

## **PREFACE**

True to its mandate, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) focused its initial activities immediately after its creation on South Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

In its short existence, DCAF has supported and initiated over a hundred seminars, publications and international cooperation projects. After being heavily engaged in strategically advising then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kostunica on security sector reform during the transition period after Milosevic's fall, DCAF offered to set up an International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) for South East Europe (SEE), actively supports both the Demobilization and Retraining effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Border Management Reform in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia & Montenegro. With studies such as this one, DCAF substantively supports the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the SEEGROUP.

In the field of Parliamentary Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector, DCAF will make the Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight (jointly edited with the Inter-Parliamentary Union and published 2003) available in Albanian, Macedonian and Serbian. This handbook, together with other materials of foundational character prepared by DCAF, will be used in DCAF-organised seminars for parliamentarians and committee staffers.

This present study is the result of the close cooperation between DCAF and the Partnership for Peace Consortium Working Group on Security Sector Reform. The research programme was conceptually prepared by experts from the region within the Partnership for Peace Consortium Working Group on Security Sector Reform. The Working Group meetings were repeatedly made available for discussion of the progress made. The present book aptly reflects the excellent possibilities and opportunities the Consortium provides for comparative and cross-country studies. The Consortium provides for just this kind of meeting of

like-minded experts and comprehensive area studies. It is unique in this respect, and deserves our attention and support.

Philipp Fluri, Ph.D.  
DCAF Deputy Director

# INTRODUCTION

The present study was conceptually prepared and implemented on a mandate of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, together with three more stock-taking programmes on behalf of the Stability Pact Table III Quick Start Programme as bases for policy decision-making. The four studies, intended to supply decision-makers with analytical data on the status of select aspects of the security sector and security sector reform, will be published and made available for discussion in the first half of 2003.

These extensive programmes in SEE countries funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland on behalf of the Stability Pact and executed by DCAF reflect a profound concern with transparency-building, democratic oversight and reform of the security sector in the region. The programmes are: The South East Europe Documentation Network; The Stock-Taking Programme; The Transparency in Defense Procurements Programme; and The Needs Assessment in Expert Formation.

## *1. The South East Europe Documentation Network (SEEDON)*

Managed by DCAF in partnership with Tetracom (Sofia, Bulgaria) and ISN (Zurich, Switzerland), SEEDON ([www.seedon.org](http://www.seedon.org)) makes civil-military relations and security sector reform programmes in SEE countries accessible and transparent, supports the (emerging) security community in SEE and provides the international community with substantive SEE data via an eponymous website. SEEDON provides international practitioners and academic researchers in the field of civil-military relations and the democratic control of security sector with a network of regional and local partners and the possibility of on-line data access.

To do this, the network identifies governmental and non-governmental institutions working in the field of democratic control of the security sector, initiates documentation programmes on democratic control of the

security sector based on publicly available data and makes the data publicly accessible, creates the possibility of training and instruction for all institutions and individuals who are part of the regional network, and equips them with the means to participate in on-line projects. SEEDON information is contained in its four services: the SEEDON Document Library; the SEEDON Links Library the SEEDON Events Calendar; and the SEEDON Events Calendar.

## *2. Security Sector Reform Stock-Taking Programme*

On a mandate from the Stability Pact Table III on Security and the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DCAF invited six South East European governments to participate in a four-part Stock-Taking Programme on Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform during 2002. The aim of the programme was to further assist the democratic re-shaping of civil-military relations in the region and to create substantive and transparent mechanisms for the democratic and civilian control of the security sector.

The structured research programme had four elements: Expert Self-Assessment; Expert Workshop; Consolidation; and Publication. The findings of these six country studies will be published in book form in April 2003 and handed over to the Stability Pact for further discussion. Given the considerable overlap in the research objectives of the SEESTUDY and the present study, the DCAF Directorial Board was delighted to make the findings available to the SEEGROUP in January 2003.

## *3. Transparency in Defense Procurements Programme*

The purpose of the investigation is to gauge how open (or transparent) the conduct of military affairs are in eight SEE countries. The Transparency assessment seeks to establish data on existing and planned practices in SEE and to make them available in the SEEDON framework on the internet. The project is run by CESS/Groningen on a commission from DCAF.

The research produces a portfolio of Country Transparency Profiles (CTPs) which, after review, will be brought together and presented – with some comparative analysis – as a regional Transparency Audit Paper (TAP), incorporating a provisional ‘ranking’ of the eight states from this standpoint. The findings provide the basis for prescriptions about transparency-building: what needs to be done to improve matters, and how it might be done. Regarding the international dimension, information is sought particularly on arrangements for data-exchange on military outlays, budgets and spending intentions (including compliance with the OSCE’s reporting requirements).

#### *4. Needs Assessment in Expert Formation*

This programme seeks to establish demands and needs for future expert formation programmes in the security sector reform and democratic oversight of the security sector in SEE countries. Firstly, the project looks into and documents the actual supply of training and formation for both civilian and military experts in both fields. Secondly, the needs and demands for such formation as prescribed by official representatives in the region are documented. Thirdly, the efficiency of relevant training programmes for those needs and their impact on society is assessed. Finally, recommendations for future training and formation programmes are formulated. The research was structured to rigorously elucidate the current extent and status of relevant knowledge bases, personnel, institutions, security sector practices.

The present study is the result of a fruitful cooperation between the Partnership for Peace Consortium Working Group on Security Sector Reform and DCAF. The editors would like to express their gratitude to the Working Group, and especially chairperson Anja Ebnöther who kindly provided an informational text on the Consortium (annex 4), and coordinator Marlene Urscheler who prepared and implemented the Consortium questionnaire/opinion poll<sup>1</sup> and made the results available to

---

<sup>1</sup> Questionnaires were distributed to all members of the PFP-Consortium. The purpose of this questionnaire was threefold. First, it provided an overview of existing programmes of security expert formation. Secondly, the survey tried to assess what was needed to guarantee effective democratic oversight of the security sector. The third step included

us. DCAF research associate Stefan Imobersteg expertly summarised the texts. Eden Cole edited the texts and brought them into a print-ready format.

The Editors

---

specific recommendations on the type training courses that should be offered to every group. Questionnaire findings will be available on the PfP website: <http://www.pfpconsortium.org>







# **PART I: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT BY REGIONAL EXPERTS**

## **Introduction**

Experts on Security Sector Reform and institutional aspects of the security sector from all South East European countries were invited to provide assessment and additional information on a range of questions grouped under four headings:

- (1) What are the priorities and the time plan for democratic oversight and reform of the security sector in your country?
- (2) How has expert formation in democratic oversight and the reform of the security sector been organised until now? How are experts on the institutional aspects of the security sector trained? What opportunities were provided by governmental and non-governmental organisations on the national, regional and international levels?
- (3) Do the offered possibilities square with the priorities?
- (4) What would need to be done by governmental and non-governmental organisations on the national, regional and international levels to provide the necessary expert knowledge to implement priorities and time plans in democratic oversight and security sector reform in your country?

Authors were further asked to list expert formation opportunities they had knowledge of and to provide insights into how such programmes were viewed in the national context.

# Zija Bahja

## SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN ALBANIA

### 1.1 Assessment of the Armed Forces in the Framework of the Albanian Security Sector

#### 1.1.1 Introduction

Steady progress has been made over the past decade in reforming the Albanian Armed Forces and reorienting them towards NATO operational concepts. However, the most essential restructuring of the AAF still lies ahead. Faced with no immediate military threats, AAF can complete their internal transformation even with a constrained budget over the next ten years, and still meet Albania's National Security Strategy requirements. However, to meet those requirements successfully, no new equipment acquisitions can be made before the completion of the reform process.

Albania does not yet have the requisite planning and programming systems ready to define its minimum mission essential force requirements and operational capabilities. This is an imperative. Accurate decisions were made during the summer 2002 regarding the size and composition of Albania's active force needs in the near to mid future. Due to the reassessment of security threats and affordable resources, the Albanian Assembly downsized the current authorised active strength of its Armed Forces from 31,000 to an objective force of 16,500 in 2010. This conclusion was based on a mission analysis, the state of the AAF and fiscal realities, to purposely meet NATO criteria for membership.

Meanwhile, on 25 July 2002 the national *military strategy* was approved, which defines how Albania's military leaders will implement the MOD defence policy and fulfil its military missions. As a result, the gap in the

conceptual basis for planning system and the determination of force requirements has been filled.

Also, much progress has been made from 2001–02 with the assistance of the US team, called SAIC, though Albania is still missing the *multi-year planning, programming and budgeting process* to link defence priorities to resources over time. Without such a system the MOD will be unable to apply resources consistently to Albania's highest priorities. The MOD cannot track capabilities with investment and measure progress towards established objectives.

This aspect reflects a need to focus the efforts of expert formation programmes in the future, preparing proper teachers and specialists working in these spheres, as well as the parliamentarians, journalists and NGOs, concerning transparency, accountability and parliamentary oversight of defence spending.

Finally, and no less crucial to reform and restructuring, is the development and employment of a comprehensive personnel management system to assess, train and retain a quality force, including timely retirement for all grade levels. The AAF face an immediate and multidimensional personnel crisis that is not adequately addressed in current reform plans; however, efforts have been made to address it more satisfactorily in the new ten-year defence transformation plans.

Until these tools are in place and effective, reform will be stymied and the AAF will remain a force with only minimum capabilities to support Albania's NSS. Moreover, unless objectives are requirement-based and fiscally sound, it will be difficult to justify the defence budgets necessary to meet reform targets and later secure investment by modernisation of force.

### **1.1.2 Defence Policy and Planning**

Albania published a sound National Security Strategy and a supporting Defence Policy in early March 2000 and a Military Strategy in July 2002. These documents, and the new Inter-Ministerial Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (ICI) that guide Albania towards its goal of integration with NATO and the EU, anchored Albania's defence policy and planning on a solid foundation. Even though the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania had just recently been approved, it gave a new impetus towards implementing the country's defence policy and planning, to map out how the military implements national policy, and to provide guidance to subordinate commands within AAF. At the policy level, a formal inter-agency review process for all national security matters would infuse valuable perspectives and help create broad and crucial support for Albania's national security strategy and its attendant investments. For this purpose, two Military Conventions were conducted in Albania. The first one was founded last year, led by the strong determination of the Minister of Defence, Pandeli Majko, in seeking public and inter-governable support in Albania for AAF.

In addition, Albania is to be commended for establishing the ICI, a bold initiative that immerses all relevant ministries in interagency communications, cooperation and policy formulation. The Committee performs an important function in coordinating policies towards NATO and NATO member states with participation by all relevant ministries. Furthermore, the ICI represents an important committee for reviewing defence policies and planning within the context of overall national priorities. The ICI may be the beginning of a healthy interagency process that could broaden to consider all aspects of national security. Close cooperation among all ministries will be essential as Albania faces a host of challenging decisions regarding the future of Albanian Armed Forces.

However, this institutional body needs to be staffed with full time experts and a bureaucratic body which is currently missing. There is also a need to qualify participants.

As the MOD and GS develop a defence resource planning process and the implementation of military strategy, the same emphasis on interagency consensus should be invoked, as was evident during the construction of the NSS. Developing these key documents through an interagency process will accomplish the four important goals stated below.

- It will ensure a broad national consensus on defence; both among leaders and voters, and it will ease the approval process (as well as the approval of individual programmes necessary to implement the strategy).
- It will ensure that all government ministries and agencies be included, that their interests and programmes have been considered, and that all subsequent national security-related programmes would be part of a comprehensive and coherent whole.
- It will create a broad-based approach for establishing the basis for national defence, one that will provide stability for national security planning and allow resource planners to achieve predictability for their programme requirements.
- It will develop national security strategy documents and a legal framework regarding security system reform based on the inclusion of all affected parties and agencies. In return, this will aid to convince foreign leaders that regardless of change in political leadership, Albania is committed to the strategy. Consequently, Albania will more likely be viewed as a viable candidate among Western security and economic institutions.

Albania, eager to achieve its national priority to join NATO around 2005, considers the understanding and proper implementation of military strategy and the defence resource planning process as a critical step. This will facilitate the matching process and provide the necessary means to preserve the proper balance. Without being able to understand and manage all of these changes, including a comprehensive personnel planning process, these documents will remain as merely written but not underpinning the NSS proposed reorganisation plans of objective Force in 2010. Consequently, Albania's national security requirements will not be successfully met.

Hopefully, DCAF will initiate the outlining of the appropriate concepts needed to conduct courses to effect the above mentioned objectives of the Albanian Security Sector, especially its Armed Forces.

(a) *Defence Policy Guidance*

The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the year 2000 is the strategic framework for executing the MOD's responsibilities at the leading ministry for the military defence of Albania. The NSS is well crafted and contains changes for Albania's strategic environment. It further provides adequate planning guidance for the next five years or longer. The NSS addresses all essential aspects of national security and provides a clear picture of Albania's perspectives on its environment, threats, risks and enduring national interests. Internal national security concerns are a major theme of the NSS, and one that will impact on the priorities of Albania's military forces. This concept will present a unique national priority for Albania's security situation for some years to come, and will have a significant influence on doctrine, training and readiness posture, although it should not impact on the actual force design.

Therefore, I strongly suggest the qualification of military and civilian security sector specialists be targeted on the fields of nation state and social development such as conflict and cooperation, security analysis, power and regime theory, as well as conflict resolution and transformation in the complex emergency situations.

The Albanian MOD has produced three authoritative documents that define the link between national securities, partially detailed defence requirements, and military strategy. The 2000 Defence Policy and 2002 Military Strategy define Albania's Defence Concept as Forward Defence as well as the concept of Rapid Reaction Force. They call for 'a standing presence of forward forces' especially in the central part of Albania, close to the national road net system. This is considered a non-threatened region, far from any bordering country, allowing for improvement of CBM, neighbourhood policy and cooperation. The Concept specifies a three-month mobilisation criterion for full defence against external threats, coupled with constant intelligence assessments. It also estimates that Albania will not stand alone in self-defence in case of the attack of potential aggressors. Most importantly, the Defence Policy enumerates missions and commands relationships for land, air, naval and Special Forces operations. The Defence Policy and Military Strategy are the most pivotal policy guidance documents for the AAF as it restructures, develops military doctrine, and formulates plans on how military forces will accomplish their missions. The third authoritative document for the AAF is Albania's NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), starting at the beginning of 2000. The MAP identifies near to mid-term objectives of the AAF in terms of both multilateral defence programmes and internal reforms. It also delineates the future force structure of the AAF in more detail than the Defence Policy. The MAP goals are ambitious and not likely to be achieved in their total number within the time specified. However, the MAP goals are appropriate and lay out a plan that should be achievable over time. They also have the merit of outlining in greater detail than one sees anywhere else a surrogate multi-year Defence Policy guidance. However, our MAP needs to be compared with the experience of other aspirant countries, because it lacks the comprehension and synchronisation efforts with other governmental departments, agencies and NGOs.

While the aforementioned plan has been approved by the Minister of Defence the Prime Minister has done no more than just appreciate it. This in turn leads to a lack of institutional responsibility and interagency cooperation, and in the meantime, a paucity of sufficiently assigned resources. This is another field requiring expertise and exchange.

Just like the NSS, both the Defence Policy and the MAP identify the priority of the AAF as maintaining ‘constitutional order’. In this regard, documents accurately reflect the NSS emphasis on addressing internal security.

Our conclusion is that *education, training and planning* for internal response missions will be more important for the AAF in the near future than is customary in other militaries, an unsurprising result of the upheaval in 1997. While this mission should diminish as Albania’s internal situation improves, it must be fully addressed in near-future policy, planning and programming decisions.

(b) *The Defence Planning System*

The MOD’s current annual planning and budgeting methods will not be successful in optimising scarce resources against the myriad of requirements that span the proposed ten-year defence reform project. A more deliberate and analytical system – one based on a multi-year timeline – is essential to achieve a genuine defence reform. All of the defence guidance and strategic planning documents Albania has published in recent years address multi-year planning on a broad, conceptual level. However, the actual planning and follow-up steps of programming and budgeting have yet to be put in place on a multi-year basis. Supporting plans will need to provide much more detail before defence reforms can be executed. Recently, the Albanian government published a medium term planning budget for the years 2002–04; however, this is insufficient for long-term planning of AAF.

Without an accepted well-understood multi-year planning process at all levels, reforms will be ineffective. Therefore, the expert formation initiative needs to be focused nation wide according to the framework of the EU.



(c) *Democratic Control of Armed Forces*

The democratic control of the military is considered an important prerequisite to carry out national security objectives. Democratically elected or appointed authorities are given the lawful responsibility to oversee defence policies and their implementation. Our institutions agreed that there exists not only one form, structure or strategy to implement democratic control of armed forces; but there are certain criteria to follow. Some of these criteria include: the establishment of a democratic constitutional framework, strict control of the armed forces by a legitimate elected government through the office of a civilian ministry of defence, a justified and transparent budgetary process, and a cadre of trained/informed civilian experts to address these issues in Parliament and the media. All the above contribute to the establishment of a national defence system where the military is institutionally subordinate to civilian control, and where political restraint/regulation is exerted from the governmental, presidential and parliamentary levels.

Therefore, one to two courses called 'Defence College' have been conducted in the Albanian Defence Academy every year, comprised of civilians, military experts, some MP and journalists. Programme details/instructions and syllabi are formulated in accordance with the German Hamburg Academy. The curricula of these courses, as well as the Officer General and lower level courses, emphasise several organisational principles of effective democratic oversight and management of the military:

- A clear division of authority between the President and the government contained in the Constitution and/or public laws. The laws should include a clear chain of command for the military in times of peace, crisis, or war, as well as specifics on control over the military (who promotes military officers in peacetime and who has the authority to mobilise the reserves).
- Legislative oversight of the military, control of the defence budget, as well as the role of legislature in deploying armed forces in peace, crisis and war. The inclusion of all minority and opposition parties in appropriate committees and the free and

routine flow of national defence related information are key issues to the legislative oversight of the military.

- Interagency coordination among the agencies mandated by the Constitution as responsible for national security (e.g. the President, legislature, prime minister, ministers of defence, foreign affairs and finance etc.). This coordination should be both formally – through a National Security Council – and informally conducted on a routine and systematic basis.
- A civilian defence minister, appointed by the elected head of government and accountable not only to the government but also to the legislature. The minister of defence, just like other governmental ministers, may be subject to the advice and consent of the legislature, depending on the specifics of the nation's constitutional process. In any case, the minister of defence should be obliged to appear before the legislature and to testify on defence-related matters.
- Peacetime oversight of the General Staff and military commanders by civilian defence ministers and staff. Education and experience are critical regarding the successful implementation of civilian oversight, ensuring that selected civilians are qualified to execute their roles and responsibilities. Because ex-military officers play an important role in the civilian defence bureaucracy, civilian leadership should be based on civilian personnel.
- Development of qualified civilian defence experts in the Government, the legislature and in public institutions (e.g. universities, think tanks, political parties etc.), as well as training military officers on the principles of civilian control. Senior military service academies offer excellent opportunities for future training and learning for civilian and military leaders together.
- Ensuring military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability through an active outreach programme to the nation's citizenry. Such a programme must receive strong backup from political

leaders and should include local, as well as nation-wide initiatives.

- Clarification of the role of the judiciary in the military justice system. Among the roles to be considered for the judiciary are appeals and review of military court decisions, incorporation of applicable international agreements and norms (e.g. laws of land warfare), and adjudication of constitutional issues concerning national security laws and policies.

However, there are only two or three teachers that/who (are qualified to) teach on these subjects. In addition, as of now, there are no NGO's devoted to research in this domain.. There is thus a need to educate and qualify experts in short-term courses relating to DEMCON of AF as well as CMR. If these fields are seriously considered, there are some six to seven military officers qualified in USA, UK, Germany, who could join the team of CMR, SSR or DEMCON after attending some short seminar courses.

