

Security and Sustainable Development in Bogotá, Colombia

A case study for the DCAF Policy and Research Division Project:
SSR for Safer Cities - Supporting States to Achieve SDG 11

By Juan Felipe Godoy, Claudia Rodríguez y Dr. Hernando Zuleta
Center of Studies on Security and Drugs (Centro de Estudios sobre Seguridad
y Drogas-CESED) Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá

October 2018, Geneva



DCAF
a centre for security
development and
the rule of law

Credits and contributors:

DCAF project lead: Fairlie Chappuis
Editorial support: Daniel Reimers and Jasper Linke
Copy-editing: Jo Nicoud-Garden
Design and layout: Petra Gurtner
First edition: October 2018

Acknowledgements:

This project was completed with the support of the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

Disclaimer:

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or views of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Human Security Division or the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. All empirical data used in this publication has been provided by the author. DCAF is not responsible for any errors or omissions.

Foreword

SSR for Safer Cities - Supporting States to Achieve SDG 11

Safety and security has already become an urban experience for more than half of the world's population. Against this backdrop, SDG 11 seeks to bring sustainable and peaceful development to the people who live in cities by calling on states to "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable". Yet high rates of urban violence reflect a failure to address the challenges of urbanization in national and donor-supported strategies for security and development. Urban violence exacerbates state fragility and human suffering, endangers local and regional peace, and drives uncontrolled migration. This fact demonstrates the urgency of linking SDG 11 with SDG 5 on women's empowerment and SDG 16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Within this larger priority there is now a pressing need to address the immediate challenges of SSR in urban contexts and this is the purpose of DCAF's Policy and Research Division project "SSR for Safer Cities" supported by the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. This case study is one of three case studies on security in cities conducted by local experts over the course of 2018: the selected cities are Bogotá, Cape Town and General Santos City.

Contents

Foreword	3
Introduction	5
Security in Bogotá	5
SDG 11 in Bogotá: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	7
Public transportation	8
Security in slums	9
Recovery of public spaces	10
SDG 5 in Bogotá: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	12
Gender-related violence	12
Policies adopted in Bogotá	14
SDG 16 in Bogotá: Promote peace, justice and strong institutions	16
Perception and under-reporting of crimes: Mistrust towards the police and the judicial system	21
Conclusions	25
Bibliography	27

Introduction

Security in Bogotá presents an interesting case study for today's urban safety agenda. On the one hand, Bogotá is the capital of Colombia, a country that since the 1960s has experienced a complex armed conflict triggering extreme violence across the national territory. On the other hand, Bogotá has not experienced the high crime rates, nor the increasing rates of homicide that other urban and rural regions have suffered; the city seems to have its own security environment. This paper therefore aims to describe some of the characteristics that differentiate Bogotá from other cities in Colombia and the relevance for these programmes, policies and challenges under the scope of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 11, SDG 5 and SDG 16, putting forward those that could determine public security policy for the city. Section 1 briefly recounts Bogotá's historical, political and administrative contexts. Section 2 focuses on the discussion around the security situation in public spaces such as public transportation, slums and parks in light of SDG 11. Section 3 describes local government efforts to improve the city's rates of crime and violence against women with relevance for SDG 5. Section 4 looks at SDG 16 and the evolution of homicide rates in Bogotá and citizens' perception of the police and the judicial system. It also explores a possible hypothesis about the relationship between citizens' perception of the state and the state's efficiency.

Security in Bogotá

Latin America is the second most unequal region in the world, and Colombia has the second highest Gini coefficient of Latin American nations. In fact, it is ranked seventh in the world for income inequality.¹ In *Collateral Damage*, Zygmunt Bauman explains how poverty and inequality lead to a series of social problems that affect the wellbeing of society as a whole.² Moser and McIlwaine developed a study that explains how violence, security and poverty interrelate in causal ways within impoverished communities.³ Gary Becker has developed an analytical framework that explains this relationship.⁴ Crime rates depend on the trade-off between apprehension of the risks of facing penalties and potential gains from criminal activities. These potential gains are in turn affected by income inequality.⁵ Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza developed a study demonstrating the causal links between income inequality and violent crimes across 37 countries (including Colombia).⁶ They show a strong correlation between the Gini index and homicide and robbery rates. Inequality in Colombia, and specifically in Bogotá, could therefore be one of the main causes of security problems.

Another factor that plays a major role in the security landscape of Bogotá is Colombia's civil conflict. Because of its status as capital city, guerrilla and paramilitary groups sought to take control of the city in the early 1990s. The military fought against the guerrillas to prevent them entering the city, while paramilitary groups fought against guerrillas who already had some control in slums and neighbouring towns. These interactions led to a violent urban war and transformed the dynamics of crime in Bogotá, especially in the city's southern slums.⁷

- 1 Marcelo Justo, '¿Cuáles son los 6 países más desiguales de América Latina?', BBC Mundo, accessed 18 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2016/03/160308_america_latina_economia_desigualdad_ab.
- 2 Zygmunt Bauman, *Collateral Damage: Social Inequalities in a Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
- 3 Cathy McIlwaine and Caroline Moser, 'Poverty, Violence and Livelihood Security in Urban Colombia and Guatemala', *Progress in Development Studies* 3, no. 2 (April 2003): 113–130, <https://doi.org/10.1191/1464993403ps056ra>.
- 4 Gary S. Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', In *Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment*, ed. Gary S. Becker and William M. Landes (NBER, 1974), 1–54.
- 5 Morgan Kelly, 'Inequality and Crime', *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 82, no. 4 (2000): 530, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646649>.
- 6 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, 'Inequality and Violent Crime', *J. L. & Econ.* 45, no. 1 (April 2002): 1–39, <https://doi.org/10.1086/338347>.
- 7 Iván Arturo Torres, 'Conflicto armado, crimen organizado y disputas por la hegemonía en soacha y el sur de Bogotá', (MA thesis, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2011), 22–45, <http://hdl.handle.net/10554/1571>.

With the arrival of the guerrillas and paramilitaries, illegal businesses in Bogotá and criminal structures established prior to the 1990s adopted some of the practices the armed groups had introduced into urban spaces. New illegal activities such as *oficinas de cobro* (offices where people could hire a hitman, bribe authorities or buy weapons) were created, drug micro-trafficking grew due to the increased connections between cocaine cartels and criminal gangs and, in general, violence in specific areas in the city worsened.⁸

In this context, security in Bogotá became a source of concern for local and national governments. With the creation of the National Constitution in 1991, the executive power obtained total control and full responsibility for every issue related to ‘public order’. The new constitution established that ‘the President, governors and mayors are responsible for the preservation of public order in their respective jurisdictions’. Mayors therefore hold the highest position of authority in the police force and are responsible for preserving public order in the municipality where they are elected.

Some of the mayor’s new responsibilities include proposing measures and police regulations in accordance with the Constitution; promoting, in coordination with the police commander, programmes and activities designed to strengthen respect for human rights and civic values; and verifying that the Police National Code is enforced. Policy initiatives are not only focused on strengthening security within the city, but also on increasing the municipality’s resilience towards calamities such as floods, earthquakes and fires.

In addition to these functions, it became of interest to integrate national, regional and local authorities in order to develop coordinated strategies and policies, and to address public order concerns. To achieve this target, the Security Council, Public Order Committee, Security Fund and Security Plans were created. These four instruments are designed to support the mayor’s decisions and actions.

The Security Council consists of monthly or extraordinary meetings where the mayor and commanders of the armed forces and justice sectors, as well as human rights agencies, discuss pressing issues of security sector governance. Some of the Council-specific functions include studying, evaluating and accounting for the fulfilment of the city’s security and coexistence policies, as well as coordinating the appropriate deployment of police manpower in the city.

The Public Order Committee comprises the mayor, police commander and the general commander of the relevant military garrison. The main purpose of the committee is to implement security and administer the Security Fund budget.

The Security Fund is an instrument designed to obtain resources to finance different activities that guarantee urban security. This budget is managed by the Public Order Committee, based on the priorities of municipal public order interests.

Finally, the Security Plans are multisectoral policies articulated in accordance with municipal development plans and national security policies. Essentially, these plans are aimed at strengthening relationships with citizens and encouraging their participation in urban security issues.⁹

8 Ariel Ávila and Bernardo Pérez, *Mercados de criminalidad en Bogotá* (Bogotá: Editorial Linotipia Bolívar, 2011), 115–129.

