Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs

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Executive Summary

This paper highlights some major operational challenges that hinder Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission planners and field personnel from effectively implementing security sector reform (SSR) missions. Member States have launched 13† SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment. The European External Action Service (EEAS) with its EU Delegations certainly has the potential to improve integrated planning of SSR missions, though it remains to be seen how its constituent parts, i.e. staff and departments from the Council, Commission and Member States, will interact in practice. Also, given that the great majority of CSDP missions are of civilian nature, more resources will be needed for civilian planning as well as evaluation of past engagement.

At the end of the day, the main challenges for SSR missions will have to be tackled by the Member States themselves who currently do not show much interest in further integrating their civilian and military capabilities. On the other hand, they have been keen on promoting the recent CSDP mission in Guinea-Bissau as following a holistic approach to SSR. However, although successful from a purely operational point of view, this mission once again demonstrated the EU’s weakness when it comes to pursuing political objectives under uncomfortable conditions.

SSR missions without mustering the political will to supply sufficient adequately trained personnel, money and equipment. The European External Action Service (EEAS) with its EU Delegations certainly has the potential to improve integrated planning of SSR missions, though it remains to be seen how its constituent parts, i.e. staff and departments from the Council, Commission and Member States, will interact in practice. Also, given that the great majority of CSDP missions are of civilian nature, more resources will be needed for civilian planning as well as evaluation of past engagement.

Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy in the EEAS which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.

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† These missions are: EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), EUPOL Proxima (succeeded by EUPAT fYR Macedonia), EUJUST Themis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DRC, EUJUST LEX Iraq, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), EUPOL DRC, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, EULEX Kosovo and EUTM Somalia. See <www.csdpmap.eu>. EULEX Kosovo will, however, not be dealt with in the paper, as it is not representative of CSDP SSR missions due to its size and mandate – it has executive powers whereas all the other missions have non-executive mandates.
**Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Council General Secretariat</td>
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<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>Civilian Response Team</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
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<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>HoD</td>
<td>Head of Delegation</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>IIS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly MONUC)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Situation Centre</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
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Introduction

Security Governance Reform, Security Sector Reform or Security System Reform (SSR) has become a major focus of conflict prevention and crisis management since the late 1990s. According to the OECD-Development Assistance Committee Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, which serve as a reference for a number of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), the following characteristics form the basis for the SSR agenda:

The focus of security policy itself is broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state stability and regime security to include the well-being of their populations and human rights. Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked which opens the way to mainstreaming security as a public policy and a governance issue. This invites greater public scrutiny of security policy.

State institutions involved in providing security are being re-evaluated. The military is now seen as only one instrument of security policy with traditional legal, social and economic instruments receiving greater attention.

Accordingly, the security sector (or system) includes traditional security actors, security management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions as well as non-statutory security forces. Importantly, SSR should look at the whole picture and be reflective of oversight. As such, in the EU framework, SSR is defined as a “reform of both the bodies which provide security to citizens and the state institutions responsible for management and oversight of those bodies. Thus, security system reform goes beyond the notion of effectiveness of individual services (including the military, the police, the justice institutions, etc.) and instead focuses on the overall functioning of the security system as part of a governance reform policy and strategy of the public sector. In other words, SSR should be seen as a holistic process, strengthening security for all citizens as well as addressing governance deficits.”

The EU has a long record of addressing individual areas of the security sector through Community instruments (EC) as well as actions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, SSR understood as a comprehensive approach is a relatively new area of engagement. In 2005 and 2006, first the Council of the EU and then the European Commission developed concepts on SSR which define their respective understanding of and role in this broad policy area. According to the “Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform” the two concepts “constitute a policy framework for EU engagement in Security Sector Reform.”

If one takes into consideration the newness of the SSR concept in EU policy making, the number of SSR-related CSDP missions undertaken since 2003 (thirteen) is noteworthy. Nevertheless, the results of these missions, especially with regards to fragile states, are considered disappointing by many policy analysts and academics. However, in order to come to a fair judgment on

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2 For further information on the concepts see OECD, 2005, and GFN SSR, 2007.
3 OECD, 2005.
5 Derks and More, 2009.
6 Council of the EU, 2006a.
the effectiveness of CSDP in supporting SSR, one has to consider the limited size of most of the missions, both in monetary terms as well as with regards to personnel deployed.\(^9\)

Howsoever assessed in regards to their concrete impact, the EU’s CSDP missions are a tool to tackle SSR-related deficits in third countries since they advise on reforms in sectors “that cannot easily be supported by Community instruments given development policy and ODA eligibility constrains.”\(^10\) As such, under CSDP, the EU can support partner countries’ efforts to reform their security sector. Furthermore, CSDP missions focus on capacity building and reforms in the security sector in post-conflict situations, i.e. situations in which Commission personnel cannot be deployed due to security concerns.\(^11\)

This study focuses on EU support to SSR in the form of CSDP missions, analysing recent developments in the EU’s internal set-up, capacities and training arrangements for mission personnel. It is based on interviews with mission personnel, Brussels-based officials and secondary sources.

In section one, the EU’s policy framework for SSR and the core characteristics of the actual policy will be presented, with a focus on CSDP, followed by a short description of the main CSDP actors involved in support to SSR. Furthermore, implications of the departmentalisation of policy making for SSR support will be discussed. Since there are a number of recent comprehensive texts on SSR from an EU perspective, this section will also briefly highlight their findings.

Section two explicitly concentrates on SSR missions under CSDP. There are currently 13 CSDP missions, out of which ten concentrate on SSR.\(^12\) This paper will focus on seven of them, namely EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), EUPOL Afghanistan, EUTM Somalia, EUJUST-LEX Iraq, EUPOL DRC and EUSEC DRC.\(^13\) EULEX Kosovo will not be dealt with in detail as it is the only mission in the field of SSR support with an executive mandate. Moreover, with its 1,650 international and 1,200 local staff\(^14\) it is much bigger than other SSR missions under CSDP which with the exception of EUPOL Afghanistan and EUPM BiH only count more than a few dozen staff.

The main aim of section two is to highlight the challenges arising during the planning, setting-up and conduct phases of ‘typical’ SSR support missions, i.e. very small missions that are mandated to support capacity development and advise state authorities in partner countries. The main focus will be on the problem of shortages in EU personnel, equipment and money. In addition, several contextual factors that have been hindering implementation of the missions’ mandate will be discussed.

Section three presents recent steps undertaken by the EU to improve CSDP support to SSR. After a short discussion of institutional changes in relevant departments, special attention is paid to efforts made in improving rapid procurement of equipment as well as harmonising SSR trainings across Member States and the recently created permanent pool of SSR experts for the EU. While

\(^9\) For mission personnel figures, see <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel>. For SSR missions, the number of personnel ranges from as little as 35 in EUPOL RDC to 1490 in EULEX Kosovo (figures from November 2010.)


\(^11\) Interview with EU official, 11 August 2010.

\(^12\) This number includes the Border Support Team in Georgia which operated under the mandate of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Caucasus until 28 February 2011, when the EUSR’s mandate terminated. For an overview of all past and ongoing CSDP and EU missions see CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership web-portal (<www.csdpmap.eu>) which is administered by ISIS Europe (<www.isis-europe.eu>).

\(^13\) The border missions EU BAM Rafah and Border Support Team (BST) in Georgia will not be analysed, since EU BAM is on ‘stand-by’ due to the political context in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and BST is not a CSDP mission proper, as it operates under the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus.

\(^14\) Correspondence with EU official, 11 May 2011.
military missions are discussed throughout the study, the main emphasis of this section is on civilian and civil-military elements of CSDP support for SSR. This is justified i) by the clear numerical predominance of ongoing missions with a civilian character (11 of 13) and ii) by the comparatively more serious shortcomings of EU Member States to outfit civilian missions with sufficient resources.

The final section summarises the main findings and discusses the strengths and challenges of EU support to SSR under CSDP. Furthermore, some recommendations on how to improve such missions in the future will be presented.

1 SSR under CSDP

The following three sub-sections will present the EU’s framework for SSR-related activities in third countries, with a special focus on CSDP; the main actors involved in setting-up and conducting civilian and military SSR missions; and the basic setup for generating civilian and military capabilities under CSDP.

1.1 The EU’s SSR Framework

The EU’s policy for support to SSR is based on three documents. The “EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform” presents the concepts, objectives and activities of SSR for CSDP (formerly ESDP). The “Concept for European Community Support to Security Sector Reform” does the same for the European Commission. Finally, the “Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform” state that both concepts put together form a common or single EU framework for SSR.15

Although both the Council and Commission concepts are based on the OECD-DAC “Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance,”16 they differ in that they stress the institutions’ respective competences and strength in the EU’s SSR-related activities. Thus, the Council document focuses on the CSDP’s role to provide mentoring, monitoring and advice to authorities in third countries undertaking SSR,17 while the Commission document highlights the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the long-term impact of its SSR-related activities on partner countries.18 Nevertheless, questions of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are also mentioned in the Council paper as the guiding principles of EU support to SSR. Therefore, CSDP missions must also respect these principles.

In practice, CSDP missions are mostly based on very narrow mandates, to be implemented in short timeframes. This crisis management approach to SSR under CSDP contrasts starkly with the European Commission’s more long term approach that could be best described as a mixture of conflict prevention policy and classical development cooperation. Problems of coordination and cooperation arise since CSDP mission and Commission staff work under different mandates in the same country. To give an example, CSDP missions usually deploy personnel seconded by Member States for only ½ to 1 year whereas Commission staff will in most cases stay for a longer period in-country. This discrepancy makes it difficult for both sides to develop good and stable work relations.