Since 1998, Albania has done an excellent job of creating a firm legal foundation for civilian control of the military. Albania's 1998 Constitution lays out clear criteria for the civilian and democratic control of Armed Forces. These criteria have been put in place and are reflected in later documents – the NSS and the Defence Policy – as well as in the restructuring of the MOD and General Staff. Nonetheless, the Constitution and Defence Policy provides for the President, as commander-in-chief, to bypass the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence when exercising control of armed forces during wartime. In addition to creating command and control problems (discussed in the paragraphs below) this provision dilutes civilian oversight of the military at them moment when it becomes most crucial.

The relationship between MOD Staff and General Staff needs to be better balanced than it is now. Suspicion and lack of cooperation exacerbate natural organisational tensions between the two Staffs. Their structures are not organically integrated, neither horizontally nor vertically. There is only one possible point of contact between the Minister of Defence, an elected civilian, and the Armed Forces, which

only consists of the Chief of General Staff. Military officers perceive a lack of experience among civilian defence experts and seek to broaden their roles and responsibilities into what are traditional civilian policy areas. Civilian defence specialists react with suspicion to military advice and attempt to extend civilian control into operational military arenas.

The presence of a mature defence bureaucracy would help alleviate many difficulties as ministerial officials attempt to grasp the intricacies of Defence Policy making, planning and force development. Trained and experienced defence specialists, supported by military professionals experienced in working with civilians, would provide the institutional knowledge and continuity to ensure smooth transitions during changes in senior leadership. Equally significant for civilian oversight is the expansion of the nascent interagency process of the ICI to all defence policy-making and planning to include coordination of the national military strategy.

In the formative stages of creating effective civilian control, civilians in the MOD, other national security agencies, and the Albanian National Assembly would benefit from international educational opportunities to help them become more knowledgeable in defence-related matters. Educating military personnel on teaming up with civilians towards common goals is no less important for the AAF. Achieving this objective will take time, and the process will be enhanced through a combination of published roles and responsibilities documents and focused education courses. To accelerate and consolidate this process, our Defence Academy plans to start a new 18-month-long course, called 'Master of Defence Administration'. This course intends to target both civilians and military experts in managing the defence matters in MOD system and other state civilian agencies, media and NGOs. However, it needs to be underlined that Albania still lacks numerous NGOs dealing with security sector reform and MCR.

(d) *Command and Control*

The Defence Policy and Law of Commanding Strategic Authorities describe a civilian chain of command over the military during wartime that is different from the chain of command practised during peacetime. During war, the President as Commander-in-Chief, exercises command through the Commander of the Armed Forces, whereas in peacetime, the President exercises control through the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. This constellation contains the potential for a disaster and at best will create certain confusion in times of crisis. It is an imperative of command and control over any military structure that the chain of command remains consistent, irrespective of the national security situation of the nation – peace, crisis or war. Albania's civilian chain of command for the AAF does not adhere to this norm. Until now, a law has not been established concerning wartime in regard to the separation of powers, the roles and the chain of command of the Military Commander in Chief in wartime and the Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister and the President. It looks as if the functions and authority of Minister of Defence in wartime is avoided or skipped. At this point, a legal gap still exists which requires proper expertise to be filled. Regarding this issue, some difficulties have emerged in arranging the command and control concepts in the joint doctrinal level, which will bring Albania's decision-making process and tactical procedures close to NATO standards. As a consequence, the professional military education will develop along the same lines.

The reorganisation of the MOD and General Staff realigns the diverse staff according to NATO principles and therefore provides sound staff structures at the level of Albania's defence organisation. Key shortcomings of the AAF's structure are being addressed by organising the AAF into five command units, including Army, Air Force and Navy Commands. An emphasis is placed on training and logistics by creating the Joint Logistics and Training/Doctrine Command. This underscores the AAF's intent to concentrate on these essential though critically deficient areas.

However, the MOD and AAF will have to check closely on the total required organisations and layers of command to establish a military

structure of modest size. For example, it might be advisable to consolidate all service components directly under the General Staff, similar to the concept of other nations (e.g. the Canadian model). The AAF should also consider whether the critical need to focus on training and logistics could be achieved without creating two wholly separate commands.

Further reform of the AAF's command arrangements for special units may be warranted as well. The subordination of several operational units directly to the Chief of the General Staff is inconsistent with the General Staff's primary responsibility to provide strategic planning, direction and management to the AAF. The special operation units are subordinate to the General Staff. Those exclusive land force units would receive better training, administration, planning and resource advocacy if they were under the army command. The Chief of the General Staff could still retain tasking authority. Principally, the General Staff is not the best place for effective operational control.

However, the AAF optimise their command structure. The current yet antiquated insecure voice communications system is unreliable and incapable of providing effective support without extensive redesign and modernisation. This is a matter of high priority.

Therefore, it is suggested C4ISSR programmes be conducted, to teach experts how to protect and manage the information, as well as how to conduct the whole spectrum of information operations.

(e) *Education for the Security and Defence Institutions*

The importance of education has been raised to top priority level, not only in current defence transformation plans, but also with regard to security and defence institutions throughout the country. The strategy aims to provide those institutions with well-educated people who are trained to understand and adapt to processes, changes and challenges of the new security environment. Education, training and self-education are crucial factors concerning the evaluation of personnel qualification and should help to create a basis for further improvement. The ability to

apply and transfer acquired knowledge should also be evaluated, because it benefits the environment and the entire national security system.

Skills and knowledge must be recognised by principles, head of departments, or the commanders and be adequately praised. One of the key elements of permanent success and continuous upgrading of the management structures is the ability to assess the skills and knowledge of their inferiors and find the best way of implementation.

The national security education system, which is developed in our newly created Defence University, comprises three military service faculties – Land Forces, Navy and Air Force – one Defence Academy, one NCO Academy, one Internal Order Police Academy, as well as one State Intelligence Service Academy. They aim to provide highly skilled staff who will contribute maximum effort to the system as long as represented by them. The system provides education and training of its staff to maintain efficient functioning, self-initiative and exchange of knowledge and ideas. Another task of the system lies in providing a chance to all those leaving the environment for employment in civil organisations where their experience, knowledge and skills will be fully recognised.

Apart from civil education, the system provides training at regular intervals for its employees. The areas include: workshops, training courses, upgrading seminars and others. This improves knowledge and skills necessary to accomplish work and tasks within the national security system. The institutions of the Republic of Albania should be fully aware that high-quality personnel are a key element for the successful performance of tasks. Supervisors and other officials of the national security system should be given the necessary instruments to accomplish this goal.

Defence Studies are not yet organised within the structure of Tirana University, a civilian higher education institution in Albania. The goal has been set up for this University to start courses in managing defence in democratic societies, to provide education in the field of defence for citizens who should be able to use that knowledge, and to participate in various defence system activities. For instance, experts needed by the active forces of the AAF; civil servants who will be employed by the

Ministry of Defence; Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania or Defence Departments; civil experts for production and maintenance of arms and military equipment; experts who will work in R&D institutes that deal with defence or in defence oriented industry; journalists and defence correspondents; advisors in state administration bodies; government institutions etc.

Therefore, National Security Studies should be added as part of the structure of civilian university education. An interfaculty multidisciplinary postgraduate course should be set up and provide the possibility to obtain scientific degrees in the field of National Security, in accordance with regulations applicable to higher education and scientific research as mentioned above.

Additionally, postgraduate institutions should organise short courses lasting several weeks and one specific academic year that deal with issues covered by strategy and security studies. Short courses will be available to all interested staff members of civil institutions and their primary goal will be to educate members of the political elite and management structures. One-year courses will be mandatory for promising brigadiers and generals, before they reach eligibility to be appointed for a major general position.

An inter-university multidisciplinary national security study should be established, including civilian universities, to provide education and training for highest-ranking positions in the management and commanding structure. Recent efforts focus on the enhancement of compatibility concerning the structure and quality of military education institutions with other Albanian university studies. The approach also deals with the standardisation of the transfer credits based on the European system. Currently, the process only includes bachelor degree level, whereas later the master's degree will be added. As a result, 18 months of education in national security should be mandatory for highest military and civil functions in the national security system. This course is planned to be carried out at the Defence Academy, mainly MBA focused in public and security business administration in the democratic systems.



The study should be organised to create later possibilities for acquiring scientific degrees at PhD level. Additionally, courses and seminars lasting from 10–15 days to three months should be organised within the study programmes. Political officials should be encouraged to attend short-term courses and acquire knowledge to maintain their political and other functions within the national security system. This approach requires an open door policy by our Defence Academy towards a wide range of students within civil society, to turn itself into a backbone education institution for the whole Albanian bureaucracy and NGOs for security matters. This is the declared intention in reorganising our Defence Academy. Courses should be as open as possible to public workers, journalists, politicians, military commentators and others. Through organised and systematic training they will be able to develop skills for efficient monitoring and understanding of security issues crucial for the entire society.

### **1.1.3 Quality of Personnel as the Force Multiplier**

Quality personnel are one of the most important elements that differentiate among various armed forces; a point that was emphasised in the last report by NATO at the Prague Summit. Regardless of their organisational and technological refinement, systems that rely on human resources – particularly the security and defence structures – cannot avoid difficulties in their everyday activities. High-quality professional education and training of the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are the main preconditions for its functioning as a coherent and cohesive system. Both during regular daily activities and throughout times of change, well-educated and trained staff will have a better understanding of social and political changes occurring in the world. They will find it easier to keep up with technological advancements and will not impede or deter to the evolution and progress of Armed Forces and the national security system. The adoption of appropriate standards in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania makes every member of the Armed Forces a possible “force multiplier” benefitting the entire system.

The quality of military and civil personnel is one of the key elements in attempts to reach the level of readiness the AAF need to carry out their tasks and respond to possible threats. Over the past ten years, personnel presented the key factor of the country's defence mechanism since the equipment was mainly obsolete. The ongoing development of the military's capabilities and the comprehensive development of the Armed Forces causes personnel to be an essential factor that must secure the necessary level of readiness of the Armed Forces for operations under the circumstances of estimated threats from the security environment.

Moreover, with technical modernisation after 2006, restructuring and education, the AAF personnel will gain an even more important role in performing their military assignments. However, the quality level will be very different. The system of national security and defence defines the necessity to come up with systematic solutions and organisational preconditions that will make it easier for the military staff to achieve desired results that will benefit the entire Albanian society.

In the future, civilian servants – government employees and staff members – should be provided with a significant functional role in the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces of the Republic of Albania. This category of employees was systematically neglected and unappreciated in the past, or employed based on political party affiliation and without proper expertise. However, today, there is greater appreciation of the role and importance for efficient functioning of the armed forces. Many positions and duties do not require a professional military individual, but rather a civilian with his or her special expertise, and technical, managerial or administrative competencies.

However, the civilian role in the military is not limited. They further provide an important contribution to the existence of civilian perspectives of military issues, their status and activities. The level of integration of soldiers and civilians in performing everyday military duties should be considered an indicator of the degree of development of civil-military relations. The general education system, as well as education and training in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, should be adjusted to serve the requirements for the development of civil personnel who will have the necessary knowledge and capability to

apply it to the Armed Forces. This presents another gap demanding foreign help.

Considering all issues related to personnel quality, attention should always be paid to several important facts:

- Organisational solutions and behaviour themselves are never sufficient. They just facilitate functional activity.
- Well-developed plans only help for the planning and preparation of activities, but they only present the first element of operational activity. Experience shows that those plans often diverge from their original direction.
- Theories of large system management and commanding hierarchies offer support and security, but are no major accomplishments themselves.
- Operational activities succeed or fail because of the people preparing or executing them. Only by selecting the best people and by developing the system's ability to select can we achieve relative certainty that the activities will be logical and systematic and will lead to desired consequences.

#### **1.1.4 Education and Training**

Development of high-quality education and training programmes will create preconditions for improved quality of personnel. Programmes that intend to improve the quality of life of members of the military and their families should advance military tasks to a level where worries and frustration – resulting from the separation of their families, families inadequate health or social/employment status – can be reduced to the greatest extent possible.

The educational and training structure of the active members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania should provide a starting point for further personnel training and improvement of abilities. The modern soldier must possess knowledge on how to understand his cultural environment including diverse forms of interactions and in extreme

cases to know how to survive on the battlefield. The officer of today, depending on the progress of his career, has to be a capable operational officer, precise administrative clerk, and successful manager and leader too. Therefore, the military education system should be improved to satisfy the needs for additional, supplementary and permanent training of soldiers for the execution of their tasks in the complex emergency environment.

The civil-military education system must be able to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania and to the tasks its members encounter during their careers. Lower ranked officers tend to perform tactical tasks, which require the system to provide them with executive abilities. A change occurs among higher ranked officers because the officers switch from tactical and operational missions to conceptual thinking processes, which demand the system provide them with continuous training in the field of managerial skills and creative as well as critical thinking. For these reasons we intend to provide our junior officers with a BSc or BA degree in management and the possibility of electives in technology, telecommunication, navigation or political science. The military education system should provide for the acquisition of complementary civilian and military competencies and should design and respect educational programmes that will be verifiable and recognised by the civilian sector as well. Therefore, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, institutions of higher education of the Republic of Albania are to develop programmes, curricula and courses in the field of defence systems, related sciences and technologies. The military profession and career should become an attractive choice for young generations who have to make decisions about their future life. Furthermore, members of the military will have better chances of employment in the civilian sector if they decide to terminate their military career.

However, in organising and starting the new curricula for cadets in September 2004, we lack the right and well qualified teachers in the fields of management, anthropology, security studies, conflict studies, research methodology, social and development studies and political studies.

In comparison with the present-day situation which is characterised by a lack of meaningful and systematic activities, the military profession will undergo a major change to be reflected in intensive training and new obligations brought about by the undergoing military transformation programmes. This new tendency mainly came to life because of a feeling of hopelessness and frustration among many members of the Armed Forces who are fed up with being passive. In 2010, activities should be aimed towards the better understanding of relations between the civil society and armed forces and the imposed requirements by society to their members. The enhanced military professionalism will lead to the exposure of members of the AAF to an increased number of activities and requirements. This process needs to advance slowly and can only be successful if every individual has been trained and prepared for the new level of duties. At the same time the utmost care should be taken in relation to the living standard of the members of the Armed Forces and their families.

Personnel management should ensure such a system of appointment and promotion that will encourage professional attitude and will push forward the best and most qualified people, giving equal opportunity to each member of the Albanian Armed Forces. It should increase the authority and responsibility of commanders and members of civilian management. Furthermore, achievements should be rewarded, human potential recognised and challenged and provide them with appropriate duties. In doing so, it should equally treat all members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, regardless of their gender, race, nationality, religion and local or social affiliation. The system should also be immune towards any outside (including political) interference.

Until now, a long-term planning for education – especially for qualifications based on independent needs of every service of AAF – has not been in existence. The majority of courses that have been offered by foreign institutions so far did not specifically focus on future jobs of personnel or to fill the gaps of expertise evident in certain functions and institutions. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief of the General Staff should propose to the Minister of Defence, on an annual basis, a list of specialties that are in high demand in each service and support command of AAF. This need should not be met by imposing an

excessive workload on personnel, which would currently affect 30 per cent of our Armed Forces personal strength. Therefore, we should consider distance learning and the recruitment of people who have appropriate qualifications from all available sources in accordance with the criteria and to the levels determined necessary. However, we still lack the infrastructure and resources to develop proper distance learning. It should be anticipated what the needs might be three to five years ahead in order to adjust training programmes in time, getting the proper qualified personnel before too much times elapses. Members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, might face interruption of their current military job due to the reformation process, are considered for retraining programmes to fit the standards of a civilian life. However, we lack expertise in that field, which could be fulfilled by different NGOs.

Therefore, my recommendation is to focus expert formation efforts in that field as well.

At the same time, the recognised excellence of the military profession and knowledge accumulated in the course of engaging in such a profession should become a stimulus for civilian organisations and institutions to offer jobs to people who have spent 20 or 30 years in the Armed Forces. At the age of 50–55, many former members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania still have the strength, will, health and capacity to continue to work in the civilian sector at least for a while. Continuous and systematic care concerning their career and professional development in the Armed Forces should enable them to follow a previously described idea.

All future candidates for commissioning in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania should have a university diploma. If they fulfil all other requirements and demonstrate adequate psychological and physical readiness, they should be commissioned by the Armed Forces once they graduate from Officers' School. However, the Armed Forces should enable young people to join even with a high school diploma and possibly pursue a military career after their university studies. This requires at least three different combinations of university education with military academy courses, which also forms the precondition for

commissioning an officer and his first appointment in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania.

Those who decide to join the Armed Forces after graduating from university should be obliged to attend a training course at the military academy for a duration of at least eleven months. During this time, they will acquire basic military knowledge and will complete the process of integration of their civil education with the military system.

University students who decide during the course of their studies that they might commence a military career in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania upon their graduation should be able to select desired courses at the faculties that provide expert education required by the Armed Forces. Those courses would be optional after the second year of studying. Following their graduation, they should also attend a course at the Military Academy over a shorter period of time (only six months). It is expected that during the final years of their studies the military-oriented optional courses should have provided them with knowledge regarding the seamless integration of their original and military profession. The three-months course at the military academy should further enable them to acquire some basic military knowledge necessary for a successful beginning of their military career.

The Armed Forces provide accommodation and appropriate four year scholarships for young people who opt for a military career. They receive the opportunity by participating in diverse Armed Forces activities in order to gain more effectively a practical impression of work and life in the military. Once they obtain their university degree, having attended the same curriculum as the previous group, they will immediately be commissioned to the active forces and will receive their first appointment in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania. Meanwhile, they are obliged to pursue their officer basic training courses in the weapon schools, specialising in the different branches of AAF services.

While attending courses at the defence academy in the level of Staff College, War College or the National Security Studies, members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are not allowed to carry out

any other duties. They devote all their energy to successfully mastering their educational programmes, since they are not yet able to apply distance learning programmes. The Defence and National Security Studies should hold the key position in the structure of civil education for the needs of defence and national security. The Defence College as part of the Albanian Defence Academy remains the highest military education institution for civilian and military personnel.

Regarding all new developments in our professional military education, expert formation initiatives taken by DCAF are essentially beneficial to AAFs and civil society. This concerns the total spectrum of Security Sector Reform in Albania. Based on possible interest, I may recommend proper individuals available to follow and conduct further responsibilities in the field of SSR in Albania and in the different working groups of DCAF.



**Nikola Radovanovic**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

### **1.2 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

#### **1.2.1 Introduction**

It goes without saying that the transition from one to another state system inevitably requires reforms in all state sectors. It has been generally accepted that reforms have to be comprehensive and total. Therefore, the reform process should consist of at least three co-existing processes: reform/adaptation of some elements, creation of new elements and disbandment of others; not to mention the harmonisation of mutual functions and procedures. The smooth managing of those processes requires successful workmanship and becomes even more complex if it is not supported with sufficient human, financial, time and other resources. Consequently, both knowledge and wisdom are necessary to reach the goal in this context. Previous experience has shown that security sector reform in transitional states, with regard to the parliamentary and market economy, are among the most demanding.

The security sector includes governmental organisations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, detention and arrest, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and supervision:

- military;
- intelligence services;
- police forces;
- border guards;
- customs services;
- judicial systems (including court support and infrastructure);

- penal systems;
- parliamentary, judicial, and administrative management and oversight bodies.

Such a comprehensive definition of the security sector has been generally accepted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH). The concept clearly states that a lack of security, for the state or its citizens, presents a major obstacle to political, social and economic development.

