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Militär und Sozialwissenschaften

herausgegeben vom Arbeitskreis
Militär und Sozialwissenschaften (AMS)
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The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
The International Security Forum (ISF) is designed as a forum for discussing ways to increase communication and cooperation between institutions engaged in research related to international security in Europe and North America. Over the years, the ISF has brought together hundreds of researchers, academics, civil servants, military officers and media representatives from some 50 countries. Due to the success of the ISF, the Swiss government, more particularly the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, continue to support the biennial ISF conference, which is alternately organised in Geneva and Zurich.

The 4th ISF conference in Geneva, November 15–17, 2000, brought together about 600 high-level civil servants, diplomats, military officers, academics and representatives of non-governmental organisations from the Euro-Atlantic area. The conference succeeded in creating a platform for discussion and exchange on current security issues. The conference promoted practical cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) member states and beyond and identified future key issues and trends in international security.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was one of the three principal organisers of the 4th ISF, along with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Just previously, in October 2000, DCAF was inaugurated by Federal Councillor Adolf Ogi, the then Swiss President, who expressed the wish of Switzerland and 30 other countries, to support and underline the goal of promoting democratic civil-military relations. In its short existence, DCAF has supported and initiated over a hundred seminars, publications and projects, among others, an international project to advise President Kostunica of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on future security sector reform.

This publication includes the proceedings and presented papers of the various DCAF-sessions at the 4th ISF. The publication reflects the debates and foci of attention of the DCAF-sessions: security sector reform, parliamentary oversight of the security sector, research on civil-military relations as well as lessons learned and recommendations for future democratisation of civil-military relations.

Via this and future publications DCAF remains committed to foster an international and multidisciplinary dialogue that will identify future key issues and trends in good governance and security sector reform.

*Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler*

*Director DCAF, Geneva*
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The views and opinions expressed (unless otherwise declared) are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Geneva, July 2002

Hans Born, Marina Caparini
and Philipp Fluri
Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control and Reform of the Security Sector

Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri

I From Civil-Military Relations to Security Sector Reform

When the Fourth International Security Forum was held in November 2000, the idea of security sector reform (SSR) was just beginning to spread through those policy and academic communities that deal with democratisation, development, defence and foreign assistance. The emergence of the concept suggested the growing acceptance of a broader definition of security than the traditional definition focused on military security of the state. According to this broader definition, security has non-military elements as well, and the object of security is not only the state, but importantly includes individuals and society more widely. Security sector reform expands the scope of security to include “public security”, or the safety of the individual from threats of crime, disorder and violence. Because security sector reform is focused on the use of public resources to provide security for citizens, there is a necessary focus on state (often executive) institutions and public policy. Such institutions include military forces, policing structures, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, border management services, the judicial system and penal institutions, as well as the state bureaucratic structures that exist to formulate policy and manage these institutions. SSR accordingly recommends a holistic approach to reforming state structures responsible for providing security. Although the policy and academic communities promoting the security sector reform concept endorse a holistic approach, serious practical obstacles exist in achieving a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the enormously complex public policy domains relevant to security, and the multi-sectoral reform requirements that would inhere in a democratising state.

Security sector reform also has a very significant emphasis on good governance, characterised by the World Bank as encompassing the rule of law, predictable, transparent and open policy-making, a professional bureaucracy that serves the public good, and a vibrant civil society that actively engages in public affairs. Good governance when applied to the security sector means the effective, efficient, participatory, accountable and transparent functioning of state institutions that have a monopoly of legitimate use of coercion.

Security sector reform represents the evolution and rapprochement of two distinct policy and academic communities concerned with the spheres of development on the one hand, and defence and security on the other. As a concept, the emergence of SSR has been credited to changes in thinking among members of the development community, specifically their recognition that basic insecurity, whether from external, military threats or internal threats such as civil war, violence, crime, disorder, injustice and impunity constitutes a serious if not insurmountable obstacle to sustainable economic development, social justice and poverty alleviation. The inability or inefficiency of a state in providing for the basic security needs of its citizens thus poses a significant obstacle to stabilisation and democratic consolidation. In numerous post-authoritarian states of Latin America, for example, it is widely recognised that the inability of the state to provide for the public security of citizens against spiralling crime rates is potentially the most destabilising factor in the consolidation of democracy throughout the region.

The other main community that has broached the notion of security sector reform is comprised of students of defence affairs and civil-military relations, a domain traditionally dominated by political scientists, as well as historical and sociological approaches to understanding the relationships between the armed forces, the state, and the rest of society. The politics of defence policy formulation and implementation was a natural area of concern of traditional civil-military relations, particularly the effect of different institutional and political perspectives on how national defence requirements were perceived and managed.

One particularly pressing area of concern in the field of civil-military relations concerns the democratic control of armed forces: the predominantly institutional constraints, checks and balances that serve to ensure that armed forces are constitutionally regulated; are under civilian control; and, are depoliticised and their members do not play an inappropriate role in domestic politics. With democratic control and civilian supremacy over the military, the armed forces are subordinate to institutionalised civilian control from both the executive and the legislative branches. There are clear chains of military command and political responsibility for each type of contingency in which the armed forces can be used, and military use in peacetime is constitutionally regulated. More over, the executive and legislative branches share responsibility for control and oversight of defence expenditures. Finally, civilian experts must be able to provide advice on defence and security issues and must be available to staff relevant state institutions.

While establishing democratic control of armed forces was a clear priority for emerging democracies in the early transition period, other security-related problems soon appeared on the policy and public agenda. In many transition countries, crime rates increased sharply with political and economic liberalisation, spurring a demand for reforms in the criminal justice system in order to enhance the capacities of police, prosecutors and courts. However also in many of these countries, police lack a service ethic, are unaccountable, and are implicated in crime, corruption, and abuses of the human rights of citizens. Internal security forces have often proven to be even more resistant to reform and democratisation than military forces. Judicial reform has also lagged, and judicial systems, to be legitimate, must be able to create a sense in the people that they will effectively uphold constitutional principles and defend their human rights against abuses by police and other public officials. These are but several of the main parts of the broad institutional framework evoked by security sector reform.
The concept of security sector reform originated in the policy community. Perhaps because of the entrenched departmental structures and tradition of distinct, long-standing academic fields such as economics and political science, academics have been slower to embrace the idea. Yet there is now (mid-2002) a perceptible change in academic research and writing on defence and security reform that reflects the shifts in many Western democracy assistance and outreach programs to democratising states. The development and spread of the idea of SSR among academic and policy circles is an example of what has come to be termed an “epistemic community”. That is, the spreading and gaining of acceptance of a new way of thinking about a problem, in this case effective and accountable security provision to citizens in a democratic state, among a network or community of specialised scholars and practitioners. Since the ISF in Geneva in November 2000, it is possible to trace the development of a SSR discourse and practices both in development/reform assistance and in actual reforms undertaken.

The value of the concept of SSR is also clearly a function of the new security agenda, heralded by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although some strategic analysts were warning of the dangers of asymmetric, transnational and non-military threats well before September 11, their voices remained mainly on the margins of national and international security dialogue. The events of September 11 drove home to governments and publics alike that “end of history” optimism of the post-Cold War period needed to be replaced by an appreciation of a more complex security environment where the threat is unclear, and the existing means to counter such ambiguous threats are clearly inadequate and outdated.

Because many of those coming to the SSR discourse are arriving from either the civil-military relations or the development perspectives, this accounts for some continuing tendencies in “stove-piping” – that is, concentration of attention on distinct component elements of SSR, such as military and defence reform, to the neglect of certain others (such as police, judicial and penal reform) or to the whole of the security sector. This tendency is understandable given the complexity of the subject. Developing an expertise in any one component of SSR requires substantial time and commitment. Establishing democratic civil-military relations and effective defence reform is a distinct field unto itself, as indeed is the establishment of effective, neutral, law-based and accountable policing, or an independent, impartial and effective judicial system. Each of these components of security sector reform draws on a distinct canon of academic literature and wealth of past practices and policies.

Few scholars or practitioners could truly claim to have an expertise in SSR in the comprehensive understanding of the concept. Developing the comprehensive, holistic knowledge and perspective that is integral to SSR is extremely challenging and this process has only recently begun. The challenging nature of the task is reflected in this collection of essays, which, when written in late 2000, were only beginning to broach the idea of a comprehensive and holistic approach to public provision of security.

It is perhaps not surprising that the emergence of the concept of security sector reform coincided with the shift from transition to consolidation of post-communist and post-authoritarian states. Such states have moved from the stage where they are actively undergoing institutional transformation of formal state structures to political democracies, to the more gradual and challenging processes of democratic consolidation and democratising society. While formal democracy exists in most of these countries, many tend to face lingering problems of violations of human rights, corruption, clientelism, arbitrary exercise of power, weakness of rule of law, and weakness of the accountability of public officials. Free and fair elections take place regularly in the new democracies, but are not sufficient in and of themselves for keeping state power under effective democratic control. Additional mechanisms and processes of accountability are necessary to make it more likely that public officials follow established rules and procedures, acknowledge and respond to citizen preferences, are fair and efficient in the appropriation and spending of public money, and avoid exploiting public office for private gain.

The articles in this volume reflect these early steps towards a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of security, and a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of democratisation and the relationship of agencies of coercion to the modern democratic state and society. The majority of the authors write from a background in and perspective of civil-military relations. That is, they speak to the requirements and constraints of defence and military reform, establishing democratic and civilian control of armed forces, parliamentary oversight of the military, and the relationship of the military institution to broader democratic society. Writing in 2000, the contributors to this volume look back at a decade of reform and transition to democracy. Their insights into the evolution of civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces in the Central and East European region reflect more broadly the evolution of a field of inquiry that has long been dominated by Western, and particularly Anglo-American, voices and assumptions.

2 The Experiences of Post-Communist Europe

Almost all of the contributors to this volume bring to it a regional focus through academic expertise or policy experience in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. This regional focus is reflected in the main arguments, lessons learned, and points of focus for the discussions on democratisation, civil-military relations, and security sector reform. Specificities of communist civil-military relations, such as the strong system of civilian (Party) control over the armed forces and only superficial sentiments of loyalty and commitment to the party-state within the ranks of the military, help to explain the low risk and incidence of military intervention in post-communist politics.

Following the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, many analysts feared that armed forces and security services across the region could mount a praetorian threat and intervene to halt the transitions to democracy. Despite armed resistance by security service personnel in Romania during the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu, a failed coup by military hard-liners in the Soviet Union in 1991, and attempted military suppression of independence movements in the Baltic states, fears of military coup appear to have been exaggerated. There exist no military regimes in the region, nor calls for military intervention during times of crisis. There has been no significant military intervention or influence in domestic politics in most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
One of the main challenges facing post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe has been achieving fundamental military reform and democratising civil-military relations. Reflecting the relative success of democratisation more generally, much progress has been made in the field of civil-military relations and establishing democratic control of armed forces, especially in states of Central Europe and the Baltic states. Nevertheless, there continue to exist various problems in civil-military relations which include the consistent under-funding of personnel and materiel, poor public opinion about the armed forces and defence more generally, low morale within the armed forces, and insufficient civilian defence expertise both in government and in the non-governmental sectors. The simultaneity of Central and Eastern European reforms across all main sectors of state activity made the task of defence reform all the more challenging, as the defence and security sectors have had to contend with competing social and economic priorities. And yet the importance of democratic control of armed forces was generally recognised by the political elite, and its development as a policy priority given substantial impetus by the prospects of NATO and EU enlargement. Many institutional reforms have been implemented and the principle of democratic civilian control of armed forces appears well-entrenched throughout the region.

Problems that now remain in civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces for many countries of the region tend to derive from the political culture of governing elites and the mass public, and concern the fundamental redefinition of the relationship between state agencies of coercion (chiefly armed forces, intelligence agencies and policing services) and society. Particular issues include increasing accountability and transparency of state security bureaucracies. The perpetual challenge in civil-military relations, as in democracy more generally, is finding ways to improve democratic accountability of the organs and agents of government, both civilian (political and administrative), and military, while also ensuring the efficient and effective functioning of those institutions.

3 Contents of the Book

This book has been divided into four main parts. The papers in the first section provide an overview of the fields of civil-military relations and security sector reform. The second section deals with parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, an issue of particular concern to democratic societies in terms of their relations with their security sectors. The third section examines the particular challenges faced by Central and Eastern European countries in efforts to establish democratic control of armed forces. Finally, the book closes with the personal reflections of a number of individuals who have worked in or studied the subject of civil-military relations and security sector reform. These individuals were asked to assess how successful were past efforts to facilitate democratic control of armed forces and security sector reform, and to give their forecasts of where the fields are heading.

4 Major Themes

A number of major themes emerge from this diverse group of articles. Many authors suggest that while significant institutional reform has occurred, there remains much to be achieved in the democratic control of armed forces in transition states. While the legislative-institutional framework of new democratic political systems may now be in place in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the challenge now lies in inculcating norms, attitudes, policy processes, management of public administration in security, and cultivating civil society and relations with other civil society organisations like media and interest groups. These are the less tangible social and cultural factors that give substance and meaning to democratic political institutions, and imply the extension of democracy to the social sphere.

Another theme emphasises that the management of security, with particular emphasis on the armed forces and defence, is an area of public policy. It requires the building up of government capacity to formulate policy, implement and adjust it, as conditions and resources require. Management of security policy also reflects the broader political environment, the extent to which consensus is sought or thought necessary, and the politicisation of public administration at the higher levels. Democratic control of armed forces therefore raises the related issue of democratic control of military and defence policy, including components such as defence spending, force structure, missions of the armed forces, and procurement decisions.

It also emerges from this volume that one of the main deficiencies experienced by the post-communist states in the management of defence and security as a public policy area is in the area of civilian expertise in defence affairs. Such civilian expertise enables more effective and competent assertion of democratic control of defence policy, providing governments with external sources of expertise to the military institution that is directly affected by such decisions, and hence serving as a potential check on the tendency for institutional self-interest to prevail. Since the area of defence and security affairs was traditionally monopolised by the military in the communist era, development of civilian expertise has been slow and inadequate.

Finally, many of the contributors offered insights regarding outreach and assistance efforts from Western democracies to Central and Eastern European states. The absence of coordination and cooperation in donor assistance is repeatedly observed. Nevertheless it is also acknowledged that, despite its often uncoordinated, competitive, and self-serving nature, Western assistance and incentives have proven generally helpful in establishing democratic control of armed forces.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is certainly fair to say that security sector reform is a concept on the move. If the notion of security sector reform in 2000 was still rather new and had a strong developmental policy aspect to it, in 2002, and especially after the events of September the 11th, 2001, security sector reform is strongly seen in the light of inter-agency cooperation on both
the national and international level and pertinent institution-building to fight against newly identified risks and threats to democracies. The transition to democracy and the institutionalisation of democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector remain crucial core concepts of the reforms that are to be implemented. However, vis-à-vis the point when these articles were written in 2000, the objectives of the reforms have become much clearer and many governments have become much more determined in their implementation. The proceedings of future ISF meetings will certainly reflect this state of affairs. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces will be proud to assist these processes wherever it is given the possibility of doing so.
PART I:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Introduction

Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri

This first collection of articles deals with civil-military relations and the broader concept and field of Security Sector Reform, particularly the effectiveness of Western assistance programs to date. Christopher Smith opens with a brief tour d’hui and describes the main challenges to be confronted in advancing the concept and practice of Security Sector Reform. In his view, SSR has become a trendy term in certain policy circles, and although it is increasingly used to refer to disparate activities, it lags far behind in terms of its intellectual development. Nevertheless, encouraging signs include the firm link that has been established between SSR and good governance, the understanding that SSR involves more than just military reform, and the consensus that effective SSR requires a comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach. Some preliminary lessons learned in SSR can be identified. These include the observations that successful SSR requires significant financial resources, that donors need to respect national views and preferences regarding their security structures, and that donors further need to avoid hypocritical and blatantly self-serving approaches in promoting SSR.

In the following article, Anthony Forster assesses recent Western donor assistance and policy transfer mechanisms in democratic control of armed forces and SSR to states in transition to democracy. He notes that Western assistance in this domain generally seeks to ensure accountability and legitimacy of the state’s armed forces, to erode distrust between former enemies, and to bolster peace between states by consolidating new democracies. Forster concurs with Smith concerning the continued fuzziness and confusion surrounding the concept of SSR, with implications for the effectiveness of assistance that is based on it. Another problem is the often competitive and uncoordinated assistance efforts by Western donors. The outcome of Western attempts at policy transfer in democratic control of armed forces appears fairly successful on the surface. However, deeper problems remain, including insufficiently accountable armed forces, lag in attitudinal change, inadequate parliamentary oversight, and the underdeveloped capacity of civil society, especially the media, to help hold government policy-makers accountable for their decisions and actions. Forster ends by noting that Western civil-military relations should also be the subject of scrutiny and can be improved in many areas. In attempting to push forward the discourse and agenda of SSR, Western governments would do well to look at their own security sectors and ponder the requirements for reform, better coordination, and improved accountability.

Jan Trapans draws an analogy between SSR and the more traditional concept of a national security strategy, which looks at various facets of security – military, economic and societal – and includes the domestic process by which the strategy is formulated by civilians with input by security experts and consensus is developed. Trapans also recommends better coordination and planning to avoid repetition and redundant bilateral programs, and to provide a continuous, sustained support to reform efforts. Further, he maintains that the predominance of bilateral approaches to SSR assistance should be complemented by a regional approach for addressing certain issues, such as crisis management.
1 Mapping the Landscape: The State of Security Sector Reform in the New Millennium

Christopher Smith

Over the past three years, security sector reform (SSR) has become a ‘catch all’ term for a series of reviews, reforms and reconstructions of security forces around the world.

However, from an academic perspective, there is a significant lag. The research world is still spending a great deal of time understanding and responding to what is going on. At present, in relation to security sector reform we lack the ‘over-the-horizon’ research that can link together areas such as:

- The changing strategic landscape.
- Responding to weak states becoming weaker and weak states attempting to reconstruct.
- Future roles and missions in relation to new regional security issues to confront, such as trafficking and border security issues.
- Where adjustments and changes to the defence industrial base can be identified and addressed.
- How, politically, SSR can be developed in partnerships, especially amongst aid donors and recipients and how can the conditionality trap be avoided.

All these questions add up to the need for a major research effort but, at this juncture, not much is happening. What is going on at the moment is interesting but more focused. The SSR debate is becoming firmly situated in the wider, non-military security debate. As such, the framework has become much more inclusive to include:

- The need for SSR to address non-military security issues.
- The importance of process, which has led to SSR becoming firmly rooted in the good governance debate.
- The need to develop a holistic and integrated framework for understanding SSR.
Developments in the Real World

There is a solid belief that SSR has to be comprehensive to be legitimate. At one level this may be correct. First, to professionalise the armed forces but not the police force, for example, would be a mistake. Second, modernising and professionalising decision making structures, especially the legislature, is meaningless if the key people involved do not understand defence and security issues.

In surveying the global response to SSR, it is clear that there is a great deal underway that could fall under the rubric of SSR but is not in any way comprehensive. In many respects, Sierra Leone is the exception that proves the rule. So are Indonesia and Nigeria where, it can be argued, democratisation is SSR and vice versa.

In Latin America, the size and influence of the armed forces have been reduced significantly since the beginning of the 1990s. Certainly this has been reflected in military expenditure statistics, which have reflected significant decline, until recently when the trend appears to have been reversed. However, there are well founded fears that that democratic reform in the region is beginning to take short cuts and is in danger of evolving into populism and the politics of frustration. Former serving officers are beginning to identify and fill the gaps and power vacuums that have emerged, which is serving to further their authority.

South East Asia is a region where the military influence in politics has been significant. In at least four countries – Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia – very little has changed. In these countries the political influence of the military ranges from the unduly strong to comprehensive.

Elsewhere in South East Asia, the fall out from the 1997 financial crisis sheds much light on SSR in the region. For example, after 1997, military expenditure in the region declined dramatically and many modernisation programmes were either abandoned or put on hold. This was especially the case in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Now, as the region begins to recover, military expenditure figures are on the rise and modernisation programmes are becoming unfrozen. Does this mean that there has merely been a pause in the South East Asian arms race? Perhaps. It might also mean that constitutional forces are in control of budgetary allocations and procurement decisions.

East Timor, struggling to come to terms with UN trusteeship and independence, has taken small but highly significant steps to understand the scope of its future defence and security needs.

Across the African sub-continent, SSR is very much on the agenda, but in different ways. Following the 1994 election and the end of apartheid, the restructuring of the armed forces became one of the major success stories for the African National Congress (ANC). Perhaps of some significance, the South African programme was internally driven, with only partial funding from aid donors. Moreover, another significant aspect of the programme was the appeal to the professional side of the armed forces. The process was as successful as it was remarkable, but was it as radical as it seems? Police reform has certainly lagged behind and the degree of institutional restructuring is less than might have been attempted.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa, South Africa is now taking the lead in advising and helping individual countries design new security architecture and implement SSR programmes. These include the Seychelles, Lesotho, Tanzania and Mozambique. Also the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has recently voted to adopt a raft of projects and initiatives that relate to SSR.

Further north, the Government of Rwanda is attempting to build a new security architecture and is currently developing mechanisms that will facilitate the production of a defence white paper, involving representatives of civil society. British Military Advisory and Training Teams are active in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the UK has made a major commitment to SSR in Sierra Leone.

In Sierra Leone, the combination of a BMATT programme coupled with “root and branch” security sector reconstruction adds up to one of the most ambitious programmes yet undertaken. However, the durability of the conflict and the fragility of the government are major obstacles. The key advantage, however, is that the government and the donors are starting off with a blank sheet because vested, institutional interests are either weak or non-existent.

The US Congress has invested $42 million in the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, a roving sub-continental road show with a key emphasis upon civil-military relations.

France is engaged in reform programmes but it is not clear where this will lead. Much depends upon how the country resolves the ongoing debate over its role in Africa. Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden currently provide various types of military assistance to a number of African countries. These programmes were originally focused upon operational efficiency but they are now more tied to governance and democracy.

Where might SSR develop in the future, given the growing political will at the international level to press for SSR programmes, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and amongst developing countries?

When considering and planning the future, there are various obstacles that need to be identified and recognised.

First, the financial resources required for comprehensive SSR are massive. Many of those now engaged in SSR realise that original ‘ball park’ estimates are far too low. In this respect, expectations should be measured.

Second, donors should avoid unwittingly taking the ‘do as we say, not as we do’ trap. Western donors who push aid recipients to undertake SSR programmes should first think carefully whether enough has been done at the domestic level to warrant placing pressure upon aid recipients. In Africa, aid is considered a right, not a gift.

Third, there is a clear need to respect national views and interpretations over what a government’s security architecture should look like.

Fourth, many governments advocating and funding SSR programmes are also extremely active in the advanced end of the international arms market. Much of the equipment they may be trying to sell could be considered ‘inappropriate’ for poor and indebted countries. This is a major contradiction that needs to be addressed and resolved.
2 West Looking East: Civil-Military Relations
Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe

Anthony Forster

Abstract

This paper argues that there is clear agreement amongst western donors that security sector reform is both necessary and an important priority for governments and non-governmental actors. It is therefore no surprise that in the last decade there has been a significant effort to develop policy transfer mechanisms to transition states. In terms of the processes, the international community has been important in defining a set of characteristics and standards for what constitutes democratic control of the armed forces and developed a clear idea of the actions necessary for effective security reform. The Transatlantic Alliance has been central to this process. Since it offers a set of characteristics, shared norms and a prescriptive solution to many problems. The centrality of NATO in leading peacekeeping missions has set a de facto standard of interoperability of equipment, standard operating procedures and command and control, offering a demonstration effect. However, NATO has also been important in extending the values and norms of the transatlantic security community well beyond those who aspire to its membership. The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) have been important instruments in supporting this change and benchmarking standards. Through a willingness of NATO to undertake military missions with other states (on its own terms) and the sharing of values and norms without the need to commit to NATO membership, the Alliance has also developed soft mechanisms of policy transfer. However, without doubt the prospect of NATO membership has played a central role in establishing a set of characteristics, which applicants have to meet. Membership Action Plans represent hard policy transfer and are a major instrument of policy.

However, bilateral western assistance has been contradictory. Competition amongst Western governments to provide bilateral assistance and especially the lack of co-ordination has hindered and in some cases been counterproductive as states are overloaded with the demanding task of reform. Contradictory Western interests have pitched the need for arms sales and economic benefit against the needs of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, especially the limited resources available for modernisation. Moreover, once CEE states have been incorporated into NATO, these states face new challenges in the process of modernisation. Whilst the Western hope is that incorporation will consolidate democratic control of the armed forces and the modernisation process, it remains unclear if this is actually happening. The incentive for change is reduced; the level of domestic and international funding for professionalisation decreases; and NATO countries further reduce their efforts in these states.

The impact or scope of external influence varies between phases of modernisation. In the initial phase, external assistance may be greater than in a phase where the basis policy lines have been determined and domestic actors play a more direct role. Self-help remains a central aspect determining the embeddedness of reform. It cannot be imposed from outside. The trajectory of modernisation is not always orderly uncomplicated and linear process. Domestic factors are central to the process. The role of a wide range of societal influences such as the media, public opinion and the degree of consensus amongst political elites and political parties do play a part in shaping the speed and direction of modernisation.

Introduction

This paper offers a survey of Western attempts to provide policy transfer to CEE over the last decade. It does so by offering an analysis of the key actors, instruments and outcomes in the area of security sector reform (SSR). In the first section the paper briefly explores what Western actors are trying to achieve in terms of their aims and objectives. The second section of the paper examines the key instruments of policy transfer and the third section reflects more broadly on what is left to do. The argument of the paper is there is a danger that poorly thought through aims and objectives of SSR are hindering the transformation of civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The concept of SSR needs to be better operationalised and in doing so not only will this improve both the means and the needs of policy transfer, but SSR will have a direct relevance for Western states who themselves are undergoing a major shift in the way in which armed forces are organised and deployed.

What is the West Trying to Achieve?

The first point to make is that definitional issues are important in thinking about what the West is trying to achieve. There is certainly a wide range of choice and terminology varies, whether ‘defence diplomacy’, ‘security sector reform’, ‘preventive defence’ or more plainly ‘democratic control of the armed forces.’ On the one hand, one could argue that this is a matter of national branding, with differences simply reflecting particular domestic and linguistic requirements. Moreover,
while intellectually untidy, some might argue that fundamentally nomenclature is unimportant, substance and outcomes are really what matters. One might add that whatever the nomenclature, the fact of the matter is that Western actors are engaged in a whole range of activities, which share important similarities in terms of means and ends. Broadly these means and ends are three-fold: first, a normative assumption that democratic civilian control of armed forces ensures accountability and legitimacy for the maintenance of state force and if necessary its use; second, engagement through contact and shared activity will break down distrust and barriers between former enemies. By this means partners can communicate values and through debate develop shared understandings; and third, there is an operating assumption that democracies cannot or will not be able to go to war, thus SSR ensures a peaceful future.

Despite broad agreement about the goals of SSR, it is not an unfair criticism to suggest that the absence of a robust definition of what is meant by these terms underscores the ‘fuzzy thinking’ surrounding SSR and ultimately undermines the effectiveness of it. As Chris Smith’s presentation makes clear, despite the rapid expansion of international military cooperation in the last decade, there has been little rigorous analysis of the nature, challenges and consequences of SSR, as policy analysts run to catch up with events on the ground. The absence of a shared understanding as to what are the aims and objective of SSR is having the following consequences:

- SSR is routinely defined in a holistic way to include concern with good governance, conflict prevention, human rights promotion and post conflict reconstruction. The growing number of issues which are now included within the area of security sector reform are leading to a loss of focus, as SSR becomes entwined in much broader range of transition issues, notably issues of state capacity, democratisation and market reform.
- An understandable temptation exists to re-brand long-standing activities as SSR without re-evaluating what needs exist and thus developing new or re-targeting of old policies to make them relevant to the circumstances in CEE.
- There is not one Western model of civil-military relations but several. In the absence of any shared understanding about the fundamental similarities and differences between these different models, or how different checks and balances work in particular models, this is leading to considerable confusion in terms of exactly what policies, ideas and values should be transferred.
- Without shared conceptions, governments, international organisations (IOs) and NGOs often pursue conflicting goals and undertake incompatible activities in the region of CEE in part because they are examining different parts of the security sector reform process without taking a holistic view of the process or how different national and international programmes fit together on the ground. However, within a broad SSR agenda, Western actors are pursuing quite different aims and objectives.
- Western actors – especially governments and IOs are both partners and rivals in the process of SSR, in part because the rewards are potentially lucrative. For governments, the attraction of arms sales and other economic benefits are difficult to ignore. For international organisations, the search for new competences is part of the process of re-inventing themselves and denying opportunities to potential rivals. This tension comes to the fore without a shared understanding of what is to be achieved.
- The absence of a debate about what are the fundamental characteristics of SSR, raises quite serious issues about effectiveness, what works and what does not work.
- Donor fatigue should not be underestimated. In the absence of a clearly articulated explanation of why the West and particularly governments do what they do this is even more likely. It risks popular support for funding; and it risks introducing gimmickery through a temptation to keep branding and re-branding similar activities to give new impetus to them instead of a focus on substance.

What are the Key Policy Instruments?

The West is not a homogeneous actor, but has a variety of constituent parts. Bilateral government-to-government activities are supplemented by the role of international actors such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Western European Union (WEU) and NATO (through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative), are all active in developing multilateral military cooperation between Western states and their Central and Eastern European partners. The range of actors has a number of consequences in terms of the policy instruments used:

- First, governments remain powerful stakeholders in the process, providing the principal source of funding and other resources. There are quite distinctive national approaches to security sector reform, which affect the type of activity undertaken, the bilateral partners selected for attention, and the amount of resources allocated to particular activities. National policy instruments remain important and indeed central to Western activities. This is particularly so in relation to places at national command and staff colleges and training establishments, the deployment of national advisory and training teams, and in quantitative terms in relation to conferences, workshops, seminars and courses.
- Second, governments are keen to retain a leading role in transforming civil-military relations. One consequence is that some governments have tried to maximise their autonomy by limiting the remit of international organisations and routinely used international institutions as multilateral cover for the pursuit of purely national objectives. Whilst this is perhaps unsurprising, the absence of any serious mechanisms for deconfliction are having important effects and lead to a number of important mixed messages being sent to recipients which undermines the effectiveness of international approaches to security sector reform.
Third, despite the lack of Western homogeneity, international efforts have been important. The Transatlantic Alliance has been most central in defining a set of technical characteristics and standards for armed forces.

- The centrality of NATO in leading peacekeeping missions has set a de facto standard for interoperability of equipment, standard operating procedures and command and control offering a demonstration effect.
- NATO has also been important in extending the values and norms of the transatlantic security community well beyond those who aspire to membership. The North Atlantic Co-operation Council, PIP and activities in the spirit of PIP such as the Defence Academies Consortium have been important instruments in supporting this change and benchmarking standards. The willingness of NATO to undertake military missions with other states (on its own terms) and the sharing of values and norms without the need to commit to NATO membership are both based on the principle of ‘transformation through convergence’.
- The role of PIP and activities in the spirit of PIP require particular mention. The Consortium of Defence Academies is engaged in particularly innovative work through its CONNECTIONS publications including a journal, monthly bulletin paper series on security issues. The purpose is to provide a relevant service of academic excellence and independence to scholars, researchers and military educators across the PIP Community. Importantly, each of these will be translated into Russian and French.
- Fourth, the EU, the Council of Europe and OSCE have made an important contribution to establishing shared democratic norms, especially through the PHARE and TACIS programmes. As with NATO, the EU has promoted clear entry criteria which it requires of states before the European Commission will treat any application seriously.
- Finally, NGO activity has been important in providing assistance on issue of particular concern and in attempting to provide depth to the relationship between East and West.

The diversity of activities is extraordinary:

- Within the military-to-military level these cover (1) military education programmes run at national or joint service establishments, including initial officer and advanced training; (2) military training programmes for overseas personnel and in-country establishments for example language training courses and NCO training; (3) activities of diplomatic and military roles of Defence Attaches; (4) assistance in the form of permanent training teams or establishments as well as short term training teams who assist in the reform process; (5) individual personnel exchange programmes of civil and military secondees, exchange officers/advisers and Loan Service personnel eg through the deployment of civil servants in MoDs and individual attachments of in-country advisers; (6) high level visits, for example by ships, aircraft and military units as well as other military and civilian visits; (7) training exercises including crisis management, command post and field training exercises; (8) military confidence-building measures (CBMs) and military support for arms control and defence conversion as part of broader conflict prevention strategies; (9) academic and practitioner seminars/conferences and workshops targeted at military audiences.

- At the civilian level these include (1) the training of civilians to work in defence ministries, especially policy planning and assistance in preparing military budgets; (2) assistance with procurement decision-making and developing appropriate relationships with defence related industries; (3) assistance in developing parliamentary expertise for oversight of the executive; (4) the development of a crisis management capacity.
- At the military and society level these activities include (1) capacity building in terms of building NGO centres of defence studies; (2) the development of expertise to organise information campaigns; (3) decommissioning of small arms

What are the Outcomes of Policy Transfer?

In general terms the level of development of civil-military relations is unrecognisable from those of ten years ago. Progress has been rapid and few states now dispute the goals of democratic and civilian control or the need to embrace internationally approved standards. Both ‘West’ and ‘East’ should acknowledge this progress. However, the fact remains that the trajectory of SSR is not always an orderly, uncomplicated and linear process, and we should not be complacent in what has been achieved or blind to future needs. A brief review suggest the following points:

- The extent to which democratic control of the armed forces has become a guiding set of principles is not clear in every state. In many case the rhetoric of democratic control is promoted by CEE states, but few governments have established the full range of features required of modern democratically accountable armed forces.
- At one level, ‘first generation’ institutional issues such as the drafting and approval of new constitutional structures and the allocation of clear lines of responsibility have been remarkably successful. Most states in CEE have recognisable democratic structures in place. However, a “second” generation behavioural set of issues is emerging as being central to the on-going reform process. These are concerned with the effective operation of institutions and procedures and as important attitudinal change, the acquisition of shared norms and values by civilians and military. Whilst insti-
tutional structures have changed rather rapidly created on paper, attitudinal change appears to be taking place over a longer time horizon than institutional or structural change.

- A significant degree of consensus has emerged amongst political elites and political parties. However, parliamentary debates are often poorly attended with focus on headline goals and less on the details of policy; parliamentary accountability therefore requires constant vigilance to ensure that accountability in theory, is accountability in fact. The effectiveness of systems is highly dependent upon the vigilance of parliamentarians on the relevant committees and their tenacity in pursuing an issue (as well as on interested non-parliamentary interest and pressure groups, who play an important external role in ensuring that the government of the day pays the proper attention to public scrutiny and accountability).

- Domestic factors are central to the process of professionalisation. Whilst governments and the military have done much to adapt old structures to new circumstances, the role of a wide range of societal influences such as the media and public opinion have lagged behind in generating a serious non-governmental capacity to make an independent contribution to the checks and balances required in modern civil-military relations. The quality of press reporting of military issues is rather poor – an issue which will have long-term consequences for society-military relations.

- The outcomes of policy transfer are rather inconsistent across the region. There appear to be national favourites, where certain countries are particular favourites and others are not. One group of scholars has referred to ‘the Outsiders’, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, where the impact of the West is diminished by the exclusion of these states from the possibility of joining the EU and NATO. Here the transformation of civil-military relations is slow and needs particular nurturing to ensure membership of Western institutions does not become divisive.

- The transformation process is, at least in some cases leading to the advocacy of inappropriate models for the particular security needs of a state. NATO for example, is actively promoting what I have elsewhere termed a power-projection model with an emphasis on rapidly mobile forces, capable of operating outside national territories, with an emphasis on volunteer rather than conscript forces. This at least in part, is a consequence of the absence of developed partnerships between East and West.

- Once CEE states have been incorporated into NATO, these states face new challenges in the process of professionalisation. Whilst the Western hope is that incorporation will consolidate professional armed forces and the professionalisation process, it remains unclear if this happening. The incentive for change is reduced; the level of domestic and international funding for professionalisation decreases; and NATO countries further reduce their efforts in these states.

The New Agenda

Looking back over a decade of reform, the questions of what is left to do and how can we do it better, raise serious issues and there are eight points to make:

- First, we need a systematic research driven review of activities in the area of security sector reform, which further explores some of the issues set out in this paper: first, as yet there is only a cursory understanding of what has been achieved by governments, international organisations and private sectors; second, there is no comprehensive overview of how governments are addressing issues in SSR; and third, there is no single authoritative repository of what has been achieved both intellectually and in policy terms. There exists a pressing need for research co-operation to address and to inform future activities, and to directly shape the intellectual agenda over the next decade. If policy analysts do not do this, it is unlikely that governments will, with as a consequence the loss of focus in SSR programmes.

- Second, the role of partnership needs to be re-evaluated. Self-help remains a central aspect of the transformation process. It cannot and should not be imposed from outside, but self-help needs to be facilitated by international actors. Some Western countries are offering real long-term partnerships rather than ‘quick fix solutions’. In view of this, there is a growing need for recipient partners to decide their own reform agendas and priorities. Moreover, not only do they need to accept aid but they also need to ensure effective implementation.

- Third, important areas and aspects of SSR have been overlooked by the international community. First, the role of a wide range of societal influences such as the media and public opinion has been undervalued and Western efforts need to better support them. This is not just a matter of building up non-governmental centres for defence analysis, though this is important. It requires mechanisms to examine and measure the impact of public opinion on defence policies to develop a better understanding of how policy-makers can communicate and legitimate policy. Second, more attention needs to be placed on ‘second generation’ problems to ensure that attitudes and values change in step with institutional and procedural transformations. Third, within the general rubric of civil-military relations and SSR, attention needs to be focussed on the role of paramilitaries and private militias within the security sector.

- Fourth, despite the reticence of governments to engage in ‘problem areas’ and ‘problem states’, the non-governmental community should be focussing attention on precisely these areas, whether in the Balkans, Central Asian Republics or on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.

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• Fifth, novel forms of contact and networks should be created which bring new actors into contact with each other. The development of non-governmental networks where the atmosphere is more informal and major politico-ideological matters can be put to one side will deliver significant benefits in the next decade of the reform process.

• Sixth, there is a pressing need for Western ‘donors’ to develop a better methodology for understanding what policies work and why. This will strengthen their ability to assess the impact of a particular policy on recipient countries; whether the policy being transmitted is the most appropriate; and assist in assessing the extent to which a particular policy represents good value for money. Methods for achieving this are only in the initial stages of construction.

• Seven, there is a need to utilise new technologies as instruments of SSR. The work of PfP Defence Academies Consortium is an innovative example of this approach. The West should think more imaginatively about harnessing technology though distance learning, internet portals and more widely the web.

• Finally, as resources become more scarce, and excessive overlap and duplication will become less acceptable, the case for greater co-ordination is compelling. This is easier said than done, but requires careful analysis nonetheless.

Conclusions

For all the remarkable progress which has been made over the last decade, it is clear from this overview that there remains much to do. Civil-military relations are a process not an event and we cannot yet (if ever) be satisfied with the results. If stakeholders are seriously committed to the process, we need to think longer and harder about what the objectives are and the implications of trying to achieve them. Whilst contact in and of itself is important, in the West the challenge of the next decade is to ensure that activity is not a substitute for substance.

