human Security Focuses on the Essence of Security Provision**

While the focus on the security needs and requirements of individuals is not new, some specific features of the human security concept are innovative. These features, which are highlighted in the following points, give new and useful guidance to those who wish to understand security as a holistic, comprehensive phenomenon and condition; an understanding that draws on both vertical and horizontal aspects of safety, development and protection needs of populations, their states and the regional and global community of societies.

2.2.1. **Whose security are we concerned about?**

Focusing on human security implies focusing on the individual and the population as the “referent objects” of security: this means that the security needs of individuals, communities and populations are the main concern of those charged with security provision at community, national and international levels.

2.2.2. **What do we mean when we talk about “security”?**

“Security” refers to the absence of both direct and structural violence. “Direct” violence includes physical and often armed violence against individuals and their states; whereas “structural” violence is linked to threats posed by environmental issues, human rights violations, injustice, discrimination, underdevelopment, or lack of adequate food or access to healthcare. Both direct and structural violence can be equally harmful and lethal and should thus be given equal attention.

2.2.3. **How do changing notions of security affect the work of those who provide it?**

In response to evolving and more appropriate approaches to the meaning and nature of “security”, there is a need for state and non-state actors whose responsibility it is to provide security and prevent insecurity to rethink and revise their policies, programmes and activities, including spending priorities, when it comes to services and actions in the name of security provision.
2.2.4. The need to invest in threat mitigation, and build resilience of those threatened

Two very important dimensions of managing security threats emerge. On the one hand, it is important to prevent, avoid or – at a minimum – reduce the impact of threats. On the other hand, particularly when threats cannot easily and quickly be avoided because of prevailing structural and systemic conditions, it is important to “empower” populations themselves to strengthen their resilience – their capacities to cope with and adapt to ongoing human insecurity.

Investing in human security is therefore first about both the recognition and the alleviation of the conditions and factors that cause and perpetuate threats (i.e. “root cause alleviation”).

Second, it is about building capacities among threatened populations to cope with threats that cannot be alleviated easily and quickly and thus continue to impact their lives by threatening their security (i.e. “symptom mitigation”).

The primary objective of human security provision is thus to do away with threats, while a secondary, intermediate, objective is to build and strengthen resilience to allow people to manage continuing threats and reduce their impact on their lives.

2.3. Establishing Thresholds: When Does a “Normal” Threat Turn into a Human Security Threat?

For the purpose of a practically meaningful and useful assessment of human security threats and potential mitigation measures (and for the meaningful implementation of human-security-focused policies, programmes and activities), not every inconvenience, risk or threat can realistically be referred to as a human security threat. The OPHUSEC approach therefore operates on the assumption that a threshold exists where a threat has or will likely become an “existential threat” – meaning a threat that is endangering the physical survival of a person. That is the threshold at which a threat can be considered a “human security threat”. Priority should be given to the detection and mitigation of these existential threats.

2.4. Survival as the Minimum Requirement of Human Security, and Indicator of Higher-level Security Conditions

Human security stands for the ability of people to secure, at a minimum, their basic right to physical survival. If one’s survival cannot be guaranteed for the next day, week or month, and if one has to struggle to secure the survival of the family and community, nobody will enjoy peace and stability. It is those existential threats endangering people’s lives which are at the core of our understanding of human insecurity. Once these existential threats have been alleviated, attention can and should shift to the mitigation of less serious, non-existential threats.

2.5. Threats and Mitigation Activities are Highly Contextual

It is important to recognize and emphasize that the nature of threats, their impacts and mitigation options are highly contextual. They vary across regions, countries and communities. They also vary depending on the social, economic, political or geographic conditions that characterize a given context. The context
guides the analysis of threat dynamics as well as the design and implementation of options for mitigation measures.

2.6. The Benefits of Taking a Human Security Approach

Taking a human security approach is advantageous for both security recipients (the society and the state) and security providers (the community, the society, the state and the wider international community).

Analysing, planning and acting in the spirit of human security paves the way for people-centred security provision. Taking such an approach necessitates inclusive participation at all levels of information collection and analysis by the beneficiaries of future mitigation efforts. It is crucial to listen to and act upon the real (perceived and experienced) needs of people by drawing on their insights, experiences, expectations, entitlements and perceptions.

The focus on remedial or preventive mitigation action seeks more than well-intended acts that might eventually generate some positive impact. Instead it aspires to generate observable (and possibly measurable) positive impact on beneficiary communities.

Operationalizing human security means focusing on mutual accountability in the planning, implementation and evaluation of mitigation actions: state, non-state, community-based and inter-state providers of human security are accountable to the beneficiary population for their intentions and actions; while in turn, beneficiary communities are accountable to human security providers for their long-term commitment to support joint mitigation measures and maintain and sustain community-based mitigation activities. Such mutual accountability improves chances for positive and sustainable results.

2.7. The Benefits of Applying the OPHUSEC Approach

Based on feedback received from the pilot phase’s project team and participants, as well as practical experience with OPHUSEC’s pilot case studies, the OPHUSEC approach is a useful tool for identifying and prioritizing threats and promising mitigation measures. In short, the approach generates helpful and constructive threat assessments and mitigation advice.

Cahier 20, a useful background reader alongside this toolkit, reflects on various key components of the development and pilot phases of the OPHUSEC project. It highlights the utility and challenges of a comprehensive, full-fledged OPHUSEC approach, which requires high levels of institutional commitment, personnel and funds – and a supportive professional and political environment. Cahier 20 may also be referred to for examples of less comprehensive versions of the OPHUSEC approach, the application of which will be presented in the following section of this publication.
3. OPHUSEC TOOLKIT: GUIDE TO CARRYING OUT CONTEXT-RELEVANT, PEOPLE-FOCUSED THREAT AND MITIGATION ASSESSMENTS

3.1. Generic OPHUSEC Tools

The table gives a list of the entire range of OPHUSEC tools, which will be discussed in more detail in the following pages.

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<th>Generic OPHUSEC Tools</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) &quot;Background Study&quot;</td>
<td>Background study and situation analysis</td>
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<td><em>(Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation)</em></td>
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<td>(2) &quot;Threat and Response Analysis&quot;</td>
<td>Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses</td>
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<td><em>(Multistakeholder Workshop Part One)</em></td>
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<td>(3) &quot;Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis&quot;</td>
<td>Identification of key threats and required mitigation action</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Two)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) &quot;Implementation Analysis&quot;</td>
<td>Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations</td>
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<td><em>(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three)</em></td>
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<td>(5) &quot;+Capacity-building Workshops&quot;</td>
<td>Thematic and actor-focused assessments</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>(Specialized Follow-up Workshops)</em></td>
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<td>(6) &quot;++Action&quot;</td>
<td>Monitoring and analysis of threats and impacts; evaluation and refinement of mitigation action and impacts</td>
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<td><em>(Post-Workshop Activity/Implementation/ Institutionalization)</em></td>
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3.2. Guidance on Implementing Individual OPHUSEC Components

3.2.1. Guidance on (1) "Background Study"

3.2.1.1. WHAT?

*Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation:* Producing a background study precedes the first workshop and helps all involved parties to come to the meeting adequately prepared.

3.2.1.2. DESIRED RESULT

*Background Study and Situation Analysis:* Preparatory research results in a written background study, with a focus on an analysis of the current situation, which will be considered by the workshop participants.
3.2.1.3. SUPPORTING MATERIAL

Consult **Worksheets** entitled "Threat and Response Analysis" and "Report Writing Guidelines".

3.2.1.4. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the background study is to produce a detailed situation analysis in the form of structured and systematically presented information on a variety of relevant threats, as well as mitigation measures that have already been used or are currently being applied.

One should think of the background study as a mapping exercise, a first attempt to brainstorm and analyse threats and responses that have been put in place, irrespective of their impact and priority in the context of all possible threats. All threats – and corresponding responses – should be collected and mapped, including as much information as possible. There should be an assessment of, among other things, the nature, scope and impact of threat and responses. The worksheets in the annex offer guidance on the type of information that would ideally be collected through this mapping exercise.

At a very minimum, the background study represents the documented report of a brainstorming exercise by the research team.

Ideally, however, the background work is carried out as a desk study, drawing on as much information as is available, and if possible also on interviews with key stakeholders.

The background study is a very first and rough draft of the eventual assessment report. It is not a definitive final report! The background study will guide further research and eventually will be informed and substantiated by the analyses and discussions among stakeholder representatives emanating from the consultation workshops.

The level of detail of the background study depends on the level of resources that are invested – in terms of the time available and expertise among those involved in researching and writing the study.

3.2.1.5. HOW TO?

For advice on how to structure and organize a background study, consult the **Worksheet “Report Writing Guidelines”**.

3.2.1.6. FOLLOW-UP

The background study should be followed up with one or more multistakeholder workshops (MSHWs), which will test, scrutinize and supplement the study’s initial findings.

3.2.1.7. TIPS AND HINTS

✅ **The authors of the background study:** The background work is ideally carried out by knowledgeable, experienced, respected and – as far as possible – objective local experts, who should have access to internationally available data and information.

✅ **Linking international and local practices:** The background study ideally attempts to contrast international norms and practices with prevailing local/national ones. The study highlights shortcomings and opportunities of linking international/external norms and practices, donor preferences, “demands”, expectations and priorities with those of local stakeholders.
Using the study to select appropriate workshop participants: Written in advance of consultation meetings with stakeholders, the background study helps in selecting workshop participants, ensuring that all identified stakeholders are invited to subsequent meetings. Such knowledge also helps in assuring that threat-affected populations and threat-relevant security providers are present at the meetings.

Preferably no advanced distribution of the study: If the multistakeholder consultation group has a chance to meet on several separate occasions – and if sufficient time is available for each meeting – the research team may be best advised not to share the background study with the workshop participants in advance of consultation meetings. This will avoid any unwanted influence on their thinking, awareness and perception. Ideally the participants would be exposed to the same questions and issues that the authors set out to address when researching and writing the background study. The results on the consultation workshop would then be “untainted” by the research team’s analysis, findings and implicit suggestions.

When meetings are few and time is limited, advance distribution might be advisable: If there is only one consultation meeting and its length is limited, little time will be available for participants to reflect, discuss and debate. In such cases it can be more effective to start discussions at a more advanced level of understanding and exposure to the subject matter. Participants could be asked to prepare for the meeting by reading and reflecting on the background study compiled by the research team. As a result, with very limited time available for actual discussions, the multistakeholder representatives would not have to start brainstorming and discussing threats and responses from scratch, but would already have enough shared information within the group to reflect critically, discuss and complement the analysis that has already been carried out by the researchers. If that option is chosen, the background study should be made available to all participants at least one week in advance of the meeting.