Processes such as the final phase of the BiH security policy definition, the beginning of the BiH defence policy implementation, activities on the creation of military doctrine, reduction of the armed forces in BiH to an affordable level, reduction of compulsory military service to six months, introduction of the civil service, increased level of the democratic control of the armed forces, better defence budget planning and transparency, creation of the State Border Service and better cooperation among interior security services are some of the indicators of internal improvements already being achieved in the security sector reform in BiH.

Complementarily, the admission of BiH to the Council of Europe, the fulfilment of the EU Road Map conditions and the beginning of work at the Feasibility Study within EU Stabilisation and Association Process, the initiative for joining the Partnership for Peace Programme and improved relations with NATO as a whole (SEECAP, SEDM, SEESTUDY etc.), inclusion of military observers from BiH to the UN missions in Ethiopia/Eritrea and DR Congo, education of military officers at the Baltic Defence College in Estonia, the participation in number of activities within the Stability Pact for SEE in other areas of security, and contribution to the global fight against terrorism are some of the indicators of improvements at the international level that BiH has achieved, or is determined to pursue in the area of security sector reform.

Based on the current indicators of change, it is still questionable whether the conclusion can be made that the direction of the security sector reforms in BiH are certain and steady.

A positive conclusion would not reflect accurately on the real image or situation of the country. Most people who closely follow the development in BiH know very well that indicators exist that might lead to an opposite conclusion, meaning that the security sector reforms are slow and uncertain. Much work needs to be started at various levels and there is still plenty of work in progress which needs to be properly finished. Nevertheless, the modern world is dynamic, which makes permanent process of reforms immanent.

As a matter of fact, the strong and decisive presence of the international community plays a major role in the security sector reforms in BiH. Besides huge amounts of money that have been spent on the stabilisation process of BiH, tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers have worked passionately together with officials from BiH within the Office of High Representative (OHR), UN Mission to BiH (UNMIBH), OSCE, NATO-led Stabilisation Forces (IFOR/SFOR), EU, the World Bank (WB), just to mention the most important, to perform the reforms. They integrated their knowledge and experience into BiH and have been willing to share it at all times. Bilateral contributions of many world states have also been significant. For many years, from an internal point of view, an inexhaustible source of unchallengeable knowledge and experience has been available free of charge. A permanent transfer of knowledge and experience to individuals and institutions in BiH has also been provided.

However, since September 11, the dynamics of international relations have changed to a different focus of interest in the international community. As a result, the international presence in BiH has been reduced over the last three years. It seems this process will to be even more accelerated in the near future. However, the recent situation with the mandate of the UNMIBH, and the present situation about the official proposal of the US Government to BiH for signing the bilateral agreement about surrendering individuals to the International Criminal Court, outlines that BiH, though in a specific situation, is not immune to wider developments. Therefore, it can be realistically expected that by 2005 the presence and mandate of the international community in BiH will be significantly altered and reduced. In other words, BiH will maintain, more than ever before, with its own resources, including knowledge and experience, with its own always-ongoing reforms, and

with its determination to be a credible member of the international community.

After this consideration, we can hypothesise that the issue of expert formation in general, and the issue of expert formation in the security sector in BiH in particular, is important today, and will remain of critical importance in the near future.

### **1.2.2 The Security Sector Experts: Distribution and Attributes**

BiH is characterised by a complex structure as well as complex relations in the security sector, which are the result of well-known circumstances. Therefore, BiH needs more competent officials in the security sector than countries of the same size, but with a simpler state organisation. In addition, the presence of international community institutions and their constant interaction with BiH representatives add to an already high need for competent officials. What are the elements, the number and formal status of BiH security structures which comprise security sector experts?

To answer these questions, the distribution and attributes of the security sector experts may be considered through the following segments which represent the security sector:

- (a) Executive: experts informal status of advisors
- (b) Executive: leading civil servants
- (c) Legislative: parliaments and parliamentary staff
- (d) Military, police and 'law enforcement agencies': leading representatives of these institutions
- (e) Educational institutions
- (f) NGOs
- (g) Media
- (h) Major international organisations in BiH: BiH citizens

(a) *Executive: Experts' Informal Status of Advisors*

The Law on Civil Service in the Institutions in BiH (the Law on Civil Service) contains provisions that certain individuals be appointed to the status of advisor to the Members of the Presidency (3), the Chair of the Council of Ministers (1), the Ministers (6) and the Deputy Ministers (12). According to the provisions of the Law, any persons appointed as advisors cannot be civil servants.

Similar law provisions anticipate similar opportunities within analogous institutions at the entity level, the F BiH, and also all ten Cantons.

In accordance with provisions of the Law on Civil Service, advisors are appointed by those they are advising. The advisors are not granted security of tenure. As a rule, the term of the advisor may not be longer than the term of the individual advisee, and under certain circumstances the term of the advisors can be shorter. The advisors have to be citizens of BiH, and have a fixed salary level by law.

The advisors are expected to be competent experts within the constitutional/legal area of responsibility of the institution they work for. Furthermore, it might be desirable that advisors at the top State level possess the capacity to provide more diverse expertise, including security issues.

As a rule, all officials who possess the right to appoint advisors make use of this right and hire persons appropriate to their mandate. Normally, a single advisor gets appointed, in some cases two, and as an exception three or more. For example, the Prime Minister of RS has employed five advisors. The particular advisers for military issues (military advisors) are nominated only by the members of the Presidency of BiH, and by the President of RS. In most other cases, advisors serve as 'general advisors', without having an area of specification. The military advisors are either active or retired military officers with ranks of brigadier/full colonel/major general.

Military advisors to the Members of the Presidency, as members of the Members' of Presidency Cabinets, have the opportunity to complete

corroborate their expert opinion with other advisors (for legal, political, or economic issues), and, on the other hand, to provide other advisers with security aspect issues. Their advantages lie in formal military education, experience and practice. The Standing Committee for Military Matters (hereafter SCMM) presents the supreme body in the area of defence in BiH. Military advisors are responsible for the work of the SCMM Secretariat, which has been recognised as a ‘point of contact’ in military matters by the international community representatives. Based on this capacity, military advisors play an active role in SCMM decision-making and decision implementation processes, as well as in military diplomacy. Therefore, military advisors play an outstanding role in the defence part of overall reforms. They have been well supported in their work by international community representatives and have passed through a number of different forms of training.

On the other hand, not only the levels of authority and responsibility have been extended, but expectations and requests have increased as well. For example, a detailed understanding of civil service logic and practice is expected, as well as the capacity to prepare and chair top-level decision-making meetings. General skills in diplomacy and military diplomacy in particular, as well as an increased capacity in the area of public relations (particularly with the electronic media), are also expected.

Due to an explicit ban on memberships to political parties, top level military advisors in general maintain less influential and developed social contacts, compared with other socially and politically established advisors.

Compared with his colleagues at the state level, the military advisor to the President of the RS has been significantly less visible in the public and has played more an ‘advisory’ role. However, he still has been active and has played an important factor in defence reforms.

The great majority of other non-military advisors have expert knowledge in economic law. To estimate and comment on their level of interest and competence regarding defence and security issues could be difficult and embarrassing. They indeed have taken part in seminars or some

activities dealing with security sector reforms. The most common characteristic of this group of advisors might be that almost all, with a few exceptions, are either politically active or politically affiliated. Being a significantly less coherent group than the military advisors, it nonetheless includes advisors with thirty years of working experience, as well as advisors who just finished their undergraduate studies. Furthermore, the group includes advisors who actively master four foreign languages and IT technologies, as well as those who have no such capacities.

Finally, advisors seem to be less interested in further and permanent education/training as well as in having increased political loyalty, than could be expected. On the one hand, they receive solid salaries, but their terms are limited (following the October 2002 elections, after which four-year terms will be introduced for the first time). Due to their relatively modest number, advisors are constantly on duty. On the other hand, they are aware that they have been elected by the most senior political leaders in the State.

(b) *Executive: Leading Civil Servants*

This category includes the following: civil servants, heads of departments and directors of directorates. They are employed at State level, in specific cases the F BiH, and canton level ministries which are responsible for some aspects of security sector reforms.

Similar to other transitional states, BiH incorporates a request for permanent adequate governance and institution building. To meet the basic legal principles set out in Law on Civil Service, which are legality, transparency, publicity, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, as well as professional impartiality, an expert level is expected from civil servants at all levels and positions. This process is boldly supported by different international community institutions.

Regarding the beginning of the institution building process in BiH, a significant distinction between the ideal situation and reality can be noticed.

At the state level defence sector, the SCMM Secretariat exerts its functions, currently with four directors/heads of departments who are important for reform processes. They predominantly have military backgrounds. The entity level consists of two Ministries of Defence (MoDs – the MoD/RS and the MoD/F BiH), as fully developed structures. Each MoD includes up to ten deputies, directors and heads of departments who are important for defence reforms. Most of them are civil servants. The department for defence planning is much more developed in the MoD /F BiH than it is in the MoD/RS. Most representatives of the former MoD actively participate in all activities (seminars, courses, working groups etc.), while representatives of the latter group are barely present at any activities, especially not in the international scene. Generally, MoD/F BiH departments consist of twice or three times the number of people as the RS/MoD departments. The Br\_ko District of BiH has been demilitarised.

The sector of interior affairs at state level includes a special department for cooperation with INTERPOL. The department itself serves as an operational body with no reform planning activities. The entity level consists of the two Ministries of Interior (MoIs – the MoI/RS and the MoI/F BiH), as fully developed structures. Each MoI then comprises up to six deputies and directors/heads of departments, who are important for security sector reforms. Activities of the MoIs include professional development and regional cooperation. The activities are mutually more developed than activities of the MoDs. Special cases represent the Cantonal MoIs (10) in F BiH. Those structures are well developed and enjoy a relatively high level of independence from the MoI/F BiH. There are at least another 20–30 deputies, directors/heads of departments who are of importance for the security sector reforms. The Br\_ko District of BiH has its own structure for interior affairs, with five to six experts being of importance for the reforms. Due to specific constitutional positions in BiH, representatives of the Br\_ko District Government do not always participate in state level planning activities with their full capacity.



Being established as a project of the UNMIBH and with extensive overall support from different international resources, the State Border Service (SBS) forms the new structure in BiH's security community, predominantly on-task oriented. Whenever necessary, expertise is provided by foreign experts. Currently, it is difficult to estimate how many important experts for the reform in the SBS there are.

Established at the entity level, the Custom Services (CSs- the CS/RS and the CS/F BiH) represent other structures devoted to border control. Both are under the authority of the entity Ministries of Finances and at least ten experts in each CS play an important role in security sector reforms. It is important that regional cooperation in the area of border control has been significantly increased.

No other ministries obtain departments that are devoted to the security sector. If they deal with security sector reforms, other departments follow a more general approach.

(c) *Legislative: Parliaments and Parliamentary Staffers*

This category includes elected members of the parliaments (MPs) at the State, entity, canton and the Brčko District level. Parliamentary staffers are civil servant employees in different parliaments. Advisors to the Members of the Parliamentary Assembly can be appointed in accordance with provisions of the Law on Civil Service.

MPs who are of interest for this report possess either knowledge/experience in the security sector, are members or participate in the work of the different councils, committees and delegations to the international organisations, or actively publish on security subjects that are of interest for this report.

It has taken many years for the political and public awareness of the importance and role of the MPs in security sector, either in the democratic control of the armed forces or in the area of reforms, to be recognised. However, it cannot be said that during those years most

official or potential MPs have spent enough energy and time on their personal education as security sector experts.

In accordance with provisions of the Constitution of BiH, the Parliamentary Assembly (two cameral, 57 seats in aggregate) does not have direct authority over most aspects of security, including defence issues. However, due to having the Parliamentarian Committee for Foreign and Trade Affairs in the House of Peoples, as well as the Parliamentarian Commission for foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, they inevitably deal with foreign and economic security aspects. The Delegation of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly to the OSCE is the other example of the legislature's indirect dealing with security issues at State level. Different hearings on behalf of the Parliamentary commissions have been predicted in their rules of procedures.

Both the F BiH Parliament (bicameral, 214 seats in aggregate) and the RS Parliamentary Assembly (monocameral, 83 seats) play a direct role in security sector issues. Different committees, including committees for security and/or defence, have been established. On this level, the rules of procedure offered an opportunity for hearings on behalf of the Parliamentary commissions.

Retired generals or high-ranking military officers, as well as demobilised military officers, can be found in a limited number among MPs in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly and in the F BiH Parliament, but not in the RS Assembly.

The Brčko District Parliament and the Parliaments at the canton level lack specialised bodies to cope with security sector issues.

Although, the opportunity exists among provisions of the Law on Civil Service, it is uncertain whether MPs have professional advisors. Lacking appropriate resources even at work, it is possible that advisors to the MPs, if there are some, work at premises for the Parliament (for example at universities, seats of political parties etc.)

Generally, parliaments at all levels are understaffed. Technical and administrative staffers only provide functional elements to the parliaments and basic technical support to the MPs.

(d) *Military, Police and 'Law Enforcement Agencies': Leading Representatives*

Professional technical expertise is normally expected from every professional military or police officer in institutions devoted to law enforcement. Theoretically, all professional members within these structures can be considered experts. The level of skills and professionalism developed at lower executive levels plays an important role in senior leaders to foresee, plan and lead through the process of security sector reforms.

Considering reforms of the military structures in BiH, it seems that the General Staff (GS ARS-in the Army of the RS) and/or Joint Command (JC AF BiH-in the Army of F BiH), as well as the Corp HQs (C HQ) level decisively participate in the process.

At those levels, commanding officers normally rank as generals, being appointed after passing through a legally established procedure, which includes structures in both executive and legal branches. In comparison to procedures in other states, the nomination and appointment of commanding officers at the rank of general include the specific role of the SFOR Commander (COMSFOR). The COMSFOR has the authority to approve or disapprove the nomination of every military officer, after considering certain data. Further, the COMSFOR has the right to suspend any military person from duty who disrupts the implementation of the Peace Accords. The COMSFOR uses but never misuses its rights.

For that reason, professional careers of top military officers in BiH currently depend on the following three factors: professional qualities and past career records, share of the political power and COMSFOR records.

All generals have completed their studies at military academies (in ex-Yugoslavia), staff academies and the School of National Defence in FR Yugoslavia. This education has prepared them to plan and conduct joint military operations. Unfortunately, their accessible educational programmes have not provided complete knowledge to plan and implement changes in the security sector, or for the development of new strategic concepts. An additional system for further/permanent education in ARS has not yet been developed. International seminars and courses, as well as direct work on reforms, together with international experts currently only provide an opportunity for professional development in accordance with international standards in the ARS. Another system of further/permanent education in AF BiH has been developed.

On the other hand, the AF BiH generals have completed their studies at military school and courses in almost a dozen different countries, which are all compatible with NATO-procedures and standards.

The staff officers – important for the security sector reforms – at the above mentioned levels deal with people ranking from major to major general. A wide variety in education, age difference, experience and professional as well as life priorities are factors that portray this category rather incoherently. Thus, significant differences in understanding and approach to reforms can be detected. Staff officers generally work directly on reforms with foreign experts, attend international seminars and courses, and have a relatively solid approach to information.

It is difficult to estimate an aggregate number of military officers essential for the security sector reforms. There are probably 15–20 decision-makers, and a total of up to 80 persons included in military reform management.

On the one hand, military experts are small in number and face professional as well as political pressure regarding their work on reforms. On the other hand, they are too numerous to be additionally and effectively educated/trained within a short period of time. Research could be done on whether resources and focus for military reforms can be found within the armed forces alone.

The system of education and training in other security sector structures/law enforcement agencies has been more civil-university-based (law, economy, political science etc.). In addition, modules and institutions for further or supplementary education, as well as for the professional development, have been much more developed than in the armed forces. The number of high-ranked leaders who actively participate in the security sector reforms is significantly smaller than in the armed forces.

(e) *Educational Institutions*

In ex-Yugoslavia, an extensive number of security sector educational institutions were situated on the territory of BiH. The Faculty of Defence had been members of the Sarajevo University since 1974. Being an integral part of the overall system of military education, military academies were located in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Rajlovac; Military high schools and schools for reserve officers were placed in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Rajlovac. The Police High School was situated in Sarajevo.

A number of experts and scholars had been employed at those institutions. They educated students ranging from high school to PhD level. They further provided an extensive institutional framework for research and editing. However, most of the previously mentioned factors portray an ideological perspective.

After 1992, those institutions ceased to exist. Generally, facilities were destroyed, scholars and experts dispersed, and the tradition was lost. In contrary to other states of former Yugoslavia, most of the security sector scholars of this period have not succeeded in re-establishing their academic authority. Reasons are: resistance accepting changes, staying out of science for an extensive period of time, sanctions, isolation and low salaries.

Today, BiH maintains seven universities (Banja Luka, Bihać, East Mostar, West Mostar, Sarajevo, Srpsko Sarajevo, and Tuzla). The Sarajevo University exclusively offers programmes (at the department of

criminal sciences) that are directly devoted to the security sector. Law departments exist at almost all BiH universities and provide an indirect approach to security sector issues, such as international law.

Educational institutions outside the university sector offer basic courses with a maximum duration of 18 months. Examples are the following: police academies –Sarajevo, Banja Luka; the School of SBS; Custom Service courses etc. However, such a cadre lacks the ability to immediately take over leading positions in the reform process.

Due to the fact that most universities suffer from a lack of resources and capacities to act independently, a very low level of cooperation among them has been established. Often, much better relations can be established with foreign universities than with universities within the country.

As an effort to stimulate joint research in the security sector, the OSCE Mission to BiH has supported the creation and work of the Inter-University Steering Committee on Security Studies. So far, the committee has achieved modest results.

(f) *NGOs*

NGOs that pertain to the security sector began serious and systematic work during the year 2000 significantly later than in other states of the region.

Most university centres in ex-Yugoslavia, such as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade or Skopje, had networks of research centres or institutes that continued with their work even during war years. Later, during the democratisation process they served as the nucleus for the first NGOs by providing accumulated knowledge and personnel. Even if those centres had existed, work or existence of such research centres and institutes in BiH would have been made impossible during the BiH conflict. Knowledge, experience and practice would have been lost, too.

It took years before enough confidence in BiH arose to realise the work of NGOs with regard to the interest of security sector issues. Even today, security sector issues are kept under a certain level of secrecy.

Most NGOs comprise a director, usually an MA or PhD holder, and a minimal number of staffers. In the case of leading NGOs, the Steering Board and Academic Committee comprise a number of influential persons from abroad and/or other NGOs. Nonetheless, the system of higher education in security studies does not produce a surplus of experts, who ultimately affirm themselves through engagement in NGOs. In conjunction with modest NGO finances, an extremely small number of experts have been employed with NGOs as contractors. Furthermore, the small number of experts has prevented a possible creation of at least one think tank in the security sector area. As a final consequence, free competition of ideas or a market of expertise has not come to fruition in BiH.

In contrast to advisors in the executive and legal branch, the existing small number of experts in NGOs demonstrate a high amount of motivation to learn and advance in the field of international competence and competitiveness.

Possibly, NGOs in BiH are of even higher importance than in other transitional states. Due to a significant lack of confidence, animosity and strongly opposed political programmes, NGOs provide opportunities for unofficial dialogue and communication among policy-makers of all levels, scholars, military personnel, representatives of different law enforcement agencies and all different experts. Such activities attract interest and are regularly well attended.

(g) *Media*

The media in BiH has been a subject of major interest for years, and huge efforts have been dedicated to their development and independence. Besides the high representative interventions in this area from time to time, positive changes can be detected in the intention to reach international standards.

Electronic and print media pay significant attention to information from the security sector. News reporting and descriptive journalism prevail in both groups, while analytical and research journalism have been less developed. An extremely short period of time has been devoted to the specialised programmes of the electronic media. There exist no specialised in-country edited journals or magazines, while some foreign journals on security issues can be found in BiH. There are many reasons why such a small number of items are sold, lack of financial means being the most important.

