Security and Sustainable Development in Cape Town, South Africa

A case study for the DCAF Policy and Research Division Project:
SSR for Safer Cities - Supporting States to Achieve SDG 11

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Foreword

SSR for Safer Cities - Supporting States to Achieve SDG 11

Safety and security has already become an urban experience for more than half of the world's population. Against this backdrop, SDG 11 seeks to bring sustainable and peaceful development to the people who live in cities by calling on states to "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable". Yet high rates of urban violence reflect a failure to address the challenges of urbanization in national and donor-supported strategies for security and development. Urban violence exacerbates state fragility and human suffering, endangers local and regional peace, and drives uncontrolled migration. This fact demonstrates the urgency of linking SDG 11 with SDG 5 on women's empowerment and SDG 16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Within this larger priority there is now a pressing need to address the immediate challenges of SSR in urban contexts and this is the purpose of DCAF's Policy and Research Division project "SSR for Safer Cities" supported by the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. This case study is one of three case studies on security in cities conducted by local experts over the course of 2018: the selected cities are Bogotá, Cape Town and General Santos City.
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Introduction

The City of Cape Town (CoCT), which has a gross geographic product of ZAR 300 billion, is the second largest urban economy (after Johannesburg) in the Southern African region. The city comprises a total area of 2,446 sq. km. Its population of 4 million residents and 1.265 million households has grown over the past three decades due to a relatively high rate of urbanisation and Cape Town’s physical geography, specifically that the city centre is hemmed in by the Table Mountain range and the Atlantic Ocean. The Cape Town economy saw a modest growth of 3.2% between 2005 and 2015, and employment growth of 2.1%.1

The CoCT, however, has high levels of structural, social and income inequality (with a Gini coefficient of 0.57); poverty (25% of households); unemployment (25.3%, with a youth unemployment rate of close to 47%);2 and residential segregation along racial and socioeconomic lines.3 The CoCT is at significant risk of the effects of climate change, particularly drought; and there is often flooding during winter and numerous brush fires during summer. Population densities vary considerably across the city, but are the highest in the poorer and more socioeconomically marginal areas where there is also a significant shortage of affordable housing and land. For example, in Khayelitsha and Nyanga, where a significant proportion of residents live in informal housing, population densities vary between 251 and 500 per hectare, while in the city centre the figure is less than 50 per hectare. Population densities are significantly lower in wealthy residential areas, such as Constantia and Bishopscourt.

Most working class and poor residents live considerable distances from their places of work or employment opportunities, and as a result, such households spend as much as 40% of their disposable income on transport, which severely restricts upward socioeconomic mobility. The city authorities have been incrementally implementing an integrated rapid transit system since 2011, with the MyCiTi buses (which have dedicated lanes in many areas) as the flagship service. However, the Metrorail train service, which is controlled by the national government Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), has become increasingly unreliable and unsafe in recent years due to a combination of mismanagement, alleged corruption, insufficient security measures and persistent criminality.

At an aggregate level, Cape Town has some of the highest rates of reported violent crimes per city in South Africa, such as murder, attempted murder, robbery and common assault. The murder rate for the CoCT is 63 per 100,000, which is double the national murder rate and is 50% higher than that average murder rate for all major cities in South Africa. Furthermore, there are very high levels of gang- and drug-related violent crime. Critically, violent crime is disproportionately dispersed throughout the city, with some ten policing precincts (out of a total of 65) accounting for more than half of the reported murders in the CoCT.4 Since 2011 there has been a significant upsurge in incidents of collective violence in the Western Cape, particularly in Cape Town, which was commensurate with a more than a 100% increase in such incidents nationwide between 2011 (1,218) and 2016/17 (3,715).5 Between April 2017

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By Guy Lamb

and December 2017, there were 2,578 incidents of violent ‘unrest’ across South Africa. Such collective violence has mostly been related to protests over ineffective government services, including policing; access to land and housing; labour strikes; vigilantism and xenophobia.

The CoCT is politically unique in South Africa as both the city and the province in which the CoCT is located (Western Cape) is entirely controlled by an opposition (minority) political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA, which has had ambitions to expand its electoral support base throughout South Africa, has intentionally sought to promote good governance and economic development in Cape Town in an attempt to demonstrate that it has the ability to provide effective public services and governance outcomes.

However, such a state of affairs has, at times, contributed to acute tensions between national government (led by the African National Congress) and the city authorities in relation to resource allocation and policy priorities.

In this context, the CoCT has enthusiastically embraced the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and used the (SDG) to frame its integrated planning framework documents. The five strategic focus areas, or ‘pillars’, are for Cape Town to be a city that is safe, caring, inclusive, well run and opportunity-oriented.

Cape Town is also a member of the 100 Resilient Cities network. Hence, Cape Town is a highly relevant case study to analyse the relationship between the application of strategies that are aligned to the realisation of the SDGs and the safety and security sector in this city, particularly in relation to SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).

Violent crime and insecurity in Cape Town

As previously indicated, Cape Town has the highest murder rate of all the major cities in South Africa, which, as shown in Figure 1 (below), has escalated significantly since 2010/11. This is in stark contrast with most other South African cities, which have experienced a general decline and/or stabilisation in their respective murder rates. Similar trends have been observable in relation to other categories of violent crime, such as attempted murder, common robbery, robbery with aggravating circumstances and collective violence (particularly violent protests and vigilantism). Such violence is the outcome of a complex interplay of historical and contemporary factors, and risk factors. Such a state of affairs has made it very difficult for government authorities at various levels to promote peace in Cape Town.

In 2012, interpersonal violence accounted for 16.8% of premature mortality amongst males, while for females it was 2.7%. Most victims of violent crime in Cape Town, particularly murder, are black men between the ages of 15 and 44 that reside in poor and/or marginalised areas in the city.

In 2017/18, 370 women, 60 girls and 219 boys were reported to have been murdered in the Western Cape province, which was equivalent to a total of 17.3% of all reported murders in the Western Cape for 2017/18. Women and children, however, comprise the vast majority of victims of reported sexual offences in the Western Cape,
with there being a reported annual average of 7,333 such reported offences in the province since 2008/09.13 Women in Cape Town, as throughout South Africa, have also consistently experienced extremely high levels of domestic violence.14

Violent interpersonal crimes have often been the outcome of aggressive verbal disagreements, or during the perpetration of another crime, particularly robbery. An analysis of an unspecified number of murder dockets throughout South Africa by the South African Police Service (SAPS) indicated that 56% of murder cases reviewed had reportedly ‘started as an argument which degenerated into a fight and then a [fatal] assault’. In addition, 28% of the perpetrators in the assessed murder cases were family members, or were in an intimate relationship with the victim, while 22% and 19% were friends and acquaintances of the victims, respectively.15 Comparable findings have been reported in subsequent SAPS annual reports, especially the 2010/11 report, which stated that the SAPS Crime Research and Statistics component had estimated that over the previous ten-year period and in at least 70% of murder and 60% of attempted murder cases, the victims and perpetrators were acquainted with one another prior to the violent incident.16

A key driver for aggression resulting in violent crime is that for a variety of historical reasons, violence has become deeply ingrained within the social fabric of South African society. Violence is widely perceived to be a legitimate means of managing interpersonal conflict, expressing frustration, disciplining children and expressing dissatisfaction with the inadequate level of government services (particularly in poorer areas). Violence has also become an integral component of various forms of masculinity and patriarchy in South Africa.17 Violent crime has also been exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, the availability of firearms, and drug use throughout South Africa, including Cape Town.18 In terms of alcohol consumption, 2010 mortuary data indicated that close to 60% of murder victims were under the influence of alcohol at the time of their deaths.19

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17 Lamb and Warton, *Why is South Africa so Violent?*
In a study on firearm and non-firearm homicides in Cape Town, Matzopoulos et al. noted that there was an 81% increase in the firearm homicide rate per 100,000 in Cape Town between 2009 and 2013 (increasing from 13.2 to 24.2) compared to only a 0.3% increase in non-firearm homicides for the same period (32.7 to 32.8). SAPS data on cases relating to the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (IPFA) in Cape Town has shown a dramatic increase in the IPFA rate (per 100,000) compared to other cities, climbing from 50 in 2008/09 to 63 in 2016/17 (see Figure 2 below). Fifty-eight per cent of IPFA cases in the Western Cape in 2016/17 took place in the 23 policing areas (of which 21 are in Cape Town) that the SAPS have identified as violence hotspots.