9 Veeduría Distrital, ‘Estado de la política pública de seguridad y convivencia de Bogotá D.C.’, (Bogotá D.C., April 2017), Section 1.2. [http://veeduriadistrital.gov.co/sites/default/files/files/Estado%20de%20la%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20P%C3%BAblica%20de%20Seguridad%20y%20Convivencia%20de%20Bogot%C3%A1%20-2017%20\(28%20abr%202017\)VF.pdf](http://veeduriadistrital.gov.co/sites/default/files/files/Estado%20de%20la%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20P%C3%BAblica%20de%20Seguridad%20y%20Convivencia%20de%20Bogot%C3%A1%20-2017%20(28%20abr%202017)VF.pdf).

All these strategies designed during the 1990s were adopted and applied by subsequent administrations in Bogotá. As mayors of Bogotá in the late 1990s and early 2000s, both Enrique Peñalosa (1998–2000) and Antanas Mockus (2001–2003) implemented policies focused on strengthening civil culture and recovering public spaces. Some of their policies had a preventive approach, such as disarming the population and regulating alcohol consumption.

Between 2004 and 2015, three mayors belonging to the same political party (Polo Democrático Alternativo) governed Bogotá. A statistical analysis of criminality and security data together with the timings of the policies implemented during these administrations suggest that their goals were not achieved. Also, some experts claim that during the administrations of Luis Garzón and Samuel Moreno there was no coordination between national and local governments in terms of security. Nevertheless, some programmes are worth mentioning.

Programa Pactos was a programme implemented during the administration of Luis Garzón and continued by the administration of Samuel Moreno under the name Pacto de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana. This programme tried to promote agreement between different groups of citizens in order to identify and reduce risk factors contributing to violence. For example, some agreements were signed with taxi drivers in order to improve security conditions in the transportation system.

Gustavo Petro implemented policies aimed at reducing discrimination and segregation in the city. For example, during his government, victims of the armed conflict that arrived in Bogotá received full assistance including economic, social and political aid. There were also programmes for specific geographical sectors in the city designed to reduce problems of security and coexistence. Some of these zones were selected based on the incidence of crime reported in their neighbourhoods, as well as other risk factors.

Enrique Peñalosa was again elected in 2015 and is the current mayor of the city. In 2016, the Security Secretariat was created to address issues related to security, coexistence and access to justice in the city. It is through the Secretariat that the Mayor executes, designs and implements policies at the local level.

In the following sections, some of the policies implemented and their results in terms of security sector governance and reform will be described and discussed under the scope of the SDGs.

SDG 11 in Bogotá: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

There is an entire Sustainable Development Goal targeting the improvement of cities because, according to the United Nations, 4.2 billion people live in urban contexts. Therefore, many of today's challenges are a consequence of the complex interactions taking place in cities. Working towards inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities means working to reduce inequalities, tackling climate change and improving quality of life. One of the challenges in modern cities is security. Agglomeration, poverty and constant growth make cities an environment prone to crimes such as robbery, mugging and homicide, among others. In this section, we describe and analyse Bogotá's major security challenges with relevance for SDG 11. We study three scenarios in particular: public spaces, public transportation and slums. Additionally, we discuss the policies that have been implemented to cope with those challenges and what is still to be done.

Public transportation

SDG 11.2 aims to establish safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all. In this section we examine the current state of safety in Bogotá's transportation system and what has been done to address the challenges in this area. Public transportation in Bogotá has two main components: Transmilenio and the Sistema Integrado de Transporte Público (SITP). Transmilenio is a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system implemented by Enrique Peñalosa's administration in December 2000. It consists of 12 interconnected bus lines, where buses have two separate lanes on the streets and stations are above ground-level, requiring passengers to access the station by bridges over the street. Buses are bi-articulated with a capacity of 270 passengers. SITP was introduced in 2012; it is the district bus system replacing the previous informal bus system that had no stations, no central ticketing system and almost no regulation. Both tickets cost around USD 0.80. This section focuses on Transmilenio as it transports more people daily than SITP.

The introduction of Transmilenio initially resulted in positive effects on the city and its citizens. Firstly, the construction of bus stations meant a state presence in some areas where the communities seldom saw police officers. For example, the neighbourhoods around the Avenida Caracas, a sector with high crime rates, experienced a reduction in crime due to the construction and operation of Transmilenio.¹⁰ Secondly, the previous system's buses shared the roads with private cars, motorcycles and other vehicles in the city, meaning that public transportation users were affected by traffic conditions. Transmilenio buses, however, use exclusive lanes and do not get caught in heavy traffic. As a result, the implementation of the system significantly reduced the commute times of its users.¹¹ Finally, during those first years of operation, citizens were proud of the system, discouraged vandalism and took care of the buses and stations.

However, the system's popularity declined after only 5 years of implementation. By 2005, only 17% of citizens believed Transmilenio was safe, according to the Chamber of Commerce. In the same survey, data shows that between that same year and 2017, crimes taking place in Transmilenio (mostly pick-pocketing and robbery) increased by 163.6%. This situation and some of the system's flaws, such as excess demand and long waiting times inside the station, have led to widespread dissatisfaction with the system. Additionally, political disputes between Enrique Peñalosa and some of the left-wing mayors that came after him, such as Gustavo Petro, have created a negative image of Transmilenio.¹² As a result, citizens do not have a sense of ownership of the system and do not take care of it. This is an obstacle for the completion of SDG 11 because buses are constantly vandalized, which translates into additional expenses. Some estimates suggest that around 15% of the 2.3 million daily users do not purchase tickets, which negatively affects the system's finances and makes affordability harder to achieve in the long run.

The security sector has implemented different types of policies to work towards a safer public transportation system. Even though Bogotá has a relatively small police force compared to other large US or Latin American cities, an effort has been made to reallocate more police officers to Transmilenio buses and stations. As of 2016, there were 600 police officers working solely within Transmilenio. Some of them work undercover, trying to catch thieves and smugglers in the process of carrying out crime. However, due to Bogotá's low number of police officers, it is hard to allocate policemen and women to the transportation system without leaving streets and parks unattended. Along with this effort, in 2017 the new Police Code established a 200,000 pesos (USD 72) fee for travelling on Transmilenio without

10 Alavaro Jose Moreno, 'Impacto del Transmilenio en el crimen de la Avenida Caracas y sus vecindades,' *Documento CEDE* No. 2005-55 (September 2005), https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/d2005-55.pdf.

11 Irma Chaparro, *Evaluación del impacto económico del transporte urbano en la ciudad de Bogotá. El caso del sistema de transporte masivo, Transmilenio*, Serie: Recursos Naturales a Infraestructura (CEPAL, October 2002).


12 Colprensa Press Agency, 'Alcalde Petro invitó a marchar contra Transmilenio el 11 de marzo', *La República*, 5 March 2014, <https://www.larepublica.co/economia/alcalde-petro-invito-a-marchar-contra-transmilenio-el-11-de-marzo-2103465>; Noticias RCN, "'Transmilenio Colapsó': Petro sobre los problemas del sistema", *RCN*, 14 October 2014, accessed 15 April 2018, <https://www.noticiasrcn.com/nacional-Bogotá/transmilenio-colapso-petro>.

paying. This fee can be reduced if the offender attends an instructional course. Finally, several educational campaigns have been run by the municipality to encourage people to stop vandalizing buses and stations as well as to educate citizens on the importance of purchasing their tickets.

Security in slums

Slums are areas that suffer from overpopulation, poverty and exclusion from many public goods and services. For this reason, slums are crucial for the analysis of the evolution of SDG 11.1.¹³ and 11.3.¹⁴ Bogotá is administratively divided into localities – each locality has a local mayor and the autonomy to make certain decisions regarding public spaces. The biggest slums in Bogotá are located in the localities of Ciudad Bolívar and Usme. There are also smaller slums situated in the localities of Usaquén, Chapinero and La Candelaria. These slums started to grow around the 1970s and 1980s when people from across the country came to Bogotá to escape violence in rural areas and to look for better paying jobs. The growth was completely unsupervised and unregulated, so a large part of the population has no legal ownership of their land. This also means that many of the properties do not meet safety or environmental standards. As can be seen in Map 1, Ciudad Bolívar and Usme are on the outskirts of the city (Sumapaz being a predominantly rural district). Here, public goods and services such as schools, hospitals and transportation systems were scarce until the mid-1990s, when communities started pressing the government for the provision of such public goods.¹⁵

Figure 1: Bogotá divided by localities



Source: Fundalectura. Accessed 18 August 2018. <http://fundalectura.org/lectores-ciudadanos/>

Consequently, these areas face challenges that the rest of the city does not have to contend with. For instance, when the guerrillas sought to take Bogotá in the 1990s, Ciudad Bolívar seemed like a suitable point of entrance due to its location and socioeconomic conditions. At the same time, paramilitary groups who wanted to prevent the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from entering the capital settled in this locality, as they knew its strategic value. The armed groups took advantage of the existence of gangs in the area, merged with them, created new ones and recruited young militants. This resulted in the creation of new criminal behaviour, not only in Ciudad Bolívar but also in Bogotá more widely.