Most institutions attempt to apply certain public relations principles and practices to develop whole strategies. It must be noticed that MoDs tend to become more and more open to the public. Efforts have been made to edit military magazines, which still predominantly aim to improve intra-army information systems. The quality level is higher in F BiH than in RS, while, at the same time, both quality and number of issues being treated are significantly smaller than in neighbouring countries. As a rule, higher ranked officials or scholars do not publish in military magazines. Basically, most of the social elite still try to stay away from practical defence or security issues.

A focal point in the process of professionalising the media has been the training of young journalists. In a second step, an attempt to include them in public life has been undertaken. However, there are too many journalists who sign reports on security subjects, and an insufficient number of them have had a chance to specialise in this area, mostly due to weaknesses in the educational system. Additionally, media enterprises tend to be chronically understaffed. Therefore, journalists often have to report on very distant issues. Internal political sensitivity to security issues in BiH may cause journalists not to dedicate their professional careers to security issues.

The possibility of studying journalism exists in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar, while the international contribution has been of decisive importance. OSCE offers modest opportunities for journalist specialisation on security issues.



(h) *Major International Organisations in BiH: BiH Citizens*

All major international organisations in BiH have been employing a certain number of local staffers, some of them at mid and a small number at senior level, providing them with the unique opportunity to work with foreign experts. Many local staffers hold graduate diplomas, are fluent in English, and have been trained in IT technologies. They have worked for years (some of them over five) in the international, less stressful and advanced professional environment. Citizens of BiH have acquired knowledge and skills which might be comparable with that of international experts.

It is surprising that this group of experts has not been paid more attention by the surrounding environment. The truth is that many of them would rather leave BiH or proceed with private initiatives, because they have developed a significantly different professional culture and habits, as well as more refined private needs on much higher salaries than civil servants at any position in BiH. However, some must remain in BiH and contribute to a positive development, as well as those that positively contribute to the process from abroad.

### **1.2.3 Possibilities for Security Sector Expert Formation**

The possibilities for security sector expert formation are modest in Southeast Europe.

It is crucial to notice that the Department of Criminal Sciences at Sarajevo University is the only institution offering four years of undergraduate, as well as postgraduate, studies directly devoted to specific security sector issues. Postgraduate studies in international relations and diplomacy are both offered at the Faculties of Law at Banja Luka and Sarajevo University. Furthermore, postgraduate studies in international relations are offered at the Faculty of Political Sciences at Sarajevo University, which are partially related to the security sector. More modern methods and subjects are being studied at the Centre for European Studies in Sarajevo with regard to international relations and

democracy. Those activities have been established and developed through EU Tempus programmes, which portray a new trend in the education process of BiH. Specialised courses and schools have been developed to meet the needs of police, the SBS and customs. They aim to supplement acquired knowledge at civil faculties (law, economy) to the previously mentioned institutions. However, it would be wrong to expect that they provide sufficient professionals with lifelong dedication to those fields.

Although employing a small number of non-governmental experts, NGOs are becoming one of the leading factors in the security sector expert formation.

International efforts, both multilateral and bilateral, push the reform processes forward. The OSCE and the Stability Pact for SEE provide multilateral frameworks with a number of opportunities for expert formation. The bilateral contribution includes a number of often modest projects that were arranged through bilateral agreements. Due to their number, and relatively distant character to third parties, such projects were not subject to consideration in this report.

An overview of the security sector expert formation programmes offered in BiH is provided in the Appendix.

#### **1.2.4 Main Gaps in Expert Formation**

##### *(a) Dissemination of Knowledge/Information*

Too many security sector experts lack active knowledge of the English language; a smaller number are not even familiar with the use of IT technologies either. The situation is more promising and satisfactory among younger generation experts. Therefore, this problem might be expected to disappear in the next ten years.

Currently, the majority of senior experts (decision-makers and advisors) depend on secondhand information, being unable to access any up-to-date sources of information.

In addition, the major international politically binding documents (UN resolutions, OSCE documents, regional and subregional agreements and statements) remain untranslated, not disseminated to the institutions and persons of interest in the security sector, or are publicly unavailable in local languages to those who might be interested.

Internationally legal binding documents, as well as state-level documents, are translated and published in the *Official Gazette of BiH*, whereas legally binding documents adopted at the entity level are published in the RS and F BiH official gazettes. Unfortunately, the gazettes are not available online, and cannot be obtained free of charge.

For different reasons, there are no libraries, specialised collections, or archives available in the parliaments, the Council of Ministers of BiH, the entity governments, or any particular ministry. The university libraries are supplied with a limited number of predominantly outdated items. It is almost impossible for students to find daily newspapers and magazines devoted to foreign security sector reforms. Also, day-to-day press releases by the media and specialised on-line databases cannot be expected. Here, Sarajevo presents itself as the one exception, where the first multimedia library was established.

The parliamentary committees dealing with security issues do not produce internal or public reports, as well as materials. The few experts that actively participate in public academic life, with some exceptions, have no habit of publishing or contributing their opinions and articles in different newspapers or magazines.

Most institutions in both the executive and legislative branch have no Web-presentations, while existing presentations might be more professionally organised and informative.

(b) *Academic Education*

The current organisation of the academic education system already poses a serious threat to the prosperity and stability of BiH, and will continue

to do so in the future if not significantly changed. Therefore, the task of improving the unsatisfactory situation in the education sector, especially regarding higher education, presents one of the new priorities of the international community agencies in BiH. The principles of the Bologna Declaration provide a framework for this project. However, there is still no convergence to a '3-5-8' model of higher education, to academic credits, to modular education, and so on.

The academic education in the security sector ranks among the most critical areas of higher education. Opportunities for graduate and postgraduate studies in the area of security are limited, and existing programmes very often outdated or incomplete. There exist no military schools or academies.

As a result of the displayed conditions in BiH, it is evident that there is no systematic education of the security sector cadre. Only a small number of research projects have been launched. As a consequence, the knowledge of available scholars has been outdated, the number of young researchers has been insufficient, translating and editorial activities have been insufficient, the number of NGOs has been relatively small, and the presence of BiH experts in international projects has been poor. Over time, an imbalance between military, technical and social science aspects of education has come about.

Students from BiH already attend security-related undergraduate studies in different countries, but lack further opportunities in postgraduate and doctoral studies in the area of security at leading universities. The majority of all offered multilateral programmes and some of the bilateral programmes are ad-hoc programmes (from case to case) and are not part of the longitudinal programmes of assistance or curriculum.

A notion exists in BiH that the majority of existing programmes only offer basic training, while senior and top executive programmes are represented on a much lower level. This approach inevitably leads to a protracted dependence on foreign experts and their expertise. If the assumption of the notion is correct, then part of the reason is given by the truth that foreign experts are easier accessible and more reliable than the development of domestic experts. Of course, this will not be the best strategy in the long run.

Today's tendency predicts that more technical experts are available who are able to implement decisions, than experts who are able to create long-term development strategies.

(c) *Executive Education*

Although benefits from the executive education (such as on-problem focused programmes), easy arrangements with the best teachers from BiH and abroad, the opportunity for use of modern education methods (such as Advanced Distance Learning, Distance Learning, summer schools etc.), the opportunity of verification of diplomas and certificates already held from courses/schools abroad, financial benefits, faster professional development, permanent education, are well known, the system of the executive education is still not well developed in BiH.

The demanding/needy area of the security sector is unable to release a clear definition on expert profiles at any level, and consequently, there exist no clear definitions of programmes needed to improve this specific sector. Unclear as well are the time dimensions. Obviously, not much research has been done in this field.

The supply side, which could be identified as universities and other educational institutions, have not been able to develop any modular programmes. On the contrary, the fact that such modules do exist in other areas and function well (for example modules for foreign languages training or IT-training) indicates that the real problem is based on a lack of sound and clear requests on the part of the demanding side. Furthermore it is unclear which institutions should define/formulate such requests or appropriate curricula.

(d) *Public Administration and the Civil Service*

The basic principles of efficient public administration and civil service in BiH have been defined in accordance with EU standards. There is bold support to the ongoing process of institution building at all levels. It

might be expected that the EU SAP programme will further contribute to the process. At the same time, there are no modules offered for public training.

The main part of the security sector community (military, police, intelligence), for different reasons still maintains specific characteristics (enhanced position in society, higher importance and responsibility, secrecy etc.). This tendency negatively impacts the melting process between security sector and society. Experiences from the previous state system show how dangerous such exclusions of the security sector from society can be. Therefore, it is crucial that experts from the security sector receive training in public administration and public service. If they lack such training, they will be unable to cope properly with challenges in higher positions.

(e) *Teamwork*

Current tendencies show that problems of the modern world become more and more complex, the available time to find optimal solutions more and more limited, experts tend to be more and more specialised, and small countries suffer more and more from a lack of necessary resources. The only way to deal with those problems, for BiH and other small states, is by developing knowledge, skills and work culture, in ad hoc, problem-oriented, intersector meetings. Those include the governmental-civil society as well as other groups. The composition of those meetings helps to produce the best expertise or solution possible. However, currently, officials at the mid, senior and top level are unable to receive practical training on important techniques such as teamwork, negotiations, consultation of advisors, decision-making process, management of changes, public relations, the media etc.

### **1.2.5 Conclusion**

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a strong need for comprehensive and total reform of the security sector. The situation asks for the help of institutions of the international community, which are responsible for the

implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. As of now, the main reform initiators have been international experts with a modest contribution of country (BiH) internal experts.

Events on the international scene, after September 11, indicate a shift of interest to new problem areas. This fact, combined with the progress of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords' provisions, will inevitably lead to an increased dependence of the process of security sector reforms on BiH experts.

Due to its complex structure, the number of needed security sector experts in BiH is relatively large, especially if compared with other, similar states. Additionally, the following gaps in the process of security sector expert formation exist: poor dissemination of knowledge and information; inappropriate system of academic education; under-developed system of executive education; divergence between civil service principles and practice of governance in the military; police and law enforcement agencies; and the lack of knowledge and experience in modern work methods.

In order to overcome the identified gaps, long-lasting efforts to cover the wide range of problem aspects will be needed.

### **1.2.6 Recommendations**

To fill the identified gaps in the security sector expert formation, prolonged and diligent work must be done. Special attention needs to be paid to the existing and future expert community in BiH, both at state administration and civil society level.

To support this work, further efforts, initiatives and potential projects could be recommended within two interconnected strategies: first, to render BiH's presence in the international security sector expert community more significant (foreign aspect); and, secondly, to support internal developments aimed at the security sector reforms in general, and particularly at the security sector expert formation level (internal aspect):

(a) *Foreign Aspect*

- To establish permanent research processes and to obtain reliable, available and active partners in BiH, it is of crucial importance that 1–2 ‘think-tanks’ devoted to the security sector be established in BiH.
- To establish regular scholarship programmes eligible throughout the next 5–7 years, which should allow postgraduate and PhD studies for BiH experts at leading universities. The programmes would aim to establish a cadre with the goal of independent development within BiH.
- To support the evaluation and certification of security related courses already completed by BiH citizens at different institutions worldwide. For example, at the Baltic Defence College, the George Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Royal College for Defence Studies, etc. Individuals who achieved a certain academic credit level would be eligible for a special curriculum to achieve a MA diploma. As a result, the number of necessary scholarships could be reduced, and a critical balance of verified experts in BiH be established. Further, in-system experts should be motivated to join international courses and programmes that are being offered.
- To secure a better display of what has already been achieved in BiH, as well as to expose legally and politically binding documents that were created in BiH to an international expert community for analysis and feedback. A further contribution to the process would be the establishment of support programmes for the translation of documents from local languages into the English language. Finally, the documents could be posted at specialised websites.



- To open a channel of communication between the international expert community and BiH's NGOs working in the security area. First, this process could be encouraged by the creation and maintenance of BiH's NGOs' web-presentations. Secondly, by making them more professional and informative.
- All projects that are oriented towards the improvement of the cooperation in SEE should be strongly encouraged.

(b) *Internal Aspect*

The following steps should be applied to enhance the level of security issues and the presence of international security sector experts in BiH.

- Develop and support programmes of translation into local languages of the relevant UN, NATO, OSCE and other international organisation and initiative documents, as well as the translation of relevant periodic publications, leading newspaper articles, and selected materials from specialised databases, in order to make these materials accessible to experts and other interested persons in printed form or via the Internet.
- Support the translation of books and brochures dealing with security issues into local languages. Support the project of developing specialised, publicly accessible classical or multimedia libraries at parliaments and universities.
- Encourage international security experts to publish their articles in BiH publications.
- Based on the experience of other transitional states, develop a curriculum with focus on security expert formation in BiH through summer schools, and the use of existing distance learning centres (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla) as well as through access to ADL modules.

In order to support institution building in BiH:

- Senior level decision-makers and their assistants:

IT courses: organise IT courses two times a year at which the existing websites related to security are being presented and access to specialised databases is being secured.

Secure courses and practical exercises in negotiation techniques, modern decision-making process and management of changes.

Presentation of experience in the making and providing of expertise and use of advisors in states with a long tradition of parliamentary democracy and states in transition.

- Parliamentary assistance:

Support establishment of specialised parliamentary committees devoted to different aspects of security.

Support to parliamentary staff training courses.

Training support programmes of new members of parliaments in accordance with parliamentary procedures.

- Assistance to military, police and law enforcement agencies:

Inclusion into EU programmes of courses on civil administration.

Support to the establishment and functioning of policy planning departments.

## **APPENDIX 1      SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – PROGRAMMES OFFERED**

### *A1.2.1 Programmes Offered by BiH Agents*

- Faculty of Criminal Sciences/University of Sarajevo (<http://unsa.ba>)  
Two and four-year undergraduate study  
Postgraduate study
- Faculty of Law / University of Banja Luka (<http://www.unc.bl.ac.yu>)  
Postgraduate study of diplomacy and international law.
- University of Banja Luka (<http://www.unc.bl.ac.yu>)  
University Centre for Distance Learning

The project is developing in cooperation with the World University Service-BiH (<http://www.sus.ba>), and auspices of the World University Service-Austria (<http://www.wus-austria.org>). The pilot sub-project of e-learning/distance learning of the international law is under development.

The project offers the window-of-opportunity for including programmes from area of the security sector as well.

- Police Academy / Sarajevo and Banja Luka  
Undergraduate two-year study  
Basic police education
- School of the State Border Service/Sarajevo  
Undergraduate 18-month study  
Basic border service education

- University of Tuzla (<http://www.untz.ba>)  
University Centre for Distance Learning

The project is being developed in cooperation with the World University Service – BiH (<http://www.sus.ba>), and auspices of the World University Service – Austria (<http://www.wus-austria.org>). The project offers the window-of-opportunity for including some programmes from area of the security sector as well.

- Centre for Security Studies-Bosnia and Herzegovina/Sarajevo (<http://www.css.ba>)

Founded in 2001, the CSS is an independent research, educational and training enterprise dedicated to encouraging informed debate on security matters and to promoting democratic structures and processes in foreign and security policy in BiH, and in the SEE region. Main objectives and projects:

development of the security policy of BiH;

preparation for integration into PfP and NATO;

improvement of inter-entity cooperation;

re-establishment of legislative framework.

- Centre for Strategic Studies / International Forum Bosnia-Sarajevo (<http://ifbosna.org.ba>)

Founded in December 2000, the aim of the Centre is to be a sound and genuine nucleus of strategic and geopolitical thought in BiH and to assist the development of BiH through:

ongoing analysis of the regional and global political, security, economic and cultural reality of BiH, with an interpretation of trends and interactions;

interpretation, evaluation and forecasting the strategies of our neighbouring states and their impact on BiH; and

contribution to deliberations by the local and foreign public on issues of significance for the future of BiH

- Association of Defendologists (+387 51 343 367)

As a part of the wider EU project of the transition states democratisation, the Association was established in 1998 with the predominantly sociological approach to issues such as:

internal affairs and security;

democratisation of police and policing;

citizens and police.

The Association's activities include organisation of seminars and publication of the magazine 'Defendology'.

### *Support Service Providers*

- Academic Cooperation Centre for Students in Sarajevo (<http://www.access.ba>)
  - The first multimedia library
  - Centre for distance learning
  - For university professors and students only
- Mr Dalibor Kesic, Freelance Interpreter and Authorised Court Interpreter specialising in legal and security matters ([bore@blic.net](mailto:bore@blic.net))
- GAMA Prevodi Translating Agency ([mirjanag@gamaprevodi.com](mailto:mirjanag@gamaprevodi.com))  
GAMA Prevodi is a translating agency for English, French, German, Italian and Chinese language. Agency's translators are

especially qualified in translating legal documents and documents related to economics; however, they are equally familiar with military, political, humanitarian and any other terminology.

### *A1.2.2 Programmes Offered by the International Organisations*

#### *OSCE Mission to BiH*

- BiH Inter-university Steering Committee on Security Studies (in cooperation with Geneva Centre for Security Policy-GSCP, East-West Institute-EWI, Universities in BiH)

Established in 1999, the Centre is an inter/university body which supports, promotes, coordinates and evaluates security studies within BiH. Its goal is to create environment, which supports young researches and experts in the field of security studies as well as to connect them with the broader international security studies community. Projects:

Problems of return of refugees;

Integration of BiH in the Euro-Atlantic Security system;

Security aspect of geo-economy of BiH.

Up until now, modest results have been achieved.

#### *Security Cooperation*

Activities have been managed through the OSCE BiH Department for Security Cooperation (DSC), whose overall aim is to establish conditions in which military force can be eliminated as a means of resolving conflicts in BiH.

Working within the context of the military annexes of the Dayton Peace Accords, the primary goal of the DSC is to contribute to the creation of a framework for peace and stability within BiH, which can be sustained in the aftermath of a withdrawal or a major reduction of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR). This goal is pursued in conjunction with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), SFOR and other members of the International Community.

### *Projects*

- Seminars on the Code of Conduct in political-military aspects of security.

Four seminars annually for young military officers, devoted to the promotion of professionalism in the military profession.

- Seminars for journalists.

Two seminars annually for selected civil journalists dealing with security sector issues, as well as for journalists from specialised military journals. A certain number of MoDs officials for informing and planning has been included, too.

- Defence budget planning.

Different seminars and workshops devoted to planning techniques, audit policy and procedures, defence budget's transparency and defence procurement are organised.

## *Education Reform*

On 4 July 2002 the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna expressed its support for the request from the High Representative that OSCE facilitate enhanced coordination and cohesion of the International effort in the area of education reform in BiH, consistent with its mandate in the area of human rights. In order to fulfil this responsibility, the Mission has created an Education Department within its Head Office and will add specialist education staff to its existing field structure. The main objective at the present phase of project is development of a framework strategy for education in BiH for presentation to the Peace Implementation Council in September 2002.

The OSCE will focus its coordinating and field monitoring efforts in the following areas:

- access to education;
- equity in the provision of educational opportunities to students of all ages;
- improvement in the quality of education at all levels.

Different initiatives aimed to bridge the existing gap in security sector expert formation could be developed within the project.



## *Stabilisation Forces (SFOR)*

- Re-structuring of the Armed Forces in BiH

SFOR and the OSCE Mission to BiH co-chair the Working Group on the Re-structuring of the Armed Forces in BiH (WG). The WG was established in 2000, and since then plays major role in:

Creation and implementation of the ‘Defence Policy of BiH’ document;

Downsizing of the military personnel;

Structural reforms of the armed forces in BiH, both active and reserve component;

State level defence institution building;

Seminars for the military personal, with support from the SHAPE.