One final remark is a reflective one. This paper has addressed the issue of SSR only in so far as it concerns the priorities of policy transfer to the East. However, this focus avoids some quite pressing issues concerning the nature of civil-military relations in Western Europe. At the same time that Western states are active in giving advice, the need to improve civil-military relations in Western Europe should not be overlooked. Today, Western states themselves often have poorly functioning systems of parliamentary accountability, poor equipment procurement and husbandry, ineffective non-governmental sources of information and scrutiny and societies which do not fully understand the role of the armed forces. There are four reasons for the ‘West to look West’, to review the state of our own civil-military relations. First, formal procedures and practices rarely reflect the reality of civil-military relations as they exist in reality. Second, there is a need to better ensure accountability and legitimacy for the maintenance of state force – and if necessary its use. This is particularly pressing given the increasing calls to deploy armed forces in a variety of multinational humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making roles and the need to ensure societal support for this. Third, whilst advocating a holistic approach to SSR in other regions, Western governments have barely addressed the need to think of their own security sector as connected and requiring a co-ordinated approach between and within departments to ensure effectiveness. Finally, there is a need to develop a broad based understanding that the phasing out of conscription, downsizing of armed forces and their adaptation to better suit the needs of the current strategic environment requires consent and is inevitably expensive. In developing a more robust understanding of SSR we should not overlook the fact that it not only serves the East but it should also serve the West.
A decade ago, the Communist parties collapsed, the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, and the Soviet Union imploded. At the time, there was apprehension in the West that the armed forces might attempt to hold together the dissolving structure, or intervene in domestic affairs to support the existing regimes or safeguard the soldier’s power and privileges. There were some unsuccessful rear guard actions by the Soviet military. However, in Central and Eastern Europe, the new governments could claim political supremacy over their armed forces without a political interregnum. Thereupon, civilians and the military have had to establish working relations, and neither of the two had any experience in that. Subordinate members of the Warsaw Pact had little sovereign control over the armed forces. Their limited experience had not prepared them for work in parliamentary democracies.

Democratic control of the armed forces, a properly structured relationship between the civilians and the military, between those who have power through the ballot box and those who have power because they have arms, is one of democracy’s pillars. “Democratic control … involves three distinct but closely related elements: the non-involvement of the military in domestic politics; democratic control of defence policy … and democratic control of foreign policy.” Western experts have examined the development of civilian-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe to find out to what extent the armed forces are guided by these major principles and other significant criteria. The Principles and the criteria are drawn from Western experience. British and American experience, in particular, show how parliaments gained ascendancy over the military. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State is the best known study of civil-military relations; it is the work quoted most often by Western experts and, lately, by Central and East European writers on political and military affairs.

The Western arrangement of democratic control is structurally sound and flexible. Originating at a time when relations between the politicians and the soldiers were relatively simple, it was adapted to complicated contemporary international and domestic demands. Internationally, civilians and the military have to respond to requirements emanating from alliances like NATO. Domestically, planning has become so complex that governments have come to rely on experienced civil service staff and on “the security experts”, a unique breed that habituates public policy institutes and similar organisations. Democratic control in Central and Eastern Europe, among other things, has to assimilate and utilise a new community of experts, emerging in their countries and available from abroad.

Establishing the fundamental rules for civilian-military relations was among the first things on the agenda of Central and East European governments; it was done with constitutions and through fundamental laws. In retrospect, it could be said there were inexperienced legislators in many countries who made laws, which are no longer appropriate and should be reconsidered. On the one hand, legislation has been ambiguous, awkward and can hamper decision-making. On the other, in most countries, the legal arrangements have worked at least adequately, and the civilian-military collaboration has not irreversibly entered some blind political alley.

[The] patterns of civil-military relations across Central and Eastern Europe have become more complex, more varied and more difficult to assess. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have arguably made substantial progress in establishing democratic models of civil-military relations. Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are generally perceived to be moving in the same direction but lagging behind the first three new NATO members. The Baltic states and Slovenia have made progress in establishing national armed forces with democratic, civilian control at their core.

The countries mentioned are the “Central and Eastern Europe” of this study. We will describe it in general terms, although this approach fails to recognise adequately political and historical variances, for what holds true for Estonia is not the situation in Bulgaria. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have become NATO members. Most reforms of the security sector, which other states have yet to complete, no longer concern them, although much of what the three new members did before they were admitted offers experience that repays close study. The Baltic states are somewhat a special case. The Soviet Army was withdrawn from their territory, and they have built their armed forces from the ground up. Nonetheless, most of the problems, which we consider in civil-military relations and security sector reform, appear in the Baltics, although on a smaller scale. In Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, the armed forces remain involved in domestic politics; some authoritarian governments are served by the military or have a weaker hold over the military. These countries cannot be excluded from consideration, but they stand closer to the fringes of the issues that we will look at. If any country were to be placed at the center of attention, Slovakia is as good a choice as any. Nonetheless, the imprint of “the socialist past” is still deep in all of the area and, for most of it, so is “the Warsaw Pact heritage”. We can make generalised observations.

During the Cold War Central European governments did not have their own national security strategies. The Soviet Union decided what security was and imposed it with the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact. The military of Central and Eastern Europe was conversant with how the Soviet military conducted planning with its voyennaya doktrina, “military doctrine”, but had limited participation in it. In the newly sovereign countries, civilians and the military, having established new working relations also had to develop democratic national security strategies (or “national security concepts”) as they


4 Ibid.
usually are called). The present-day democratic approach to strategy was elaborated during the Cold War as a method of identifying and dealing with threats and risks:

The West … developed [a] National Security Concept, which tacitly assumes that the security of the nation includes defence but is not based only on military strength. It is an attempt to achieve balance between economics, society, and military power. It also recognises overwhelming need to consult the people and recognises the need to take into account the attitude of neighbours. A national security concept is not imposed as the Soviet military doctrine was imposed.5

The new concepts in Central and East European states encompass political, economic, and foreign policy considerations and present to the public the rationale for democratically directed security strategies. (As a rule, the governments also prepare separate foreign policy concepts.) The process of developing the concepts shows how appropriately civilians and the military have arranged their new positions of responsibility in principle and how effectively their relationship works with the practical aspects of security reform. The core issues can be formulated as three questions. The first one is: who made them, meaning, what roles did the civilians and the military have in developing the concepts? The second is: what do they contain? Do they give a realistic interpretation of a country’s security needs and establish feasible objectives? And, finally: do they provide clear policy guidance to defence ministries, military officers, parliamentarians, and the supporting staff? Do the constitutional and legal division of powers and responsibilities actually work in practice? If not, then they are not much more than a statement of good intentions, with limited impact on what actually takes place in the short, medium, and long terms.

As to the question “Who made them?” the answer is: “Civilians, with assistance from the military.” Governments have accepted the Western view that national strategies are political as well as military in nature and that the civilians decide what belongs in a security concept, although the military should be consulted for advice. Senior military commanders have handed over some of their responsibilities, once the prerogatives of the soldier, to civilian authorities, chiefly to the ministry of defence. Cabinets have formulated the concepts as public documents; parliaments have debated and accepted them. A concept does not have the force of law, but it is a political document, although it stands above party politics. A Western observer could conclude that, at this stage, the process of developing and accepting national security strategies in Central Europe is not much different from what takes place in the democratic West. However, the observer might add a qualification that security is not widely debated by “the concerned public” and, therefore, it has not yet fully entered the realm of “public policy”.

We come to the second question: what do they contain? Western states have had years of experience in analysing and describing their security needs. Because each country develops and documents its security strategy according to established political customs, there is no Western template, no blueprint for import. (The closest that we come to a general model is provided by NATO’s Strategic Concepts from which, as we shall see, planners have taken form and content.) The essentials – a country’s strategic environment, its relationship to international organisations, its foreign policy and its economic capabilities – form the core and in this regard the concepts are not different from those of Western states. However, they include statements and requirements that would not appear in western strategies (or appear in them only secondarily). They make fundamental statements about the importance of democracy and they refer to political and economic requirements formulated by NATO.

The “fundamental statements” affirm civilian supremacy over the military, sometimes as summaries of constitutions and other laws that have established a new political framework. Thus they recapitulate the main points on how the civilians and the military have allocated their respective responsibilities: on the one side, the powers and responsibilities of president, prime ministers, defence minister, cabinet, parliament; on the other, the top military, such as the commanders and chiefs of staff. They outline the peacetime guidance of the military, development of a defence policy, and wartime operational control and the development and control of defence policy. The prefatory statements about democratic control serve a practical purpose. As public statements, the concepts are meant for foreign as well as domestic consumption. They contain declarations, directed toward Brussels, about the excellence of democracy, the superiority of free market economy, and the friendship among nations.

Central and East European countries intend to join the Alliance and declare that in the concepts. Once a country opts for membership, it must conform to the Washington Treaty of 1949 and other subsequent statements and decisions. The principal one is Study on NATO Enlargement issued in 1995, which presented requirements for candidate members. There also is NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999 and, in-between, others like the Partnership for Peace. A country that hopes to join NATO has to observe definite rules of behaviour in its domestic policy and in the relations with its neighbours. Democracies have civilian control of the military. A country’s decision to join NATO must be backed by economic wherewithal to reform and sustain its armed forces and there is guidance about defence preparations for membership. States which have ethnic disputes and conflicting territorial claims have to settle their disagreements peacefully. If there are minority problems, these must be assuaged. Fulfilling these conditions does not guarantee membership, but failing to live up to some would get the country removed from the list of applicants. Candidates for future admission have to make the same reforms in politics, economy, and security sector that the three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic made – but before they actually find out whether or when they would become members. NATO stands large in security concepts, and the EU is visible.

Until recently, the terms “defence” and “security” were nearly synonymous. However, after the Cold War, new risks have emerged in post-socialist societies – and there is a long list of them. Central and East European countries cannot cope with the new risks simply through traditional defence preparations. Therefore, we will discuss defence policy as something

distinct from security policy. The first is directed against external military threats, the second against new risks. The separation, however, is neither precise nor very clear. Defence and security policies overlap; civilians and the military are involved in planning how to meet the new risks as well as the old threats. However, they need to be countered with different plans, methods, and structures. Both defence and security policies belong to security sector reform, but it is easier to describe them separately.

Everything involved in security constitutes a hierarchy, with the national security concept at the top. The next level contains defence and security policies, and we will deal first with defence policy. It is the work done largely, though not exclusively, at a defence ministry. A recent study of civilian-military relations gives a succinct description of what it involves:

We understand this to be the broad direction of the development of the armed forces, encompassing defence budgeting, force structure, equipment procurement, and overall military strategy. Democratic control of the armed forces implies that the definition and development of defence policy should be under the control of democratic, civilian authorities and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities. In practice, since the development and implementation of defence policy involves complex military-technical issues on which the military may be best qualified to provide advice and expertise, what is meant by ‘control of defence policy’ is problematic and raises difficult issues as to the appropriate balance between civilian control and sensible deference to military expertise on defence matters.6

Western societies accept that the civilian authorities have the greatest influence in determining the national security concept, and generally, this is the case in Central and Eastern Europe. Defence policy transforms the overall security aims accepted by society into feasible, optimal objectives for the armed forces and presents them for approval to “the political concept, and generally, this is the case in Central and Eastern Europe. Defence policy transforms the overall security aims accepted by society into feasible, optimal objectives for the armed forces and presents them for approval to “the political

The Warsaw Pact armies were massive. When the Pact disintegrated, Soviet troops withdrew but large blocs of the old military establishment remained in most countries. Politically, they were the national defence forces of the newly sovereign states. Militarily, they did not conform to the new national security needs. The Soviet force structures, equipment, and training, by Western standards, were top-heavy, with oversized command, administrative and military education infrastructures that required a disproportionate share of defence budgets. They had to be restructured thoroughly. When Central and Eastern European countries introduced free market reforms, national economies faltered and defence industries shrank. Society, experiencing hardships, directed demands toward the politicians, often at the expense of defence appropriations. Governments had to reduce the armed forces rapidly. Reasonably, there should have been a well-planned defence reduction and reorganisation. Faced with economic necessity and social demands, troubled by a lack of civilian experience, the reduction was not directed toward reorganisation. Defence capabilities declined rapidly. For political as well as financial reasons, conscription periods were shortened, in some cases below a practical minimum service period; training was cut back in order to save money and satisfy social demands; equipment was not replaced and ammunition stocks were not replenished. Professional soldiers dislike a reduction of the armed forces, particularly as it cuts back the officer corps. But they could make a case that defence policies, handled by inexperienced civilians, produced hollow armies.

Defence policy involves getting ready to enter NATO. Presumably, remaking the old armies and fitting them into NATO should run on parallel tracks. Each member of the Alliance has its own sovereign armed forces organised according to the needs of the country, with an appropriate contribution to the Alliance’s requirements. Therefore, reformed armed forces, which also have developed interoperability with NATO, should suffice. The Partnership for Peace is a major assistance platform, designed to bring Central Europe closer to the Alliance. Western experts identify readiness primarily as interoperability at both the highest political-military levels of decision-making and at military operational and tactical levels. However, these are the requirements for working with NATO. No Western country which has joined the Alliance has had to refashion its military establishment to the extent that Central and Eastern Europe is required to. Moreover, NATO has altered its structure and mission. The major changes are a Combined Joint Task Force concept for ad hoc coalitions established among NATO and non-NATO members to handle out-of-area conflicts, a new Strategic Concept with a new non-Article V mission of crisis management through force projection, and a very exacting Membership Action Plan. These changes have required substantial planning efforts and revisions from the defence officials in Central and Eastern Europe. They have had to perform a complicated manoeuvre of national reform and international reorientation. As we shall see, on occasions the two efforts have jostled each other.

Central European countries suffer from “a lack of national governmental capacity,”7 that is, of civilian experts competent in defence policy planning. During the Warsaw Pact, very few civilians dealt with defence affairs, but democratic political systems require very many of them for defence planning. Ministers and parliamentarians need expert staff, policy advisers who analyse and summarise complex issues for the policy makers. Some civilian experts who can deal with security sector reforms work at defence ministries. They come from the younger generation, many with a Western education, and their qualifications are of a high order. But their number is not sufficient. Western defence advisers describe the

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6 Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 1999, op.cit.
situation in the Baltic states as one “where enormous weight rests on the shoulders of a small group of admirable young men and women, who struggle to keep on top of the problem in hand.” The required governmental expertise will take years to develop fully and few countries have reached this requirement for contemporary defence planning. Moreover, in many minds there remains the psychological residue of a governmental culture where inter-agency and inter-ministerial channels of communication were small and seldom-used, where directives flowed downward and long, obscure documentation upward, where, at the uppermost level, top bureaucrats procrastinated.

In large measure this is a direct result of the Soviet legacy, which left behind it the imprint of a culture demanding conformity not initiative, control not delegation, compartmentalisation not co-operation, and secrecy not transparency. The habits ingrained by fifty years of such a regime have proved hard to shake off. We have often noticed that bureaucratic processes that we take for granted either do not yet exist or function imperfectly. It will take time to put this right. As for the civilians, not many officers can be “the reformers”. But their ranks are increasing. They have attended Western education facilities. There have been duty tours at NATO and SHAPE, training in Partnership for Peace exercises, and service in NATO-conducted crisis management missions. Possibly, the military contingent, prepared for defence planning, now grows more rapidly than its civilian counterpart. However, the soldiers have to get over a high bar on their way to the places where decisions are made. The lack of an effective and modern personnel system constitutes probably the single greatest institutional obstacle to defence reform. There are no adequate mechanisms for evaluating, promoting and assigning officers who are qualified to drive reform and implement new plans.

The progress of modernisation in all areas is hampered by the existence of a large number of older men, who lie like an impermeable ‘permafrost’, lodged between the leaders at the top, who wish to speed up modernisation, and those below, who actively desire it. This problem appears to be particularly evident in the officer corps .... We understand the political and real problems involved in large-scale retirement of such officers, and we know that much progress has been made to thaw out those who can be persuaded of the need to adapt, and to thin out those who cannot. A new and well-trained generation of young officers is coming up, eager to take on more responsibility … . Not to do so would be to run the risk of disillusionment amongst the coming generation, with a resulting outflow of talent, which in turn would exacerbate the problem.

In fairness to the senior officers, it should be recalled that they are asked to undergo a fundamental reversal of their military philosophy. They know Soviet military doctrine, Voyennaya doktrina. Developed largely by the senior military, it decided how the state would direct its resources for aims that would be attained through force. The doctrine was hierarchical, comprehensive, detailed, and logical. It also was a very efficient approach to directing the required resources of economy and society toward military requirements. If we evaluate it strictly from a professional military view, it is better for planning than anything that the West has devised. The reluctance of the senior soldiers to accept new, inexact methods of dealing with military planning should not be seen as an unspoken desire to return to the days of the ancien regime. “All militaries are conservative by nature and resistant to change, and the transitional process in most NATO nations has also had to take account of the ‘permafrost’ factor.” Officers serving in the Warsaw Pact saw NATO as an offensively poised military alliance. Perhaps this past image has not disappeared entirely. But to the military, integration into NATO has its positive side. Officers serve at SHAPE and at NATO Headquarters, participate in Partnership for Peace exercises, and deploy and command units to missions carried out by NATO in the Balkans. Without a prospect of NATO membership, defence budgets in Central and East European countries would probably decline. We will discuss here two instances of NATO influence upon defence policy, the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is to be provided for defence needs and the Membership Action Plan, or MAP.

NATO has indicated that candidates for membership should provide 2 per cent of their GDP for defence. Political and defence principles in combination have determined the amount. Democracies do not spend much money for arms, therefore 2 per cent is a reasonable level; the new market economies have to sustain defence transformation, and 2 per cent is judged an attainable level. The “two percent attainment” appears in many Western documents on NATO.
expansion. Defence white books show graphs where defence appropriations, calculated as a percentage of GDP, hopefully climb upward until they reach the desired goal in 2002, the year when the Alliance is to make a decision on new members. A strong argument that defence ministers can make when cabinets and parliaments divide up the budget is the “2 per cent for NATO admission” one.

The Alliance’s 1999 summit presented the MAP. It aims at improving the defence planning for the hopeful candidates. Countries who sign up for the Plan would submit annual, national defence plans to NATO, setting out in clear detail their activities in preparing for membership. The plans are to include military planning for force improvement, details of defence resource management and economic policy, the larger issues of democratic control of the military, jurisdictional disputes among neighbouring states, and ethnic or territorial conflicts. In this sense, the MAP recapitulates the guidance and criteria Central European countries have received since the *Study on Enlargement* of 1995, and adds new requirements. Annual meetings will take place at Brussels with each candidate in order to assess defence reforms and modernisation efforts (presumably, the 2 per cent GDP effort among them). Future members would thus improve interoperability of their armed forces so that they can carry out missions identified in NATO Strategic Concept. NATO provides direct and candid evaluation on a country’s progress as well as technical and political guidance, and supplies defence planning expertise. The type of assistance NATO offers is meant to help overcome the lack of experience among civilians and the military in defence policy formulation.

Defence policy aims at two related objectives. It has to reform the Warsaw Pact military establishment for the needs of a sovereign state. The armed forces must also be ready to enter NATO. In effect, the MAP promotes the second objective over the first. “The MAP provides for a very specific and intrusive set of activities that will have the effect of binding the would-be members remarkably close to the Alliance … . It would appear that the prospective members will be treated through MAP as rigorously as if they were Alliance members themselves, arguably even more so.” Central and East European governments have to conduct their defence planning as if they were certain of entering NATO, although there is no real certainty of it. “Preparing for the MAP may actually reduce independent defence capability in the hope of future protection by Alliance membership.”

We have so far been talking about developing a force to meet the needs of the member. The next question is what provisions a government needs to make in order to meet the other risks it can face. We divided security sector reform in two parts, “defence policy” and “security policy”. In the post-Cold War security environment, the probability of former threats, military and external, has retreated while new risks, arising from unstable post-socialist economic and political circumstances have advanced. During the last decade, Belgrade has been the epicentre of conflicts in the Balkans. The Balkan wars, however, have tended to overshadow smaller but more likely crises that might break out. When a huge, fraudulent financial scheme in Albania collapsed in 1997, there were political riots, attacks on police and military weapons depots, and a near collapse of the political system. The government did not know how to cope with the crisis; military commanders were at a loss what to do. Another possible crisis envisaged in a scenario, starts as a nuclear catastrophe, exploding where the boundaries of three countries come together. Massive flights of frightened people scurry back and forth across frontiers in an area that is disputed by two of them. In the confusion, border guards of one country reportedly direct gunfire on guards of the other. Immediately before the alleged incident, the second country had ordered the mobilisation of reserve components in order to block refugees scrambling across frontiers. Nor could the possibility that some committee of national salvation might attempt to usurp political power be ruled out unconditionally. It might not be headed by a group of colonels but by an interior minister with paramilitary police forces at his disposal.

Not every Central European country could be threatened by any conceivable event. Nevertheless, in the large area from the Baltic to the Balkans, no probable crisis can be struck off the list. Crisis management should rank higher on the agenda of security sector reform than plans for mobilising and deploying a country’s armed forces against a possible external threat.

The less a government makes adequate provision to meet these threats [by developing an effective crisis management capability and investing in the right type and quality of security forces – army, police, intelligence, etc.], the more serious will be the danger that the threats themselves pose. To international security institutions, crises are out-of-area events and the means of management range from preventive diplomacy to force projection. This interpretation is included in NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999. NATO has conducted annual crisis management workshops for Partner countries. Their centrepiece was a scenario, based on the Gulf War, which paid much attention to naval operations. But crises to a Central and Eastern European government are situations where it faces threatening developments in the country itself or in its immediate vicinity. Security policy requires management that recognises, contains, and eliminates crises in their incipient stages. The aim is early containment. A look at the security requirements in the Baltic concludes that:

Deeper down, at the very heart of governance, we see a lack of effective co-ordination which could have serious adverse effects if the system were put under strain, either through the heightening of external risk or through major civil emergency. We see the need to construct, embed, and practise on a regular basis the mechanisms required for

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15 Donnelly, 2000, op. cit., 11.
16 Ibid 3.
the efficient functioning of government in times of crisis or emergency … . The study and understanding of the skills of crisis warning, prevention and management, both internally and with partners, should feature as a high priority in the early future.17

This holds true for much of Central and Eastern Europe. Management mechanisms are inadequate or need to be constructed from the ground up. Security sector reform has to consider three areas: national, regional, and international. National planning should identify a place (perhaps the cabinet, perhaps a national security council) as a management centre. Neighbouring countries need to collaborate and management structures and procedures in adjoining countries should be very similar, with regional interoperability. Civilians and the military agencies of one country will have to talk to their counterparts across borders. There should be good communications between Western and Eastern crisis management centres.

On the national level, crisis management should be developed with three requirements in mind. The first one is the capability to collect and analyse information about what risks and threats could emerge and how rapidly. The second one is how the management structure operates. Management does not require a large, permanently staffed structure. Post-socialist governments tend to make bureaucratic plans, which can hinder rather than aid rapid response. The third requirement is legal. A government might have to exercise extraordinary means. Civil rights of a society might have to be curtailed with curfews or other measures. But post-socialist officials have a tendency to view security and response to emergencies in terms of domestic, police powers.

Threat and risk analysis is the basis for crisis management. The capabilities of the governments to perform it are not always adequate. An instructive example of that is given by Russia’s latest security concept. Evidently, each ministry or agency that had any security concern sent its list for inclusion in the concept. The result is a compilation without priorities, without a balanced assessment of threat or risk versus probability. It does not provide much guidance for security policy. Moscow has not moved toward democracy with the determination shown by Central and East European capitals; Russia stands closer to the heritage of the past, which other countries intend to leave behind. But the rate of their progress has not been rapid.

For in many of Central Europe’s countries, their intelligence services’ staff still reflects the heritage of closed societies, and a culture of secrecy still prevails. If a government has no system of incorporating both open and secret information into its information system but relies only on secret sources to make its analysis, then it is likely to go badly wrong in its choices.18

Crisis management centres are under construction or in the planning stages. Moreover, many Central and East European countries have developed special formations for deployment to crises areas, the multi-national peacekeeping formations. The Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, activated in 1995, was the first one. A Hungarian-Romanian Battalion, a Polish-Lithuanian Battalion, a South East European Brigade, and many others have followed – the full list would be long. Most of the units carry the word “peacekeeping” in their names. Some have participated in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. When Hungarians, Romanians and south Balkan nations establish regional units, they signal that they intend to put aside historical quarrels and collaborate across borders in order to counter the new risks. The purpose responds to the requirements of the Partnership for Peace, which has been described as NATO’s response to help Central and Eastern Europe cope with crises in concert with the Alliance.

Actually, the multi-national formations straddle the divide between security policy and defence policy, leaning toward the latter. They have been established with a political aim. Governments suppose that they constitute an argument for admission to the Alliance. Militarily, they promote training methods and operational procedures with NATO interoperability. In order to support their training and deployment, defence ministries have to reallocate scarce resources, removing them from the forces that are developed for national defence. Multi-national formations can be expensive propositions, particularly for small countries. Decisions to develop a capability to participate in NATO-led operations shift defence priorities toward developing special units that are NATO compatible, although they might not fit the national force structure. In the Baltic case, Western voices have warned that:

Even should defence funding increase, we sound a note of caution, as we have done before, about the danger of allowing the benefits to be gained from international co-operation to consume a disproportionate amount of the limited defence budget, to the detriment of internal development.19

Let us recapitulate. Within the larger framework of security sector reform, more attention could be directed to the new risks. Their danger has been identified, but preparations to cope with them are made largely as provisions for out-of-area actions and force projection. Many of the risks require domestic response, and civilians and the military would be involved in preparing and executing contingency plans. Much of the intricate and complex work of devising crisis management structures and methods can be done if outside expertise is matched with domestic requirements.

Western institutions have exerted strong influence upon security sector reform. This study has dealt mostly with NATO, but the EU, WEU and to a degree the OSCE, have their day. Furthermore, there has been a widening stream of advice and expert delegations to the East, flowing from international organisations, from ministries and agencies of national governments, from academia and non-governmental bodies. Conferences, workshops and seminars on security affairs frequently

17 Final Report, 19.
18 Donnelly, 2000, op. cit., 12.
19 Final Report, 6.
take place in Central and East European capitals; their representatives are invited to participate in similar events held in Western cities. The encounter of experts, advice, projects, and information is vast. The agenda extends beyond security sector reform, but foreign, security, and defence affairs have been major issues.

The objective is to match Western expertise with Eastern needs, and one organisation, the International Defence Advisory Board, gives us an insight into how this can be done. The Board was formed in 1995 at the request of Baltic Defence Ministers, to obtain advice in security and defence fields. Composed of senior, retired soldiers and civil servants from five NATO countries, Sweden and Finland, the Board worked closely with presidential offices, foreign and defence ministers, chiefs of defence, parliamentarians, senior officials and military officers. It helped with programmes and projects in collaboration with governments, parliaments, and non-governmental organisations. Among the many effective cases of assistance, we can mention its help with the national security concepts in the three countries. The Board paid liaison visits to NATO and SHAPE, and maintained close contact with Western governmental offices and other interested parties. It initiated and supported international conferences and internal seminars, encouraged and supported the development of institutions working in international relations, and directed Western expertise toward the Baltics. Therefore, it is instructive to quote a conclusion from its Final Report about the difficulties with the Western experts, who can hinder the security sector reformers.

The hard working young civilians and officers are not helped in their work by the plethora of [Western] advice and assistance, often uncoordinated and short-term in nature, offered by supporting nations and organisations, nor by the stream of visitors who have to be looked after, and of external meetings which have to be attended.\(^{20}\) A recent analysis of defence planning identifies “many young officers who have a jaundiced view of further Western training … . Many of them feel strongly that they should be left to get on with running their own armies without being constantly hectored by Westerners.”\(^{21}\) The feeling is not limited to defence ministries. A young Baltic foreign service member observed: “We have our proper stations in life: The West talks and the East listens.” There are many examples where the West has established good, productive working relations with the East. But a feeling of exasperation exists and should not be discounted, particularly so if it bubbles up from the military and civilians engaged in security sector reform.

The mood of frustration is hardly universal. But many civilians and the military could suggest how the form and content of Western assistance might be improved. First, at times there can be too many outside advisers. Ministries have to cope with an unexpected concatenation of official and non-governmental visitors who offer overlapping or repetitious programmes. Second, Western assistance is disorganised; often it lacks continuity. A consortium of governmental and non-governmental Western organisations might convene a large conference, which outlines proposals without concrete provisions how to achieve them. The proposals fade and disappear, only to reappear when the next large conference comes along. Assistance programmes need not be large, but they must be sustained, extending over a year or more. Third, Western experts might offer advice based on their sound experience, which does not answer the immediate security requirements of a Central and East European country. Workshops concentrating on naval operations in crisis management provided to Austria and Slovakia are a case in point.

Western assistance, by-and-large, has moved in one direction. The MAP is an illustrative example. Under its provisions, defence officials formulate plans, bring them to Brussels for approval, and go back to their capitals. On the one hand, this approach can bolster the weaker sectors of defence planning where expertise among civilians and the military is still thin in some areas. On the other, it introduces the relationship of one major patron with many small clients. Like the MAP, many Western programmes are bilateral initiatives; they funnel advice and instructions to recipients in individual countries. Unintentionally, this approach tends to undermine regional relationships. But some critical areas in security sector reform can only be dealt with through regional collaboration. If, for instance, Lithuania develops a crisis management structure, which does not have the capability to work immediately and effectively with the Polish structure, the utility is considerably diminished. Interoperability with management centres at NATO, WEU, and other locations is necessary.

Assistance programmes should be comprehensive. Civilians and the military have difficulties in inter-agency work for, as already noted, there is compartmentalisation not co-operation, secrecy not transparency and bureaucratic processes which Westerners take for granted either do not yet exist or function imperfectly. Given these habits, information collection and risk assessment are difficult to plan and implement. But risk assessment involves every aspect of security reform, from national security concepts to civil emergency contingencies and basic military intelligence. Politicians and civil servants should be educated to understand the system of collection and evaluation, that much of the information would come from open sources, and that it should be shared with other states. This is essential so that intelligence can be used properly. Here we need well-designed programmes and co-operation projects, which bring technical assistance from the outside and work collectively with governments, the military, parliaments, and non-governmental organisations.

Finally, there are the lessons to be learned. They can be taken from successful reform projects, for there have been many, and from the unsuccessful ones, of which there is no shortage. The issues that are to be addressed are the method as well as the purpose of assistance. There have been appropriate Western assistance plans, which have fallen short due to faulty execution, because they were “uncoordinated and short-term in nature”. There have been workshops where seasoned experts offered advice that was not relevant to the immediate security needs, as in the case of naval operations in crisis situations. Bodies like the International Defence Advisory Board are repositories of past lessons and can offer guidance on the content, prioritisation, and conduct of assistance programmes. One lesson indicated by the Board is the usefulness of public policy institutes.

In Western security planning, the public policy institute, the autonomous, not-for-profit, non-governmental organisation, is an important element. We have to look at the appearance and role of this actor in the post-socialist societies and ask

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
\(^{21}\) Donnelly, 2000, op. cit., 16.
some elementary questions. How large and effective is the community of these institutes in Central and Eastern Europe? Have nuclei of independent expertise accumulated and are they influential? What functions do they have in security sector reform, particularly in improving strategic collaboration between the West and the East? Do they work with other non-governmental organisations, academia and the media? Do they reach “the informed public”, the sector of society which is interested in foreign, defence and security affairs?

Public policy institutes have established themselves alongside other non-governmental organisations. Some countries, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, developed several of them relatively quickly, effectively converting existing institutions to serve the needs of democratic societies. Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania got off to a slower start. The Baltic states had uphill work, for they had very little to build upon. However, now there is a community of policy institutes in each country. It has developed relations with peer institutions in neighbouring countries and, notably, with the large institutions of the West. Their members make appearances in the West; they speak at conferences, publish papers, and serve stints at research institutes and study centres. They have entered that part of the international community which deals with policy analysis.

For this reason, the policy institutes are well suited for work with Western governmental and non-governmental organisations when assistance projects are planned and implemented. They understand the needs of their countries and the approaches Western experts tend to take in addressing them. An informal survey of Western supported assistance projects indicates that when the local institutes have a role in them, planning and implementation is more effective. They stand near various government offices (although, at times, a judicious external nudge might be needed to bring the two to closer working relations). Finally, they know and have struck up working relations with similar organisations in neighbouring countries and form local clusters of competence. They can be effective regional conduits for lessons learned in security sector reform, and thereby extend a regional pattern of information dissemination, which should supplement the present flow from the West to the East.

The Western understanding of democracy and security acknowledges that beyond the everyday work done by politicians, soldiers, and policy experts, society at large should accept the strategies proposed by governments. Parliaments can vote on annual defence budgets and the military would dutifully accept them, but society should indicate its general approval. Its consent can be seen in public discourse, in the media, the academic community, non-governmental organisations and, notably, through the public policy institutes, which stand close to the governmental policy makers. These are the features of a civil society, and we can see them emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. It cannot be said with much certainty how much influence civil society has, but we can make some general surmises. Governments have made presentations to Western institutions about the state of security affairs in their countries, and observers have noted the increasing skill with which they operate. No doubt, the presence of policy experts working at Western policy institutes and research centres has helped considerably. In domestic affairs, the governments have been less effective in developing the mechanisms and procedures which Western governments have built and polished over the years in order to build consensus for their policies.

Let us sum up. Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe’s security sector have been made slowly and with difficulties. Defence policy has moved forward at a better pace than security policy, although the former has had its difficulties. In retrospect, when the Warsaw Pact was on the verge of collapse, there were Western apprehensions that the military would attempt to hold it together. After it collapsed, there were questions whether the civilians could gain political ascendancy through their parliaments, determine the nation’s foreign policies, and exert democratic control over security affairs. The danger of an armed opposition to the liberal-democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe – still under way – has almost disappeared. The emergence of the expert: in the civil service, in the military, perhaps not even in the permanent service of a state but belonging to an international community of “policy experts”, is the important and necessary thing. Politicians and officials are assimilating the practices of democratic control, although some senior officers are uncomfortable with the method of defence policy formulation that it has introduced. Central and East Europe has civilians in the defence ministries, their experience in democratic practices has accrued year after year, and they function with growing confidence in their role vis-à-vis the armed forces.

There also is the West. Its institutional community has been a motivating force, asking for democratic control and providing guidelines on how to implement it. However, although the Western imperative has been strong, it has not always been clear. NATO, the lodestone for policy planning, has altered its shape and purpose over the years. In 1999, it waged war in the Balkans; in 1991, when democratic reforms in the post-socialist world got under way, there were some questions whether the Alliance would survive if it failed to find a new mission. The changing, sometimes inconstant West is a part of the story of Central and Eastern Europe’s attempts to join it. The “plethora of Western advice”, sometimes uncoordinated and fragmented, has not brought a clarity of purpose. There is no doubt that, because of the West, considerable gains have been made to reclaim the ground for democracy. But there can be no question that this has been achieved with considerable duplication, overlap, and wastage of time and resources. If there have been tactical advances, there has not been much strategic thinking how to carry out complex, long-term tasks. The Western community of experts at international bodies, governmental offices, and think tanks could do some stocktaking about the effectiveness and efficiency of their contribution to the security sector reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps Geneva is a good a place to start thinking about strategy.

22 This is based on research the author carried out at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union in 1998.
PART II: PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES

Introduction

Hans Born

The role of parliament is paramount to the democratic oversight of the security sector. Without the parliament, democratic oversight would only be civilian oversight. In the classic tradition of representative democracy, the elected representatives of a society adopt laws, authorise budgets and hold the government accountable. In addition to these control and overview functions of the parliament, the parliament is also the marketplace of democracy, where different viewpoints are discussed and the stage is set for wider deliberations.

The security sector is no exception to the overseeing powers of the parliament. In virtually all countries, parliament oversees the defence budgets, decides upon the security policy and holds responsible ministers accountable for the activities of all security sector services, i.e. the military, border guards, intelligence services, police and paramilitary forces. A society without democratic or parliamentary oversight can hardly be called a democracy.

The ISF workshop on ‘Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces’ was the second in a planned series of meetings, designed to bring together specialists who study, promote, support and – last but not least – practise parliamentary control of force structures. A first meeting, initiated by the DCAF project team, took place less than a year ago in Brussels (December 1999). The Brussels workshop was designed to achieve a kind of a stocktaking of interparliamentary assistance programmes, from a supply-side perspective, so to speak. The second workshop, which was held in the framework of the 4th ISF conference in Geneva, approached the subject from a different perspective – essentially from the recipients’ perspective. It was designed to discuss whether the countries concerned really do get the kind of parliamentary assistance they need, and whether earlier cooperation and assistance programmes did achieve what they were intended to do. The ISF workshop as well as the follow-up meeting at DCAF came up with a number of valuable suggestions and recommendations – see the report of Hans Born. This report also contains a summary of the deliberations as well as an overview of Andreas Gross’s presentation on Civil Society and Parliaments, Ivanna Klympush’s presentation on the Ukrainian Experiences as well as Marie Vlachova’s research results on the Czech Experiences (included in the proceedings).

The deliberations of the 4th ISF workshop resulted in the following points of attention concerning parliamentary assistance programmes:

- The definitive model for parliamentary oversight does not exist. There are, however, some practices which have to be adapted to specific political systems.
- Assistance programmes for parliaments have to be embedded in wider democratisation efforts aimed at other key state institutions (government, judiciary) as well as civil society (NGOs, research institutes, political parties).
- Legal frameworks are in place in most transition countries. Assistance should now be aimed at professionalising parliaments in terms of training for parliamentarians and their staff, building up libraries and information technology infrastructure.1

1 See also the Editorial of Heiner Hänggi of the First PCAF Newsletter, December 2000 (available at www.dcaf.ch).
4 Recipients’ Views on Interparliamentary Assistance: A Short Report on the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Georgia – Three Case Studies

Hans Born

Introduction

The main focus of the ISF Workshop on ‘Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces’, which was held on November 17, 2000 at Hotel President Wilson in Geneva, was to highlight the recipients’ perspectives of inter-parliamentary cooperation. Three case studies were presented by renowned specialists from the Czech Republic, Georgia and Ukraine. The workshop attracted a large group of scholars and practitioners from the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The meeting aimed to discuss the specific problems related to the promotion, establishment and practice of parliamentary control. In addition, the workshop tried to be instrumental in increasing knowledge of the existence and evaluation of inter-parliamentary assistance programmes with a view to enhancing the parliamentary control of armed forces. Finally, it was designed to lay the foundations for the creation of a DCAF-sponsored Working Group ‘Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces’.

Civil Society as the Wider Context

The first presentation at the Workshop was on ‘civil society and parliamentary control’. The speaker was Andreas Gross, who is a member of the Council of Europe and a member of the Swiss Federal Parliament. In addition, he is a scholar and practitioner of direct democracy. Gross’s definition of Civil Society is an ‘ensemble of all citoyens and citoyennes who care about the community, transcend private interests and are engaged on a volunteer basis inside and outside public institutions in self-management groups, associations and other organisations’. Important is the distinction between bourgeois and citoyen. A bourgeois only cares for private interests whereas a citoyen is concerned about private and community interests. Moreover, a citoyen is not only an observer but s/he is also engaged in the civil society on a volunteer basis.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the importance of civil society is universally recognised. No one says that citizens can be ignored. And the citoyen has a great cultural and educational potential for further development. However, Gross argued, civil society is in a fragile condition not only in the East but also in the West. In the West, civil society is in a crisis and under pressure of the hegemonic economic rationalities, professional pressures and competing demands for limited time. In the East, there is a lack of trust in others as well as lack of self-confidence. Eastern European societies have a tradition of citizens being an object rather than a subject of politics. The trust between citoyens has been destroyed as an inheritance of the totalitarian past. People see themselves as objects instead of subjects in politics.