Given the focus of this study, a few more words need to be said about the Council document. In defining the security sector as a system consisting of statutory and non-statutory security actors,

15 Derks and More, 2009. Links to the three documents are listed in the bibliography.
16 OECD, 2005.
17 Council of the EU, 2005a.
the justice sector, as well as management and oversight bodies, the Council clearly aims to adopt a holistic approach to SSR stating that “SSR should take a broad, coherent and integrated approach that addresses wider governance and security concerns of the people. This multifaceted approach should be managed in a coherent way, ensuring that all the lines of action, such as good governance, democratic norms and rule of law, respect for human rights and long term institution building, personnel management, training and provision of equipment are mutually reinforcing.” This does not, however, mean that CSDP missions are designed to tackle single-handedly all the problems relating to the security sector in a given country. The Council explicitly states that “SSR activities may target an individual agency or institution, as part of a broader SSR framework and part of a broad co-operation between different donors.” In this context, the Council paper stresses the importance of close co-ordination between the Council, EU Member States and the Commission and co-operation with other actors of the international community. The EU’s security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau) was the only mission so far that had as its explicit objective the reform of all the major state security institutions, but did not live up to this ambitious agenda.20 Moreover, the mission acted more as a traditional defence advisory mission than a ‘holistic’ SSR mission, as it focused almost exclusively on the security side of the “security-development nexus.”

Although critics have pointed to the need for the SSR framework to better reflect the EU’s specificities as an international actor ‘sui generis,’ this is unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future. Instead, Member States have been busy launching mission after mission on an ad hoc or political basis since the adoption of the Council’s SSR concept in 2005. Rather than focusing on consolidating the interplay of its diverse policies and instruments to support SSR in third countries and building up capacity, the EU seems to have adopted a learning-by-doing approach, leading to a number of challenges for mission personnel on the ground that will be discussed in section two. In this context, Gourlay has shown that due to the lack of established criteria, political decisions to launch and extend CSDP missions have not been taken in the interest of efficiency, but rather to increase the visibility and strategic position of CSDP as well as to protect the EU’s decision-making autonomy in the field of crisis management.

Before we illustrate the practical challenges related to the aforementioned characteristics in section two, the relevant actors and major framework documents for capability development under CSDP will be presented. A more detailed description of the actors and policy making process can be found elsewhere.

1.2 Actors Involved

Under CSDP, civilian as well as military SSR missions are designed and planned by the competent CFSP working groups (CIVCOM, PMG) and several Council Secretariat directorates (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS). Changes under the Lisbon Treaty include the introduction of permanent chairs for CIVCOM and PMG and the transfer of all former Council bodies implicated in CSDP policy making into the EEAS (i.e. CIVCOM, PMG, CMPD, CPCC and EUMS).

All missions are under the authority of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which comprises Member States’ representatives. The design, planning and operational conduct of SSR (as well as other types of missions) is assured by the Crisis Management Planning Directorate.

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19 Council of the EU, 2005a.
20 For more information on EUSSR GB, see EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Lessons Identified, in: European Security Review, No. 52, November 2010, ISIS Europe.
21 Telatin, 2009.
22 Gourlay, 2010.
(CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS). After the political decision to take action in the form of a CSDP mission has been taken in the Foreign Affairs Council and the PSC, CMPD leads the process of planning and establishing that mission up to the writing of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) which defines the overall strategic objectives of CSDP missions “from a civilian-military perspective.”

For civilian missions, the CPCC then develops the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and assists the Heads of Mission (HoM) in developing the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The CPCC is also responsible for the operational conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions. Thus, one could say that the CPCC plays the role of operational headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. At its head, the Civilian Operations Commander directs, coordinates, advises, supports, supervises and reviews civilian CSDP missions.

On the military side, the EUMS performs early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and crisis management (Petersberg Tasks) for all EU-led military operations. Once a CMC has been established by the CMPD, the EUMS assumes responsibility of the detailed planning process. With regards to operational command for military missions, one of three possible options is chosen: 1) If the EU chooses to conduct an ‘autonomous’ operation it can make use of headquarters (HQ) provided by its Member States; 2) Under “Berlin Plus,” the EU can make use of NATO capabilities and assets, in particular the Operation Headquarters located at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium and D-SACEUR as the Operation Commander; 3) The EU can command, through its Operations Centre located in Brussels, missions and operations of limited size (up to around 2,000 troops).

The following diagram gives an overview of the role of the abovementioned units with regards to civilian and military planning of CSDP missions and operations.

**Overview of Civilian and Military CSDP Mission Planning**

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<tr>
<th>CMPD</th>
<th>Strategic planning for civilian and military missions (Options Document, Crisis Management Concept)</th>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian strategic options</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>Military strategic options</td>
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<td>Initial military directive</td>
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<td>7 OHQs (5 national OHQs, SHAPE, EU Operations Centre)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational Planning (CONOPS, OPLAN, Conduct of mission)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational Planning (CONOPS, OPLAN, Conduct of operation)</td>
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25 For more information on the tasks of the CPCC see CPCC factsheet (March 2010).
26 Council website on CPCC.
27 Those are: HQ Mont Valérien, Paris, France; HQ Northwood, UK; Potsdam, Berlin, Germany; HQ Rome, Italy; and HQ Larissa, Greece.
29 Adapted from European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European Union, 2010.
The separation of military and civilian chains of command as well as the additional diversification of options for operational command of military operations forestalls the realisation of a holistic EU approach to SSR right from the start. As a consequence, the European Parliament in its “Report on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities”\(^{30}\) has called on EU Member States to allow for a joint civilian and military headquarters for the planning and execution of EU missions and operations. A civilian/military cell which was located inside the EUMS and tasked with “strategic planning in response to crises with a view to joint civilian/military operations” did never become functional.\(^{31}\) One of the most obvious reasons for this failure was the cell’s location in the localities used by the Military Staff which therefore quickly dominated the cell and left it with little connection to the remainder of the civilian staff in the Council Secretariat.\(^{32}\)

The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is said by some commentators to be likely to improve the planning and conduct of CSDP SSR missions.\(^{33}\) Furthermore, during the last few years, Council/EEAS officials together with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) have been focusing on propagating a common understanding of EU support to SSR amongst mission planners and implementers from the different Council/EEAS departments, e.g., by offering introductory courses on SSR. This is necessary as discussions with mission personnel indicate that some are unaware that they or the EU are actually implementing an SSR mission.\(^{34}\) However, the proposed architecture of the new EEAS still lacks a clear structure for SSR implementation.\(^{35}\) The potential of these developments to improve the planning and conduct of SSR missions will be discussed in section three.

### 1.3 Capabilities

Before analysing the challenges that SSR missions encounter in-country, we need to present the general framework for civilian as well as military force generation at the European level. Indeed, many shortcomings of the individual missions can be directly attributed to slow decision making procedures for the generation of finance, equipment and personnel, while lack of political will to invest in CSDP missions has a great impact as well.

Common costs for civilian missions under CSDP are assured by the budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whereas common costs of missions having defence implications (military operations) are financed through the Athena Mechanism which lies outside the CFSP budget. Running costs of both civilian and military missions are, however, paid for by participating Member States and third countries “where they fall.”\(^{36}\) Equally, personnel for CSDP missions – civilians as well as police forces and soldiers – are seconded by participating countries on a case-by-case basis and in most cases also include local staff (see <www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel>).

With regards to civilian missions, Member States have committed to the establishment of deployable civilian capabilities in the fields of police, rule of law, civilian administration and civilian protection.\(^{37}\) In 2004, capabilities for monitoring and support to EU Special Representa-
tives (EUSR) were added. In the same year, under the first “Civilian Headline Goal 2008,” the EU set out the aim of building the capacity to conduct a number of small-scale civilian missions concurrently with at least one large “substitution mission,” in which European staff temporarily replaces the local government. According to the Headline Goal, the EU should be enabled to send such missions “on short notice” and in a “non-benign environment.” In addition, such missions were to be sustainable for long periods of time. Member States also committed high numbers of personnel for civilian SSR missions. In 2004, 5,761 police and 631 rule-of-law experts were committed. However, since such promises do not legally bind Member States, staff actually available to SSR missions is much less. Out of 1.6 million EU civilian personnel available, only 5,000 were pledged and only about 2,000 actually deployed in CSDP missions.

In addition, the CGS was tasked with the setting up and deployment of “multifunctional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated format.” Under this heading, it established Civilian Response Teams (CRT) which comprise Member State experts that undergo specific CRT training. The CRTs are to be “of flexible size and composition” and deployed in one of three contexts: early assessment of a crisis situation; in support of the establishment of a civilian CSDP mission; and, when appropriate, in temporary support of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) or an ongoing civilian crisis management operation. Again, changes in staff structure under the EEAS—with EUSRs being replaced by Heads of EU Delegations—may change the dynamics. This will be further discussed in section three.

The more recent “Civilian Headline Goal 2010,” while stressing that “there has been a growing demand for Security Sector Reform,” does not contain any numerical targets. Instead, it stresses, inter alia, the need to develop a “robust and systematic lessons-learnt process,” new concepts and procedures for generating capabilities as well as “improved arrangements for timely and accurate support to missions, procurement, security and logistics as well as development of structures and personnel for procurement prior to ESDP deployment.” Following up on this needs assessment, Member States in December 2008 agreed to the creation of “European teams of experts that can be deployed to back up security sector reform.” The current state of play of this Pool of SSR Experts as well as lessons learnt and civilian capabilities will also be presented in section three.