- European Union (EU)

Sarajevo MA European Studies Diploma

The EU has established the TEMPUS programme to assist Central, East and South European countries, the New Independent States and Mongolia in the reform of higher education. Among other states, BiH is eligible to take part in the programme that finances cooperation projects between universities from the EU and the partner countries.

The focus is on university management, curriculum development, institution building and networking. Mobility grants for students and professors are also included. TEMPUS is one of the privileged EU instruments to achieve the objectives of the Stability Pact.

In March 2000, the University of Bologna (Italy) formally recognised the Sarajevo MA European Studies Diploma with a legal status valid for the University of Bologna. Although based in Sarajevo, the MA has an impact on the whole of Bosnia, thanks to the collaboration of the Universities of Banja Luka, Tuzla, East and West Mostar. The London School of Economics is the official contractor for the Tempus project. EU partners in the implementation of the project are the Sussex European Institute and the Centro per l'Europa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica of the University of Bologna, while the Sarajevo Law Centre is responsible for coordinating activities.

Bologna University hopes that this initiative may have a positive impact in supporting policies of inclusion within BiH, and the inclusion of BiH itself in the framework of the European Union.

### *Rule of Law and Democratisation*

Restoring the rule of law and reinforcing the democratic processes remain paramount objectives of the EU in Southeast Europe. Weak institutions and underdeveloped civil societies are unfortunately key features of the countries of the region. Projects include promoting dialogue between different ethnic communities, conflict resolution, training programmes for local NGOs, awareness raising on the role of human rights in building a civil society, promotion of citizen's participation in local democracy projects, voter education etc.

### *Institution Building, Civil Service in General*

- The Stability Pact

Working Table I – WT I (Democratisation and Human Rights)  
*Education and Youth*

Education contributes substantially to the creation of a stable and prosperous civil society. The Graz Process was initiated by Austria in order to promote democratic and peaceful development in the region by supporting and coordinating educational cooperation projects in South Eastern Europe. Projects:

- Support of long-term education reform and system development in SEE countries with a focus on regional cooperation, networking, exchange of expertise, capacity building.
- Networking/dissemination of information among educational communities in the SEE and towards the wider European Education Area.

### *Parliamentary Cooperation*

The aim of the Task Force is to promote democracy by strengthening the role of parliaments in South Eastern Europe and their contribution to stability in the region through enhancing cooperation among them. Projects:

- ‘Democratic control: Education programme for Parliament and Parliamentary staff’

This project aims at providing parliamentarians and parliamentary staff with knowledge and tools, enabling them to demand transparency and hold governments fully accountable in the areas of defence and security. Activities include regional and country workshops on the role of Parliaments and security issues.

- ‘Parliament and Civil Society in SEE: Legislatures and Citizens’

This project aims at developing a true, active working relationship between Parliaments and NGOs in SEE. Activities include civil society feedback on draft legislation and public debates, between NGOs and parliamentarians, focusing on issues identified by the parties concerned.

- ‘Promoting Parliamentary cooperation in SEE: An Action Plan’

This project aims at providing information and transferring skills to parliamentarians in relevant specialised committees including parliamentary practice and procedure, the fight against corruption, and the protection of the cultural heritage. Activities include country workshops and regional conferences for parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, for young parliamentarians and women parliamentarians, as well as exchange visits to parliaments in the SEE region and in the EU.

Working Table III – WT III (Security Issues)  
(Sub Table on Defence and Security Issues)

### *Defence Economics*

In an attempt to increase the sense of security and confidence among the countries in the region, the Stability Pact aims at enhancing transparency consolidating progress in the defence and security field.

The Pact has sponsored a Bulgarian-British collaborative effort to establish a regional planning and budgeting centre in Sofia. This centre provides, through both an experts and academic task forces, substantial ideas on how to improve and share experiences in defence planning. The Centre’s first product is an annual yearbook on planning.

Although invited, BiH has no representative in the Centre, and is not included in the Yearbook.

**Valeri Ratchev**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN BULGARIA**

### **1.3 Assessment of Security Sector Sxpert Formation**

#### **1.3.1 Introduction**

Traditionally, the security sector in former communist countries was as a ‘sacred cow’ – out of any transparency and critics. The only permissible criticism was on how to make the excellent army and security services better. The general outcome of this was dangerous for both, society and security sector professionals. The Bulgarian public had a wrong impression about the way the equipment for the army was provided and its price, the real capacity of the security services and its cost, the level of national sovereignty of the Bulgarian security sector in the Warsaw Pact and Socialist Camp format. In particular, the militaries and policemen have lost the sense of professionalism in modern context.

In contrast, there was a period immediately after the beginning of a democratic transformation, when the security sector was criticised even for its existence. The total nihilism was based on a mass rush to cancel all ties with the repressive Communist institutions. The most popular and commonly used argument to justify all activities towards the demolition of the communist hangover in the security sector was: ‘we change the system’. The professional prestige of the serviceman was minimised. The long-standing system of values was negatively re-evaluated and questioned.

Between these two periods positive and negative experience a sign of equality could be established due to the obvious lack of comprehensive and systematic analyses. There was, and still is not enough serious

expertise outside the security sectors, that could independently and impartially evaluate the status of the so called 'security sector reform'.<sup>2</sup>

In the case of Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries, foreign security and defence expertise were requested in several occasions.<sup>3</sup> The overall result of the work that had been done within some of the national security institutions was that a great gap existed on how the Bulgarian and foreign experts looked at problems of the security sector reform. In some cases, the outcomes and recommendations were not even understood, no consensus was found. Paradoxically, the media in most cases took the side of the Bulgarian experts in public debates. Which reforms were better for the national interests? It is also very illustrative that the voice of the media was significantly changed when NATO/European Union membership became more realistic!

---

<sup>2</sup> Against the background of the specific Bulgarian division of political power and related to that division security organisation this paper will address the following content of the 'security sector': the Bulgarian Army (traditional name for the Armed Forces), Police Service, Gandarmerie (paramilitary force with police functions), Border Police Service (control of the ground and maritime borders), National Security Service (counterintelligence), National Guard Service (for guarding VIP and important civilian objects).

<sup>3</sup> The Bulgarian government requested an external study of the ongoing defence reform, which would assess the situation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, civil-military relations and the efficiency of NATO membership efforts, as well as suggest steps for modernisation of the Bulgarian military. The US Department of Defence responded to the request. The Department's assessment aimed at providing the Bulgarian government with an individually tailored blueprint that could be used to develop defence reform plans in accordance with Bulgaria's national security and defence interests. The study was led by MG Henry Kivenaar and the report was compiled over the period November 1998 to April 1999. In 1998 a team from the British Ministry of Defence conducted a study of the existing civil-military relations and democratic control over the Bulgarian military. The results of this study were incorporated in amendments of the National Defence and Armed Forces Law prepared and adopted the same year. Since this period the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence has hosted consultants from the United Kingdom (defence planning, programming and budgeting, English language training and testing and special adviser to the Chief of the GS), Germany (reform of the NCO corps training and career development), and France (reform of the logistic support system). In the Ministry of Interior Services foreign expertise was used in terms to better the fight against the international organised crime during the embargo against former Yugoslavia. In recent times a British consultancy from the *Crown Agents Co* was provided to modernise the structure and activities of the Customs Agency.

At this time, which is typical for the power transition countries, a new type of mentality came into play among the civil society, political, administrative, academic and media experts, as well as the security sector professionals. As a result, the situation in Bulgaria today is much better than it was five years ago. State security organisations consider independent experts not as friends but as necessary partners. By doing this, the state security organisations can justify to the public the way the administration spends the money of the taxpayer. In their opinion, the media and NGOs are interested in working with and within the security sector not only to criticise them, but also to participate in the reform and creation of the new security organisations. It is too early to make conclusions on the process of creation of effective independent expertise on security matters as well as a fundamental understanding among professionals that this expertise is not only necessary but also vital for the successful completion of this expertise.

The basic existing problem is the insufficient and ineffective education and training of civil experts on security affairs. Without appropriate expert formation, the term independent experts would miss its actual meaning and lose its compatibility. The lack of adequate training further minimises the effect of enlarged transparency on security services activities.

Without in depth knowledge on the issue of expertise, the ‘independent experts’ (including those in political parties and the state administration) will continue to be used by professionals (as a main source of information) for their purposes. For example, certain workers/associates assume that several years of work experience in the security sector will automatically turn them into experts. This happens and continues to happen.

### **1.3.2 How are the Different Experts Prepared for Their Tasks and Assignments and How Well?**

The evaluation of expert preparedness is problematic. If the evaluation was strictly based on the proper definition of the term ‘expert’ – being very skilful, having much training and knowledge in some special

fields'<sup>4</sup> – it would be very difficult to identify an independent or politically obliged person on expert level. For the aims of this paper, it is accepted that the independent security sector expert represents a person whose primary job is related to state security, who has an education and training that permit him to understand in broad context specialised facts and information and, on this basis to make responsible independent conclusions, evaluations and recommendations. Regarding the expertise, the expert systematically has access to enough, detailed and professional information, and is in contact with the official representatives of security sector organisation(s), as well as research and academic centres at home and abroad. In addition to the work definition, it has to be considered that the requirements of the many experts vary, depending on whether they belong to parliamentary staff, state administration, NGOs or the media. Therefore, each expert needs to be specifically trained in accordance to his/her job duties.

(a) *Parliament and Parliamentary Staffers*

The Constitution and role of the Parliament determine the requirements for the expertise. The National Assembly has the authority to pass resolutions on the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. Further, the Assembly can approve any deployment and use of Bulgarian armed forces outside the country's borders, and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of the country or their crossing of that territory. It can pass resolutions on motions from the President or the Council of Ministers, introduce martial law or declare a state of emergency on all or part of the country's territory. In addition, the Assembly ratifies or rejects international initiatives of political and military nature, and envisages corrections to the national borders. The National Assembly ratifies international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral (e.g. the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe, the 'Open Sky' Treaty etc.), international conventions, as well as laws regulating particular issues of defence, internal order, security and the defence-industrial complex (The Law of Control over Foreign Trade

---

<sup>4</sup> *Webster's New World Dictionary* (3rd edn).



Activities with Armaments and Goods and Technologies with Dual Purpose Application).

The work of the legislature, referred to as the National Assembly, is open to the public. Committee deliberations are open and the media have access to both committees and plenary sessions. The draft legislation is presented on the Assembly's Internet site and in the media. Important sessions, including every Friday's 'question time', are broadcast live on national radio and television. Since 1997, parliamentary committees have increasingly drafted legislation in partnership with independent professional experts and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

(i) Preparedness of the Members of the Parliament

Throughout its history, Bulgaria has used various types of electoral systems. However, after the proportional representation system was implemented during the transition period, it was considered the best among the many before. The proportional representation system enables all interests and groups in society to be represented in the Parliament. Policies established on this specific system enjoy overall approval and enhance the legitimacy of the political system.

As a result, a large number of particular interests are represented in the Parliament, but the number of MPs with professions that could be useful for the work of the parliamentary committees is limited. The various professions are listed as follows:

<i>Profession</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Engineer	50	20.83
Lawyer	43	17.92
Economist	35	14.58
Lecturer	31	12.92
Medicine doctor	27	11.25
Journalist	8	3.33
Historian	5	2.08
Not presented	4	1.67
Other (architect, political scientist, philologist)	37	15.42
<b>Total</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>100</b>

Illustrative in this data is the fact that retired militaries (including a former Chief of General Staff) and security service personnel, being members of the Parliament, have presented other professions.

After the first democratic elections in 1990, the Grand (i.e. constituent) National Assembly decided to create the first National Security Committee (9 August 1990). Today, this is the permanent body that supports the legislative and control functions of the Parliament. In the next 'ordinary' Assemblies the members of the Committee are 36<sup>th</sup> – 29 members; 37<sup>th</sup> – 31 members; 38<sup>th</sup> – 21, and 39<sup>th</sup> – 28.

The chairmanship of the Committee has almost always been held by non-professionals. Only once, in 1991, the chairman was a retired colonel (an academician from the G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College).

For the first time, the entire Parliament underwent a significant change with regard to the structure of the parliamentary permanent committees that deal with security sector issues. The change predominantly transformed the former National Security Committee into Foreign Policy, Defence and Security Committee. The purpose of this transformation was to combine closely related issues under the control of one body. Chairman of the Committee is a philologist and PR person who entered the committee from university circles. Among the members, only one has a particular foreign policy education and another person a professional intelligence career. There are seven members with significant practice in democratic parliaments (25%) and more than two in the security sector. None of the members has either an education or previous experience in national defence and armed forces control.

Simultaneously, and for the first time, an Internal Security and Public Order Committee was established, which would work on legislation and parliamentary oversight of police and other special services that mainly belong to the Ministry of Interior. The Committee has a total of 24 members.

Among the members of this committee, nine have significant parliamentary experience (two of them with an education directly related to national security issues), which results in more than 37 per cent. A former Chief of the General Staff, head of the National Intelligence Service and Minister of Interior, leads the committee.

The lack of well-prepared and experienced members of the Parliament is well illustrated by the draft laws and amendments that are related to the national security sector. First, the basic laws and normative acts were prepared by executives. Therefore, they do not appropriately reflect on the process of democratisation and the transition of the power sector by parliamentarians. As a consequence, the security organisations started to reorganise themselves.

The influence of the intra-institutional interest is much higher when the ministers and directors of Services draft the laws than if the parliamentarians and their staffers do this job.

Secondly, this practice did not help to overcome the division of labour within the security sector organisations that found its root in the years of totalitarian regimes. In those times, every single service was ‘a state within the state’, which slowed down the transformation of a central system into various democratic reform processes.

Thirdly, this practice lowered the overall interest of members of security related parliamentary committees to participate in specific training activities.

Especially, after the years 1996/1997 direct connections (not always with positive outcome) between parliamentarians and professionals from the security sector (in many cases fired or retired), replaced the required training for expert building.

Some general conclusions regarding the preparedness of the parliamentarians are the following:

- The fact that the two committees that are dealing with the parliamentary oversight of the security sector are organised on the presumption that the security is most of all ‘external’ (foreign policy and defence) and ‘internal’ (counterintelligence and police). This shows that the entire Parliament (more precisely the majority in the Parliament) thinks very schematically about national security and its connotations.
- The proportional representation of the electoral systems does not presuppose a Parliament with professional workers in the most important areas.
- The Bulgarian political parties still lack well educated and trained party-members that could be performing effectively in their parliamentary job.
- The most popular areas of specialisation are those of foreign policy and internal security.

- The Armed Forces have no lobby and no attractive image among the members of the Parliament.
- The fact that the experienced members of the two committees represent less than half of the total is a source of irregularity and lack of depth and perspective in their work. The lack of appropriately educated people reflect the most serious problem and cannot only be compensated by experience.

(ii) Preparedness of the Parliamentary Staffers

One of the main problems of the Parliamentary committees is a lack of tradition to support permanent and invited experts. There are two reasons: On the one hand, the party members do not like to share specialised information, as well as the party's own position regarding certain topics with external people. On the other hand, the Parliament's tolerance level for hiring other experts is very low.

There is a lack of professional parliamentary staffers on an individual as well as on a parliamentary party group basis. The reason for this insufficient basis mainly depends on a lack of tradition. Bulgarian parliamentarians, some exceptions excluded, are not professional politicians. They do not receive the necessary training and therefore lack necessary sources for a successful individual political career. All individual politicians should follow the path of their affiliated party. As a result, the 37<sup>th</sup> Parliament session included two National Security Committee experts, the following session just one.

The entire 39<sup>th</sup> Parliament session seemed to focus on an enhanced organisation and use of expert knowledge. The reason for this positive development is associated with the level of education that was brought into the committees by new members. Most of them were better educated (studied abroad) and were able to integrate the values of parliamentary staffers. The new majority further wishes to avoid the former permanent relay on mid-level experts from the security sector institutions. A possible positive factor is presented by the nature of the

Secretary General of the Parliament, who was a former aide (legislative issues of the Security Sector) to the first democratic president Dr. Zhelev. In conclusion, the use of experts in the current Parliament has never been bigger with regard to all the years of democracy and promises in increasing development in quality and spectrum. In addition to the existing National Centre for Public Opinion Studies a department for Parliamentary Research and Analysis was established. The first of them has been systematically performing (since 1990) a public opinion poll and studies on security, defence, armed forces and military conscript service issues. The other contributed effectively to the creation of a concept for 'integrated Ministry of Defence' (2002).

The entire observations on the capacity of the parliamentary staff are based on less than one year of experience.

(b) *Presidential Staff*

The President is the Supreme Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. He appoints and dismisses the higher command of the Armed Forces and bestows all higher military ranks, acting on a motion from the Council of Ministers. The President presides over the Consultative Council for the National Security, which status is established by law. The National Intelligence and the National Guard Service are under his authority as well.

On a motion by the Council of Ministers, he declares general or partial mobilisation in accordance with the law. Whenever the National Assembly is not in session and cannot be convened, he proclaims a state of war in case of armed attacks against Bulgaria, or whenever urgent action is required by virtue of an international commitment. He proclaims martial law or any other state of emergency. The National Assembly is convened forthwith to endorse the President's decision.

So, the President of the Republic exercises his control in two ways: as the Head of State, responsible for applying the Constitution, and as Supreme Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces who approves the

defence plan of the country. The presidential role and status contain some possible functional problems:

- The President has to approve the quality of documents which he is unable to assess because of a lack of appropriate staff. Therefore, the act of approval is pure formality.
- The President's limited access to information forces him to execute certain acts without being aware of any possible consequences (e.g. the declaration of general or partial mobilisation).
- The President's right and obligation to appoint and dismiss the higher command of the Armed Forces (and subsequently to bear responsibility for these acts) would only work positively if he had a sufficient or strong relationship with his advising experts. The current situation only enables him to follow already existing personal structures within the hierarchy level, but does not provide him with detailed information about his individual co-workers. The current situation binds the President to the formal order of movement within the system, which prevents him from a substantive personal objective opinion. Basically, he is exclusively exposed to the existing network within the system.

In this context, the role of the presidential staff is extremely important, because in many cases their work reflects precisely on the balance between the centres of political power. In relation to the previously discussed situation – recognising a lack of personal competency – the first democratic President, Dr Zhelev, decided to establish a military cabinet that consisted of four senior officers: a one-star general as the head, and three colonels, representing in total three branches of the Armed Forces. Some observers in Bulgaria believe that 'the military cabinet' was a good idea but it was compromised by the struggle between the presidential staff and the General Staff. The clash was for more influence over the decision-making process in the Armed Forces.

Parallel to the military supporting staff, the President has a national security adviser that is responsible for the political aspects of national security competency of the Head of the State.

The next President, Mr. Petar Stoyanov, decided to abolish the existing military cabinet, as well as defence adviser, and only make use of a defence secretary. Paradoxically, during his mandate, the national security secretary was former Chief of the General Staff and the defence secretary, which is the former chief of the cabinet of the current defence secretary. Later, the former minister of defence joined the team. He got laid off his position during the last year of his mandate.

President Parvanov kept the two advisory positions, but for the first time they were occupied by civilians: the defence secretary was a retired rear admiral and the national security secretary was a former member of the Parliament (chairman of the National Security Committee) and an academician.

Without giving rise to doubt about the competency of these officers and civilians, it has to be stated that the President, in accordance with his own preferences, selects professional expertise from his co-workers. It needs to be emphasised that two of the important national services – National Intelligence and National Guard – work under presidential direct supervision. Furthermore, there is important job aiming, budgeting and strategic planning as well as work coordination with other organisations, that are not under presidential direct influence. Not included are the Military Information Service (Ministry of Defence) and National Security Service (Ministry of Interior).

The President is also chairman of the Consultative Council for National Security. The Council forms a crucial security nucleus. The Council has a unique task of bringing together the President, the Prime Minister, all ministers being related to national security responsibilities, all parliamentary leaders and the Chief of General Staff. This Council is related to the role of the President as Chief Commander of the Armed Forces. The circle of participants can be extended upon need.