- This will allow all participants to find enough time to read the study and come to the meeting with a comparable level of knowledge.
- It gives participants the opportunity to compare their own private impressions and knowledge with that presented in the background study, and possibly even share and discuss the findings with colleagues in their own organizations.
- It also allows participants to draw on their own knowledge and experience to compensate missing, inadequate or wrong information presented in the background study – and to arrive at the meeting prepared and able to contribute such missing information.
- If shared with the participants in advance of the consultation meeting, the background study should be brief, yet detailed and rich enough to serve as a solid preparation for the workshop. Mapping studies that are too long and detailed will likely not be read carefully (if they are read at all). As a consequence, participants will arrive unevenly prepared which may inhibit the dynamics of the consultation.

Participation of background study authors in consultation meetings and post-workshop activities: The author(s) of the background study should ideally participate in consultation workshops as resource persons, and subsequently participate in producing post-workshop reports, combining information in the original background study with discussions and results from the workshop consultation meeting(s). They should also be involved in drawing up the final report and final
recommendations – and, if possible, they should be involved in subsequent implementation activities.

3.2.2. Guidance on (2) "Threat and Response Analysis"

3.2.2.1. WHAT?

Multistakeholder Workshop Part One: The first MSHW or, if only one meeting is planned, the first part of the MSHW is devoted to an initial mapping and analysis of threats and responses.

3.2.2.2. DESIRED RESULT

Comprehensive account of threats and responses: Participants in the multistakeholder consultation collect and assess threats as well as past, current and required mitigation action; they discuss actual and potential impact of responses on threats; and they identify priority threats.

3.2.2.3. SUPPORTING MATERIAL

Consult Worksheets entitled "Threat and Response Analysis" and "Report Writing Guidelines".

3.2.2.4. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the first MSHW consultation is to brainstorm and record all existing threats; identify and assess past, ongoing and required mitigation measures; and assess the potential, scope and impact of both threats and mitigation measures.

If there is sufficient time for a thorough workshop (or even more than one meeting), the background study does not need to be distributed; participants will be able to engage in a genuine brainstorming exercise based on their own analysis, unaffected by the research team’s prior assessment. The participants will map and analyse threats and responses. This will ideally happen in two steps: first in separate stakeholder groups, and then within the entire group. After threats and attempted mitigation strategies and measures have been brainstormed and analysed, there should be a first attempt by the group to prioritize threats based on the OPHUSEC selection criteria (human insecurity cluster – HISC).

If time is limited and it appears advisable to distribute the background study in advance, see 3.2.1.7. above for relevant tips and hints.

3.2.2.5. HOW TO?

These objectives can be accomplished by taking these five steps.

Step 1

In separate but parallel stakeholder group meetings, thorough threat analyses are carried out. How does each group interpret the human security threat situation in the country?

Step 2

All stakeholder groups discuss and analyse responses that have been put in place to mitigate those threats. They also identify new responses that should be put in place.
Step 3
Each group presents its findings to the entire meeting and all participants have an opportunity to discuss the individual group analyses. This is the first step towards generating a consolidated list of priority threats.

Step 4
The entire group identifies the most significant threats and response requirements.

Step 5
The group discusses and assembles the HISC, a small collection of three to five key threats that are chosen based on the following OPHUSEC selection criteria.

- Key threats are existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals.
- They are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes.
- They can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and the strengthening of coping capacities.
- Success and multi-actor collaboration for mitigation are both possible and feasible.

Please remember:
If time is limited, it is advisable to disseminate the background study ahead of the meeting. In this case the focus will be on a critical debate of this report, adding, expanding, mapping and assessing threats and responses, as well as the identification of key threats.

Depending on the availability of time, these discussions can take place first in stakeholder groups before initiating debate within the entire meeting. If time is an issue, discussions can take place immediately with the entire group.

3.2.2.6. FOLLOW-UP
Immediately following the multistakeholder consultation workshop, the ideas generated in the meetings should be analysed by the research team. The researchers will update and complement their initial analysis of threats and responses (the background study) with the help of the information produced by the multistakeholder consultation.

The research team will also carry out additional research on knowledge gaps or issues that were determined to be in need of further analysis by the workshop participants.

3.2.2.7. TIPS AND HINTS

✔ On the one hand it is useful to involve the research team in the organization of the workshop. On the other hand, they should not be involved in the workshop discussions to prevent them from influencing the contents and directions of the analyses. They should, however, be available during the workshop as resource persons, providing clarification when needed. It would furthermore be useful to ask a person from outside the research team to facilitate and moderate the consultation meeting(s).

✔ It is helpful to have a detailed programme available to guide the group through the often very brief and fast-paced exercises.
Some participants will likely express frustration over the superficial nature of comparatively brief exercises and the resulting, yet unavoidable, lack of depth that tends to characterize discussions during brief meetings of a group of diverse actors who attempt to cover an enormous range of issues. It will be essential to make efficient use of the limited time available. It is also essential to ensure that participants are aware of the fact that additional, in-depth research has been carried out before and will be carried out after the workshop.

If time and other resources allow for multiple workshops or workshops permit several days of meeting time, the participants do not need to read the background paper in advance and base their discussions on what has already been prepared by the research team. Without running the risk of being influenced and prejudiced by the research team’s arguments and findings, they can generate their own independent results. Those results can then be compared and merged with the background paper.

Moreover, if ample time is available during the stakeholder consultations, it is helpful to opt for a two-stage approach. First, the representatives of individual stakeholder groups meet among themselves (e.g. all NGO representatives; all representatives from community-based organizations; all from government institutions; or all international actors); and only afterwards are the same issues discussed within the full group.

Of course, if consultations take place during the course of a day or an afternoon, for instance, there would be no time for such a two-stage approach. All issues can be debated only once, by the entire meeting. In that case the facilitator needs to ensure that all groups receive equal opportunities and speaking time to contribute to the discussion and make their perspectives known.

If only a little time is available, the research team’s preparatory work can serve as food for thought to prepare participants, solicit their feedback and identify gaps in knowledge and analysis. In that case the participants act primarily as a review panel, providing constructive feedback to the research team’s work.

Particularly when the background study has not been distributed in advance, the results of MSHW consultations are of a very preliminary nature, based on participants’ existing and intuitive levels of knowledge. Thus, after the meeting subsequent meetings could be organized, or the findings could be followed up and supplemented with the help of further conversations and interviews with individual participants.

Debating all issues covered in the worksheets might require much more time than may be available, particularly if discussions take place first in stakeholder groups and then among all participants and if the workshop cannot be held over several days. Threats and responses that could not be discussed in detail for lack of time could be followed up after the MSHW by the research team with the help of interviews and individual meetings with workshop participants.

Moreover, if time is a concern, it might be advisable to fill in analyses worksheets with less detail and focus on providing more detailed information only at the “Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis” workshop.
3.2.3. **Guidance on (3) “Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis”**

3.2.3.1. **WHAT?**

**Multistakeholder Workshop Part Two:** The second MSHW or, if only one meeting is planned, the second part of the MSHW is devoted to the identification and assessment of key threats and relevant response options.

3.2.3.2. **DESIRED RESULT**

**Identification of three to five key threats and required mitigation action:** Participants in the multistakeholder consultation decide on a set of key threats, reassess them in more detail and develop detailed response strategies and measures.

3.2.3.3. **SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

Consult **Worksheets** entitled “Threat and Response Analysis” and “Report Writing Guidelines”.

3.2.3.4. **OBJECTIVE**

The objectives of the second MSHW consultation are, first, to reach a joint agreement on three to five key threats; second, jointly to develop detailed information about these threats as well as past and current mitigation measures; third, to develop required mitigation measures alongside indicators to monitor and assess their implementation; fourth, to review the roles played by key implementation actors; and, finally, to assess the feasibility of suggested measures.

3.2.3.5. **HOW TO?**

These objectives can be accomplished by moving along the following steps.

1. At the beginning of the workshop the research team presents the results of Stage One of the project to the workshop participants:
   - the background study
   - the process and results of analysing threats and responses
   - the results of the first consultation workshop, including the group’s suggested key threats
   - the research team’s efforts subsequently to combine their own background work with feedback from the MSHW
   - the team’s proposed set of three to five key threats (building on the group’s suggestions) as well as proposed mitigation measures.

2. The proposed selection of three to five key threats and the justification for choosing those threats are discussed and negotiated between and among the multistakeholder participants and the research team. As already mentioned under point 3.2.2.5., the selection criteria for key threats include the following.
   - Key threats are existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals.
   - They are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes.
They can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and strengthening of coping capacities.

Success and multi-actor collaboration for mitigation are both possible and feasible.

The proposed or amended selection of key threats (HISC) is then confirmed by all participants.

This is followed by additional detailed analysis of the key threats, of past and required (or desired) mitigation action and, among other things, suggestions as to when, how and by whom such action could be carried out. This may take the following steps.

- Detailed threat analysis for each key threat.
- Detailed collection and assessment of past and ongoing measures as well as coping mechanisms.
- Detailed accounts of required measures and coping mechanisms at local, national and international levels.
- Consideration of sequencing and timing of responses.

Further, and keeping in mind the necessity to assess changes in threat levels and the impact of mitigation action, observable/measurable indicators for threat analysis and mitigation assessments should be selected as soon as possible. Discussions during the second meeting should thus also focus on:

- Indicators to help assess each threat and changes of the threat level over time
- Indicators to help assess the effects of response measures over time
- The type of information that will be required to measure each indicator.

In addition to the need for monitoring and assessing threats and the performance of response strategies and measures, it is useful to assess the role and performance of actors involved in mitigating key threats (i.e. the “human security providers”). This takes the form of an actor analysis.

- What has each actor done in mitigating a particular threat and/or contributing to a particular past or ongoing mitigation measure?
- What should each actor do to mitigate a particular threat and/or contribute to a particular mitigation measure?
- What are each actor’s capacities, roles, interests and expectations?
- What are each actor’s comparative advantages (what do they do better than anyone else)?
- What is each actor’s record on and approach to cooperating with other actors?

Finally, it is highly useful to discuss and assess the feasibility of various approaches – will they work or not?

- Which suggestions (especially among the chosen mitigation actions) are realistic, and which are not?
- Are there so-called “non-starters” or “slow starters” among the suggested measures? These terms describe measures that are impossible (non-starters) or very difficult (slow
starters) to take because of serious obstacles that might presently stand in the way of implementation.

- What are possible obstacles and opportunities for implementation?
- What are the key implementation strategies measures that will be the focus of the next workshop?

### 3.2.3.6. FOLLOW-UP

The research team will carefully reflect on the findings of the MSHW and verify its findings through further research. The team will also carry out additional research to supplement issues that were not adequately covered during the workshop.

### 3.2.3.7. TIPS AND HINTS

See the aspects discussed under “3.2.3.5. How To?”.

### 3.2.4. Guidance on (4) “Implementation Analysis”

**3.2.4.1. WHAT?**

**Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three:** The third MSHW focuses on the implementation of proposed mitigation measures.