Regarding military capabilities, there are no specific targets for developing military capabilities for SSR missions in particular. Neither the European Rapid Reaction Force, which came never into being, nor the EU battle groups, which have not been put to use so far – have been conceived to support SSR efforts of EU Member States or the EU abroad. Although not specifically focussing on SSR, the ‘Headline Goal 2010’ states that SSR might be included in the spectrum of crisis management operations. This implies that Member States’ commitment to “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union” is of relevance also for SSR. More recently, the “Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities” includes the aim for the EU to be able to plan and conduct simultaneously, “within the range of

38 Council of the EU, 2004a.
39 Council of the EU, 2004b.
40 Gya, 2009.
41 Council of the EU, 2005b.
42 Council of the EU, 2007a.
43 Council of the EU, 2008a.
44 The “Helsinki Headline Goal” of 1999 stated the aim of establishing a European Rapid Reaction Force which should enable the EU to deploy 60 000 troops to any crisis region in the world within 60 days and conduct operations lasting up to one year to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, i.e. humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping and combat in crisis management situations (European Council, 1999).
45 Headline Goal 2010.
operations envisaged in the Headline Goal 2010 and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010,”” two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations comprising a civilian component and which should be supported “by up to 10 000 troops for at least two years.” Again, SSR is not mentioned explicitly in the Declaration. Nevertheless, the document recognises the importance of civilian/military integration of mission planning and implementation which is crucial for SSR to be successful.

The lack of SSR specific targets for the EU military does not appear to be a major problem, as the great majority of SSR missions focus on police and justice reform and therefore do not employ many military officers. The two ongoing SSR missions with a military character – EUSEC DRC and EUTM Somalia – at present employ around 160 mostly military staff. This shows that, although the EU is short of fulfilling its targets for military capacity development to be used under CSDP more broadly, this did not significantly impact on pledges for military SSR missions at the time of writing (although EUSEC DRC could be critiqued for not having enough personnel).

The next section highlights some of the major challenges encountered by SSR mission personnel in the field. In doing so, it prepares the ground for a discussion of recent and ongoing developments in the field of SSR at the EU-level and their potential to address these challenges.

2 Current Challenges to SSR Missions under CSDP

After a short overview of ongoing SSR missions under CSDP, this section will focus on operational challenges related to personnel numbers and training; financial resources and equipment; as well as identification and implementation of lessons and best practices.

2.1 Overview

As of August 2010, the total number of international staff deployed in CSDP missions stood at over 4900 including almost 2500 in the framework of SSR missions. However, the EULEX Kosovo mission alone accounted for 1458 of these. With its executive mandate and the high number of field personnel, EULEX Kosovo stands out amongst the CSDP missions. In the scope of this article the analysis concentrates on seven ongoing SSR missions which all share two core characteristics. Firstly, all of them are small-scale, employing between 46 (EUSEC DRC) and 297 (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU and international staff (plus local staff).

Secondly, they all have non-executive mandates comprising training and/or mentoring, monitoring and advice and focus only on a part of the broader security sector reform agenda. As such, EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS (Palestine) and EUPOL DR Congo mostly focus on the police, while EUSEC RD Congo and EUTM Somalia concentrate on the defence sector and EUJUST-LEX works towards improving the judicial system in Iraq and its interface with the police. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau which ended in September 2010 is the only SSR mission which has attempted a holistic approach as it was tasked with helping the Guinea Bissauan authorities to implement a comprehensive national SSR strategy.

Apart from these broad similarities, each mission has a very specific mandate reflecting political considerations on the part of the EU Member States as well as the local context. For example, the European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), which was the first mission to be launched under the CSDP in 2003, takes place in a relatively stable security environ-
ment. Accordingly it focuses on helping local authorities tackle organised crime and corruption which are widespread problems not only in BiH but in the Balkans more broadly. At the opposite end of the spectrum we find missions that focus on helping the state (re-)establish the means to ensure basic security to its citizens (e.g. EUSEC DRC and EUTM for Somalia).

Although all CSDP missions are formally invited by host governments, active cooperation by the latter is a necessary condition for the missions to be in a position to actually implement their mandate. In light of the different local contexts in which the missions operate, the success of individual missions can hardly be measured against the achievements of other CSDP missions. What can and needs to be done, however, is an evaluation of the shortcomings and needs of ongoing missions. The benchmarks against which shortcomings are identified are the missions’ aims and objectives as formulated in their mandates as well as the existence of sufficient resources to implement these mandates.

2.2 Staffing and Training

One of the most obvious shortcomings of CSDP missions relates to Member States’ inability and sometimes unwillingness to meet their own staffing goals. In 2010, the EU received only 3,500 applications for 1,800 advertised positions, leading to a lack of competition amongst candidates. This problem is closely linked to the lack of deployable personnel in the Member States. On the one hand, only a small number of national police, civil servants or SSR experts are willing to work in dangerous places like Afghanistan or Iraq. On the other hand, even if such personnel want to join a CSDP mission, their Member States must release them from national duty. Since specialised personnel needed for SSR missions are often scarce at the national level, Member States generally prefer not to deploy them abroad. Also, most governments in the EU second only civil servants of ministerial staff, thus further limiting the choice of available experts.

This is not only a problem of credibility for the EU which wants to be recognised as a global player in civil-military crisis management, but renders effective implementation of CSDP missions difficult if not impossible. In fact, the success of a mission often depends on the number of personnel that can be deployed within the first three to six months after the launch. Although there is recognition of this on the part of the EU, “it rarely delivers in practice.” Towards the end of 2010 however, some staff in the CMPD met intensively with Member States to try to address this weakness and encourage greater delivery.

This problem is drastically exemplified by the continuous struggle of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) to meet its own staffing target of 400 police officers and legal experts. Officially established on 30 May 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan is mandated to “significantly contribute to the establishment of civilian policing arrangements, support the police reform process and help Afghan authorities to create the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy.” In practice, EUPOL concentrates on six strategic priorities. Its police experts deal with anti-crime; police command, control and communication and intelligence-led policing whereas staff in the area of rule of law focuses on anti-corruption measures; cooperation between the police and the judiciary; human rights; and gender. Since its launch, the mission has

50 Bloching and Gya, July 2010.
51 For an overview of relevant indicators for measuring the success of SSR see Schroeder, 2010.
52 Korski and Gowan, 2009; Chivvis, 2010.
53 Behrendt, 2011.
54 Ibid.
56 Council of the EU, 2007b.
been chronically understaffed due to a lack of candidates that are willing to work in the more dangerous regions of the country. Thus, although its activities aim at covering the whole of Afghanistan, its presence is very weak outside the capital Kabul.57 As of April 2011, the mission comprised 317 international personnel out of 400 projected.58

In addition, police officers seconded by Member States are often not sufficiently prepared for an SSR mission under the given circumstances. In particular, police sent are often not trained in reform advisory capacity and lack knowledge of the cultural context in which missions take place. This is less of a problem in the rule of law sector where most applicants often have operational experience in crisis management missions and very good qualifications more generally. Nevertheless, as there is a general trend towards launching rule of law missions, Member States will have to confront a shortage of deployable judicial personnel.59 With regards to police mentors, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, there is also the problem of having a high rate of turnover. This is due to national regulations which often restrict police officers’ service in CSDP missions to six month or a year. According to mission personnel, with only one year to stay, “you are just a tourist” in the country. As a consequence, mission staff often initiate projects which are then not continued when they leave.60 In this context, Blair and Gya stress that longer-term personnel in CSDP missions serve civilians much better than short-term personnel.61

Apart from EUPOL Afghanistan, several other missions remain understaffed. The European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST-LEX Iraq) can be cited as an example here. It was the first substantial measure in the EU’s joined-up policy towards Iraq after an initial decision in 2004 to support reconstruction efforts in the country. The mission offers management training and training in investigation methods for judges and high-ranking police and prison officials. From its launch in early 2005 until late 2009, due to security concerns as well as the unwillingness of those EU Member States that had opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to establish a visible presence in the country, EUJUST-LEX had only a small liaison office in Baghdad and training courses were conducted in several Member States.62 However, since the start of its new mandate on 1 July 2010, the mission has worked towards increasing its presence in Iraq and additional international staff has been deployed to Baghdad and Erbil, where a new office was opened. Furthermore, a new presence has been established in Basra.63 With 43 international and 17 local staff, EUJUST-LEX Iraq was short of nine personnel, as of April 2011.64

The EU Police Mission and the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL and EUSEC DRC) are equally lacking personnel despite the small additional numbers that would be needed to meet their respective staffing goals. EUSEC DRC provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law; gender equality and children affected by armed conflicts; democratic standards; principles of good public management; transparency; and observance of the rule of law. It aims at contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army.65 EUPOL DRC is mandated to do the same with regards to the police. Its aim is to contribute to Congolese efforts to re-
form and restructure the National Congolese Police in its interaction with the judicial system. EUPOL comprises police officers and experts in the field of civil penal justice as well as staff working on human rights, children’s rights in armed conflict and gender. Furthermore, in 2009 EUPOL’s mandate was strengthened with the inclusion of the fight against sexual violence and impunity. EUPOL is deployed in the capital Kinshasa as well as in North-Kivu (Goma) and South-Kivu (Bukavu).

In February 2010, almost three years after its launch, EUPOL DRC had only 25 out of the 47 personnel pledged at its disposal, a number which has finally grown to 40 in September of the same year. As of March 2011, the mission comprised 40 international and 19 local staff, thus remaining short of 18 staff planned for. For EUSEC RDC, full deployment has not been reached either, leaving it with 47 out of 50 staff planned for in March 2011.

Although the precarious security situation and the lack of French speaking candidates are often cited as reasons for staffing shortages in both missions, another, perhaps more accurate explanation is given by Marta Martinelli. According to this former mission advisor, “EUSEC’s rationale lies in the strategic interests of two member states, France and Belgium, who have been deeply involved in defence programmes in the DRC.” This might explain why there was “a certain reluctance on the part of other EU capitals to get involved in a Congolese SSR mission and to support it financially.” Likewise, the security situation cannot be cited as an excuse for the lack of international staff in the European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH) where international staff stands at 114, leaving the mission 83 short of the EU’s pledge.