The Council's function is mainly analytical and consultative, but its decisions have immediate foreign and domestic policy implications. The results of the Council's work carry enormous weight with public opinion. The Council meets regularly to review the security situation as it pertains to Bulgaria. Extensive reports from the intelligence services are subjected to examination for policy implications. The role of this institution is most apparent in situations of crisis.<sup>5</sup> One of the Council's shortcomings is the insufficient number of specialists involved in its work. There are almost no experts that support the Council on a permanent basis.

(c) *Political Secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice, and other Leading Representatives of the Executive*

(i) Preparedness of the Council of Ministers' Staff

There is no specific expert organisation within the government (called official Council of Ministers) that is oriented towards security issues. The only government that contained a small department – called National Security and Public Order – inside the Council's basic structure was under the regime of Mr Videnov (Bulgarian Socialist Party). The department consisted of two officers of the AF and a legal expert of the Ministry of Interior, headed by a non-professional political appointee.

The Security Council supports the government. This Council was established in 1998 on the basis of the National Security Concept that was adopted the same year. It includes the Ministers of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the Council also includes the Deputy Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, the Directors of the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Services.

---

<sup>5</sup> During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Council met in various formats every couple of days to review incoming information about the quickly evolving situation and the parameters of Bulgaria's response. Following the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001, the Council met on a number of occasions to assess the immediate repercussions of the acts for Bulgarian national security. The wider implications of the new terrorist threat led the President to convene the Council with the specific purpose of strategic analysis.

This Council is not an organ that determines governmental policy in the area of national security. It analyses incoming information on security risks and threats, delivers short- and long-term risk assessments, proposes concrete resolution plans in situations of crisis, and decides on the allocation and use of resources of the executive. The Council further produces reports and has a permanent civil servant staff, headed by a Secretary of the Security Council. When needed, the Council relies on expertise from the Ministries of Interior and Defence.

Unfortunately, there is a limited number of staff members. Due to lack of political will and understanding, the Council does not enlarge its membership number. However, such an improvement is urgent, because the Council begins to play a significant organisational and coordination role. The intra-institutional interests of the Security Services are to be directly reported to the Council of Ministers, but are not supposed to be reported or in any way publicised.

(ii) Preparedness of the Members of Political Cabinets

An administrative reform has been an integral part of the modernisation package. The Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants have led to the complete transformation of public administration, which positively impacted the work of law enforcement agencies. Key elements of the reform include a transparent and clearly structured system of administration, a clear delineation of expert and political levels in the system, the introduction of political cabinets, the introduction of common educational and professional criteria for each position in the single classificatory grid of public administration, the introduction of well-defined career paths and so forth.

‘Political cabinets’ in the security sector ministries consist of the minister, his deputies (usually three to four), the press secretary or the head of Press and Information Office, the Parliamentary secretary of the ministry, and the political cabinet secretary.

Deputy-ministers should be non-uniformed political appointees, who are experts (or should play the role of experts) in particular areas of the

respective ministry. They further possess a functional responsibility towards the ministry. For example, the areas in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are international military cooperation and defence planning; personnel policy, social adaptation and judicial issues; finance and budgeting; and logistic and procurement issues.

Following the principal diversification of the sphere of functioning of the MoD, the deputy-ministers have expertise in their own fields of work. The deputy for international military cooperation and defence planning is usually a professional diplomat or senior retired officer. The deputy for personnel policy, social adaptation and judicial issues received his/her education in the study of law and often advanced to the level of a lawyer. Financial issues are handled by economists. And the issues of procurement and logistics are entrusted to a person with business experience or senior retired officer with a logistic background.

In most cases, promoted experts occupy deputy-minister's positions. Only in very few instances, elected members of the Parliament occupy this type of position.

The press secretary is strictly a professional, but normally without any practice in defence and security related topics. Here, a fundamental problem comes into play. The press secretary receives information from uniformed structures, such as the General Staff of the Armed Forces or the National Services in the Ministry of Interior. This connection represents itself as the weakest link in the line of communication between the uniformed and civilian sectors in the power institutions. In addition, some of the ministers used to work directly with the press secretary. All other information regarding the ministry is addressed to the Press and Information Office where more professionals dedicate themselves to the different topics. Generally speaking, in Bulgaria the practice of press secretaries personally handling large amounts of information to specific institutional activities does not exist.

In this regard, a serious contribution to more effective communication between the political cabinets and members of the Parliament was expected to come from the parliamentary secretaries. Unfortunately, most appointed parliamentary secretaries in those positions did not

have expert status in parliamentary affairs. Some of them were lawyers, others journalists, and a few only political or friendly appointees. Their main goal consists in informing the minister about the position of different parliamentary groups and to share with some of them the opinion of the minister. As a result, their work is mostly oriented towards promotion of ministerial ambitions and not to contribute to more precise work of the parliamentary committees.

The political cabinet's secretary presents a position without any preconditions for occupation. In practice, the person is specifically selected and appointed by the minister, based on their individual relation and level of confidence. In several cases, the secretaries played a much more significant role in the decision-making process than was expected from their job description. However, this role has not always proven positive.

Some general observations over the period of one year, with regard to the work performance of the Political Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence and its members, give rise to the assumption that a serious organisational problem has been in existence since the beginning. The decision-making procedures are aggravated by the fact that the Deputy Ministers of Defence also deal with work in the administrative chain of governance. A big part of the information and the filing turnover in the Ministry has to pass through the administrative chain first, and is then sent to the Directors for the final execution. This results in an exceptional overloading, a lack of time for thorough analysis of the problem, and an inadequate suggestion for its solution. Further, this information process can cause delays in deputy ministers' offices due to keeping correspondence for excessive amounts of time and possibly missing deadlines. At the same time, the Deputy Ministers of Defence, as members of the political cabinet, cannot focus their attention on performance development and the control of policies in their areas of responsibility. Moreover, the members of the Political Cabinet have no obligations in accordance with the Administration Organic Law to conduct administrative work. Such obligations would further contradict duties of the Secretary General of MoD. The focus on this organisational situation is purposely made, because it is a prevailing problem among many of the East European countries. It also negatively impacts the

formation of political employees as experts on the political level of security and defence.

(iii) Preparedness of Judiciary Experts

As of 1997, the legislature, together with the executive, fell rapidly into the line of European Union practices, laws and directives. At the same time, the judiciary lagged behind. International institutions, both EU and world related – such as the World Bank – had been drawing attention to the fact of upgrading and modernising the judicial branch of the government. A lively internal debate has taken place since 1999 on the problems of the Bulgarian judiciary, including matters such as:

- the place of prosecution (whether it should remain in the judiciary or be moved over to the executive, which would require a change of the Constitution);
- whether Bulgaria has to continue to make use of the specially designed Military Prosecution Branch, which had the purpose of investigating any illegal activity among military personnel;
- how the system is funded;
- modern training programmes that intend to prepare members adequately for new requirements.

Attempts have been made to solve the problem with training since the year 2000. A school of magistrates registered as an NGO – funded with governmental sources – with the purpose of tackling issues of training of members of the judiciary.

Such forms of NGO-government cooperations have become characteristic for Bulgarian politics since the late 1990s and have spread to many disparate fields. The Government cooperates with NGOs on projects dealing with legal and communication relations between local

government and citizens, such as the NGO-led establishment of municipal and region-wide mediators, ombudsmen, ethnic and minority problems, environmental issues and, increasingly, issues of sustainable local development.<sup>6</sup>

(d) *Representatives of Civil Society such as Academic Workers, Journalists and Non-Governmental Experts Working in NGOs*

In societies such as those prevalent in the Balkans, where many different historical phenomena have created especially acute distrust between government and people, the gap between the two is usually filled with one of the following: either a resilient and kinship-based traditional society, or a civil society. Bulgaria has both, but in a less traditional mixture. External observers usually agree that Bulgaria possesses the most dynamic – indeed ‘vibrant’ – civil society in the region of Southeast Europe.

(i) Preparedness of the Civil Academicians

The state and private universities of Bulgaria were among the first to identify a lack of basic knowledge and professional training on security matters.

The main reason for the late open debate on this issue is related to the fact that in Bulgaria military science is officially recognised as an independent area of science. Based on this fact, educational programmes were concentrated in institutional high schools that were subordinate to the ministries of defence, interior, transportation or construction. Each of those ministries contained military and parliamentary forces.

Because of that, the expertise among civil academicians on security matters was developed essentially only in the mid 1990s. Before, the

---

<sup>6</sup> *Civil Society and Sustainable Development: Non-governmental Organisations and Development in the New Century*, Sofia, Centre for Social Practices & USAID, 2001, Ch. 2.

only civil educational capacity had been established at the University of National and World Economy, where a programme on economic aspects of national security was offered. The programme intended to educate people planning to work for the national defence production complex. Certain topics of international security were studied within the field of international relations.

Among the academic circles there were no centres for war and peace studies, crisis management in international relations, international negotiations etc. The first book on security was published in the 1990s by Professor Georgi Stefanov.

To fill the identified gap in training leadership on national security issues, a Centre for Personnel Training on National Security<sup>7</sup> was established within the framework of the Ministry of Defence. However, the establishment of the centre was based on the assumption that it would work for all security sector institutions as well as state administrations. The history of this small institution had a crucial influence on the overall capacity of the country at this time. Courses on national security were offered for about 25 officials with the rank of chief of department (for the uniformed – colonel/general) on an annual basis. The courses took place over a period of eleven months, with contact hours during one week per month. This course for the first time provided attendants with opinions from both internal and external aspects of national security, and foreign guest lecturers. The centre presented the first institution where civilian academicians and military experts worked together. In connection to the centre, a large circle of non-governmental and state experts was established. This team of experts created the fundamentals of national security documentation (the Military Doctrine in 1994, the National Security Concept in 1995, the Crisis Management Concept in 1997 etc.). Also, the first national and international conferences on security were organised by the centre. For the first time in 1994, international research fellows from NATO countries studied Bulgarian security problems in the country. The centre published the first Bulgarian security and defence magazine in English,

---

<sup>7</sup> Initially the institution was established under the title Scientific Centre for National Security Studies in 1993.

German, and French, named Bulgarian Military Review. With the establishment of the National Security and Defence Department into 'G. S. Rakovski' Defence and Staff College, the centre was closed. Its original purpose of expert formation was still not fulfilled.

The second important ministerial training institution is the Police Academy. Since 1997, the work of the academy has undergone a level of transformation. The structure of the Police Faculty has been reorganised and changed with the introduction of three separate departments: the Department for the Theory of Investigative Work, Crime Prevention, and Legal Matters. The first department includes training in the areas of theory and practice of investigations, legal provisions of investigative work, and so forth. The second department focuses on two main areas: economic crime and organised crime. The third department is subdivided into three units: Administrative Law, Penal and Penal Procedure Law as well as Civil Law.

In addition, a special Centre for Specialisation and Advanced Training has been developed in recent years. This Centre carries out training courses for senior officers, provides specialised training in various fields and pursues international cooperation with foreign partners.

An entire new curriculum has been devised for the initial training of university-educated officers. The programme was constructed in assistance of experts from France and Germany. The year 1998 experienced the introduction of a new MA Programme on Countering Crime and Maintaining Public Order. An emphasis was placed on policing and EU law, strategic management, policing strategies and psychology of policing. The curriculum also included courses on International Public Law, EU Law in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, and International Penal Law.

A special course on 'European Police Integration' is being taught at the Police Academy. The course deals with human rights protection, European police cooperation, EUROPOL, and the police work ethic. Assistance for the transformation of the training programmes of the Academy has come from many sources, notably from the governments of France, Germany and the UNHCR.



(ii) Preparedness of the Journalists

Issues relating to freedom of speech and plurality of independent media were resolved for the most part as early as 1990–91, with residual problems remaining only regarding state-owned radio and television channels. In the year 1992<sup>8</sup>, independent radio and TV stations began their work. Two years later, 54 daily and 323 weekly independent newspapers started to publish. Since then, a dense network of independent press, TV and radio stations has maintained pluralism and critical debate, keeping the public both informed and involved in the decision-making process. Since 1997, an independent body composed of influential, politically unaffiliated individuals – elected on a quota principle by Parliament and the President – has regulated the state-owned TV and radio stations. This regulatory body was originally called the National Council on Radio and Television, and by the end of 2001 changed its name to the Council on Electronic Media.

In accordance with conclusions made by various types of public opinion studies during the last decade, people's attitudes towards national security issues depend predominantly on their education, access to actual information and age. Those three factors form the picture of public opinion that dominates people's personal commitment to their country's security. Seventy-five per cent of Bulgarians indicate that they would fight for their country in case of a national threat (September 1995 – at the middle of the transition period; a national representative survey conducted by the National Centre for Studies of Public Opinion<sup>9</sup>). The answer to the question 'what would make you fight in a war?' outlines a specific scale of values of post-totalitarian Bulgaria. The survey indicates that a threat against the homeland security would be the primary reason for people to fight. This opinion is shared by 80 per cent

---

<sup>8</sup> Data selected by Evgeny Dajnov, director of Centre for Social Practices, a NGO based in Sofia.

<sup>9</sup> By studying public opinion, NCSPO aims at establishing the necessary feedback between the population, government agencies and the politicians responsible for political decision-making. The NCSPO team provides the Parliament, national agencies, political forces, mass media, NGOs and civil society with timely and reliable information on attitudes towards the progress of reforms and events of national importance.

of adult Bulgarians. The first six years of democratisation managed to emphasise the value of human rights and freedom, so that they were rated immediately after national security as possible causes of war. Values such as the preservation of world peace and keeping individual freedoms were abstract principles, not considered equally worthy to fight a war. One-fifth of the total interviewees held this view on both questions. The percentage of Bulgarians who would fight if their religious beliefs or the natural environment was threatened (9% each) was rather low.

The same survey shows that interviewees in large cities, those who are highly educated and middle-aged (30–50 years of age) are more likely to express readiness to participate personally in the defence of their country's security.

Here, this data is presented most of all to underline the importance of the actual, impartial and alternative information for the successful reform, democratisation and oversight of the security sector. The data, together with the basic education, reveals a transformation on the mentality and thinking processes of people related to security issues.

After 1998, defence and security issues became a daily concern to most people. This change definitely contrasted with the situation that had been in existence before. Issues such as the personnel and arms reduction (especially destruction of SS 23 missiles during the summer/autumn period of 2002), the debate over the political control of the Special Services, the preparation for the integration into the NATO, and the fight against organised crime and corruption became a focus in the daily agenda of most Bulgarians. This change predominantly resulted from the following: more transparency in the work of the state administration, and more professional reflection from the side of the media. The overall influence of the mass media on defence and security policy in the country significantly increased.

In reaction to the increased popularity of security issues, more media journalists started to pay close attention to this specific field, in order to meet public expectations. Gaining access to foreign data banks on all aspects of defence and security matters is easy and ordinary practice.

However, the media still struggles to deeply analyse security information and therefore often reports on a surface level. Observers believe that an enhancement of transparency and the strengthening of the NGOs' expertise will enhance the quality of media reports. They are most of all supported by the increased information provided by the ministries of defence, interior, foreign affairs, and some of the security services. A security community needs to consist of sustainable factors and conditions if it intends to provide transparency and clarity to the public. The media and journalists are such elements from the civil sector. They have the opportunity to create and maintain a spirit of cohesion and shared opinions in the future security community. The journalists show a remarkable aspiration for independent and informed expertise.

Among the large number of daily and weekly independent newspapers, as well as independent radio and TV stations, several have the capacity for national coverage and influence. Some of the names of daily newspapers are as follows: *Heavy Artillery*, *Trud*, *24-Chasa*, *Monitor*, *Standard*, *Sega*, *Dnevnik*, *Duma* and *Novinar*. The weekly issues that contain political information are *Kapital* and *168-Chasa*. None of the papers are politically affiliated and only two – *Duma* and *Democracia* – are strictly one-party oriented. Most papers permanently reflect on different aspects of the security situation and institutional activities. Therefore, the level of impartiality and professionalism is relatively high.

To provide higher publication qualities, seven of them (*Trud*, *24-Chasa*, *Monitor*, *Standard*, *Sega*, *Dnevnik*, *Novinar*) created specialised journalist posts on defence and security topics. Those professionals consider these specific fields as important for their careers and therefore show an increased interest in working in these fields. Regarding three daily newspapers (*24-Chasa*, *Standard* and *Novinar*), the leading journalists are former Armed Forces officers.

Concerning the electronic media, independent TV programmes with national coverage are of highest influence for the state. All of them, including the Bulgarian National TV (state owned), BTV, and Nova TV (both private channels) have journalists specialising in defence and security issues. Most of the releases discuss particular events and

elaborate on interviews given by key executives, members of Parliament, and senior militaries. Independent expertise is still a rarity on TV.

Among the radio stations, specialised staff is only available on the Bulgarian National Radio and the Sofia Office of Radio Free Europe. Additionally, the Bulgarian official news agency BTA has a professional in the field of defence and the security sector.

As previously mentioned, the number of journalists specialising in security policy issues is fairly small. Considering that 30 per cent of those journalists have military backgrounds, the additional training for others is not difficult. Interesting topics are methods of journalist investigation in the area of security and defence policy, procedures in defence planning and procurement, illegal arms trade and proliferation, global threat of nuclear and biological weapons and the spread of political terrorism.

### (iii) Preparedness of the NGOs' Experts

Bulgaria is home to a large number of NGOs, which have a significant financial influence. By the end of the year 2000, Bulgaria had an adult population of 6.4 million and 4500 registered NGOs, all of which had increased since 1989. A wide-ranging study conducted in 1999 indicates that 1,600 of these NGOs are active, and no less than 700 are in fact full-time organisations. Registered trade unions, sport clubs and various 'creative unions', which survived the transition away from communism, provide the sector with another 3000 organisations. The post-1989 NGO community attracts a total funding equal to 1.5 per cent of the total GDP. That represents the same amount as is spent on the national budget for the environment. It even exceeds the money spent on the national culture budget. Since 1998, one-tenth of all foreign investments entering Bulgaria have been attracted by the NGO sector.<sup>10</sup> Most NGOs are set up with help from Western countries or international foundations. The

---

<sup>10</sup> *Civil Society and Sustainable Development: Non-Governmental Organisations and Development in the New Century* (Centre for Social Practices, Sofia, 2001).

major and influential NGOs continue to run primarily on EU and US-funded projects, addressing a wide range of issues, but focusing primarily on citizen and community empowerment in the decision-making and problem-solving process. Those facts have let researchers conclude that the Bulgarian NGO community is way more than just a political one. The community is dedicated to work and pursue – in all the different NGO fields – agendas of civil society and empowerment, as well as to overcome exclusion and discrimination. Furthermore, the experienced and influential non-governmental sector has been one of the major contributors to Bulgaria’s democratic determination. Since 1990, this sector has acted as a powerful guarantee against the abandonment of reform agendas, and it has been helping governments and parliaments move forward in the drive to modernisation.<sup>11</sup>

Established, influential NGOs exist in the fields of economic development, foreign policy and security too. Since 1998, a joint programme between the government and an organisation called the Non-governmental Resource Centre, has co-coordinated the retraining and resettlement of army officers made redundant under the army modernisation process. The same Centre has previously been involved in three regions of the country’s organisation of small and micro-lending schemes to enterprising individuals. The scheme was so successful that by the end of the 1990s the leading party of today (National Movement of Simeon the Second) appropriated the idea during the parliamentary campaign in the summer of 2001, and made it into government policy after the election. The same government set up an NGO Commission in the National Assembly. The Commission in return established a forum of 200 leading NGOs in order to tap into their expertise for government policy formation and legislative intentions.