Democracy will never be perfect

According to Gross, a strong democracy is not possible without a strong civil society. In addition, a strong democracy does not limit itself to a strong parliament only. Like democracy, the democratic control of armed forces is never finished and may always be improved. A democracy will never be perfect, only steps on the road towards a more perfect democracy are imaginable. Within this context, democratic control of the armed forces means an ongoing public debate on a wide range of issues beyond mere defence and security policy.

The Case of the Czech Republic

Dr Marie Vlachová, head of the social research department of the Czech Ministry of Defence, opened the series of case studies. Drawing on an earlier study, Vlachová presented a normative list of activities of the defence and security committee of the Czech Parliament. In her country, the parliamentary committee on defence and security:

• approves the security and defence laws (six laws in 1998–99);
• approves the military budget and the military expenditures;
• is responsible for deploying armed forces in crisis;
• declares, extends and ends the state of emergency;
• approves the participation of Czech troops in peace missions;
• can establish committees of inquiry;
• takes part in the creation and implementation of the security policy;
• approves the governmental nomination for the chief of staff of the armed forces.
However, Vlachová’s own research shows another picture of the activities of the Members of the Czech Parliament. 50 per cent of the MPs think that they do an important job but 50 per cent of the MPs think that they do not carry out the activities as mentioned above in a proper and influential way. The conclusion seems to be that Members of Parliament evaluate themselves as being of minor importance when it comes to parliamentary control of the armed forces.

Negative Self-evaluation of MPs

What are the reasons for MPs’ negative self-evaluation? One of the first reasons is that the security defence committee work is characterised by many party political skirmishes. Secondly, the prevailing operational character of work hinders the parliamentary committee from spending sufficient time on strategic activities. In addition, the competence of the committee members in the area of security and defence is limited and it is difficult for them to acquire knowledge and information on security and defence issues. A last reason contributing to less than optimal parliamentary control is that the security community (independent experts) is not very well developed in the Czech Republic.

Vlachová offered some suggestions for future foreign assistance programmes. Among others, she thinks that further support for an independent security community is needed. Only in this way will Members of Parliament be able to acquire information from independent and reliable sources. In addition, support for public debate on defence and security matters would strengthen the democratic context of parliamentary control of the armed forces in the Czech Republic.

The Case of Ukraine

The second case study, presented by Ivanna Klympush, Acting Director of the East-West Institute in Kiev, focused on the evaluation of the inter-parliamentary assistance programmes in Ukraine. According to her, the basics of democratic control of the armed forces are in place in Ukraine, as laid down in the 1996 constitution and further laws later on. There is a regulatory-legal basis, and there are bodies for coordination and control over the power structures. In addition, in the civil society three to four NGOs are active on security and defence matters. There is an ombudsman (human rights of service-men) and an Auditing Chamber oversees the budget.

Sphere of Secrecy

A sphere of secrecy, however, is present around the armed forces. The powers of the Parliament are rather limited. Particularly, the Parliament has nothing to say about the staffing of the top of the armed forces. The president and the government appoint the high-ranking generals as they wish, without the consent of Parliament. Many aspects of relevant laws are contradictory and a lot of laws have not yet been enacted. The Members of Parliament lack support in terms of knowledge. Many budget matters are secret and not revealed to MPs or to the public. Therefore, budget auditing and transparency are on a low level.

NATO as a Major Actor

The Ukraine did not receive the support that NATO gave the Czech Republic in the early 1990s. The result is that neither civilian nor military expertise exist on legislation in the Ukraine. Until now, most inter-parliamentary assistance programmes went through NATO. These programmes tried to familiarise the Members of Parliament with parliamentary control of the armed forces. In addition, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) established a monitoring group. Not only NATO is active. Other institutions, like the Marshall Centre and Harvard University, have their own programmes on parliamentary control of the armed forces.

Lack of Strategic Thinking

Ivanna Klympush was rather critical about inter-parliamentary assistance programmes in Ukraine. In her view, the Western programmes lack strategic thinking, comprehensive analytical effort, systematic and systemic approaches, concentration on specific matters, programme coordination (leading to many tiresome duplications) and wider engagement of in-house expertise. Furthermore, the Western assistance programmes are lacking in sensitivity in regard to national peculiarities. Therefore, future parliamentary assistance most certainly could be improved by implementing the following measures:

• setting up follow-up inter-parliamentary cooperation and assistance programmes;
• linking of strategic objectives with short-term requirements;
• adapting of the general parliamentary assistance programmes to the specific national needs.

The Case of Georgia

The last case study was presented by David Darchiashvili, Director of the Civil-Military Relations Institute in Tbilisi and Head of the Research Department of the Georgian Parliament. Darchiashvili discerned several factors enhancing Georgian state/security building, such as active international organisations, the interests of Western countries in Georgia (due to its
energy sector, transportation routes and pipelines) and national feelings and pride (‘Georgia deserves its own national state’). However, there are many factors hindering Georgian state and security building, such as ethnic conflicts, economic crisis and widespread corruption (linked with politics). These positive and negative factors constitute the context for parliamentary control of the armed forces in Georgia.

Weak Parliamentary Control

Generally speaking, the role of Parliament in democratic control of the armed forces is weaker than the role of the president. Certain laws speak for the parliamentary control but the reality is different. The Parliament hardly fulfils its main obligation in security and defence policy: budgetary control. Until now MPs have had very little knowledge and understanding of how defence resources are allocated and spent. The President cannot dissolve Parliament and in case of political will the Parliament of Georgia would be able to play a crucial role. However, in practice the head of the executive power dominates political life.

In the period 1992–94, the head of the state was at the same time head of Parliament as well. In the period 1995–2000, when the presidential office was introduced, a situation arose of co-control of the armed forces by the President and Parliament. But in fact the President can and does ignore the opinion of parliamentarians concerning various issues of security and defence policy. In 1998, one critical incident symbolised the troublesome situation. According to the law, the military can not be employed without prior approval of legislative branch of the government. But when an army brigade rebelled against the government, the President sent troops to bring the brigade back under control without consulting the Parliament.

Reality is different

Therefore, the real model of parliamentary control of the armed forces is that the President controls the Parliament, the defence agency as well as the armed forces. The Parliament has only a weak control on the security sector. Moreover, the President controls the Parliament. Some parts of parliamentary control of the armed forces are legislated. But those laws are imperfect because they do not prescribe the specific roles and procedures. However, sometimes the aspects of parliamentary control of the armed forces function not because of the laws but rather due to some strong Members of Parliament. Overseeing the situation in Georgia, Darchiashvili comes to the conclusions that parliamentary control of the armed forces is weak. The main causes of weak parliamentary control of the armed forces in Georgia are lack of political will, institutional problems, lack of a sound legal framework, lack of experience and knowledge, and widespread corruption within the security and defence sector.

Conditionality

Darchiashvili had some interesting ideas on how to strengthen parliamentary control. First, education and training of the Members of Parliament is badly needed. These training efforts should be aimed not only at practical knowledge but also at boosting awareness of the Members of Parliament. Secondly, in spite of the fact that ‘conditionality’ is often considered as politically incorrect, Darchiashvili thinks that international assistance to Georgia must be conditional on, for example, respect for the rule of law and human rights. Otherwise, inter-parliamentary assistance programmes are a waste of money. Darchiashvili’s last suggestion is that establishing public councils with the defence committee of the Parliament as well as with the defence ministry could enhance public involvement in the defence and security sector.

Fuzzy Concepts?

The presentations were followed by an interesting and rich discussion. One issue was related to the use of the concepts ‘civil society’ and ‘control’. Some of the participants argued that control and civil societies are confusing and misleading. Control implies a command relation, while civil-military relations can imply something else as well. Therefore, control would probably not be a good word to describe political-military relations. And what is civil society? According to some of the participants, better concepts are democracy at the national level and at the local level and they prefer to speak about the relationship between national and local levels. Civil society is too fuzzy a concept. Nevertheless, Andreas Gross, the first presenter, sticks to the need of civil society for democratic control. In addition, Gross acknowledged that control is not a good word. Democracy goes much further than control. One should make a deeper background analysis. Generally speaking, he argued, people are far too attached to formalistic points of democracy. There was general agreement that the study of parliamentary control of the armed forces should take into account the wider context of democracy. Within the wider societal context of parliamentary control, David Darchiashvili noted that the civilianisation of society is not a top-down process. It is a matter of culture, notably political culture.

Empowerment

Another issue in the workshop discussion was related to the apparent passivity of some parliaments (like the Georgian Parliament) or Members of Parliament (like in the Czech Republic).
The question was ‘Why are some parliaments so passive and how can we empower members of parliaments?’ In terms of empowerment, Marie Vlachová noticed in her country that many Members of Parliament (who are laymen) experience psychological stress while coping with expert counterparts of the ministry of defence, resulting in the sub-optimal functioning of the parliamentarians.

Another perspective on the alleged passivity of parliamentarians was put forward by Ivanna Klympush. In the Ukraine, the Members of Parliament are dealing for many reasons more actively with economic transition problems than with security sector problems. Moreover, the information at hand is not perfect and is always related to power issues. She concluded with the remark that information power, essential for parliamentary control, means in the East something else than in the West. In the East, concealing information implies power, whereas in the West the distribution of knowledge implies power.

Follow-up Meeting

After the PCAF workshop, a follow-up meeting took place at DCAF HQ in Geneva (17 November 2000). During this meeting several aspects of parliamentary control were discussed. In particular, Ravi Singh of DCAF presented his ideas about a handbook for parliamentarians on control of the armed forces (see his contribution on this page). In addition, attention was given to possible follow up activities.
5 Parliamentary Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic

Marie Vlachová

Introduction

Conducted at the request of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), this study presents an overview of parliamentary control in the Czech Republic at the end of the millennium. It examines democratic control of the armed forces from two points of view, describing the formal aspects of parliamentary control established in the past ten years on the one hand and the viewpoints of the deputies who sit on the Defence and Security Committee (DSC) on the other. The study has a very practical character; the final section contains suggestions as to how to facilitate access to information for deputies who work on security and defence issues in order to improve their expertise in the field. We hope that these suggestions will be helpful for the recently established Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in the creation of assistance programs for Central and Eastern European countries. For this reason, this document examines closely the resources and quality of information available to deputies. The study is based on standardised interviews with members of the Defence and Security Committee of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (DSC) conducted in September 2000 by Marie Vlachová and Jaroslava Jandová, specialists from the Research Centre of the Personnel Marketing Centre, Main Personnel Bureau of the Czech Ministry of Defence. Eighteen of the twenty members of the Committee were interviewed.

Establishment of Parliamentary Control in the Czech Republic

Parliamentary control of armed forces is part of democratic control. Democratic control is understood as a relatively independent area of the theory describing the relationship between the army and society which defines the manner in which democratic societies control and manage their military institutions. The objective is to prevent the army from taking advantage of its privilege to possess weapons and its capacity to use force. Democratic control is a complex process which incorporates both management and control mechanisms. Managing an army through democratic control means delimiting its status within the society, defining its objectives and long-term tasks and the ways in which they are to be accomplished. Controlling the armed forces involves supervising how the means entrusted to the military are used and ensuring transparency of processes that take place within the army.

Regarding the establishment of democratic control, post-communist countries have had to undergo two processes:

(a) It was necessary to eliminate the Communist Party’s influence over the armed forces and to place the military under the control of the new pluralistic political representation. Anton Bebler describes the most important steps of this process – the transformation agenda – as separation of army from the Communist Party, its de-politicisation, placement of the military under parliamentary, governmental, presidential and public control and creation of channels through which the army can express its interests. 1

(b) Another necessity was to resolve the tension created between the army and the society as a result of constant changes within both the society and the military after the end of the Cold War. Referred to as the democratic agenda,2 these processes involve coping with the general trend toward professionalisation of armed forces, reduction of personnel, changes in the military vocation brought by new types of missions, changing values among the young generation and marginalisation of the armed forces.3

Transformation problems were the priority of the first decade after the fall of communism. It was necessary to build new ties between the army’s civilian command and executive levels. The task was complicated by the fact that the army was a bureaucratic institution unwilling to change and resisting external influences, which might endanger its institutional interests. Further, the political management lacked experience and expertise necessary for transformation of the values, standards and practices inherited from the army’s communist predecessor. The situation in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic was further complicated because the society was fully absorbed in political and economic transformation, paying relatively little attention to military issues. The reasons were mostly historical. Since the Czech army had never played a decisive role in the country’s history, it was not perceived by the public as an influential factor – neither negative nor positive – of historical development. When it became apparent that the armed forces would not be used to stop the democratic changes, the society turned to civilian problems. With regard to national security, attention was paid mainly to gaining control over intelligence services. The fact that military issues were considered of lesser importance had little effect on slowing down the transformation agenda.

3 For example, Dandeker, Christopher, Facing Uncertainty: Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century, National Defense College, Karlstad 1999.
In comparison with other post-communist countries, de-politicisation of the Czech army\(^4\) was relatively fast. Within three years the section in the Constitution specifying the leading role of the Communist Party was removed. In 1990 the army’s Political Administration Centre, political departments in individual corps and political positions were abolished. Professional soldiers and conscripts were barred from participating in any political activity, a measure intended to eliminate the Communist Party’s influence on the armed forces and to ensure that the military would remain apolitical after stabilisation of the political system. Thus, the basic conditions for democratic control of the armed forces were created relatively quickly. An important step that strengthened the national character of the military was the peaceful departure of Soviet troops from the country’s territory and the non-violent division of the Czechoslovak federation and its federal army. The formerly totalitarian army became an apolitical institution defending the interests of the Czech state. The powers to manage and control the armed forces were gradually transferred to the political representatives defined in the Czech Constitution, i.e. the President, the Government, the Parliament, civilian judiciary and the Supreme Audit Office. With only one exception, every Minister of Defence since 1990 has been a civilian.

This study examines the current state of parliamentary control in the Czech Republic. The Czech Parliament plays a vital role in democratic control of the armed forces as far as its competences and focus of activity are concerned. The Parliament approves security and military laws and plays an important role in drafting the military budget and controlling military expenditures. Further, the Parliament is responsible for deploying the army in cases of crises and declaring or extending a state of emergency at the demand of the Government. The Parliament approves participation of Czech troops in peacekeeping missions abroad.\(^5\) It monitors actions of the Government in the defence area and may propose solutions to problems that exist within the military. The Parliament has the power to establish commissions in order to lead inquiries into serious problems in the armed forces.\(^6\) In addition, the Parliament can take part in the creation and implementation of the country’s security policy. The principal focus of parliamentary control is oversight of the military budget and military expenditures. The Parliament takes an active part in the drafting of the defence and security budget and approves and oversees the budgets of ministries which participate in implementation of the security policy. The Parliament also has a duty to control activities carried out by all institutions responsible for national defence and security. For example, the Parliament examines issues concerning modernisation of armaments and approves acquisition of foreign military equipment. The Parliament approves the Government’s nomination for the Chief of General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic.\(^7\)

The main responsibility for parliamentary control lies with the Defence and Security Committee (DSC). The Committee currently has 19 members and is headed by a chairman and four vice-chairmen. The governing Social Democratic Party has seven, the contractual opposition Civic Democratic Party six, coalition opposition (Christian Democratic Party and the Freedom Union) four and the Communist Party two members. The Committee has a broad focus ranging from the military, the police, and rescue units to prison issues. The Committee has three subcommittees – Subcommittee for Integrated Rescue System and Civilian Planning, Subcommittee for Prisons and the Subcommittee for Intelligence Services. Further, DSC members are active in parliamentary commissions which work on areas where the competences of various numerous parliamentary committees overlap (for example the Permanent Commission for Control of the Security Intelligence Service).

State of Parliamentary Control from the Viewpoint of Deputies – Members of the Defence and Security Committee

The deputies see the main purpose of parliamentary control as being oversight of activities which may involve misuse of the army’s powers or activities which are incompatible with the society’s interests. They consider the existing control mechanisms in this area as sufficient.

DSC members perceive the managerial aspect of democratic control as far less important than the controlling aspect, which they view as affecting a relatively broad range of institutions, processes and activities. Most DSC members emphasised control of:

(a) the army’s powers;
(b) budgets of ministries responsible for national security;
(c) important processes which concern the current modernisation of the armed forces;
(d) intelligence services;
(e) issues encountered by deputies in their constituencies which concern military issues on the regional level.

Fifty percent of the questioned deputies consider competences in these areas as a guarantee that the Parliament will maintain control over the armed forces. Fifty percent of the respondents mentioned shortcomings which prevent further development of the existing control mechanisms. Almost all DSC members stressed that cooperation between deputies and security forces has improved in the past two years. The deficiencies in parliamentary control of the armed forces mentioned most frequently are described below.

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\(^4\) Eliminating the Communist Party’s control and influence over the army.
\(^5\) A legislative amendment will transfer some powers of the Parliament to the Government to allow greater flexibility in dealing with crises.
\(^6\) So far, no situation has necessitated the establishing of such a commission.
\(^7\) The Chief of General Staff is nominated by the Government, approved by the Parliament and appointed by the President who is the chief commanded of the armed forces.
Legislative Barriers

Parliamentary control is generally defined in the Czech Constitution. Some specific issues concerning the Parliament’s powers during a state of emergency are set out in the constitutional law pertaining to security of the Czech Republic. The Parliament’s national security responsibilities are defined, on a general level, in the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic.

The deputies’ opinions about their legislative powers to control the armed forces vary. While some believe that modern constitutions and laws that apply to security and the armed forces give deputies sufficient control power, others mentioned deficiencies, especially regarding control of military intelligence services. In their opinion, the overly broad protection of secret information, set out in a law adopted before the Czech Republic joined NATO, prevents deputies from obtaining information of confidential nature. Access to such information is subject to a security check of the highest level, a lengthy and complicated procedure. Consequently, a number of important documents are not discussed by the DSC. According to the interviewed deputies the situation could be rectified by an amendment to the pertinent legislation. One of the respondents stated:

“The powers of deputies are based more on moral responsibility for control of the army than legislative one.”

It is interesting to note that a number of the deputies voiced positive comments about preparation and approval of laws concerning security and the military in 1999. Besides the fact that this legislation is vital for democratic control of the armed forces, they valued the process which necessitated extensive cooperation between politicians and the Ministry of Defence. As part of the joint effort to complete the legislative work, politicians and defence officials got to know each other. Stereotypes from the past about ‘incompetent politicians’ and ‘old ministerial structures’ were eliminated. The politicians appreciated the intellectual capacity and meticulous work of Ministry experts and realised that their disposition towards development of democratic control of the armed forces, they valued the process which necessitated extensive cooperation between politicians and the Ministry of Defence. As part of the joint effort to complete the legislative work, politicians and defence officials got to know each other. Stereotypes from the past about ‘incompetent politicians’ and ‘old ministerial structures’ were eliminated. The politicians appreciated the intellectual capacity and meticulous work of Ministry experts and realised that their disposed

Political Barriers

The opinion that development of democratic control of the armed forces is hindered by the style of DSC’s work which reflects relations among political parties was voiced not only by the two Committee members from the Communist Party but also by one deputy from the governing Social Democratic Party. Thus, this opinion is not necessarily due to the isolation of communist deputies. Some believe that not all DSC members receive information provided by the Defence Ministry. The same respondents voiced similar criticism about the Government. They believe that these practices are detrimental to the frankness and productivity of discussions; materials are in many cases discussed only formally without the formulation of necessary conclusions. As access to information often depends on personal contacts of deputies with Ministry officials, the more experienced, communicative and active individuals – as well as those who, thanks to their political affiliations, enjoy good relations with the minister – have an advantage over others. This situation often results in tensions, a fact that was discernible during the interview.

Barriers Due to the Deputies’ Style of Work

The occasions when the Parliament prepares, studies, discusses and approves laws or important documents concerning national security are relatively infrequent. Deputies usually work in an ad hoc manner, dealing with current issues emanating from the media, army units, local government authorities, regional institutions which are in contact with military bases, etc. Some deputies even consider such an approach, which is based on fieldwork, as the priority of parliamentary control. They believe that personal contacts are an important (in some cases the only) independent source of information undistorted by political and ministerial interests. A role is played by personal preferences – some politicians favour cabinet-like work with documents and materials, others prefer active communication with people. Although it is unquestionable that fieldwork is an important part of political activity, it is uncertain to what extent a politician who is mostly ‘field-oriented’ can see particular problems from a global point of view, unless he/she is able and willing to seek and study information of a general nature.

Barriers Due to Lack of Qualifications

Work on national security and defence issues is difficult and often thankless. It is a very extensive area which covers internal and external security, and where remnants from the country’s communist past are combined with complex transformation tasks that are subject to current military development trends whose consequences are unclear even to top

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10 The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is viewed as the successor of the pre-1989 Communist Party. Even though it maintains its position in the parliament thanks to a substantial number of faithful voters, it does not get invited to participate in governments or opposition coalitions.
11 The current Defence Minister, Vladimír Vetchý, is a member of the governing Social Democratic Party.
expert. In addition, in the Czech Republic defence and security represent an area which is of marginal interest to both the lay public and experts. While the public prefers issues concerning interior security which are related to everyday problems, such as crime, experts pay attention to security and defence matters only to a certain extent, partly due to the fact that there is no independent academic institution focused on the military aspects of national security. Moreover, access to foreign literature on political science, sociology and other areas is very limited.

Research has shown that even politicians themselves do not perceive national security and defence as a topic which would improve their standing among voters. The last deputy publicly recognised in connection with the military was rock singer Michael Kocáb who, during 1991–92, negotiated the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. Most deputies are assigned to defence issues by their political parties; cases of deep personal interest or extensive experience with security matters are rare. For reasons that must be apparent, former professional soldiers have not tried to pursue political careers. Only a small number of DSC members work on army issues. Most focus on other security issues, such as the police, intelligence services, prisons and the rescue system. There are about five deputies who work on issues concerning the armed forces, especially the armaments industry and technical problems of modernisation.

Newly elected deputies who want to perform work in the DSC responsibly have to be prepared for many years of on-the-job study in order to become familiar with the numerous security and defence issues. DSC members must possess knowledge about military history, development of NATO armies and international political ramifications of security policies. Due to the current modernisation of the armed forces, DSC members who have technical education are advantaged, as they are better able to communicate with arms manufacturers and Defence Ministry specialists. According to some respondents, it takes several years before a deputy gains sufficient knowledge about defence issues to be a qualified partner to security and defence professionals. Even then, politicians are in the position of an informed layman facing an experienced specialist, which is difficult from the psychological point of view. According to one respondent, deputies will only be part of the democratic control of the armed forces when they gain sufficient knowledge about the specifics of security issues, being able to confront defence and security specialists as equal partners.

Role Played by DSC Members in Management of Security and Defence as Part of Democratic Control

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the management aspect of the democratic control process is perceived as being less important than control itself. Management of defence and security institutions requires the ability to see beyond defence issues, to perceive them in a comprehensive manner and to formulate national security objectives. The approach to national defence is outlined in strategic documents and the security and military strategies of the state. The study included an examination of the mechanism used in the creation of these documents.

The Security Strategy and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic were approved by the Government in the spring of 1999, before the country joined NATO. At present, these documents are being revised to reflect the Czech Republic’s new security and defence reality based on NATO membership. Thus, a question about the role played by deputies in the amending process is very timely. A request to draft a strategic document or an amendment thereto can be made by the Government. Individual ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence) prepare the draft which is subsequently submitted by the Government to the Parliament for approval. DSC members usually receive only the final version of the document and have little opportunity to change it. Their participation in the drafting of documents is to a large extent a formality which, as the deputies admitted, is often completed hastily.

The vast majority of deputies believe that DSC members should take part in the entire process of creation of security-related documents, including the initial stage during which proposals about the nature and content of the documents are made at the ministerial level. Such an approach would prevent changes in already completed documents and it would allow deputies to participate in discussions of opposing viewpoints. DSC members could present their views and get to know opinions of Ministry officials, thus deepening their knowledge about particular issues. Further, documents could be more easily approved by the Parliament, as deputies taking part in the entire drafting process would be better able to defend their standpoint. DSC members could act during discussions about individual documents en bloc and successfully dispute contrasting opinions in both the Parliament and the Government.

Some of the respondents consider the status quo satisfactory and believe that strengthening cooperation between the Committee and ministries responsible for national security would be sufficient. One DSC members opined that defence documents should be created exclusively by specialists who are not influenced by politicians due to the fact that the periods for which strategic documents are drafted exceed the electoral term of deputies and longevity of governments.

The deputies exhibited varied opinions about who should set the political parameters used in the creation of strategic documents. It could be the Defence and Security Committee, the Government, ministries jointly with the DSC or ministries alone. There is a widespread belief among DSC members that Ministry officials should define long-term strategies for development of the armed forces and that politicians should evaluate their proposals for value, impact and feasibility. It is uncertain whether such an approach would not essentially mean the relinquishing of the management aspect of parliamentary control. Overall, the interviews showed that politicians are aware of their responsibility for management of the ministries responsible for national security and are interested in expanding cooperation with them.

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12 See for example political decisions concerning the Kosovo crisis and the Czech obligations arising under the recent joining of NATO.
14 This may change in the near future, as in the next several years top army commanders from the new generation of military professionals will return to civilian life.
DSC Members’ Information Access

In the Czech Republic, a country with few independent sources of information about defence and security, politicians rely mostly on the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for such information. Academic research and a broad defence community are at an early stage of development. This situation is reflected in the opinions of DSC members. Only about half of them have access to independent civilian expertise which is represented mainly by former defence employees. Most DSC members know two to four specialists whom they contact from time to time. The reason for this paucity of external, independent sources of information and expertise is not only the small number of persons who can be considered civilian experts, but also their uncertain trustworthiness. Some deputies consider the quality of information from these sources as questionable. Due to the fact that accuracy of such information is difficult to verify, they are not interested in contacts of this type. Independent civilian expertise is attributed a greater importance by deputies who have sat on the Defence and Security Committee for a longer period of time. Overall, the opinions about civilian expertise are ambiguous.13

The study also included an examination of the stand of DSC members toward the defence community, a group of people who for professional or personal reasons concentrate on defence and security issues and who possess valuable expertise thanks to their knowledge and experience. Besides politicians and officials from ministries responsible for national security, the Czech defence community consists especially of journalists, scientists, researchers, representative of non-governmental organisations, people from the armaments industry and members of interest groups.

Four of the interviewed deputies were not familiar with the term ‘defence community’. While some considered it to be an important concept, they associated the term chiefly with people from the private sector who lobby among politicians. For this reason they did not regard members of the defence community as independent experts, but as persons pursuing the interests of specific groups.

Despite a somewhat cautious approach, DSC members consider the defence community important. They are aware that politicians and Ministry officials are not the only ones responsible for democratic control of the armed forces and perceive the defence community as an important aspect which enriches its philosophical, strategic and systemic dimensions. The deputies realise that the defence community can function as an independent source of specialists and expertise for politicians. Thanks to the defence community it is possible to generalise findings from the field and to see particular problems from a global point of view. DSC members are realistic about the current state of the defence community; they see it as dispersed, disorganised, small in number and disjointed. According to one of the respondents, members of the defence community only recently began to realise their relationship to a specific group of people with whom they share common interests. The deputies understand that the creation of a functioning defence community is a spontaneous process which requires time and suitable conditions. They perceive as positive the fact that some of the members of the defence community are former employees of ministries responsible for national security.10 None the less, the actual use of the intellectual potential of the defence community seems to be at a rather low level and depends on the qualifications and perceived trustworthiness of the community members as well as the experience of individual deputies with defence-related issues.

Additional information sources used by deputies include foreign literature, especially publications on NATO and the European Union, information from the Foreign Ministry’s International Relations Institute, the Interior Ministry’s Criminality Institute, literature published by the Military Information Agency, the civilian press, international studies of politicians and publications about military history. Non-governmental organisations are used sporadically; the respondents mentioned only the Free Business Development Foundation and the Bohemia Foundation, both of which occasionally provide deputies with information. DSC members frequently use the Parliamentary Library and information services of the Parliamentary Institute. Most deputies use the World Wide Web, where the websites of defence and security organisations are a source of valuable information.

Communication Between the Ministry of Defence and DSC Members

The study has shown that the most important source of information for DSC members are institutions responsible for national security, the Defence Ministry in particular. The deputies were asked about communication and their satisfaction with the information provided by the Ministry.

Most DSC members are satisfied with the amount of information received from the Ministry of Defence. Deputies who have sat on the Committee for more than one electoral term stated that communication with the Ministry has improved substantially during the past two years. Several of them voiced positive comments about computer presentations prepared by the Ministry which seem to be a very effective instrument allowing deputies to grasp particular problems rapidly. Despite the positive trend, however, the assessment of communication with the Defence Ministry included considerable criticism, testifying to the fact that the situation is far from optimal.

Almost all the interviewed deputies affirmed that the Ministry provides them with requested information; however, the quality is not always adequate. Sometimes there are unnecessary delays and information is often incomplete or insufficiently detailed. To understand all aspects of a problem in order to assume a defendable stance on an issue, a politician needs a large amount of information which, according to the respondents, the Ministry is not always willing or able to provide. A special problem is information about the functioning of military intelligence services which can be provided

13 This fact is supported by two conflicting statements: ‘Contacts with civilian experts are poor, they basically don’t exist. Civilian expertise is too scattered to be taken seriously.’ vs. ‘Communication between civilians and deputies is beneficial for both sides. Civilians themselves seek deputies to make them aware of their problems. On the other hand, deputies are very interested in what they have to say.’

16 One of the respondents estimated that there are 20–25 former employees of ministries responsible for national security, mostly former professional soldiers, eight of whom can be considered top defence and security experts. Their services are used by some parliamentary committees.
only to persons who undergo a thorough security check. The deputies also lack comprehensive information about how the Ministry of Defence is coping with the demands exerted on the Czech army by NATO membership. It is very difficult to obtain information about the fate of some projects and government contracts. There is no systematic information on modernisation of the army and acquisition of new armaments. Furthermore, the deputies complained about a lack of financial information from the Ministry, little transparency of financial operations and unwillingness to provide information about budget spending. Some DSC members also lack up-to-date information about the structure of the Defence Ministry and the armed forces.

The manner in which DSC members communicate with the Ministry of Defence is very disorganised, unsystematic and improvised. This is partly due to the fact that the deputies do not plan their work and mostly focus on current problems raised by the media or the electorate. A role is also played by the Ministry which is overly passive in communicating with the deputies; defence officials usually wait to be approached by the Committee without trying to initiate or deepen contacts and meet politicians’ needs. The deputies would appreciate a more helpful attitude especially in situations when they need to form an opinion about a problem rapidly, such as the military aspects of security of the Temelin nuclear plant. Communication is irregular, a fact that was reflected in a statement made by one of the respondents:

‘A lot of people from the Ministry think that after a piece of legislation is passed they no longer need politicians. They think that they’ll be off the hook for another two years.’

Functioning communication with the Ministry during preparation and approval of security and defence legislation is exceptional and occurs mostly when one side needs the other.

Personal contacts with Ministry officials are considered very important. The vast majority of the interviewed deputies admitted that informal relations are instrumental in helping them understand the essence of problems. Their assessment of the willingness of Ministry officials and representatives of the General Staff differs according to the persons with whom the deputies communicate – some consider the Ministry to be more disposed to provide information, others the General Staff. The Defence Ministry was criticised for delays in provision of information and excessive bureaucracy and the General Staff for being overly secretive and cautious. None the less, some deputies harbour an opposing opinion about the two institutions, believing that the General Staff is flexible and prompt in comparison with the Ministry. If such conflicting opinions can be generalised at all, it appears that deputies representing the governing Social Democratic Party are inclined toward the Ministry of Defence, whereas deputies representing the opposition Civic Democrats favour the General Staff. Even though some DSC members are aware of the tension that exists between the Ministry and the General Staff, they do not believe that the friction is detrimental to their ability to access information. Overall, it seems that satisfaction with communication depends on contacts with specific people, and such contacts are the basis on which the deputies form opinions about the institutions and departments as a whole. Further, the ability to find sources of information and maintain informal contacts with people from institutions responsible for national defence is very important.

Some DSC members voiced an interesting opinion in connection with the amount of lobbying done by defence officials. Lobbying is considered a legitimate part of political life – an ability to gain political support for projects that involve government contracts. However, the deputies are afraid of the negative aspects of lobbying, i.e. favouring various interest groups, more in respect of the private sector than Ministry officials and army representatives whom they consider too passive, cautious, disciplined and observing procedures to initiate independent lobbying activities. It is apparent that the extent of trade and industry lobbying is incomparable with defence and security lobbying. One of the respondents described the situation as follows:

‘In general, lobbying from defence officials is low because they don’t want to provide information with the exception of times when defence laws are being approved.’

Although this statement is probably a good description of the current situation, it does not mean that defence officials do not engage in lobbying. However, most such activities are exceptional. This fact is supported by two deputies who stated that the DSC has backed redistribution of budget funds allotted to training of pilots. The initiative behind this decision came from the army, testifying to the fact that defence officials are learning to use lobbying as a legitimate political means.

Summary

Establishment of formal elements of parliamentary control which took place in the Czech Republic relatively shortly after the 1990 political changes was the first stage of institutionalisation of democratic control of the armed forces. It appears that the subsequent phase, during which legislative, administrative and civic instruments of democratic control are put into practice, is considerably longer and more complicated. The quality of parliamentary control depends not only on the legislative framework defining the powers of deputies in respect of the armed forces and institutions responsible for national security, but also on their practical ability to exercise these powers. To be successful, deputies must have access to information and possess knowledge about defence issues. This study has shown that DSC members understand this fact. They are aware of the importance of good relations with defence officials, realise that a well-functioning defence community can provide them with invaluable assistance and feel that their existing access to defence and security expertise is lacking. The interviewed deputies perceive positive trends in the development of relations between defence institutions and the Parliament. Furthermore, the study has identified specific areas where democratic control is used insufficiently. Below is a list of the most problematic aspects:

- The management aspect of parliamentary control is underestimated and the deputies are somewhat unable not only to exercise control, but also to determine the basic direction of development of defence institutions and the armed forces.
• The legislation pertaining to flow of secret information which deputies need to control military intelligence services is unsuitable.
• The DSC’s style suits the Committee’s more experienced members who have a network of contacts and information channels and therefore enjoy a certain advantage over others in respect of discussing issues and defending the stand of the political parties they represent.
• Some deputies work mostly in an ad hoc manner. They concentrate on fieldwork to the detriment of research and study of detailed analytical information which necessitates substantial effort because of the lack of defence-related expertise in the Czech Republic, a country where social research of defence and security issues is at an early stage of development.
• Security and defence represent a complex field which requires relatively extensive knowledge about political science, security, international politics and military developments after the end of the Cold War. To make matters worse, this field is considered marginal in the Czech Republic by both specialists and the lay public.
• The defence community is at an early development stage; it can be described as isolated, small, dispersed and uncoordinated. Consequently, politicians do not consider it trustworthy.
• Basic information about defence is provided by parliamentary institutions, such as the Parliamentary Library and the Parliamentary Institute. Another source of information is foreign literature from NATO and the European Union as well as materials published by the Foreign Ministry’s International Relations Institute, the Military Information Agency and the Ministry of Defence.
• The most important sources of information are institutions responsible for national security. Fundamental for performance of parliamentary control is communication between deputies and defence institutions which, according to the respondents, has substantially improved in the course of the past two years. Shortcomings include especially a passive approach of the Ministry of Defence, which more or less meets deputies’ requests, but shows little activity in respect of the politicians’ need for information. Flow of information is irregular, plagued by delays and mostly based on personal contacts. The quality of provided information depends on the deputies’ individual activities and abilities to maintain personal relations with defence officials.
DSC members highly appreciate assistance programs which provide them with knowledge about foreign armed forces. Most often mentioned were inter-parliamentary exchanges and visits to the NATO command and the EU headquarters in Brussels. Most of these programs took place at the time the Czech Republic was joining NATO. The priority were parliaments in countries with comparable armed forces and similar transformation problems, such as Belgium, Holland, Hungary, Poland (the other new NATO members) and also, for understandable reasons, Slovakia. Since assistance programs are currently oriented mainly on issues concerning accession to the European Union, DSC members do not take part in them. Some of the interviewed deputies recalled projects organised by OSCE and the Council of Europe without specifying details. One respondent mentioned contacts with France which has asked the Committee to describe its position concerning the European Defence Initiative. The only Czech institutions remembered by the deputies were the non-governmental organisations Free Business Development Foundation and the Bohemia Foundation – no further details were given. In addition, the respondents mentioned visits to arms trade shows in the Czech Republic and abroad and contacts with foreign war veteran organisations; once again no details were provided. Some of the interviewed deputies expressed appreciation for materials provided to the Parliamentary Library by the EU, NATO, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Most of the respondents are interested in information about military legislation, internal security, intelligence services, information systems in Western armed forces, status of military bases in regions and developments in the armaments industry. All the interviewed deputies agreed that the principal value of assistance programs is the opportunity to gain knowledge about specific processes that take place in foreign armed forces (professionalisation, modernisation). Overall, it seems that assistance programs are scarce and irregular. Furthermore, when offered, they are only used by some deputies.

During the closing part of the interview the deputies were asked to make suggestions in respect of foreign assistance programs which would improve their knowledge and provide information necessary for work in the Defence and Security Committee. The suggestions concerned the following areas:

1. **Exchange of information between parliaments and armed forces, especially in NATO member countries and countries with comparable armies** The deputies believe that exchange of this type of information would enhance the democratic control process and promote the Czech Republic and its armed forces. Even though complete models or methodologies for dealing with problems are transferable in a limited extent only, the deputies believe that information from abroad and personal experience from meetings with foreign partners would provide an invaluable source of inspiration.

2. **Support for development of social sciences dealing with defence, security and military issues** Since this area is not very highly developed in the Czech Republic, the deputies lack intellectual backing and qualified specialists who would permanently work in this field and whose expertise could be used by both politicians and defence institutions. Support should be provided for existing organisations (the Foreign Ministry’s International Relations Institute, research centres of the Ministry of Defence, the Strategic Studies Institute of the Brno Military Academy) where the human resources and funding are limited. Further, the deputies suggested that university humanities courses should be expanded to include specialised seminars on defence and security as well political, social and psychological issues related to the military. Several respondents stated that the Czech Republic has no independent academic institution specialising in security issues.

3. **Support for research activity in the area of defence and security** Research should be focused on areas where deputies lack information (see below) with the aim of increasing availability of information on the opinions of civilians and military professionals about current national security topics.

4. **Support for the existing information facilities in the Parliament of the Czech Republic** The Parliamentary Library should acquire and translate literature about defence studies. In addition, interns specialising in defence and security should be invited to work in the Parliamentary Library and the Parliamentary Institute to facilitate deputies’ access to information. At present, the availability of specialised defence-related literature in academic and public libraries is very poor, a fact that significantly hinders access to up-to-date information.

5. **Organisation of seminars, roundtables and discussions about defence and security for the needs of deputies** The deputies suggested seminars with erudite foreign lecturers, meetings with members of the defence community, improvement of the quality of discussions, examination of selected current topics based on foreign experience and evaluation of pros and cons of different approaches to dealing with problems.

6. **Availability of defence and security information on the World Wide Web** The deputies would like to see better quality of information from institutions responsible for defence as well as more general strategic information about the development of foreign security policies and current trends in the development of armed forces.