The abovementioned difficulties contrast starkly with the rapid deployment of EU and third country military officers taking part in the European Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM Somalia). EUTM is tasked with providing specific military training support to the mission and according to the EU, “is conducted in close coordination with EU partners, including the TFG of Somalia, Uganda, the African Union, the United Nations and the United States of America.” EUTM seeks to train 2,000 Somali recruits with the aim of strengthening the Somali security forces. Since EUTM is a military mission, it was planned by EUMS which comprises roughly 200 personnel, compared to only around 70 in the CPCC. Furthermore, EUMS officials did not encounter any problems in recruiting enough staff for the mission (through the Member States) in a short notice of time. In fact, by August 2010, EUTM had even exceeded its staffing target of 131, as it comprised 140 international and 9 local staff. However, as of March 2011, the mission was short of 8 staff, with the number of international staff standing at 116.

In addition to many missions not being staffed according to their mandates, there is the problem of a notably unequal gender balance. Women are heavily underrepresented in all CSDP missions. To give but one example, as of July 2010, out of 86 EU police officers amongst EUPM BiH staff only 7 were women. Equally, amongst the 32 international civilian experts in the mission only 9

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66 Council of the EU, 2007c.
67 Council of the EU, 2009a.
68 Herz and Gya, February 2010, and Bloching and Gya, July 2010.
69 CSDP MAP, September 2010.
70 CSDP MAP, September 2010.
71 Martinelli, 2009.
72 CSDP MAP, March 2011.
73 EUTM website.
74 Council of the EU, 2010a.
75 Interview with EU official, 24 August 2010.
76 CSDP MAP, September 2010.
77 CSDP MAP, March 2011.
were female. This is problematic on several accounts. Local women, be it in the police, military or judiciary, are more likely to accept female rather than male trainers. The same is true for interactions between CSDP mission personnel and local women more generally. In fact, women need to be brought into the SSR process in order to assure sustainable results as they are often the mainstay of society and community. Especially in CSDP missions with a focus on fighting gender based violence and sexual abuse, having female staff is crucial as girls and women that are the victims of these crimes are more likely to confide to women.

The cases of EUSEC and EUPOL DRC exemplify another shortcoming related to insufficient expertise on gender aspects inside the EU bodies tasked with designing, planning and conduct of SSR missions. If the EU takes its human security approach to SSR seriously, and it seems eager to do so in DRC, at least on paper, then it should address the problems listed in a report on CSDP missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to this report, only half a dozen staff members across the EU institutions tasked with CSDP have a sound awareness of gender-specific needs. Ultimately, there are no official gender positions for staff that work on CSDP and the new EEAS has no architecture that provides for a solid staff to support the EU’s work on gender in crisis management. Some staff is tasked with human rights in their job description and work on gender is within this category. The only official gender positions in the EEAS now are two ‘focal points’ for gender – one in the Human Rights and Democracy Department and a staff in the CMPD charged with gender perspectives. Three staff for ~1600 in the EEAS shows very poor support for gender sensitive policy making and implementation in CSDP.

It is worth mentioning, however, that in the case of the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and EUPM BiH there have been improvements in internal mission preparation, such that all incoming personnel receive training with a strong focus on human rights, cultural sensitivity, crimes against women, dress code, code of conduct and gender. Moreover, nearly all missions have gender advisors and the gender advisors that were formerly double-hatted as gender/human rights/legal advisors, generally now concentrate full-time on gender. There is also improved strong CPCC support for gender, such that it must be included in reporting back to Brussels. Nevertheless, in most SSR missions, gender advisors still have to deal with a range of other aspects such as human rights or legal questions, thus impeding effective implementation of their gender related tasks.

2.3 Finance and Procurement

Another challenge facing mission personnel is the lack of sufficient financial back-up by Member States. Again, the cases of EUSEC and EUPOL DRC are symptomatic of the consequences of having understaffed and underfinanced SSR missions. Both missions are unique in the framework of CSDP in that they have an explicit mandate to tackle human rights abuses and gender based violence. However, due to the lack of personnel, two gender advisors and three human rights advisors are shared between the two missions. Furthermore, these advisors spend a lot of time fundraising with Member States, as not enough money is foreseen in the mission budget to undertake activities on the ground. To give an example, on 12 March 2010, EUPOL in cooperation with EUSEC and the Congolese authorities in Goma organised three workshops on the role of women in SSR in DRC. Participants from the military, police and women’s organisations discussed career opportunities for women in SSR, participation of civil society actors, es-

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78 Email exchange with mission personnel, August 2010.
80 See Gya, Isaksson and Martinelli, 2009.
81 Gya, 2010; email correspondence with EU official, 20 May 2011.
82 Bloching and Gya, July 2010.
83 Herz and Gya, February 2010.
especially women’s organisations, in discussions on security and the role of security actors as well as their perceptions of the reform process. However, the planned publication of a report on the workshops was long delayed due to lack of funding\textsuperscript{84} thus depriving the missions of a valuable tool to promote further dialogue with Congolese civil society. Follow-up is crucial if the EU wants to react to actual needs rather than merely raising its flag to become more visible amongst the broad range of international organisations active in the field of SSR support.

For a number of CSDP SSR missions, a precarious security situation in the host country combined with a lack of adequate equipment of international personnel has been a continuous hindrance to effective implementation. Unlike military staff which normally come with their own equipment, civilian staff must be equipped on a case-by-case basis by the responsible EEAS bodies and the Member States. The EU rules governing procurement of a basic kit, however, are cumbersome and far too time-consuming for an operational deployment such as EUPOL Afghanistan. As a result, important equipment such as armoured vehicles and computers were not in place when the mission began, prohibiting EUPOL staff from leaving the base camp.\textsuperscript{85} This reflects a shortage of armoured vehicles ready for rapid deployment in general. In some cases, cars for civilian use were fortified on the spot as deliveries of adequate armoured vehicles would arrive only months into the launch of a mission. In the case of Afghanistan, exemptions from EU procurement regulations were eventually given making procurement faster.\textsuperscript{86} This did not, however, significantly help the mission in becoming more flexible on the ground. Despite practical arrangements between EUPOL and the NATO Training Mission in the country (NTM-A) major problems remain due to the absence of a formal security agreement. EUPOL still has to rely on technical arrangements with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which had to be negotiated individually with each PRT lead nation. Accordingly, when the lead nation for a PRT changes, EUPOL needs to renegotiate the terms under which security is provided to its staff. Moreover, in most cases security forces from the PRTs will only transport and protect EUPOL staff when they have spare capacities.\textsuperscript{87} As a result, freedom of movement of mission staff is severely restricted. In fact, staff can only leave their offices to travel in the country when accompanied by a private security company or the Afghan National Police.\textsuperscript{88}

Security problems also restrict freedom of movement for EUSEC and EUPOL RDC staff. As the security situation remains precarious in the east of the country, both missions rely on the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, formerly MONUC) for protection.

If Member States are really interested in enabling CSDP missions to implement their mandate, they can either make good on their commitments for personnel numbers as well as finance and equipment or strengthen partnerships with other international and regional organisations that are ready to provide these resources. In any case, the EU should at least put itself in a position where it can assure the safety and operational readiness of its own mission personnel. This is first and foremost a question of credibility for the EU’s engagement in SSR.

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\textsuperscript{84} Bloching and Gya, May 2010.
\textsuperscript{85} Gross, 2009.
\textsuperscript{86} Chivvis, 2010.
\textsuperscript{87} Bloching and Gya, July 2010.
\textsuperscript{88} Phone interviews with mission staff, 11 August 2010, and with an EU official, 19 May 2011.
2.4 Identification and Implementation of Lessons and Best Practices

This sub-section revises the main innovations in the field of identification and implementation of lessons and best practices. For a broader overview of monitoring and evaluation arrangements for CSDP missions, see Babaud, 2009.

Despite “a gradual trend towards more routine and detailed monitoring across missions,”89 several challenges remain, especially in Brussels. With the change of structures under the Lisbon treaty, there is only one person for lessons in the CMPD who spends most of their time working on civilian concepts and one person in the CPCC dealing only partially (1/4) with identifying lessons from the missions. The situation is somewhat better with regards to military missions with one person in the EUMS working on lessons learnt. Also, there is still no commonly agreed assessment tool for SSR missions. The “EU Guiding Framework for SSR Assessments” elaborated under the Swedish Presidency of the EU, though comprehensive in scope and promoted by the European Security and Defence College as a useful tool for EU mission planners and staff, has not (yet) become a binding document. This reflects the general trend of Member States taking a cautious stance towards evaluating CSDP missions as they try to avoid criticism of their own engagement. Also, the EU is still, in the words of an EU official, “in a phase of soul searching” with regards to the aims SSR missions are supposed to achieve in the long run, i.e. helping to stabilise a partner country or focusing more on promoting long term development. Accordingly, there is still too little of a common, systematic framework for evaluating CSDP missions. Instead identification and implementation of lessons and best practices happens ad hoc and is often based on inter-service agreements and a different approach for different reports, rather than on commonly agreed standards.90

For every mission, six-monthly reports are elaborated by the Civilian Operations Commander, who heads the CPCC, and Heads of Missions (HoMs), identifying their own best practices and lessons identified in the mission. In this context, there are now “best practice officers,” albeit only in a couple of CSDP missions so far, who are tasked with collecting and mainstreaming best practices. This is not however, based on standardised guidance in the mission planning documents and there is no common training for these officers in Brussels, as set out in the “Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian CSDP missions of 2008.”91 Furthermore, the CPCC organises annual meetings of HoMs as well as meetings of some sector experts.92 The “Final Report” on EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, the only mission that formally has SSR in its title, is not accessible to the public. This is an unfortunate waste of useful information, as the report highlights on the one hand the successful planning of the mission while on the other hand mentioning problems during the installation and operating phases which were at least partly due to a lack of commitment by some Member States which did not provide sufficient personnel.93

On the positive side, one should mention the first thematic report on mainstreaming human rights and gender issues in CSDP military operations and civilian missions, which was approved by the Council on 13 December 2010. The recommendations contained in the report include, among other things, taking account of gender and human rights considerations in mission planning and evaluation, ensuring adequate training, improving the gender balance of the staff deployed, in-

89 Babaud, 2009.
90 Phone interview with EU official, 27 August 2010.
91 Council of the EU, 2008b.
92 To give a recent example, a meeting of gender and human rights advisers took place on 5-6 July in Brussels. Participants were invited to share their experience. A lessons identified report on mainstreaming human rights, gender and child protection in CSDP missions is due to be presented to Member States in mid-December.
93 CPCC, 2010.
creasing communication on human rights and gender issues, and promoting active participation of women in negotiations and political work. According to an EU official, further thematic reports on SSR and on Mentoring, Monitoring and Advice are planned to be elaborated this year.