This data suggests that there has been a major increase in the proliferation of illegal firearms and ammunition in Cape Town in recent years. A key source of illegal firearms was due to certain corrupt SAPS personnel responsible for the destruction of confiscated firearms in Gauteng. That is, approximately 2,000 firearms earmarked for destruction were subsequently sold to criminal gangs in Cape Town from as early as 2007, with police investigation revealing that between 2010 and 2016 some 1,066 murders (of which 231 were child victims) were committed with these specific firearms.

Licensed civilian firearm owners, as well as SAPS officials and armouries, have also been sources of the illegal proliferation of firearms and ammunition. In early 2018, the SAPS reported that it had seized more than 35,000 rounds of ammunition between October 2017 and January 2018 in the Western Cape alone.

The increase in the availability of illegal firearms in Cape Town appears to have had a dramatic impact on murder levels in areas that consistently experience high levels of gang violence. In Philippi East, the annual number of murders increased by 180% between 2013/14 and 2017/18; while in Kraaifontein, Manenberg and Delft, there were 66%, 49% and 35% increases in annual murder levels over the same period, respectively.

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20 Matzopoulos et al., ‘A Retrospective Time Trend Study of Firearm and Non-Firearm Homicide in Cape Town from 1994 to 2013.’
Various studies of trauma as a consequence of violence have consistently found that on average more than 50% of trauma victims tested positive for alcohol.24 Studies on violence against women, particularly domestic violence in Cape Town, have indicated that alcohol abuse is a major risk factor for both perpetration and victimisation;25 and research on violence against children in Cape Town has shown that alcohol abuse in the home significantly heightens the risks for such violence.26 Studies of the causes of death in South Africa have shown that in Cape Town more that 60% of homicide victims tested positive for alcohol, which was significantly higher than other cities.27

The use of illegal drugs has consistently been a risk factor for violence and criminality in the CoCT for many years,28 and drug-related crime is considerably higher in Cape Town when compared to other South African cities (see Figure 3 below). A recently published study of 122 patients that were admitted to the Trauma Unit at Groote Schuur Hospital (Cape Town) for violence-related injuries found that 48%

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tested positive for alcohol, 41% for cannabis, 33% for methamphetamine, 25% methaqualone, 14% opiates, and that 47% were positive for two or more substances. Furthermore, only 13% of the sample did not test positive for either alcohol or drugs.²⁹

Figure 3: Drug-related crime rates in South Africa’s largest cities

In some areas of Cape Town, gang rivalries have resulted in numerous murders, with the SAPS estimating that more than 19% of all murders in the Western Cape during the 2016/17 reporting year were gang-related.³⁰ In September 2017, 23 people were murdered in relation to a gang-vigilante conflict in the Marikana informal settlement in Philippi East.³¹ Gang violence (and threats thereof) has also reportedly had implications for development projects in the CoCT, as has been the case in the building of low-cost housing in areas such as Valhalla Park and Manenberg.³² In Manenberg, Lavender Hill and Hanover Park, schools have been closed on numerous occasions due to violent gang clashes. Furthermore, drilling operations by the CoCT to access water within aquifers (to alleviate the effects of a drought in 2018) near high-crime areas have been affected by vandalism and theft.³³

As previously indicated, there have been numerous cases of collective violence in Cape Town, as with most other cities in South Africa. Much of this violence has centred around what communities view as inadequate and unfair services and resources allocated by government at all levels. Throughout the country, communities have frequently resorted to the use of violence as a means to attract the attention of senior government officials. There have been injuries, deaths, destruction of property and looting. In 2018, some incidents of collective violence were linked to efforts by the CoCT Anti-Land Invasion Unit

²⁹ Andrew J. Nicol et al., Violence and Substance Use at a Cape Town Trauma Centre, unpublished manuscript, 2018.
³² City of Cape Town, Urban Settlements Development Grant (USDG) Performance Review. Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements, 13 March (Cape Town: City of Cape Town, 2018).
to evict residents that had illegally occupied land, which included the demolition of housing structures in areas such as Dunoon, Nyanga, Philippi East, Vrygrond and Mitchell’s Plain.34

Emergency services have also come under attack from criminal groups and residents in high crime areas, such as Hanover Park, Khayelitsha, Manenberg and Nyanga, with, for example, ambulance personnel being subjected to more than 200 attacks between 2012 and 2017,35 with 95 being reported in 2016/17.36 In such places, which have been designated as ‘red zones’, ambulances are often provided with a police escort, which has at times slowed down response times.37 Similarly, firefighters have been attacked in some poorer communities and their equipment damaged.38

The safety of commuters within Cape Town has been a cause for concern. In 2017 there were 1,315 road crash fatalities in the Western Cape,39 of which approximately 80% are estimated to take place in Cape Town.40 These crash fatalities have been linked to drink and reckless driving, non-roadworthy vehicles, and exceeding speed limits. Importantly, there has been a 24% reduction in total road fatalities in the Western Cape since 2008 when there were 1,739 fatalities. Such a reduction has been linked to law enforcement interventions.41 In 2016/17 there were 40 reported incidents of minibus taxi violence in the province.

In terms of the railway environment, the Western Cape has consistently accounted for more than 50% of all contact crimes since 2013/14. In 2016/17, 1,539 contact crimes were reported in the Western Cape, which was equivalent to 58% of rail-related contact crimes for the entire country for that year.42 Metrorail, Cape Town’s dedicated train service, has been negatively affected by the sabotage of sub-stations, widespread theft of signalling cables, vandalism and violence (including the shooting and assault of train drivers and security personnel). For example in 2014, 19 train carriages were destroyed in an arson attack at the Salt River Metrorail depot in Cape Town.43 Furthermore, in April and May 2016, 11 trains were set alight in Cape Town station.44 In early 2018, PRASA reported that Metrorail in Cape Town had a 38% shortage of rolling stock due to criminal acts and had sustained ZAR 116 million in losses due to fires on its trains in Cape Town in 2017.45

This state of affairs has been particularly acute on the Central Line, which services some of the most densely populated and poorer areas, such as Khayelitsha, Mitchells Plain and Nyanga. Service to this line was suspended between mid-December 2017 and mid-February 2018 due to cable theft and various acts of vandalism. These developments have severely undermined the reliability and safety of the Metrorail service on this line. At the time of the closure, the Cape Chamber of Commerce declared: ‘The criminals have won… [they have] sabotaged and killed a vital train commuter service that provided a transport

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45 PRASA, Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Transport, 13 February 2018.
lifeline for the communities most in need of affordable public transport’. Further to this, a network of prominent civil society organisations entitled #UniteBehind reported to the South African national parliament that many of the private security personnel hired by PRASA to provide security on trains had criminal records and were not registered with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Association. #UniteBehind also indicated that much of the Metrorail network was not adequately fenced and that lighting was insufficient.