**3.2.4.2. DESIRED RESULT**

**Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations:** Participants in the multistakeholder consultation explore specific options for and approaches to feeding the results and recommendations of the OPHUSEC analysis into real-world policy and strategy planning processes.

**3.2.4.3. SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

Consult [Worksheet](entitled “Report Writing Guidelines”).

**3.2.4.4. OBJECTIVE**

The third workshop focuses on developing strategies to help assure that the threat and mitigation assessments’ recommendations reach those actors who will most likely be interested and willing to implement them. In the consultation the participants search for ways of turning recommendations into policies and strategies. They identify institutions and persons who might possibly be interested and in a position to ensure the continuation of the OPHUSEC analysis, carry out periodic research, produce periodic threat and mitigation assessments, offer advice on pressing threats and feasible response measures, and subsequently monitor the record of all involved actors’ efforts aimed at turning recommendations into timely and effective threat management.

The overarching issue for the workshop and the project team’s research is how most effectively and sustainably to promote the recommendations to relevant actors, secure their buy-in – and get them to appreciate the merits in following up on those recommendations.
3.2.4.5. **HOW TO?**

To generate information that meets these objectives, participants should be asked to share their own insights and discuss the following questions.

- Who are the most suitable and influential audiences for suggestions and recommendations of the threat and mitigation analysis?
  - Is there one single audience or are there several audiences, each of which needs to be reached with different knowledge transfer strategies?
  - How can knowledge be packaged and presented properly to reach each intended audience?
  - If contacts with desired target audiences do not exist, how can such contacts be made, "groomed" and maintained?
  - How does one identify potential partners and "champions of change" (those individuals who are most likely to be receptive to new ideas and approaches)?
  - How does one identify and "neutralize" potential spoilers?
  - Who might be silent spoilers, obstructive spoilers or potentially malleable spoilers?
  - What happens if the audience consists mostly of potential spoilers, for instance if one runs workshops with armed non-state actors? Similarly, how does one deal with transition environments (particularly with political situations that are in flux)? How does one deal with barely enabling, unwelcoming environments that are characterized by the absence of promising partners and entry points?

- How does one locate helpful "entry points" – including individuals, places or events that offer opportunities for the promotion of recommendations and might be receptive to engaging with new ideas?
  - In particular, the previous actor analysis (point 3.2.3.5.) should indicate some potential human security providers. If this analysis by the research team and the multistakeholder consultation group has managed to show convincingly who should do what, when and how in addressing root causes and symptoms of human insecurity, the "target audiences" for one’s recommendations should now be known. However, these actors have to be convinced that they need to become involved.
  - Among these target audiences, promising entry points for advocacy efforts and subsequent mitigation action need to be identified. These might be specific institutions or individuals. It might be useful to start with the participants in the multistakeholder consultations, especially when they sit in strategic positions and could serve as door-openers.
  - Picking the right entry points also refers to choosing the right moment at which an opportunity presents itself for making a positive and influential contribution to, for instance, the development of a policy process.
  - It is useful to be familiar with the details of an organization’s project and budget cycles. One should seek contact during the project planning phase, when those responsible for formulating policies or designing programmes might be seeking outside input and
feedback, and when there might be greater interest in receiving and applying useful advice.

✓ How important is it to engage in advocacy to promote the assessment’s suggestions?
  - Can skilful advocacy convince unwilling actors to act?
  - Who should advocate, when, where and how?
  - What are likely costs and benefits of advocacy, particularly depending on the respective political context?
  - If advocacy and promotion of assessment outcomes are not possible (for various practical and/or political reasons), is it still worth pursuing threat and mitigation analyses as an ongoing activity?

✓ If advocacy is identified as an important instrument for assuring or increasing chances for effective influence and positive impact, should the analysis and advocacy effort be institutionalized?
  - Should there be an institution that provides continuous knowledge transfer and ensures that the most appropriate recipients are approached, knowledge is transferred in a manner conducive to meeting “receptive ears”, and recipients take the time and effort to listen and ideally act upon the suggested recommendations? Who should provide such as role?
  - Who is particularly suited to approach, speak and keep contact with particular strategic actors?
  - What specific roles can academics and practitioners, possibly acting in teams, play in promoting and transferring recommendations?

✓ Particularly if a regularized process, possibly in the form of an institution, has been realized, how does one monitor and ensure continued interest from – and engagement with – implementation actors (i.e. the community of human security providers)?

3.2.4.6. FOLLOW-UP

The research team will carefully reflect on the findings of the MSHW, and verify them with the help of further research.

The team will carry out additional research to supplement issues that were not adequately covered during the workshop.

3.2.4.7. TIPS AND HINTS

Please refer to the points under “3.2.4.5. How To?”.

3.2.5. Guidance on (5) “+Capacity-building Workshops”

3.2.5.1. WHAT?

Specialized Follow-up Workshops: In specific capacity-building workshops individual actors or groups of actors discuss and further develop the findings and recommendations of the assessment exercise. Moreover, they explore and further define their own role in and contribution to threat mitigation.
3.2.5.2. **DESIRED RESULT**

**Thematic and actor-focused assessments:** Supplementary reports outline the specific roles that should and will be played by specific actors or thematically focused groups of actors in taking the implementation of mitigation measures forward and contributing to future multistakeholder assessment exercises.

3.2.5.3. **SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

Consult **Worksheets** entitled "Threat and Response Analysis" and "Report Writing Guidelines".

3.2.5.4. **OBJECTIVE**

Different threats and mitigation measures each involve a unique set of subnational, national and international actors – either as causes of threats, as victims of threats and/or as those whose collaboration and actions are required to mitigate threats. On the one hand, each threat likely has to be mitigated by a series of actors whose expertise, support and active participation are necessary to implement a mitigation measure or strategy. On the other hand, no one single actor could possibly respond to all threats, and therefore each actor needs to understand where its own comparative advantage lies when it comes to mitigating a particular threat.

Discussing the results of the threat and mitigation analysis among fellow security providers supports realistic fine-tuning of policy recommendations. It offers opportunities to generate a supportive environment among key actors as they walk away from those workshops with a better appreciation of the problems and solutions associated with each threat. They also gain a better understanding of where and when they might be called upon to contribute to the implementation of the recommendations that have been generated.

The research team can use the recommendations developed during the meetings to adapt mitigation measure to the capacities and most desirable roles played by those actors who will eventually be responsible for implementing them.

Thematic workshops could, for instance, be carried out with actors involved in development, human rights protection or political/governance and security sector reform processes. Actor-specific workshops could be held for civil society organizations, community-based groups, media representatives, international organizations or individual security sector institutions.

As an example of such a capacity-building workshop, the following section (3.2.5.5.) provides some issues that might be explored with representatives of institutions involved in a country’s security sector.

3.2.5.5. **HOW TO?**

This is an example of a follow-up workshop on “Human Security Threats and Mitigation: Relevance for Security Sector Governance and Security Sector Reform Actors”.

- **This workshop could foster a common identity among diverse security sector actors and instil a shared sense of their respective roles and responsibilities according to international standards and principles of good SSG. In the process, the various security institutions learn more about each identified threat’s relevance for the security sector – and the sector’s relevance for generating and mitigating the threat; they learn about each other’s roles, tasks and comparative advantages; and they learn about how they, as a community and in close collaboration, might best implement certain response measures.**
In particular, security-providing and oversight institutions within the sector are sensitized to the importance of “mutual accountability” among external and internal actors; government and non-governmental actors; people and authorities; local, national and regional contexts; and providers and beneficiaries of mitigation action.

They also examine the role and importance of sustainability in threat mitigation, often requiring long-term commitments with unknown exit strategies – apart from the accomplishment of measurable, stable and sustainable threat reduction.

A useful strategy for such a workshop includes the following steps.

- **First**, the results and recommendations of the OPHUSEC workshops and research work are made available to the relevant thematic or actor-focused audience ahead of the workshop.

- **Second**, at the workshop itself the research team summarizes this information, with a focus on those threats, responses and recommendations that specifically identify security sector actors as being among the main players in either causing or mitigating threats.

- **Third**, the participants are given the opportunity to discuss those findings – and their supposed role in creating or mitigating key human security challenges – in small groups. In the case of a security sector audience, it would be useful to begin with discussions among the representatives of individual institutions (such as the military, police, armed groups, parliament, civil society, etc.) before continuing discussions jointly with all others.

- **Fourth**, the participants develop recommendations as to when, how and why they should be involved in reducing threats and implementing mitigation measures. They also identify the conditions required for their most effective and efficient involvement.

- **Fifth**, the workshop concludes with a set of recommendations, which are based on opportunities for their most constructive contribution to the implementation of the original threat and response mapping exercise’s recommendations. The recommendations identify the roles that could and should be played by various security sector actors. They also identify key non-governmental, governmental and international actors who would need to be involved in implementing those aspects of the mitigation recommendations that are outside the purview and expertise of the security sector.

- **Sixth** and finally, the group identifies steps towards feeding the recommendations generated into decision- and policy-making processes within and beyond their own institutions.

A similar approach can be pursued in the context of other thematic or actor-specific capacity-building and consultation workshops.

### 3.2.5.6. FOLLOW-UP

The research team carefully reflects on the findings of the MSHW and verifies the findings through further research.
The team carries out additional research to supplement issues that were not adequately covered during the workshop.

3.2.5.7. **TIPS AND HINTS**

Please refer to the points under “3.2.5.5. How To?”

3.2.6. **Guidance on (6) “+ + Action”**

3.2.6.1. **WHAT?**

**Post-Workshop Activity/Implementation/Institutionalization:** The OPHUSEC approach is used by its own dedicated institutional set-up to carry out periodic assessments, advise relevant actors on mitigation action and monitor and follow up on implementation action.

3.2.6.2. **DESIRED RESULT**

**Monitoring and analysis of threats and impacts; evaluation and refinement of mitigation action and impacts:** An institution is in place to host and facilitate ongoing OPHUSEC analysis and mitigation activities.

3.2.6.3. **SUPPORTING MATERIAL**

Consult **Worksheets** entitled “Threat and Response Analysis” and “Report Writing Guidelines”.

3.2.6.4. **OBJECTIVE**

If the opportunity arises to institutionalize the previous activities as a permanent feature in local, national and international human security provision-making and decision-making processes, the various steps accomplished by the project would be repeated periodically, to update threat and mitigation analyses and resulting recommendations; to warn of deteriorating threats or derailing response measures; and to identify if, when, where and how recommendations have been implemented or not, and with what consequences.

Figure 1 visualizes the process of such a “human security assessment, warning and response system cycle”. This process follows the following sequence:

**First,** a threat and response assessment (1) is carried out.

**Second,** recommendation of mitigation strategies and measures are made and warnings of major deviations in threat levels and urgencies for immediate action are issued (2).