---

<sup>11</sup> It was the NGO sector that filled the now empty reformism niche by acting as ‘keepers of the democratic agenda’, as analyst Ivan Krastev noted in one international study of the NGO sector.

### 1.3.3 What Courses would be Needed?

Several comprehensive studies from the last five years focused on conclusions such as the one made by professor Peter M.E. Volten: ‘The problem of reforming the security institutions is based on a lack of civilian competence, elite bickering, legacy of communist days and training a new generation of security experts and officers.’<sup>12</sup>

#### (a) *Assessment of Needs for Additional Courses*

The reality in Bulgaria fully confirms Professor Volten’s conclusion. There are several significant ‘white spots’ within the national education and training system that are still short of the intellectual aspect of the security sector reform.

First, in both the civilian universities and security institutions’ educational systems, several key topics related to the new type of security expert formation are still on a very rudimentary level of teaching, or even missing. Some examples are the following:

- *Peace and war studies*: a modern context that should help educate experts in the field of security in its international and national dimension. The training would target civil as well as uniformed professionals.
- *National security*: this course would provide a social, economical and political approach to security and elaborate on multidisciplinary and inter-institutional characters.
- *Democracy*: as an applicable theory and system of practices in executing civil oversight of the Armed Forces and other security institutions.

---

<sup>12</sup> Peter Volten, Chapter I in *Towards Shared Security: 7-Nations Perspectives* (CESS, 2001).

- *Civil-military relations studies*: a methodology to analyse the concepts and practices of objective and subjective control over the security sector organisations.
- *Governmental studies*: in their strategic and political aspects.
- *Strategic leadership*: command and management for civilian and military senior executives.
- *Crisis management and conflict resolution*: in national security and international intervention context.
- *Human rights, humanitarian and international law*: regarding national and international security aspects.
- *National security decision-making processes*: concerning planning, programming, budgeting and management of the security sector resources.

An essential lack of basic education in the above-mentioned areas, as well as in several others, reflects on the capacity of both civilians and uniformed experts. As a result, additional training is needed in order to see them as comprehensive in modern understanding. However, the existing training restricts experts in a professional area without gaining a larger vision of the strategic and political dimensions and perspectives.

Secondly, the so-called ‘national security experts’, who occupy positions which enable them to oversee security organisations, were either elected or promoted from respective parliamentarian, executive, or management positions. Their training through practice is essential but very much depends on factors such as Bulgarian society as a political authority, public confidence, international prestige and even money. A negative impact, caused by a lack of appropriate training and comparative practical information about the experience of other countries, takes place

because people do not work/act creatively and therefore fail to contribute to a bettering of relations between society and security sector professionals.

Thirdly, members of the academic and non-governmental sector with expert status often find themselves on a very basic level with regard to security problems. For that reason, very few of them can actively participate in important debates. For example, the Kosovo crisis, the reduction of the army, the expulsion of some foreign businessmen, the destruction of SS 23 missiles etc. were unquestionably controlled by a dominance of security sector professionals. Society had no chance of any alternative ideas, evaluations and/or recommendations. An alternate expertise was demonstrated during the case of SS 23 missile destruction this year by a scientist who was affiliated with the Bulgarian Academy of Science.

Fourthly, the absence of regular training courses prevents important forums from coming into existence. As a result, civilian and uniformed people are deprived of an opportunity to meet with each other, to share ideas, information, mentality and culture. If those requirements could be met, a democratic security community could easily be established.

(b) *Identification of Needs to Enhance Formation and Training Courses in these Fields*

There is no doubt that the formation of security experts is a top priority for the successful implementation of reform plans, the successful preparation for integration into NATO and EU, and a further successful democratisation of the society. The main considerations are as follows:

- The global, national and regional security situation developed a tendency which, in comparison with a decade earlier, was much more complicated though not as destructive. Adequate reactions to this tendency require a substantive expertise in previously unknown areas of security. Examples are political and criminal terrorism, non-traditional military missions abroad and at home,



cross-border corruption, international organised crime networks, cyber-criminality etc.

- Dynamic processes within different security areas are high and are constantly being stepped up. This fact reflects on requirements for more and better experts in every tier of the security decision-making process, including its parliamentary and civil society context.
- There is an immediate need for a significantly higher number of well-trained experts who are capable of handling work in NATO and EU accession context. Again, this need is prevalent in practically all five areas mentioned in the NATO's Membership Action Plan. Considering that the best of them will occupy NATO and EU positions, a professional training becomes even more important.
- Following the defence and security services' reforms, their technical modernisation and integration into NATO and EU, the amount of resources delivered for security will be systematically increased.<sup>13</sup> This will inevitably require more experts and expertise to oversee and control the spending of public resources.
- Following further development of society as a modern liberal democracy and the application of European Union's judicial system and regulations – including the security sector – more precise work will be required in the legislation sectors of the executive and parliamentary branches. The quality of the laws and other regulations is crucial for the enhancement of the effectiveness and sustainability of the security sector. Similar expertise is also needed for the correctives: the presidential staff, the Constitutional and Administrative Courts, as well as the civil sector and media.

---

<sup>13</sup> Despite the fact that Bulgaria has one of the highest figures of security expenditures among aspirant countries in the 2003 budget, there is extra money for both defence and interior sectors.

- The avalanche of security-related information that comes to both institutions and society needs to be analysed, translated into an understandable format and adequately presented to decision-makers and society. It is crucial for the evaluating/interpreting experts to profit from professional education and training programmes which are in accordance with friendly and alliance countries. As a result, the expert community will effectively contribute to the formation of a stable public and institutional environment.
- The ongoing reform of educational systems in both the civil and security sector demands higher requirements on the quality of teaching and research, and on the large scope of security problematic.

There is another important element regarding the situation around the expert formation in Bulgaria and countries that implement similar types of security sector reforms. Significant decreases in the number of civilian and uniformed personnel in the Armed Forces and security services (except the Police Service) serves as a potential source of independent experts. They can fill the missing expertise in state structures and non-governmental as well as academic institutions. The precondition for successful work among experts is appropriate training.

- (c) *Assessment of the Needs of Participants-to-be: Whom do We Want to Address with the Existing Courses and What Are Their Needs?*

In assessing potential target groups, the reality of the Bulgarian security sector needs to be considered. The sector seems to be homogenous, including both a system of organisations as well as procedures of political direction.

The number and content of target audiences is a product of national tradition and last decade's international cooperation in implementing different training programmes. Basically, they can be structured as follows:

- *Senior group*: members of ministries' political cabinets, senior military and security services leadership, members of Parliament, chiefs of local administration, and senior staff from state agencies.
- *Executive group*: heads of departments in ministries and state agencies, heads of departments in the Armed Forces and security services' (HQ), heads of the analytical centres from the security sector, chairman of inter-institutional planning groups, chiefs of crises reaction committees.
- *Supporting group*: advisory staff within ministries, senior planners from ministries, HQ, security services and state agencies, researchers and experts from situation centres and analytical units, crises reaction staff members, members of centres for excellence in security matters and civil-military relations, civil servants and uniformed personnel interested in individual expert formation.
- *Independent group*: academicians, researchers, journalists, representatives of local businesses, members of political parties, members of NGOs with national and local format, university aspirants and students.

The last decade's experience in security expert formation shows that the separation of potential members within different training and education programmes should be flexible. There are particular topics that senior group members prefer to discuss only among themselves. Any inclusion of external persons, especially from the non-governmental sector and the media, considerably confines the scope and depth of discussions. The groups preferably consist of people who are familiar with each other, even if they have only just been elected or promoted. For instance, at the beginning of the parliamentary, presidential, or governmental mandate.

Under different circumstances, mixed groups tend to be preferred. They provide each member with a unique opportunity to learn from the others. Furthermore, personal ideas can be exchanged, re-evaluated and possibly newly generated. This approach only fulfils its purpose if all members have an adequate initial level of preparedness. If this precondition is missing, than the debates are usually limited between better informed members and those who only assume they know everything but in reality lack the necessary skills to contribute actively to a substantive exchange of information. Mixed groups are also very effective when the topic of debate deals with current problems.

Finally, during the selection period the organiser should account for the existing education and the level of personal experience of potential course members. Certainly, neither the new members of Parliament nor the ministerial cabinets are those of ten or five years ago, not to mention NGO members. Factors such as education, personal experience, information, culture and mentality are different. For example, in 2001 a well-prepared seminar for parliamentarians on defence planning and budgeting failed since invited MPs had no interest in discussing an issue, because of their education and experience. Foreign partners who provide training opportunities often overlook this fact.

#### **1.3.4 What Possibilities for Expert Formation do Exist?**

The first efforts of expert preparation in the context of the new comprehensive understanding of security in Bulgaria were made in 1988. The reason for those first steps was the Vienna process of arms control and a non-proliferation policy. The three months programme was addressed only to selected militaries. The focus was set on international relations behind the ideological boundaries, mutual problems of security and a new approach towards arms control, early warning and international military cooperation for conflict prevention. Civil-military relations and any issues of democratic control were not touched upon.

##### **(a) *Programmes Offered by Foreign Institutions***

The presented institutions and their activities in Bulgaria are arranged in accordance with their involvement in Bulgarian security sector democratisation and reform. However, the way of listing is not so important. Over the last 2–3 years, the institutions have often exchanged experts and speakers, intending to provide the best experts for each of the topics discussed. However, the exchange was not always successful. There are also a lot of other foreign and international institutions that perform different methodology programmes on expert formation in Bulgaria. The following institutions have no incidental focus on the security sector.

(i) Centre for European Security Studies (CESS)

After the democratic transition, several Western institutions and research centres suggested short seminars and a series of seminars on democracy and the power sector. Among the first in Bulgaria were the East–West Institute and especially the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) at the University of Groningen, in the Netherlands. The seminars were primarily addressed to middle-ranked staff of the Ministry of Defence civilian and uniformed staff. Later, the CESS suggested a series of seminars for members of Parliament and key executive personnel. The CESS represents one of the few institutions that systematically participate in the security expert formation in Bulgaria. In addition to the training programmes, several Bulgarian scholars had the opportunity to publish research papers in English on security and civil-military relations issues with the support of CESS (see also Appendix 1.1).

(ii) George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies

The other institution that strongly influenced the introduction of civil-military problematic in Bulgaria was the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies. The programmes of the College of International and Security Studies and the Conference Centre of the Centre are well known. They are structured around specific target groups and cover almost all important issues of control regarding armed forces and democracy.

Since 1995, the Marshall Centre has provided Bulgarian experts, executives and parliamentarians with a series of seminars, workshops and conferences to support the democratisation process of the security sector and the modernisation of the security sector management. Until the year 2002, the focus was towards defence management (1995); defence planning and budgeting (1996, 1997 and 1998); civil-military planning and performance in crisis management (1999); and resource planning and management (2001). High training quality and an adequate selection of topics with regard to national needs are guaranteed by professors from the College of International and Security Studies, experts from the Defence Analysis Institute (Virginia), parliamentarians and experienced generals and senior officers from Germany, the USA, and other countries, as well as distinguished institutes and research centres (see also Appendix 1.2).

(iii) Hans Seidel Stiftung

Among the many influential institutions, the Hans Seidel Stiftung needs to be mentioned. This institution paid special attention to the intellectual support of the democratisation of security services in the Ministry of Interior. A series of conferences took place and a number of works were published in order to promote democratic thinking and reform know-how (see also Appendix 1.3).

(b) *Programmes Offered by National Educational and Research Institutions*<sup>14</sup>

(i) ‘G. S. Rakovski’ Defence and Staff College

The G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College is the oldest military education and training school, which in 2001 gained College status. It is recognised by the State Accreditation Agency following general civil rules. To develop a suitable environment for education and research in the G. S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College, the existing General Staff Faculty, in the year 2000, was transformed into a National Security and a Defence Faculty.<sup>15</sup> The Faculty implements a series of security, defence and war level courses (see Appendix 1.4).

- Senior course on *Strategic Leadership and Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*:

The idea of the course is the sharing of responsibilities for the defence aspect of the national security, which should be based on common recognition of the importance of the specific political-economic expertise of civilian leadership, and the unique military expertise of the officers’ corps. This raises the non-discussible need of educated political strategists and military politicians. The joint education on strategic art is the key factor for both sides to achieve a new culture of thinking and acting. Furthermore, it coincidentally serves the national interests and is compatible with the modern Euro-Atlantic style in defence policy. The strategic level of military education faces a challenge by creating a liaison between the defence sector and political decision-makers.

The goal of the educational programme is to introduce members into the complex of conditions and factors that form the strategic environment of the national security and defence. Among them,

---

<sup>14</sup> The copyright belongs to the mentioned institutions. Translation is non-official.

<sup>15</sup> The General Staff Faculty was established in 1993 when the country authorities decided to cancel the practice of all senior military leadership being educated in Moscow’s Voroshilov Academy. Originally, the Faculty was designed for a small number of officers (up to 12) who plan to be promoted to generals and admirals.

senior military staff lead the armed forces to give them knowledge about modern methods and approaches in analysis and estimation, and to prepare them to solve basic issues that concern the strategic leadership of the armed forces. They were looked up to as a higher stage of military qualification on national security, defence and military policy, and military strategy.

The scope of the course is designed to refer members to search for answers to the great questions of peace, war, armed forces and the strategy for their development and utilisation:

Which are the main tendencies in security and military areas that influence national security and defence policy?

How should defence policy be structured and developed in conditions of a democratic political system, openness of the military activities and a civilian political leadership?

What are and how should the key characteristics of the Bulgarian military strategic culture be developed? What should be the balance between the national and international elements in the strategy?

What are the characteristics of the future military conflict in the region and how do they reflect on force planning? How should the strategy be developed during the next decades? What operational capacity should the Armed Forces possess? How is the modern military strategy related to diplomacy in conflict prevention and crises management?

Which internal factors and conditions influence the strategic processes in security and defence? How can strategic and force planning balancing be accomplished with limited economical and demographic resources?



How to relate the defence policy with the growing civil society and the free media?

What are the characteristics of the contemporary military professionalism? How to implement the Western concept of modern strategic leadership? What should their new social status be?

The course is designed for civilian and military personnel from all the state institutions, including foreigners (under contract with the Ministry of Defence). The attending military personnel ranks from commander, high-level staff officer, general, to flag officer. Civilians should at least be in a head of department position. The course extends over one academic year.

- For those who are not interested or who do not have the required graduate education to study campaign and operations planning (military art), there is a shorter (six months) version of the course. Most of the civilians from the Ministry of Defence, state and local administrations attend this course.
- Advanced distributed learning course on *National Security and Defence*

This is a postgraduate specialised course designed for those who occupy senior positions in the security sector and the state administration. In the future, the course will be limited only to working places in ADL laboratories. The first experimental course will start in September 2002 with six participants. The Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands donated the newly equipped ADL lab.

- *Programme for orientation and expert support to parliamentary oversight of security sector*

The programme was initiated by the National Security and Defence Faculty and suggested to the Parliament through the Minister of Defence in begging for the mandate of the entire (39<sup>th</sup>) Parliament. It is aimed in the first place to provide focused initial training of those MPs who do not have relative education or political practice to perform effective parliamentary oversight of the security system. Simultaneously a group of experts was organised to meet eventual parliamentary requests for professional expertise on specific issues.

- *Programme for orientation of the Political Cabinet of the Minister of Defence*

The newly appointed Minister of Defence requested the programme for the first time in 2001. It was designed in the National Security and Defence Faculty and performed by selected experts and professors. The programme lasted two weeks, two and half-hours daily. The audience included the Minister, all deputies, the secretary of the Political Cabinet, the speaker of the Ministry, all the Minister's advisers and the parliamentary secretary.

(ii) Police Academy

The modernisation of expert formation for the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and its National Services is related to the MoI 'European Integration Programme of the Ministry of Interior for the period of 1998–2000' and the 'National strategy for combating criminality'. In their context, one of the main aims is 'Enhancement and strengthening administrative capacity of the Ministry of Interior in accordance with the European norms and standards'.

The enhancement and strengthening of the administrative capacity of the National Services of the MoI are related to deep changes in the way of education and training of security services personnel followed by institutional and legislative reforms. Based on that, the Faculty of

‘Police’ in the Academy of Ministry of Interior developed (in 1998) a five year programme aimed at the ‘Modernisation of the organisation of the Faculty to meet the new requirements for education and training’, the ‘High quality of accreditation criteria on specialties of education and training police experts’ and the ‘Adaptation curricula to European police force education and training standards’.

The reason for the first aim is the increased number of students and recognition of a specialised education for the newly established National Services Border Police, the Gendarmerie and the combat against organised crime. Another need was identified in the field of special courses for the qualification and requalification of the senior leadership of the Ministry of Interior.

The average annual number of students that make up the faculty is as follows: bachelor degree – 400; extra-mural – 350; master degree – 20; courses for qualification and requalification – more than 1200.

The staff of the Faculty specifically underlined that the number of special seminars with foreign instructors has been significantly enlarged since 1999. French specialists have presented courses on the methodology of police force training. The Hans Seidel Foundation from Germany has sponsored a series of conferences on police reform, including the exchange of education and training expertise with the Bavarian Police.

The second aim reflects on the quality of education of police experts. The basic educational specialty for the police experts is ‘Counteraction to criminality and guarding public order’ (see Appendix 1.5).

(iii) New Bulgarian University

The New Bulgarian University was the first private university to suggest a master degree programme on national and international security. It was developed at the Political Science Department in the year 2000. The programme is designed for students who have a bachelor's degree in any of the following fields: philosophy, sociology, journalistic, political science, economics, international relations, and protection of national security. The authors consist of a team of lecturers, mainly from the Police Academy. As a result, the programme is based on general security knowledge, but with a focus on internal aspects of security. Examples are: public order and the role of police, protection of national security and the role of counterintelligence, the fight against organised crime, the role of the Ministry of Interior Services, and crisis management. The international, legal, psychological aspects of security are relatively well presented. The qualification training is more oriented towards police and counterintelligence functions than towards other aspects of security. In spite of a large list of institutions in which graduates could possibly find a future occupation, the programme is mostly designed for all Ministry of Interior Services and security officers in private businesses.

Similar in content is the programme performed at the Public Administration Department. Here, focus is given more to issues related to the administration and governance of security sector institutions. In fact, the programme was initiated in the context of the new Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants. These laws have led to the complete transformation of public administration including the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. For that reason, the programme is a well-designed module on civil-military relations (see also Appendix 1.6).

The Department of Economics also provides a course (30 academic hours) on *Security and Economics*. The course is taught by a professor from the University of National and World Economy.

(iv) University for National and World Economy

This state university offers two programmes related to security expert formation. The *International and National Security* programme is designed for bachelor and master degree education in International Relations. This programme is one of the oldest in the civilian sector to contribute to security expert formation. Most Bulgarian diplomats and foreign policy experts graduated here. The security aspect of the programme underwent a total change after the end of the Cold War.

The other programme, called *National Security and Defence Economics*, has contributed to security expert formation for a long time (primarily in aspects of defence). This programme aims to prepare finance and resource management experts for the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the national defence industrial complex, and state financial as well as all other institutions dealing with financial or defence related resources. The programme is designed for bachelor and master degree level, and different postgraduate studies (see also Appendix 1.7).

A similar programme, called *Security and Economics*, is carried out at the New Bulgarian University.

(v) Varna Free University

This private university offers two programmes for civilian experts belonging to the state, regional and local administrations, as well as services that provide public order and security. A focus is further given to the institutional system for executing penalties, business companies and bank security (see also Appendix 1.8).

### **1.3.5 What possibilities for Expert Formation, which you would consider necessary, are not available and who would ideally offer them?**

Generally, expert formation in the area of security includes the following activities:

- basic security education;
- specific training (postgraduate) and retraining in concrete security fields;
- training in applying expert's methodology and methods;
- comprehensive practice;
- theoretical and field research;
- collection and use of adequate data;
- development of modern operational and communicative skills.