7. **Financial support for communication and assertiveness courses for deputies.**

8. **Support for improvement of deputies’ foreign language skills.**

**According to the deputies information about the following areas is most lacking:**

- the work of military intelligence services, the manner in which they are controlled by the Parliament, systems used abroad;
current trends in development of the armed forces, reorganisation and restructuring, modernisation problems faced by foreign armies, technical parameters of foreign armies, developments in arms manufacture, experience with offset programs;

professionalisation in foreign armies, comparative studies, experience, pros and cons;

functioning of defence communities in advanced democratic countries;

foreign defence legislation;

information about developments in regions affected by conflicts and crises (Kosovo);

security risks for Central and Eastern European countries;

developments within the Islamic world from the viewpoint of security risks for Central and Eastern European countries;

development of armies in distant countries which are interesting from the viewpoint of security risks (China, Pakistan);

military integration trends;

perception of the Czech army abroad;

building of armed forces in Slovakia;

importance and function of regional authorities in respect of military issues and their incorporation into democratic control of the armed forces;

structure of parliamentary committees responsible for national defence and security;

care for veterans in Western countries;

development of the Czech public’s perception of NATO.

Annex 2: Questionnaire: List of Interviewed Deputies

1. What is the role played by the Czech Parliament in democratic control of the armed forces?

2. What are the main barriers, obstacles and problems of parliamentary control of the armed forces?

3. What is the best mechanism for the creation of security documents? Who should prepare these documents and based on what instructions? Should committees be created for this purpose and if yes, who should sit on them?

4. What is your opinion about professionalisation of the Czech army?

5. Based on your experience, what is the state of the so-called defence community in the Czech Republic?

6. Do you have sufficient access to information on control of the armed forces?

7. Does the Ministry of Defence give you information you need for your work in the DSC?

8. How do you rate the quality of communication between yourself and civilian experts?

9. How do you rate the quality of communication between yourself and military experts?

10. From what sources do you get information and knowledge about democratic control of the armed forces?

11. What assistance programs organised by Czech and foreign institutions have you encountered during your work for the DSC? How do you rate the benefits?

12. What would you like to see in this regard? What areas should assistance programs concentrate on? What kind of programs would be most beneficial for you?

13. What can a research institution, such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, do to improve democratic control in the Czech Republic?

14. What information would you need from the Research Department of the Defence Ministry?

List of interviewed deputies

1. PhDr. Petr Nečas, Civic Democratic Party – DSC Chairman
2. Petr Koháček, Civic Democratic Party – DSC Vice-chairman
3. Ing. Jan Klas, Civic Democratic Party
4. Tomáš Kladívko, Civic Democratic Party
5. Jaroslav Melichar, Civic Democratic Party
6. Karel Černý, Social Democratic Party
7. Ing. Karel Hönig, Social Democratic Party

With the exception of Jan Vidím (Civic Democratic Party) all DSC members took part in the study.
8. František Španbauer, Social Democratic Party
9. PhDr. Karel Špíchal, Social Democratic Party
11. Jan Žižka, Social Democratic Party – DSC Vice-chairman
12. Mgr. Radim Turek, Social Democratic Party
15. Ing. František Ondruš, Freedom Union
16. Mgr. Ivana Hanačková, Freedom Union
17. Josef Houzák, Communist Party
18. Václav Frank, Communist Party

Luis Eduardo Tibiletti

Background

The Argentine Constitution of 1853 was inspired by that of the US and, therefore, it also grants extended responsibilities to Parliament regarding the Armed Forces. For more than a century, these parliamentary powers were used in a limited manner regarding both the frequency and profoundness of their exercise.

With the return of the rule of law in 1983, when Dr. Alfonsín took over as president, the peculiar characteristics of the democratic transition in Argentina allowed the Parliament to revert this history and become one of the key players in the political conduct of the military.

We are intentionally using the words ‘political conduct’ because we believe it is a more appropriate and wider concept than the word ‘control’, which is only one of the functions of conduct. We believe the main function is to determine what is the military’s job, and where, when and how they should perform it. This much wider responsibility essentially rests with politicians, and they have to assume it in full and not only be responsible for ensuring that any tasks are complied with.

Actions Taken

We shall mention only a few landmarks here:

Enactment of a Set of Legal Rules

These legal rules make up a regulatory and political corpus with a recognised foundational character, including:

(a) Amendments to the Military Code of Justice (1984) which enabled the prosecution of the former military commanders in chief. This is a unique case in Latin American transitions to democracy and is only similar to Greece on a global level.

(b) The National Defence Act (1988) which precluded the involvement of the Armed Forces in domestic security tasks. This hit at the heart of the National Security Doctrine promoted by the US all over Latin America during the Cold War years and happened two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

(c) The Domestic Security Act (1992) which ratified the principle above and created a system for political control of the police and security forces.

(d) The Voluntary Service System Act (1995) which abolished the draft system that had lasted for almost a century.

(e) The Armed Forces Reorganisation Act (1998) which established strategic principles later reflected in a White Book on National Defence of Argentina. A number of public hearings were held before this Act was passed.

Most of these pieces of legislation were unanimously approved by all political forces and by initiative of Congress members. They did not originate from the Executive Branch, which, however, did not use its constitutional powers to veto any of these acts. This can be interpreted as recognition of the Congress’s ability to agree on actions that the Executive could not carry out due to the structural weakness of the Ministry of Defence.

1 For details on the constitutional powers of the Parliament regarding military matters and work methodologies of the Defense Committees, see Tibiletti, Luis and Ugarte, Jose Manuel, “The role of defense committees as a forum for civil-military interaction” in Towards a New Civil-Military Relation, report of the Seminar held in Montevideo by CEPNA-CELADU-NDI with prologue by Walter Mondale, National Democratic Institute, Washington 1990.


3 Tibiletti, Luis, as above. In that paper I review the main actions taken by the defense committees until 1994. For further information on subsequent actions, the paper by Martinez, Pablo, “The role of Parliament in the reorganization of the armed forces”, is now in print and to be published by CHDS and SER en el 2000.

4 The Argentine White Book on Defence may be consulted in our database at www.ser2000.org.ar, where express acknowledgement is made of both Parliamentary committees and NGOs that took part in its elaboration. More information on White Books from our region and the rest of the world can be found at www.pdgs.org.ar.
Both military men and politicians agree on the key role played in Argentina by Defence Committees to create a cooperation environment which is unique in the institutional history of our country. The creation of the parliamentary liaison function has been equally important.

**Main Lessons Learned**

1. **The importance of creating a civil community of defence specialists** who, representing political parties, could generate consensus regardless of each group’s circumstantial interests. In this sense, retired military who were not tied to their institutions played an important role: they were able to provide the specific knowledge from a standpoint of political rather than institutional commitment.

2. **Having a core of tough political leaders** who, in spite of the low electoral benefit derived from engaging in defence matters, were able to set the foundations for consensus, as elaborated by the above-mentioned specialists. They are the ones responsible for taking such consensus to the level of their parties’ political leaders both in the Executive and Legislative branches. It is this work that enables building the well-known state policies. Probably the best example of this has been the ability not only to confront but even to change the minds of representatives of US security sectors. They had insistently put pressure on Argentina to abandon its position of non-involvement of its military in the fight against drug-trafficking. In spite of the enormous asymmetry of power and the linkage they exerted with other significant aspects for the Armed Forces, they could not achieve their objective for fifteen years. Finally, they accepted the Argentine doctrine of a logistics support role for the military and disseminated it around the rest of Latin America.

3. **The success in involving the NGOs, universities and the media**, so that they might increase their respective areas’ knowledge and promote the study of defence and security issues. This had never occurred in the past in our country, as our Hispanic tradition made us believe that these were issues pertaining to the military and the police forces and not to the citizens in general, and to the politicians in particular. As an example of this achievement, our institution coordinated the Third National Meeting of Strategic Studies where more than fifty institutions, including national and private universities and civil and military study centres, took part in discussing the future of the Inter-American security system.

**A Few Key Factors for Future Actions**

First, we would like to remember that the civil-military relations issue, in general, and democratic control of the military, in particular, cannot be treated outside the specific context of each country, in terms of the situation of the governance/security pair. The tasks at the PDGS, which we perform together with other organisations, have led us to value this relationship in a special way. Ignoring this context could hinder, precisely, the priority objective of democratic stability. This could happen in such circumstances as where governance is affected by security problems, especially in the area of the states’ ability to exert the monopoly of violence across their entire territory. Also, not taking into consideration such situations as where governance can be hindered by problems in the defence and security structures themselves can equally affect such an objective.

We can, thus, list a few ideas to be developed at length in the future:

(a) **Civil-military relations** must be understood as an issue of a permanent rather than circumstantial nature. In countries in transition it is very common that, when relative stability is attained, people begin to ask why we continue discussing this issue. Such studies are not viewed as permanent. As such, a commendable field of action could be the creation of curricula reflecting the complexity and universality of the issue for application to the education of political and military leaders.

(b) Similarly, there exists a need to develop university studies not only on civil-military relations, but also on defence and security issues at the global, regional and national levels. In most developing countries, this does not have an academic tradition, which further discourages political leaders from undertaking these studies.

(c) It may also be convenient to create programs to develop NGOs’ capabilities to act in these fields, thus linking the strengthening of civil society with the issue of civil control of the military or in otherwords, empowering society’s conduct of its own security and defence affairs.

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5. This is a phenomenon observed also in the US, where retired service are part of the advising staff in the defence committees and have admitted to having promoted from those forums the reforms they were unable to implement in their institutions while they were in active duty.

6. For further information, see www.enee.ser2000.org.ar.
Finally, we believe that a field of particular influence on civil-military relations is the study of *joint action in humanitarian missions*, both inside each nation and in the projection of international and regional joint capabilities. The experiences of various international organisations over the past few years show that the development of an effective interaction of civil and military agents in many emergency situations has been a key factor for the success of those missions.
PART III:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Introduction

Marina Caparini

After more than a decade of democratisation and structural reforms in the defence and security sectors of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, it is useful to assess the degree to which past efforts were successful in achieving their ends, identify lessons learned, and recommend future approaches. The articles in this chapter address the issue in a regional context from at least three angles. First, the authors describe the conditions and problems faced by actors within CEE political and military establishments who are seeking to enact reforms. Second, the authors address the types of challenges encountered in the attempts of Western actors to provide encouragement, advice, guidance, and also exert leverage on processes of civil-military transformation in the region. And third, prevailing theories in civil-military relations are examined, particularly their inadequacies in providing explanation and guidance for many of the problems encountered in transition. This 3-pronged approach underlines our need to better understand, theorise and systematise experiences in implementing democratic control of armed forces, in order to better inform the advice, assistance and requirements that may influence or induce policy change concerning the armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe.

Tim Edmunds provides a thoughtful analysis of past Western efforts to promote democratic control of armed forces in the region. He notes that outreach strategies have often been characterised by high profile events, lack of coordination, and the simplistic promotion of Western models. He notes that attention is now rightly shifting from adjusting institutional frameworks towards deepening democratic processes and norms, attending a shift in focus from military-political elites towards parliamentarians, mid-level bureaucrats and civil society organisations. Edmunds finally notes the need to broaden the focus from democratic control of the armed forces proper, to the wider security sector.

David Betz maintains that the entire region continues to face major challenges in establishing effective armed forces that are under the competent management of civilian officials, with the main obstacle being the sheer complexity and magnitude of the task. This is made all the more difficult by the low priority assigned by most policy-makers to the subject compared to other pressing policy issues in post-communist states. Betz further notes the inadequacies of applying Western “models” of armed forces and their control, which have arisen out of the particular historical, political and social conditions in their originating countries. He underscores that civilian political and administrative actors must recognise their need to acquire expertise, and be proactive in addressing that need, in order to effectively exercise their responsibilities in this area.

Similarly, Janos Matus cautions against an over-reliance on legislation as the main corrective for complex military and defence problems. Rather, more attention needs to focus on the policy process, as well as improvement in the management and public administration of security and defence. In Central and Eastern Europe, he notes, policy-making remains restricted to the narrow confines of civilian and military bureaucrats while academic experts and civil society more broadly remain excluded.

Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker address the relevance of pre-1989 civil-military relations theory, which failed to predict both the demise of the Marxist/Leninist regimes in CEE, and the subsequent absence of coups in the region since transition began. Describing the situations pertaining in post-communist CEE countries, they note that while a few Central European countries appear to have adopted Western values including democratic control of armed forces (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Baltics, Slovenia), the majority of post-communist states have not. Danopoulos and Zirker look to religion to provide a possible explanatory factor for the differing attitudes of individuals to state authority and social control, values that undergird political doctrines and social values of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. Specifically, they posit that those societies with Catholic and Protestant religious traditions have a cultural and political predisposition towards the development of civil society and democratic values. In contrast, Orthodox and Muslim religious traditions have encouraged the predominance of other values, such as collectivism, tradition and nationalism, which have tended to impede the acceptance of values supporting democratic and civilian control of armed forces.

Underlining the need to look at deeper social and cultural factors, Marjan Malešić and Ljubica Jelsuč address lessons learned particularly from the experience of Slovenia. The authors posit that civil-military relations encompass three main components: the armed forces, the political elite, and civil society. Malešić and Jelsuč point to an interesting paradox: While the political elite often acts as mediator between the military interests and those of civil society, civil society actors have greater influence on the armed forces over the long term, when compared to the relatively short shelf life of individual members of the political elite. They suggest that this is an area where more research is needed.
The promotion of democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe has become an increasingly important part of the West’s ‘outreach’ policies in the past decade. However, these have been characterised by difficulties in several areas, and, while it is apparent that lessons are being learned, problems remain in approach, agenda and target audience.

First, in terms of approach, western policies towards the promotion of democratic control of armed forces (DCAF) in Central and Eastern Europe have been characterised by something of a ‘quick fix’ philosophy. Often, outreach strategies have focused on one off, high profile activities such as conferences or visits by senior military/political/academic delegations. While there is, of course, a place for these activities in a coordinated process of engagement with Central and Eastern European states over DCAF issues, it is important that they do not detract from or replace the development of more sustained, long term forms of cooperation and contact. These can take the form of inter-country exchange programmes between personnel engaged in defence and security issues, or long term training programmes for Central and Eastern Europeans at, for example, national staff colleges. Sustained military, diplomatic or academic contact and cooperation ‘on the ground’ in Central and Eastern Europe can also help to build confidence, introduce western norms, and facilitate the further development democratic norms in recipient countries.

Additionally, ‘western’ promotion of DCAF, has suffered from a lack of coordination. Different countries have often pursued diverse, and even contradictory, approaches in this area. Additionally, while outreach activity has occurred through international organisations such as NATO or the WEU, these organisations have generally functioned as separate actors in their own right, rather than overall supra-national bodies for coordinating policy. Thus, different (and differing) outreach activities have occurred under the auspices of, for example, the UK MoD, the George C. Marshall Centre, the German MoD, and NATO. Moreover, there has also been limited coordination at other levels. Academic institutions run parallel and similar events with the same countries. When the activities of other non-governmental actors such as NGOs are thrown into the equation, the number of uncoordinated programmes promoting DCAF proliferates even further, adding to confusion and skepticism about these activities amongst recipients. Again, while efforts are being made to address these problems, it is clear that networks between governments, academics and non-governmental actors need to be strengthened further.

There has also been a tendency amongst some western actors engaged in the promotion of DCAF to take a rather unsophisticated approach towards its application in the Central and Eastern European environment. Thus, models of DCAF, which have developed in relation to the differing circumstances, traditions and histories of particular western states have sometimes been proposed as ‘the only’ or ‘the best’ way forward for post-communist states implementing democratic reforms. Two examples of this problem are apparent in the strong promotion of Huntingdonian ‘objective’ control of the military by the US, or of the concept of *Innere Führung* by Germany, though most western actors have also promoted similarly problematic policies. In practice the specific circumstances of particular Central and Eastern European states differ widely both from the experiences of the West, and also from each other. Specific western models of DCAF may be inappropriate to particular national situations, or be unrealistic to implement. It is important that in the future, the promotion of DCAF should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the recipient states concerned. The role of western advice should not be to strongly promote particular models, but to encourage a deeper understanding of the core principles of DCAF amongst relevant recipient policy makers. In doing so, western policies can encourage the development of an environment in which Central and Eastern European states can make informed judgments about how best to implement reform, according to their own particular set of criteria and circumstances.

Second, there is a changing agenda in terms of the implementation of DCAF in the Central and Eastern European region. Perhaps most significantly, there has been a general move from ‘first generation’ to ‘second generation’ reform issues. These are less concerned with the construction of institutional mechanisms and frameworks within which the DCAF process can take place, and more to do with the democratic ‘substance’ that fills these structures. Indeed, in most Central and Eastern European states legislative and institutional frameworks for DCAF have largely been successfully established. It is apparent, however, that the mere existence of these frameworks on their own is not sufficient to ensure the day to day implementation and internalisation of genuine DCAF. DCAF depends on far deeper attitudinal change.

In the Central and Eastern European environment, for example, problems of DCAF have often originated in the civilian sector, with misinformed or inept civilian interference in defence policy issues leading to inappropriate policy choices and politicisation of the military. Additionally, it is important to encourage the military in the defence reform process in order to encourage a sense of ownership in the transition process. Without this sense of ownership, experience shows that creative non-compliance becomes commonplace, with rules un-enforced, and democratic norms overlooked. Moreover, if an effective democratic defence planning process is to be developed, it is important that national armed forces are structured to serve national foreign policy goals, and clarity on the issue of force requirements is essential. Sufficient finance for these requirements must be allocated, and it must be spent in an effective and efficient manner. Finally, there is a need for DCAF...
to engage with ‘civil-society’ far more widely, in order to ensure genuine public scrutiny and accountability for both civil and military sectors. It is imperative that Western outreach activity recognises this new set of ‘second generation’ DCAF issues and adapts its policies accordingly.

Third, and in relation to this changing reform agenda, it is clear that the promotion of DCAF in the Central and Eastern European region needs to reconsider its target audience. Western promotion of DCAF over the past decade has been disproportionately focused on senior governmental actors and the military. While this bias was perhaps unavoidable and necessary during the first stages of the post-communist reform process, it is important that future outreach activities think more carefully about whom they should actually be engaging with. As was made clear above, it is not just post-communist military sectors. It is imperative that Western outreach activity recognises this new set of ‘second generation’ DCAF needs to be considered further.

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8 The Persistent Problem of Civil-Military Relations in East and Central Europe: A Briefing Note on Democratic Control of Armed Forces

David J. Betz

What are the Lessons Learned Regarding the Promotion of DCAF in the Past Decade?

Ten years into the post-communist era the transformation of civil-military relations to democratic norms is still a major political issue with the potential to delay, complicate or even thwart the transition to democracy of many post-communist countries. This is the main lesson to be drawn regarding the promotion of the democratic control of the armed forces: the problem is exceptionally persistent. Nowhere in the Central and East European region can we point to a country that has established a totally satisfactory mechanism of civilian and democratic control of its military establishment. Even in new NATO states that have made great strides in this respect, considerable problems still remain. To a large degree, the specific problems of civil-military relations differ from one post-communist country to another. The deficiencies of the current system in the Czech Republic, for example, differ qualitatively and quantitatively from those of Russia or Ukraine. Nonetheless, there are some readily identifiable causes of the persistence of the problem of civil-military relations that are consistent across all the post-communist states.

First and foremost, the problem of building a system of democratic and civilian control in the post-communist context is simply a much bigger and more difficult one than is generally recognised. Only in the last few years have the governments of some Central and East European countries (and of the Western countries that are providing advice and assistance to their democratization) come to realise how complex and multifaceted a job it is. Others still have not, or will not, acknowledge the extent of the problem.

What matters even worse is that civil-military relations are but one of a host of problems that the governments of these new democracies must face. Reforms in the economic, social and political sphere are often of much more consuming interest to the public than the reform of the military system. As a result, there is a tendency for civil-military reform to be pushed to the bottom of the political agenda. Relatively few policy-makers in the region are prepared to recognise that the broader goal of building democracy cannot proceed without the transformation of the defence sector, and vice versa; the two are inseparably linked and interdependent.

Another reason for the persistence of the problem is that it has not been well understood by scholars and policy-makers in East or West. James Sherr has argued that the armed forces in a democratic state must not only be subordinate to the nation’s political authorities, they must also be capable of performing the tasks assigned to them. That is, they must be effective and effectively managed, because an army that is controlled without understanding, knowledge and judgement can prove to be as dangerous to its society as an army that is subject to no control at all.1 Armies exist to safeguard the state, not to bring harm to society through indiscipline, misadventure, the exaggeration of threats, or the wastage of scarce economic resources. But in the post-communist countries, this is precisely the problem: how to provide effective and accountable public administration of a vital state institution, not how to curb the potential of the military to intervene in politics. Sadly, this point has only recently entered the mainstream of scholarly discourse on civil-military relations.2

For the post-communist states, building democratic civil-military relations calls for finding solutions to relatively few, but fundamental, questions. How exactly are the armed forces controlled in a democratic society? What types of laws, institutions, and procedures, precisely, are necessary for such a system of control to exist? In matters of policy, is there a strict line between what is a political decision to be made only by elected civilians and what is a military-technical decision best left to the military professionals? And, if so, where is it?

The answers to these questions are not at all obvious. The Western democracies possess no universally applicable model for the post-communist states to mimic. There are “common characteristics”3 of civil-military relations in democratic systems, but the more one strives to list the features that are common to all democracies the less exact and, hence, the less useful for Central and East European reformers such lists become.

The most frequently cited characteristics would include: a civilian minister of defence, clear lines of authority over the military, integrated military-civilian ministries of defence, a strong parliamentary role in defence (especially in oversight of the military budget), non-partisan armed forces, and a capacity for informed public debate on defence issues. The United States enjoys most, but not all, of these. Nonetheless, inter-service rivalry has cut across integration in the Pentagon. Republican party preferences prevail among senior officers. And some of these officers have been prepared to speak out publicly on security issues – not least Colin Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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1 Sherr, James, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: to What End? By What Means?”, in Betz & Löwenhardt, Army and State.

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3 Sherr, James, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: to What End? By What Means?”, in Betz & Löwenhardt, Army and State.
The United Kingdom is fond of stressing the apolitical nature of its armed forces, but it displays few of the listed characteristics, at least in a robust form. Although tensions and differences within the ministry of defence persist, the consequence of integration in Britain has been a merging of attributes and enthusiasms, thus channelling the responsibility for the subordination of the armed forces to bodies outside the ministry. But parliamentary supervision of defence is weak, and the capacity for informed public debate is limited.

Nor is there any agreement in the West on the basic structure of the armed forces. Britain has made professionalism a key attribute of the military’s political subordination: many liberals regard conscription as the first step to militarism. This is in accord with the thinking of Huntington, who would see the rejection of politicisation as a key definition of military professionalism. In the same vein German historians are increasingly inclined to view the Wehrmacht’s readiness to follow Hitler as evidence of its deprofessionalisation. And yet, paradoxically, both Americans and British have tended to hold the German Army up as a model of military effectiveness, and therefore implicitly of professionalism. Central here is the difficulty created by the formation of a centralised general staff, which is at once both a symbol of professionalism (and hence, according to Huntington of subordination) and an agency for coherent political intervention.

The increasing conviction that the immediate and medium-term roles of armed forces in democratic societies will focus on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, rather than major war, favours Britain’s preference for professional forces. This is the road along which the United States has gone, and with which most other West European states are flirting. But the consequence of small armed forces recruited on long-term engagements is to deepen the division between them and their parent societies. Their attitudes seem increasingly conservative, and their members vulnerable to the blandishments of the radical right. Neither France, reflecting the legacy of the citizen soldier and the French Revolution, nor Germany, with its determination to avoid a repetition of the two world wars, is willing to forego the principle of conscription, even if both states have modified or will modify it in practice. The belief that conscription is the best protector of democratic controls has found expression in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe, but elsewhere in the region the economic burdens of large armed forces militate against it.

The plethora of alternative systems of democratic civilian control confused the issue for Central and East European reformers while the capacity of the standard theories of civil-military relations to generate solutions to the problem has been manifestly insufficient. The long-standing concern of Western specialists with understanding why, when and how military coups occur has contributed greatly to the growth of a fallacious, but pervasive, “No coup? No problem” attitude toward civil-military relations amongst civilian and military elites in the region. And as it turns out, the military coup d’état has not been a factor in post-communist transition because a professional military conviction that the armed forces should be the servant of the state was a central feature of the Soviet-type system of civil-military relations. No doubt the quiescence of post-communist armies, in addition to perplexing many Western scholars, has contributed to the complacency in which many political elites, who feel no urgent necessity for change, have treated the issue of civil-military reform.

The deficiencies of civil-military relations theory are evident at a very basic level. The very meaning of the term “civilian control” is a matter of dispute. Various analysts propose alternatives, such as “civil control”, “political control”, “civilian management”, “civilian supervision”, and so on. Most analysts would agree that the standard terminology is inexact and outdated but no consensus has emerged on a replacement. If such confusion exists amongst academic specialists on civil-military relations, and if there is still no satisfactory definition of its basic concepts, no wonder there is confusion in Central and Eastern Europe.

The confusion that surrounds discussions of the issue of civil-military relations is in itself an obstacle to solving the problem in practice. In the West, we have not been very good either at analysing the situation or at communicating to Central and Eastern Europeans why democratic civilian control is important. This has affected civil-military reform in the region in two completely different ways. In those states that aspire to further integration with Western institutions like NATO or the EU, it has meant that reforms are designed and (often half-heartedly) implemented because NATO requires them, not because they are seen as intrinsically necessary and worthwhile. As a result, the reforms in these countries are sometimes more shallow than substantive; there is a difference between the formal and informal systems of civilian control, between the rhetoric of how things are supposed to work and the reality of how they actually do.

Further East, especially in Russia, Western blandishments about the desirability of civil-military reform are seen as mentoring, patronising and arrogant by many in military circles. Democratic civil-military relations are understood to be “Western” civil-military relations, which carries the unspoken meaning of “better” civil-military relations. In short, the terms themselves are value-laden, but interpreted in different ways in different countries.

**Which are the Upcoming Research Issues in CMR in General and DCAF in Particular?**

So, how does one get civil-military reform right? What areas should we be looking at? First, getting the legal basis of the defence establishment right is an important step. Hungary is a good example of how a poorly designed legal and institutional structure for the defence establishment can cause a multitude of problems. Moreover, changing the system once it is established is extremely difficult if it entails amending the constitution, because this requires a high degree of political

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8 A plausible explanation for this might be the very different experiences of Russians, as opposed to Central Europeans, in the Warsaw Pact. The non-Soviet former Warsaw Pact countries are accustomed to receiving political directives from abroad which were expected to be implemented without question. Russians are not similarly accustomed. On the contrary, they are accustomed to the reverse – issuing directives.
consensus that is often sorely lacking in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, as we can see in Russia, which has some excellent draft legislation on civilian control, having an excellent draft for a democratic system of civilian control is not worth much if it is never enacted.9

Changing paper, even constitutions, is, however, easier than making substantive changes in the actual practice of civil-military relations. Reform of Central and East European defence establishments has often taken the form of tinkering with the functions of pre-existing structures rather than wholly reorganising them or creating totally new structures. The trouble with tinkering is that individuals or groups opposed to change tend to remain in positions where they can obstruct the process of change. Moreover, if the personnel remain the same there is a tendency for new patterns to remain only formal and declaratory, while informally and in practice the old patterns predominate.

This suggests another requirement of successful reform that has seldom been strongly evident in Central and Eastern Europe. The onus for reform is on the civilian political elite, not on the leadership of the army. It is up to the civilians to decide what kind of army they want and to see that it is implemented. This may seem incredibly obvious, but what is really surprising about post-communist civil-military reform is how rarely this has happened. Few of the new democratic regimes know what type of armed forces they need (or can afford) and so they have not directed their military experts to create such forces, or made realistic plans to fund reforms adequately, or monitored the implementation of their directives systematically. Without guidance, orders, funds, or monitoring, the armed forces leadership can hardly be blamed for doing what it thinks is right and possible.

Only in the last few years have states like Bulgaria even begun to address these issues. In Hungary, by contrast, the problem is not so much the lack of a plan; rather, it is that with each new government, policies aimed at reforming the system of civil-military relations flip-flopped and so no particular plan was ever followed through to completion. Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic the indifference of the electorate to issues of defence and security has made it practically impossible to improve the informal structure of civil-military relations. In Russia, the overarching objective of ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces to the president at the expense of any other political player has been achieved at the price of allowing the military a latitude for independent decision-making that would have been unthinkable in the Soviet system.

For three decades after Samuel Huntington published The Soldier and the State, and Morris Janowitz published The Professional Soldier in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the field of civil-military relations was basically stagnant. The prevalence of military regimes during that time inspired some, mainly Latin Americanists, to study the issue but few new theoretical insights were generated.10 Post-communist transition, however, has inspired a renaissance of interest in the question of how civilian control is achieved in democratic states that suggests that the research agenda should focus on breaking new ground.

As was noted above, it is widely recognised now that the past focus of Western scholarship on military praetorianism was misleading, not only in the post-communist context but also in the democratic states, notably the United States, where an alleged “crisis” in civil-military relations inspired a certain amount of navel-gazing. The problem in contemporary scholarship is no longer how to prevent military coups; rather, it is a problem of how to provide proper civilian management and direction to the armed forces. Building effective civilian control of the military requires the concerted effort of the civil society and the political elite to increase their own capacity for control.

It is not merely a matter of the military withdrawing from politics. Civilians must take the initiative, step into leadership roles and equip themselves with the knowledge and expertise necessary to oversee and monitor the military establishment effectively. Acquiring this knowledge is a difficult task in Central and Eastern Europe where there is essentially no tradition of civilian expertise in defence, which suggests that the focus of research (and reform assistance) in the future should be on the civilian side of the civil-military equation.

That the Central and East European states inherited armed forces that were too large, too expensive, inappropriately equipped, trained, organised and deployed to meet the new security objectives is a fact that cannot be escaped. The problem is as evident to the military leadership in these countries as it is to the political leadership. However meagre it might be, if the country’s defence budget is still not enough to support even marginally effective armed forces, then the situation is unsatisfactory for soldier and civilian alike. But, ultimately, this is a problem for the government to solve, not for the army. Civilian governments must decide for themselves what they want their armed forces to do and how they are to develop.

This means hard choices; it might even mean that some countries cease to have an army altogether, electing instead to build a gendarmerie as Chris Donnelly has suggested.11 Certainly this will cause tensions in civil-military relations, but the experience of the post-communist states thus far has been that the military is able to absorb such blows. For most military men, it is preferable to be faced with the difficult problem of building a military force under tight budgetary restrictions as long as the parameters of the problem are well defined (i.e., in terms of available resources, time, expected missions, etc.), than it is to be faced with the army’s “death by a thousand cuts” to no discernible end.

I also think that we are nearing the point where we can no longer refer to the post-communist states collectively. Although to a large extent their problems have the same origins, the implications of the continuing crisis in civil-military relations are now so much greater in Russia than they are in the new NATO states that it is increasingly difficult to compare them. If the Czech Republic fails to solve its problems of civilian control then it will continue to waste annually a substantial portion of its GDP. Upsetting as this might be to Czechs, it will make hardly any difference at all to anyone else. In Russia, on the other hand, the failure to put the situation in order may result in the utter collapse of the military machine—an event which would have catastrophic results for everyone.

9 See Ivanov, Yuri, “Legislative, Political and Budgetary Aspects of Civilian Control of the Military in Russia”, in Betz & Löwenhardt, Army and State.
Introduction

The changing role of military force is one of the most complex issues of the evolving international security system. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe experience enormous difficulties in coping with this situation. The sources of problems are only partially financial ones. It is fair to say that difficulties other than financial and material are even more complex and hard to solve. The proper way of dealing with military issues is a key to the solution of a number of other important problems relating to security. The governments of the new democracies will have to address two basic problems before they can justifiably expect concrete results in this field. First, the leaders of the Central and Eastern European countries will have to realise the need for a well-conceived political decision-making process as a precondition for making the right decisions on defence issues. This process should be able to integrate different policy options, independent expert views and input from the public as to the preferences of the citizens concerning security and defence. Secondly, Central and Eastern European countries need new mechanisms and institutional frameworks both in the governments and in the area of education and research to decide basic issues of security and prepare appropriate policy options.

Legislative Processes

The Hungarian experience shows that a great deal of effort has been made in the area of legislation with the aim of changing the military and adapting it to the new situation. At the same time very little attention has been paid to the substance and long-term implications of the legislative acts passed by the Parliament. These legislative acts reflect the political will of the elected bodies to keep the military budget as low as possible and reduce the size of the forces. However, this is not an effective way of how modern armed forces and defence capabilities are created. Many more substantive efforts should be made towards the establishment of a military force which corresponds to future requirements.

The legislative acts have not changed the military structures and have not improved the quality of forces because they neglected basic political and professional considerations. The one-sided legalistic approach, which disregards political and professional requirements, is not suitable for the solution of complex military and defence problems. Legislation of course is extremely important in exerting firm civilian control over the military. Legislative acts in the past ten years fundamentally changed the situation inherited by the Central and Eastern European countries concerning civil-military relations. In the past, one political party exercised total control over the military in these countries. The constitutions and other legislative acts established the proper political and legal framework for control by elected politicians. The details of the legal construction may vary from country to country, but in general we can say that the former one-party control has been eliminated, and the new legal systems are in harmony with the requirements of democratic societies.

Political Processes

While we can be satisfied with the legal process, substantial deficiencies remain in the area of political processes. By nature the legal process cannot address substantive defence policy issues, which should be kept separate from legal issues. Defence policy should be seen in the context of national security strategy, which defines the ways and means of adaptation of a country to the changing security environment. Taking into consideration the need for substantial financial and material resources in the creation of a reliable defence capability and the subsequent burden on the national economy, it is necessary to establish a consensus between political parties on the most important issues of security and defence. There is also a need for the support of an informed public. These are important elements of a political process which is supposed to collect and channel opinions, proposals and ideas for the decision-making process leading to a realistic and well-balanced defence policy.

In democratic political systems independent professional expertise is supposed to play an important role in the political process leading to decision-making on defence. In the Central and Eastern European countries independent defence expertise is very weak and is mainly disregarded by government institutions. Decisions on defence issues rely on the proposals of narrow circles of civilian and military bureaucrats, who may be well informed on the administrative and technical details of defence but are not sufficiently informed about ideas, concepts and theoretical approaches to the complex problems of security and defence. It is a well-known fact that bureaucratic and intellectual approaches to different aspects of government may differ substantially. The tensions between the two approaches may be used creatively in a well-functioning political decision-making process. Members of parliaments in particular could use independent academic expertise effectively. In Central and Eastern Europe legislators rely mainly on the expertise and advice of government officials, taking the risk that institutional interest may prevail over national interests in decision-making. That is the explanation of why military reforms have developed so slowly in the past ten years.
The second basic question concerns institutions and decision-making mechanisms which are dependent on prevailing approaches to the complex issues of security and defence. Due to the dominance of the legal approach to military reform and the almost total neglect of political and professional approaches, very little attention has been paid to the creation of a government level institutional system, which would coordinate and constantly review security and defence policies of the state. There is a lot to be done in the area of independent research and education of experts as well. These are important elements of a well-functioning political process in every democratic state.

It has been widely recognised that we are entering a new world with different and complex security challenges, requiring creative thinking and fresh ways and means of dealing with the new situation. In spite of the intellectual understanding of this new situation very little consideration has been given to the management of the defence and military sectors. Government bureaucracies keep thinking and acting in traditional compartmentalised ways. In the evolving international system problems can not be categorised and separated according to the separation of government ministries, which often have the imprints of centuries-old concepts and theories.

The modernisation of public administration is still ahead of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result of modernisation we may expect significant changes in the management of defence policies. Modernisation will require substantial intellectual input of research institutions and universities and also much closer and better organised cooperation between government officials and experts from the academic field.

Conclusion

International cooperation among experts on defence and military issues is important in the new international security environment. In the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe there are common problems with regard to civil-military relations in the transitional period. The identification of common problems with common efforts may make the transition more effective and less painful.

The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces can be an ideal place for discussion of complex issues regarding civil-military relations. Government officials, researchers and the representatives of academia may establish long-term relationships with the help of the Centre and may start common research programs to find solutions to the identified problems.

Proposals

1. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces should facilitate a comparative analysis of the general problems of civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe and organise debates with the aim of helping to find solutions to those problems.
2. The Centre should contribute to the establishment of common standards of democratic control over the armed forces.
3. The Centre should facilitate common research programs with the participation of countries belonging to particular regions, where the sense of community is strong and the participants would be ready to cooperate in a constructive manner.
10 Civil-Military Relations Theory in the Post-Communist World: The Role of Religion

Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker

The pivotal role of soldiers in warfare, empire building, and national security has been the subject of epic poets, historians, and other social scientists since time immemorial. By comparison, one finds precious little on the role military officers played in domestic politics, despite the fact the soldiers overthrew emperors and other office holders, installed new ones, and influenced government decisions in prehistoric, ancient, and modern societies. Yet, beginning with World War I, a series of major political, social, and economic developments, including the travails suffered by newly independent countries, stimulated empirically oriented social scientists to seek to understand the critically important role the armed forces played in the domestic politics of old and new societies alike. This gave birth to civil-military relations as a subfield of comparative politics.

This essay seeks to explore a complex and confusing question in civil-military relations. Is there an international learning curve that affects the development of civil-military relations in countries undergoing rapid and profound political transition? In other words, can lessons of recent failed dictatorships, virtual disasters in the annals of civil-military relations, be absorbed by the countries that, for lack of better title, will be here referred to herein as the new regimes of the former Eastern bloc?

Understanding these questions requires some reference to the broad literature of civil-military relations, including, of course, its theoretical and historical pioneers. Harold Lasswell laid the first theory-building bloc in 1937. Taking his cues from the Sino-Japanese war (1931), Lasswell coined and expounded on the “garrison state” concept. Reacting to fear emanating from communism and revolution, established “business states” – like Japan, Britain and the US – sought to safeguard their own domestic order and international dominance by emphasizing security at the expense of peace and prosperity. The result was a move “away from the dominance of the business man, and toward the supremacy of the soldier”. Characterised by centralisation of power in the hands of the military and the executive, the garrison state, Lasswell predicted, will downgrade democracy and will likely lead to various forms of authoritarianism (Lasswell 1937: 643–649).

A couple of decades later, Samuel P. Huntington sought to respond to the growing acceptability of the garrison state theory by advancing a diametrically opposing model. In his classic The Soldier and the State, Huntington asserts that modern (post-1800) military organisations are “professional” bodies led by “professional” officers. He defines professionalism “as a special type of vocation characterised by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness” (Huntington 1957: 7–8). Huntington maintains that a professional military concentrates all its efforts on perfecting its fighting ability and “stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.” In other words, professionalism acts as bulwark against politicisation and renders the military a “politically sterile and neutral” servant of the state (Huntington 1957: 38–39). According to Huntington, professional soldiers become completely apolitical and this leads to “objective control” of the military by the civilian leadership. Besides objective control, he also recognises another form of civilian control: “subjective”. Civilian authorities allow or are forced to accept military participation in politics through which they hope to inculcate in the military those subjective values the civilians regard as salient (Huntington 1957: 80–83).

Huntington’s book coincided with burgeoning military intervention in Asian, Latin American, African and other developing or changing societies. As a result, a plethora of cases as well as more comparative and theoretical studies appeared in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, attempting to explain the causes of praetorianism, and to assess the performance of soldiers as political governors and agents of social change. Learned and well designed, these scholarly publications concluded that praetorianism occurs in transitional societies characterised by economic backwardness, social and ethnic divisions, and weak political institutions.

Moreover, scholars who studied civil-military relations in Marxist/Leninist societies were nearly unanimous in their assertion that there was a close, if not symbiotic, relationship between political and military elites, and that the military’s role was to uphold the Communist parties in power.