Other factors affecting safety and security

The safety and security sector has been required to respond to a range of issues that affect the quality of life in Cape Town, such as climate change, illegal land occupation, noise pollution, derelict buildings, homelessness and non-violent street crime.

For Cape Town the key climate change challenges have been declining annual average rainfall; an increasing mean annual temperature, average wind and maximum wind strength; and more frequent and intense heat waves and winter storms. Furthermore, sea levels are expected to rise in the future. In recent years, Cape Town has been confronted by water shortages during the dry summer months and has had to impose water restrictions from time to time. In late-2017 during a severe drought, City Town faced the prospect of running out of drinkable water, and hence the CoCT was compelled to impose drastic water usage limitations on households and businesses and impose large fines against non-compliant water users. This crisis was forestalled with the advent of good rainfall between May and September 2018. Cape Town is also prone to fires throughout the year, especially wild fires in summer and shack fires in informal settlements during winter (mainly as a result of accidents with paraffin stoves and lights). In the 2015/16 financial year, 3,981 shacks were affected by fire, with there being 511 fire-related fatalities between January 2015 and June 2018. During winter the City is often affected by severe storms and flooding, which tend to be more acute in informal settlements.

There is also an acute shortage of available land for residential purposes, particularly for poorer households. Furthermore, in Cape Town there are approximately 300,000 applicants on a waiting list for government-funded housing. This has contributed to some residents invading or illegally occupying government and privately-owned land. The CoCT reported that there was more than a 50% increase in the number of land invasions in the 2017/18 reporting period compared to 2016/17, with there being 176 reported cases of land invasions in Cape Town between January and June 2018.

Derelict and poorly maintained buildings have significantly contributed to a fear of crime, increases in localised criminality and decreases in community well-being in Cape Town. Such buildings have frequently been occupied by drug dealers, gangsters and petty criminals. The CoCT typically investigates more than 1,000 cases of problematic buildings each year and has the mandate, through city by-laws, to instruct owners of such buildings to secure and repair such structures. Where there have been non-compliance, city authorities are permitted to undertake the required repairs at the cost to the owners of the properties. In extreme cases, the City may demolish such derelict structures.
The residents of Cape Town are also affected by a relatively wide range of non-violent crime. According to 2016/17 SAPS data, Cape Town has the highest rates of residential burglaries, arson, malicious damage to property, and thefts out of motor vehicles as compared to other major cities in South Africa. In addition, Cape Town is the city with the second highest rate for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (after Johannesburg) with 9,392 cases having been recorded in 2016/17.

Cape Town, like other South African cities, has a significant homeless population, which is currently estimated to be close to 5,000 with some 700 homeless people regularly residing within the city centre. The city authorities have typically provided resources to civil society organisations that offer shelter and welfare services to homeless persons, particularly during the winter period. The budget for this in 2018/19 is ZAR 850,000. Nonetheless, until relatively recently, the Metro Police and Law Enforcement approach to homelessness was predominantly punitive with homeless persons often being fined and forcibly relocated under the auspices of by-law enforcement.

The safety and security sector in the Cape Town cityscape

Safety and security services in Cape Town are provided by a wide array of governmental and non-governmental bodies. A breakdown of the architecture of the security sector that has direct relevance to the City of Cape Town is depicted in Figure 4 below. For the sake of brevity, only the key safety and security institutions will be discussed in some detail in the section below. Key safety security policies, strategies and resourcing priorities are predominantly determined at the national level, with the relevant policies being the National Development Plan 2030, the White Paper on Safety and Security (2016) and the White Paper on Policing (2016). Safety and security policies at the provincial and local government level are required to align to national policies. Funding for safety and security at the city level is mostly derived from the National Treasury, but cities have the authority to use some of the income derived from local rates and taxes to augment existing safety and security resources, services and measures. Consequently, major policing operations undertaken in Cape Town are determined by the SAPS leadership, which is supposed to consult with the relevant provincial and city authorities. The decision to deploy the military in cases of emergencies, disasters, and to support the SAPS is also a national government prerogative.

52 Western Cape Government, Homelessness (Cape Town: Western Cape Government, 2018).
Figure 4: Safety and security sector architecture in Cape Town

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<td>National</td>
<td><strong>SAPS</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Detective Services&lt;br&gt;  - Crime Detection&lt;br&gt;  - Vehicle Theft Units&lt;br&gt;  - Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences&lt;br&gt;  - Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks)&lt;br&gt;  - Serious Organised Crime&lt;br&gt;  - South African Narcotics Enforcement Bureau&lt;br&gt;  - National Bureau for Illegal Firearm Control and Priority&lt;br&gt;  - Violent Crime&lt;br&gt;  - Visible Policing&lt;br&gt;  - Rapid Rail Police&lt;br&gt;  - Flying Squad&lt;br&gt;  - Public Order Policing&lt;br&gt;  - K9 Unit&lt;br&gt;  - Mounted Police Unit&lt;br&gt;  - Special Task Force&lt;br&gt;  - Tactical Response Team&lt;br&gt;  - National Intervention Unit&lt;br&gt;  - Crime Intelligence&lt;br&gt;  - South African National Defence Force (SANDF)&lt;br&gt;  - National Intelligence Agency&lt;br&gt;  - Department of Correctional Services (prisons)&lt;br&gt;  - SA National Parks&lt;br&gt;  - Visitor Safety Team (Table Mountain National Park)</td>
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<td>Western Cape Provincial Government</td>
<td><strong>Department of Community Safety</strong>&lt;br&gt;  - Community Safety Improvement Partnership&lt;br&gt;  - Department of the Premier&lt;br&gt;  - Game Changers (alcohol abuse)</td>
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<td>Level</td>
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<td>– Strategic Surveillance Unit</td>
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<td>– Tactical Response Unit (support to SAPS Public Order policing)</td>
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<td>– Substance Abuse Enforcement Unit</td>
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<td>– Neighbourhood Safety Teams (gang areas)</td>
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<td>– School Resource Officers</td>
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<td>– Road Block Unit</td>
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<td><strong>Law Enforcement</strong></td>
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<td>– Informal Trading Unit</td>
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<td>– Metal Theft Unit (Copperheads)</td>
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<td>– Liquor Enforcement and Compliance Unit</td>
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<td><strong>Neighbourhood Watch structures</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Street committees</strong></td>
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<td><strong>NGOs/social movements/religious organisations</strong></td>
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<td>Private sector</td>
<td><strong>Community Improvement districts (with private security, visible policing and by-law enforcement)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Private security (formal and informal)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Minibus taxi associations (often perform a safety and security function)</strong></td>
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The SAPS Act (Act no. 68 of 1995), which brought the SAPS formally into being in September 1995, requires the SAPS to ensure the safety and security and uphold and safeguard the fundamental Constitutional rights of all persons in South Africa; cooperate with ‘the communities it serves’ to reduce crime; and submit to civilian oversight. The SAPS’ approach to policing has been guided by the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS), which was launched in 2000. The principal focus of the NCCS has been serious and violent crime, as well as organised crime, with the aim being to substantially reduce the incidence of such crime. It has also focused on policing service delivery in order to provide more visible and immediate accomplishments.

The SAPS is a hierarchical and militaristic national policing organisation that is directed from a national headquarters in Pretoria, with it being structured and resourced in terms in terms of provinces (9), clusters (176) and precincts (1,146). It is comprised of 194,605 personnel, with there being 120,475 personnel at station-level. The SAPS has sought to promote gender equality throughout the entire police organisation, but nonetheless women are under-represented in the SAPS. As of September 2018, some 37% of all SAPS personnel are female. Closer parity has been achieved at top management level, with 13 out of 31 posts being occupied by women, but of the more than 125,000 non-commissioned SAPS officers, only 27% are female.