13 SDG 11.1: by 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day

14 SDG 11.3: implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable

15 Monica Alvarez and Laura Fernanda Orozco, 'Ciudad Bolívar: la historia de una lucha colectiva', Centro de Memoria Histórica, 4 June 2015, accessed 18 April 2018, <http://centromemoria.gov.co/ciudad-bolivar-la-historia-de-una-lucha-colectiva/>.

These gangs developed three new activities: *oficinas de cobro*, social cleansing and extortion. *Oficinas de cobro* were offices where people could hire hitmen, bribe authorities or buy weapons. With only few exceptions, these bureaux were located in the slums.¹⁶ The new gangs also started carrying out social cleansing, which meant killing members of society they thought to be disposable or undesirable.¹⁷ This grim practice took many young people's lives, mostly men between 16 and 30 years old. At the time, as most of these murders were justified on the basis that the victims were drug addicts or gang members, the public was not aware of the extent of the practice. Finally, the armed groups implemented a 'war tax', which was an extortion fee charged to commercial establishments in Ciudad Bolívar.¹⁸

According to the authorities, armed groups, such as the FARC or paramilitary groups, are no longer established in the area.¹⁹ The biggest paramilitary group in Colombia, the AUC or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, demobilized in 2006 and FARC signed a peace treaty in 2016. However, little is known about how their influence changed the way criminal organizations function in Bogotá and whether the practices established in the 1990s are still the *modus operandi* of the slum gangs.

Recovery of public spaces

It is worth discussing the intervention that took place in El Bronx, a cluster of streets located in the centre of the city, where homicide, child prostitution, arms and illegal drug trafficking and torture, among other crimes, occurred under the control of criminal gangs. Before the intervention, local authorities had no control over the zone, especially because criminal gangs had formed associations with the police force that patrolled the area. This situation was an obstacle to achieving SDG 11.7²⁰ because the streets were not accessible to the public, and several human rights were violated, especially those of children.

On 28 May 2016, the Mayor's administration, headed by the Security Secretariat, undertook a multi-institutional intervention in El Bronx. At 4:00 am, a group of military and police forces, different agencies of the state and institutions, such as the District Institute for the Protection of Children and Youth and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, entered El Bronx.

- According to the district administration the intervention had three main objectives:
- to re-establish the rights of minors and the homeless;
- to dismantle organised criminal structures that controlled the sector;
- to guarantee an institutional presence and recover territorial control.

The aim of the intervention, carried out by Enrique Peñalosa's administration, was to recover public spaces and make them safe, and to improve citizens' wellbeing. In the short term at least, the goal was achieved.

After the event, approximately 140 minors were identified and transferred to the programmes of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (see SDG 16.2).²¹ They captured three key figures from the *ganchos*, a criminal gang operating in El Bronx, and confiscated 30 firearms, 5 grenades, cash and narcotics²² (see also SDG 16.4).²³

16 Torres, 'Conflicto armado, crimen organizado y disputas por la hegemonía en soacha y el sur de Bogotá', 22–45.

17 Ibid.

18 Ávila and Pérez, *Mercados de criminalidad en Bogotá*, 115–129

19 W Radio, 'Distrito responde ante denuncias por presencia de grupos armados en Ciudad Bolívar', interview, 3 May 2018, accessed 8 May 2018, <http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/Bogotá/distrito-responde-ante-denuncias-por-presencia-de-grupos-armados-en-ciudad-bolivar/20180503/nota/3745201.aspx>.

20 SDG 11.7: by 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, particularly for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities

21 SDG 16.2: end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children

22 CPAT and Parces ONG, *Destapando la olla: Informes sombra sobre la Intervención en el Bronx* (Bogotá: CPAT and Parces ONG, 2017).

23 SDG 16.4 by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime

After the intervention, electricity was reconnected, surveillance cameras were installed, and the area was cleaned up. A large police force contingent continued to patrol El Bronx as old buildings were destroyed and new urban projects started.

Today there is no consensus about the middle- and long-term results of the intervention. The public, academics and politicians have different views on how security has evolved in the area since the event. Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) suggest that there are four dynamics that have become more apparent since 28 May: 1) Illicit drug market fragmentation and its relationship with the homeless; 2) Corruption is less visible but not necessarily in decline; 3) Displacement and dispersion of the homeless; 4) Increased vulnerability of minors in the city.²⁴

Security institutions, together with citizens, must face up to these challenges and start working to find a solution. During Enrique Peñalosa's second administration, attempts to intervene among homeless people have been more subtle.

Slums are mainly occupied by 'street inhabitants', who are most commonly consumers of psychoactive substances and face serious health issues. Most of them are frequently either victims or perpetrators of crime.²⁵ According to the VI Census of Streets Inhabitants of 2012, 52.05% have committed robbery and 49.41% have committed assault.²⁶ The Colombian state is confronted with two responsibilities that often entail contradictory responses. It has an obligation to protect all its citizens, especially those in vulnerable conditions, but it also operates under the rule of law, which respects individual freedom. On the one hand, the homeless face severe health problems, and the state must ensure their wellbeing (Law 1566 from 2012²⁷ and Decree 560 from 2015²⁸). On the other hand, according to the Supreme Court mandate from the sentence T-454/14, intervention without an individual's assent is beyond the state's jurisdiction.²⁹ Therefore, aside from ensuring that centres are available for those who voluntarily choose to go, the Colombian state can only intervene if a crime has been committed.

Bogotá currently has 15 operating centres for the homeless, each with an average capacity of 500 people. The homeless usually sleep in sewer pipes, under bridges or on the sidewalk. The police force may intervene to relocate these people but it cannot force them to go to a rehabilitation centre. Instead, Enrique Peñalosa's administration developed the *Ángeles Azules* project, which consists of a team of 700 professionals that patrol the city looking for the homeless. They establish contact with individuals, encouraging them to go to a centre and later reintegrate into society. In 2017, Bogotá's welfare services assisted 11,847 homeless people.³⁰

24 Juan Carlos Garzón, Julián Wilches and José Luis Bernal, *Las revelaciones del Bronx. Intervención de zonas de alta complejidad: Desafíos y alternativas* (Bogotá: FIP, 2017).

25 Alberto Gomez, Hernando Zuleta and Pablo Zuleta, 'Habitantes de calle, seguridad y adicción: Opciones jurídicas con sustento médico', *Document CEDE* No. 2005-55 (September 2017), https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/d2005-55.pdf.

26 DANE, *Censo habitantes de la calle Bogotá* (Bogotá: DANE y Ministerio de Salud. Secretaría Distrital de Integración social. Bogotá Humana, 2012).

27 Colombia, Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991.

28 Colombia, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2015.

29 Colombia, Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia, 2014.

30 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 'Tras dos años de toma del Bronx, habitantes de calle contarán con 5 nuevos centros de atención', 30 May 2018, accessed 18 August 2018, <http://www.bogota.gov.co/bronx-Bogotá/noticias/tras-dos-anos-de-toma-del-bronx-habitantes-de-calle-contaran-con-5-nuevos-centros-de-atencion>.

SDG 5 in Bogotá: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Half of the world's population are women or girls, yet due to differences in rights and opportunities many girls may not grow up to reach their full potential. From child marriage to unequal pay, women are victims of certain forms of discrimination solely because of their gender. SDG 5 aims to achieve gender equality by providing the same opportunities and rights to girls and women and by ending harsh practices such as genital mutilation and child marriage. Regarding security, men and women are victims of a different set of crimes because of the cultural structures surrounding both genders. While women and girls are most likely to suffer from sexual assault, men and boys are the most common victims of personal injuries. Security policies should be developed to prevent and protect women from the crimes they are victims of by understanding the gender-related context behind them. This section presents data on the crimes women and men are victims of and explains the policies that have been implemented in Bogotá to address gender-related violence.

Gender-related violence

The objective of SDG 5.2 is to reduce all forms of violence against women and girls in public and private spheres.³¹ As such, it is important to discuss why this is one of the targets of SDG 5 and why there is such a thing as gender-related violence. As mentioned above, men and women are victims of different sets of crimes that are a consequence of the role each gender plays in society, where men are normally the dominant figure in households.³² While men are most commonly victims of homicide and personal injuries, women suffer systematically from domestic violence and sexual abuse. Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution by gender and age of these four crimes in Colombia for the year 2016.