The demise of Marxist/Leninist regimes in the former Eastern bloc and the severe economic, social, and political difficulties that followed – and still plague these societies – called into question the validity and explanatory value of civil-military relations theory. If the military’s role was to keep Communist parties in power, the armed forces of former Eastern bloc countries did not live up to that expectation. In fact, the reclusive leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, told his visiting (June 2000) South Korean counterpart that Communist regimes fell because they “failed to control the military”. Even though many/most successor regimes have and continue to face similar, if not worse, problems identified in the literature as stimulating intervention in Third World countries, post-communist countries have been coup-free. Did civil-military relations scholars miss the boat entirely?

This chapter seeks to provide a preliminary “state of the discipline” report. The following pages will summarise the main themes of civil-military relations theory, juxtaposed in the light of developments in post-Communist states of the former Eastern bloc, and will sketch out the emerging patterns of civilian-military interactions in this part of the world.
Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Brief Overview

Despite the divergent approaches and methods used, a common point of departure or reference characterised nearly all works on civil-military relations: they either agreed or disagreed with Huntington’s views on military professionalism and its impact. Two schools of thought emerged. One view accepts Huntington’s position that professionalism renders the military politically neutral and willing to accept the supremacy of the legitimate civilian leaders. The second view, most clearly articulated by Morris Janowitz, takes the view that professionalism obliges the military to acquire administrative and political skills. This, in turn, politicises the officer corps and leads the military to challenge civilian supremacy (Janowitz 1971). Roman Kolkowicz’s analysis of the Soviet military agrees with Janowitz’s view. He maintains that the changing technology of war forced Soviet political leaders to cede to the professional military greater institutional prerogatives, transforming it into an interest group (Kolkowicz 1967).

As military interventions became a common phenomenon in the 1960s and 70s, Huntington sought to update his model and used it to explain praetorianism in the developing world. In his Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), he maintains that in changing societies, lack of institutionalisation results in politicisation and political decay which afflict all segments of society, including the military. Huntington cites two elements as crucial to stimulating praetorianism: a low level or lack of professionalism on the part of the officer corps, and absence of legitimate political institutions “capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political action”. In other words, as far as Huntington is concerned, the causes of praetorianism “lie not in the nature of the [military], but in the nature of society” (Huntington 1968: 221). The military is nothing but a mirror of society.

Victor Alba, a disciple of the Huntington school, developed a typology designed to operationalise his mentor’s thesis that professionalism dissociates the military from politics. Drawing primarily from the Latin American context, Alba’s classification scheme consists of three types of officers: “barracks groups”, “school officers”, and “laboratory men”. Of the three, the barracks groups type resembles those who as “civilian politicians in uniform” led national uprisings and are characterised by relatively low levels of professional training and ethos. This type of officer, Alba maintains, is distrustful of democratic politics. The School type are generally career oriented soldiers with higher levels of professional training – which they received in such countries as prewar Germany, Italy, and Spain – and are considered “the principal supporters of demagogic dictators”. Finally, the laboratory officers are younger and far better equipped technically and intellectually, owing their training to indigenous schools and postgraduate military academies in the United States. This type of military men, Alba asserts, strive to “dissociate the army from politics and to neutralise the interventionist tendencies of the other two types” (Alba 1962: 174–175).

Accepting Huntington’s premise, Alfred Stepan sought to explain the interventionist behavior of the professional military in Latin America. Mixing Huntington and elements of Lasswell’s garrison state thesis, Stepan argues that the Cold War and Soviet desire to aid revolutionary activity in South America helped elevate the importance of national security. This gave rise to what he referred to as “new professionalism” in which the military perceived itself as the protector of the state and the guardian of domestic order against leftist revolutionary encroachments (Stepan, 1973). When the threat emanating from the Cold War subsided, the Brazilian military sought to give this type of professionalism a new meaning. The country’s military hierarchy is advancing the claim that conquering Amazonia constitutes an integral part of the state’s national security in the post-Cold War ecology-dominated international configuration. Given the importance and enormity of the project, the military claims that it is the only societal institution with the capacity to handle the project (Zirker and Henberg 1994; Martins Fiinho and Zirker 2001).

Following Janowitz’s thesis that professionalism politicises the military and inevitably leads to an expanded political role, a body of literature developed which contradicts the basic premise of the Huntington school. Despite differences in approach, Amos Perlmutter, Bengt Abrahamsson, Claude Welch and Eric Nordlinger blame praetorianism on the military professionalism.

Of these, Perlmutter argues that the contemporary soldier is no longer the traditional professional soldier of the past characterised by such “qualitative variables” as internal cohesion, hierarchical structure, bravery and discipline. The advent of technological innovations have imposed on the military modern bureaucratic qualities such as managerial techniques, strategic planning and engineering. The contemporary soldier, Perlmutter asserts, represents a “fusion between the professional and the bureaucratic”. In other words, modern professionalism has politicised the military and strengthened its “propensity” to “intervene”. When a regime lacks popular support and is unable to govern effectively, the military rushes in to its client, the state, and with it the organisation’s corporate interests. In Perlmutter’s mind, “modern praetorianism is the praetorianism of the professional soldier” (1977: 92–93).

Bengt Abrahamsson makes a concerted effort to identify and elaborate on the nature of professionalism and its connection to praetorianism. He speaks of military professionalisation, instead of professionalism, and sees it as the product of two adaptations: macro and micro. By macro, Abrahamsson refers to economic, political, and other “historical adaptations” which are responsible for recruitment patterns and technological innovations. Micro adaptations, on the other hand, are socialisation such as training, education, and interaction with colleagues. In Abrahamsson’s mind, macro-level adaptations create and maintain “a complex, effective, well-organised and thus powerful and often independent social structure”. Micro-level processes inculcate certain values and orientations. In other words, the characteristics of a profession are “a function of both processes”. Given their resources and desire to influence the ecological (macro) processes, the military “are not and cannot be neutral and objective servants of the state”. Instead, soldiers have “beliefs [and] certain interests” that make it only natural for them to want to influence or even regulate the forces capable of endangering them, i.e., the economic and civilian elites. Like Janowitz and Perlmutter, Abrahamsson believes that professionalism politicises the military and thus increases its propensity to intervene (1972: 15–17).

In their Military Role and Rule, Claude Welch and Arthur Smith argue that high on the list of military priorities is protection of the institution’s “mission” and “organisational characteristics”. By mission, they refer to soldiers’ responsibility
to protect “their sole patron”, the state, against outside threats. However, if they are “ordered” by the civilian authorities to suppress domestic political opponents of those in power, fight an unsuccessful war against a dubious external enemy, or engage in acts contrary to their perception of national interests”, officers may intervene to safeguard the state and their institution “from the machinations of political leaders”. Similarly, if political authorities tamper with the military’s recruitment procedures, promotions, internal budget priorities, and other professional prerogatives, in the words of Welch and Smith, civilian leaders “court intervention” (1974: 13–26).

Like Abrahamsson, and to a lesser extent Perlmutter and Welch and Smith, Nordlinger argues that professionalism is responsible for the creation of an “autonomous institution much concerned with the protection and enhancement of its corporate interests”. Such interests, Nordlinger observes, include: adequate budgetary support, institutional autonomy, protection of the institution against encroachments from other institutions, and institutional survival. In his view, interference with these corporate interests constitutes “the most powerful interventionist motive” (1977: 65).
Theory and Post-Communist Reality

Since the demise of communist regimes Eastern European and Soviet successor states are mired in the same, if not more severe, political, social, economic and other problems that civil-military relations theory associates with praetorianism in the Third World. Tables I and II present a partial but nevertheless compelling picture of economic and social devastation. In most countries the 1994 Gross National Product (GNP) was half or less compared to four years before. Per capita income reflected an equally dismal situation. For instance, from being 36th in 1986 (out of 142 countries), Bulgaria’s per capita GNP dropped to 92nd in 1994. With the possible exception of Slovenia, no former Eastern bloc country has managed to reach pre-1990 levels of GNP and rank. At the same time, Greece’s per capita GNP increased from $4,995 in 1986 to $12,000 in 1997 while Hungary’s dropped from $6,212 to 4,430 in the same period.

Table I: Gross National Product-GNP (in Million 1987 US$)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>27,075</td>
<td>21,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>51,800</td>
<td>44,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>23,900</td>
<td>22,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>69,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>25,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (FRY)</td>
<td>60,508</td>
<td>34,230*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>436,593**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figure includes the combined GNP of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) as well as the other former Yugoslav republics (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia).

** Figure includes Russia as well as the other USSR republics.

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1,391/65</td>
<td>985/78</td>
<td>610/106</td>
<td>750/84</td>
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<td>4,955/39</td>
<td>3,062/42</td>
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<td>490/114</td>
<td>510/96</td>
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<td></td>
<td>390/123</td>
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<td>840/92</td>
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<td>1,340/69</td>
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<td>580/107</td>
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<td>440/99</td>
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<td>840/10</td>
<td>390/103</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,510/57</td>
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<td>2,740/51</td>
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<td>350/124</td>
<td></td>
<td>330/110</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1,450/80</td>
<td></td>
<td>630/91</td>
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<td>1,460/79</td>
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<td>1,040/77</td>
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<td>330/127</td>
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<td>815/76</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2,300/63</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,610/36</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>860/100</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,210/88</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,456/?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


† Estimate provided in “Balkan Survey”, *The Economist*, January 24, 1999, 5.
These negative trends have had a deleterious effect on the quality of life in former Eastern bloc countries. Unemployment and inflation shot up and poverty spread dramatically. The percentage of people living below the poverty line rose from 4 per cent in 1989 to 32 per cent in 1994. It should be noted that for this region of the world, the World Bank suggests a poverty line of $4 a day per person (Human Development Report, 1977). Disease and poor diet are on the increase. In August 1999, Romanian health authorities reported an alarming increase in meningitis, which they attributed to “precarious hygiene” and substandard health care. The UNDP confirms the sad state of affairs in its July 1999 report. It states that “[t]he transition years have literally been lethal to a great number of people, [and warns of] demographic collapse and a rise in self-destructive behaviour, especially among the young”. It attributes this serious crisis to “human insecurity” which results from loss of earnings, economic uncertainty, unemployment, and decline in social services (Associated Press, 1999).

This melancholic situation is also reflected in the ranks of the once pampered military as well. The size of the military has been reduced, morale is low, and desertion and suicide have reached epidemic proportions. The International Herald Tribune (July 1, 2000) reported that in the city of Obninsk, during Russia’s “recent semi-annual military call-up, 50 young men, or about half of the conscripts, refused to report for duty”. Similar stories have been reported in Albania, Romania and other Balkan and Central Asian countries.

In the face of severe economic conditions and a new and less threatening security environment, successor regimes have slashed budgetary defence appropriations. Table III illustrates that from 1987 to 1994 per capita spending for defence went down between 50 to 70 per cent. War-torn ex-Yugoslavia is an exception to the precipitous decline of military spending in the former East bloc countries. As a result, in Russia and some other Soviet successor states, officers have lost housing and other privileges, their purchasing power has been reduced to a third of their pre-1990s level, and they frequently go six months or more without pay. Moreover, the new regimes have intervened in internal military matters, such as promotions, retirements, training and education, and have in some cases sent their armies to fight difficult and unwinnable wars (Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). In Russia, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia and in some republics of central Asia and the Caucasus the armed forces have been employed by governments to suppress domestic political dissent.

Table III: Per Capita Military Expenditures (US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>219</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>138*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>229*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average per capita public military expenditures of Soviet and Yugoslav successor states.

should we assume that social organisations would always respond the same way when confronted with issues affecting their institution and the social milieu in which they operate? The corporate interests of the Spanish military did not exactly flourish during Franco’s rule, yet there was no movement on the part of the officer corps to move against the regime. Like its Soviet bloc counterparts in the 1990s, the Spanish military, with minor exceptions, supported the democratisation that followed Franco’s eclipse in 1975.

Finally, the generally non-interventionist posture of post-communist militaries is also connected with the comprehensive nature of transition that began in these societies a decade or more ago. Transition away from communism affected all segments of society, not just the military. Every level of society appeared willing to accept temporary economic and social pain in order to achieve long term gains. Under the circumstances the military has not felt that it was being singled out to bear the brunt of transition. Its professional or corporate interests did not suffer to the benefit of some other segment of society. Communist collectivist indoctrination in socialist egalitarian values is helpful in this regard, and so is the old Leninist maxim that even though “power grows out of the barrel of the gun, the gun shall never be allowed to command the party”. Andrew Cottee, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster are on the mark when they state that “decades of communist rule may have helped to generate military cultures in which the armed forces accepted the concept of civilian control – at least as it related to domestic politics – and had little or no tradition of military intervention in politics” (2002: 14).

Though much scorned in the last decade, such attitudes are still important points of reference to the citizens in former Eastern bloc countries, including the military.

**Similar Hopes, Divergent Paths**

Post-totalitarian regimes realise that one of the key components of political democracy is civilian control of the military. Successor regimes, by coincidence or design, appear to rely on Huntington’s theory that professionalism, as understood and practiced in Western democratic societies, renders the military politically neutral and the sterile servant of the legitimate state authorities. Toward this goal they emphasise three complementary, interrelated, and even overlapping strategies: depoliticisation, departisation, and democratisation. Depoliticisation is taken to mean removing and keeping the military away from everyday politics, and preventing it from taking public stands on political and policy-related matters. Closely connected is departisation, which denotes severing the once close and often symbiotic relationship between the military and the Communist Party. Distinct from depoliticisation and departisation is democratisation, which is intended to have the armed forces’ role, mission, and activities defined and under the control of the legitimate and freely elected political authorities.

Yet, the record is not uniform; some countries have done a better job in professionalising/Westernising their military than others. A cursory review of civil-military relations in former Eastern bloc countries reveals that with the exception of the three Baltic republics, Soviet successor states have yet to achieve desirable levels of depoliticisation, departisation, and democratisation. Marybeth Ulrich finds that in Russia “the weakness of democratic institutions charged with ensuring democratic control of the armed forces has allowed the post-Soviet military establishment to resist attempts to subordinate it to the oversight of legitimate democratic bodies” (Ulrich, 1999: 107).

Instead of civilian, democratic control of the military in Russia and Ukraine one sees presidential dominance. Analysing the specifics of the Russian case, for example, Irina Isaakova notes that under the country’s current constitution “power over the military shifted to the president. The Russian government, as distinct from the President, has no clear jurisdiction over defence matters”. The ascent to power by Vladimir Putin produced no change. In fact “[t]he changes introduced or planned by President Putin are designed to ensure strict presidential control over the military and security establishments” (2002: 216–218). Neighbouring Ukraine displays remarkably similar characteristics. Grigoriy Perelptitsa argues that in the Ukrainian political system “the President play[s] the central role in controlling the armed forces ... and in the development and implementation of foreign, security and defence policy” (2002: 238).

In Belarus, the Central Asian republics and in the Caucasus as well as Russia successor regimes have used the military to quell domestic opposition and to keep themselves in power. A similar situation exists in some East/Central European countries, including Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania. For example, when ordered by President Yeltsin, the Russian government used force against the country’s parliament. In neighboring Georgia a coalition of military and anti-Ghamsakhuria forces toppled the country’s elected president and replaced him with Edward Shevardnadze. For the leaders of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics the military is nothing more than an internal police force used by these post-communist rulers to keep themselves in power.

Some East/Central European and Balkan states, such as Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and Romania displayed similar characteristics. The Albanian military were instrumental in bringing down President Berisha, and the military constituted the mainstay of Slobodan Milosevic’s control of the FRY, despite devastating losses of territory and international isolation. The Romanian armed forces played a pivotal role in the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989, and so did their Bulgarian counterparts in forcing the octogenarian Todor Zhivkov out of power earlier the same year. Larry Watts informs us that Ceaucescu’s successors “[a]ttempt[ed] to politicise the [Romanian] military and to use it as an internal security force”. In his mind, “[t]he most seriously counterproductive effect was the marginalisation of the mechanisms of democratic control with all that implies for democratic consolidation more generally” (2001: 615).

In general, post-totalitarian civil-military relations in many of these countries are characterised by a system of civilian control over the military which tends to be almost exclusively executive dominated. Instead of serving the Communist Party, the armed forces now serve the interests of the president and those around him. Legislative institutions lack expertise, knowledge and often the institutional mechanisms to challenge executive dominance. Western type democratic control through legislative oversight has and continues to be anaemic in most Soviet successor and many East/Central European states. The military sees itself as the protector of the nation, which frequently means a particular or predominant ethnic
group. For Max Weber, allegiance to the nation “means above all that it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups” (cited in Linz and Stepan, 1996: 21).

By contrast, other East/Central European countries have been more successful in their efforts to professionalise and instil Western style democratic control over their armed forces. The military answers to elected state institutions, including the legislature, and sees its role as protecting the legally constituted state. The Czech Republic is a case in point. Ulrich believes that “the task of democratic control of the military has fared better [there] than in most of its neighboring post-communist states” (Ulrich 1999: 106). Andrew Michta reports similar findings in Poland; he states that “the Polish officers are closer to the democratic ideal now than at any point in their past” (1997: 120). Despite the fact that “military expenditures have plummeted, [Hungary too has] successfully completed the establishment of civilian oversight over the military” (Barany and Deak 1999: 47).

Slovenia’s landscape displays identical features. In Anton Bebler’s mind “there is overwhelming civilian domination of the military, with numerous instruments of democratic control” (2002: 172). The same appears to be the case in the Baltic states. In their analysis of Lithuanian civil-military relations, Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbonas state that “common European values and principles, including that of democratic control of the armed forces, are being strictly implemented and their continued development remains high on the political and public agenda” (2002: 124). Ilmars Viksne informs us that neighboring Latvia’s “institutional framework of civil-military relations clearly provides for democratic civilian control over the armed forces and defence policy”, and concludes that the country’s “armed forces remain politically neutral” (2002: 104).

In addition to democratic consolidation and economic privatisation, progress toward instilling democratic control over the military weighed heavily in NATO’s decision to extend membership to the first three and to promise Slovenia’s inclusion in the second round of expansion. Similar considerations are also used in European Union enlargement deliberations.

Interestingly enough the dividing line between more successful and less successful efforts to professionalise the military appears to be religion. Countries with Catholic or Protestant background are in the successful category, while their Orthodox or Muslim counterparts are in the less successful group. Table IV provides data on population and religious affiliation in Eastern European and Soviet successor states. What explains this difference?
### Table IV: Population (in millions) and Religious Preferences (in %)

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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,160.000</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,052.000</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>11,102.000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other includes Jewish, Greek Catholic and a host of other denominations.

**Source:** *Global Studies: Russia, the Eurasian Republics and Central/Eastern Europe, 6th ed.*, (Sluice Dock, Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & Benchmark Publishers, 1996).

Like other social phenomena, professionalism has a home in and is the product of evaluative and cognitive criteria, commonly referred to as culture. Encompassing a mixture of societal norms, values, and attitudes, culture “consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organised, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves” (Schwartz 1992: 324).

In the post Cold War period religion has emerged as the most important cultural and attitudinal point of reference toward authority and individual relatedness to society in Eastern/Central Europe and the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states. For Emile Durkheim religion serves three important functions: social cohesion, social control, and providing meaning and purpose (1966). Benedict Anderson places religion at the center of “cultural systems” (1983: 12), while Thomas F. O’Dea’s sees it as “among the strongest buttresses of social order” (O’Dea 1966: 2). Donald Eugene Smith is even more direct. He states that in transitional societies religion is “the most important expression of the basic ideas,
attitudes, and assumptions found in its culture” (Smith 1970: 169). Citing Clifford Geertz, Diana Kendall believes that “religion establishes powerful and pervasive moods and motivations to help people interpret the meaning of life and establish a direction for their behavior” (2002: 18). Samuel P. Huntington is even more emphatic and makes religion the principal defining element responsible for the coming clash of civilisations (1996). It should be noted that religious activity in the former Eastern bloc, restricted during the communist era, experienced a strong revival when the process of transition got under way.

Despite remarkable similarities, the Catholic and Orthodox churches differ with respect to the nature of logos (word of God). St. Basil and other Christian theologians recognise two essential types of Christian teaching: kerygma and dogma. In her fascinating and learned work, A History of God, Ann Armstrong defines and elucidates the importance of the two concepts: “Kerygma was the public teaching of the Church, based on the scriptures. Dogma, however, represented the deeper meaning of biblical truth, which could only be apprehended through religious experience and expressed in symbolic form” (1993: 114–115). In Armstrong’s mind, Catholicism concentrates on kerygma and seeks “exoteric truth”. As such, Western Christianity “would become more talkative” and would adhere “to the kerygmatic interpretation of religion, which was supposed to be the same for everybody” (177). In contrast, by seeking “dogmatic” or “esoteric truth”, Orthodoxy came to believe that “all good theology would be silent or apophatic”, and “was only grasped intuitively and as a result of religious experience” (115–117). Jaroslav Pelikan stresses that “these devout and saving dogmas of the [Orthodox] Church were divinely revealed truth, and as such were changeless” (1974: 13).

This subtle but important theological difference manifests itself in three important aspects: organisational structure, individual relatedness to God, and church-state relations. The Catholic Church’s organisational structure is universal and centralised, and it is imbued with the authority to make canonical and doctrinal pronouncements. As the successor to St. Peter, the pope is the vicar of the church with almost exclusive authority on ecclesiastic and doctrinal matters. Catholic tradition provides a framework which emphasises both individual responsibility and community. The role of community is elevated and individual relatedness to God goes through his/her community. As such, and in John Langan’s words, “both as a community and institution, Catholicism contains free and inventive persons who will react in complex ways to newly emergent situations” (Langan 1998: 247). Finally, over the years the Catholic Church connected with, recognised and worked with the state, and saw it as another societal, and at times, competitive entity like itself. As a result, “Catholicism played a powerful role in recent civil society resistance movements” in the former Eastern bloc (Stepan 2001: 247).

In contrast, Orthodoxy lacks the centralised administrative structure, and recognises the Creed as the centrepiece to Orthodox doctrine. Behind its mystical and conservative outlook, Orthodoxy is decentralised and has no administrative or doctrinal centre equivalent to the Vatican. Each patriarchate or national church is autocephalous and the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul) is nothing more than first among equals and possesses little administrative or doctrinal authority. Bishop Kallistos (Timothy Ware), one of Orthodoxy’s foremost living theologians, sums up the implications of this situation: “[A]ll bishops are essentially equal, however humble or exalted the city over which each presides. All bishops share equally in the apostolic succession, all have the same sacramental powers, all are divinely appointed teachers of the faith. If a dispute about doctrine arises, it is not enough for the Patriarchs to express their opinion: every diocesan bishop has the right to attend a General Council, to speak, and to cast his vote” Ware, 1963: 35). As such and in Huston Smith’s words, Orthodoxy “leaves many more points open to individual judgement than does the Roman Catholic Church” (Smith 1986: 459).

In addition, the Catholic state-church-people connection has never been a major component in Orthodox tradition. Church-state Orthodox relations go back to Byzantine tradition, which Max Weber called a “caesarpapist” structure. The Byzantine Empire “was a theocratic entity in the sense that the emperor was the ruler of a Christian commonwealth, even in religious matters, but always under the ideological sovereignty of the Church” (Kyriacopoulos 2000: 5–7). Michael Radu sums up the implications of this relationship stating: “though representative of the people, [the Orthodox Church] was expected to support the state and be subject to it” (1998: 247). Citing Weber, Stepan reaches a similar conclusion: “the church is a national as opposed to an international organisation. Such a national church is not really a relatively autonomous part of civil society because there is a high degree of subordination of priestly to secular power” (2001: 248).

This has considerable implications in the social and political arenas. The very nature of Orthodoxy has been of little assistance to the development of civil society. As Linz and Stepan correctly point out, a strong civil society has “the great capacity to mobilise opposition” to authoritarianism in Latin America and distinguishes Catholic and Protestant countries in Eastern/Central Europe (1996: 7). Lack of strong civil society is even evident in politically stable and relatively wealthy Greece. Borrowing from Weber, Stepan argues that “Orthodoxy places more stress on liturgy than action”, and privileges “quietism” as a response to the world. In the structural context of caesarpapism, and the liturgical context of quietism, the ‘prophetic’ response to injustice, while doctrinally available in Orthodoxy’s multivocal tradition, is seldom voiced” (2001: 248).

Unlike Catholicism or Protestantism, the Orthodox world did not produce widely recognised political theologians, like Aquinas or Calvin whose writings advanced church positions on all sorts of issues, including politics, war and peace, human nature, and the role of community and the state. As a consequence, Orthodoxy has not benefited from a body of religiously-inspired political doctrine which would bridge tradition and change in a dynamic world. As such, the individual-community nexus, so central to Catholicism, remains unbridged in the Orthodox tradition in which the church emphasises collectivism and nationalism.

Though subtle, these differences have important implications in church-society relations. Owing to its centralised structure, emphasis on the strong individual-community connection, and a history of dealings with the state, the Catholic Church “was able to counter the Marxist concept of alienation with an interpretation which has as its foundation the inherent dignity of man, and which derived from the realistic application of society’s inner problems.” In other words, the communist experience made the Church aware of its “place in society – and in particular, the need for a strategy which allows it to participate in the lives and fortunes of its members” (Babiuch 1996: 270). An additional and arguably more relevant
development was the pope’s (church’s) decision to endorse market economics and Western capitalist institutions. In *centesimus annus* (1991), Pope John Paul II states that “the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilising resources and effectively responding to needs” (quoted in Langan 1998: 250). Protestantism’s emphasis on individual salvation through economic success is remarkably similar.

Lacking both structure and historical or doctrinal flexibility, Orthodoxy could not and did not develop a doctrine to counter Marxism. Instead, as Radu asserts, Orthodoxy was “more vulnerable to communist manipulation [and] helped legitimise the nationalist claims of some communist regimes” (Radu 1998: 287). When the situation called for it, church leaders switched allegiance and became supporters of the new rulers, primarily those holding executive positions. Some church hierarchs, like Patriarch Theoctist of Romania, supported the communist rulers to the bitter end, and are viewed with suspicion and skepticism by many in their flock. Not until February 2000 did the Romanian prelate find the courage to admit that the church “made mistakes and concessions”.

Steeped in tradition, the Orthodox Church continues to be captive to past practices. Instead of concentrating on guiding the individual in how to relate to a fast-changing environment, it labours to uphold traditions and practices that often run contrary to the very nature of the liberal democratic state which is characterised by pluralism, human rights, political democracy, and private enterprise. So far, the church has been unable or unwilling to clarify its position and declare its unequivocal support for free enterprise and market economics. Thus the Orthodox Church’s image to outsiders is one of unjustified inwardness, reaction, backwardness, and lack of universality.

Occasional statements by Orthodox clergy do little to alter the picture. For example, in May 2000, Patriarch Alexi II of Russia stated his opposition to a government bill aimed at streamlining the country’s tax system, calling it “the work of the devil” (*San Francisco Chronicle*). Radu captures the essence of this ambivalence: “[a]t a time when the majority of Romanians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians (if not Russians and Serbs) seek integration in a democratic and capitalist Europe, the Orthodox churches are increasingly vocal opponents of Western influence” (Radu 1998: 300). A remarkably similar picture comes out of the Muslim populated countries of Central Asia, exemplified by strident fundamentalism and anti-Western rhetoric.

To navigate their countries through the straits of transition and to professionalise/democratise their armed forces, post-totalitarian regimes in the former Eastern bloc needed internal coherence and outside connectedness. Religion was one of the few resources they had to rely on. Countries with Catholic background could draw on the church’s centralised and universal organisational structure, which provided them with a community spirit, external connectedness, and access to organisational, financial and other resources. With its emphasis on individual salvation through economic success, Calvinism proved equally helpful.

These attributes made it easier for Catholic countries to accept Western values and adapt/adopt democratic institutions and practices. Civil-military relations fell under this general pattern. The armed forces of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are part of the NATO framework and are adapting to Western style civil-military relations. There is virtually no possibility of any kind of praetorianism in the three as well as Slovenia, Latvia or other Catholic countries of the former Eastern bloc. The death of Franjo Tuđman removed Croatia’s personalistic and almost messianic regime. His successor fired a number of high ranking officers for insubordination and alleged involvement in atrocities earlier in the decade. The country is moving with deliberate speed toward democratic governance and Western style civil-military relations.

Orthodoxy’s lack of organisational structure, emphasis on collectivism, tradition and nationalism, and absence of international connectedness did little to help link Orthodox countries to Western political, economic, and cultural values and practices. And the West found it easy not to respond, especially in terms of economic investment. Lack of transformative capacity killed any chance of economic and political development and made burgeoning ethnic conflict difficult to contain. Despite strenuous efforts, no Orthodox or Muslim country was included in the first round of NATO enlargement. The militaries in these countries have not been infused with democratic ethos nor internalised the rule of law or the principle of civilian supremacy. Instead, the armed forces are still inclined to serve the interests of those who control the levers of authority. It is no accident that with the possible exception of Bulgaria, Orthodox countries adopted strong presidentialist systems. Orthodoxy’s inward looking tendencies, mysticism, and inordinate emphasis on tradition reinforce these attitudes.

A mixture of religious-inspired resistance and a sense of cultural generated lack of response on the part of the West have deprived the militaries of these countries of badly-needed exposure to those civil-military practices so beneficial to their colleagues of Catholic counterparts. Civil-military relations in Orthodox and Muslim countries of the former Eastern bloc reflect this general melancholic ambiance that permeates these societies. Simply stated, civilian control of the military in Orthodox countries is relatively weak and turbid. Continuing economic and other difficulties, coupled with cultural/religious and other societal factors, compose an environment tailor-made for a man on a white horse, a new-age St. George, to step forth, kill the “dragon” and cleanse the transgressions visited upon the peoples’ helpless souls by the sinful acts of immoral politicians and their atheist Western patrons.
References


We were asked by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces to prepare a survey of lessons learned in the past decade, and of future research topics in the field of civil-military relations in general and democratic control of the armed forces in particular. We offer a few past lessons and future research topics, as seen from the perspective of Slovenia as a relatively young and inexperienced country in the sphere of civil-military relations. Because Slovenia has not only thoroughly reformed its political, economic and security systems recently, but has also only recently become an independent state, the experience and research prospects may be limited. However, they could be of some validity for other transition states and that experience could be particularly useful for states established on the territory of former Yugoslavia, with whom Slovenia shared seven decades of its history.

Lessons Learned in the Past Decade

**Lesson 1: We need to clarify terminology in order to speak ‘the same language’**. Throughout the period in question, the expression ‘civil-military relations’ was used to describe the relationship between civilian and military spheres; however, it is very difficult to draw a clear line between civil and military institutions, skills and interests. Even if we do not analyse the military structure but take it as a unit, problems arise in the civil sphere. In our view, that sphere consists of the political elite and civil society. Hence, there is a triangle to be taken into account: in a way, the political elite acts as a mediator between the armed forces and the civil society. There are cases when the political elite shares interests with the army, but the two may object to the interests of the civil society. It is also possible that the political elite dominates the army as well as the civil society.

**Lesson 2: The changeable nature of the democratisation process in society influences the managing of the triangle relations**. The political elite change according to the election results: as a certain number of the elected parliamentary members change, it is unable to control the military effectively. The civil society, especially academic institutions, mass media and individual journalists seem to be more efficient long-term controllers of the armed forces, than politicians who lack the appropriate knowledge and experience. Media serve more and more as a presenter of military activities to the society, and as a civilian controller of the military.

**Lesson 3: It is very important to stress the democratic (publicly transparent) ways of controlling the armed forces**. According to the majority of classicists of civil-military relations theory, including Huntington, Janowitz, Finer and van Doorn, the military is most strongly civilian supervised in liberal-democratic and in totalitarian states, either fascist or communist.

**Lesson 4: As part of the process of democratisation of the ‘political and military landscape’ typical of the reform period in transition states, the following could be especially underlined as the imperatives of civil-military relations in general and the democratic control of the armed forces in particular:**

- **the depoliticisation of the armed forces and its officers** – the elimination of the political party from the army; the abrogation of the post of political commissioner; the cancellation of ideological content from curriculum and from drills for officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers; characteristic of Slovenia is that officers are prohibited from participating in political parties, as well as being denied the right to be elected – they have only passive voting rights; equally characteristic of the state was the selection of officers for the newly formed armed forces that was made not so much according to the ‘red or expert’ label, but rather according to officers’ loyalty to the Slovenian state during the ten-day war in 1991; due to the shortage of high-rank officers the promotion to higher ranks was made possible fairly soon, even in cases of inadequate type and degree of education;
- **the loyalty of the armed forces to the Constitution and thus to the state** – especially to the parliament, the president of the republic, and the government – and not to a political party, which meant the end of one-party control over the armed forces. Consequently the armed forces have become politically neutral, at least formally; however, new political parties tried to install a very similar way of controlling (subordinating) the military – it is the party that appoints a minister of defence and which usually understands defence and military as being a part of its own domain (Slovenia is a typical example);
- **the nomination of the civilian defence minister** – however, such an act in itself tells nothing of the minister’s ‘military stance’, his (non)aggressive behaviour pattern, nor of the interests for which s/he stands;
- **the respect of human rights in the military field** – e.g. the humanisation of military service; the use of one’s mother tongue; the chance for officers and soldiers to follow their own religious principles; the right of conscientious objection;
- **the parliamentary supervision over the armed forces** – the parliament formulates the defence policy of the state as well as drawing up its defence budget. Parliamentary committees for defence have been established to control the development of the concept of national security, and to supervise military intelligence;
• defence politics and the defence budget have become more transparent due to external factors that influenced the development of civil-military relations, as well – namely the Partnership for Peace/NATO, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

• the abolition of military courts and the internal repressive role of the armed forces in general.

Lesson 5: Many problems appeared in the last decade regarding civil-military relations typical of former socialist countries, e.g. a relatively low level of education and professionalism of the new political and military elite, familiarity in making personnel politics, corruption, and manipulation of the public.

In the paragraphs to follow, we will introduce some typical problems of Slovenia in the sphere of civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces in the last decade:

The glorification and mythologisation of war. Immediately following the ten-day war in 1991 there were attempts to glorify the armed resistance. It occurred in spite of the fact that the resistance was widespread and of a different nature, and included non-military and non-violent forms, backed by the political elite as well as by the civil society, and the majority of population. The promoters of the glorification and mythologisation – the two phenomena much needed by the military establishment – were some of the key actors of the military resistance together with part of the nationally oriented intelligentsia.

The dispute concerning competence, in the years 1993–94. The dispute in question, between the President of the Republic, who is constitutionally ‘the supreme commander of the Slovenian defence forces’ and the Minister of Defence regarding the competence of the armed forces, resulted in polarisation within the military establishment, and within the officers’ corp. The importance of legal clarification (constitution and law): division of responsibilities between the president (sovereign), supreme commander, the premier and the minister of defence is more than obvious.

The Arms Affair in September 1993. At one of the Slovenian airports, containers with large amounts of infantry weapons were found labelled as humanitarian help for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where at that time war was in progress. From the viewpoint of civil-military relations two roles were interesting: the role played by the armed forces and the role played by the public, i.e. civil society in general, who obviously knew nothing about it since the whole business was the one of concealment, manipulation and pretext on the part of the political elite.

The Depala vas Affair in Spring 1994. The affair was a continuation of the dispute between the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defence; namely, the Minister suspected that a former military officer of the Slovenian army was persuading intelligence informers, his former colleagues and military officers to collaborate for the benefit of the President of the Republic.

We could also mention two interpellations against the Ministers of Defence, in 1994 and 1995 and the inadequate interventions of the military press in civil affairs.

It is important to stress, that as a general rule, all the above mentioned problems were created by the political elite during its struggle over the influence within the armed forces, while the military had no ‘Praetorian’ ambitions, whatsoever, and was, together with the civil society and part of the political elite, a subject of manipulation and misuse.

Lesson 6: An important role in democratic control of the armed forces was played by academic institutions, mass media and the public.

Lesson 7: Countries should build their civil-military relations in line with their own tradition, political culture and needs, taking into consideration general standards pertaining to the model of civil-military relations in liberal democratic states. Consequently, there are some lowest common denominators found in all democratic states, which could be summarised as follows:

• a solid constitutional and legal framework;
• the accountability of the armed forces to the Government through a civilian defence minister;
• the co-operation of military representatives with qualified civilians in the process of defining defence requirements, policy and budget;
• the division of professional responsibility between the civilian and the military spheres;
• the supremacy and scrutiny of the parliament over armed forces and defence matters in general; and
• the internal and external (international) transparency of security and defence matters of the state.

Upcoming Research Issues in Civil-Military Relations in General and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Particular

Civil-military relations in general

• The development of civil-military relations in transition post-conflict states such as Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY and perhaps some other countries in the region affected by the conflicts in their neighbourhood. The circumstances in the aforementioned states show the presence of the same problems as in other transition states, but the role of the military is more influential, as demobilisation processes are not successful enough.
The gradual introduction of an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in some countries and its impact on the civil-military relations. The reasons for the introduction of AVF are different in various countries, therefore we need to examine all factors influencing such a decision, case by case. Some Western countries made a change from mass (conscript) armies to AVF when public acceptance and support declined to less than 30 per cent, and it was a natural step to preserve the armed forces (however, the AVF as such did not get higher scores in public opinion, but the situation changed when professionals were sent to peace-keeping missions).

The impact of peace-keeping and involvement of the armed forces in it, on the possibilities to control the armed forces members of parliament and civil society lose direct control over the activities, behaviour and performance of the peace-keepers while exercising out of country missions. They have to rely on media reports and military reports.

Democratic control over the armed forces

Defence socialisation (education) of political elite and of civil society – the adoption of civilian values by the military, common security related courses for civil servants and military professionals, and education of the military in public relations.

Political neutrality (political non-partisanship of military professionals) as an excuse to disengage from doctrinal issues and lobbying in political parties. The result is vulnerability of military professionals to political abuse in disputes between different political groups. Military professionals are not able to draw the line between control over themselves and their professional autonomy. Professional responsibilities are in many cases a subject of political control. That is, politicians deal with professional military issues instead of executing effective control over issues that are supposed to be civilian-controlled, such as defence policy, the military and defence budget, defence expenditures, etc.

The role of the military press in civil society (positive or negative experience).

Internal control over military performance vs. international control over national militaries – as performed by the OSCE, UN, military alliances, and at the bilateral level.

Military disengagement from activities based on the imperative of societal development – as leading towards the total loss of legitimacy of military. Can engagement in ‘Operations Other Than War’ be a factor in increasing military legitimacy? Can military involvement in external policing activities function as a key to increasing military legitimacy?

Is the opening up of the military (through ‘open door’ days in military barracks, visits of the military to the civilian institutions) a way to achieve its better transparency? Does it help civilians to control, to keep an eye on the military? The resistance to increasing transparency in the military of transition states contributed to the decreasing legitimacy of the military and to a more suspicious public perception of the military.

Demobilisation and reintegration of the military professionals and veterans after the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia – veterans as a possible source of professional control over the armed forces or as a source of possible social riots (Croatia); and problems of war criminals and national patriotism in past wars. The military tends to keep the secrets of war criminality as part of its corporate behaviour and is reluctant to accept any kind of civilian/politically exercised purges.

The problem of purges within the military in all transition states: natural fluctuation in military personnel is partly a result of the highest qualified professionals leaving the military due to their very competitive status in the labour market. Forced purges are also undertaken in order to exclude the remnants of the old regime (but sometimes also the most qualified in terms of military professionalism). The appointment of too young and inexperienced military professionals to very high positions in the military hierarchy, where they lack expertise and experience. They are more manageable (‘easily politically abused’) than older professionals. Is there a problem of professional international recognition of ‘instantly’ promoted military officers?