The SAPS determines the overall policing approach and policing standards for the entire country, which is emphasised in the White Paper on Policing (2016). City-based Metro Police have some autonomy in terms of policing activities, as long as these activities are not in conflict with the overall SAPS national strategy. Further analysis on the relationship between SAPS and the CoCT Metro Police is discussed in a later section of this case study.

The Western Cape has a SAPS budget allocation of ZAR 700 million and has 20,230 SAPS personnel, of which 3,233 are detectives (2016/17). This province has a total police-per-population ratio of 1 police official for every 311 people. Within Cape Town there are 65 SAPS precincts with dedicated police stations, which are grouped into 8 clusters, but traditionally the SAPS does not organise itself along city lines.

South African National Defence Force (SANDF)

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has the constitutional mandate to protect and defend the territorial integrity of South Africa and its population from external threats. The military has a significant presence in Cape Town in that it has three large army bases (with a number of smaller properties), an air force base (Ysterplaat) and a naval base (Simon’s Town). Due to its constitutional mandate, the SANDF’s role in directly contributing to day-to-day safety and security efforts in Cape Town is limited. However, should the CoCT be attacked by a foreign enemy then the SANDF would be subsequently deployed. Oversight of the SANDF is provided by two parliamentary committees, and complaints about the conduct of SANDF members can be directed to the Military Ombudsman.

Nonetheless, the SANDF has provided medical evacuations and has assisted with fighting veld (brush) fires within the city. In early 2018, with the CoCT in the grip of a severe drought, the SANDF were asked...
with jointly securing water distribution points with the SAPS, the Metro Police, Law Enforcement and the Traffic Department should water supply levels for the city reach critical levels. Such an event, which has been referred to as ‘Day Zero’, was averted due to water saving measures and the onset of autumn rainfall. The SANDF has also been involved on an ad hoc basis in joint crime-combating operations in which soldiers were deployed, alongside the SAPS and Metro Police, to provide perimeter protection and a show of force. In such circumstances, the SANDF does not have policing powers and technically falls under the overall command of the SAPS officer-in-command. Internal deployment of the SANDF nevertheless requires authorisation by the State President.

**Western Cape Department of Community Safety**

The Department of Community Safety (DOCS), which has a current budget of ZAR 316.6 million (2018/19), does not have dedicated policing or security entities, as in the case of the CoCT. Hence, in an attempt to leverage quantifiable improvements in community safety, DOCS, through the Western Cape Community Safety Act (2013), has devoted considerable resources to supporting and building the capacity of community safety groupings. Accredited neighbourhood watch structures have primarily benefited in this regard. DOCS has also actively sought to build relations with Community Policing Forums (CPF) and has incentivised CPF participation in its Expanded Partnership Programme (EPP) to which it allocated ZAR 3.2 million in its 2018/19 budget. As of March 2018, 133 out of 150 CPFs in the province were part of the EPP.

DOCS also funded the Chrysalis Academy (which is based in Cape Town), a youth development training organisation that was established in 2000 with a specific crime prevention objective. DOCS' funding contribution for 2018/19 was ZAR 13 million, with which the Academy planned to train 640 youth candidates and facilitate work placements for a 12-month period after graduation.

**SA National Parks**

In the terms of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (57 of 2003), the SA National Parks (SANParks) has the mandate ‘to conserve, protect, control and manage’ national parks. Within Cape Town, the Table Mountain National Park (TMNP) spans an area of 33,000 hectares, with 25,500 hectares being unfenced. There are a wide variety of walking and hiking trails within the reserve that are popular with residents and tourists alike.

In response to an increase in robberies in the TMNP, some of which were violent, SANParks created the Visitor Safety Team in 2005, which is primarily comprised of park rangers that have law enforcement, rescue and disaster management responsibilities. The Team (which currently has around 60 personnel, but can call on the support of an additional 90 rangers as well as graduates from the Chrysalis Academy) patrols crime hotspots in the TMNP. It has a canine unit and access to horses (for patrols) and helicopters if required. Cooperation between SAPS, the CoCT authorities, DOCS and concerned community groups is supposed to take place within the Table Mountain Safety Forum, which was established in 2011, but meetings have typically only been held when the need has arisen.

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62 Ibid.
City of Cape Town Safety and Security Directorate

In 2018, the CoCT allocated 2.7% of its 2018/19 total budget of ZAR 44.3 billion towards Safety and Security Directorate, compared to 4% for Social Services, 26.8% for Transport and Urban Development, 19% for Energy and 6.7% for Assets and Facilities Management. Within the Transport and Urban Development budget, ZAR 54.5 million was allocated for security at 50 transport interchanges. Within the Social Services budget, ZAR 100 million was earmarked for improved security services and various community-based facilities, such as youth development, crime prevention, and alcohol and drugs harm reduction programmes.66

The Safety and Security Directorate is comprised of three policing bodies, namely the Metro Police, Law Enforcement and the Traffic Department. The CoCT Metropolitan Police Department (Metro Police) is an independent police body that was established in 2001 in the terms of Section 206 (7) of the Constitution and Section 64 of the SAPS Act (no. 68 of 1995). The SAPS Act stipulates that such metropolitan police have functional authority in relation to road traffic, by-law enforcement and crime prevention. As of 2015/16, the personnel size of the Metro Police is 647, of which 521 are operational personnel; it also has a reservist unit. It is one of only six Metro Police departments in South Africa. The primary mandate of the CoCT Law Enforcement division includes the enforcement of city by-laws, such as those relating to liquor trading and consumption, homelessness, informal trading, metal theft, noise pollution, derelict buildings, graffiti, illegal land occupation and the extraction of marine resources. As of 2015/16 it has 1,060 personnel, of which 753 are operational staff. The Traffic Department is responsible for the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations within Cape Town, including violations relating to vehicles, drivers and parking. It also oversees vehicle and driver testing stations. It has a total operational staff of 430 (2015/16). The Civilian Oversight Committee and Safety & Security Portfolio Committee are responsible for oversight of the Metro Police, Traffic Services and Law Enforcement Departments in the CoCT.

As shown in Figure 4 above, specialised units have been established within the Metro Police and Law Enforcement departments relating to the major security risks and challenges in the CoCT. In recent years, the Safety and Security Directorate has prioritised an integrated and coordinated approach to policing and policing innovations, particularly involving the use of CCTV and audio detection technology. This will be discussed in more detail in a later section of this case study.