With regards to the actual implementation of lessons, few proposals included in the Guidelines have been put into practice so far. Lessons are still not systematically collected on all levels and by all CSDP actors. And a systematic tracking of their implementation is not in place, nor is a degree of functional independence from the planning and conduct of the missions ensured in all instances. Instead of focusing on negative lessons, reports increasingly highlight good examples and best practices, which can be used to support good working practices in planning, reviewing and evaluating missions. Furthermore, no appointment was made for the proposed post of “action officer” who would be tasked with “implementing each lesson identified where it is in its mandate to take action.”

Finally, most planning and reporting documents on civilian SSR missions and all respective documents on military missions are still classified (with the notable exception of the above-mentioned report on gender and human rights) and researchers and advocates, and sometimes even EU personnel, find it hard to access them. Many of the structures of CSDP are still of an informal character and there is no formal doctrine for the missions. Even the official annual lessons learned reports, which are approved by Member States and therefore binding, are not publicised. This hampers impartial input from interested parties outside the official EU sphere that could help improve CSDP missions.

As there seems to be no political will to formalise lessons and best practices at the EU level, learning from past experience remains very unsystematic. A possible solution might be found in the creation of “need-driven communities of experts” on, inter alia, SSR, police, rule of law and gender, as mentioned in the Guidelines. By sharing knowledge, such networks could prepare the ground for a more systematic approach to identifying solutions for challenges encountered across Member States. At the very least, they would bear the potential of complementing insufficient human resources in the CMPD and CPCC without costing a lot of money. Moreover, national experts might find it easier to convince their respective Member States of the added value of commonly agreed and implemented methods in this area.

3 Recent Developments and Their Potential to Improve CSDP SSR Missions

This section will highlight recent changes to the policy making procedure, capabilities and training arrangements for SSR support under CSDP and discuss their potential to address the shortcomings presented above.

3.1 Structural Changes

The first sub-section highlights the most recent institutional developments as relevant for SSR. It focuses on the potential of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), which includes, amongst others, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate and the EU Delegations, to improve the planning and conduct of SSR missions.

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94 Council of the EU, 2010c.
95 Email correspondence with EU official, 19 May 2011.
96 Council of the EU, 2008b.
97 For the report agreed in 2010, there was a last minute decision by Member States not to make it public although this had been planned initially (phone interview with EU official, 27 August 2010).
3.1.1 The CMPD

In February 2010 the CGS Directorate VIII (Defence Aspects) and Directorate IX (Civilian Crisis Management) were merged into a new Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). This integration of military and civilian strategic planning for CSDP missions has led, according to an EU official, to better cooperation with the CPCC, which had been established over two years earlier, in August 2007. Before the creation of the CMPD, Directorate IX had not only been in charge of running civilian missions and developing lessons learnt and best practices but also of managing the development process of civilian capacities for CSDP missions.

During the set-up phase of CPCC, Directorate IX covered conceptual and strategic issues, including capability planning and development, whereas the CPCC was responsible for the operational planning and conduct of missions. Due to a lack of personnel, Directorate IX did not always have the capacity to give CPCC sufficient input in the first month of its existence. Today the CMPD is systematically involved in the strategic planning of new missions. After some disagreements during the setting-up phase of CMPD about its exact role in crisis management, the two council bodies (CMPD and CPCC) have found a relatively clear division of labour. Also, the CMPD is seen as an improvement at least by some CPCC staff.

As mentioned above, the CMPD leads the process of establishing a CSDP mission up to the writing of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). Thereafter, CPCC takes over and elaborates the CONOPS and Operation Plan. Furthermore, it is responsible for the operational conduct and support of the civilian missions. However, CMPD also plays an important role after the establishment of the CMC, e.g. by putting informal pressure on Member States. Moreover, the CMPD incorporates lessons identified from the CSDP missions into reports which, once discussed by Council working groups and approved of by the Council, bind Member States to address shortages such as insufficient financial and human resources or inadequately trained mission personnel.

While the creation of the CMPD is supposed to achieve better integration of civilian and military planning for CSDP missions, the EEAS aims at integrating the EU’s diverse crisis management instruments. The following sub-section therefore briefly presents its main features as relevant for SSR missions.

3.1.2 The European External Action Service and EU Delegations

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the post of Special Representative for External Relations and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission was created. Catherine Ashton, which was appointed to this position on 19 November 2009, is tasked, inter alia, to enhance the coherence of EU foreign policy by harmonising and coordinating the EU’s external action between the Commission and the EEAS. This has potential to improve coordination with regards to EU support to SSR which is done both by the Commission under its enlargement and development policies and by

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98 Interview with EU official, 24 August 2010.
100 Both EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and EUMM Georgia were planned by the CPCC without active support from DG IX. (Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2010.)
101 One of the remaining points of contention is the conduct of EUSEC DR Congo through the CMPD. Interestingly enough, according to an official from the CPCC, many HoMs and even some officials inside the CMPD would prefer that the mission be directed by the CPCC. This is, however, a contentious issue among Member States due to it being a military and not a civilian mission. (Interview with EU officials, 2010.)
102 Interview with EU official, 11 August 2010.
103 Interview with EU official, Brussels, August 2010.
104 Interview with EU official, 24 August 2010.
the EEAS in the framework of crisis management missions (CSDP). To date however, this has not yet been the case, as is outlined below.

The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) is assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS), launched in December 2010. It comprises former Commission and Council staff as well as seconded national diplomats and is scheduled to be fully operational in 2012 and subject to review in 2014. In order to increase coherence across the abovementioned policy fields as well as Commission and Council compartments, the EEAS integrated, inter alia, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Situation Centre (SitCen), as well as the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for External Relations and geographical desks of DG Development.\textsuperscript{105} If the EEAS obtains a strong role in coordinating civilian and military training under CSDP, there is a chance of overcoming fragmentation in the planning and conduct of SSR missions in the long run.\textsuperscript{106} The chances for the EEAS to achieve more coherence will, however, depend on the concrete interaction between the abovementioned bodies as well as between them and the other units, departments and directorates relevant for the planning of SSR missions that will remain outside the service. So far however, turf battles and lack of vision have not seen the creation of a ‘home’ for SSR, which at present seems to be shared across staff with remits for concepts/pooling and lessons in the CMPD.

The ongoing transformation of Commission delegations into EU delegations i.e. single units representing all EU institutions and which will be part of the EEAS, is supposed to help the EU to better implement its comprehensive approach to SSR. As is the case for the EEAS more generally, EU delegations comprise Commission and Council staff as well as officials seconded by Member States. It is important to note that some EU Special Representatives to countries, regions and international organisations have merged as Heads of Delegation (HoD) and others might follow. Heads of Delegations will notably speak on behalf of the European Union as a whole (which has acquired legal personality under the Lisbon Treaty). Here is a real potential to increase overall coordination of the EEAS’s and the Commission’s diverse activities in the field of SSR support in third countries, thereby ensuring a lasting impact through thoroughly thought follow-up activities after the end of CSDP missions which usually only stay for a few years. However, as of May 2011 neither concrete support for EU Delegations nor a clear division of labour between CSDP missions and the Delegations was institutionalised in the EEAS, which often created confusion on the ground for the EU delegations as to the changes and roles. EU Delegations could also back-up SSR missions by exerting diplomatic pressure on local authorities with the aim of inducing them to effectively cooperate with EU mentors and advisors in reforming the security sector. Also, according to Korski and Gowan, EU Delegations could prove particularly effective in fragile states if taking on the role of former EUSRs and if they were integrated into the set-up phase of new missions.\textsuperscript{107} However, even after 18 months, the EEAS is still struggling to have a clear strategy vis-à-vis the role and positioning of EU Delegation heads. However, as CSDP mission planning and conduct will not be integrated into the EU Delegations but stay with the EEAS in Brussels, cooperation on the ground will continue to depend on the attitudes of staff in Brussels and in the field. Since the impact of SSR missions hinges, inter alia, on efficient coordination with related Commission and individual Member State activities, it is important to make sure that HoD and their staff support these missions. Interestingly, the notion of having a more integrated EU foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty has helped in changing minds inside some former EC delegations. As such, according to an EU official, the new HoD in

\textsuperscript{105} Council of the EU, 2010b.
\textsuperscript{106} Lieb, 2010.
\textsuperscript{107} Korski and Gowan, 2009.
the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as his colleague in Guinea-Bissau see/saw the deployment of CSDP missions alongside Commission projects as a viable means to increase visibility of the EU’s engagement in SSR.108

3.2 Capabilities

As previously noted, contrary to military personnel who are supplied with their own equipment, civilians that have been selected to take part in SSR missions have to be equipped on a case-by-case basis by the European Commission and Member States.109 There is a range of problems related to this. First of all, as the final decision on the launch of a mission and the resources to be made available for it is made at a late stage during the planning cycle, CMPD staff often have to start mission planning without knowing how much personnel, equipment and financial resources Member States are willing to supply. Moreover, since the Member States do not always possess the needed equipment, it often has to be ordered ad-hoc from a small number of commercial suppliers. This is very costly and time-consuming as tenders have to follow competition rules of the EU. If mission planners could rely on a permanent pool of equipment, comprising, amongst others, armoured transport vehicles, communication tools and personal security kits, much time could be saved in “enabling” seconded mission staff to work.110

For a number of years pre-Lisbon, the CGS had been trying to convince Member States to agree on establishing a permanent ‘warehouse’ for civilian equipment. As Member States were cautious to make new commitments at the EU-level, proposals by the EU to build up such a stock of equipment foresaw to capitalise on equipment that is not used by ongoing or former missions anymore. While Member States had initially not seen the necessity of this project, the crisis in Georgia in 2008 brought about a change of mind. Under the French Presidency of the EU, a monitoring mission was dispatched to Georgia with the primary aim of keeping the warring parties apart. French gendarmerie forces were sent since they were sufficiently equipped and thus deployable on short notice (within 30 days). Many Member States were, however, not happy with the ad hoc nature of the deployment which had been pushed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.111 However, since the EU did not use its civilian response teams, it was not really in a position to protest.