**Third,** responses are designed by and for single or several actors within a multi-actor response strategy (3).

**Fourth,** responses are implemented (4).

**Fifth,** monitoring and assessment of implementation performance and impact are carried out, along with warning of deviations from the chosen response measures and strategies (5). The implementation record will influence the results of continuous threat and response assessments.

The overall assessment and monitoring depend on a process of continuous analysis and tracking based on research and multistakeholder consultations (6).
3.2.6.5. HOW TO?

Several issues need to be considered when attempting to put into place what could be called a Human Security Assessment, Warning and Response System cycle or process.

✔ First, who should carry out such an activity? Who would be a suitable host and facilitator?

- Who is best placed to take the initiative, lead and possibly host such a new mechanism? Would options include, for instance, one or more individuals from within the original research team, or perhaps an organization that has participated in the previous multistakeholder consultations?

- To be considered as a legitimate host for such an activity, which is potentially highly sensitive, it could help to be a non-governmental actor with no formal links with the
government. It might also be important that the host does not itself take responsibility for the assessment of threats and the design and implementation of response measures.

- If it is impossible to institutionalize the threat and mitigation response mechanism, one needs to ask if there is value in merely carrying out occasional (or one-time) assessment exercises. Do such mechanisms need to be institutionalized in order to be useful?

- Second, how does one organize continuous monitoring and analysis? It is important to develop a feasible and reliable process.
  - It would be useful to monitor and measure actual as well as perceived (“felt”) variations in security levels. Which threats improve or worsen, and why does that happen? Making these distinctions might involve the need to carry out opinion polls and perception surveys.
  - When variations in conditions are assessed and identified (for example, in terms of observable changes in the seriousness of a threat based on geographic scope and number of people affected or killed), it is important to establish specific thresholds against which variations can be judged. Broadly supported indicators of success and failure must be identified. Regardless of the specific approach and mechanism chosen to assess, monitor and evaluate changing levels of the impact of threat and response measures, one needs to identify benchmarks, standards, objectives and expectations against which actual performance is compared and judged.
  - When measuring and reporting the accomplishments of a certain activity, the long-term impact of threats and implemented mitigation measures should be measured against locally defined benchmarks. This allows one to direct an activity towards reducing context-relevant threats.
  - Once indicators are identified to measure performance vis-à-vis stated objectives, approaches and tools also need to be identified for measuring output, outcome and impact. Evaluation specialists should be consulted to assist in designing appropriate and relevant evaluation and impact measurement tools.
  - One needs to determine how “continuous” a continuous monitoring and analysis mechanism should be. In other words, how often and at what intervals should the analyses be carried out? This question can be answered based on the demand of analysis and advice – and of course available resources.

- Third, how should such a system be structured and organized?
  - While it is instrumental to set up an effective and efficient organization, it is very difficult to determine in advance how such a threat assessment and mitigation mechanism needs to be structured and organized, how many individuals should be involved, or which skills they require. Much of this depends on the availability of resources and the host institution’s level of engagement with state and non-state human security providers.
  - If there is high and frequent demand for such services, then opportunities and political support (as well as funding for appropriate infrastructure, personnel and expertise) are easier to secure. If the demand is low – or if such assessment activities are discouraged by government authorities – it might be difficult, if not impossible, to pursue assessment and advisory activities in an open, constructive and effective manner.
A number of key steps should be performed by any such effort, including:

- situation, threat and mitigation analyses
- ongoing monitoring and analysis of threats, response/mitigation needs and the impact of targeted mitigation measures
- transfer and advocacy of the knowledge and recommendations created by the OPHUSEC mechanism to those who are willing and able to use them for improved threat mitigation.

Fourth, how can such a mechanism be financed?

- It is important to assure proper financing. With the best of intentions, even in welcoming and supportive environments for unimpeded and unbiased threat and mitigation analyses, none of these activities can persist without appropriate financial commitments. Financial resources must be secured (and thus committed) at a level commensurate with the requirements for the effective and sustainable operation of such a mechanism.
- Who should provide financial support – ideally without attaching undue strings to the mechanism’s work? Is funding available from local and national sources? Would external funding sources be available – and if so, will they offer support without attempts to influence the mechanism’s process and findings? Will the acceptance of external financial support challenge the mechanism’s neutrality and thus compromise the legitimacy, value and impact of its recommendations?
- It is important to carry out a careful cost/benefit assessment of accepting financial support from any local, national or international source. A generously funded mechanism with highly professional and skilled personnel, producing critically relevant and important policy recommendations, might still not be worth much if its legitimacy is compromised by one of its donors.
- If there is a reasonable risk that funding arrangements – as generous and tempting as they might be – might compromise the mechanism’s legitimacy, it might be wiser to downsize the effort and pursue it with less resources and less output, but uncompromised legitimacy.

3.2.6.6. FOLLOW-UP

The research team shares its recommendations with participants of the previous MSHW. Periodic threat and mitigation assessments through further research and periodic MSHWs assure up-to-date assessment results.

Frequent contacts with donors ensure their long-term commitment (including financial contributions) to the human security assessment, warning and response mechanism.

3.2.6.7. TIPS AND HINTS

Please refer to the points under “3.2.6.5. How To?”
3.3. Four OPHUSEC versions: “Light”, “Standard”, “Advanced” and “Full”

As suggested throughout this toolkit, the extent to which this OPHUSEC threat and mitigation assessment mechanism can be put into practice depends on a variety of conditions – not least the level of funding and personnel available to launch such an effort; the availability of a legitimate and influential institutional host; and the degree to which the political situation allows a supportive and enabling environment for carrying out critical assessments of threats and mitigation.

If the conditions for such a mechanism are good, expectations might be great among all stakeholders for a serious, comprehensive and ongoing effort. However, if the conditions are poor, efforts need to be invested in grooming more widespread appreciation of the services that such a mechanism can provide.

Any environment, under any condition, allows for at least a very rudimentary but still rigorously structured attempt to take stock of existing threats, their significance for society and the state, and the record of mitigation and response measures that have already been taken. Prevailing conditions may even permit the articulation and promotion of cautiously expressed recommendations for more effective measures to address key threats, directly or indirectly, by state and non-state actors which are committed to improving a society’s human security conditions.

Four versions of the OPHUSEC approach are briefly summarized below: OPHUSEC “Light”, OPHUSEC “Standard”, OPHUSEC “Advanced” and OPHUSEC “Full”.

The four different versions of the instrument include different combinations of tools. Depending on the specific needs as well as the amount of time and resources available for an OPHUSEC-type threat assessment and mitigation exercise, more rudimentary or more comprehensive approaches can be implemented.

The table recalls the various steps of the standard list of generic OPHUSEC tools.
**Generic OPHUSEC Tools**

| (1) “Background Study” | Background study and situation analysis  
(Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation) |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (2) “Threat and Response Analysis” | Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses  
(Multistakeholder Workshop Part One) |
| (3) “Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis” | Identification of key threats and required mitigation action  
(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Two) |
| (4) “Implementation Analysis” | Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations  
(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three) |
| (5) “+Capacity-building Workshops” | Thematic and actor-focused assessments  
(Specialized Follow-up Workshops) |
| (6) “++Action” | Monitoring and analysis of threats and impacts; evaluation and refinement of mitigation action and impacts  
(Post-Workshop Activity/Implementation/Institutionalization) |

### 3.3.1. OPHUSEC “Light” (starter/sensitization version)

3.3.1.1. **Advantages of OPHUSEC “Light”**

- OPHUSEC “Light” offers the opportunity to carry out an assessment within a relatively short period of time and could take the following form.
  - A one-day workshop with multistakeholder participants.
  - A brief desk study by the research team based on the workshop findings (which could also serve as a background study for a more expanded version, should that be planned for at a later stage).
  - Half- to full-day brainstorming meetings as periodic, follow-up reassessment exercises.

- OPHUSEC “Light” is an ideal approach to pursue in case of:
  - limited resources in terms of personnel and funding
  - limited time available for the overall project and consultation meetings
  - limited availability of and interest from stakeholders
  - an environment characterized by a closed political system or similar obstacles to the pursuit of a fuller range of OPHUSEC tools.
OPHUSEC “Light” can be a useful introduction to the OPHUSEC methodology:
- to get actors interested in the threat and mitigation assessment methodology
- to brainstorm basic issues with different stakeholders
- to promote OPHUSEC’s methodology and highlight the uniqueness and potential usefulness of its approach and the assessment results.

If OPHUSEC “Light” features a workshop, discussions can take the place of a confidence-building measure.

3.3.1.2. Steps/tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPHUSEC “Light”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) “Threat and Response Analysis”</td>
<td>Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses (Multistakeholder Workshop Part One)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) “Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis”</td>
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3.3.2. OPHUSEC “Standard”

3.3.2.1. Advantages of OPHUSEC “Standard”

OPHUSEC “Standard” raises the level of analysis by combining a thorough background study with MSHW activities.
- Ahead of consultation meetings with multistakeholder representatives, a background study is prepared by a research team.
- The research team can decide to share this study with the workshop participants and then use MSHW consultations as opportunities to generate feedback on the study’s findings.
- Alternatively, the team can pursue a two-track approach. First, it can work on its written research report in parallel to the consultation meetings. Second, it would then incorporate consultation results in subsequent drafts after the workshop (in case of one-time consultations) or after each MSHW (in case of separate workshops organized for each step/tool of the OPHUSEC approach).

OPHUSEC “Standard” is an ideal approach to pursue in the following cases:
- holding a brief MSHW is not considered an adequate approach to accomplish a complex assessment
• there are reasonable prospects that assessment results can indeed influence policy-making or programme design of mitigation measures; in this case, and as important decisions might be based on the assessment results, solid additional research needs to be carried out supplementary to the mostly intuitive findings generated through relatively brief and superficial workshop discussions

• a well-researched assessment is desired, based on thorough background analysis and multistakeholder feedback.

✓ Compared to OPHUSEC “Light”, OPHUSEC “Standard” requires:

• adequate resources in terms of time, personnel and funding

• availability and interest of stakeholders

• a supportive political context and the absence of obstacles that might stand in the way of pursuing a wider range of OPHUSEC tools.

3.3.2.2. Steps/tools

OPHUSEC “Standard”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) &quot;Background Study&quot;</th>
<th>Background study and situation analysis (Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(4) &quot;Implementation Analysis&quot;</td>
<td>Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations (Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three)</td>
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3.3.3. OPHUSEC “Advanced” (plus capacity-building)

3.3.3.1. Advantages of OPHUSEC “Advanced”

✓ OPHUSEC “Advanced” further increases the depth and quality of analysis by adding another level of actor- and theme-specific assessments to the generic threat and mitigation assessment.

• The additional level of assessment engages with stakeholder groups that represent specific actor levels (for example non-state or international actors) or specific thematic clusters of threats or mitigation action (for example the environmental or security sector community).