Community Police Forums

The SAPS Act (no. 68 of 1995) requires the police to facilitate the establishment of CPFs in all policing areas. CPFs are envisaged to be committees of community members that are required to promote communication and cooperation between communities and SAPS, engage in joint problem solving between civilians and the police, facilitate transparency and accountability of the police, and improve the delivery of police services. CPFs are supposed to be representative of their respective communities and can consist of representatives from civic organisations, businesses, schools and religious bodies. There are 65 CPFs in Cape Town, but their performance and effectiveness varies considerably throughout the city, with CPFs in wealthier areas being generally more active and better resourced than those in poorer areas.67

Neighbourhood watch structures

Historically, both the Western Cape government and the CoCT have viewed neighbourhood watch structures as a catch-all term for geographically specific not-for-profit community safety entities comprised of volunteers from the area in which they operate. Such neighbourhood watch structures could include neighbourhood watch associations, street committees, street watches and flat watches.68

In order to be accredited with the CoCT and DOCS, members of neighbourhood watch structures are required to undergo a two-day basic training course provided by DOCS. Accredited neighbourhood watch structures are thereafter required to display their insignia/logo on their clothing and vehicles (when patrolling), wear specific identity cards, establish and maintain a means of communication with the communities they represent, maintain records of safety/patrolling activities, as well as submit regular reports on relevant activities, crime and safety concerns.69 Where there is a need, neighbourhood watch structures may be provided, via their local CPF, with jackets, reflective vests, torches, radios, first aid kits and even bicycles.70 DOCS has the authority to revoke the accreditation of any neighbourhood watch structure, particularly if they engage in criminal acts.71 As of March 2018, the CoCT estimated that there were 130 accredited neighbourhood watch structures that drew on an estimated 20,000 neighbourhood watch volunteers throughout the city.72

In some areas, the CoCT and the Western Cape government have allocated funding to neighbourhood watch structures to provide patrolling and protection services to schools in an attempt to prevent vandalism and crime, including violence against female learners and teachers. In 2018, funding was provided to establish 10 ‘Safe Zones’ linked to 14 priority schools in areas with high levels of violence, such as Manenberg, Khayelitsha and Delft. This included the deployment of School Resource Officers (SROs) and Neighbourhood Safety Officers (NSOs) between 7am and 10pm every day, as well as the support of the SAPS.73 Further to this, ‘walking bus’ initiatives have been supported by the Western Cape government in 75 areas and 222 schools in which community members (many of which are neighbourhood watch members) escort groups of learners to their homes at the end of the school day.74 Neighbourhood watch structures at times also escort emergency services into high crime areas.75

In 2016, the Western Cape government launched the ‘Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer’, with one of the objectives being the reduction of alcohol-related violence in the province. In Khayelitsha, Gugulethu and Nyanga, members of neighbourhood watch structures were paid by the provincial government to monitor the compliance of alcohol outlets in relation to established regulations.76

71 Western Cape Government, Community Safety Act.
73 Western Cape Government, ‘2018/2019 Department of Community Safety Budget Speech.’
75 Felix, ‘Neighbourhood Watch to Aid EMS.’
violent social control and vigilantism. For example, in the mid- to late-1990s the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) was established to initially advocate for improved community safety, but in a short space of time, PAGAD began to engage in a range of violent vigilante attacks against alleged gangsters and perpetrate acts of terrorism. More recently, (October 2017), a community safety group in the Marikana informal settlement murdered seven alleged gang members. In some cases there have been reports of clashes between different types of neighbourhood watch structures, such as in Khayelitsha.

**Private security**

According to the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) there are 53,879 active private security personnel and 989 service providers in the Western Cape registered with PSIRA (as of 31 March 2017). The total number of persons and entities engaged in the private security sector may in fact be larger as there is a significant unregistered component. There is a relatively broad spectrum of services that are categorised as private security, such as premises guarding, body guarding, patrolling, armed response, cash-in-transit protection, private investigation, security equipment installation, entertainment venue and event control, security control room staffing and locksmiths. Both the CoCT and the Western Cape government have made use of private security companies, mainly for the protection of buildings and facilities, and access control.

The private security industry in Cape Town plays a prominent role in the context of Improvement Districts, of which there are more than 20 throughout the city. Improvement Districts are not-for-profit special geographical ratings areas approved by the CoCT that are funded through levies paid by property owners. They are typically created to contribute to improvements in public spaces and social well-being. Crime prevention is at the heart of the Improvement District model, and many Improvement Districts contract private security companies for policing and patrolling services. Good working relations are generally maintained with the local SAPS stations, and private security companies associated with improvement districts often assist SAPS with roadblocks, and at times, crime-combating operations. Improvement Districts, however, have been criticised for actively displacing homeless people and other ‘undesirables’ from their designated areas, and hence contributing to reinforcing existing structural inequality in Cape Town. In this regard, private security companies require the presence of Law Enforcement officials to evict homeless people illegally occupying buildings and land and to dismantle their shelters. Some Improvement Districts have nonetheless employed social workers to support and assist homeless people in their respective areas.

Linkages between the private security and the nightclub/hospitality sector has a long history in Cape Town, with many of the security service providers operating in this area being involved in extortion,
assaults, drug trafficking, and with links to major gangs and criminal networks in the city and elsewhere. In 2017, there were a series of incidents of violence, including murders and attempted murders, within the nightclub security (bouncer) sector in Cape Town due to a new criminal grouping attempting to usurp control of the industry from another criminal syndicate. At the time of writing, key figures from the new criminal group were standing trial in the Cape Town Magistrates’ Court for extortion.

Roles and responsibilities of the security sector

The security sector in Cape Town has made some valuable contributions towards SGD 11, namely to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, particularly given the persistently high levels of crime, violence, inequality and poverty within many parts of Cape Town. There has been a considerable degree of formal cooperation between the SAPS, Metro Police/Law Enforcement and DOCS, which has allowed for coordinated responses to key safety challenges. However, such efforts have been undermined by institutional rivalries, the disproportionate allocation of police resources, and militaristic policing approaches. Nonetheless, these safety challenges have also led to some innovations and reforms that will have positive implications for the realisation of SDG 11 in the medium- to longterm.

At all levels of government there is legislation, as well as policies and strategies designed to facilitate gender equality (and prevent gender-based violence) in terms of SDG 5. Both the SAPS and the Metro Police/Law Enforcement have a priority mandate to respond to violence against women and children. The SAPS also has specialised units that deal with gender-based violence. In 2018, the Western Cape Government allocated ZAR 20.2 million to specifically support the prevention of violence against women. The CoCT has been seeking to address personal norms that promote violence through the piloting of a training course titled ‘Men and Masculinities’ in Delft.

However, the widespread nature of violence against women and girls in South Africa, and the fact that much of this violence takes place in the home means that it is very difficult for police to fulfil this mandate. In addition, the SAPS in the Western Cape has the highest level of complaints relating to non-compliance (54%) in terms of implementing the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act (1998). There have, however, been some positive developments in the safety and security sector in terms of school safety and alcohol harms reduction that have strong potential to reduce violence against women in Cape Town. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Inter-agency cooperation and political/institutional rivalries

The legislation pertaining to the establishment of Metro Police departments requires such entities to actively cooperate with the SAPS. This is realised through the implementation of regulations, policing standards, operating procedures and national instructions. Furthermore, Metro Police departments are also required to develop an annual plan in cooperation with the relevant SAPS Provincial Commissioner. In addition, operational reports relating to this plan are required to be submitted to SAPS (Visible Policing) on a quarterly basis. Interactions between the Metro Police and the SAPS take place at national and provincial operational planning meetings, as well as at cluster and station levels. The SAPS convenes

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a National Forum of Chiefs of the various Metro Police departments that meets quarterly to discuss cooperation measures, policing standards and procedures, and suitable practices. In Cape Town these arrangements have allowed for a structured, systematic and predictable approach to cooperation between policing agencies, particularly in relation to road blocks, high density operations, the policing of sporting and major events, protest action, elections and the annual opening of Parliament.88

These coordination arrangements have nonetheless resulted in an unbalanced policing partnership. That is, SAPS ultimately oversees all departments and is thus able to direct and support the coordination of policing strategies and activities at a city level in a manner that is aligned to SAPS’ institutional and operational priorities and interests irrespective of their suitability and effectiveness. The SAPS only make very minor references to the SAPS’ cooperation with Metro Police departments in SAPS annual reports and strategic plans.