As seen in Figure 2, homicide rates and personal injury rates are significantly higher for men than for women. Although homicides in Colombia were historically related to the armed conflict, today homicides in Bogotá are circumstantial or due to fights between citizens (this will be addressed in more detail in the section concerning SDG 16). The UNODC classifies these two types of homicide as related to criminal activities and related to interpersonal conflicts.³³ When homicides related to interpersonal conflicts occur in the public space, it is a global trend to see higher homicide rates of this kind for young men. Additionally, personal injuries are a consequence of interpersonal violence; they are not fatal and normally occur during fights. These rates are also higher for young men in Colombia. The information shown in Figure 2 is not exclusive to Colombia – homicide and personal injury rates are higher for men around the world, but especially in the Americas where men are more likely to be involved in criminal activities and more likely to resolve conflict using violence.


31 SDG 5.2: eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.

32 Helen .V. Tauchen, Ann Dryden Witte and Sharon K. Long, 'Domestic Violence: A Non-Random Affair', *International Economic Review* 32 No. 2 (May 1991): 491–511.

33 UNODC, *Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data* (Vienna: UNODC, 2014).

Figure 2
Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants
Colombia 2016

Personal injury rate per 100,000 inhabitants
Colombia 2016



Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.


On the other hand, there are crimes such as domestic violence and sexual abuse that are commonly suffered by girls and women. Figure 3 depicts the distribution by gender and age of these crimes for Colombia in 2016. Domestic violence is aggressive behaviour within a home, and in this case, the data only shows violence perpetrated by the victim's intimate partner. As shown in Figure 3, rates of domestic violence are meaningfully higher for women than for men. Although violence in the streets is targeted towards men, women are subjected to violence in their homes.

In addition, the sexual violence data presented in the graph below corresponds to examinations carried out within the framework of medical jurisprudence due to what are presumed to be sexual assaults. This information reveals that women and especially girls are usually the victims of sexual assault. In regards to homicides, while 1% of men were killed by their partner or ex-partner in 2016, 28.4% of women were killed by partners or former partners. This shows that men and women suffer from very different types of violence with different types of causes and consequences. While men are killed because of their relationship with other crimes or because of circumstantial violence, women and girls are killed or abused out of passion, jealousy or sexual desire.³⁴ Again, this is not a pattern exclusive to the Colombian context, it is a common trend around the world. Hence, SDG 5.2 focuses on reducing gender-related violence.

34 Medicina Legal, 2016 Forensis. *Datos para la vida* 18, No. 1 (June 2017), accessed 23 April 2018, <http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/documents/20143/49526/Forensis.2016.Datos.para.la.vida.pdf>.

Figure 3

Domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants **Sexual assault rate per 100,000 inhabitants**
Colombia 2016 **Colombia 2016**



Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.

Policies adopted in Bogotá

Due to the multitude of challenges to be overcome, providing security for gender-related crimes is not an issue that concerns solely the police or the Security Secretariat. For example, some victims of sexual assault or domestic violence are afraid to speak out because the cost of reporting an incident could include losing their jobs or homes. As many victims live in hostile environments, asking the police force for help does not solve the problem as it might for robbery or burglary. For this type of crime, the security sector includes the police, the judicial system and more importantly, channels giving victims better access to authorities. Without these channels, many victims remain silent and the government can provide neither security nor justice.

In Bogotá, the main programme designed to provide assistance and give victims better access to authorities is called SOFIA. It was implemented in 2009 under Gustavo Petro's administration to help women who are victims of any form of violence. It has three main components: a hot line and two types of offices that provide their services for free.

The hotline is called La Línea Púrpura, or the Purple Line, and was opened in 2015. It provides a listening ear and guidance for women who have been victims of violence or assault, or who think they might be in danger. In three years, the line has assisted more than 20,000 women for free. Social workers, psychologists or nurses listen and advise the women who call. The main reason for calling is to report different types of violence towards women: physical, psychological and sexual. Also, women have called to ask for help with mental health struggles caused by gender-related violence and to request information on sexual and reproductive rights. Most of the callers are young women between 18 and 30 years old.³⁵ The hotline was such a success that there is now a national hotline for women all over the country.

35 Secretaría Distrital de la Mujer, 'La Línea Púrpura Distrital "Mujeres que escuchan mujeres" de 12 a 24 horas al día para las mujeres de Bogotá', 13 February 2017, accessed 18 April 2018, <http://www.sdmujer.gov.co/inicio/1137-la-linea-purpura-distrital-mujeres-que-escuchan-mujeres-de-12-a-24-horas-al-dia-para-las-mujeres-de-Bogotá>.


There are two types of assistance offices: one that only provides legal assistance, and one, known as the House for Equal Opportunities for Women, that in addition to legal support offers psychosocial services, workshops and information designed to prevent gender-related crimes and to empower young women. The current administration has set several goals for these agencies, including implementing a strategy for the promotion of women's rights targeted towards girls, boys and teenagers, and performing 20,000 legal consultations and 30,000 psychosocial orientations.³⁶

Since SOFIA was implemented, and in particular the Purple Line in 2015, the reporting of sexual assault and domestic violence has increased for both women and men. Even though the programme has not been evaluated and no causal inference can be made, the improvement in channels of communication between authorities and victims could be one of the reasons that reporting rates are increasing. As seen in Figure 4, the rate of reporting of sexual assault has increased 277% for women and 295% for men in 4 years while the rate of reporting of domestic violence has increased 216% for women and 340% for men. This increase in numbers is alarming, however, due to the under-reporting that characterises these types of crimes, it is a positive sign that victims are speaking out and seeking legal and psychological help.

Figure 4

Rate of sexual assault per 100,000 inhabitants

Rate of domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants



Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.

Additionally, the Women's Secretariat and the police are working to make public spaces safer for women. They are doing this by mapping danger spots for women around the city to address the needs in each one of them. The first information source is the mobile app Safetipin, which uses satellite imagery to identify places that need additional lighting, police or accessibility routes to make them safer for girls and women. They are also using qualitative information provided by women's organisations who know of the danger spots in each locality and can comment on why such places are dangerous for women. Lastly, the mapping of these danger spots identifies the spaces where mediated gender-related crimes have been committed. By identifying these danger spots, the police can better prioritise budget resources to make public spaces safer for women.³⁷

36 Secretaría Distrital de la Mujer, 'Casas de igualdad de oportunidades', 31 July 2017, accessed 18 April 2018, <http://www.sdmujer.gov.co/component/content/article/2-uncategorised/42-casas-de-igualdad-y-oportunidades>.

37 Cristina Velez, 'Bogotá seguridad de las mujeres en el espacio público', interview, Metropolisasociación, 5 April 2017, accessed 18 April 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhFJ_406J40&t=11s.

Finally, over the past ten years, Congress has passed two very important laws protecting women against gender-related violence. These laws directly target SDG 5.C,³⁸ which aims to adopt and strengthen legislation that promotes equality and empowerment of girls and women. The first is law 1257 of 2008 which establishes ‘a set of norms for sensitisation, prevention and sanction towards violence and discrimination against women’.³⁹ This law commits the government to a variety of measures including implementing public policies to guarantee women’s rights, eliminating violence against women inside families and society, and promoting campaigns against gender violence. Also, it makes it explicit that there should be no discrimination or any kind of physical, sexual, psychological or patrimonial mistreatment towards women because of their gender.⁴⁰

In addition, law 1761 of 2015 created the autonomous crime of femicide. Killing a woman because of her gender or gender identity has a sentence of 250 to 500 months of prison. Also, any of the following circumstances before the murder classify as a femicide: having had a family or intimate relationship with the victim and having committed any form of abuse against her, taking advantage of a position of power, and having a background of any type of violence against the victim even if the situation was not reported. This law acknowledges the structural differences in violence towards men and women, increases the time in prison for offenses against women and brings justice to those crimes committed for gender-related reasons.⁴¹

SDG 16 in Bogotá: Promote peace, justice and strong institutions

Working towards the development of a security sector capable of providing accountability, justice and security at the city level, stands out as a crucial element of the Sustainable Development Goals and SDG 16.⁴² Cities with legitimate, accountable and effective security institutions can reduce threats to their citizens and promote a safer environment. That is why the reduction of all kinds of violence, the promotion of the rule of law and the fight against corruption and criminal structures should be objectives pursued by the authorities in a comprehensive way. In this section, the evolution of the homicide rate in Bogotá and citizens’ perceptions regarding security and the police in Bogotá will be presented, as well as how this could prevent institutions from doing their job effectively. Finally, a summary of the intervention in El Bronx, one of Bogotá’s hot spots where many crimes and violations of human rights occurred, will be presented.