Research on the armed forces (by military scientists or by civilian scientists with access to military units) could also help improve civil-military relations. Researchers may serve as transmitters of civilian preferences and expectations to the military – how could the military know what the civilian expectations are if it is politically neutral and closed in upon itself in the barracks in order not to disturb public opinion? The only mediators might well be media and researchers with their surveys.

Feminisation of the contemporary armed forces, mainly but not exclusively, as a consequence of introducing an All-Volunteer Force.
PART IV:
LESSONS LEARNED AND UPCOMING
RESEARCH ISSUES

Introduction

Hans Born

The papers of this session were presented within the framework of the European Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). ERGOMAS is a pan-European association for experts and academics who are studying civil-military relations. The papers explore lessons learned and upcoming research issues in the realm of civil-military relations.

Karl Haltiner, a Zurich-based scholar, argues that during the last ten years the issue of democratic control of armed forces underwent a renaissance for at least two reasons. First, the ongoing processes of European enlargement via EU and NATO enlargement put democratic control of the armed forces on the agenda at the negotiating table. Democratic control of armed forces was regarded as an essential element of the wider democratisation processes in the candidate member states. The role of democratic control of armed forces in the enlargement processes also obliges the mature democracies in the West to reflect about the essence of how force structures can be controlled democratically. Secondly, the decline of mass armies has had a profound effect on civil-military relations. In many Western countries, the abolition of conscription service has been formally decided (The Netherlands, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy and Portugal) and in other countries whether or not to continue with conscription is being fiercely debated (Denmark, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Sweden). The trend towards abolishing conscription has triggered debates in many countries about how a professional army should be related to its parent-society.

Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Karl Haltiner propose to start a European research project on how democratic control functions in reality. After reviewing the present literature, which is heavily dependent on Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), the godfathers of the discipline, they come to the conclusion that the dominant schools of civil-military theory are no longer in touch with reality. The post-Cold War situation, characterised by multilateral peace missions and new risks, replacing the nuclear arms race and the bipolar world, has resulted in new challenges for civil-military relations which are not adequately addressed or captured by existing theoretical frameworks.

Kuhlmann and Callaghan put forward a highly original and comprehensive approach to measuring civil-military relations. Based on an international research project covering nine European countries, they advance some interesting conclusions about how military-society relations were shaped at the end of the twentieth century. Their framework of analysis, focusing on various aspects of military-society relations, will be useful in future research.

Volten and Drent describe lessons learned from the perspective of a key implementing NGO engaged in promoting democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe, the Centre for European Security Studies. Anna Bolin examines the consequences of the new defence environment, and specifically new patterns of military deployment on civil-military relations.

Marina Caparini, a Canadian expert on civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, points out some of her lessons learned and recommendations for future research on civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, and more broadly in the area of security sector reform.
12 Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Renaissance of an Old Issue?

Karl W. Haltiner

There are at least four good reasons for predicting a growing relevance of the issue of democratic control of armed forces in the near future:

1 Post-Cold War Transfer Experiences

After the Cold War the democratisation of Eastern European countries formerly under communist rule demanded an institutional revision of the political control system of party-dominated armed forces. The fundamental transformation of the role of these countries in the international system after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact coincided with a substantial systemic change in their civic culture. In order to establish democratic control of the armed forces, models and principles in democratic force management were needed. Mainly NATO members, especially the USA, projected their force control ideals and experiences onto the region of the former Warsaw Pact countries. By doing so, they not only intended to help consolidate democracy but also lessen the potential risk of their own destabilisation from external factors. It was the Western European Union and the Partnership for Peace Programme that became the most important institutional frameworks for promoting principles of democratic force control and defence management.

Ten years of transfer experience suggest that:

• the establishment of democratic control cannot be considered simply as an event but must be seen as a process, and this process has not ended yet;
• expertise on democratic control cannot be based on abstract ideals and guidelines only but must suit the historic and sociological realities and the specific political and military culture of the individual countries;
• democratic control cannot be limited to legal and constitutional arrangements but must be seen as part of the comprehensive transformation of political and military culture;
• in addition to the promotion of constitutional principles and theoretical models, more attention must be paid to the specific kinds of interrelations between political powers (executive, legislative and juridical), military administration (MOD), political parties, public opinion and media structure on the one hand, and the armed forces on the other hand;
• it is not sufficient to focus on the mutual relationship between the civilian and the military side only. The process also includes the reshaping of the armed forces with regard to the basic command and management principles as well as the basics of military socialisation and officer selection and formation (human and civic rights in the forces). In other words, democratic control of forces refers to military-internal aspects as well as to military-external ones.

2 Self-Reflection and New Theories as a Reaction to the Post-Cold War Transfer Experiences

Emerging questions about the possibility of a transfer of institutional models of democratic control – such as, for example, the model of separation of powers and military professionalism (USA), of civic education and inner leadership of the Bundeswehr or the Swiss militia army model – simultaneously intensified the re-examination of the institutional prerequisites of these models in their respective countries of origin. Evidently, the latter themselves had to become aware again of the role of these countries in the international system after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact coincided with a substantial systemic change in their civic culture. In order to establish democratic control of the armed forces, models and principles in democratic force management were needed. Mainly NATO members, especially the USA, projected their force control ideals and experiences onto the region of the former Warsaw Pact countries. By doing so, they not only intended to help consolidate democracy but also lessen the potential risk of their own destabilisation from external factors. It was the Western European Union and the Partnership for Peace Programme that became the most important institutional frameworks for promoting principles of democratic force control and defence management.

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reason to believe that new models, such as the concordance model stipulated by Rebecca Schiff, are better suited to certain political cultures. According to Schiff’s model, effective civil control of the armed power is better guaranteed if a consensus between the civil and military elites as well as the citizenry is sought and developed as a form of political-military culture. We can therefore conclude that:

- there is a need for comparative research in order to explain more thoroughly the existing variety of democratic control systems;
- there is also a need for clarifying theories and terminology such as ‘civilian control’, ‘democratic control’, ‘political control’, ‘civil-military relations’ etc.

3 Renaissance of the Control Issue in all European Countries Due to the Ongoing Decline of the Mass Armies

The end of the Cold War has drawn us nearer to the end of mass armies. Europe’s armed forces are being reduced and restructured, and military missions and priorities are being redefined. These transformations are having a significant impact on civil-military relations. In seven European countries compulsory military service has either been abolished (Belgium, The Netherlands) or its eventual abolition has been formally decided (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal). In other countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Sweden) a public debate on compulsory military service is taking place. Citizens liable for service will instead become exceptions to the rule in the increasingly smaller and more professionally organised forces-in-being. The reduction of forces and the lowering of armaments spending are strains on civil-military relations. As a rule, the military resists the abolition of compulsory military service and the disarmament steps are often more motivated by financial reasons than by those of security. The abolition of conscription in Belgium, for instance, led to conflicts with Chief of the General Staff Charlier. In the Netherlands as well, the abolition of compulsory military service took effect only due to the ever-increasing pressure of the government.

In the transfer to actual voluntary armed forces there is a danger of enhancing the development of right-wing subcultures and ghettos of values and lifestyles that are estranged from civil society. In that case the military is inclined to become a social ‘counterculture’. By abolishing compulsory military service and reducing and professionalising the armed forces, the latter are newly positioned in politics, economy and society as a whole. Thereby, the inherent normative tensions between the political and military elites can become more severe. There are many indications of a growing alienation between the armed forces on one hand and the political authorities and society on the other hand in the United States.

This means that democratic control is not solely a matter of concern to the new democracies of the post-communist East but something that the Western European democracies have to deal with as well.

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5 Haltiner, Karl W., “The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?”, Armed Forces & Society 25, 1 (Fall 1998), 7–36.
10 Vogt, R. Wolfgang (Hrsg.), Militär als Gegenkultur (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1986).
During the ten years which we call the post-Cold War period, the armed forces of the European democracies have been primarily used for interventions of a policing type, either in classic peacekeeping and humanitarian operations or in more ‘muscular’ peace-restoring operations. The rules of engagement for this type of military mission differ essentially from the classic defence and combat tasks, for which the forces were originally created. They are to act with a minimum use of force in a ‘protective posture’. The process of ‘constabularisation’ of armed forces has accelerated in the last decade, thereby creating new problems with regard to the political control of the military.

Peace forces act under the command of an international organisation but are at the same time partly subordinated to their nation’s control system (government, parliament, public opinion). The division of control power may create a dangerous ambiguity because operational mandates and chains of command of supranational institutions are often insufficiently clear. For their in-theatre operations contingent commanders may not only receive orders from the UN force commander but also have to ask the approval of their national superiors far away from the theatre. This creates dilemmas for the national contingent commands especially when the demands of the UN force commander go beyond national restrictions. In order to avoid problems, frustrated national contingent commanders may be tempted not to act at all. Both the double command chain as well as growing passivity can endanger the mission. Interventions by national governments in operational actions can jeopardise operational control. The Dutch government intervened during the Srebrenica crisis in July 1995 when it became obvious that air-strikes could harm the besieged Dutch battalion in the enclave. On the other hand, military commanders on the spot will sometimes interpret their mandate in their own fashion and ascribe to themselves unauthorised autonomy. This can endanger the mission as well. Spectacular examples are the diplomatic scandal about French UNPROFOR General Jean Cot, the argument between the UN headquarters and the Italian government in the case of General Loi in 1993 in Somalia, as well as the one between NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark and KFOR Commander Lt. General Michael Jackson about how to deal with the surprising Russian move into Kosovo in 1999.

No doubt, the problem of political control of forces under UN command will have to be solved if constabulary operations under the command of the United Nations are going to have a future.

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13 Models of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Multi-Country Study
Comparing 'Good Practices' of Democratic Control

Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Karl Haltiner

Introduction: Goal and Relevance

Basically, the subject of democratic control of the armed forces refers to the question ‘Who shall guard the guards?’ This enduring question was raised as long ago as the first century AD by the Roman lawyer and satirist Juvenal (c. 55–c. 140).1 Democracy always implicitly presumes civilian supremacy over the command of the armed forces – anything short of that defines an incomplete democracy.2 But what exactly is democratic control, and how can we conceptualise it? Generally speaking, we see a state’s system of democratic control as being a product of its system of government, politics, history and culture. And as there are many different cultures and political systems, many different norms and practices of democratic control exist as well. Consequently, and for better or worse, there is no single, definitive normative model for democratic control. At least several models are present, some of which appear to contradict others. In this research project we want to address the question ‘how can democratic control be conceptualised?’ by developing and exploring alternative models for democratic control. By using the plural form ‘models’, we acknowledge that many democratic countries exercise control in different yet legitimate ways. Therefore the research goal is to develop several models or frameworks for democratic control by exploring the practice of democratic control in several countries. The end goal is not a beauty contest of democratic control models, but to collect practices and norms of democratic control in several countries and to search for patterns that lie behind those practices. The relevance of this research project consists in its identification of models of democratic control that may contribute to efforts in governing, advising and educating on this vital topic.

We assume that democratic control should be studied within the societal, political and cultural context. In order not to overstretch the research project and bearing in mind the scope of ERGOMAS, we limit ourselves to possible societal contexts within Europe. However, we will not exclude theoretical comparisons with political-military relations outside Europe, for example, the well-known US system.

Points of Attention for Studying Democratic Control

A consensus exists that democratic control implies at least civilian supremacy and parliamentary control. However, leaving this bottom line, one encounters many contrasting views on democratic control. A previous literature search3 identified the following contrasting perspectives:

(a) **Scope**

Authors may use a narrow versus broad scope for studying democratic control. The narrow scope focuses on civilian supremacy and parliamentary control. The broad scope takes the complete civil-military relations into account, focusing on integrating the military into society. Notably, some take the view that democratic control of the armed forces should be put into the cultural and societal context because the political institutions as well as the armed forces are a product of the values and norms of their environment.4

The question is how to relate the macro level (society, political system) to the micro level (the actual democratic control).

(b) **Actors**

In line with the scope, a narrow approach involves only the parliament, government and military. In addition, the broad scope involves societal institutions or actors as well. Some authors regard the relationship between the politicians and military as an inherently hostile or conflictual one, whereas others see control as a matter of shared responsibility between political and military leaders.

(c) **Types of control**

Different types of control exist, such as vertical, horizontal and self-control. First, democratic control refers to top-down vertical control: parliaments and governments controlling the armed forces. Secondly, horizontal control refers to democratic control exercised by other societal institutions like the media, unions and research institutes. This is called horizontal democratic control because social institutions are not hierarchically positioned vis-à-vis the armed forces and their influence is generally informal. A third type of democratic control is self-control. Democratic self-control refers to the internalisation of societal values and democratic norms in the mind of the military professional.

Another distinction of different types of democratic control is the momentum or timing of democratic control. We may distinguish reactive, proactive and dunque democratic control. First, democratic control might be reactive, taking place ex post or after decisions have been made and implemented. An example is reviewing the budgetary expendi-

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3 Born, Hans, The Transformation of Political-Military Relations and Democratic Control in the Post-Cold War Era (Breda: Royal Military Academy, 2000).
tures of the MoD after the fiscal year has passed. This type of control may be referred to as audit. In addition, control can be proactive or ex ante. In this way, political leaders do not check and correct the military afterwards, but try to anticipate future events and requirements. Formulating strategic security documents may be regarded as a form of proactive democratic control. Thirdly, democratic control may take place during a military operation. This type of democratic control (operational or dumque) implies in fact that politicians may interfere with the command of military operations.

(d) Civilian control does not in itself equate with democratic control
The civilians can be non-democratically elected leaders, such as the communist party leaders. The presence of substantively democratic processes and institutions, then, is necessary for control to be democratic.

(e) Power bases
Democratic control refers to the relative power position of the military in society, especially in relation to political leaders. The relation between politicians and the military can be regarded as a simple command relation, in which the military is subordinated to the politicians. In such a relation, politicians give orders and the military simply implement those orders. However, the politico-military relation can be regarded as an asymmetrical power relation as well. Roughly speaking, the political leaders possess formal power whereas the military leaders posses information, expertise and relational power (connections, alliances). In such an asymmetrical power relation, a negotiating or tit-for-tat relation may arise in which politicians and military leaders exchange desired goods (funding, information, relations, actions/policies, support).

(f) Military professionalisation
Some, notably Huntington (see below), argue that the professionalisation of the military leads to apolitical or politically neutral soldiers. Others, notably Janowitz, hold the opinion that military professionalism implies that soldiers acquire administrative and political skills as well as corporate interests, which in turn politicises the military.

Models for Democratic Control

The preceding discussion demonstrates that democratic control encompasses many variables and views. However, only a few authors have attempted to construct comprehensive models. The predominant scholar in this field is, without a doubt, Samuel Huntington. At the end of the 1950s, during the height of the Cold War, he wrote his classic book The Soldier and the State, putting forward objective civilian control and subjective civilian control as two contrasting models for democratic control. Huntington perceived objective civilian control as the only proper type of democratic control. This type of control is aimed at maximisation of military professionalism by separating political and military decision-making. The political leaders formulate the end goals and some broad conditions for military operations, and the military commanders carry out the ordered military operations. The political leaders do not interfere in military operations while military commanders do not intervene in the policy process. According to this point of view, the military officer is a politically neutral and autonomous professional who carries out the goals of his political masters sine ira et studio.

Subjective control is aimed at the maximisation of the power of the governing political party. Political leaders try to control the armed forces by appointing high-ranking generals who are political friends and allies. The criterion for occupying a high military position is not military professionalism but political loyalty. Huntington devalued subjective control because he believed that it tends to corrupt the professional quality of the armed forces.

Huntington has, to a large extent, influenced the way Americans think about civil-military relations. For decades, officers of the US armed forces had to learn the ideas of Huntington by heart. Because the US is a superpower with global reach and relations, it has influenced thinking about civil-military relations in many other countries as well. From these accounts, objective civilian control would seem to be the only accepted way of looking at civil-military relations.

For several reasons we question the validity of the claim that objective civilian control is the only proper way of democratically controlling the armed forces. A first reason is that some countries do successfully practice a type of democratic control that is very close to subjective civilian control. A well-known example is Switzerland. Karl Haltiner has illustrated that the Swiss model of civil-military relations makes use of subjective control. Switzerland is a federal state, having one of the oldest democracies and civil societies in Europe, where people traditionally have had an aversion to centralised state power and a “deeply rooted mistrust of military professionalism”. In peacetime, Switzerland does not have a military commander-in-chief. In times of crisis the Parliament will appoint for a fixed period a general and it “is almost evident that not only military but also political and lingo-cultural aspects play a role in the parliament’s election of the military commander in chief”. The Swiss case of politico-military relations illustrates that subjective civilian control can be a legitimate means of dealing with the military in a democracy.

A second reason for doubting the general validity of objective civilian control is that Huntington developed this model during the height of the bipolar confrontation known as the Cold War. The US and the USSR were then engaged in a perpetual arms race, resulting in increasingly effective weapons of mass destruction and a system of security based on strategic nuclear deterrence. In those days, it was important to resolve satisfactorily the civilian-military paradox, i.e. to guarantee that democratic society possessed a strong protection force while preventing that force from becoming too

7 Haltiner, Karl op.cit., 5. The commander in chief is called a general-elect. An interesting case of subjective civilian control is the appointment of the Swiss commander in chief during World War II. Although the German-speaking Swiss are by far the largest ethnic group in Switzerland, in 1939/40 for obvious reasons the Swiss government chose to appoint French-speaking Henri Guisan as Supreme Commander of the Swiss armed forces.
dominant in society. In terms of internal security too, the requirements of national security became predominant in many countries. That is, there was a prioritising of military and state security, which frequently resulted in the de facto limitations or even infringements of human rights and civil liberties. While it seemed that in the immediate post-Cold War period, with the passing of the bipolar competition for world hegemony and the deadly arms race, this paradox would become less acute. However, the events of September 11, 2001 have apparently served to place the threat of terrorism at the forefront of Western security concerns. Other paradoxes and challenges of civil-military relations have to be addressed as well. By the early 1960s Morris Janowitz had predicted that armed forces would transform into constabulary forces, i.e. international police forces. These armed forces do not attempt to win a war at all costs, but seek to establish peace in inter/ intranational disputes. In Janowitz’s view, the integration and not the separation of the military and the political system guarantees the alignment of political and military goals. The military and political leaders decide together about direction and implementation of military goals because the politicians and military leaders are depending on each other. In this view, it is not realistic, as Huntington proposes with his objective civilian control, to make a distinction between policy and implementation or between government and administration. The reason is that during military operations, especially peace missions, military commanders have to make many military decisions with political implications. Therefore, it makes sense to question the general validity of objective civilian control and to search for alternative models for democratic control as well.

A Methodology for Exploring and Developing Models for Democratic Control

A method for exploring and developing models is induction. According to the inductive method, abstract categories and general rules are derived from empirical evidence and practical experience. Induction can be understood as a scientific interpretation of ‘lessons learned’, and provides the advantage of taking stock of what has already been done in the field of democratic control.

Based on the principle of induction, the methodology of the research process encompasses two phases. In the first phase the practices of democratic control in several countries in Europe are examined. These countries should be democracies or consolidating democracies, because it does not make sense to study democratic control in a dictatorial or authoritarian regime. Preferably, the countries should be situated in several cultural contexts of Europe in order to guarantee as much variation as possible. It is arbitrary to state what the different societal contexts of Europe are. The most important discerning contextual factors seem to be:

1. Cultural values: Hofstede and Soeters studied organisational and military cultures. They discern clusters of countries, where different attitudes exists regarding power distance (between superior and subordinate), authority and hierarchy. Closely related to cultural values are religious belief systems. Notably, Danoupolous supposes that countries with a predominantly Christian-Orthodox or Muslim religion (or heritage) have another way of dealing with political-military affairs than countries with a predominantly Catholic or Protestant religion (or heritage).

2. Economic wealth: economic poverty not only places political institutions under pressure, but military institutions as well.

3. Geographical location could shape political-military relations.

4. Political system: presidential democracy, parliamentary system, direct democratic system. It can be assumed that the structure of the political system influences the way the armed forces are institutionally controlled.

5. State system/political culture: federalist or centralised state structure with more or less autonomy of the states/Länder/cantons: Can they shape the political will and influence of the central government and if so, how much? Do regions participate in defence relevant issues (military-industrial complex/ territorial origin of troops)?

6. Military culture: is there a tradition of a force-in-being (all volunteer) or a citizen-soldier tradition of conscription or militia?

7. Recent war and conflict experiences

8. Economic position of the defence industry/importance of the military-industrial complex

9. Number of memberships in alliances and supranational institutions, e.g. NATO or the EU. In other words, the extent to which a country is ready to renounce military sovereignty and to become integrated into a supranational control system; to what extent does the state follow a policy of autonomy and neutrality?

Next to the case-studies of the countries, it would be equally important to study international organisations that are present in Europe and which are dealing with international military task forces, i.e. the EU (WEU) and NATO.

In the second phase of the project, efforts are made to construct general categories or models. The results of the research in each country or international organisation are compared, looking for similarities and dissimilarities. We will try to distinguish patterns that enable us to generalise about the key factors and sets of relations at work. We expect that several factors seem to be:


models will probably result, linked to their specific (cultural, national or regional) contexts and that we will use the broad approach.

Using Fixed Research Questions in International Comparative Research

It is crucial to define questions, which will be used for the survey in each country. In the last five years several other international research projects on civil-military relations were carried out using ‘local researchers’ and a fixed set of research questions or themes.10

Following this research tradition, in comparing (inter)national experiences in democratic control, we want to co-operate with local researchers who will use a fixed set of research questions as their framework of analysis. Regarding democratic control, the following categories of questions could be addressed. Again, the list is preliminary and exploratory.

a) Context of democratic control

1. Changing perceptions of security. Within this theme we explore the perceptions of the actors with regard to national security requirements and the roles of other actors, as well as the impact that the main actors’ perceptions have on processes of democratic control. How do the civilian authorities and the military perceive security and the role of the guardians of the state within the post-Cold War security context? There is much here to explore and at various levels, including similarities and differences of opinion among political elites; among military specialists; between the military and political leaderships; and between different countries’ political leaderships. What are the formal and informal processes of consultation and building consensus on the state’s security requirements? When disagreements persist, how are they mediated (if at all) and how do they influence relations of control? We could also explore apparent disjunctures in how elites and publics perceive security, such as in many Central and Eastern European states where political elites’ perceptions (who tend to see security largely in terms of joining NATO, lending support for traditional military missions) often diverge from those of their publics (who tend to perceive security as public security against rising criminality, and the maintaining of law and order). Also relevant is the increased complexity and ambiguity of current threats: what has been the impact on public discourse and concrete decisions of leaders and opinion-leaders on security? What effect has the “war on terrorism” had on these perceptions, and on the perceived missions and roles of the military? The terrorist attacks of September 11 seem to have convinced some NATO governments that more money is needed for domestic defence, counter-terrorism and greater international coordination, but has it convinced publics? This question of categories could also tap more narrowly into specific sectors, like the trend of converging military and policing functions, greater inter-agency coordination, and the heightened requirements for domestic and foreign surveillance. We are specifically interested in how national responses to the “new” terrorist threat will affect democratic control and civil-military relations.

Additionally, we might also include the privatisation of security and the growth in professional mercenary groups here, as well as civil-military relations in the context of peace operations (how do aid and humanitarian agencies interact with military forces, both at the policy-making level domestically, and on the ground in theatre)?

2. Internationalisation of democratic control. Militaries are no longer solely a national concern. Increasingly militaries interact internationally in peacetime, in the fields of strategy, doctrinal development, planning, production, training, outreach, defence diplomacy, and implementation of force (in preparing to meet requirements of interoperability, both in terms of peace operations and coalition operations). Few countries, if any, remain completely sovereign when it comes to the management of the monopoly of violence. For example, the entry of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into NATO had major consequences for their respective armed forces. Their parliaments had to adopt new laws and strategy documents, increase defence budgets, and their militaries had to undertake major reforms in organisation, ethos, as well as the training of the soldiers. We might ask, then, what is the influence of internationalisation of the militaries, or more properly, military cooperation, for the democratic civilian oversight of the armed forces? This question is not only relevant for the former communist countries, but for Western countries as well. For example, the NATO air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 revealed several points of tension between the smaller member states and NATO HQ, where it was decided when and how the air campaign would be carried out. This theme would give insight into the international pressures that may be eroding the traditional monopoly of violence of nation-states.

b) Dimensions of democratic control

3. Vertical democratic control. The most well-known form of democratic control is parliamentary control and civilian supremacy. This type of control can be defined as vertical control because it implies top-down control.

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10 A first recent example is the international research project carried out by Charles Moskos and an international team of researchers. Based on Moskos’ occupational-institutional model, they tried to ‘measure’ whether the military in various countries is a unique institution in society or just another job like other occupations. A second example is the international comparative research project, lead by Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan of the US Marshal Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, aimed at describing the civil-military relations in various Western European and transatlantic countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries. A third example of an international research project, using a large team of researchers coming from various countries and using a fixed set of questions, is ‘Warriors in peacekeeping: points of tensions in intercultural relations’, initiated by Mathias Schönborn and Jean Callaghan. This research project identifies the lessons learned of peace missions within the field of intercultural relations between the national armies working together and between the intervening armies and the local population.
The relevant question in this field is a rather descriptive one: how is vertical democratic control arranged in the constitutional and legal framework in terms of powers, roles, checks and balances, and mechanisms of accountability? It would be important to include in the analysis a critical evaluation of parliamentary control and civilian supremacy in terms of effectiveness, transparency and legitimacy. In fact, this question refers to the status quo of the political primacy in the countries concerned.

4. **Horizontal Democratic Control.** As argued above, democratic control can be divided into vertical parliamentary control, horizontal control, and self-control. The theme of horizontal control refers to the question: what are viable alternative methods of democratic control aside from the vertical/hierarchical control of the political leaders? This question addresses the role of civil society and especially the media, interest groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with regard to military affairs. There are not many studies on this topic. Addressing this question might be one of the most useful studies in practical terms, indicating the constraints and opportunities that local and foreign media, civilian experts, and NGOs have experienced in promoting security awareness, monitoring the military, holding executives, legislatures and bureaucracies up to public scrutiny, etc.

5. **Democratic Control and the Public/Political Agenda.** To what extent is democratic control perceived as a real problem within society? This question addresses whether political parties, civil society organisations, members of the attentive public, and the media pay attention to issues of democratic control or if democratic control is regarded as a minor, non-important issue. In this regard the position of the media is particularly important and how they cover political-military relations.

6. **Democratic Self-Control.** Democratic self-control refers to the internalising of societal values in the mind of the military professional. The military soldier is a professional who to whom the political leaders have delegated important aspects of the management of the monopoly of violence. Autonomy and self-discipline are the pillars of the military professional. In terms of democracy, it is relevant to study the internalisation of societal and democratic values in the mind of the military professional. It would be interesting to research what extent are internal safeguards present within the military, fostering the democratic orientation of soldiers? A democratic education of officers, the right (or duty) to disobey unlawful military orders, or recourse to an ombudsman could all be factors that would enhance a democratic attitude of the soldiers and by which a ‘Befehl ist Befehl’ attitude may be avoided.

However we could also turn the spotlight onto the values and expectations of the political leadership and public with regard to the armed forces as a politically contested domain. That is, to what extent are liberal, pluralistic democratic values held by these groups when it comes to defence policy and the military? How do they react to dissenting views within government and outside it concerning roles, missions, resource allocations, defence policies, etc? To what extent do compromise and consensus building exist in the policy process surrounding the armed forces? In these sorts of questions, we would attempt to understand the political culture underpinning a country’s system of democratic control.

c) **Problems of democratic control**

7. **Democratic Control and Armed Forces Restructuring.** This is an interesting theme because nearly all militaries in the post-Cold War period have been confronted with budget cuts, lay-offs of military personnel, as well as changing tasks and missions. The processes are not per se in the interest of the militaries or concordant with the traditional role and culture of the military. Militaries are not that keen on becoming smaller or being tasked to fulfill the new peacetime missions. What has been the impact of restructuring of the armed forces on democratic control? Were the civilian authorities confronted with explicit opposition by the military? Or did the civilian authorities face organisational inertia, which is common in large bureaucracies? These questions could be approached on several levels.

8. **The Problem of Double Subordination.** How is the problem of double subordination addressed, i.e. whether soldiers should obey the state (constitution) or a particular government that is in office? Regarding this problem, Huntington identifies several potential conflicts between political and military leaders, in which it is in some cases justified that a soldier disobeys his/her political leaders, such as:

- when political orders are incompatible with military professionalism;
- when political orders are illegal; or
- when political orders are incompatible with basic morality.

It would be interesting to know how these dilemmas are addressed in the countries concerned.

9. **Impact of Post Cold War Peace Missions on Democratic Control.** How, and to what extent, do the post-Cold War peace missions influence Politico-military relations, in comparison with politico-military relations during the Cold War era? Bernard Boëne and Christopher Dandeker predict that the political control of the armed

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12 Huntington (1964), op. cit., 70–78.
forces will be both more complicated and problematic due to the social transformation in civil–military relations. They state that

“the future will see a return to radical professionalism, due mostly to the restoration of prestige, more frequent opportunities for military action, drastically reduced military establishments, and societal contexts for which the ‘post-modern’ label provides a convenient short-hand description. The consequences in civil-military relations will include stronger identities, more forcefully expressed interests, and less flexibility on the military side, while politicians, as is already the case in a number of countries, will exhibit a degree of diffidence, or at least less assurance, in dealing with military matters.”

10. The erosion of the primacy of the politics. To what extent is the military an important political actor in the political decision-making process? Montesquieu developed the idea of the Trias Politica, i.e. dividing the different powers of the state into three branches: the executive branch, the legislative branch and the juridical branch, which was an influence on the constitutional framework of many states, notably the constitution of the US. However, by the 1970s concerns were voiced about the power of civil servants resulting in a Fourth power, next to the three constitutionally acknowledged powers. The argument is that the span of control of a minister is no match for the enormous ministry and the complex work of the permanent civil servants. A minister doesn’t have the time, the energy and the knowledge to control the work of all the civil servants. Because of the complexity of the tasks, a civil servant is not only responsible for the implementation of the policy, but for the development, decision-making and evaluation of the policy as well. Increasingly civil servants have to take over work from politicians. Such a trend can be witnessed with regard to the military as well. Military commanders enjoy discretionary powers and have to take decisions with major political consequences. Hence, we could characterise political-military relations as a relationship between actors, each with a different set of power sources. The political leaders possess the constitutional power to command the armed forces, whereas the military leaders possess power in the form of expertise, information, delegated authority as well as the command of influential relations. In addition, political-military relations could be characterised as asymmetrical because the two actors possess different types of power bases.

15 Ed van Tijn et al., De sorry-democratie: recente politieke affaires en de ministriële verantwoordelijkheid (Amsterdam: Van Gennip, 1998), 9–11.
The idea of controlling the military is obviously firmly established in the democracies of the Western security community. The reasons behind it, however, “are often overlooked or taken for granted.” To carry out their mission, the military assumes “a special and distinctive position in our societies, chiefly as the principal possessors of weapons and armaments.” Service in the military “builds strong bonds and loyalties and requires a degree of cohesion and coherence that few other professions can claim. It is these qualities - discipline, dedication and loyalty - that make the military profession different and, in some respects, distinct from the rest of society.” The military has “coercive power; it may also have the ability to enforce its will on the community ... even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?” (This refers to the ‘state within the state’ problematique.)

It is a basic assumption in civil-military relations theory that armed forces are Janus-faced organisations. On the one hand, they and their political masters must respond to the strategic context by building militarily effective organisations. On the other hand, especially in democracies, they must ensure that the armed services are responsive to wider social values and thus to the society that pays for them and without whose support they can do little. The key challenge is to ensure that a balance is struck between these, sometimes competing, demands.

Military uniqueness is rooted in the functional imperatives of armed forces. Ensuring that service personnel are prepared to fight involves leadership, management, and motivation. For the military, the core values of military culture are subordination of the self to the group and the idea of sacrifice: the individual must be willing to subordinate him or herself to the common good – the team and common task. Furthermore, there must be a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the team in peace and war; without this, an armed force will lose. Ideally, as result of leadership and training, these values will be upheld voluntarily as a result of conscience, but, if necessary, coercion may be required. This is what makes military discipline quite different from other organisations in terms of the demands it places upon personnel. Thus, the military is unique in its obligation to train to kill and sacrifice self.

As a result of social and economic change, some Western countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, have faced a series of challenges to a number of traditional features of military life. For example, it is increasingly difficult for the military to resist the argument that civilian models of business efficiency can be applied with success to the armed forces – as illustrated in recent developments in privatisation and ‘contractorisation’ of defence support activities. Furthermore, especially in Western countries, the social climate is increasingly less deferential to the military. Now it is up to the military to prove that conforming to the changing norms and values of wider society would be likely to damage operational efficiency rather than the burden of proof being on the proponents of change. More often than not, these issues will have to be addressed in a legal context, as a series of rulings and directives will continue to flow, not so much from the national legislatures, but from such bodies as the EU Commission and European Court of Justice, especially in the field of employment law, health and safety at work, and freedom of information.

These social changes pose questions and challenges for the armed forces’ unique culture: how can states develop appropriate strategies of readjustment that do not damage operational effectiveness – or make the services feel that they are permanently under attack from outsiders who do not fully appreciate the strategic imperatives impinging on them? At the same time, the supportive links between armed forces and society must not be undermined. In a democracy, it is vital that the armed forces do not remain too far apart from the society that they are charged to defend, which funds them, from which it recruits its personnel, and to which they return to continue their working lives as civilians.

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2 Ibid.
5 For example, with regard to the employment of women in all military occupations and the policy of formally excluding homosexuals from military service.
Assumptions about what civil control over the military should look like vary widely. One extreme position is, for example, held by the Czech government, which views civil control as an open feedback process about the status of issues that are mainly military “between the supreme country authorities and the top leadership of the Czech military”, thus strictly excluding other societal actors such as the mass media, public opinion, non-governmental organisations, military unions, and other diverse lobby-groups. Sarvaš summarises the opposite extreme of the continuum, citing S. Sarkesian, namely, “that the generally accepted idea that acceptance of the military in democratic societies as an apolitical organisation, characterised by civilian control and supremacy, is, in practice, mere ignorance of history and reality.” In reality, “armed forces [would] prompt express concerns in every society and it is up to the democratic controlling institutions to supervise the parameters within which the military is allowed to mediate its interests. The professional corps interprets world events in a way that enables them to achieve the greatest share of resources. Not only institutional and corporate loyalties, but also personal interests, are voiced by professional soldiers.”

Indeed, contemporary theoretical frameworks for the study of civil military relations widely support Sarvaš’ pragmatic approach. D. L. Bland, for example, defines a model of “shared responsibility”, in which “civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused.”

The “vague use of the phrases ‘civil-military relations’, ‘democratic control’, and ‘civilian control’, however, is a good indicator for the “lack of a comprehensive theory”, as Bland put it, which can describe, explain, and predict core problems of civil-military relations. These terms “are rarely defined with any exactitude and are often used inter-changeably – implying that they are the same things.” In this context, A. Cottey et al. propose reserving the use of the term ‘democratic control’ for “the political function and position of the military – that is to say, their relationship with the institutions and patterns of political power in the society concerned.” Within the constitutional and legal framework, ‘democratic control’ of armed forces means “… the control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state.” (This reflects the Czech government position, discussed above.)

‘Democratic control’, according to A. Cottey et al., forms the core of ‘civil-military relations’, which “… involve wider issues: the broader attitude of the military towards civilian society; civilian society’s perceptions of and attitudes toward the military; the military’s ethos as to what its roles should be; and the economic role of the military.”


The above outlined concept has already proved successful in a comparative analysis, which the Research Division at the George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, initiated.

The project aimed at bringing academicians from East and West together for cooperative research work on topics of mutual interest. The theme was change in civil-military relations – comparing the ways in which established democratic capitalist societies as well as those of the new market-oriented democracies created in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union are managing processes of change.

In order to create a general platform for further proceedings and discourses, three basic papers addressed key issues of the planned common research. Martin Shaw, University of Sussex at Brighton, U.K., gave a theoretical overview of trends and academic approaches that in the end form the contemporary common-risk society, a concept first popularised by Ulrich Beck.

Christopher Dandeker, King’s College London, U.K., shared his thoughts about new times and new patterns of civil-military relations in democratic societies. Wilfried von Bredow, Philippus University, Marburg, Germany, posed the question whether new challenges for the military in a changing global environment would lead to a re-nationalisation of military strategy.


7 Sarvaš, Š., "Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe", Armed Forces and Society 26 (Fall 1999), 99.


9 Loc. cit. 9.


11 Ibid.


During a first workshop at the Marshall Center in 1996 seventeen international participants joined together in a three-
day, work-intensive, and encouraging discussion. They, of course, focused broadly on the basic papers, proposing amend-
ments from the specific viewpoints of the participating scholars. A major topic was the question whether civil-military
relations in new post-communist democracies would, in the end, develop much the same as the Western countries had or
should have different experiences in different national settings. It caused long and antithetic disputes with no consistent
solution, of course, but clearly revealed the need to agree on social indicators and other variables apt to describe and
analyse civil-military relations in societies the participants come from. Attendees then in a two days long brainstorming
dispute collected a sample of guiding questions and variables, which as a set could image civil-military relations in any
society. They agreed that these questions and variables would form the starting point for “country papers” for each of the
participating countries. The same sample looks as follows:

ISSUES, GUIDING QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES

ARE
A I
NATIONAL SOCIETY
1. NATIONAL ASPECTS
2. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

ARE
A II
MILITARY ORGANISATION
1. THE MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES
2. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING (LOWER RANKS AND OFFICERS)
3. INTERNAL DYNAMICS

ARE
A III
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
1. POLITICAL ASPECTS
2. CULTURAL ASPECTS
3. ECONOMIC ASPECTS
4. SOCIAL ASPECTS

ARE
A IV
WEIGHT OF HISTORY

In more detail:

AREA
1 – 1. NATIONAL SOCIETY – NATIONAL ASPECTS

• Basic: area, borders, neighbours, shores, off-shore territory
• Demography: population, population density, males 16–25, ethnicity, minorities etc.
• Concept and role of the State in recent and not so recent history (citizenship tradition): minimal (Liberal) State, Individual > Citizen; Democratic Citizenship State, Citizen = autonomous Individual; Totalitarian State, Citizen > Ind-

dividual
• Constitutional and legal arrangements: separation of powers or government responsible to parliament? Modalities of
civil political control
• Is nationalism, pacifism a factor? Is ethnicity a problem?: e. g. do citizens/soldiers view themselves first as citizens
of their country or do they have a European/UN identity? National consciousness and nationalism
• Cultural variables: education, languages
• Economic history (50s–80s): workforce in economic sectors, GNP in economic sectors
• Economic status: GNP, economic growth, productivity, public debts, international trade balance, unemployment,
models of civilian management, welfare state?

AREA
1 – 2. NATIONAL SOCIETY – INTERNATIONAL

ASPECTS
(International Flows: People, Education, Products, Capital, Culture)
• Economic: proportion of trade in GNP: exchanges with the EU or others

• Attitudes governing foreign policy: search for security, security and status, attitude of the population vis-à-vis alliances and international organizations, international “embeddedness” of armed forces; reasons for participating in “new missions” (military defence of home country and defence treaty’s area; peace keeping, peace enforcing, humanitarian missions, military interventions like Gulf War II), opening EU and NATO to post-communist countries

• Political: membership or participation in political International Organisations (political weight) number of embassies, participation in international conferences, number of participants

AREA II - 1. MILITARY ORGANISATION – THE MISSION

• Organisational format of the military: make-up, personnel strength, force structure; what is the considered formal role of military?; participation in international military activities: exercises, operations; reform – reorganisation of force-structure for new missions?; attitudes toward “new missions”; military links or training with other countries’ armed forces; peace support operations (what kind of forces participate?)