Furthermore, cooperation between the Metro Police and the SAPS was severely affected by the efforts of the SAPS political leadership (from the mid-2000s and with the support of the African National Congress) to absorb the Metro Police departments into the SAPS.89 These attempts were assertively criticised by the DA-led CoCT, with the CoCT stating that it would take the matter to the Constitutional Court if required. In 2015, J. P. Smith, the CoCT Mayoral Committee member responsible for safety and security issued a press release in which he stated that such efforts would not:

[S]erve the public – it serves the ANC ruling hegemony and their desire to control every aspect of the criminal justice system. It serves the gang bosses and criminals and it destroys the innovation and alternative options that CTMPD has driven and which the public demand.90

Further to this, Smith publicly declared:

[The CoCT] Metro Police offer much value to policing in the current structure… If anything, we should be disbanding the SAPS and integrating it into the Metro Police because, in most cases like in Cape Town, it is the Metro Police who are closing down drug dens and fighting crime better than the SAPS.91

In addition, Smith has on a number of occasions accused the SAPS of mismanagement in Cape Town. Smith has implied that the ANC intentionally undermined police effectiveness in in the Western Cape as: ‘[The ANC] terminated the paid reservist programme the moment the ANC lost control of Province thereby slashing the reservists from more than 22,000 to slightly over 2,700 in 2012’.92

These political tensions at times played out in relation to joint SAPS-CoCT Metro Police operations. For example, in 2012, the SAPS withdrew from Operation Sisonke, over what SAPS officials regarded as illegal searches conducted by the Metro Police; and accused the Metro Police of providing them with poor crime intelligence on at least one occasion.93 Where allegations of corruption have been levelled at the Metro Police, the CoCT has responded by suggesting the similar corruption is substantially worse in the SAPS.94

88 Ibid.
90 City of Cape Town, ‘We’ll Fight to Keep Metro Police out of the SAPS – Cape Town’, CoCT Press Release, 19 August 2015.
Political efforts to formally incorporate the Metro Police into SAPS structures were finally discarded with the finalisation of the 2016 national White Paper on Policing, which stated that the relative independence of the Metro Police should be retained. However, some tensions between the Metro Police and SAPS have remained. For example, in what appeared to be indirect criticism of inadequate SAPS support at the city level, six Metro Police departments made a joint presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police in 2016 and bemoaned their low numbers of personnel, which prevented them from adequately responding to increasing levels of public disorder, as well as their limited policing powers and the growing demand from city residents for community-oriented policing. The Metro Police departments also suggested that the SAPS training regimen for Metro Police officials was inappropriate and that there should instead be a separate Metro Police qualification arrangement.

Allocation of police resources

Given the intensely disproportionate distribution of crime throughout Cape Town, with most violent crime being perpetrated in the poorest areas of the city, a logical strategy in relation to SDG 11 would be to concentrate policing resources in poorer areas. However, the decisions relating to the allocation of policing resources within the security sector has not necessarily been underpinned by this logic. This is particularly evident in terms of the private security industry and SAPS.

The formal private security industry is profit-oriented and generally only provides services to wealthier residents and businesses throughout the city. Poorer families typically do not have the available cash to contract private security companies, and the safety risks for security personnel in poorer areas are generally much higher than in upmarket areas. One of the few exceptions are the Western Cape government and the CoCT, which have hired private security companies to guard some of their properties in poorer areas. The 2016/17 Victims of Crime Survey indicated that 17% of households made use of private security companies in the Western Cape. However, only a handful of private security companies operate in the relatively safer townships, such as Langa and Gugulethu.

SAPS personnel is supposed to be deployed in terms of its Theoretical Human Resource Requirement (THRR), a human resource allocation tool that takes into consideration the nature of reported criminal offending in each precinct. In reality, the allocation of police resources by the Western Cape SAPS appears to have been skewed in favour of wealthier areas that have lower rates of criminal offending. This state of affairs has the effect of reinforcing established patterns of poverty, inequality and violent crime. For example, Camps Bay (one of the wealthiest suburbs in Cape Town), which has very low crime rates, has 1 SAPS official per 112 people. Yet, Nyanga and Harare (Khayelitsha), which have some of the highest rates of violent crime in South Africa, have ratios of 622 and 722 respectively. This state of affairs is particularly pronounced in the southern peninsular where Fish Hoek (a middle-class area) has a ratio of 263, while neighbouring Ocean View (a poor community) has a ratio of 459. In addition, the quality of service provided by SAPS is uneven throughout the city, with there being lower levels of service in poorer areas. Poor reaction times, inadequate police investigations and lack of police visibility were identified in some of the most crime-ridden areas in Cape Town, such as Khayelitsha, Mitchell’s Plain and Nyanga.

98 Tony R. Samara, Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2011).
In 2012, the Western Cape government established a commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha following lobbying from civil society organisations and residents about the poor standard of policing. The SAPS National Commissioner and Minister of Police at the time, despite being aware of the abysmal level of SAPS service and systematic failures with respect to the residents of Khayelitsha, actively sought to prevent the establishment of the commission of inquiry and took their fight as far as the Constitutional Court. The Court, however, dismissed their case. This commission of inquiry subsequently found that crimes were often not investigated properly; adequate feedback was not provided to complainants; victims of crimes, particularly victims of sexual abuse and family violence, were not being provided with the necessary support; SAPS management at the three Khayelitsha police stations, as well as many of the policing tasks, were substandard; and that relations between the SAPS and the communities in Khayelitsha had broken down. A further finding was that there were significant problems with the THRR.101

A task team made up of senior representatives from the SAPS, DOCS, and civil society organisations was created in 2015 to facilitate the implementation of some of the recommendations of the commission of inquiry. Some changes at the station level were made, namely that more competent station commanders and additional detectives be deployed to the Khayelitsha police stations.102 The new SAPS leadership has appeared to be genuinely seeking to improve relations with the community in Khayelitsha, nonetheless, to date many of the recommendations have not been implemented.

Militarised policing approaches

Low levels of trust between the police (both SAPS and the Metro Police) and poor communities throughout South Africa, including in Cape Town, have precluded any significant community-oriented policing, and as a result more militarised and forceful forms of policing have been prioritised both by SAPS and the Metro Police, with both bodies having frequently stated that they are fighting a ‘war on crime’.103

This approach is a core creed of the SAPS’ National Crime Combatting Strategy, and until recently, the CoCT had emphasised a zero-tolerance approach to policing, prioritising ‘crime-fighting’ and arrests. In 2011, J. P. Smith declared, ‘I’ve got the nasty-guy-with-the-sharp-stick niche – and I don’t tolerate excuses’.104 The Mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille, has frequently referred to crime as a ‘scourge’ that needs to be ‘combated’.105 This has been particularly prevalent in the policing of the unlicensed alcohol sector and illegal land occupations. In the case of alcohol outlets, forceful saturation police operations have been the predominant strategy. The SAPS have also primarily responded to the problem of alcohol abuse by policing the illegal distribution and trade in alcohol. Throughout South Africa in 2016/17, the SAPS confiscated a total of 1.35 million litres of alcohol, conducted 47,185 operations and closed 15,314 illegal outlets.106 In the case of land occupations, the general response by the CoCT and the SAPS has been to dismantle housing structures and evict residents. In this regard, some of the operations conducted by the CoCT Anti-Land Invasion Unit have been described by prominent constitutional law scholars as ‘brutal, inhumane and totally unlawful’.107

101 Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, Towards a Safer Khayelitsha.
106 SAPS, Overview Of Operation Safer Festive Season 13 October 2017 To 20 January 2018.
The SAPS, often in cooperation with the Metro Police, have undertaken high density operations in many of Cape Town’s high crime areas. Two of the more prominent operations have been Operation Combat and Operation Fiela-Reclaim. These forms of militarised policing have contributed to reductions in violent crime but at the same time have further widened the trust deficit between the police and community. Operation Combat was initiated in the Western Cape in 2012. Its focus was to ‘dislodge and terminally weaken’ the ability of gangs to operate in high-crime communities and prisons, ‘disorganise and fundamentally disable’ the gang-related economy through the targeting of senior members of organised criminal networks and large consignments of contraband, and ‘mobilise and organise communities’ against gangs and gangsterism. Operation Fiela-Reclaim was launched in 2015 in response to outbreaks of xenophobic violence, but also sought to ‘dominate and stabilise’ high-crime areas, a number of which were in Cape Town, by pursuing high visibility policing actions, arresting wanted persons, fast-tracking criminal investigations and adopting a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to lesser forms of criminality. In June 2015, the SANDF returned to barracks following public concerns about the adverse repercussions that their long-term internal deployment would have on the state of democratic governance in South Africa.