Homicide

Even though Colombia has been engaged in armed conflict since the 1950s, with the conflict permeating rural and urban zones of the country, today the homicide rate in Bogotá is one of the lowest among Colombia’s regions.⁴³ Even during the 1990s when drug cartels and armed groups controlled an important part of the national territory, Bogotá’s security indicators remained positive compared to the rest of the country.

Figure 5 shows the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants for the 32 departments of Colombia and the Capital District of Bogotá in 2016. It can be seen that Bogotá’s homicide rate is lower than the country’s average with approximately 15 cases per 100,000 inhabitants.

38 SDG 5.C: adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels

39 Colombia, El Congreso de Colombia, *Ley 1257 de 2008*.


40 Ibid.

41 Colombia, El Congreso de Colombia, *Ley 1761 de 2015*.

42 SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

43 María V. Llorente, Rodolfo Escobedo, Camilo Echandía and Mauricio Rubio, ‘Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá’, *Sociologías* 4, no. 8 (2002): 172–205.


Figure 5: Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants and department of Colombia – 2016



Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.

For the last two decades, homicide rates in Colombia have been decreasing, and this trend can also be observed in Bogotá.⁴⁴ Figure 6 shows the progression of the homicide rate for Colombia and Bogotá since 2003, respectively. Two main elements stand out: firstly, Bogotá’s homicide rate has been below the national average for over ten years. Moreover, between 2007 and 2016, excluding 2011, the homicide rate fell.

Figure 6: Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants



Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.

According to Bogotá’s Security Secretariat, for the period 2014 to 2016, approximately 90% of victims were men between 20 and 34 years old, more than the 50% of the cases were committed with firearms and most of the homicides were associated with the consumption of alcohol and other psychoactive substances.⁴⁵

44 FIP, *Crimen organizado, intensidad y focalización de la violencia homicida en Bogotá. Una mirada de largo plazo* (Bogotá: FIP, 2013).


45 Secretaría de Seguridad, Convivencia y Justicia, ‘Plan integral de Seguridad, Convivencia Ciudadana y Justicia 2017–2020’, (2017), <https://scj.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion/PISCJ.pdf>.

The information above suggests that, unlike in the early 1990s, homicides in Bogotá are not necessarily related to the armed conflict, but reflect the phenomena of intolerance, shifts in values and urban crime, which are common spillovers from war.

Even though homicide rates appear to have stagnated since 2012, other crimes in Bogotá have increased. As discussed above, robbery, fights and intrafamily violence are the most common crimes affecting people in Bogotá today. This phenomenon has influenced citizens' perception of the overall security situation in the city and has shaped their reactions to the problem.

As seen in Figure 7, although burglary in residences and business establishments has remained stable over the last 15 years, robberies have dramatically increased. Robberies and thefts are classified as different types of crimes; robberies normally occur in public spaces (parks, streets, public transportation, etc.) and the victim is always present, while burglary occurs when there is an entry to an establishment to commit theft. The 64,172 cases of robbery reported in 2017 show that insecurity in public spaces is an important challenge to be met. Additionally, the Survey of Perception and Victimization carried out by Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce shows that the most common crime in the city is robbery, as 77% of people who were victims of any crime, were victims of robbery.

Figure 7: Theft crimes in Bogotá 2003–2017




Source: SIEDCO. DIJIN. Graph produced by the author.

However, this sharp increase in robbery could partly be explained by an increase in reporting. Analysis of the Survey of Urban Security (Encuesta de convivencia y seguridad ciudadana - ECSC) carried out by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE), reveals that the victimisation rate has risen 7% in the past three years – not as steeply as cases of robbery reported by the police, which increased 133% during the same period.

The increase in the reports of robbery has a negative effect on the perception of security in public spaces. According to the ECSC, 87% of citizens felt unsafe in Bogotá in 2017. This figure has increased 18% over the last three years. Moreover, perception of insecurity in public spaces has also risen. As shown in Figure 8, the proportion of people who believe security in public spaces (such as parks, streets and

malls) has become worse, is higher in 2017 than in 2016. Similarly, those who believe that security in those areas has improved were fewer in 2017 than in 2016. Therefore, citizens in Bogotá believe their public spaces are not safe.

Figure 8: Perception of security in public spaces
People who believe insecurity has increased **People who believe insecurity has decreased**



Source: Survey of Urban Security. DANE. Graph produced by the author.

To mitigate the problem of feeling unsafe in public spaces, the security sector has implemented two main policies in the last few years: hotspot interventions and public surveillance cameras. The hotspot interventions were a combined effort of the Security Secretariat, responsible for planning and design, and the police, responsible for carrying out the interventions. The programme consisted of identifying the spots where most crimes were committed and then increasing both the time of police patrol in those areas and the municipal services in some of them to make them safer. The interventions took place between 9 February and 14 October 2016 and were designed to enable evaluation. The results of the evaluation show that intensive policing improved security in the hotspots, but that crime might have been displaced to nearby streets.⁴⁶


The Security Secretariat also planned the installation of surveillance cameras in 2,703 sites around the city. The cameras are connected to a surveillance system monitored by civilian security companies and the police. The cameras are expected to contribute to an increase in the cost of committing crimes.⁴⁷ This is because ‘certainty of punishment can increase by means of changes in the probability of arrest, the probability of prosecution given arrest, or the probability of sentencing given prosecution’. Camera footage provides substantial evidence for sentencing and prosecution, and criminals are more likely to be caught while committing offences if streets are being monitored by camera. In Medellín, a similar intervention was carried out by the city’s administration. There, crime decreased 23.5% in coverage zones relative to zones with no camera coverage, as did the number of arrests, which decreased 31.5% compared to areas with no intervention. Therefore, the installation of surveillance cameras in Bogotá is expected to have similar effects to those in Medellín, resulting in a positive effect on safety in public spaces.

46 Christopher Blattman, Donald P. Green, Daniel Ortega and Santiago Tobón, ‘Place Based Interventions at Scale: The Direct and Spillover Effects of Policing and City Services on Crime’, NBER Working Paper No. 23941 (October 2017), accessed 15 April 2018, <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23941>.

47 Santiago Gomez-Cardona, Daniel Mejia and Santiago Tobon, ‘The Deterrent Effect of Public Surveillance Cameras on Crime’, Document CEDO No. 2017-09 (February 2017), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2912947>.

From 2015 to 2017, robbery rates per 100,000 inhabitants rose. Data shows two interesting but puzzling results. On one hand, the population perceives effects of the increase in the robbery rate. On the other hand, Figure 9 shows how the victimization rate has been relatively stable over the past years. This difference could be illustrating a problem of reporting and/or under-reporting.


Figure 9: Victimization rate (ECSC) and robbery rate



Source: Encuesta de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana (ECSC). Graph produced by the author.

In Figure 10, results from the ECSC are presented. It can be seen that in 2015 the proportion of people surveyed that felt unsafe had increased from 2014, but since then, it has remained roughly constant. In general, however, a large part of the population perceives Bogotá as an unsafe city.


Figure 10: Perception of security



Source: Encuesta de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana. Graph produced by the author.

Figure 11 presents the percentage of surveyed people that report crime to the authorities. After 2015 there is an increase of 40% in the reporting rate, however, percentages of reporting are still very low.

Figure 11: Did you report the crime?



Source: Encuesta de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana. Graph produced by the author.


In summary, for the past five years Bogotá has had a relatively stable homicide rate but an increase in crimes such as robbery. This could be negatively influencing citizens' perception of security, which is shown by the fact that more than 80% of those surveyed believe they are living in an unsafe city. But this preoccupation does not necessarily translate into an active reaction among the population. What the ECSC shows is that the victimisation rate, compared to the number of cases identified by the authorities, and the percentage of people in Bogotá that report the crime, is significantly low.

Perception and under-reporting of crimes: Mistrust towards the police and the judicial system

To understand why this is happening, it is worth reviewing the perception Bogotá residents have of the police. In 2017, the Centro de Estudios sobre Seguridad y Drogas (CESED) carried out a survey of drug consumption in Bogotá and Medellín. Questions concerning the city's institutions were included in the survey, so it is possible to identify citizens' perceptions of the police.