• Female soldiers: percentage, kind of roles assigned, future role of women in the military

• Minorities: policy, attitudes (compare to civil society): Women, gays, ethnicity

AREA II - 2. MILITARY ORGANISATION – RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING (LOWER RANKS AND OFFICERS)

• Patterns of recruitment: length of recruitment; terms of service; compensations; retirement; pensions (mentioning if there are changes); lower ranks – draft versus volunteer, if both, what differences between them; percentage of youth cohort recruited

• Nature of professional training (general and for specialities): length and sequence of education; military schools of various levels; attendance at civilian schools; officers – military academy, civilian university graduates, officers training programs, officers with special professions (medical, chaplain, law); kind of studies; curriculum orientation in training (engineering, social science, humanities, foreign languages’ training?)

• Social background: ethnical background, age composition, rural/urban, socio-economic status of family, proportions of bachelors/married, rate of divorce

AREA II - 3. MILITARY ORGANISATION – INTERNAL DYNAMICS

• Economic status of military personnel: remuneration, medical care, social and economic privileges as compared to civilian strata of society; pay differentials when on missions abroad?; is moonlighting legal? (numbers)

• Service hours: open-ended contract or compensation for overtime

• Officer cultural model: bureaucratic, professional or occupational?; convergent or divergent?

• Attitudes toward discipline/leadership (official policy, reality): law and order attitude – order and obedience? (post-modern societies according to Inglehart?); duties and rights; mission tactics – command tactics?; leadership attitudes and behaviour; working conditions and human relations at work; hazing/mobbing/harassment amongst soldiers?; job attitudes; commitment, satisfaction, career motivation

AREA III – 1. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS – POLITICAL ASPECTS

• Military and government transparency: constitutional relations of AF to civilian leadership, e.g. president, prime minister, defence minister, parliament; primacy of politics over the military?; transparency in defence planning and budgeting: is there full parliamentary control (civilians’ involvement in defence planning); number and positions of the civilians working in the MoDs

• Legal system: the existing gap between the legal and conventional system (the present status of the laws concerning military); legal system and judicial control; military legal system – how overlapping with civilian legal system; restrictions on the exercise of soldiers’ civil rights: are rights and duties of soldiers defined and protected by law?; soldiers’ political rights; extent of soldiers’ political participation (active duty or retired? elected office?; party and union membership: rules, numbers; lobby groups

• Is the use of troops in non-military roles constitutional?: help in case of civil disasters at home and abroad; tasks concerning the protection of environment; tasks concerning foreign (development/humanitarian) aid; ceremonial functions (state visits, guard of honor); missions to build up the civilian infrastructures (road construction, harvesting, assistance for refugees; to replace civilian workers on strike; assistance in policing state borders (especially in case of mass immigrations); fight against terrorism; fight against organised drug dealing; maintain constitutional order (functional differentiation between police and armed forces?)
• Conscientious and total objectors towards conscription and/or military service: policy; numbers; motivations: secular or religious; alternative services? format of any societal (national, civic) service; is the screening process for COs under military or civilian control?; scope: conscripts only or regulars also?; impact of objection and alternative services on recruitment policy of armed forces

AREA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS – CULTURAL
III – 2. ASPECTS
• Threat perception and defence policy: roles assigned to the military: by government, by public opinion, de facto
• Legitimacy issues: extent of value change in society; confidence/approval ratings; willingness to serve; occupational prestige of military personnel; is there an ongoing debate on the organisational format?; standing of AF in popular opinion among intelligentsia
• Self-perception of soldiers and military elites: how do soldiers and military elites see their own role and status in society?; what do soldiers and military elites think about how the public rates the military’s role and status?; concept of “citizen in uniform”?; “sui generis” approach?
• Political orientations of career soldiers: preference for political parties; conservative versus liberal orientation; are there pressure groups/lobby groups outside the framework of MOD promoting career soldiers’ interests?; tradition of political intervention by military?; current situation; trust of military elites in politicians
• Is the military used as school of the nation: militarisation of society?; forming national identity by military training and values?; actual role and influence of military elites in the political decision making process, in public administration, economy and the overall shape of society (militarisation versus civilianisation)
• Research on the military: are there research agencies or entities in the social sciences or in related areas within the military including MOD? Where do their results go? Do military leaders include results in their decision making process? Standing and reputation of researchers in military officials’ and public eyes? Right to research and publish independently? What procedures? Critical research allowed?; are there civilian institutions or individuals that study the military as an institution or civil-military relations or military personal? How are they funded? What is their impact on public opinion and government’s policy making?; does military-related social research/dealing scholarly with the military play a role in the public universities’ curricula; are there any institutions that study strategic issues and do they have any interest in civil-military institutions/relations or military personnel issues? How are they funded?
• Relations with the media (soldier-communicators): do civilian media have journalists dedicated to military coverage?; their means and skills to provide accurate information on the military; their independence from military authorities; number and structure of military media within the armed forces; military public affairs officers; how extensive is media coverage of military, media viewed as favorable, neutral or unfavorable?; trust in journalists; numbers of soldier-communicators and circulation of military press; use of the media to voice views or complaints; use of the media for government campaigns about the military (promotion, commercials, information, manipulation); expenditures as compared to defence budget

AREA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS – ECONOMIC
III – 3. ASPECTS
• Defence as economic burden: dynamics over time (share of state budget, share of budget devoted to military sectors in comparison with GNP, comparison with social budget); special issue: costs of “Defence Role Three” missions
• Defence as economic asset: the military and the defence sector as permanent employers (share of working population directly or indirectly employed minus draftees); share of defence in exports; share of defence in public and private research: positive fall out in civilian economy; strategic industry – share of armament exports – problems of conversion and unemployment with defence budget cuts

AREA CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS – SOCIAL
III – 4. ASPECTS
• Social integration: residence, do soldiers live on base?; situation of military families; are spouses integrated in the civil economy? May and can they pursue their own professional careers?; unemployment amongst military spouses as compared to civilian strata; endo-recruitment; networking/sociability/integration with civilians
• Resettlement strategies/transferability of skills: does military training curriculum explicitly refer to transferability of military skills?; are there programs to integrate soldiers into civilian labour market after retirement? (“We train you for a second career.”); success and acceptance of such programmes; share of expenditures to defence budget
• Incidence of religion: chaplain services (organisation/proportions )

AREA WEIGHT OF HISTORY
• **Role of military during the Cold War period:** types of activities, participation in WTO operations, Soviet troops on the territory

• **Role of the military in the democratisation processes:** positive - negative

A Conceptual Paradigm for Studying the Military’s Integration in its Hosting Society

The group is indebted to Christopher Dandeker who illustrated the interrelations of the above variables by the following figure and comments.¹⁷

Today, armed forces operate in an *international environment* of political, economic, social, and cultural relations. The paradigm above gives some insight into the impact of globalisation and the new security landscape on the defence and security policy of states, as well as on the organisational format of their armed forces, and their civil-military relations. The domestic sphere of national society can be divided into four broad sectors. These are the political relations between civilian governments and the military concerning the control of coercive force, and the social relations between the military and the wider society, particularly areas of convergence and divergence or tension.

When contemplating the *political context* of the armed forces, one must explore the question of how the military’s use of coercive force is made to serve legitimate, democratically determined ends without prejudicing the professional autonomy the military needs to perform its job effectively. Issues to be addressed here include the legislative and public oversight of defence policy and the relations between civilians and military personnel in the central organisations of defence.

In examining these issues, one must be aware of the ways in which new times are transforming the context in which the armed forces conduct military operations, largely as a result of the confluence of two trends. The first of these is the impact of the electronic media and public opinion on the formulation and implementation of security policy, and thus on the problem of managing the tension between the military imperative for secrecy and the democratic imperative of the public’s right to know. The second concerns the way in which the communications revolution has led to a further erosion of the boundary between political and technical military decisions and thus the work of politicians and military officers.

The *broad links between armed services and society* in terms of social and cultural issues include public perceptions of defence and the armed forces, including issues of recruitment, retention, and transfer of military personnel back to civilian society. In addition, the military family is of great importance: to which extent are the military personnel’s families integrated successfully into wider society? On all these issues, the problem of what Boëne has called *uniqueness*¹⁸ looms

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large. How do the military and society deal with the tensions arising from the need for armed forces, with their distinctive organisational structure and culture or ethos, to remain apart from society, yet at the same time reflect and defend that society’s civilian norms and values?

The connections between the military and the industrial sector, on which the armed forces depend for its equipment and technology, have changed. Here one can identify a trend towards a reduction and restructuring of the defence industrial base (DIB). A key priority is to design a capacity to regenerate defence capacity according to the longer warning times of a major threat. In addition, one can observe the increasingly multinational effort to provide for both current and projected needs leading, for example, in particular in Western European countries, to the development of a rationalised transnational, ‘Europeanised’ DIB, as in the field of aerospace. This could possibly provide the infrastructure for a European defence identity in the longer term. An important question is how such developments connect with military restructuring in ex-communist societies.

The weight of history influences how armed forces respond to challenges in the international and domestic arenas. The fact is that the armed forces have an inheritance from the past in terms of defence roles and missions, organisational structure, military culture, patterns of civil-military relations, and, of course, equipment. This factor can be observed in action when one considers the example of the impact of political and cultural factors on the retention of conscription in Germany and France (at least until the French government’s announcement in 1997 that it planned to move towards an all volunteer force). Another example can be seen in the reservations of both German élites and public opinion about the use of German armed forces in combat operations. These reservations are understandable; yet, as we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, the use of German armed forces in a combat-related peace operation has helped the process of the ‘normalisation’ of Germany, both in its own self-perception and the perception of its neighbours. This process will make it easier for Germany to shift to an all volunteer force if it decides that current strategic and economic needs are more important than continuing a perhaps overcautious approach to international relations because of the burden of its WWII experiences.

The Civil-Military Complex in Nine Countries of West, Central and East Europe

The above outlined international interdisciplinary research project ended in a second round in July 1997, held once again at the Marshall Center. Twenty-one scholars gathered, including visiting “observers” who, for many reasons, showed vivid interest in the ongoing project. Nine country papers had come in prior to the meeting and were then discussed addressing common traits and special features of civil-military relations in Eastern and Western societies.

Participants remarked upon the paradigm’s value as a fruitful and necessary means for sharing conclusions from different viewpoints before a background of different personal and societal experiences. Bernard Boéne’s contribution reflects the differences and identities of civil-military relations in the investigated European societies in the following summary.19

Relations among the military, the State and society are still deeply influenced by the weight of history. The French military is intimately connected with national tradition. It played a central role not only in defence or affirmation of international status, but also in modernisation and formation of national identity, democratic citizenship and republican institutions. Subsequently, class struggles, colonial wars and the secondary role (as mere auxiliary of nuclear deterrence) assigned to it under the Cold War led to a temporary (relative) eclipse of popular appreciation and prestige. Technology, effectiveness, post-modern conditions and ‘new missions’ (plus the recent announcement of a shift to the all volunteer force) have restored favorable conditions in the last decade or so.

The Italian military tried to assume the same symbolic role as in France until WWII. Painful memories of Fascism and WWII, political dissensus, class struggles and pacifism during the Cold War on both sides of the political divide (Catholic centre right vs. Communists) to produce “a-militarismo”: a lack of interest in the military expression of sovereignty. Today, public attitudes still border on indifference, but less so than earlier, and much emphasis is put on European integration. However, with the influence derived from economic success, élites tend to exhibit a new desire for international status, for which participation in “new missions” is regarded as the price to be paid.

The German Bundeswehr, created in 1956, faced the daunting task of ensuring security through a universal draft at a time when things military, with WWII memories on most minds, were almost uniformly suspect. Thanks to NATO and strict guarantees against the return of past militarist tendencies, it proved effective, but ambivalence never really subsided. Today, Germany is in a double bind: castigated for not doing enough to help allies in out-of-area operations, it has to allay fears that a unified Germany might again be tempted to dominate Europe militarily. Time will probably ease that situation by getting the public used to legitimate new defence roles.

In the Netherlands, the armed forces played a role as a major symbolic institution for most of the 20th century. In the 1970s, a change of sociopolitical climate based on anticolonialism, individualism and human rights produced retrospective bad conscience and criticism of the military for alleged war crimes during operations in the East Indies (Indonesia) dating back to the late 1940s. Draftees imposed a thorough liberalisation of discipline which became proverbial throughout the West. Such anti-military agitation, especially in the media, was relayed by anti-nuclear campaigning in the 1980s. When the Cold War ended, legitimacy of the armed forces had reached rock bottom. However, participation of Dutch troops in peace support operations in the former Yugoslavia brought back some of the old lustre, despite the Srebrenica disaster of 1995, when civilians were rounded up and massacred by Bosnian-Serb soldiers while the Dutch battalion of the UN force looked on helplessly. The recent shift to an all volunteer force has changed the nature of relations between armed forces and society, now premised on professionalism, “value for money” and a measure of organisational “remilitarisation”.

The Czech military (despite feats of arms by WWII exiles) has no record of successfully fighting for its homeland. The 1938 (Munich) and 1968 (Soviet intervention) episodes, in which it could not hope to resist without external help, go far to

explain Czech society’s skepticism. During the Cold War, military conservatism and close subordination to Moscow did little to improve its image. In 1989, its leadership expressed readiness to intervene to defend socialism and crush demonstrators. Today, despite “lustration” efforts, only the benefits of NATO integration have helped to change public perceptions for the better.

The Hungarian military was associated with struggles for national independence and values, but hardly with success (1848, WWII, 1956.) However, the role assigned to it after 1956 within the Warsaw Pact destroyed much of that historical legitimacy, especially as Hungary was in the vanguard of a liberal version of Communism as from the 1970s. Today, the military does not figure prominently in national priorities, which have more to do with economic transition and the prospect of EU integration; public attitudes are indifferent at best. Yet, NATO integration will probably bring with it more attention to military issues.

National sentiment and the Romanian military have been closely bound up since the struggle for national independence and unity (1859–1918.) Lingering fears about external security, and the part it played in modernisation and development of the nation, later maintained that positive public image despite troubled circumstances (WWII). Under communism, a national tradition of independence vis-à-vis Moscow kept the military in the public esteem. In 1989, in the only instance of violent demise of a communist regime, the Army briefly fought on both sides, before backing the Revolution. Since then, it has been seen as a promoter of national values and identity.

Nationalism, born of an insecure geostrategic position and history of conflicts with neighbors over borders and ethnic rivalries, is central to the Bulgarian tradition to this day. While relations with Moscow were cordial, the country was proud to be free of stationed Warsaw Pact troops during the Cold War. The military, in that context, is still influential and functions as a guarantor of national sovereignty and school of the nation.

The failure of Gorbachev’s reforms and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union brought Russia back to its 17th century borders. Its economy is in a shambles. With civilian society busy surviving or becoming prosperous despite great disorder, the military look like down-at-heel have-beens, forgotten by new tides. Chechnya and the brutal treatment of draftees unearthed by the press have washed away the glory and prestige of WWII. The military cannot hope to retrieve the central place it held under communism.

Formal civil control formulas are diverse in the old democratic West. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, the pattern of executive civil-military relations is of the balanced type, while Italy has a vertical system; the scope and extent of parliamentary control and investigative powers have tended to narrow in France, whereas they remain large in the other three countries. Judicial control, as a rule, de-emphasises specific military courts and law. Administrative control, as measured by the numbers of civilian public servants in defence ministries, is effective at the top, but not at lower echelons, except in Germany, where 137,000 non-uniformed employees (and an Ombudsman) are a power to reckon with. Germany is the only one here to severely restrict non-military roles for the armed forces; the other three Western countries do allow them (except when it comes to police functions in normal times), but tend to regard them as politically sensitive.

Close political subordination of the military is therefore achieved in the West without much of a gap between theory and practice, even where, as in Italy, there are lacunae in control mechanisms, and Cabinet instability continues to be a problem; in this event, these are compensated for by a tradition of political neutrality, and the influence of NATO norms. Military expertise among politicians and administrators tends to limit lack of transparency on the part of officer corps. The centre of gravity of military opinion, in keeping with the dominance of a pragmatic professional ethos, ranges from centre to centre right, and in Germany, the Innere Führung process ensures that no extremist political views are given free rein. Political activity is allowed off-duty, except in France. Military lobbies exist, but do not carry overwhelming weight, if only because of media zest for investigative (but often ill-informed) journalism, because of the existence of independent scholarship (though the latter’s influence is rarely expressed through strong institutional channels), and lack of strong links to other elite groups. Public opinion, in the post-Cold War era, is either supportive or at least not hostile.

This rather satisfactory condition owes much to the gradual rise, during the Cold War, of a pragmatic ethos driven by the inhibition of high intensity conflict, mounting tides of technology, organisational complexity, and of individualism on the outside. This ethos, by and large confirmed in the post-Cold War period, was made possible by, and favoured, a more representative recruitment base (a majority of middle class officers, working class volunteers, non-commissioned officers somewhere in the middle, except in Italy where sons of southern farmers amount to nearly half the total), and a probably unprecedented degree of social and cultural integration into society. Thus, military education, especially regarding officers, is in large part geared to university degree curricula; living standards compare favorably with civilian (public and, though to a lesser extent, private sector) pay levels, which mostly generate moderate to high satisfaction with service conditions; military wives’ gainful employment rates edge ever closer to civilian ones (which obliges the military to adapt or, as in Germany, face resentment of a “patriarchal” system assuming that all soldiers are bachelors); family residence is mostly off-base, and lifestyles are much less distinguishable, at comparable levels, from those dominant on the outside than they were a few decades ago. Except in Germany and Italy, where they are totally absent, military women are on the rise due both to external influences and reliance on volunteer recruitment. Gays and racial minorities are so far non-problems, but promise to emerge as issues in the decades to come.

However, while nothing egregious or sinister is in the cards, it should be noted that the combination of endangered corporate military interests (drawdown), increased vulnerability to outside cultural pressures, the wider latitude in political action afforded senior officers by multinational, multifunctional “new missions” marked by real-time media coverage, a decline in the proportion of politicians with first-hand experience of military life and a rise in the level of military legitimacy and prestige probably guarantee more vocal officer corps, and more strained civil-military relations at the political level (of which there have been a number of instances in the last few years) than they were in the Cold War’s last three decades.

The situation is very different in the former communist countries. At first, during the initial transition to liberal democracy, these countries sought to imitate western models of civil-military relations, only to be confused by the diversity they offered. All soon had subordination of the military to sovereign political power carved in stone in their constitutions or...
legislative set-ups. Political or union activity is generally held to be incompatible with active-duty military service, and non-military roles, while not unconstitutional, are severely restricted on paper.

Yet, old habits die hard, and lacunae in the new provisions, coupled with inexperience, quickly revealed gaps between theory and practice. The main stumbling blocks are unclear division of political labour at the top (e.g., among president and prime minister, defence minister and chief of staff) and a general lack of interest and expertise on the part of civilians nominally in charge of enforcing political, administrative and judicial control. Though depoliticisation of officer corps has, on paper, proceeded at a rather brisk pace in almost all eastern countries, the political centre of gravity of military opinion is generally left of the civilian one (except for Romania, where a conspicuous neutrality is observed.) Incomplete screening of personnel formerly tied up with Warsaw Pact structures, administrative secrecy and defence through informal networks of the military’s jeopardised corporate interests, not to mention partially reversed trends at the hands of neo-communists, have often been enough to thwart transparency. In some cases, powerful military lobbies exist in parliament (Russia), or the prestige of the military is superior to that of legislators (Romania, Bulgaria), so that controllers seem bent on approving rather than discussing policy and implementation. It is not altogether rare to see politicians trying to use the military to gain influence in the political arena. Frictions, overlap, duplication of efforts, inefficiency and evasion of control often ensue. The best illustrations are probably the Russian executive’s inability to impose reforms on a reluctant military, and the recent Hungarian episode in which MIG jets took part in a joint manoeuvre in Poland unknown to the Defence Minister or Parliament. However, there seems to be little fear of military coups or threat posed to the new regimes, because the armed forces are politically divided (Russia), lack legitimacy (Hungary, Czech Republic), do not wish to impose military ways upon society (Romania, Bulgaria), and/or (with the conspicuous exception of Russia) do not want to spoil their country’s chances of becoming NATO members. Investigation by the media, who see themselves as guardians of the fledgling democracies, but also the influence of officers’ newly retrieved professionalism (of the pragmatic variety in Central Europe, of a more radical hue in southeastern Europe and Russia) compensate at least partly for the weak functioning of formal control mechanisms. Independent scholarship, while not absent, has yet to make its influence felt on policy and public opinion.

One interesting feature that separates eastern from western countries is that in most of the former, social origins are lower than average: military service is traditionally an avenue of upward mobility for bright young types. But the consequences of that fact vary according to whether military cadres are rewarded by high prestige and pay, as in Bulgaria and Romania, or feel frustrated in that regard (Hungary, Czech Republic, and now Russia.) In the latter case, junior officers tend to leave the service in droves to seek better opportunities in the private sector, which can only slow down the regeneration of the corps, and detract from its quality level. Another factor is that while military education and lifestyles now resemble those on the outside, the links of uniformed personnel with civilian society have remained weak so far, either because of the communist legacy of insulation, lack of interest on the part of civilians, or because, as in Romania or Bulgaria, prestige places the armed forces on a pedestal and encourages them to remain apart.

Finally, military women are present in many capacities, mostly filling officer or non-commissioned officer slots in traditional support functions, a situation that parallels that in the West; however, resentment and, often, mistreatment of gays and racial or ethnic minorities in the military – which seem to grow stronger the further one travels eastward – goes to underline a divergent trend for decades to come between the two parts of the continent.

The general picture east of the former iron curtain may in part seem bleak. Yet, there is reason for guarded optimism. The worst – political activism on the part of military establishments thwarting democratic development at home and rekindling tensions abroad – seems unlikely at best. There is no turning back to totalitarianism because populations once subject to Soviet domination evince little taste for such a return to the recent past, and because the Soviet might that made it possible is no longer there. If it is true, as Tocqueville taught, that societies evolve by perfecting the logic underlying their most undisputed cultural options, and if it can be postulated also that they learn from their past mistakes and the misery they brought upon themselves, then avoidance of major war (after tens of millions of casualties in a double-barrelled suicide of Europe in the former half of this century), desire for western-style affluence and individual freedom after several decades of ideologically imposed personal restraints and sharing of poverty, as well as the apparent collective will to cultivate national identities while containing the undesirable effects of nationalism, all point in the direction of a peaceful, democratic, and in due course more prosperous region, despite current obstacles and imperfections. No doubt, the prospect of joining the EU and/or NATO provides a powerful incentive not to deviate from that course. Only Russia’s destiny remains uncertain, but there again, cultural passivity and the capacity to endure have made it possible, against tremendous odds, for the Russian people to overcome the trauma of a chaotic transition without turning pent-up frustration against itself or against others. And there may be little cause for despair if present efforts are kept up, and its house is finally put in order.
Lessons Learned in the Promotion of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Western mistakes

After having implemented assistance projects in our field of interest for Central and Eastern Europe for almost ten years, it is obvious that the North American and West European agencies that have been most active do not have an unblemished record with regard to the appropriateness and effectiveness of their effort. A few remarks are in order here on the major ‘mistakes made’ (including our own).

Government-led projects especially often brought ideas and information that were manifestly not suitable for local conditions, such as concepts for military doctrines formulated in purely Western terms or blueprints for defence ministry budgeting systems presented as ‘one size fits all’. The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) noticed and were often concerned that the West did not appear fully to understand their circumstances or their needs. The consequence was scepticism, even cynicism, in some quarters about certain assistance efforts – not, thank goodness, expressed in relation to the Groningen Centre’s work; and a certain resentment, even hostility, regarding many of the Western bodies’ condescending attitudes – not, we would claim, an accusation that can be levelled at CESS.

The Western NGOs’ efforts in particular have been fragmented and poorly co-ordinated. In fact they have not been co-ordinated at all. This has meant wasteful replication of general and elementary messages – typically lauding some ideal-type ‘Western model’ for democratic civil-military relations – and precious little concrete guidance on democratic control tailored to individual nations’ or target groups’ requirements and taking account of the local political culture.

It has, of course, been CESS’s mission to explain the key features, and stress the merits, of a ‘Western model’. However, we have always tried to do this with a sound appreciation of shortfalls in Western democratic practice and, most importantly, placing due emphasis on both a pragmatic approach to instruction and a proper respect for host-nation sensibilities.

This is not as straightforward as it sounds. The challenge is to convey the democratic ‘message’ in an effective way in a milieu still affected by a hard residuum of attitudes of mind, habits of thought and patterns of behaviour which is perhaps the Communist era’s most enduring legacy. Our second set of reflections – presented in a rather more telegrammatic style – underscores this point.

Prevailing conditions

Most obviously, a basically undemocratic – or at least non-participatory – political culture in some countries still hampers reform. Until very recently the Slovak Republic was the classic case in point, but the phenomenon is noticeable elsewhere.

The other side of this coin is that, within the security communities in most – if not all – CEECs, there remains a lot of ‘old’ authoritarian thinking. This is especially, but not exclusively, the case among the oldest senior officers. There is a marked generation gap between the older and younger officers within the armed forces in almost all states.

Generally, there also remains a formidable language obstacle. Many older participants in CESS events do not speak any foreign language except Russian. This makes effective communication difficult (or expensive).

This is probably part of the explanation for another phenomenon – the passive attitude that many audiences take (although we suspect this could also have something to do with years of conditioning to interminable speeches by party luminaries). On any given occasion we reckon that around one-half of those present are likely to be listening attentively, perhaps two-thirds if the subject is topical and the tutor is energetic. The proportion willing to get involved in discussions, or converse at length with a foreign lecturer, is lower than that. Most local participants do appear to want to learn about such matters as strengthening civilian control over the military. Having said that, we suspect that many who display an appropriately receptive attitude during the formal proceedings at an event may not return to their jobs full of reforming zeal.

In many places the military have adopted a distrustful attitude to reforming politicians similar to that which was shown towards the ancien regime. But the men in uniform are not always the difficult characters. Civilian actors can hamper the reform process too (for instance, Lech Walea during his presidency of Poland and diehard functionaries everywhere). Generally a palpable tension exists between the uniformed military and the civilians in the MODs of Central and Eastern European countries.

Security and defence matters continue to be regarded as the more or less exclusive preserve of government agencies. The powers-that-be show little disposition to engage academic institutions and NGOs in comprehensive and regular policy dialogue. For this reason, among some civil members of the security community we detect signs of a culture of deference and only limited enthusiasm for assumption of the role of critical interlocutor with the authorities.
This last observation is the most disturbing, from the standpoint of promoting democratic control. Equally important, though, is the fact that those who do take up this challenge – and others who might – are frequently frustrated by a lack of trustworthy information.

The ‘information problem’ is an appropriate one with which to end this analysis and evaluation of ‘the CESS experience’ in Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade. Nothing has frustrated our work more. It has limited the extent to which instruction can be placed in context, by extensive use of illustrative local data. It has made it difficult (often impossible) to produce good, realistic local case studies to enrich our courses. Above all, we have been aware that, even if we inspire audiences to constantly ‘put to the question’ what governments are doing, they will be constrained by lack of information.

In CEECs, governments are not eager to disseminate facts and figures – especially not figures – about their nation’s defences. A particular inhibition seems to operate in relation to data on spending (budgets and actual outlays) about which the citizens of CEECs are kept in a state of ignorance that North American and West European taxpayers would not tolerate. It will be hard to improve the democratic control of armed forces – and popular understanding of security matters generally – in the next decade if this problem is not addressed.

Continuing instructional needs

Perhaps the main conclusion is that there is a continuing need for some further education and training through direct instructional effort just about everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe.

This is especially the case with respect to the promotion of accountability and transparency in the security sector. In mature democracies it is taken for granted that the nation’s armed forces and those directly responsible for security policy-making and provision – including defence planning, programming and budgeting plus the management of defence resources – are accountable, for all that they do, to the national legislature in the first instance and ultimately to society-at-large. Equally, it is understood that it is a fundamental duty of elected legislators – supported by their staffs, independent analysts and academics, the print and broadcast media – to hold the military and civilian leadership accountable for all that they do. These are the two faces of accountability.

In line with this, in mature democracies it is accepted that there should be ‘open government’ in the national security area as in any other. The electorate, through their chosen representatives, have ‘the right to know’ all about the executive’s business – including the military and paramilitary forces’ professional business – subject only to some constraints in a few sensitive areas where it is recognised that the powers-that-be must invoke ‘need to know’ considerations. In a phrase, domestic transparency is a democratic imperative. Increasingly nowadays openness in this area vis-à-vis neighbouring states (and, indeed, the global community) is expected too, because it is a confidence- and security-building practice. In this sense, international transparency has become a political desideratum. Thus transparency also has a dual aspect (domestic and international).

Taken together, accountability and transparency are clearly the essential instrumentalities of democratic control, in the security field generally and in relation to armed forces in particular.

So much is elementary. However, though considerable progress towards democratic control has been made in most Central and East European countries during the last ten years or so, none of the above is unreservedly accepted, still less diligently practised, in any of these states.

Formal civil control of defence and armed forces has been put in place – through the appointment of civilian defence ministers and the passing of constitutional legislation on presidential and parliamentary powers, for example. However, what all-round democratic control entails remains imperfectly understood and is, therefore (and generally speaking), conspicuous by its absence. The requisite change(s) in political culture, and the emergence of vibrant civil societies – these are developments which have yet to occur.

It follows that in the furtherance of democratic control there is a clear continuing need for:

a) direct education of security sector officers and officials, to inform (or remind) them of their obligations so far as transparency and accountability are concerned;

b) practical training of parliamentarians and parliamentary staffs in the persistent assertion of their ‘right to know’ (demanding transparency) and the conscientious exercise of legislative oversight (practising accountability); and

c) similar practical training of academics, analysts and commentators at independent NGOs, journalists, schoolteachers and other influential citizens who also have a part to play in ensuring that electorates are adequately informed about security matters (transparency) and in generally holding governments to account on behalf of society-at-large (all-round accountability).

The need for instruction translates into the form of appropriate provision here. We should continue to provide well-planned seminars, training courses and workshops. The aims of these activities are still to transfer knowledge, promote understanding, enhance relevant skills, and equip people with the specific techniques necessary for the effective conduct of parliamentary and popular oversight.

In relation to (b) above, we think there is particular value in facilitating dialogue among parliamentarians themselves and also with domestic and foreign experts. Also, we think it is important to take into account the extremely diverse level of knowledge and experience among elected representatives. Most important, we have learned that appearing to want to teach an MP his or her business is counter-productive. Legislators expect a certain respect for their status. Hence, we favour the ‘indirect approach’: looking at a specific issue, and inviting MPs to define their role in relation to it, has proven very
effective. In general, the major challenge is to strike a balance between conveying the basics of holding governments to account and giving more advanced guidance on how to ask the most searching and least welcome questions.

Further, we would counsel against looking narrowly at legislative oversight of a passive kind. We should make legislators aware that they ought to take a pro-active role vis-à-vis their governments, especially on security issues. Finally on work with parliamentarians, a cautionary word is in order about inter-parliamentary exchanges and other out-of-country activities. These can be useful, but only if there is a clearly targeted purpose and a well-directed programme. Parliamentary tourism is a waste of time, money and effort. It should not be encouraged.

A clear recommendation that we would make on the approach to instruction of all groups ((a)–(c) above) is to avoid insensitive and undifferentiated provision. All education and training should be informed by an understanding of local customs, constraints and circumstances (context). There is no universal model of democratic control and the context of each individual country should therefore be respected. At the same time our role is the dissemination of knowledge about best practice in mature democracies and we have to be assertive about this. Here, too, it is a matter of balance-striking.

**Upcoming Research Issues in Civil-Military Relations in General and the Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Particular**

There is a huge list under civil-military relations in general, because the term has numerous aspects:

1. military in relation to the state (Turkey?);
2. military in relation to the civil authority and the government of the day: civilian control (narrowly defined);
3. military in relation to the electorate through the legislature of the day (DCAF as we understand it);
4. military in relation to the society, as a source of recruits/job opportunities etc.; and military as a social group (warriors/managers): military sociology themes (gender, gays, managerial styles etc.).

A lot of civil-military relations people, especially in North America, put point 4 on top of their list of concerns, because they regard 1–3 as ‘taken care of …’. We do not have a lot to say about military sociology (in the Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos sense), because we are a centre for security studies. With regard to 1–3 we seek to make people aware – including those from mature democracies – of the necessity of a continuing sensitiveness towards civilian control and DCAF. Instead of investigating civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe in isolation of civil-military issues in Western Europe/North America, we want to break through this ‘study in isolation’ to allow for cross-fertilisation. The built-in tension between civilians/politicians and military are universal. There may be a difference in degree, but not in principle. Issues that need further investigation are:

- international dimension of civil-military relations (conditionality, role of international organisations, international assistance programmes);
- new missions, new civil-military relations.

On DCAF in particular then, what are ‘the issues’? Among other things, we see scope for research on:

- what makes for effective DCAF (criteria); the relationship between formal rules/powers and actual practice in transparency and accountability;
- can effectiveness be measured (yardsticks)? can you rank states, produce standings; can you measure improvement or backsliding?
- particular countries’ experience (story so far, current position, needs);
- comparative studies (why do some countries do better?).

DCAF

- non-involvement of military in domestic politics;
- democratic control of defence policy (in terms of force size and structure, defence spending and procurement);
- democratic control of foreign policy (including decisions on the external use of force).
In security policy and military circles, reference is often now made to the ‘new times’ for national security and military affairs. The conditions for national defence and defence policy-making are today considered by many to be fundamentally different from those of ten years ago. More precisely, it could be argued that the contemporary nature of the defence environment consists of several different factors, ranging from technological developments to tendencies in public opinion. The defence environment is subject to a certain amount of controversy, and there is no real general agreement about it. In this section the focus will be on changes in deployment of the military, which has come about largely as a consequence of the altered international security order since the end of the Cold War.

Probably the most important aspect of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ending of the Cold War is that it implied a fundamental alteration in the basic conditions for international politics. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, there followed, as a natural consequence, the breakdown of the bipolar system that for nearly half a century had been the basis of international politics. In its place emerged what is now basically a multi-polar system. Due mainly to changes in the international political structure, a different type of conflict and crisis dominates the international security agenda today. During the Cold War the competition and risk of nuclear war between the two ‘superpowers’ – the USA and the Soviet Union – was the dominating issue, shaping international politics as well as national defence planning and management. With the fall of the bipolar order we have experienced the outbreak of a broad range of conflicts and crises which previously had been suppressed: border disputes, ethnic conflicts, self-determination claims, etc. Without the superpower tension of the Cold War, these smaller and low-level conflicts also penetrated the awareness of the Western industrialised world with greater force than before. Moreover, it can be argued that changes in norms and values, towards a greater emphasis on individual human rights and the right to national self-determination, have further contributed to the attention given to several of the conflicts which today head the political agendas and media coverage. The risk that these conflicts may spread, and the potential consequences in terms of, for example, vast numbers of refugees, are other factors that have contributed to the significance ascribed to conflicts and crises such as those in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, etc. Conflicts like those today constitute an important, if not the most important, element in most North American and European nations’ security thinking and defence planning.

How military security is conceived and the means to reach it are today consequently quite different compared to a decade ago. Instead of territorial defence, the main or the most frequent task of today’s armed forces is that of ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW), and then mainly peace-support operations.1 The use and aim of the military today are seldom for the winning of war. The task of the military is, instead, more often that of hindering war in a practical way and its consequences – either by ‘making peace’ by force, or by ‘peacekeeping’, i.e. guarding an existing but fragile peace. The missions for which the military is called upon also often involve several more and very differing aims. Humanitarian considerations, rehabilitation of political institutions, economic reconstruction, etc. are other aims that are frequently part of the missions. This broad nature of the missions in its turn implies the presence of a number of different actors such as, for example, different non-governmental organisations, besides the armed forces, in the field of operations. The tasks of today’s military are, in other words, often part of broad and complex operations, or, in the terms of UN and US officials, ‘complex emergencies’ and ‘complex contingency operations’. It can probably be said that:

“The pattern of interventions since the end of the Cold War, although sharing some characteristics with traditional patterns, represents a new trend.” (Vincent Davis)

Another aspect of these developments in international politics and in the use of military power is that the military instrument has become significantly more frequently and actively used than was the case just a decade ago. The military instrument has become an integrated part of national foreign politics in a sense not experienced before. The closer integration of military affairs with foreign politics is not just due to the nature of military missions, and the fact that these almost are conducted without exception within broad international coalitions. It may also be seen as a consequence of increased international cooperation in general in military and defence issues. A closely related tendency or consequence is the more political nature of defence issues and military missions, in the sense of these being highly dependent on compromises, negotiations, public opinion etc. This ‘politicisation’ of military affairs may, in its turn, be said to have several causes.

1 The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish Armed Forces

2 Freely translated from the Swedish text, which reads as follows: “..., risken att […] komma i krig har minskat, men risken att […] soldater kan komma i strid har ökat.” (General Johan Hederstedt, the Swedish Supreme Commander)

3 The term ‘peace support operations’ is here used according to the Swedish armed forces’ Joint Military Doctrine – Peace Support Operations. ‘Peace support operations’ (PSO) is there used in the sense of an overall concept referring to all operations other than war: ‘PSO are defined as a category of operations that covers a broad range of the ‘Spectrum of Conflict’. PK [peace keeping] lies at the more pacific end of this range and, at the more violent end, PE [peace enforcement].’ (Joint Military Doctrine – Peace Support Operations”, 1997, 2.1)
First, there is the complexity of military missions, with various different actors involved. Secondly, there are several dominant foreign policy stakes. A third factor, and maybe the most significant, in making military affairs and missions highly political is the use of the military in situations other than those where fundamental national interests are threatened. Military interventions in the form of peace-support operations are certainly defined as protecting and contributing to the national interest, but it is still not a question of defending national survival, which is quite different.

This new defence environment implies the need for, and actual emergence of, other and different relations and interactions between the military and politicians and civil servants. It also means new prerequisites for civilian political control over the military. In sum, the new defence environment may be argued to contribute to the forming of a new interface between politics and politicians on the one hand, and national armed forces on the other.

In the following, attention will be given to what can probably be regarded as two of the more important consequences for political-military relations stemming from the development of the above discussed new defence environment. These consequences are, first, an increased need for an active political leadership in defence and military affairs. With this need, it is argued, also comes a growing demand for civilians and politicians with sound military and defence knowledge, as well as requirements for clear and well-founded national security strategies. A second consequence that is highlighted is an increase in, and to some extent different, interaction between on the one hand the national armed forces, and on the other a long range of non-military actors of different types. This growing military-civilian interaction, in its turn, may be argued to create the need for more politically and socially aware and knowledgeable militaries.

The implications for the political-military interface due to changes in the security and defence situation are of course several, but the focus here will be upon these two aspects.

**More – and More Active – Political Leadership**

“We must … guard against [the armed forces] ever having to answer the call of an uncertain trumpet.” (General Colin Powell, as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff)

One consequence for political-military relations that may be argued to emerge from the changes in the defence environment is an increased need for political leadership. What often seems to be forgotten is that not just the tasks and the role of the military have changed since the end of the Cold War, but so have also the tasks and the role of the political leadership in defence politics and military affairs. Due to the uncertainty involved in today’s military missions concerning goals, which means to use, etc., as well as their increased political nature, a clearer and, above all, more active political leadership is necessary. This need for a more active political leadership has been evident in several situations and occasions during the latest decade. Maybe the most important implication, due to shaky political leadership, has been a military wariness and reluctance in response to calls for intervention in the new conflict scenario. This in turn implies that lack of political leadership may have had implications for not just the efficiency and success of military operations, but also for the exercise of civilian political control.