• Once key threats have been identified and mitigation options and strategies have been discussed and developed by the research team and MSHW participants, i.e. the generic
phase of the OPHUSEC approach has produced results, they are shared and debated with the target audiences of capacity-building activities.

- In the first case this could involve a consultation workshop with a group of international actors; government ministries; local NGOs and community-based organizations; or media representatives. In the second case it could involve a consultation with representatives of the security sector (as described in more detail below); the development community; the health sector; the humanitarian sector; the financial community; or all actors expected to contribute to the mitigation of environmental threats.

- Ahead of consultation meetings with dedicated actor- or threat-specific groups, the results of the generic OPHUSEC assessment are shared with the participants.

- The research team may decide to conduct and share with the workshop participants an initial assessment of the specific relevance and applicability of the generic findings.

- Following the consultation, the research team either integrates the consultation results in its preliminary actor- or threat-specific assessment or, if a preliminary study has not been carried out, it writes such a report based on the consultation results and additional empirical research.

- The research team shares the final results of the additional assessment with workshop participants as well as the organizations represented in the MSHW.

✓ OPHUSEC “Advanced” is an ideal approach to pursue in cases when:

- the generic OPHUSEC assessment produced recommendations that depend on the cooperation of very specific groups of actors for successful implementation, or that require joint and coordinated action by a variety of thematically specialized actors in response to very specific types of threat

- implementation strategies by the generic OPHUSEC assessment point to the necessity of engaging with particularly sets of actors

- implementation strategies by the generic OPHUSEC assessment indicate the necessity to build mutual confidence, support local ownership of mitigation measures and build knowledge and capacity among key sets of actors

- in a supportive political environment groups of actors express an interest in contributing actively to the implementation of mitigation measures and – for that purpose – request further elaboration on the most effective, efficient and constructive options for their involvement.

✓ Compared to OPHUSEC “Standard”, OPHUSEC “Advanced” requires:

- additional resources in terms of time, personnel and funding

- actor- or threat-specific expertise within the research team

- expression of interest and active participation by relevant stakeholders

- a supportive political context and the absence of obstacles that might stand in the way of pursuing a wider range of OPHUSEC tools.
3.3.2. Steps/tools

**OPHUSEC "Advanced"**

| (1) "Background Study" | Background study and situation analysis  
*Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation*

| (2) "Threat and Response Analysis" | Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses  
*Multistakeholder Workshop Part One*

| (3) "Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis" | Identification of key threats and required mitigation action  
*Multistakeholder Workshop Part Two*

| (4) "Implementation Analysis" | Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations  
*Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three*

| (5) "+Capacity-building Workshops" | Thematic and actor-focused assessments  
*Specialized Follow-up Workshops*

3.3.4. **OPHUSEC "Full" (plus capacity-building, plus action)**

#### 3.3.4.1. Advantages of OPHUSEC "Full"

- **OPHUSEC “Full”** turns a one-off exercise into an ongoing and institutionalized applied research exercise that:
  - produces threat assessment and mitigation analyses and recommendations on an ongoing basis, and periodically shares the results with relevant actors
  - monitors threat dynamics and updates recommendations for most effective and efficient mitigation measures
  - monitors the effect and impact of implemented mitigation measures on evolving threat dynamics and levels
  - assesses the impact of any failure to implement suggested mitigation measures on evolving threat dynamics and levels.

- **OPHUSEC “Full”** is an ideal option to pursue in cases when:
  - the multistakeholder consultations carried out as part of generic and advanced OPHUSEC activities have generated a critical momentum of interest, support and commitment among key stakeholders
  - participants in multistakeholder consultation workshops manage to secure their organizations’ commitment to use and endorse ongoing decision support in the form of institutionalized OPHUSEC assessments.
- there are reasonable expectations that the buy-in of relevant key actors can be secured, and the system’s assessment results and recommendations will be used as a decision, policy and programme support tool
- an appropriate, independent, respected and thus legitimate host for these continuing activities can be identified.

✓ Compared to OPHUSEC “Standard”, OPHUSEC “Full” requires:

- availability of additional adequate, stable and secure resources in terms of personnel and funding
- stated commitment of stakeholders to support and make use of the activity’s output
- a supportive political context and the absence of obstacles that might stand in the way of institutionalizing OPHUSEC activities as a long-term, if not permanent, decision support tool to assist community-based, non-governmental, state and international human security providers to improve their individual and concerted efforts in protecting both society and state from key threats to their survival.

3.3.4.2. **Steps/tools**

**OPHUSEC “Full”**

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<td>Monitoring and analysis of threats and impacts; evaluation and refinement of mitigation action and impacts <em>(Post-Workshop Activity/Implementation/ Institutionalization)</em></td>
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</table>
3.4. **Supporting Materials**
- Worksheet “Threat and Response Analysis” (see below).
- Report Writing Guidelines (see Cahier 21).

3.5. **Tips and Hints on Organizing Multistakeholder Consultation Workshops**

3.5.1. **Practicalities**
- Experience shows that multistakeholder groups can focus better on their tasks if meetings take place in locations that are some distance away from any of the participants’ offices/premises.
- Participants’ focus and contributions are greatly improved if they refrain from using their smartphones and other social media hardware during meetings. Special breaks can be built into meetings to allow participants to touch base with their home institutions, should they feel the need to do so.
- It helps if the MSHW is held outside – yet near – the capital, to ensure broad participation.
- Workshops benefit from being hosted by a third party (such as a university) and if meetings are held at neutral locations (such as hotels or convention centres).
- The workshop premises should offer rooms of various sizes to accommodate both plenary and break-out meetings; and ideally also offer overnight accommodation for all participants.
- Workshop dynamics are positively affected if participants jointly travel to the workshop site and subsequently spent some common time outside the official MSHW activities – for instance during joint daily meals, breaks and social activities. The networking character and value of such meetings should not be underestimated.
- The first consultation meeting should be very carefully and thoroughly evaluated – and lessons should feed into improved subsequent workshops. This includes self-assessments by the project team, workshop evaluations by participants and possibly feedback from attending third parties (if any).

3.5.2. **Participants**
- The number of participants is crucial – the group should not be so small that major stakeholders cannot be included; but it should also not be too large, which would prevent meaningful participation by all participants.
- All major stakeholder communities should be represented, including marginalized populations. In particular, youth and children should be included, as they often tend to be excluded in such gatherings or represented by an adult representative of a youth or children’s advocacy organization.
- It is important to know the participants’ respective knowledge level and background expertise, in order to pitch the workshop at a level that can be easily understood by all.
The expected contributions of the participants should be effectively communicated to them ahead of or at the beginning of the workshop. Time should be set aside to discuss roles and procedures and provide clarification, if needed.

If the consultations are carried out in several successive workshops, it is desirable that they be attended by the same individuals to ensure coherent discussions; this also helps in capitalizing on the trust- and confidence-building momentum that might be generated and enhanced from meeting to meeting.

Some – if not all – participants may require special assistance in facilitating their attendance. This might include compensation for lost earnings if they have to miss work or take leaves of absence for the duration of the meetings; the provision of childcare for attendants with children; or the provision of safe transportation to and from the workshop site, particularly in unsafe environments or when meetings last beyond sunset.

3.5.3. Facilitators

The role and behaviour of the facilitator are crucial ingredients in any participatory multistakeholder consultation meeting. The facilitator ensures that discussions are inclusive and focused, and cover all the major thematic areas and key questions and issues that need to be discussed in order to move the group effort forward.

The facilitator needs to be respected by all participants for his/her objectivity and neutrality. Careful thought has to be given to the choice of facilitator. Should the facilitator be a member of the affected community or should he/she come from outside the community? Should he/she come from a particular population group – or not? Should the facilitator possess local, national and international experience – or not?

The facilitator should be well versed in the methodology of the OPHUSEC approach. He/she needs to understand and identify with its major guidelines – otherwise he/she steers (and possibly derails) a consultation meeting in directions that might not generate the information required for this particular threat and mitigation assessment approach. It is important that the facilitator does not take it upon himself or herself to reinvent and change the project and workshop methodology.

In situations when discussions become emotional and threaten to escalate into disputes between workshop participants, having a facilitator with strong mediation skills has proven highly helpful.

Sometimes co-facilitation by an external and an internal individual can be helpful in moving the process forward and maintaining a constructive balance between local, national and international expertise.

The facilitator should be familiar and comfortable with facilitating consultations attended by participants from academic, policy and community-based organizations. The facilitator’s own professional background as well as his/her institutional affiliation and reputation as an objective and neutral player in workshop settings should be considered when choosing the most appropriate candidate.
4. **REPORT WRITING GUIDELINES: ADVICE ON DRAFTING OPHUSEC REPORTS**

The following are guidelines to support the drafting of written materials at each step of the OPHUSEC analysis process. The guidelines cover the background study as well as reports based on the integration of research and consultation meeting results for the three steps of the “Standard” OPHUSEC process. These are the reports that also serve as background information for further activities (OPHUSEC “Advanced” and OPHUSEC “Full”), as discussed earlier in this toolkit.

**Report Writing Guidelines**

4.1. **BACKGROUND STUDY**
Background study and situation analysis  
*(Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation)*

4.2. **THREAT AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS**
Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses  
*(Integrating Multistakeholder Consultation/Workshop Part One)*

4.3. **KEY THREATS AND MITIGATION ANALYSIS**
Identification of key threats and required mitigation action  
*(Integrating Multistakeholder Consultation/Workshop Part Two)*

4.4. **IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS**
Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations  
*(Integrating Multistakeholder Consultation/Workshop Part Three)*

The length of each report is indicated in word counts. An average page, double-spaced and in size 12 point Times New Roman font, would be about 250–300 words. Length indications are approximate suggestions that can be adjusted to meet the research team’s specific requirements.
4.1. Background Study

COMPARE with Tool (1) “Background Study”

Background study and situation analysis

(Pre-Workshop Activity/Preparation)

Suggested Table of Contents

- Part 1: Situation Profile
- Part 2: Threat and Response Analysis

Aside from an introduction and a conclusion, the background study features two main parts, a “situation profile” and a “threat and response analysis”.

**Part 1: Situation Profile**

The situation profile offers current information on a wide range of relevant information about the geographic context (such as a city, region or country) for which the human security threat and mitigation analysis is carried out, including, among other things:

- political, economic and socio-cultural overview and developments
- demographic overview and developments
- environmental overview and developments
- overview and developments of the regional and international contexts.

The suggested length should be about 1,500–2,500 words, but it can of course be longer if necessary or desired. It is not helpful merely simply to copy Wikipedia or other encyclopaedic entries available on the internet, but preferable to carry out one’s own research and draw on current data and information. It is important to offer as much real analysis as possible. It is useful to include relevant statistical data.

**Part 2: Threat and Response Analysis**

It is helpful to keep the following issues in mind.