Figure 12 presents the distribution of the answers people gave about how often they thought the police justified their decisions and actions, made fair and impartial decisions, and treated people with respect. Responses to the three questions demonstrate that the clear majority thought that these events did not happen very often. In particular, it is perceived that when a victim reports a crime, poor people are treated worse than rich people, as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 12: Perception of the police



Source: CESED. Encuesta del consumo de Drogas en Bogotá y Medellín. Graph produced by the author.

Figure 13: When victims report a crime, do the police treat rich or poor people worse?



Source: CESED. Encuesta del consumo de Drogas en Bogotá y Medellín. Graph produced by the author.

These two graphs reveal a critical situation in the relationship between the population and the police. In general, people believe that the police are neither partial nor unbiased while fulfilling their duty. This creates a feeling of mistrust towards the institutions that provide security in the city. According to the 2017 Poll of Perception and Victimization of Bogotá, most citizens believe that the action to be prioritised in order to improve security in Bogotá is to put an end to police corruption.⁴⁸ As long as these institutions are not seen as effective, just and unbiased agents that can enforce the rule of law and fulfil their duty, it will be hard for citizens to rely on them for security provision.⁴⁹ In Bogotá, 65% of victims do not report the crime. 78% of these do not report either because the process takes up too much time, because of a lack of confidence in authorities or because the process is too complicated.

48 Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 'Encuesta de percepción y victimización en Bogotá', Vicepresidencia de Gestión Cívica y Social y Dirección de Seguridad y Convivencia (2017), <http://hdl.handle.net/11520/19393>.
 49 H. Zuleta, 'Construir legitimidad y confianza: Un reto inaplazable de las instituciones responsables de las políticas públicas de seguridad ciudadana y justicia en América Latina y el Caribe', Semana de la Seguridad Ciudadana (2017).

That citizens do not report crime relates to the fact that they do not trust the judicial system, either. In the 2017 Bogotá Poll of Perception and Victimisation, 12% of citizens believe that in order to improve security, the main course of action must be to improve the judicial system.⁵⁰ On average, every day 60 people are arrested for robbery in Bogotá. Yet, most of them are set free the same day. As mentioned by Enrique Peñalosa, the mayor of the capital city, even people who are captured several times a year never set a foot behind bars.⁵¹ Some argue that criminal justice in Colombia suffers from many loopholes. Judge Jairo Alfonso Bustos Vásquez points out that the law allows a criminal to compensate the victim the same day.⁵² If, for example, in the case of a robbery, the perpetrator gives back the stolen item, the victim may be judicially compensated and the perpetrator set free.

Former Secretary of Security, Daniel Mejia, has outlined several complaints about the problem of recidivism in Bogotá. He states that in the last four years, 26,865 people have been caught committing crimes more than once in Bogotá.⁵³ As shown by Garzón, Llorente and Suárez, recidivists erode confidence in the judicial system and create a situation in which citizens do not file charges.⁵⁴ In Colombia, 37% of prisoners that are set free after they have served their sentence are sentenced again within the next five years.⁵⁵ Bogotá holds the record for the individual who has been arrested the most often – 52 times, which is an average of every 17 days.

Even if criminals are captured and sentenced, jails in Bogotá face a major crisis due to overcrowding. In fact, estimates suggested by *El Espectador* indicate that jails in Bogotá exceed their capacity by 63%.⁵⁶ Penitentiary centres that suffer from a lack of funds and face problems of overcrowding often become ‘universities of crime’. As pointed out by Garzón, Llorente and Suárez, jails with overcrowding problems reinforce patterns of criminal behaviour and enable prisoners to develop connections in the criminal world.⁵⁷ This increases the probability of recidivism, which in turn also increases citizens’ perception of uncertainty.

This situation is a clear barrier to achieving SDG 16.6, which aims for the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions.⁵⁸ Security agents, such as the police and the district attorney, need correct and reliable information to provide a better service. Good databases and information systems are necessary to design effective security strategies and assertive public policies. Nevertheless, what the data from the previous figures suggests is that citizens are not reporting crime. As a result, authorities are losing a primary source of evidence that would help them develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions. As shown, Bogotá suffers from a snowball effect: the state cannot take action due to a lack of reporting. Citizens do not report because of a lack of trust in both the judicial system and the police force. This leads to an obstacle for the state to act accordingly against crime.

50 Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, ‘Encuesta de percepción y victimización en Bogotá’.

51 Noticias Caracol, ‘¿Por qué que quedan libres los ladrones capturados en flagrancia o cuyos crímenes son grabados?’, 20 January 2018, accessed 24 July 2018, <https://noticias.caracol.com/Bogotá/por-que-que-quedan-libres-los-ladrones-capturados-en-flagrancia-o-cuyos-crímenes-son-grabados>.

52 Noticias Caracol, ‘¿Por qué que quedan libres los ladrones capturados en flagrancia o cuyos crímenes son grabados?’

53 Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, ‘Más de 26 mil delincuentes han sido reincidentes en Bogotá: Secretario de Seguridad’, 25 August 2018, accessed 18 August 2018, <http://www.bogota.gov.co/temas-de-ciudad/gobierno-seguridad-y-convivencia/delincuentes-reincidentes-en-bogota>.

54 Juan Carlos Garzón, María Victoria Llorente and Manuela Suárez, ‘¿Qué hacer con la reincidencia delincencial? El problema y sus posibles soluciones’, Serie Notas Estratégicas 04 (Bogotá: FIP 2018).

55 Santiago Tobón, ‘Condiciones de reclusión y reincidencia: evidencia de una expansión de cupos carcelario’, *Documento CEDE* No. 2017-07 (April 2017), <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921477>.

56 Juan David Moreno, ‘Cárceles, URI y estaciones de Policía: con la capacidad desbordada’, *El Espectador*, 10 November 2017, <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/carceles-uri-y-estaciones-de-policia-con-la-capacidad-desbordada-articulo-722563>.

57 Garzón, Llorente and Suárez, ‘¿Qué hacer con la reincidencia delincencial? El problema y sus posibles soluciones.’

58 SDG 16.6: develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

Leopoldo Fergusson exemplifies the snowball effect in Colombia with the provision of public goods.⁵⁹ When the state provides a low level of public goods, demand also falls because citizens turn to the private sector. Therefore, there is no need to increase the level of provision. In Bogotá, this is evident with the use of private security, especially companies specialised in security. According to the report from the Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada, Bogotá has 203,956 companies specialised in security, with the industry moving more than 9.8 billion pesos (approximately USD 3.6 million) a year.⁶⁰ Hiring a security guard for a private building costs around 8.6 minimum-wage salaries. Still, people that earn a minimal salary often live in buildings or neighbourhoods that employ a security guard.⁶¹ As most of the guards do not have permission to shoot and none have the authority to arrest an offender, they are hired primarily as a preventive strategy.

Breaking the chain

Breaking the chain of factors leading to a lack of quality in the provision of public services is difficult. One of the strategies is to invest a large amount of resources into providing high quality public services. The construction and restoration of parks around the city is also a way to target SDG 16, as it promotes access to safe public spaces as well as increasing state presence. Bogotá's current administration led by Enrique Peñalosa believes that recreational areas such as parks are important for improving citizens' quality of life and that they should be green and accessible to all. He has therefore promised to restore parks currently in poor condition, build 100 synthetic sport fields and 7 multi-purpose parks, invest in lighting in existing parks, and plant trees and vegetation around parks. As of May 2018, the administration has opened 55 synthetic fields and has restored 103 parks and sporting facilities. These interventions are important to the achievement of SDG 16 because, on one hand, studies show that increasing vegetation in Bogotá reduces crime⁶² and well-managed recreational spaces may encourage teenagers to engage in non-crime related activities.⁶³

Today's administration is also financing an initiative that is worth mentioning. Better information could improve perceptions of safety and lower distrust in the police.⁶⁴ Some efforts have been made to collect a bigger sample of the number of crimes committed in Bogotá and to make the whole process of reporting infractions easier and more accessible. ADenunciar is an application designed by the general attorney and the National Police that enables citizens to report crimes online. With this tool, if people have access to internet, they no longer have to go to police stations or Unidades de Reacción Inmediata (URI) to report a crime. Users fill out a document with personal data and describe the crime. In less than 24 hours, a judicial police officer checks the information and if it is correct, the case is assigned to a prosecutor.

This application could also help towards the completion of SDG16.3,⁶⁵ which promotes the rule of law and ensures equal access to justice for all. ADenunciar's reach across the population could be greater than that of the police and general attorney, which can only be accessed through their physical offices. The app could be a mechanism used by authorities to promote the rule of law while improving the presence of the state in places like the slums where it does not have the monopoly and control of security.