As a result of this episode, and in the context of a significant scaling-down of EUPM BiH in 2009 which freed a lot of material, Member States agreed to the creation of a preliminary warehouse for civilian capabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead of being liquidated, as is the standard procedure, equipment no longer used by EUPM was stocked in the UN premises in Sarajevo. After a first round of inquiries by the CPCC and the Commission into Member States’ attitudes towards establishing a permanent warehouse as well as their possible contribution, a ‘wish list’ detailing equipment that could possibly be collected and stocked was sent to EU capitals.112

Although first steps in preparing the final decision on the ‘warehouse’ were undertaken by CMPD officials, Member States in October 2010 decided, on the basis of a recommendation by the European Commission, to implement the project through a call for a commercial tender. As a result, the Commission has taken over the lead and the CMPD’s role will be restricted to sup-

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108 Interview with CPCC personnel, 11 August 2010.
109 Basic infrastructure for missions is funded under the CFSP budget (common costs) and managed by the European Commission whereas specific equipment comes directly from Member States (Phone interview with CPCC official, 27 August 2010).
110 Phone interview with EU official, 27 August 2010; Korski and Gowan, 2009.
111 Phone interview with EU official, 27 August 2010.
112 Phone interview with EU official, 27 August 2010.
porting the Commission by supplying it with technical data on Member States’ present civilian capabilities for crisis management operations. Given that the Commission call for tenders will only be launched in early 2011, the permanent warehouse will probably only be functional in late 2011 or early 2012.113

The civilian equipment so far, almost exclusively taken over from EUPM, only suffices to equip one middle-sized CSDP mission. By adding material that is currently lacking to the EU’s stock, a permanent warehouse would significantly enhance the EU’s capability to rapidly deploy CSDP mission personnel. Once established, the ‘warehouse’ would notably be of added value for future SSR missions in Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia where ongoing missions have often suffered from lack of equipment, especially during the initial deployment phase.

Regarding Member States’ commitment of 2008 to “develop national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and encourage exchange of good practices between Member States,” some progress has been made.114 According to an EU official, work on strategies is ongoing in almost all Member States, though it will probably take a lot more time until these strategies will be implemented. Equally in response to the “Declaration on strengthening capabilities” quoted above, rosters are currently being set up in many Member States. This is a long overdue development as planning for missions is currently complicated due to the lack of a clear picture of personnel ready for deployment.115 There has however been a slight stagnation in 2011 during the restructuring of the EEAS and a diminished focus on the work already done so far on building capabilities. The EU could do well to re-concentrate on this.

Despite these signs of progress in the capitals, there is the danger that Member States might lack the resources to actually implement strategies and stocktaking exercises as national budgets will be slashed, especially for foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, the pooling of resources, be it for procurement of equipment, or with regards to personnel, should take priority in the coming years as it has the potential to save a lot of money and improve SSR missions at the same time. EU Chiefs of Defence in May 2011 identified as desirable areas of cooperation armoured vehicles, command and control systems and light weapons, as well as maintenance, training and education (mainly in foreign languages).116 Furthermore, there is also great potential to improve training, as will be explained in the following sub-section.

### 3.3 Training

The Lisbon Treaty states that “Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy.”117 In other words, training for CSDP mission planners and personnel remains first of all the responsibility of Member States which second civilian and military experts on a case-by-case basis. This would in itself not be a major problem if CSDP missions received enough adequately trained staff in an appropriate timeframe. However, this has been the exception rather than the rule in the setting-up and conduct of most past and ongoing missions. Progress on training has continuously been hampered by a number of factors.

First of all, Member States do not all have the political will to sufficiently train their civil servants, police and military experts to conduct SSR and other missions in a multinational force operating abroad, often under precarious conditions such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. As Korski and

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113 Interview with Brussels based official, November 2010.
114 Council of the EU, 2008a.
115 Interview with EU official, 8 September 2010.
116 Europe Diplomacy and Defence 412, 5 May 2011.
Gowan have shown, there are considerable differences between Member States with regards to training offered to their civilian and military personnel. Regarding SSR, another problem resides in the fact that civil servants seconded by Member States often hold diverging views on what SSR means, let alone what supporting the security sector actually means. There are only few common standards for training in this field, especially in the civilian sector. A survey by Korski and Gowan of the civilian capabilities of all 27 member states from 2009 shows “a melange of approaches to training, planning, debriefing and recruitment” as well as numbers of civilians sent on missions. With regards to the military, achieving interoperability of equipment and personnel are the biggest challenges.

Given that specific training provisions for SSR are weak in most Member States, all personnel selected to take part in SSR missions receive short induction training on the ground, which serves to familiarise them with the mission environment and specific tasks. However, they can in no way replace adequate pre-mission training. Despite the well-documented lack of adequately trained personnel to take part in SSR missions, there is still too little cross-national coordination of existing training arrangements. Furthermore, few training initiatives existing at Member State level specifically target those who will be deployed in CSDP missions. A notable exception is Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) which will be discussed in subsection 2.3.2.

The EU itself is involved in training vis-à-vis the European Security and Defence College and until recently the European Group on Training (and now vis-à-vis ENTRi), which will be discussed later. On the other hand, CSDP mission budgets under the CFSP can only be used for in-mission training, i.e. after the official launch of a mission. As there is currently no consensus amongst Member States to let pre-deployment training be carried out systematically at the EU-level, future SSR mission planners in the CMPD, CPCC and EUMS will have to rely on Member States’ commitment to increase the number of sufficiently trained personnel as well as on their own restricted possibilities to prepare selected mission staff for deployment abroad.

At present, there are different types of training courses at the EU-level. To begin with, personnel from the Member States that are appointed to key positions such as Head of Mission (HoM), Deputy HoM or Chief of Staff, but also ever more lower-rank staff, receive pre-deployment training in Brussels. As such, in the case of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, the CPCC trained core mission staff (around 10) on SSR before the official launch of the mission. In addition, as has already been mentioned above, all mission staff receives induction training on arrival in a CSDP mission. However, these short introductory courses are still not standardised and cannot make up for missing preparation prior to deployment.

The next sub-section presents the work of the European Security and Defence College in propagating a common understanding for SSR in the framework of CSDP. Thereafter, the most recent initiatives aiming at harmonising training across Member States will be discussed.

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118 Korski and Gowan, 2009.
120 Korski and Gowan, 2009.
123 Interview with EU official, 11 August 2010.
3.3.1 The Role of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

With the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2005, the EU aimed to enhance a “European security culture within ESDP.” The ESDC is a virtual network college comprising civilian and military national universities, academies, colleges, institutes and think tanks that have expertise in CSDP. EU Member States participate in ESDC’s activities on a voluntary basis. The College develops courses and on-line training material for EU-level education that can be used by personnel from Member States and the EU institutions. Amongst others, it aims at facilitating the dissemination of a common understanding of SSR as outlined in the EU’s SSR Framework presented above. In this context it is important to note that ESDC training modules, in addition to dealing with SSR support through CSDP, also cover the European Commission’s activities in this area, thus giving a broader picture of the EU’s SSR agenda.

Equally, while training under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) had traditionally concentrated on the European Commission’s activities in support of SSR, the establishment of the EEAS might facilitate a more comprehensive approach to SSR support. As such, future calls for tenders by the Commission are likely to oblige applicants to include training on CSDP activities alongside training for Community support to SSR. This is an important development in achieving more coherence between the different components of EU support to SSR.

Training courses under the aegis of the ESDC take place both in Brussels and the Member States. The College has notably developed a CSDP High Level course, an Orientation course and a Common Module on CSDP for young military officers. Furthermore, there are several courses on the planning process of CSDP missions as well as relevant horizontal aspects such as SSR. With regards to SSR in the framework of CSDP, the Austrian Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) has initiated two courses under the ESDC. The first pilot training session for practitioners on SSR in ESDP missions was organised by the Netherlands and France in October 2008 under the aegis of the ESDC. Three subsequent courses were organised in Hungary and Austria in 2009 and 2010. In December 2010, ASPR together with the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports and the ESDC organised a ESDC pilot course on “Training of trainers for EU SSR” which is conceived to support training for the EU SSR Pool of Experts (see below). A follow-up Train-the-Trainer seminar is planned for November 2011. For the coming two years Austria has also committed to host one course on SSR per year. Furthermore, four SSR courses were run under the Hungarian Presidency (1 January to 30 June 2011). Thus, in total the ESDC has run seven SSR courses (two Core Courses of 10 days and five Basic Courses of three to five days), with the latest being in May 2011.