More recently there has been considerable high-level political advocacy, from both the Premier of the Western Cape (Helen Zille) and the national Minister of Police at the time (Fikile Mbalula), for the SANDF to be redeployed in high crime areas in Cape Town. According to de Zille, “This is entirely justified, as gangs have in some areas effectively usurped the authority of the state and the conventional law enforcement agencies.” Some community groups in areas affected by gang violence, particularly in Manenberg, have publicly endorsed a crime-fighting role for the military. Nonetheless, the SANDF has not publicly expressed the same enthusiasm, with the Chief of the SANDF, General Solly Shoke, cautioning, “[W]e are soldiers, we take orders and … we go anywhere and any direction where the country needs us to be. However, when you deploy us you must be ready to accept the consequences because we don’t take nonsense, we are not trained to combat crime we are trained to win battles, but if called we will duly comply, we are ready.”

In May 2018, the new national Minister of Police, (Hon.) General Bheki Cele, announced that the SAPS would undertake an intensification of militarised policing in Cape Town with the launching of Operation Thunder in which the SAPS would be ‘painting the Western Cape Blue’, entailing an additional allocation of 120 members of the Tactical Response Team to Khayelitsha, Mitchell’s Plain and Nyanga. Additionally, a new firearm amnesty was launched to encourage the surrender of illegal firearms.

117 South African Government, ‘Budget Vote Speech: Department of Police and IPID Delivered by Minister of Police Hon. General Bheki Cele (MP).’
Towards a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to safety and security

It is important to note that in recent years, however, the CoCT militarised approach to policing has become diluted with the CoCT increasingly adopting a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to crime and violence within the city (which will be discussed in more detail in the sections that follow). This has entailed combining law enforcement with crime prevention, harm reduction and social development. It has increasingly been facilitated by administrative restructuring where social services and policing functions now fall under one directorate in the CoCT.

Additionally, DOCS has created the Community Safety Improvement Partnership (CSIP) which it defines as an ‘integrated service delivery model’. CSIP brings together senior provincial government officials from DOCS and other departments, such as Health, Social Development and the Premier’s Office, along with crime and violence prevention experts, to discuss holistic strategies and interventions to address crime and violence in the Western Cape.\(^{118}\)

This change has also been particularly evident in relation to how the City has modified its response to the homelessness problem. In 2017, J. P. Smith referred to the City’s traditional punitive (law enforcement) approach as a ‘lost cause’, emphasising the need for the City to instead prioritise compassionate and social upliftment strategies for the homeless. In this regard, in July 2018 the City of Cape Town established its ‘Safe Space’ for homeless people within the city centre. The facility can accommodate a total of 230 persons and provides ablution facilities, a safe sleeping area (with security provided by Law Enforcement), bedding and a soup kitchen.

Key safety and security reforms

Reforms and innovation have been initiated by the Western Cape government and the CoCT within the safety and security sector in Cape Town in response to a number of factors: the significant safety deficit, the often-strained relationship between the CoCT/provincial government and the SAPS, and the Democratic Alliance’s aspiration to indicate that it has the capacity to effectively govern South Africa at a national level. These reforms will be discussed in more detail below.

Technological solutions for improved safety and security

In recent years the CoCT has placed a strong emphasis on the use of technology as a key means to enhance its responses to safety and security challenges. The flagship interventions have been CCTV, the Emergency and Policing Incident Control (EPIC) system and ShotSpotter. The CoCT has also been exploring the use of drone surveillance technology in emergency and traffic incidents, protest action, policing operations and land invasions.\(^{119}\)

CCTV has been a key policing tool for the CoCT since the late-1990s and also provides surveillance of crime hotspots. In 2010, the Metro Police reported that it had access to a network of 442 CCTV cameras. At the time, the Metro Police boasted that it was the largest area surveillance agency in Africa.\(^{120}\) Since 2010, the CCTV network has more than tripled, that is, as of April 2018, the CoCT reported that it had access to a total of 1,544 cameras, as well as access to 513 privately registered CCTV cameras.\(^{121}\) There is a dedicated Camera Response Unit that has been created to respond to actual and potential safety, security and emergency incidents.\(^{122}\)

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\(^{118}\) Western Cape Government, Community Safety Budget Vote 2016/17. 2016.
\(^{120}\) Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department: A Brief to Parliament: Portfolio Committee on Police, 10 May 2010.
\(^{122}\) CoCT, Five Year Integrated Development Plan July 2017–June 2022.
EPIC, which was initiated in 2016, is an integrated and coordinated electronic management communication tool for emergency and policing incidents. All response units are provided with tablets that are connected to a central command centre, as well as to relevant traffic authority and SAPS databases, including the Central Firearm Registry. EPIC also allows for real-time crime mapping and analysis. It is currently being used by the Metro Police, Law Enforcement, Traffic Services, Emergency Services, Fire and Rescue, Disaster Management and Social Development Services, among others. The system also allows for the inclusion of neighbourhood watch structures and CPFs.

ShotSpotter is an acoustic technology developed for law enforcement purposes in the US, which in 2018 was being used in 88 US cities. The system draws on a series of specialised sensors in order to pinpoint the location of gunshot incidents and then relays this information to law enforcement officials via a mapping interface. The ShotSpotter project in Cape Town, which is the only one outside of the US, currently covers an area of seven square kilometres in Hanover Park and Manenberg, which are gang violence hotspots. It has recently been linked to the CCTV camera network in an attempt to identify those responsible for discharging firearms and other firearm-related crime. The effectiveness of this technology is highly dependent on the support of the SAPS, but in April 2018, the CoCT reported, ‘While there is certainly support for the ShotSpotter concept, the limited SAPS resources and response to alerts remains a challenge’. By March 2018, more than 2,200 gunshots had been detected.

Neighbourhood Safety Officers and Neighbourhood Safety Teams

The CoCT has also been experimenting with the deployment of Neighbourhood Safety Officers (NSOs) and the creation of Neighbourhood Safety Teams (NSTs). NSOs and NSTs are based on the local application of the problem-oriented approach to policing. Problem-oriented policing seeks to identify and analyse varieties and clusters of problems within a community that may ultimately result in criminality and disorder. An NSO is typically a specially trained Metro Police official that is deployed in a specific neighbourhood to identify safety problems and coordinate the solving thereof with relevant community and local government stakeholders. As of April 2018, there were 16 NSOs that were deployed to 17 areas, most of which have high levels of crime.

NSTs are still in the early stages of being rolled out, with a pilot project currently being pursued in Delft. NSTs will draw members from relevant city entities, community organisations such as CPFs, and neighbourhood watch structures in order to provide a more comprehensive problem-solving approach to safety and security problems. The Delft NST, given the intensity of gang violence in the area, includes members of the Metro Police’s Stabilisation Unit and Gang and Drug Task Team.