59 Leopoldo Fergusson, 'Who Wants Violence? The Political Economy of Conflict and State Building in Colombia', *Documentos Cede* No. 2017-67 (December 2017), <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:015890>.

60 Supervigilancia, 'Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada', 2017, accessed 18 August 2018, www.supervigilancia.gov.co.

61 Jorge Piñeros, 'Seguridad: un tema prioritario en edificios y conjuntos', *El Tiempo*, 13 April 2018, accessed 18 August 2018, <https://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/recomendaciones-para-contratar-la-seguridad-privada-en-edificios-y-conjuntos-204822>.

62 Fernando Carriazo and Jorge Tovar, 'Arborización y crimen urbano en Bogotá (Trees and Urban Crime in Bogotá)', *Document Cede* No. 2016-37 (December 2016), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940428>.

63 Raul Caruso, 'Crime and Sport Participation: Evidence from Italian Regions over the Period 1997–2003', *Journal of Socio-Economics* 40, no. 5 (2011): 455–63.

64 Martin Ardanaz, Ana Corbacho and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega, *Mind the Gap: Bridging the Perception and Reality of Crime Rates with Information* (Inter-American Development Bank, 2014).

65 SDG 16.3: promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all

Conclusions

One of the problems faced by the institutions responsible for providing security and justice services is the population's lack of confidence. If citizens do not trust institutions, reporting rates are low and therefore impunity is high. Likewise, prevention efforts carried out by institutions without legitimacy are not welcomed by citizens and therefore do not produce significant results. This implies that adequate and efficient provision of security and justice services, from prevention through control, investigation, judicialisation, condemnation and rehabilitation, among institutions responsible for the provision of such services must be legitimate.

The causal relationship between trust and effectiveness of institutions is twofold: low confidence and high crime rates are two sides of the same phenomenon and to improve insecurity and the lack of legitimacy of institutions, it is necessary to confront these two problems. To do this, security and coexistence policies must be continuous, with stable resources and a long-term strategy.

In order to increase trust and legitimacy, there must be a broad and transparent information system. This would facilitate communication between individuals and the city government. This system must include, in addition to official statistics, information collected by civil society organisations. In the same way, the system must include qualitative information that helps to understand the context of young people at risk of committing crimes.

The image of Transmilenio needs to be improved. The efforts made by the city government in terms of police force allocation and fining offenders are not enough. There must be investment in order to improve the transportation system and communicate in an effective way with users so that they defend the public good. Similarly, municipal educational campaigns must continue.

The judicial system is not effective. Prisons are overcrowded, criminals who are a real threat often do not go to prison, even when they are caught in the act of committing an offence, recidivism is high and the cost of committing crime is low. The use of technological tools can increase the efficiency of security and justice systems. For example, Machine Learning techniques can be used to quickly review the records of suspects and determine the risk of recidivism. This technique can help to determine which individuals should go to prison and which ones should not, thus contributing to increased security in the streets and less overcrowding in the prisons. Similarly, apps for reporting crime reduce costs and help the official tracking of crimes committed in the city. Finally, an increase in prison capacity and an effort to improve prison conditions for prisoners is also required.

SOFIA and the Purple Line are helping communication between women and institutions. Gender violence and domestic violence are abhorrent in themselves but also engender other types of violence. Children who grow up in violent environments often reproduce this behaviour when they reach adulthood. In this sense, the effects of SOFIA and Purple Line are likely to have positive long-term effects.

Investment in parks, recreation and restoration of existing parks help improve perception of safety and provide children, woman, the elderly and persons with disabilities with access to public spaces. The provision of public goods can also help to build legitimacy and confidence in institutions.

The Sustainable Development Goals seek to strengthen universal peace within a larger freedom. Eradicating poverty is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. The goals and targets should stimulate action areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet. For the case of security in Bogotá, the most relevant is Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Building government programmes according to the SDGs would help align the incentives of each administration with long-term goals and could serve to make individuals and their well-being the ultimate goal of policy. This implies that the government plan

of any administration must include the following objectives: (i) universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green public spaces; (ii) safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all; (iii) reduce all forms of violence against women and girls in the public and private spheres; (iv) development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions.

Bibliography

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. 'Más de 26 mil delincuentes han sido reincidentes en Bogotá: secretario de Seguridad.' 25 August 2017. Accessed 18 August 2018. <http://www.bogota.gov.co/temas-de-ciudad/gobierno-seguridad-y-convivencia/delincuentes-reincidentes-en-bogota>.

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. 'Tras dos años de toma del Bronx, habitantes de calle contarán con 5 nuevos centros de atención.' 30 May 2018. Accessed 18 August 2018. <http://www.bogota.gov.co/bronx-Bogotá/noticias/tras-dos-anos-de-toma-del-bronx-habitantes-de-calle-contaran-con-5-nuevos-centros-de-atencion>.

Alvarez, Monica, and Laura Fernanda Orozco. 'Ciudad Bolívar: la historia de una lucha colectiva.' Centro de Memoria Histórica. 4 June 2015. Accessed 18 April 2018. <http://centromemoria.gov.co/ciudad-bolivar-la-historia-de-una-lucha-colectiva/>.

Ardanaz, Martin, Ana Corbacho and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega. *Mind the Gap: Bridging the Perception and Reality of Crime Rates with Information*. Inter-American Development Bank, 2014.

Ávila, Ariel and Bernandro Pérez. *Mercados de criminalidad en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Editorial Linotipia Bolívar, 2011.

Becker, Gary S. 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.' In *Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment*, edited by Gary S. Becker and William M. Landes, 1–54. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974. <https://www.nber.org/chapters/c3625.pdf>.

Blattman, Christopher, Donald P. Green, Daniel Ortega and Santiago Tobón. 'Place Based Interventions at Scale: The Direct and Spillover Effects of Policing and City Services on Crime.' National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 23941. Issued October 2017. Accessed 15 April 2018. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23941>.

Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá. 'Encuesta de percepción y victimización en Bogotá.' Vicepresidencia de Gestión Cívica y Social Dirección de Seguridad y Convivencia. October 2017. <http://hdl.handle.net/11520/19393>.

Carriazo, Fernando and Jorge Tovar. 'Arborización y crimen urbano en Bogotá (Trees and Urban Crime in Bogotá).' *Documento CEDE* No. 2016-37 (December 2016). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940428>.

Caruso, Raul. 'Crime and Sport Participation: Evidence from Italian Regions over the Period 1997–2003.' *Journal of Socio-Economics* 40, no. 5 (2011): 455-63. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.003>.

Centro de Pensamiento y Acción para la Transición and Pares en Acción Reacción Contra la Exclusión Social ONG. *Destapando la olla: Informes sombra sobre la Intervención en el Bronx*. Bogotá: CPAT and Parces ONG, 2017.

Chaparro, Irma. *Evaluación del impacto económico del transporte urbano en la ciudad de Bogotá. El caso del sistema de transporte masivo, Transmilenio*. Serie Recursos Naturales a Infraestructura no. 48. CEPAL, October 2002.

Colombia, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2015.

Colombia. Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991.

Colombia. Corte Constitucional de la República de Colombia, 2014

Colombia. El Congreso de Colombia. *Ley 1761 de 2015*

Colombia. El Congreso de Colombia. *Ley 1257 de 2008*.

Colprensa Press Agency. 'Alcalde Petro invitó a marchar contra Transmilenio el 11 de marzo.' *La República*, 5 March 2014. Accessed 15 April 2018. <https://www.larepublica.co/economia/alcalde-petro-invito-a-marchar-contr-transmilenio-el-11-de-marzo-2103465>.

Córdoba, Adriana, Alexandra Rodríguez, Juan Carlos López, Carlos Julio Piedra, María Catalina Parra and María Lucía de La Cruz. *Marco normativo y de gestión para la seguridad y la convivencia ciudadana en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Veeduría Distrital, 2015.

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. *Censo habitantes de la calle Bogotá*. Bogotá: DANE y Ministerio de Salud Secretaría Distrital de Integración social, 2012.

Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 'Inequality and Violent Crime.' *The Journal of Law and Economics* 45, no. 1 (April 2002): 1–39. <https://doi.org/10.1086/338347>.

Fergusson, Leopoldo. 'Who Wants Violence? The Political Economy of Conflict and State Building in Colombia.' *Documento CEDE* No. 2017-67 (December 2017). <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:015890>.