The number of participants in SSR trainings so far ranged between 30 and around 50 per course, mostly Member State civil servants and other potential candidates for CSDP missions. Compared to the over 2,300 international staff working in CSDP SSR missions, this figure represents a drop in the ocean. In addition, many Member States still use their own material to prepare staff for deployment in SSR missions. This material is diverse, reflecting divergent national political and security systems, and thus inhibits a more coordinated EU approach to SSR. Moreover, since the

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124 Council of the EU, 2005c.
126 Interview with EU Official, 5 August 2010.
127 The ESDC serves as an implementer of political decisions on the military Erasmus programme which promotes the exchange of students and teachers between officer training schools in EU countries. Most recently, ESDC members have revised the learning outcomes in the common modules to better meet young students’ needs (Interview with EU official, 5 August 2010).
128 Email correspondence with EU official, 18 May 2011.
ESDC secretariat is severely understaffed with only three out of eight staff mentioned in a political agreement from 2008 actually working in its premises in Brussels, chances are slim that it will be able to increase its supply in common SSR training material over the coming months. However, within the network, there are training providers who are currently working on this topic and who will make corresponding training material available to ESDC partner institutes.

In addition to the lack of common training material, there is still too little exchange of information on national training institutes’ training activities which impedes cross-national participation in courses. The ‘Schoolmaster’ database which is run by the CMPD with the support of the College and which was designed to allow for a better flow of information amongst ESDC partner institutes remains largely underused. The reports on training activities in the Member States often go to the other Member States, but do not always reach the training institutes. Nevertheless, in the medium term, the abovementioned creation of common training material in combination with better coordination of Member States’ training activities clearly holds the potential of improving interoperability and cooperation amongst mission personnel in the field.

Moreover, France and the UK have recently proposed the establishment of a specific Executive Academic Board in support of training on EU SSR. This Board, which was inaugurated on 17 May 2011, is chaired by the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Since Member States have given the ESDC a specific task in harmonising training on SSR, the new Board will focus on achieving a better linkage between training institutes and experts in this field.

### 3.3.2 Training under the European Group on Training (EGT) and Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi)

The European Group on Training (EGT) was created through funding by the European Commission and was later funded under the Instrument for Stability (IFS) as an open network of training institutions, training providers and ministries engaged in the recruitment and training of civilian crisis management personnel. Whereas the ESDC concentrates on strategic training, thereby disseminating a common understanding of concepts including SSR, members of the EGT worked towards establishing common training standards and curricula for civilian capabilities. The lead of the EGT was transferred to a Member State based institution in 2010, namely the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF). During the last 9 years the EGT developed courses on the rule of law, civilian administration and civilian crisis management. Its members have notably trained over 1,200 Member State civilian experts in a range of aspects related to the EU’s SSR agenda such as re-integration of ex-combatants; rule of law; civil-military coordination; and human rights and democratisation. Nevertheless, under the EGT no specific training on SSR was offered.

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129 Council of the EU, 2008c.
130 This situation is likely to change in June 2011, as the secretariat will be joined by a new training manager. Furthermore, two vacancies will be published in May 2011, thus enabling the secretariat to recruit additional people (Email correspondence with EU official, 18 May 2011).
131 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 5 August 2010.
132 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 5 August 2010.
133 Due to financial irregularities in the management of the EGT, the Commission transferred the tender to Member State owned institutions (interview with EU official, 5 August 2010).
135 Training of police, election observers and civil protection personnel trained at the EU level is assured by programmes under the Instrument for Stability.
As pointed out by a report of the EGT and a study for the European Parliament, there were several problems with this form of cooperation in training field mission personnel. First of all, there was a lack of coordination due to the lack of institutionalisation and the resulting ad hoc nature of the arrangements by the members of the network. Further, despite some progress, the contents of most existing courses have not yet been standardised. As a result, there are often no commonly agreed standards and criteria which could guarantee a higher degree of unity in the substance of what is taught. Also, courses were provided depending on what was offered by the training providers in the network and thus did not always reflect actual needs. Finally, of all the people trained by the EGT, very, very few went on a mission.

Another and maybe even the most worrying shortcoming of the EGT related to the insufficient link between training, recruitment and deployment. There were several reasons for this. Depending on the Member State, there is either greater or lesser cooperation with the national training institutes. The long time period between training and recruitment can be identified as another impediment for the deployment of well trained personnel in CSDP missions. Many course participants accept offers to take part in other missions abroad, e.g. in the framework of the UN, before they could possibly get a chance to participate in an EU mission. Given the relatively small number of personnel trained specifically in SSR, it must be considered a waste of resources by the EU that only a minority of them actually take part in CSDP missions afterwards. The example of the Civilian Response Teams, which will be presented in the next section, illustrates this problem.

In reaction to the training-recruitment-deployment gap, ZIF together with twelve partner institutions—a mix of government affiliated and non-government—from EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia) on 10 January 2011 launched a new training initiative for civilian crisis management called ENTRi (Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management). The European Commission has confirmed funding to the project under the IfS and it will run over a period of two years. Activities include the preparation and organisation of pre-deployment and specialisation courses for civilian experts either already working in or to be deployed to civilian crisis management missions worldwide, including in the framework of the EU. Secondly, ENTRi will issue certificates for training courses with the aim to standardise the quality of courses provided by European as well as non-European training providers. This represents an important development, as third country nationals accounted for around 7% of CSDP mission personnel in May 2011. So far, courses can be certified for 11 themes for which ENTRi has developed Course Concept papers. No Course Concept on SSR is included in this list yet, however, one of the specialisation courses planned by ENTRi partners will focus on SSR. Therefore, certification will become available also for this theme in the near future. Finally, the assessment of lessons learned, the sharing of good practice and the creation of a deployment manual will also be part of the project.

At present, ENTRi is having problems in finding enough participants for the courses. This is mainly due to the fact that ENTRi members cannot contact suitable candidates directly, but have to ask their respective EU Member State via CIVCOM to invite people to the training courses. And here the above mentioned problem of weak links between many EU Member States and
their national training providers still exists and complicates the recruitment of adequate candidates for training under ENTRi.

At present, discussions are ongoing among ENTRi members as to which training curricula and certificates elaborated under the EGT they will use for ENTRi. During the two years for which ENTRi will receive 80% of its operating costs from the European Commission, it is very likely that it will play a leading role in coordinating training activities at the EU-level, whereas the EGT, for which EU funding has ended, will probably play a less prominent role in this field.

The next two sub-sections will present the state of play of the Civilian Response Teams (CRT) and an ongoing project to establish a roster of SSR experts available for EU SSR missions and assess in which way these projects might help the EU in overcoming its personnel shortages.

3.4 The Civilian Response Teams (CRT)

Since rapid deployment of civilian experts constitutes a major challenge for the European Union, as could be seen in section two, Member States in 2005 adopted a concept for rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams (CRT) within the framework of CSDP. The CPCC has been managing the set-up of a CRT expert pool through calls for nominations from Member States and the EGT was tasked to develop a CRT training curriculum within the framework of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.\(^\text{143}\) The people trained by Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Finland should then take part in fact-finding missions and early assessment of crisis situations, mission planning and build-up; reinforce existing CSDP missions and operations; and provide temporary support for the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the mission area.

Although the CRT roster had originally been planned to comprise 100 national experts, Member States in 2009 decided to increase it to 200. However, until May 2011, only 18 CRT deployments or CRT-type deployments have taken place at all and very few individuals from the roster have actually been deployed.\(^\text{144}\) According to a Brussels based official, there are several reasons for this.\(^\text{145}\) There have been few deployments in general because this tool has been underused. As to the question of why so few actual selected experts in the roster have been deployed, Member States often nominate very high level civil servants for the CRT roster, with the consequence that they are not willing to free these people from duty at home, in order for them to take part in CRT training courses or actual CRT deployments. Furthermore, following the Third call for Nominations for 108 experts sent out on 4 May 2010 by the CPCC, many Member States nominated candidates that were at that time already working in CSDP missions. Hence, they cannot be deployed in another fact-finding or support mission under the CRT framework, without creating a void in the mission they are working in when a request for deployment is made.

Another challenge consists in finding enough experts for all the expert profiles contained in the CRT roster. While there are many suitable candidates with police or rule of law backgrounds as well as information analysts, political advisors and gender and human rights experts, it is relatively difficult to find mission support experts amongst the candidates. This leaves the CRT roster in need of “hands-on practical people” whose knowledge and experience is especially vital in fact-finding missions. As of January 2011, after the Third Call for Nominations, there was still a shortfall of 23 experts, mostly in the field of mission support, which left the CRT pool standing at 174.\(^\text{146}\) To address this, the CPCC sent out a renewed Third Call for Nominations for addi-

\(^\text{143}\) Lieb, 2010.
\(^\text{144}\) CRT Deployment Matrix, 2010.
\(^\text{145}\) Interview with Brussels based official, December 2010.
\(^\text{146}\) Email correspondence with EU official, 18 January and 20 May 2011.
tional experts on 16 February 2011. When the selection panels have finished their work, there should be up to 200 experts in the roster – some of them double-hatted.

Finally, gender and geographical balance, which is outlined as a goal for CRT composition in the CRT concept, has not been achieved at the time of writing. At present, there are 121 males and 53 females listed in the roster. This is a direct result of the fact that Member States nominate a much higher percentage of men than women for the pool. As such, following the Third Call for Nominations Member States nominated 75% men and 25% women. In addition, women remain highly underrepresented amongst some job categories, such as Senior Management and Police.

With regards to geographical balance, one EU official pointed out that it is hard to achieve this criterion when out of 17 Member States that nominated experts during the last call (out of 27 Member States overall), many nominated only one or very few people. Again, as the selection panels have to select first of all on the basis of the candidates’ experience and expertise, chances were slim that these Member States would be duly represented in the CRT roster.