- It is useful to begin by producing a list of various threats, regardless of their importance, significance or impact.
- It is not useful to pre-judge or pre-select certain threats – or to prioritize them – at this stage, as this might undermine subsequent steps of the analysis.
- Based on the list of threats, a threat analysis can be carried out for as many of them as possible.
- After initial brainstorming one might realize that some threats turn out to be symptoms or root causes of threats, rather than threats in themselves. At this stage, there is no need to go into much detail beyond collecting the most important information for each question covered by the threat
analysis. After the initial analysis, threats can be merged or root causes can be identified as such (and taken off the list of threats, etc.).

✔ The response analysis focuses on responses that have been taken in the past, those that are ongoing and those that have not been initiated yet but would seem to yield promising responses if applied.

✔ There will subsequently be opportunities to go into more detail for threats that are later identified as the most significant (those forming part of the “human insecurity cluster”).

✔ It is important (and will be of great help for subsequent reports) to include, right from the beginning, full citations for all sources used, such as books, articles, reports and statistics, including both print and online sources.

✔ The background study will be used and referred to by all subsequent reports.

For the purpose of organizing the background study it is helpful to follow the same questions that are listed on the “threat analysis” and “response analysis” worksheets, which will be used during the first multistakeholder consultation.

First, each threat is analysed

✔ WHAT is the threat? (Name of threat)
✔ WHO is threatened? (Section of society)
✔ By WHOM? (Source)
✔ WHERE and WHEN? (Location and time)
✔ Is the threat LIFE THREATENING? (Threat to survival of individuals)
✔ How many VICTIMS? (Numbers, estimates, levels)
✔ Is it a POTENTIAL and/or an ACTUAL threat? (Threat in future or already felt)
✔ What are potential TRIGGERS? (Unexpected events triggering escalation)
✔ What are the SYMPTOMS? (Visible evidence of the threat)
✔ What are the ROOT CAUSES? (Underlying reasons)
✔ How SERIOUS is the threat? (Is it a credible threat or a product of fear? What is the impact on society and greater political stability?)
✔ What would be a GOOD SCENARIO? (Positive trend if threat is addressed)
✔ What would be a BAD SCENARIO? (Negative trend if threat remains unaddressed)
Second, responses to the threat are analysed

- Which response measure HAS BEEN TAKEN AND CONCLUDED IN THE PAST?
  - BY WHOM? (Actor)
  - TO WHOM? (Target group)
  - FEASIBILITY? (Is it a workable and feasible plan?)
  - EFFECTIVENESS? (Was the measure effective? Did it make a difference?)
  - INDICATORS (Which indicators measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?)

- Which response measure IS CURRENTLY BEING TAKEN?
  - BY WHOM? (Actor)
  - TO WHOM? (Target group)
  - FEASIBILITY? (Is it a workable and feasible plan?)
  - EFFECTIVENESS? (Is the measure effective? Is it making a difference?)
  - INDICATORS (Which indicators measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?)

- Which response measures NEED TO BE TAKEN IN THE FUTURE?
  - BY WHOM? (Actor)
  - TO WHOM? (Target group)
  - FEASIBILITY? (Would it be a workable and feasible plan?)
  - EFFECTIVENESS? (Would the measures be effective? Could they make a difference?)
  - INDICATORS (Which indicators could measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?)

These are the same questions that will be addressed by the stakeholder workshop participants. Yet while the research team should be able to analyse each threat along all of these questions, the quite limited time available during the workshops will likely restrict either the number of threats for which the analysis can realistically be carried out or the extent to which all questions can be answered in detail for each threat.

There are two added features with which some teams of the original OPHUSEC project experimented, and which might prove useful.

- First, it is useful to carry out separate threat and response analyses for subregions within the chosen geographic context if it becomes obvious that certain regions display very specific threat profiles (such as a border region or an urban centre).

- Second, it is useful at this point to measure the impact and significance of individual threats based on factors such as duration and projected impact of particular threats over time, or the availability and effectiveness of existing coping and mitigation measures.
Writing Guidelines

✓ To allow consistent analyses across the various activities and stages of the OPHUSEC approach, it is crucial to follow the threat and response analysis issues listed above (as mentioned, these are the same as on the MSHW worksheet).

✓ The research team is advised to include reliable statistical information whenever possible, as participants at consultation workshops will only be able to draw on intuitive assessments unless, for instance, they manage to access internet-based statistics with their PDAs).

✓ For each threat one might write about 1,000–2,000 words (or more, depending on the information available). It may be useful to divide the analysis of various threats up among several team members.

✓ At least ten to 15 threats, possibly more, should be covered in this way.

4.2. Step 1 Report

COMPARE with Tool (2): “Threat and Response Analysis”
Producing a comprehensive account of threats and responses
(Multistakeholder Workshop Part One)

Suggested Table of Contents

Part 1: Research Team’s Background Study
Part 2: Multistakeholder Workshop Consultation
Part 3: Consolidation of Research Team and MSHW Assessments

Aside from an introduction and a conclusion, this report has three parts.

✓ First, the research team’s background study (for guidelines see above).

✓ Second, the first multistakeholder consultation results, divided into:
  ▪ the results of each stakeholder break-out group (handwritten worksheets ideally transcribed on a computer and translated into English)
  ▪ the research team’s summary of the workshop discussions and overall results.

✓ Third, the integration of the background study, the workshop results and subsequent follow-up research, featuring:
  ▪ a summary highlighting similarities and differences between the inputs by the research team and the consultation workshop participants
  ▪ explanations for the highlighted similarities and differences – note that such comparisons and the integration of both sets of findings should be a smooth task as long as both the research team and the MSHW participants follow the same process and respond to the same questions/issues.
Writing Guidelines

✓ For this study the research team will produce the first part (background study) and the last (integration of background study and workshop results); while the part in between is based on the results of the workshop discussions.

✓ Ideally, the research team’s background study is completed and written before the multistakeholder consultation workshop.

✓ If this is not the case and only preparatory situation profiles, if anything at all, have been prepared prior to the first MSHW, the brunt of the analysis needs to be carried out by the research team after the workshop has been held. In this case it is important that the workshop materials and summaries are put aside for the time being until the analysis has been carried out. This should be accomplished without consulting – and thus being prejudiced by – the workshop findings. It would be counterproductive to use the workshop findings as the basis of the research team’s first background assessment. Only after having completed the study should the workshop findings be assessed, compared with the research team’s report and subsequently integrated into one overall analysis.

✓ It is useful to begin with a general introduction to the report. The reader should be familiarized with the overall threat and response analysis, its objectives, structure and process, as well as those contributing to the analysis. It is important to mention and describe the three steps of the project and explain how this report fits in. Then the reader should briefly be guided through the report. What does it offer and how did the author(s) go about accomplishing it? In short, a brief outline of the report should be included.

Part 1: Research Team’s Background Study

✓ The background study offers a first and broad threat and mitigation analysis. This section may need to be expanded, updated or complemented with new information generated by the discussions held during the first consultation workshop. If no background study or only a very rudimentary study was written, the research team might find it helpful to follow the guidelines provided for the background study in carrying out this analysis (see above).

Part 2: Multistakeholder Workshop Consultation

✓ The MSHW consultation will generate more or less carefully completed worksheets of group exercises as well as minutes, and possibly also recordings, of the discussions.

✓ A brief introductory section should inform the reader about the selection criteria for participants, their number and respective affiliations, and the characteristics of the overall group, as well as the location and duration of the workshop.

✓ This is followed by three sections.

1) Each stakeholder group’s results for “all sorts of threats” brainstorming; threat analysis of some or all of those threats; and response analysis for those threats.

2) Group discussion of the threats and response analyses.
3) Consolidation/merger of individual stakeholder group assessments: diversity, similarity, common ground characterizing the discussion results, and potential agreement on threats to be included in a key HISC.

- The final section should discuss the overall nature of the workshop – the nature of the discussions, the participants’ attitudes and interests, and the dynamics of participation.
- Important issues to consider include the following.
  - Reporting on the diversity of stakeholder responses: If at all possible, the workshop should generate information on the diversity of threat and response profiles developed by different groups. Do they all think alike? Or are there considerable differences in the ways in which, for example, government actors judge the threat and response situation in the country, compared with how community representatives or academics see the same reality. Different groups might perceive different threat realities – or they might prioritize threats quite differently. What might be the reasons for such differences? Did divergent views converge during joint discussions? Did participants develop an understanding for and appreciation of other groups’ findings?
  - Worksheets: It will be helpful to transcribe and record the handwritten worksheets digitally, so they can be easily shared among the team. It also helps to translate all materials into the overall project language, so that other project members can read the information.
  - Length: The length of this section depends on the number of threats analysed and discussed by the multistakeholder group. Much of this information can be recorded in the form of tables.
  - Long-term benefit of systematic recording: Should the threat and mitigation assessment eventually become institutionalized and thereafter periodically inform decisions on mitigation strategies and measures, multistakeholder consultations would be carried out regularly and periodically to allow assessments of and comparisons between differences, variations and changes over time. The more systematically these results are recorded, the easier it will subsequently be to consult them for the purpose of comparison and deeper analysis.

Part 3: Consolidation of Research Team and MSHW Assessments

- The third part of the report is devoted to the consolidation and merger of the research team’s study and the results of the MSHW consultation assessments: Of special interest are diversity, similarity, common ground among responses, and the prioritization of threats – a ranking of threats based on their severity, past record of mitigation, and requirements for and feasibility of new mitigation measures. These are all assessed with the help of OPHUSEC’s human security cluster selection criteria, according to which “core threats” meet the following requirements.
  - They are existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals.
  - They are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes.
  - They can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and strengthening of coping capacities.
There is the potential that successful multi-actor collaboration in implementing mitigation measures is both possible and feasible.

There are important issues to consider.

- It is important to realize that the selection of core threats still involves a high level of subjectivity, informed by the specific understanding and judgement of each person and group asked to contribute to this analysis. This observation makes it all the more important to present and discuss different groups’ reasoning for selecting particular core threats.
- A summary of the report and the suggested HISC will be presented at the beginning of the second MHSW consultation.
- The length of this third part of the report is about 2,000–3,000 words.

This is the end of Report 1. The research team is now in a position to present those findings to the multistakeholder group at the beginning of the second MSHW.

4.3. Step 2 Report

COMPARE with Tool (3) "Key Threats and Mitigation Analysis"

Identification of key threats and required mitigation action

(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Two)

Suggested Table of Contents

Part 1: Step 1 Final Results and Presentation and Discussion of the Human Insecurity Cluster
Part 2: The Human Insecurity Cluster Analysis
Part 3: Discussion and Assessment of the Feasibility of Various Approaches

The second report offers further analysis of core threats and relevant mitigation analyses. It should be used as the key decision support instrument generated by this threat and mitigation analysis. It should offer not only useful analysis but also helpful and constructive recommendations to various key mitigation actors.