Fundación Ideas para la Paz. *Crimen organizado, intensidad y focalización de la violencia homicida en Bogotá. Una mirada de largo plazo*. Bogotá: FIP, 2013.

Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá. *Políticas y programas de seguridad ciudadana en Bogotá 2008–2014*. Cuadernos de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2015.

Garzón, Juan Carlos, María Victoria Llorente and Manuela Suárez. ¿Qué hacer con la reincidencia delictual? El problema y sus posibles soluciones. Serie Notas Estratégicas 04. Bogotá: FIP, 2018.

Garzón, Juan Carlos, Julián Wilches and José Luis Bernal. *Las revelaciones del Bronx. Intervención de zonas de alta complejidad: Desafíos y alternativas*. Bogotá: FIP, 2017.

Gomez, Alberto, Hernando Zuleta and Pablo Zuleta. 'Habitantes de calle, seguridad y adicción: Opciones Jurídicas con sustento médico (Street Dwellers, Security and Addiction: Legal Options with Medical Support).' *Documento CEDE* No. 2017-53 (September 2017). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3046827>.

Gomez-Cardona, Santiago, Daniel Mejía and Santiago Tobón. 'The Deterrent Effect of Public Surveillance Cameras on Crime.' *Documento CEDE* No. 2017-09 (February 2017). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2912947>.

Justo, Marcelo. '¿Cuáles son los 6 países más desiguales de América Latina?' BBC Mundo. Accessed 18 August 2018. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2016/03/160308_america_latina_economia_desigualdad_ab.

Kelly, Morgan. 'Inequality and Crime.' *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 82, no. 4 (2000): 530–39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646649>.

Llorente, María Victoria, Rodolfo Escobedo, Camilo Echandía and Mauricio Rubio. 'Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá.' *Sociologías* 4, no. 8 (2002): 172–205.

Llorente, María Victoria and Angela Rivas. *Estudio de caso: La caída del crimen en Bogotá: una década de políticas de seguridad ciudadana*. Washington, D.C.: Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento / World Bank, 2005.

McIlwaine, Cathy and Caroline Moser. 'Poverty, Violence and Livelihood Security in Urban Colombia and Guatemala.' *Progress in Development Studies* 3, no. 2 (April 2003): 113–130. <https://doi.org/10.1191/1464993403ps056ra>

Medicina Legal. *2016 Forensis. Datos para la vida* 18, no. 1 (June 2017). Accessed 23 April 2018. [http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/documents/20143/49526/Forensis 2016. Datos para la vida.pdf](http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/documents/20143/49526/Forensis+2016.+Datos+para+la+vida.pdf).

Moreno, Álvaro José. 'Impacto del Transmilenio en el crimen de la Avenida Caracas y sus vecindades.' *Document CEDE* No. 2005-55 (September 2005). https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/d2005-55.pdf.

Moreno, Juan David. 'Cárceles, URI y estaciones de Policía: con la capacidad desbordada.' *El Espectador*, 10 November 2017. <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/carceles-uri-y-estaciones-de-policia-con-la-capacidad-desbordada-articulo-722563>.

Noticias Caracol. '¿Por qué que quedan libres los ladrones capturados en flagrancia o cuyos crímenes son grabados?' 20 January 2018. Accessed July 24 of 2018. <https://noticias.caracoltv.com/bogota/por-que-que-quedan-libres-los-ladrones-capturados-en-flagrancia-o-cuyos-crimenes-son-grabados>.

Noticias RCN. "'Transmilenio Colapsó': Petro sobre los problemas del sistema.' *RCN*, 14 October 2014. Accessed 15 April 2018. <https://www.noticiasrcn.com/nacional-Bogotá/transmilenio-colapso-petro>.

Piñeros, Jorge. 'Seguridad: un tema prioritario en edificios y conjuntos.' *El Tiempo*, 13 April 2018. Accessed 18 August 2018. <https://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/recomendaciones-para-contratar-la-seguridad-privada-en-edificios-y-conjuntos-204822>.

Secretaría de Seguridad, Convivencia y Justicia. 'Plan integral de Seguridad, Convivencia Ciudadana y Justicia 2017–2020.' 2017. <https://scj.gov.co/sites/default/files/planeacion/PISCJ.pdf>.

Secretaría Distrital de la Mujer. 'Casas De Igualdad De Oportunidades.' 31 July 2017. Accessed 18 April 2018. <http://www.sdmujer.gov.co/component/content/article/2-uncategorised/42-casas-de-igualdad-y-oportunidades>.

Secretaría Distrital de la Mujer. 'La Línea Púrpura distrital "Mujeres que escuchan mujeres" de 12 a 24 horas al día para las mujeres de Bogotá.' 13 February 2017. Accessed 18 April 2018. <http://www.sdmujer.gov.co/inicio/1137-la-linea-purpura-distrital-mujeres-que-escuchan-mujeres-de-12-a-24-horas-al-dia-para-las-mujeres-de-bogota>.

Supervigilancia. 'Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada.' 2017. Accessed 18 August 2018. www.supervigilancia.gov.co.

Tauchen, Helen V., Ann Dryden Witte and Sharon K. Long. 'Domestic Violence: A Non-Random Affair.' *International Economic Review* 32, No. 2 (May 1991): 491–511.

Tobón, Santiago. 'Condiciones de reclusión y reincidencia: evidencia de una expansión de cupos carcelario (Prison Conditions and Recidivism: Evidence from an Expansion in Prison Capacity).' *Document CEDE* No. 2017-07 (February 2017). <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921477>.

Torres, Iván Arturo. 'Conflicto armado, crimen organizado y disputas por la hegemonía en soacha y el sur de Bogotá.' MA thesis, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2011. <http://hdl.handle.net/10554/1571>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data*. Vienna: UNODC, 2011.

Veeduría Distrital. 'Estado de la política pública de seguridad y convivencia de Bogotá D.C.' Bogotá D.C., April 2017. [http://veeduriadistrital.gov.co/sites/default/files/files/Estado%20de%20la%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20Pública%20de%20Seguridad%20y%20Convivencia%20de%20Bogotá%20-2017%20\(28%20abr%2017\)VF.pdf](http://veeduriadistrital.gov.co/sites/default/files/files/Estado%20de%20la%20Pol%C3%ADtica%20Pública%20de%20Seguridad%20y%20Convivencia%20de%20Bogotá%20-2017%20(28%20abr%2017)VF.pdf).

Velez, Cristina. 'Bogotá seguridad de las mujeres en el espacio público.' Interview. *Metropolisasociacion*. 5 April 2017. Accessed 18 April 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhFJ_406J40&t=11s.

W Radio. 'Distrito responde ante denuncias por presencia de grupos armados en Ciudad Bolívar.' Interview with Daniel Mejía. 3 May 2018. Accessed 8 May 2018. <http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/bogota/distrito-responde-ante-denuncias-por-presencia-de-grupos-armados-en-ciudad-bolivar/20180503/nota/3745201.aspx>.

Zuleta, H. 'Construir legitimidad y confianza: Un reto inaplazable de las instituciones responsables de las políticas públicas de seguridad ciudadana y justicia en América Latina y el Caribe.' *Semana de la Seguridad Ciudadana*, 2017.

Zygmunt Bauman. *Collateral Damage: Social Inequalities in a Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity Books, 2011.

About this case study

Security in Bogotá presents an interesting case study for today's urban safety agenda. On the one hand, Bogotá is the capital of Colombia, a country that since the 1960s has experienced a complex armed conflict triggering extreme violence across the national territory. On the other hand, Bogotá has not experienced the high crime rates, nor the increasing rates of homicide that other urban and rural regions have suffered; the city seems to have its own security environment. This paper therefore aims to describe some of the characteristics that differentiate Bogotá from other cities in Colombia and the relevance for these programmes, policies and challenges under the scope of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 11, SDG 5 and SDG 16, putting forward those that could determine public security policy for the city. Section 1 briefly recounts Bogotá's historical, political and administrative contexts. Section 2 focuses on the discussion around the security situation in public spaces such as public transportation, slums and parks in light of SDG 11. Section 3 describes local government efforts to improve the city's rates of crime and violence against women with relevance for SDG 5. Section 4 looks at SDG 16 and the evolution of homicide rates in Bogotá and citizens' perception of the police and the judicial system. It also explores a possible hypothesis about the relationship between citizens' perception of the state and the state's efficiency.

About DCAF

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation dedicated to making states and people safer, within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights. DCAF works towards this ultimate objective by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms based on international norms and best practices, and in response to specific local contexts and challenges.