To conclude, more Member States need to nominate a wider range of experts as well as be encouraged to nominating more women, especially for the positions of Senior Management, Police, Justice and some Mission Support categories.

3.5 The Permanent Pool of SSR Experts

Following up on an initiative by the French Presidency of the EU, a decision by the Member States from 2009 mandated the CMPD to create “Deployable European Expert Teams.” The Council decision sets out that the deployable SSR teams consisting of experts from the Member States, the Commission and the CGS—now the EEAS—will be drawn upon for short-term assessment missions to analyse the situation prior to the deployment of a CSDP mission and for providing experts in specific parts of the security sector for participation in CSDP missions. Thus, the Pool aims to “reinforce expertise on European level in the SSR domain in order to support the European Union’s SSR efforts within the framework of crisis management.”

According to some EU officials, this initiative represents an unnecessary doubling of efforts as there exists already a roster of deployable experts for CSDP missions (the CRT). However, there are differences between the two expert pools which relate to the kind of expertise and the mode of deployment. Regarding the first point, it is important to highlight that CRTs can only be deployed in civilian missions while experts from the SSR Pool can be deployed to missions having “military or defence implications” as well. Another difference is that CRTs can be deployed ‘rapidly’ while this is not a criterion for the experts in the SSR database. Moreover, according to the “Council Decision on Deployable European Expert Teams,” experts listed in the permanent SSR pool may be tasked with: “(a) promoting shared expertise on SSR-related matters within EU institutions and between MS and (b) contributing to reflection on the development of SSR theory within the EU by providing analyses for submission to the relevant Council working parties and/or the relevant European Commission departments.” Thus, their role is not restricted to their deployment in fact-finding or CSDP mission, as is the case for the CRTs. Nevertheless, CRT and SSR Pool databases are planned to be linked and Member States are invited “to do a screening of their CRT experts in order to identify those that fit the SSR expert profiles and put forward the names.”

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147 Council of the EU, 2009b.
148 Council of the EU, 2010a.
149 Interviews with EU officials, July-December 2010.
150 Council of the EU, 2009b.
151 Council of the EU, 2009b.
Candidates for the pool were nominated by the Member States and selected by the CMPD according to nine expert profiles which had been elaborated under the Swedish Presidency of the EU. These categories are: Head of SSR mission, policy and strategy, public finance, civil society, criminal justice, police, defence, intelligence and border control. During several months in 2010, a variety of people in the CGS/EEAS were involved in the selection process for the Pool and in December 2010 this process was completed. After some initial difficulties to find enough candidates for all the nine categories, there are now 104 experts from altogether 16 Member States, the EEAS and Commission listed in the pool, with around 11-20 experts for each category, with some of the experts chosen for more than one category. The fact that enough candidates could be found in a relatively short period of time (for EU standards) and that the field experience of the experts covers all continents can be considered a success.

Nevertheless, as is the case with the CRTs, women remain under-represented, with only 25 (24% of total) female experts retained in the SSR Pool. Not just for reasons of equity, but having sufficient equal male and female personnel is “an operational necessity” in order to create more representative security sector institutions, strengthen responses to Gender-Based Violence (GBV); and increase collaboration between security sector institutions and civil society organisations, including women’s groups. Member States are therefore called upon to nominate more female candidates during subsequent calls. Also, eleven Member States do not have a single expert in the Pool. Furthermore, the nine expert profiles seem to reflect the needs of ongoing police, military training or rule-of-law missions rather than aiming to include all sorts of experts that might be needed in future SSR missions. For example, the creation of a criminal justice profile responds to a clear need, as several missions have a focus on this area. Alternatively, in order to implement a broader approach to SSR, a profile for experts in the civilian justice system could have been created.

SSR experts may be deployed in the framework of cooperation between the EU and other international organisations such as the UN or the African Union. It is also envisaged that joint assessment missions between the EU and its partner countries or organisations’ experts will take place in the near future.

In mid-May 2011, the EU for the first time activated the Pool and sent a call for contributions to Member States for an SSR exploratory mission to Libya (and possibly also to Tunisia and Egypt). This will be an important test case for the usefulness of the Pool, as Member States may as well propose experts from outside the Pool for secondment to the upcoming SSR team. A Brussels based official interviewed in May 2011 mentioned that a decision on the selected members of the team will probably be made by early June 2011.

Overall, the Pool certainly has the potential to improve planning and deployment for future CSDP missions, especially if these follow the model of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau which was tasked with implementing a holistic approach to SSR. It is unfortunate, however, that the use of SSR expert profiles in formulating calls for contributions to established CSDP “SSR type mis-

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152 Interview with Brussels based official, November 2010.
153 Europe Diplomacy and Defence, 16 December 2010.
154 E-mail correspondence with EU official, 20 May 2011.
155 Valasek, 2008.
156 Missions with a strong focus on criminal justice are EUPM BiH, EUPOL COPPS, EUJUST-LEX Iraq as well as EULEX Kosovo.
157 Interview with EU official, 12 August 2010.
158 See, for example, Bloching, 2010.
sessions” was not made compulsory, as even if these profiles might not cover the whole range of the EU’s theoretical SSR agenda under CSDP, they represent a first step in the direction of coherent implementation of this agenda. Also, in order to ensure a common understanding of SSR in the CSDP framework, the number of SSR Pool experts that have taken part in an ESDC Basic or Core Course on SSR should increase from 22 at present to include all 104 experts contained in the roster.

Conclusion

This paper set out an overview of frameworks, actors and capabilities in support of security sector reform under the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. It then highlighted some major operational challenges that hinder CSDP mission planners and personnel from effectively implementing support to SSR—as defined in the mission mandates—on the ground. As was highlighted in section two, Member States are currently conducting seven small and one considerably bigger SSR-related missions without mustering the political will to deliver sufficient supply in adequately-trained personnel, money and equipment.

On the basis of this observation, the most recent institutional reforms as well as ongoing efforts to harmonise training for potential SSR mission personnel amongst Member States have been analysed. Here, the European External Action Service (EEAS) with its EU Delegations certainly has the potential to improve integrated planning of SSR missions, though it remains to be seen how its constituent parts, i.e. staff and departments from the EEAS, Commission and Member States will interact in practice. Also, the imbalance between civilian and military staff inside the EEAS should be addressed. Given that the great majority of CSDP missions are of civilian nature, more resources are needed for civilian planning as well as evaluation of past engagement. As such, the CPCC, which acts as an operational headquarters for civilian missions, should be set on an equal footing with the EUMS. Member States are advised to pay attention to calls for more personnel coming from the CPCC as its staff deals with the bulk of missions while the EUMS, which comprises around 200 people, is implementing only three ongoing military missions, although the EUMS does also provide logistical support to civilian missions. In the same vein, the European Parliament in a Report on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities from November 2010, urged the EU’s High Representative/Vice President to make sure that the CMPD as well includes a sufficient number of civilian experts.

With regards to civilian capabilities, a permanent warehouse could provide for quicker and less costly deployment of crucial equipment which would be an asset for future missions. Furthermore, while some progress has been achieved in raising awareness of the EU’s approach to SSR through trainings at the strategic level, notably in the framework of the European Security and Defence College, there is still a long way to go to ensure training on the aims of SSR for all concerned mission staff. The European Group on Training has worked towards this end by coordinating training activities across its members; however, many Member States have not deployed their nationals that have undergone SSR relevant training under this formula in CSDP missions afterwards. Therefore, future efforts should concentrate on creating a strong link between training institutes and recruiters in all the Member States. The new ENTRi project holds the potential to address this training-recruitment-deployment gap, as it will reserve pre-deployment and specialist courses for civilian experts that have been pre-selected for actual deployment or are al-

159 “In case of SSR type missions, the SSR expert profiles could be used in formulating the call for contributions” (Council of the EU, 2009b).
160 The CPCC sent a letter to The High Representative/Vice President in August asking for 40 more staff (Interview with EU official, 11 August 2010).
161 Christian Ehler (Rapporteur), 2010.
ready deployed with the EU, OSCE, UN and African Union. It is however crucial that ENTRi and the new ESDC Executive Academic board in support of training on EU SSR develop good working relationships with regards to monitoring, coordinating and publicising training activities for SSR offered by their respective members. Given the overlapping membership of some ENTRi and ESDC network members and the new impetus that is given to SSR with the creation of the new Executive Academic board, the chances are good that SSR training activities will become more visible and accessible for potential mission personnel over the coming years.

At the EU-level, the ongoing efforts to increase and make use of the Civilian Response Teams and to set-up a permanent pool of SSR experts available for rapid deployment in CSDP missions can be seen as a step in the right direction. In order to ensure that those experts will be able to work together in a CSDP mission, it is crucial that they be trained together in order to create a common understanding of aims and tasks in the EU SSR policy framework. Although some EEAS staff see the SSR Pool as a duplication of efforts, given that a roster for the Civilian Response Teams which includes experts on SSR-related topics already exists, there is an opportunity to create a team of SSR experts which rather than being just the sum of its parts, has a real added value for the EU.

At the end of the day, the main challenges for SSR missions will have to be tackled by the Member States themselves, who currently do not show much interest in further integrating their civilian and military capabilities. While the creation of recruitment and deployment mechanisms at the national level is a positive development, there remain problems of coordination as those mechanisms vary between EU Member States, ranging from the creation of units in foreign or interior ministries over the setting-up of inter-ministerial groups to outsourcing to state and private sector agencies, experts or NGOs.162

Member States must decide on whether or not they want the EU to become a viable international actor in the field of SSR. If so, they must clearly prioritise future CSDP missions in order not to waste scarce resources through mere flag raising exercises. Therefore, and in addition to addressing the operational needs mentioned above, the EU needs to agree on an SSR strategy which would clarify the concrete criteria for intervention as well as objectives to be achieved in the framework of SSR-related CSDP missions.

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