Aside from an introduction and a conclusion, this report has three parts.

- The first part features a brief overview of the research team’s Step 1 Report, the proposed HISC, the subsequent discussions and negotiations with the MSHW group on the suggested insecurity cluster, and its final profile.
- The second part reports on the consultation workshop’s results:
  - the results of each stakeholder work group, including variations and the reasons for variation (based on handwritten worksheets transcribed on a computer and translated into the main project language)
the research team’s summary of the cumulative and joint discussions of the overall workshop results

- the integration of the workshop results with the research team’s additional research and analysis, presented as a set of easily comprehensible findings.

✓ The **third part** offers an assessment of the feasibility of the suggested mitigation measures and strategies:
  - this analysis is based on initial workshop discussions, the research team’s own assessment and the previous two parts of the report
  - the analysis offers specific insights into the actors that need to be involved, and their abilities, interests and mitigation potentials.

✓ For this study the research team will have produced the first part, while the second and third parts are based on the results of the workshop and the research team’s additional analysis.

✓ It is again useful to start with an overall **introduction** to the report (about 1,000 words). The reader should be familiar with the overall threat and response analysis, its objectives, structure and process, and the participants in the analysis. It is important to mention and describe the three steps of the project and explain how this report fits in the structure. The reader should then be briefly introduced to the report. What does it offer, and how did the author(s) go about accomplishing it?

✓ It would be useful to mention the two main objectives of this second step of the analysis, the MSHW and the research team’s subsequent work. Someone who has not read the first report should nevertheless be able to gain a basic understanding of what the threat and mitigation analysis is about and what it seeks to accomplish.

✓ The **first objective** refers to the research team’s presentation of the results of Step 1 of the project to the workshop participants: the background study, the analytical process, the results of the research team and the first MSHW’s findings, as they have been integrated into the Step 1 Report. This presentation concludes with the recommendation of an HISC of three to five core threats to the MSHW group. This is followed by the results of joint discussions, as the group needs to be an integral part of this process. The proposed choice of key threats will have been debated and negotiated by the group and the research team. Both will have decided and agreed a common set of core human security threats on which the remainder of the project discussions and research would be based.

✓ The **second objective** is the deeper analysis of the threats in the HISC, as well as the identification and discussion of measurable responses to the selected key threats. This will have been accomplished during the workshop consultations, followed up by the research team. Consequently, and subsequent to the workshop, the research team will have built its more detailed research on the same questions and on the results of the MSHW. This means that for the second stage of the project the research team would not initially work independently of the MSHW findings, but would in fact wait until after the workshop and then expand and deepen the rough analysis initiated during the MSHW.
Part 1: Step 1’s Final Results and Presentation and Discussion of the Human Insecurity Cluster

The first part of the report (about 2,000 words) includes the following.

- **First**, a brief overview of the research team’s Step 1 report and findings.
- **Second**, the research team’s choice of a proposed HISC, including the reasons why those particular core threats best fit the selection criteria and should thus be included.
- **Third**, a summary of the subsequent discussions and negotiations with the MSHW group about the suggested HISC. Was there immediate agreement with the research team’s suggestions? Was there disagreement, and if so why and from whom? Did the subsequent discussions trigger a reformulation of the HISC? Were some threats dropped or added? Were some threats rephrased so as to characterize them in a narrower or possibly broader and more comprehensive way?
- Finally, the HISC is presented. These are the threats that will be the main focus in the remainder of the Step 2 tasks, as well as for the third and final stage of the threat and mitigation assessment.
- In short, this part of the report will accomplish the following
  - Presentation of the first stage’s analysis and discussion of proposed key human security threats in the selected context (mentioning different threat constellations in subcontexts or larger contexts, if applicable), based on the following selection criteria of “core threats”.
    - They are existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals.
    - They are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes.
    - They can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and strengthening of coping capacities.
    - There is the potential that successful multi-actor collaboration in implementing mitigation measures is both possible and feasible.
  - Agreement and confirmation of the key threats that form an HISC in the chosen context (if the focus is on identifying threats in a national context, supplemented with possible subclusters for specific subnational contexts).

Part 2: The Human Insecurity Cluster Analysis

- This second part of the report (about 5,000–7,000 words) offers a detailed discussion of the selected key threats and the development and presentation of mitigation strategies. The results are based on separate stakeholder group work (if and why did some stakeholders identify different as well as common threat characteristics and mitigation measures?); and the joint discussions of the entire group, as well as additions and alterations by the research team. **Unlike the Step 1 discussions, at this point all groups and the research team will have worked on exactly the same set of threats.**
- This part of the report will be structured along four sections, each building on and expanding the work of the MSHW groups. Each section summarizes the workshop findings along with the research team’s additions and changes.
A brief first introductory section summarizes the purpose of this part of the report, which focuses on the identification and assessment of the selected key threats and past, current and required responses that have been, are currently, or should in the future be applied to mitigate those threats. The required responses are presented in the form of recommendations. Based on the nature and impact of the threat, which past or ongoing responses have been useful or not, and which responses should be pursued as a priority in the future? Moreover, indicators will be presented that allow one to observe and judge the potential impact of these mitigation measures, and to monitor and assess whether they have been successful. Finally, this part of the report explains which actors should be responsible for the mitigation measures, and how realistic recommended measures are.

Identification and assessment of threats and responses

In the second section, threats and responses are identified and assessed.

- First, a detailed threat analysis is offered for the selected key threats. This is a closer analysis than in the first report (although it can build on it), as now one is concentrating on a limited number of threats.
- Second, a detailed account and assessment of past measures and coping mechanisms are offered. Here, too, there is more detail than in the first report, as the focus is on the responses to only a small number of threats.
- Third, a detailed account of required measures and coping mechanisms at all relevant levels is offered (including household, community, local, national and international levels).
- PLEASE NOTE: This is basically the same task as in the first report, but now the focus is on only a handful of threats and can therefore go into much greater detail. The same questions and classifications (and worksheets) of the first report apply. At first sight this might seem repetitive. However, as the discussion concerns very few threats and their responses, the analysis in this second report is much more comprehensive. Depending on the depth of analysis originally provided, the first report can of course serve as a useful foundation and starting point.
- PLEASE ALSO NOTE: The first report should have shown how different threats are related to one another, and how they interconnect through common root causes. If it now appears that this dimension is missing from the first report, one should urgently return to that report and add this analysis, as the linkage of threats through root causes is one of the requirements for a threat to be included in the HISC. Thus by concentrating on a smaller number of threats in detail, and developing real recommendations for policy actors and others involved in mitigation, one indirectly also addresses the many other threats that are linked to the key threats in the HISC.

Evaluation/Measuring/Implementation

The third section suggests indicators that can be used to measure levels of threats and performance of response measures.

- Indicators assess the level of each threat (and show if the threat situation and level are worsening or improving).
- Indicators observe the success or failure of response measures (and show if responses are effective and have a positive impact or not).
- Details are provided on the type of information that is needed to measure each indicator.

**For example**, a core threat in one case in the original OPHUSEC pilot study was “lack of basic income for survival”. Informal and formal employment levels are among the possible indicators to measure “lack of basic income”. The information required for measuring employment levels would include official statistics, but also household surveys. If, for example, one recommends job creation programmes as a mitigation measure, a useful indicator might be changes in official employment rates and levels of informal employment. Here, too, one might use government statistics, statistics generated by NGOs or international organizations or household surveys to see if the number of people earning money in the formal and informal economic sectors has increased or decreased.

### Identification and Assessment of Actors

- The **fourth section** identifies and assesses the actors involved in the implementation of response/mitigation measures. Who will have to be involved in implementing a mitigation measure and the overall mitigation strategy?

- First, one should look at all the key actors – those already active and those who are not (yet) active. One should conduct an actor analysis.
  - Report what each actor has done so far with respect to the response measure that has been identified.
  - Suggest what each actor should do.
  - Examine more closely several important issues that characterize the actor’s significance for the suggested mitigation strategy. What are the technical, financial and personnel resources and other capacities of the actor? What are its interests? How does the actor itself and others define the roles it should play in addressing core threats? What is expected from each actor, especially by the affected population – what do they expect the actor to do to improve their situation?

- Second, each actor’s comparative advantage should be identified. In which area of activity does one actor have an advantage over all others? Perhaps an actor has many resources or close contacts with influential key authorities. Perhaps it possesses a more thorough and better understanding than any other actor of the nature of a threat and the requirements for mitigation. Perhaps an actor has useful experience in particular mitigation activities.

- And, third, each actor’s role in cooperation and coordination should be assessed and identified. Is a certain actor likely to cooperate with others, and with whom? Is there a history of cooperation? Does one actor need to be at the forefront of mitigation action, accomplishing highly visible tasks in order to satisfy its constituency (this might be the case for many international NGOs, which need to be highly visible to secure continued financial flows and donations from supporters). Some actors may be much more accustomed to coordinating their actions with others. Such experience with project coordination might be a powerful comparative advantage.
Main results of this part of the report

In short, this part of the report accomplishes the following.

- It offers a detailed analysis of the core threats and relevant response strategies.
- It identifies how the success or failure of these response strategies can be measured with the help of particular indicators.
- It identifies the most significant actors whose actions are required to implement response measures most effectively. Actors’ capacities and comparative advantages as well as their ability and willingness to cooperate with other actors are discussed.

The workshop results serve as the first basis to respond to all these issues – while the research team subsequently reflects on and rethinks all that was accomplished by the workshop participants. The research team thus expands and improves the very brief analysis generated by the workshop participants during their usually brief meetings.

Part 3: Discussion and Assessment of the Feasibility of Various Approaches

Part 3 of the report (about 2,000–3,000 words) assesses the feasibility of the suggested response measures, based on what is currently known about the actors that need to be involved and their abilities, interests and potential capacities. At this point the research team should be in a very good position to make informed judgements about which approach is realistic and which is not.

- Returning to the example referred to above, if an employment creation programme is suggested as a key measure, but one now realizes that the actors which need to be involved in the implementation of the programme have no long-term interest, limited financial resources and questionable credibility, one might argue that this key measure is neither feasible nor realistic. Although important and potentially effective, it will not succeed unless key implementation actors change their attitudes or alternative actors with greater interest, budgets and credibility are identified.

- One might also come to realize that a key actor with important resources and the ability to implement a suggested response measure is detested by the current government and will thus likely not be allowed to commence activities. Under those circumstances, that particular measure might not be feasible to pursue, at least for the time being.

- One might find that certain actors have the willingness, legitimacy, network and credibility to implement potentially very successful measures, yet they are lacking technical expertise and financial resources to do so successfully. As long as these shortcomings can be made up by other actors, one could still speak of a feasible measure, conditional on the availability of partners to provide such assistance.