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126 S. Ndlendle, ‘CCTV Cameras Deployed to Help Cape Town’s ShotSpotter Programme Identify Shooters’, The Citizen, 12 April 2018.
School Resource Officers

The School Resource Officer (SRO) intervention was introduced by the CoCT in 2012 in cooperation with the Western Cape provincial government. There are currently 38 SROs (Metro Police officials) that have been deployed to 18 schools in high crime areas throughout the Western Cape. SROs have undergone specialised training by the US National Association of School Resource Officers. Since the SROs were placed in schools, there have been a number of positive outcomes including an increase in the reporting of criminal incidents to the SAPS, search and seizure operations, and the monitoring and reporting of truancy. Principals at the schools have reported a decrease in crime since the SRO intervention was initiated.

Rent-a-Cop, volunteers and cadets

In 2008, the CoCT established the Rent-a-Cop programme, which involves the sponsoring by the private sector of half the costs of a junior Law Enforcement officer for their dedicated deployment in specific areas at specific times to provide for improved visible policing and the issuing of fines for traffic and by-law violations. This initiative has mostly been used by business associations, ward counsellors and Improvement Districts. For example, in the 2017/18 financial year, the South African Breweries contributed close to ZAR 4 million towards this initiative.

Since 2013, the CoCT has maintained the Volunteer Auxiliary Law Enforcement Service, which draws on volunteers to support neighbourhood safety interventions throughout the city, particularly in relation to neighbourhood watch structures. Volunteers, which receive training from the Metro Police, have to be 18 years or older and not have a criminal record. It is largely sustained through Expanded Public Works funding and also includes some graduates from the Chrysalis Academy.

The CoCT also introduced a Volunteer Cadet Youth programme in 2013 in an effort to expand its law enforcement and visible policing capacity, but also to contribute to active citizen and social responsiveness amongst youth in Cape Town. The five-year period between 2013 and 2017 saw the participation of approximately 2,000 cadets. Graduates from the programme wear a uniform and can be deployed to assist more experienced Metro Police and Law Enforcement officials.

Safety in the Table Mountain National Park

In early 2018 there was a spike in violent robberies and attacks in TMNP. The Table Mountain Safety Forum was publicly criticised by civil society groups, such as the Table Mountain Watch, for inadequate planning and implementation of safety measures. Shortly thereafter, SANParks endeavoured to adopt a more concerted ‘joint operational approach’ with the SAPS, CoCT policing agencies and community groups, and announced that it would look into the use of crime prevention technology.

Reporting hotlines

The CoCT has established a number of hotlines for residents to lodge complaints with city authorities with respect to a range of wellbeing and safety-related issues, such as noise nuisances, excessive construction and demolition noise, illegal dumping. The Traffic Department has a hotline for residents to report drunk or reckless driving. The Metro Police have a hotline for reporting domestic violence. The City’s Department of Social Development and Early Childhood Development has contact numbers for the abuse of the elderly and other vulnerable groups. There are also dedicated hotlines for corruption, illegal land use, land invasions, derelict buildings and for the negligent disposal of cigarette butts that has the potential to cause fires.

Improved police oversight

Two key outcomes for improving police oversight at the provincial level emerged out of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, namely, the creation of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman and the DOCS Watching Briefs Unit. The Western Cape Police Ombudsman, which is the first of its kind in South Africa, is responsible for investigating complaints regarding police inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between the police and any community in the Western Cape. Between December 2014 and March 2018, 1,445 complaints were received and 883 investigations were undertaken and finalised by the Ombudsman’s office.140 The Watching Briefs Unit attends relevant court hearings in order to determine if any police abuses or inefficiencies have taken place and then submits reports to the Western Cape SAPS Provincial Commissioner.141 The unit monitored more than 3,768 cases between 2014/15 and 2017/18. It also regularly conducted oversight visits to police stations in the province.

Urban upgrading to prevent violence and promote safety

Both the CoCT and DOCS have closely collaborated with an organisation known as Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU). This organisation has used environmental design and social crime prevention methods in high crime areas such as Khayelitsha and Gunya. Published research findings of neighbourhood level township upgrading projects in Cape Town have presented mixed results, with some of the upgrading interventions yielding modest violence reduction impacts.

For example, in a study of the impact of urban upgrading programmes in Freedom Park (Mitchells Plain), Sheffield Road (Philippi) and Monwabisi Park, (Khayelitsha), Brown-Luthango, Reyes and Gubevu found that ‘In a context marked by high unemployment, poor education and limited opportunities to break the cycle of poverty, the long-term impact and sustainability of upgrading interventions is limited in the absence of targeted programmes aimed at addressing the structural factors which drive and sustain high levels of violence and crime’.142 Furthermore, preliminary study findings by researchers closely associated with VPUU have indicated that robberies declined significantly within the VPUU business development upgrade site in Harare (Khayelitsha) after the implementation of the upgrade and other crime prevention interventions in this small area.143

140 Western Cape Government, ‘2018/2019 Department of Community Safety Budget Speech.’
Gang violence reduction

Through the financial support of the CoCT, the Ceasefire/Cure Violence gang interruption model has been used by a community organisation (First Community Resource Centre) in Hanover Park and Manenberg. In essence, the approach involves the deployment of violence ‘interrupters’ who use mediation techniques in an attempt to defuse tensions between individual gang members. It also seeks to promote non-violence problem-solving norms in focal communities. The model was initially developed and refined in Chicago (USA), and studies have shown that it has the potential to reduce firearm-related violence between alleged gang members.144

Both the CoCT and the First Community Resource Centre have publicly stated that the programme has been a success. However, the SAPS have been unsupportive, and the approach has been undermined by the increased proliferation of illegal firearms and an intensification of gang violence through the city in recent years. In May 2018, the CoCT announced that it would no longer continue to fund the Ceasefire interventions, but after public criticism announced that it would review this decision.145

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Cape Town has been confronted with a range of acute safety and security challenges that have the clear potential to undermine the efforts of both government and city residents to realise many of the SDGs. The three-tiered safety and security sector (city, province and national), combined with the fact that both the CoCT and the Western Cape province has been governed by an opposition political party for several years, has presented both obstacles and opportunities to SDG-aligned security sector reforms.

There has been a general commitment from all government entities in the safety and security sector to cooperate in relation to policing and crime prevention within the city. Nonetheless, institutional rivalries, the non-strategic allocation of police resources and militarised policing ideologies have hampered the ability of government at all levels to comprehensively improve the conditions of safety within Cape Town. Conversely, the safety deficit has resulted in both the Western Cape Government and the CoCT pursuing safety and security innovations, particularly the leveraging of community participation, policing specialisation and the use of new technology.


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About this case study
The City of Cape Town is the second largest urban economy in the Southern African region and with 4 million residents and 1.265 million households, the city has grown over the past three decades at a relatively high rate of urbanisation. However, Cape Town has high levels of structural, social and income inequality and residential segregation along racial and socioeconomic lines. At an aggregate level, Cape Town has some of the highest rates of reported violent crimes per city in South Africa and there are very high levels of gang- and drug-related violent crime. In this context, the CoCT has enthusiastically embraced the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and used them to frame its integrated planning framework documents. The five strategic focus areas, or ‘pillars’, are for Cape Town to be a city that is safe, caring, inclusive, well run and opportunity-oriented. Cape Town is also a member of the 100 Resilient Cities network. This makes Cape Town a highly relevant case study to analyse the relationship between the application of strategies that are aligned to the realisation of the SDGs and the safety and security sector in this city with respect to SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).

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