The increased complex and political nature of the conflicts and crises for which the military is called upon means that political judgements are present in more decisions and throughout the planning and execution of military missions. This is even more the case when the military instrument is used in situations short of a direct threat to the nation, involving highly political stakes, such as relations to coalition partners, international treaties and agreements etc.

If political leadership does not give clear directions or guidance the military does not have any framework within which to work. In meeting new and ambiguous situations and tasks without a clearly defined political will and strategy, the reaction of the military to show wariness and caution, and their tendency to fall back on traditional paradigms, can be seen as both natural and logical. It is also possible to argue that if the political leadership is hesitant and perhaps containing disagreements, the potential for a stronger military influence on decision-making increases, more or less, automatically.

An important aspect of the wider problem of deficient political leadership may be a lack of enough civilian and political expertise in military affairs. Several scholars and practitioners have pointed out that civilian and political interest in and knowledge of defence and military related issues have decreased significantly in the latest decades. As the situation is now, they argue, civilian decision-makers are less prepared to deal with current and future defence and military situations and issues than are their military counterparts. This is, of course, problematic in the view of civilian political control generally, but with an increased need for active political leadership and initiative, it becomes so even more.

The main problem and challenge is, however, probably the fact that in most nations today neither the political leadership, nor the military services have a common vision of the future. The understanding of what the military should be able to do differs between the actors concerned which, in turn, means that there is no common vision of how the services should be organised, trained and equipped for the twenty-first century. In other words, there is no generally accepted mid- or long-range plan or picture of the future, within which, at multiple levels of decision-making, civilian and military leaders can comfortably agree on who decides and for what. The questions, which whole nations, as well as their governments, will have to face and solve sooner or later, concern the basics of their national security strategy. What is the importance of low-level conflicts in relation to national security goals? Are, for example, complex contingency operations a natural and deliberate part of foreign policy or are they, instead, hesitant improvisations when all other policies have failed?

**A More Politically Integrated Military?**

“The key is the role of military power within the nation’s array of foreign policy tools.” (Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz)
In the new defence environment the conflicts and crises for which the military is called upon are in most cases highly complex. The political goals and aims behind intervention are several and multidimensional. This also means that the military is just one out of several other actors involved in conflict or crisis management. The multitude of aims, such as humanitarian relief, economic reconstruction, and judicial supervision – besides the military operation – bring with them a broad spectrum of individuals and organisations – non-governmental as well as governmental. To this should be added the fact that these missions – the military as well as the civilian parts – almost without exception constitute international undertakings, with the participation of various countries. Coordination and cooperation over borders – both organisational and national – become crucial in this environment. Such coordination and cooperation are needed in many contexts and on many levels. Governmental and non-governmental actors have had to find ways to coordinate actions and goals with each other, while interaction and combined efforts within the government between different ministries or departments have become increasingly important. But, maybe most important is the enhanced need for continuous communication and coordination between, on the one hand, the highest military leaders and, on the other, political decision-makers – those within the military sector, as well as others, who have important responsibilities with regard to conflict or crisis management.

An additional aspect, following on from increased political-military and civil-military interactions, and growing integration with the broader foreign policy, is the need for an enhanced political and social awareness in the armed forces. With the new type of military missions the armed forces have to cooperate with a broad array of different actors and take on responsibilities far beyond those traditionally held. The role of military affairs and defence politics within the broader framework of foreign politics has been significantly altered, and national armed forces of today work within a different framework compared to those of just a decade ago. These developments, in turn, mean that it has become more and more important that military men at all levels, but not least at the highest, are profoundly familiar with and understand the working of the broader context within which they act. Or, in other words, it is important that military officers:

“...understand ‘the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions,’ and that they must be prepared to adjust to a ‘change in political objectives’”. (Lyle J. Goldstein)

Some Concluding Remarks

Relations between military and civilian leaders are undergoing a significant transition in this early post-Cold War period. Political-military relations of today are in a state of transition and are moving away from a tenuous but long-standing equilibrium. It is not yet known at this date how long the transition will be and whether the new relationship will include an equilibrium similar to the old one. No one really knows what factors are providing the major impacts on the transition. Future historians will most probably consider the Cold War to be a seminal event in the long-term evolution of political-military relations. Today we can just make vague estimates of the extent of change under way, and we far from understand the specifics. Many of the perceptions, and beliefs, as well as structures and functions that shaped national security policy during the Cold War still linger. We are so far in the 'post-Cold War' security era, awaiting the birth of a new one. The issues that will shape the future such as the changing nature of armed conflict and alterations in national security strategies are relatively clear, but their precise impact on political-military relations is still very uncertain.

Upcoming Research Issues

For a successful adaptation of our political-military relations to the new international politics and defence environment there is a great need for research as well as debate. With the discussion above as a starting point, several important research issues in civil- and political military relations can be found. Some examples are:

- The nature and implications of the changes in the political-military relations, experienced as a consequence of the ‘new defence environment’ – are they universal or do they differ depending on, for example, national or regional security and military history? And, if they do differ, in what way do they differ?
- What will the new situation regarding security policy and military affairs mean for the requirements on the organisation – form as well as function – of the higher political and military leadership? What does the trade-off between operational effectiveness on the one hand and democratic control on the other look like?

How should we now define the concept of democratic control of armed forces? Does it imply the same as it did during the Cold War? Are the ‘mechanisms’ at work still the same?
17 Lessons Learned and Upcoming Research Issues in Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform

Marina Caparini

Personal Lessons Learned Regarding Promotion of Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The development of democratic control of armed forces in the Central and Eastern European region is interesting from both academic and policy perspectives, because of the extent to which fundamental reform has been undertaken with the aim of creating democratic polities, and because of the unprecedented opportunity those societies have of learning from the experiences, histories and mistakes of other democratic and democratising states.

Democratic control of armed forces is a reflection of the democratic quality of mentalities, norms, institutional structures and policy processes in a polity. History has shown that in practical terms, democracy is often not an either/or condition, but is composed of multiple variables and shifting perceptions of who is considered a legitimate citizen with attendant civic rights and obligations; what are the proper relationships between government, state security institutions, and societal actors, such as the degree of inclusiveness in the formulation and implementation of policies; and especially, public expectations about the transparency and accountability of state security institutions and those entrusted to act in the public good. A contemporary example is provided by various post-authoritarian Latin American societies, which are generally acknowledged to be consolidating democracies. Often, however, military withdrawal from politics was, and remains, contingent on the preservation of certain military prerogatives that are not concordant with prevailing Western views of what constitutes democratic control of the armed forces.

Even long established democracies may contain contradictions, undemocratic attitudes and practices, and may on occasion violate the human rights and civil liberties of its citizens, or more likely, specific groups of citizens. This underlines the importance of procedural and structural safeguards in democratic systems, cultural expectations, and also the perpetual nature of the effort needed in any democratic system to keep government responsive, responsible and accountable. In a similar way, formalistic democracy may exist with the regular occurrence of free and fair elections, but this does not guarantee that the wishes of the people are always, or even usually, considered and respected on specific policy issues. To achieve a more profoundly democratic quality in a polity, it is necessary to have a political culture that upholds the right to hold dissenting views, to be openly critical of government and its policies, and for government to recognise the legitimacy of public expectations and demands for more inclusive governance.

Promoting security sector reform and democratic control of security forces has become a key component of Western defence diplomacy and outreach activities. There have been few efforts however to compare and inform these activities with lessons learned in other, more traditional sectors of development assistance. Thankfully, the long-standing divide between development and security is now beginning to be tackled at the conceptual and policy levels, with the recognition that effective reform of the security sector and establishment of accountability and democratic control over security structures are fundamental to long-term and sustainable development of a society. Further, there has been insufficient attention to the particularities of assistance-receiving countries and the development of alternative models of civil-military relations. This applies to the reform of institutions and procedures most obviously, but also to changing the norms, values and principles that underlie those structures. Unfortunately, Western actors engaged in outreach and democracy assistance have not tended to speak very much of their mistakes and problems in civil-military relations, even though this would be beneficial and educational for those in the process of reforming their own systems.

My understanding of what constitutes democratic control of armed forces and security services derives from the case that I know perhaps best. The successes, but also the many problems and deficiencies that continue to afflict Canada, particularly in the areas of transparency and accountability of its military and civilian bureaucracies, thus form the basis of the following observations. While countries that have emerged from state socialism or authoritarianism have many distinct characteristics and features as a result of that shared history, there are basic questions and issues in civil-military relations and democratic control and accountability of armed forces that are common to virtually all states. I raise the following points specifically with regard to well-established democracies, such as Canada, although they also clearly apply to post-communist states.

In order to begin to understand a country’s system of democratic control, one must start by looking closely at the basic structures of the political and public administrative systems. That is, the formal and informal relationships between the executive and legislative branches, among the organs of state power, and between the state and the public, as established by the constitutional-legal constraints on government, the party system and political culture. Ideally, one must also be sensitive to political trends triggered by internal processes and regulations and other factors generally hidden from public view. For example, among certain states such as Canada political scientists have noted a gradual shift of power away from ministers and departments, and a concentration in the executive around the prime minister and agencies at the centre (in Canada, the Prime Minister’s Office, Privy Council Office, Treasury, etc.). I believe that this trend has undermined legislative control and accountability of the federal government’s direction of bureaucracies concerned with national security and public order. This trend is very difficult to track, however, except during exceptional events such as public or parliamentary inquiries convened in the wake of controversies. In the security sphere examples are those involving the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence misconduct in the Somalia affair, and the abuse of RCMP police authority during the APEC summit.

Formal and procedural controls on security forces, whilst clearly important, cannot be considered in isolation from the broader context of political culture and the state of development of civil society in a country. Those political values held
willingness to engage as groups in the social and sometimes political life of the state are a fundament of vibrant democracy. This
either the state (ministries) or foreign assistance to survive. A more fine-grained appreciation of the nature of civil society’s
society under state socialism. Civil society organisations involved in defence and security affairs are usually dependent on
disregard by international enforcement and intelligence agencies of different countries. This is also suggested by th e growing convergence between inter-agency and inter-departmental coordination within states, as well as transnational cooperation between the law
infrastructure and vulnerable domestic populations. Countering such threats and strategies requires increasing levels of
American technological superiority, potential opponents are expect ed to adopt asymmetrical strategies focused on critical
impact of these trends is that citizens expect, and are gaining, greater access to informa tion about the actions of their
government, in the long term it serves to emasculate the security community and weakens public accountability of govern-
ratic governance. While muzzling informed criticism may se rve the immediate political prerogatives of a specific
government and those of other countries. Further, governments are less able to control information about their activities,
and consequently have less control over the implementation of their policies. Greater interest in democratic control and
accountability, legitimacy, and inclusiveness today than they did previously. Increasingly in mature democracies the ballot
box is acknowledged to be a necessary, but blunt, instrument of democracy. Although popular will is directly expressed and
governments are elected every 2–4 years on average, this does not mean that governments represent the views of people all
time or on every issue. The growth in support and endorsement of civil society as a political concept is based on the view
that people in a democracy should be able to express their views and preferences between elections, and that this
willingness to engage as groups in the social and sometimes political life of the state are a fundament of vibrant democracy. At a practical level, when we are considering a sphere as specialised as the security and defence arena, the engagement of

There is a need to better understand the contours of such “defence communities” – i. e. members of the attentive public and
civil society organisations who engage with defence and security issues – in specific contexts. The past ten years have
suggested, for example, that Central and Eastern Europe has distinct characteristics in terms of its underdeveloped defence
communities, a result of the atomisation of society and the resulting long-constrained and retarded development of civil
society under state socialism. Civil society organisations involved in defence and security affairs are usually dependent on
either the state (ministries) or foreign assistance to survive. A more fine-grained appreciation of the nature of civil society’s
involvement in security affairs of a given country would deepen our understanding of civil-military relations and democ-

civilian expertise in security affairs should not be conflated with the assumption that such civilian analysts must therefore support government policies, or at the very
least, not publicly criticise specific government policies. For example, vigorous questioning and debate of governmental
policy is generally viewed in the US as a valid activity for security specialists, who further tend to benefit from generously

However, the various means of support provided by the state to developing civilian expertise in security affairs should not
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However, responsibility for creating a vigorous and accountable defence policy community also lies with academics,
the news media, and the political opposition, who should carry out their informal review and oversight functions with a
sufficient degree of professionalism, expertise and integrity to inspire greater political trust and openness among govern-
ment and administration.

Upcoming Research Issues in Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform

Most generally, I believe that publics in established democracies are undergoing a significant shift in their expectations of
governance, due in part to rapid advances in telecommunications, as well as the impact of globalisation. The combined
impact of these trends is that citizens expect, and are gaining, greater access to information about the actions of their
governments and those of other countries. Further, governments are less able to control information about their activities,
and consequently have lost control over the implementation of their policies. Greater interest in democratic control and
accountability of the armed forces will probably be mirrored by greater expectations of public sector accountability and
transparency across the board. Many of the lessons concerning the control and accountability of public sector structures can
be applied across sectors.

Since the end of the Cold War, security threats have become more diffuse, complex, and in the face of overwhelming
American technological superiority, potential opponents are expected to adopt asymmetrical strategies focused on critical
infrastructure and vulnerable domestic populations. Countering such threats and strategies requires increasing levels of
inter-agency and inter-departmental coordination within states, as well as transnational cooperation between the law
enforcement and intelligence agencies of different countries. This is also suggested by the growing convergence between
military and law enforcement missions, contributing to a certain blurring of roles, weakening of oversight and accountability, and raising questions about the legitimacy of evolving roles of security and defence institutions.

We are also likely to see growing use of military assets and technologies to support law enforcement and intelligence due to the emergence of threats such as transnational organised crime, catastrophic terrorism, and illegal immigration. This blurring of the distinction between military and policing roles deserves more academic attention than it is currently receiving. More broadly, there will be much greater emphasis, both within and between states, on inter-agency and inter-departmental coordination and intelligence-sharing to confront complex security challenges. Asymmetrical strategies of actors who confront opponents with overwhelming military superiority will focus efforts not only on compromising internal security through the use of non-conventional tactics (biological and chemical attacks, hacking and information sabotage, attacks on critical infrastructure), but influencing media and public opinion to undermine coalition consensus, public morale and confidence in government, and domestic legitimacy of security operations.

Network forms of organisation and interaction will become much more prominent in security analyses and means of countering network-based security threats (transnational organised crime, international drug trafficking networks, information warfare, and terrorism. These network-based threats are often perceived as being ethnically-based, increasing the likelihood that immigrant and minority groups will be identified as potential security risks). In contrast to traditional hierarchical-based forms of organisation (as found in the state’s security bureaucracies), emergent transnational risks and threats will emphasise a high degree of fluidity, nodal forms of organisation, informal relationships and linkages. This will require greater focus on efficiency, innovation and teamwork within and between state security apparatuses. National security strategies will increasingly rely on the development of effective networks involving not only the armed forces, but state officials and agencies such as police, customs officers, border police, intelligence agencies, immigration authorities, emergency response services, public and private transportation companies, and embassies abroad.

Questions of accountability and transparency may be de-prioritised during the push to optimise the efficiency and effectiveness of state security apparatus in the face of ambiguous threats. While the “accountability deficit” is currently drawing increasing attention at the European level, this has not really filtered down into the realm of public discourse and policy debate.

Another factor that will affect the future agenda of the democratic control of the defence and security sector is the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In an era when the US (and its partners acting in ‘coalitions of the willing’) present overwhelming technological superiority vis-à-vis potential opponents, have the controls on resort to use of force become weaker? During the Kosovo conflict there was general disregard among major actors for those national and international institutions that would ratify and therefore legitimise the resort to force (both legislative scrutiny and UN Security Council approval were avoided). The legitimacy and democratic control of such operations are likely to draw increased attention in the future.

Scholars and policy practitioners also need to look more closely at the impact of international actors (donors and donor strategies) for encouraging democratic control of armed forces and security structures. While NATO and EU enlargement have functioned as carrots in offering clear incentives and requirements for establishing effective democratic control, few observers have examined how effective has NATO membership been subsequently on continuing reforms and improving accountability and democratic control in new member states.

The domestic use of armed forces is likely to grow in the future through functions such as disaster relief, counter-terrorism, support to law enforcement agencies, other aid to civil power, and maintenance of public order. For good reason, this tends to be very sensitive politically and will draw attention to constitutional frameworks and legal constraints upon such actions. Attention will focus on balance of traditional roles and domestic roles of armed forces, the impact of new roles on military professionalism, operational readiness and effectiveness, and the need for different skills and mentality of armed forces personnel. Researchers will also likely address the impact of such ‘peripheral missions’ on societal support for armed forces.

The commercialisation of armed conflict is another trend that should draw the attention of scholars in the field, specifically, the continued emergence of private military organisations that are hired by states and other actors (international organisations, businesses) to provide security. In a similar way, private security companies will become more common providers of public, firm and individual security in place of state policing services. The privatisation of policing is well advanced in Western states, with minimal attention thus far to accountability and transparency of private security companies. In post-communist states, private security companies are often closely linked to organized criminal groups. Similar movement towards privatisation is likely to be seen in intelligence, with increasing emphasis on open-source and contracting-out. Questions of accountability will become even more important, as most of these private security actors are not publicly accountable for their actions, and in practice serve to promote crime rather than public security.

There has also been significant growth in state surveillance over individuals and society more broadly as a result of technological advances and the widened definition of security to encompass economic and societal spheres. There have been some corresponding steps towards improving oversight of security services, but this generally remains inadequate in most states. While there are numerous similarities between democratic control of armed forces and that of intelligence services, there are also important differences that necessitate a distinct analytical paradigm.

Similarly, traditional notions of the democratic control of armed forces and democratic control of police are conceptually similar but operationally quite different. The military has little daily contact with citizens and a huge potential for violence, but this is rarely used. In a democracy, the military is not used against the state’s citizens. The ethos of the military is maximum violence. As a result of these characteristics, structural democratic safeguards over the military tend to predominate (parliamentary committees, budgetary oversight, civilian defence ministers, etc.). The police, by contrast, have daily contact with citizens. The police have a capacity for violence and can deprive people of their liberty, but in a democracy they can only use appropriate level of violence as authorised by law. Their guiding principle should be minimal violence, and police must answer for their use of excessive force to the courts. Therefore the widespread nature of policing (the high degree of interaction between policing practitioners and the public) and the discretionary use of violence by police
mean that democratic controls on police must be both structural (constitutional, institutional) and societal (grassroots and community). There has been a recent upsurge in the literature on democratic policing, but it is clear that the academic and international police assistance discourse tends to be dominated by Anglo-American experiences and interpretations of what policing should be in a democracy.

Post-script: the Impact of September 11, 2001 on Democratic Control of the Security Sector

The security implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11 for many Western democratic states have been significant. The increasingly porous state boundaries of the globalised post-Cold War world enabled ever greater and more fluid transnational flows of people, goods, ideas and capital. While these drivers of change in the perceived nature of state security were visible when this article was first written in late 2000, the events of September 11 have forged a consensus on their importance among defence and security experts. Many states have embarked on a de facto, comprehensive process of security sector reform, although their emphasis is more in order to maximise efficiency and improve coordination of security agencies than to improve democratic control and accountability. Domestic or internal security has reappeared as a major concern for numerous states, prompting a reorganisation of security organisations, re-tasking of security structures, and shifts in resource allocation. The attacks underscored the need for broader and deeper inter-agency cooperation, intelligence-sharing between agencies, transnational cooperation in law enforcement and intelligence, as well as continued international military cooperation. Border security and border management have become important, and politicised, to a degree largely unprecedented during peacetime.

September 11 will likely have significant repercussions for how many state bureaucracies that ostensibly have a role in providing internal and external security carry out their missions. In terms of law enforcement, for example, there will most likely be a strengthening of the existing trend in Western democracies whereby the development of sophisticated capabilities, technical competences, and organisational forms for policing transnational threats like drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration will absorb more resources, pulling them away from more community-oriented, local policing activities and programs.

A greater role for militaries in internal security functions is also a likely consequence of the post-September 11 security environment. Several Western democracies are witnessing a re-evaluation of the core missions of their militaries and application of military resources to security threats that have little to do with combat operations. Anti-terrorism has currently become the over-riding priority of the United States and certain of its allies. But concern with the continuing and growing threats of drug smuggling, illegal immigration and organised crime preoccupied mature democracies since the end of the Cold War. This array of threats requires a response that is often not chiefly military in nature, and has led militaries and defence departments into working partnerships with other state agencies and government departments to counter the non-military threats. In many Western countries, armed forces are already involved in drug and illegal immigrant interdiction.

A new focus on domestic defence, or homeland security, for example, is drawing the United States military into homeland security missions and closer relations and coordination with other government agencies. In the US, there is much resistance among the military to homeland security functions (critical infrastructure protection and control of borders), which it sees as more properly a function for law enforcement services or the National Guard, and a desire to continue focusing its efforts on warfighting. Longstanding interdictions against military involvement in domestic roles are being challenged by the new security needs. What is becoming evident is that domestic or internal security in the age of transnational threats like terrorism necessitates ongoing collaboration between civilian and military authorities. These new webs of relationships will have impact on the boundaries between police and military institutions, which are increasingly blurred; on civil-military relations; and on the democratic accountability of the military in performing its assigned tasks.

Countries in transition to democracy will probably benefit in several ways from the increased efforts of Western partners to develop transborder police cooperation. Most of these efforts will be aimed at increasing the technical capacity of policing structures to counter organised crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and other cross-border threats. New and emerging democracies must be careful, however, not to endorse further empowerment of law enforcement, security and intelligence services without implementing corresponding controls and requirements for democratic control, transparency and accountability. Democratic policing should be the foundation upon which greater police efficiency, professionalism and technical competence are built. Similarly, border management services in states that are vulnerable to cross-border flows of criminality and have weaker state structures for policing such phenomena have been receiving significant resources and assistance from European states looking to prevent greater flows of cross-border criminality into the European Union. It should be noted that this focus on strengthening border security, while serving the direct interests of European Union members, threatens to outstrip policing assistance to emerging democracies. Concentrating resources and assistance to one component of the security sector may result in marked differences in capabilities and resources, and has already been noted to foster resentment amongst other significantly under-resourced state services concerned with security such as the police. Western countries and international organisations, then, must recognise that an agenda of security sector reform should strive to understand the inter-relationships and possible tensions between sectors, and that uneven treatment or overly enthusiastic concentration on one aspect can have significant consequences for inter-sectoral relations in the recipient countries.

In conclusion, the quality of democratic control of armed forces reflects not only institutional structures and legal frameworks, but societal norms, values and attitudes about what to expect from government and the legitimate role for society in the process of governance. Security sector reform is a welcome step in the maturation of the field, opening up the scope of inquiry to include all major state institutions that have a significant role to play in providing security for the individual, society and state. The events of September 11 have highlighted the relevance of this concept for both established and emerging democracies. Pre-existing trends towards inter-agency coordination and transnational cooperation
between security agencies (police, military and intelligence) that derived from the increased cross-border flows of the post-Cold War environment have now accelerated markedly with the identification of clearer threats. In the current climate of securitisation of governmental agendas and widespread efforts to maximise the efficiency of security institutions to counter non-military risks and threats, we must not lose sight of the importance of democratic, accountable, and transparent governance in every sector of public activity, including security.
Conclusion
Hans Born and Philipp Fluri

Good governance of security sector reform is becoming an increasingly discussed and practised issue in policy and academic fora. It is a topic that lies at the crossroads of democracy and security, the twin concepts of free societies. We present here the most important findings of the DCAF workshops at the 4th ISF conference.

Context and Heritage

The first lesson is that we have to understand the context and history of post-communist countries or, more aptly phrased, new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the standard of living of most new democracies decreased tremendously. The national income per capita plummeted as much as 50 per cent or more from the mid-1980s level (see Danopoulos and Zirker’s contribution). Less income, however, not only implied less purchasing power but also resulted in, among other things, deteriorating health care and a disintegrating education system as well as many non-competitive former-state industries going bankrupt. Democracy and market orientation as well as unemployment, poverty and lack of future perspectives are the catchwords for describing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. These circumstances affected security sector reform in at least two ways. First, political leaders will always turn their attention foremost to those activities which immediately affect citizens’ daily lives, such as creating jobs, subsidising the price of bread, milk, rent and petrol. In this context, the reform of the security sector received low priority and it is understandable how, at the beginning of the 1990s, the new democratic governments only took care of installing civilian control of the military and other security services. Other necessary reforms, such as a new infrastructure, training and procurement of modern equipment, were delayed as other pressing problems also had to be solved. Secondly, because of its low political priority, the military lacked practically everything: it had too low a budget for exercises, low salaries for the officers and even, in some countries, there was sometimes not enough money for electricity or running water in the barracks. Under these circumstances, aggravated by lay-offs and job insecurity, low morale reigned in the barracks and many military officers found a meaningful job perspective in the military only with great difficulty. It was no wonder that many armies found it difficult to attract and retain qualified military personnel.

Secondly, civil society is the relevant context for the development of good governance in the new democracies. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the importance of civil society is universally recognised. No one can say, with the exception of some dictators (which we hope will become an extinct species), that citizens’ wishes can be ignored. This is also true for the governance of the security sector. As the politically responsible leaders of the security sector (e.g. head of states, prime ministers or ministers of defence) are elected office-holders, security policy is ultimately subject to political pressure and the wishes and demands of the electorate. However, civil society is in a fragile condition in both new democracies and mature democracies. In new democracies especially, where civil society was suppressed throughout 45 years of communist rule, there is a lack of trust and confidence among citizens. Consequently, people see themselves as being the object of politics, not as subjects. This mindset has been an impediment for the development of a strong and vivid political culture, which is an essential condition for good governance.

Good Governance

Many concepts such as civilian control, democratic oversight, political supremacy and accountability refer to the democratic control of the security sector. We use the World Bank’s definition of good governance: “Good governance is epitomised by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs”.1 We prefer this approach as it is a broad approach, enabling us to address the viewpoints of the various conference contributors. Additionally, good governance puts the democratic control of the armed forces in the wider context of the political system.

The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe followed different roads towards democracy and good governance. Some countries, especially in Central Europe, established powerful parliaments because of their dreadful experience with totalitarian one-party rulers. Other countries, such as Russia or Georgia, developed a model of presidential democracy with less parliamentary control. This is the essence of democracy, that is, every society makes its own choices and follows its own path. Additionally, democracy cannot be a gift. History shows us that people have to struggle or to fight for their own freedom and democracy. Democracy is not only a set of laws, backed by a constitution, but is foremost a state of mind and culture. It is a process and not an end-state. Democracy, and therefore good governance, cannot be imposed from outside. A whole range of factors such as public opinion, political parties, civil society, media influences the direction and speed of how democracies and good governance develop (see Forster’s contribution).

1 “Poor governance (on the other hand) is characterized by arbitrary policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread corruption.” See: World Bank, Governance: The World Bank’s Experience (Washington: World Bank, 1994).
As it turned out during the last decade, military coup d’état has not been an important factor. In none of the post-communist countries did a military coup take place. The real issue at stake is to what extent military leaders comply with the directives and policy guidelines of the political leaders. This is especially important with regard to security sector reform. The political leaders mostly do not comprehend all the ins and outs of the reform; they have to rely on information from those they are supposed to control. In such a situation, it is important that the military has respect for and willing compliance towards state institutions and the constitution.

Democratic control of the armed forces takes more than a politician who gives orders and an obeying general. It goes without saying that political supremacy is paramount to democratic control of the armed forces, but this is only a starting point. Democratic control is not an event but a complex social relationship between political and military leaders – see the contribution of Born, Caparini and Haltiner. Though constitutional and legal settlements regulate political-military relations, the one-sided legalistic approach of democratic control of armed forces doesn’t meet the political and professional military requirements pertaining to effective democratic control of armed forces (see Matus’ contribution). From an ideal point of view, political-military relations are based on mutual trust, dialogue and effective communication. Democratic control of the armed forces should not focus on the military leaders only and should not stop, so to say, at the gates of the barracks and treat the military as a ‘black box’. Democratic control also implies that the basic command and control principles as well as the basics of military socialisation are taking into account the fact that the armed forces are part of society and not outside it – see Haltiner’s contribution. To this end, the governments of the new democracies embarked on the road of three interrelated strategies in order to make the armed forces politically neutral and compliant: depoliticisation, departisation and democratisation of the armed forces (see Danopoulos and Zirker).

Virtually all countries in Central and Eastern Europe already installed new constitutions and laws that lay down the legal framework for democratic control of the armed forces. Most countries are now in the stage of the so-called second-generation democratic control (see the contributions of Forster and Edmunds, that is, to ‘fill’ the legal structures and state institutions with qualified, professional civilians. This is important as all too often the problems in civil-military relations originate in the civilian sector. Misinformed civilian or inept civilian interference in security sector issues lead to inappropriate policy choices, and therefore to the waste of public funds. Even worse than uninformed civilian interference is the deliberate political misuse of security sector organisations. This happened in some countries when political leaders used security sector organisations, such as the secret police, to protect their own power position, by intimidating or killing opponents to the regime.

Security Sector Reform

The conference symbolised the state of affairs of the ongoing discourse on security, defence, new risks and threats. The discourse is shifting away from defence and military towards the comprehensive security sector. This is a symptom of the growing awareness that the security of a society and its citizens is jeopardised not only by foreign military threats but also by a variety of non-military risks such as organised crime, illegal migration or corruption. Therefore, the authors and debates focused on the security sector, which could be defined as all those state organisations which are legitimised to use or threaten the use of force in order to protect society and the liberty of its citizens. These organisations – or services – are the military, police, border guards, intelligence services, and paramilitary organisations. We mention here the most significant issues of the debate on security sector reform.

Security sector services should not only be subject to democratic control but also effective in protecting society and the liberty of its citizens. Security sector services must be effective and effectively managed because an army under democratic control, but without professional expertise, understanding and judgement, can be as dangerous to society as a rebelling army. Lack of discipline, exaggeration of threats or misuse of scarce economic resources within the security sector could endanger the development of the society at large – see David Betz’s contribution. This may be the crucial issue of a new democracy’s security sector: how to provide a professional, effective and accountable security sector.

In this regard, NATO enlargement has proven paramount to the fundamental reorientation of the armed forces in Eastern Europe, because, first of all, NATO provides guidelines for direction and improvement not only for further professionalisation and for democratic control of the security services. Equally important, however, is that NATO enlargement puts the issue of armed forces reform high on the political agenda of the NATO candidate member states. In the light of possible NATO-accession, the candidate states’ political leaders commit themselves to higher financial budget and ambitious reform plans for the military.

Increasingly, developmental aid agencies and other aid donors acknowledge the importance of a professional and democratically accountable security sector. Security reform is increasingly regarded as an essential element of the wider social, political and economic development of countries. The economic and social development of many war-torn societies, for example in Africa or in the Balkans, is hampered by the lack of security and stability. The demobilisation and integration of the military professionals and veterans should take place in a smooth way under firm and accepted political leadership; otherwise, it may become a source of social unrest – see Malesic and Jelusic’s contribution. For these reasons, some donor countries, for example the UK, started to develop a comprehensive approach to development and security. To this end, developmental aid agencies and ministries of defence are working together in providing coordinated assistance programmes for war-torn societies (see Christopher Smith’s contribution).

The road to security sector reform is long, slippery and plagued by many problems. First, the Central and Eastern European countries are facing all the problems of security sector reform in Western countries plus the difficulties of the post-communist heritage. The inherited Soviet force structures were top-heavy with oversized command structures and far too big for the new post-Cold War security environment (see Trapans’ contribution). Secondly, all countries are severely constrained by a low and continuously changing financial budget. Unfortunately, ambitious political programmes were not always matched by sufficient budgets for the military. Additionally, the military and other security organisations are large
bureaucratic institutions which are not easy to change. Vested interests of the bureaucracy and inter-service rivalry are sometimes frustrating or delaying reform initiatives. Thirdly, reform is not only a matter of money or new equipment, it also entails a professional mindset characterised by expertise, initiative, cooperation and delegation. These cultural and non-tangible aspects are important and difficult to overcome.

Promoting Democratic Civil-Military Relations: Recommendations

The conference resulted in various recommendations for assistance programmes in the realm of democratising civil-military relations.

In spite of some recent research projects (see the contribution of Callaghan and Kuhlmann) there is a clear need for systematic, comprehensive and coordinated research on security sector reform issues, taking stock from previous reform efforts and identifying upcoming issues. In this respect, Western ‘donors’ need to develop a better methodology for understanding what policies work and why. The Western community of experts at international bodies, governmental offices, and think tanks could do some stocktaking about the effectiveness and efficiency of their own contributions to the security sector reform in Central and Eastern Europe (see Forster, Trapans, Matus, Volten and Drent).

The empowering of parliamentarians should be effected by supporting existing information facilities, organising international round-tables, exchanging information and experiences between parliamentarians of mature and new democracies, seminars on defence and security issues and making lessons learned available, for example via the Internet (see the contributions of Born, Vlachova and Volten and Drent).

Assistance programmes should aim at empowering recipients to help themselves. Transformation processes cannot be imposed from the outside, only facilitated by international organisations (see the contributions of Forster and Edmunds).

Target audience: in the previous decade, predominantly, military officers and senior governmental actors received outside assistance. Parliamentarians, NGOs and other civil society actors received far less attention (see Forster’s contribution). One of the reasons is that NATO, as a major player in the field, was and remains primarily focused on professionalisation of the military and making military representatives familiar with the issue of democratic control of armed forces. However, good governance of the security sector is not only about making the military and other security services more professional. As democratic control depends deeply on qualified and committed civilians within and outside the government, it is very important that the civilian component should be enhanced as well.

Several authors (see for example Smith’s contribution) argue that the assistance programmes should cover the whole spectrum of security sector reform. Not only the military but also the other actors such as border guards and intelligence services should be taken into account. To this end, a comprehensive and integrated framework for understanding security sector reform has to be developed. Such a framework should acknowledge that democratic control is more than only a legal settlement (see Haltiner) and that many countries chose their own path and speed of good governance, democracy and security sector reform, making, therefore, a ‘one model of democratic control fits all’ approach rather useless and meaningless.

Finally, the possibility of having a choice is perhaps one of the most fundamental aspects of democracy. Respect for another society’s choices should be one of the hallmarks of any democratic assistance programme.
Contributors

Dr. David Betz, Glasgow, University of Glasgow, Scotland.

Ms. Anna Bolin, Swedish Armed Forces and Doctoral Student at Lund University, Lund, Sweden.

Dr. Hans Born, Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland.

Ms. Jean Callaghan, Deputy Director, Research Department, George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

Ms. Marina Caparini, Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland, and Doctoral Candidate, King’s College, University of London.

Dr. Constantine Danopoulos, Lecturer, San Jose State University, San Jose, California, USA.

Dr. Tim Edmunds, Research Fellow, Defence Studies Department Joint Services Command and Staff College, King’s College London, United Kingdom.

Ms. Margriet Drent, Executive Director, Centre for European Security Studies, Groeningen, The Netherlands.

Dr. Philipp Fluri, Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland.

Dr. Anthony Forster, Reader in European Foreign and Security Policy and Research Director, Defence Studies Department Joint Services Command and Staff College, King’s College London, United Kingdom.

Dr. Karl W. Haltiner, Senior Lecturer, Militärakademie, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETHZ), Zurich, Switzerland.

Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Defence Studies Department, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Dr. Jürgen Kuhlmann, Former Head of Research Department, George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

Dr. Marjan Malesic, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Defence Studies Department, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Dr. Janos Matus, Head of the Department of Security Studies, National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary.

Dr. Christopher Smith, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, United Kingdom.

Mr. Luis Eduardo Tibiletti, Academic Director at Seguridad Estratégica Regional en el 2000, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Ambassador Dr. Jan Arveds Trapans, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland.

Dr. Marie Vlachova, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland.

Dr. Peter Volten, Director of the Centre for European Security Studies Groeningen and Professor in International Relations and Organisations at the University of Groeningen, The Netherlands.

Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler, Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Dr. Daniel Zirker, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Montana State University, Billings, USA.
In spite of the progress made in the past decade, the transformation and management of democratic civil-military relations remain a major challenge to many States. This is particularly true for the countries in transition towards democracy, war-torn and post-conflict societies. Armed and paramilitary forces as well as police, border guards and other security-related structures remain important players in many countries. More often than not, they act like “a State within the State”, putting heavy strains on scarce resources, impeding democratisation processes and increasing the likelihood of internal or international conflicts. It is therefore widely accepted that the democratic and civilian control of such force structures is a crucial instrument of preventing conflicts, promoting peace and democracy as well as ensuring sustainable socio-economic development.

The strengthening of democratic and civilian control of force structures has become an important policy issue on the agenda of the international community. In October 2000, as a practical contribution to this general and positive trend, the Swiss government established the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), on the joint initiative of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports, and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mission

The Centre encourages and supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes international cooperation in this field, initially targeting the Euro-Atlantic regions.

To implement these objectives, the Centre:

- collects information, undertakes research and engages in networking activities in order to identify problems, to establish lessons learned and to propose the best practices in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-military relations;
- provides its expertise and support to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic circles.

DCAF works in close cooperation with national authorities, international and non-governmental organisations, academic institutions and individual experts. In its operational and analytical work, DCAF relies on the support of 35 governments represented in its Foundation Council, on its International Advisory Board comprising some 50 renowned experts, on its Think Tank and working groups. The Centre has established partnerships or concluded cooperative agreements with a number of research institutes and with several international organisations and inter-parliamentary assemblies.

Work Programme

In order to be able to thoroughly address specific topics of democratic control of armed forces, DCAF has established or is in the process of establishing twelve dedicated working groups covering the following issues: security sector reform; parliamentary oversight of armed forces; legal dimension of the democratic control of armed forces; transparency-building in defence budgeting and procurement; civilian experts in national security policy; democratic control of police and other non-military security forces; civil-military relations in conversion and force reductions; military and society; civil society building; civil-military relations in post-conflict situations; criteria for success or failure in the democratic control of armed forces; civil-military relations in the African context. Planning, management, and coordination of the working groups is centralized in the Centre’s Think Tank.

DCAF provides its expertise on bilateral and multilateral levels, and also addresses interests of the general public. A number of bilateral projects in the areas of security sector reform and parliamentary control of armed forces are underway within the states of South Eastern and Eastern Europe. At the multilateral level, DCAF implements several projects in the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Centre regularly produces publications, organizes conferences, workshops and other events. It uses means of information technology, including its own website (http://www.dcaf.ch), to reach both target audiences and the general public.
Organisation and Budget

DCAF is an international foundation under Swiss law. Thirty-five governments are represented in the Centre’s Foundation Council. The International Advisory Board is composed of the world’s leading experts on the subject matters of defence and security, who advise the Director on the Centre’s overall strategy. DCAF staff is comprised of some 40 specialists coming from 23 different nationalities, who make up four departments: Think Tank, Outreach Programmes, Information Resources, and Administration.

The Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports finances most of the DCAF budget, amounting to eight million Swiss Francs in 2002. Another important contributor is the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Certain member states of DCAF Foundation support DCAF by seconding staff members or contributing to the Centre’s specific activities.

Contact

For additional information please contact:

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Rue de Chantepoulet 11, P.O.Box 1360,
CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
Tel: +41 (22) 741-7700
Fax: +41 (22) 741-7705
E-mail: info@dcaf.ch
Website: www.dcaf.ch

* Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Canton of Geneva.