- The first section of this part of the report considers all response measures and, based on what is known about the key actors that will need to be involved in a response, suggests if the implementation of the measure will likely be feasible.

- The second section assesses if there are so-called “non-starters” or “slow starters” among the suggested responses, i.e. measures that are either impossible to implement (because of too many obstacles) or very difficult to implement (because some key requirements are missing).
The third section of the report discusses some main obstacles and opportunities for the implementation of new mitigation measures, based on what is currently known about the suggested measures, key mitigation actors and general conditions under which implementation will take place. The third step of the project (and the third workshop and subsequent report) will return to these issues in greater detail.

Conclusion

A concluding section (about 1,000 words) should restate all of the major findings.

- The main core threats.
- The main response measures for each threat and the key indicators that can be used to measure them.
- The key actors and combination of actors that should take action.
- Recommendations on the most feasible measures that should be taken.

This is the end of Report 2. The report should be about 10,000–12,000 words long. The research team is now ready to present these findings to the multistakeholder group at the beginning of the third workshop, and to wider policy, academic and interested audiences.

4.4. Step 3 Report

COMPARE with Tool (4) "Implementation Analysis"

Support of knowledge transfer (e.g. policy advice) and implementation of recommendations

(Multistakeholder Workshop Part Three)

Suggested Table of Contents

- Part 1: Survey and Analysis of Target Audience
- Part 2: Identification of Entry Points
- Part 3: Needs and Strategies for Advocacy
- Part 4: Strategies and Measures of Monitoring Implementation

The third report focuses on strategies to help ensure that the threat and mitigation assessment’s recommendations reach their intended target audiences. These include those actors whose support and action are required to facilitate positive change based on the analysis provided by the research team and the MSHW participants. The report also focuses on means and ways to assure the continuation of policy support – particularly if the assessment can be routinely carried out and institutionalized.

- If the institutionalization of the OPHUSEC assessment exercise can be realized, this report becomes particularly important – along with the need to reserve part of the second MSHW for Step 3 activities or organize a separate workshop dedicated to them.
The report draws on feedback provided by the participants in workshop consultations as well as the research team’s expertise and targeted follow-up interviews and consultations with representatives of potential target audiences.

Aside from the introduction and conclusion, this report has four parts, each following closely the guidelines provided for this step of the assessment exercise outlined in the toolkit.

**Part 1: Survey and Analysis of Target Audience**

The first part of the report surveys and analyses the most suitable and influential actors that need to be approached with the analysis recommendations. The actor analysis of the previous report (Step 2) will have already highlighted some of the key target audiences that need to be engaged. A number of key issues should be addressed.

- Each audience might require individual and tailored knowledge transfer strategies.
- Individual knowledge transfer strategies might require different approaches to the packaging and presentation of information.
- While some contacts with target audiences might be readily in place and can be secured through stakeholder representatives during the workshop meetings, other contacts and entry points need to be established afterwards.
- It is critical to identify and cultivate potential partners and “champions of change” among those individuals and institutions that most likely will be receptive to new ideas and approaches.
- As much as “champions of change” need to be secured, potential “spoilers” need to be identified as well. Strategies need to be designed to engage with them, ideally by winning them over.
- Particularly in political environments that are hostile to change, reform and commitment to human security provision – or where political, economic or cultural transition processes stand in the way of long-term reform commitments and activities – success in securing committed mitigation partners might only be tentative at best. In such environments the feasibility and practicality of specific approaches to human security provision will have to be periodically reconsidered and adjusted to respond most effectively to quickly changing political, economic and societal conditions and dynamics.

**Part 2: Identification of Entry Points**

The second part of the report identifies specific “entry points” – including individuals, places and events – that will be receptive to the assessment’s findings and recommendations and would most likely embrace and implement new mitigation measures.

- The actor analysis carried out for the Step 2 report will indicate crucial potential human security providers.
- Promising “entry points” might include both institutions and individuals. Initial suggestions for such entry points should be made by the participants in the MSHWs, particularly those with strategic contacts in key institutions and those who could – and are willing to – serve as “door-openers”.
- It will be important to search for and embrace opportunities to make a positive and influential contribution to ongoing policy development processes. It is useful to know an organization’s project
and budgeting cycles and seek contact during the project planning phase, when those responsible for formulating policies or designing programmes are receptive to outside input and feedback, and when there might be great interest in receiving and applying useful advice.

Part 3: Needs and Strategies for Advocacy

The third part of the report addresses needs and strategies for effective advocacy efforts to convince target audiences of the project results’ relevance and feasibility for improving threat mitigation. The need to institutionalize repeated periodic assessment and mitigation analyses as well as other follow-up activities outlined in Steps 6 and 7 of the OPHUSEC approach must be given some attention.

✓ The utility of skilful advocacy geared at convincing unwilling actors to act should be explored.

✓ If advocacy is identified as an important strategy, it is important to decide who should get involved in this on behalf of the research team – and when, where and how.

✓ Not all strategies are equally suitable for advocacy efforts, as they might put those involved in danger and thus jeopardize the potential success of the entire mitigation strategy. It will be important to consider the feasibility, costs and benefits of advocacy efforts, particularly in the context of the prevailing political situation.

✓ Should it become apparent that mitigation assessment results and recommendations cannot currently be promoted through advocacy efforts (for various practical and/or political reasons), it might nevertheless be valuable to pursue threat and mitigation analyses as ongoing activities, yet with a slightly “quieter voice”.

✓ It is crucial to explore as soon as possible opportunities for continuing the assessment initiative, preferably by institutionalizing it as a regular activity within an existing and widely respected institution that provides knowledge transfer and ensures that recipients listen and act, and knowledge is transferred in a manner conducive to meeting “receptive ears”.

✓ It is also useful to explore which institutions and individuals might be particularly suited for speaking with strategic human security providers.

✓ In that context the roles of all participating multistakeholders should be considered – for instance, which specific roles can be played by academics or NGO and community leaders in promoting and transferring recommendations?

Part 4: Strategies and Measures of Monitoring Implementation

The fourth part of the report focuses on strategies and particular measures to monitor the eventual implementation of the assessment’s results.

✓ Options for monitoring the commitment to sustained implementation of mitigation efforts of all stakeholders in the assessment, mitigation support and implementation process should be explored.

✓ Should long-term institutionalization of assessment and decision and planning support activities become possible in the form of an operational “Human Security Assessment, Warning and Response System” (see Step 6 in the toolkit), this part will also consider strategies to keep human security providers engaged in such a long-term process.
At this point, options for capacity-building workshops (see Step 5 in the toolkit) should be discussed. Discussions should focus on thematic and actor-focused workshops. Practical requirements for implementation (such as personnel, funding and stakeholder participants’ availability) should be explored.

The results of this step of the process will generate useful information about translating the intentions of and expectations created by the OPHUSEC assessment into practice – and to maintain the momentum that might have been created in presenting its initial results to participating stakeholder representatives and their institutions.

This is the end of Report 3. The research team is now ready to present those findings to donors and funders.
5. **Worksheets: Threat Analysis And Response Analysis**

5.1. **Threat Analysis**

What is the threat? Who is threatened by whom, when and where? How serious is the threat – is it life threatening? What is the magnitude of the threat – how many people are threatened? Is it a potential future threat or is the threat already being felt? Are there triggers that have escalated the threat or might help to do so? What are recognizable symptoms? What are identifiable causes and root causes? If the threat is addressed, what will be the likely outcome? If the threat is not assessed, what will be the likely outcome?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the threat?</th>
<th>Who is threatened?</th>
<th>By whom?</th>
<th>Where and when?</th>
<th>Life threatening?</th>
<th>How many victims?</th>
<th>Potential and/or actual threat?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Name of threat)</td>
<td>(Section of society)</td>
<td>(Source/perpetrator)</td>
<td>(Location and time/duration)</td>
<td>(Threat to survival of individuals?)</td>
<td>(Numbers, estimates, levels)</td>
<td>(Threat expected in future or already felt)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triggers</th>
<th>Symptoms</th>
<th>Root causes</th>
<th>How serious is the threat?</th>
<th>Good scenario</th>
<th>Bad scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Unexpected events triggering escalation)</td>
<td>(Visible evidence of the threat)</td>
<td>(Underlying reasons)</td>
<td>(Credible threat or product of fear?)</td>
<td>(Positive trend if threat is addressed)</td>
<td>(Negative trend if threat remains unaddressed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2. **Response Analysis**

- What has been done/is being done/still needs to be done to mitigate and/or address each threat?
- Which mitigation measure has been (or should be) put in place, by whom and directed at whom?
- How feasible or realistic has the measure been/will the measure likely be?
- How effective has the measure been/will likely be in addressing the threat?
- Which indicators have been/could be used to measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of threat</th>
<th>What has been done and concluded in the past?</th>
<th>By whom?</th>
<th>To whom?</th>
<th>Feasibility?</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What mitigation measure?</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of threat</th>
<th>What is being done now?</th>
<th>By whom?</th>
<th>To whom?</th>
<th>Feasibility?</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<td>What mitigation measure?</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>Name of threat</th>
<th>What needs to be done in the future?</th>
<th>By whom?</th>
<th>To whom?</th>
<th>Feasibility?</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What mitigation measure?</td>
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6. SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS

National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South

The NCCR North-South is an innovative research programme in the fields of global change and sustainable development. Headquartered in Switzerland and encompassing a robust network of over 350 researchers active in more than 40 countries worldwide, it is dedicated to finding sustainable, practicable solutions to specific challenges of global change. Central to all NCCR North-South activities is a commitment to partnership between institutions and individuals in the northern and southern hemispheres. Research is collaboratively conducted with a special emphasis on the needs of developing and transition countries, since they are arguably under the most pressure due to accelerated global processes of environmental, economic and socio-political change.

NCCR North-South Management Centre, Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), Institute of Geography, Hallerstrasse 10, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland

www.north-south.unibe.ch

EPFL-LaSUR

Situated within the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) and the ENAC Faculty (Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering), the Laboratory of Urban Sociology (LaSUR) researches the social conditions that produce and appropriate cities or territories, collaborating intensively with its partners in engineering and architecture. LaSUR confronts urban phenomena through the mobility capacities of its actors. In this perspective, the principal research themes are daily mobility, residential history, the dynamics of suburbanization and gentrification, public space and network management.

EPFL-ENAC-INTER-LASUR, Bâtiment BP, Station 16, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

http://lasur.epfl.ch/

Swiss Peace Foundation

The Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) is an action-oriented peace research institute with headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. It aims to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts and to enable sustainable conflict transformation. swisspeace is an associated institute of the University of Basel and a member of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences.

swisspeace, Sonnenbergstrasse 17, PO Box, CH-3000 Bern 7, Switzerland

www.swisspeace.org

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. DCAF develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes.

DCAF, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland

www.dcaf.ch