In conclusion of Chapter 3, a systematically functioning system of expert formation for the security sector has not been arranged yet. The main reason for this problem is related to the fact that state officials still do not consider individual security organisations as being part of a security sector. From the bottom to the top layer of the hierarchy, all expert and policy institutions are separated, which prevents the establishment of a coherent security sector concept.

Expert formation further requires a strategy and long-term focus, which represents another fundamental problem because the issue reflects on the civil sector, armed forces, police, judicial system and special services. The creation of such a long-term sustainable policy should be the work of top-level national security decision-makers – members of the Government, the President and the Parliament – with the strong involvement of capable academic and civil sector institutions.

As a result, there are several important missing elements in Bulgaria's prevailing concept of expert formation. First, there is still no developed approach towards security sector professional, and security sector expert formation. The education and training of professionals is well organised on every functional level, but lacks the main purpose of educating them as security experts. Professionals have sophisticated knowledge in their field, but lack a high amount of interdisciplinary knowledge, current information and major practice. To overcome this problem, one needs to understand that training without basic education results in a limited positive effect, and that education without specialisation as well as actualisation does not turn a person into an expert either.

Secondly, in accordance with the traditional public belief, security experts are only those that belong, or have been members of the security sector organisations. There is not a single chance that a person only with a good education (possibly received abroad), or research achievements will be recognised as a security expert. Further, political parties, big private businesses, consulting companies and even academic bodies prefer to hire former security professionals instead of investing in a long-term education and training of experts.

Thirdly, the country still lacks enough expertise to educate security experts in accordance with the modern understanding of this term. All the security sector educational institutions are still in comprehensive reforms and the civil colleges are on an initial level of collecting expertise. Even the publicly accessible literature on security issues is still extremely limited.

Fourthly, the expertise provided by foreign partners, with a few exceptions, discusses the same topics and training forms as a decade ago. The role of Bulgarian beneficiaries is mainly expected to follow the best practices presented by foreign speakers. Most guest speakers are not well aware of the Bulgarian political system, the national chain of command and the decision-making machinery in security affairs. Not to

mention important issues such as national traditions and specific cultural particulars.<sup>16</sup>

Fifthly, security sector institutions have no interest in sponsoring independent security studies. Only after 1998 did the Ministry of Defence sponsor the first non-governmental research projects on defence related issues (White Paper on Defence and the Armed Forces). In 2002, the Parliament initiated a Readiness Indicator study that was realised by several NGOs. Also, the Centre for Parliamentary Studies (sponsored by the Parliament Institution) performed a support study for the concept of the integrated Ministry of Defence. The Bulgarian Academy of Science conducted, and is still doing so, research to contribute to the security sector reform. Foreign institutions sponsor most of the other research activities. This factor is a major contribution to internal developments. Unfortunately, in many cases, the practice follows ideas of foreign institutions and not specifically Bulgarian principles.

The national efforts compensate for these offsets. However, they will not be enough. The core of this part of the security sector reform, as was mentioned earlier, stands for a fundamental change in the Bulgarian strategic security culture. Without foreign support, many more national efforts would have to be made and there would still be no guarantee for the result to turn out to be what was originally expected. Regarding those support institutions, foundations and programmes which have experience in supporting such efforts, the following could be invited:

- *Comprehensive programmes:* Stability Pact for SEE, EU programmes (PHARE, TACIS), NATO Training and Education Enhanced Programme, national programmes that support democratisation in SEE, and others.
- *Security experts training programmes:* G.C. Marshall Centre, GCSP, NATO Defence College, The Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, King's College

---

<sup>16</sup> The way of preparing and the execution of destruction procedures of SS 23 missiles in Bulgaria and in the Slovak and Czech republics were totally different and this is a good example how important the above-mentioned issues are for the environment of expert formation.



(London), CASD (Rome), Centre of Civil-Military Relations (Monterey, USA), IHEDN (Paris), Institute for Defence Analyses (Virginia, USA), and others.

- *Professional training:* Defence (war, joint staff) colleges and police academies that have nationally sponsored international programmes, NATO, PfP and TEEP programme, as well as others.
- *Multinational research:* EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris), Centre for European Security Studies (Groningen), G.C. Marshall Centre, NATO Defence College, ELIAMEP (Greece), UNDIR, ERGOMAS, and others.
- *Specialised programmes:* focused on general and political aspects of the democratisation of the security sector, and its control. Further programmes include: Open Society Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Democracy Network Programme, and others. Programmes focused on expert development include: Hans Seidel Stiftung (police), G.C. Marshall Centre (defence, terrorism, corruption), and others.
- *Information:* ISN, MERLN, CIAO, PIMS, Transition on line, and others.

### 1.3.6 What to Do?

In spite of the progress made in the last ten years, security sector reform continues to be one of the top priorities in the Bulgarian political agenda. After years of difficult and frequently painful decisions, the country's general political transition to democracy was successfully completed. Along with basic issues such as the introduction of democratic political and market economy rules, considerable efforts were dedicated to implement the principle of democratic civil control and democratically legitimated relations between the society and its security professionals.

Bulgarian security sector organisations already operate under new judicial and procedural regulations leading to strict political control and public oversight. Nevertheless, they still remain an important factor in the domestic democratic process. This is not because they represent any kind of threat to society, but because they consume a significant part of the limited state budget, and have an indisputable social role. The reorganisation of the security Services and the Armed Forces from the typical totalitarian status of 'a state within the state' to the size, structure and functions, acceptable from an internal and international point of view, is a process of extremely high political and strategic importance. Security sector reform in Bulgaria is a factor for strengthening civil society, ensuring sustainable socio-economic development and effective integration into the European Union and NATO. It needs special public (including international) attention, monitoring by the mass media, and comprehensive cooperation for development and implementation of effective standards, norms and procedures, which would guarantee both the effectiveness of the security sector and rigorous democratic control.

Security expert formation is a significant problem for the success of the power sector reform (not only) in Bulgaria. It reflects key issues such as security culture as an element of politics, contemporary professionalism in all of its dimensions, establishment of sustainable civil society and, most essentially, *effective communications (liaison) between society, politicians and security sector' professionals.*

A successful solution to this problem will impact the new national security culture integrating its main dimensions:

- the way Bulgarians think about national security (comprehensive security concept and the roles and missions of the security sector organisations, relations with other instruments of national power, required capabilities, expected combat and secret operations);
- the way Bulgarian state institutions act (decision-making, prioritisation, choices, civil-military relations) and the manner in which the civil society is involved in this process.;
- the way Bulgarian governors and the public think about the security of others –partners, allies and potential adversaries.

In this context, the primary mission of security sector expert formation is to prepare civilian and uniformed leaders that are skilful to formulate ends (objectives), coordinate (balance of interests), communicate (motivate), and provide resources (motivate defence as a priority). They should also be insistently and systematically ready to apply strategies to promote and support the national security interests by following traditional liberal democratic behaviour.

To reach this aim they must achieve excellence in the art of security vision, planning and performance skills that did not exist before. The sharing of responsibilities for national security should be based on a common recognition of the importance of the specific political-economic expertise of the civilian leadership and the uniqueness of the professional corps. Joint education and training presents a key factor in developing new security experts.

The programme maximum in security sector expert formation should be based on actual achievements and EU/NATO practice as a system of orientation marks. To fill identified gaps, activities in the following areas are expected:

- conceptualising the security sector with a general design for security sector reform;
- education of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed experts;
- comprehensive and systematic security studies;

- development of a system for the collection and deliverance of security-related information;
- creation of legal, administrative and social status of security experts;
- establishment of a security community.

*The conceptualisation of the security sector and the general design for security sector reform needs to be realised as a first step. A concept of the security sector will be the organising factor for the political, professional and public debate on the future security architecture and security policy regime. It will help to overcome the narrow institutional way of thinking and will contribute to the establishment of a common language on security-related issues. The eventual successful conceptualisation will be an important tool for designing a framework of the security sector reform. Keeping in mind that many steps of reform have already been applied, the current idea is now to develop the security sector as a fully European system that complies with national interests, and is capable of meeting future security challenges. This step is large and complicated. An initial conference with the purpose of gaining the attention of top-level officials from the presidential, governmental and parliamentarian branches, as well as influential non-governmental actors, can facilitate a design of long-term strategy. The conference could be organised by DCAF with the support of the Stability Pact for SEE, NATO and EU institutions, as well as countries that have accomplished good practices in security sector reform over the last decade. The development of reform plans is a much more difficult and complicated story, but upcoming negotiations with NATO and EU can be used as a stimulating factor (similar process with regard to defence reform and customs reorganisation). Another important element that comes along with the planning process concerns the guaranteed involvement of independent experts. A permanent consultancy in key institutions has proven as good practice and therefore needs to be continued (there are foreign consultants in the Ministry of Defence, General Staff, Ministry of Interior, Customs Agency and others).*

*Education of civilian and uniformed professionals is another permanent priority goal.* Currently, the Bulgarian educational system – both civil and security sector intern – finds itself at an unequal stage of reform. A positive interpretation can be the fact that for the first time all security sector colleges are overviewed by a state civil agency for accreditation. This constellation provides an opportunity for national standards to be developed and applied, in order to enhance military and police education adequately in accordance with real world needs. Furthermore, the needs of society and politicians from the security sector should be satisfied. As a first result, a new field of education was introduced, called security and defence. This consists of two subdivisions, security and military affairs. An immediate interest of some civil and all specialised colleges leads to the proposal for an accreditation of new master programmes in the new educational areas. New master programmes were expected to successfully compensate for the lack of education in the fields of security and defence civil staff.

The author's personal experience shows the following difficulties and deficiencies in which support is needed:

- There are several new educational disciplines that are not covered by in-depth and comprehensive national expertise. Those include: national and international security, civil-military relations, and management in defence and security services sectors. In many other more or less traditional topics significant improvements are needed as well. Regarding this aspect, international scholarship training for target audiences is necessary. The summer institute formula is appreciated.
- All previously mentioned study disciplines require a detailed description of the curricula. This includes an allocation among bachelor, master, aspirant courses of particular topics, and a preparation of student books as well as packages with fundamental/actual reading materials. It could be helpful to this strategy to create experienced visiting professors who have the role of lecturers or consultants. Here it is important that they are invited by the institutions and not only the colleges. This allows them to perform conceptualising and organisational roles.

- The improvement of educational process should be accompanied by intensive scholarly and expert research. As a result, the capacity of the lectures will be strengthened, a critical thinking mentality will be developed, and the authority of professional experts will be stabilised. Joint international comparative studies with capable and preliminary educated people could decisively contribute to the process of expert formation.
- A programme for the standardisation and validation of security and defence related basic educational curricula is appropriate. It will stimulate the innovation process, enhance the international mobility of education (students, professors and instructors), and provide a basis for the general interoperability of security activities. This type of programme could be initiated with the support of institutions such as GCSP, NATO Defence College (the Conference of the Commandants), G.C. Marshall Centre, the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, civil universities and colleges (for example King's College), defence academic institutions with international programmes, and others.

*Training of civilian and uniformed experts should transform the educated professionals into security and defence experts.* Training should be most of all oriented towards acquiring specific methodologies and techniques in particular areas, including strategic, political, and international security and defence policy. The target groups are both civilians and uniformed experts. They should be able to communicate on a common language with regard to professional matters. Short intensive seminars, which last up to one week, could provide more time for questions and discussions. Such seminars could prove useful as additional forms of training. The list of topics should be commonly identified. In certain cases, locals may not know what information they might need in order to become experts in particular areas, whereas foreign partners occasionally stick too much to their country's understanding of how expert formation should be developed. It should also be stressed that a programme with a number of activities in one area would be more useful in the first run, before starting to cover many

problems and to attract the attention of a permanent list of participants. Another important factor to keep in mind is the problem of quick personnel changes during times of reform and downsizing. Furthermore, some seminars should be institutionally based but the majority need to be compulsory, with a large institutional and civil participation, including political parties and different NGOs. Very few institutions have limited experience in such comprehensive and systematic approaches. An example could be the George C. Marshall Conference Centre.

*The comprehensive and systematic security studies ask for international support to be transferred into national sustainable practice.* The country's experts and scholars have a still limited capacity to do such research. The lack of modern methods/means to study security can be identified with regard to Kosovo and other regional conflicts, as well as to the national fight against criminality and corruption. Besides the areas of economics and general democratisation, there are only few comparative studies in the field of security – mainly on NATO and EU integration issues – conducted by Bulgarian experts. A significant number of institutions contribute to the aspect of expert formation. What is missing is preliminary training on methodology issues. Without common methodology, clear and meaningful communication will never be possible. This could even dangerously impact political decisions.

*Development of a system for the collection and delivery of security-related information is an obligatory precondition for success in the expert formation process.* In comparison with neighbouring countries, Bulgaria is a leader in using modern information technologies, but still lags far behind Western standards. There are at least two key aspects concerning this context: first, the value of expert advice depends mainly on highly operational information and secondly, the necessity to place information at expert's disposal provokes and guarantees an enlargement of transparency in the security sector. Public access to security-related information was enlarged permanently in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, it is still mainly the same inside the security sector organisations. Often, new equipment is used for administrative purposes, with the exception of last year's practice in some of the organisations within the Ministry of

Interior. However, active support is received by partners such as ISN, PIMS, MERLN and CIAO and it could be developed even further.

*The creation of legal, administrative and social status of the security experts is an important element of the security sector reform. The successful realisation will provide the necessary stability and personal interest that are preconditions for expert formation. Foreign consultants could play a positive role by trying to reach this aim. Several foundations, including the Hans Seidel Stiftung, the Open Society Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Democracy Network Programme and others, could support initiatives in this direction.*

*Establishment of a national security community could be a natural result of the above package of initiatives. Generally speaking, Bulgarian society, the political establishment and the security sector professionals are not ready to go deeply into sector modernisation. They are not prepared or do not want to accept such great responsibility. NATO and EU membership perspectives strongly and positively influence this process. In any case, the finalisation will depend on the maturity of the Bulgarian society.*



## **APPENDIX 1.1 CENTRE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STUDIES**

(Groningen, The Netherlands)

Entire programmes and projects in Bulgaria<sup>17</sup>

### *Democratic Control Programme: Parliament and Parliamentary Staff Education Programme for Southeast Europe (DEMCON-SEE)*

This is a three-year programme designed specially for Albania, B&H, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Several workshops have been realised during the first half of the programme:

- Enhancing Policy and Financial Accountability (Romania)
- Setting Up Mechanisms for Democratic Control (Serbia and Montenegro)
- Parliaments and security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- Promoting Effective Legislative Oversight of the Security Sector (Bulgaria)

Bulgarian partner to the CESS for the programme is the Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia.

### *Extending Security Cooperation and Defence Arrangements in Southeast Europe Project*

This project is a kind of extension of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) that was finalised in 2001 with the in-house publication of Harmony Papers *Towards Shared Security: 7-Nations Perspectives*. The new project is organised around two study groups, each of 16 members (two from the each of eight participating countries autonomous republics: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro). The final event in the

---

<sup>17</sup> The information is based on publications in *Security Matters*, a Newsletter from the CESS.

programme is an international conference, scheduled for Bucharest at the end of November 2002.

*Transparency-Building Project in Southeast Europe (TBP-SEE)*

This project is a pioneering inquiry to gauge the extent to which transparency is practised in the security sectors of eight countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. The results from the studies are expected to be presented in the Transparency Audit paper. An investigation of *Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces and Security Services* is being conducted more or less in parallel, but independently. The country coverage includes Bulgaria, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, UK and USA. A consolidated review is the planned outcome.

**APPENDIX 1.2    GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN  
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES**  
The Conference Centre: Activities in Bulgaria,  
2001–02

A    *Bulgaria Defence Resource Planning Seminar for Experts  
(22–26 October 2001)*

The seminar was designed for experts from the Ministry of Defence, armed forces, Ministry of Finance, and other institutions involved in defence resources planning and management. The lecturers were from Defence Analysis Institute, Virginia. The following key topics were discussed during the five-day event:

- General model of defence planning, programming and budgeting
- Bulgarian defence planning goals
- Planning for national security
- Planning guidance formulation
- Defence goals and priorities formulation
- Defence programme formulation
- Defence programme development
- Defence programmes review
- Defence planning time frame and outcomes
- Synthesis of recommendations

B    *Bulgaria National Security Planning Seminar for  
Parliamentarians and Supporting Staff (29-30 October 2001)*

This two-day seminar addressed members of these parliamentary committees that primarily perform oversight of all security sector. The aim was to bring them together with senior expert staff from defence planning and management bodies for discussion of the following issues:

- Situation in security and defence planning at political and executive level
- Key issues for development of effective defence planning and management system
- Possible improvements in planning and performance system for bettering the parliamentary oversight
- Further development of the parliamentary committees' capacity for effective involvement in resource planning process

An important aim of the seminar was also to facilitate direct connections between MPs and their staff and defence resource planning experts. The lecturers were from the Defence Analysis Institute, Virginia and experienced members of the German Parliament.

C *Bulgarian–Romanian Parliamentarian Seminar (19–22 January 2002)*

The seminar was performed in Germany. More information could be obtained from the Conference Centre.

D *International (Regional) Conference on Institutionalising the Prevention of Corruption in Security Forces (11–14 March 2002)*

This conference was initiated in a continuing effort to support institutionalisation of the fight against corruption through modernisation of state institutions simultaneously with the strengthening of civil society. Based on two previous conferences that identified the threat to regional security posed by organised crime and corruption, and inventoried many of the current efforts aimed at combating these challenges, the Marshall

Centre provided assistance to countries from the region of SEE to design and implement solutions. The objectives of the conference were described as follows:

- Evaluate the effectiveness of current institutional structures that work towards preventing corruption
- Establish the components of successful anti-corruption structures including
- Setting standards/codes of ethics
- Character-building and training
- Prevention/identification
- Interagency cooperation
- Recommend areas for improvement in existing structures
- Facilitate future cooperative activities between international organisations/NGOs and security organisations towards preventing corruption

50 senior officials were invited as participants, representing internal anti-corruption structures within the armed security forces from 11 countries in Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. International organisation representatives and representatives of NGOs with the status of 'special observers' were also invited. The following key topics were discussed:

- Transforming leadership and defining norms/standards
- Building character and identity in an organisation
- Reducing vulnerabilities: accountability-enhancing structures and internal control mechanisms
- Internal investigation and prosecution structures within the security forces
- Increasing external cooperation with other government structures

- Enhancing NGO cooperation/public-private cooperation and transparency

The conference was organised in cooperation with the Centre for the Study of Democracy – a Sofia-based NGO.

E *Conference on Ethics/Code of Conduct in Bulgarian Security Forces (23–26 September 2002)*

The conference was designed for a large number of parliamentarians, executives, experts from the security sector, academicians and NGO representatives. The topics were in the context of ongoing security sector reform and the total fight against corruption and criminality in the country. The lecturers were experts from IDA and experienced people from the Department of Defence, Joint Staff and others. The basic objectives of the conference were as follows:

- Develop a clear understanding of internationally accepted ethical and moral norms
- Examine key factors involved in building military (security) forces in keeping with these norms based on a foundation of character, identity and leadership
- Bring about the realisation that such a force is the ultimate antidote to the disease of corruption
- Focus on the corrosive damage of corruption both internally and externally
- Initiate the first phases of planning and strategy to build national integrity centring on the most effective approaches and attitudes necessary to succeed

The following topics for discussion were planned:

- System of legal and ethic norms for the national security system

- Challenges to the security sector professional during organisations' reforms
- New parameters and requirements to the character, identity and leadership in security sector organisations
- Forms of corruption in security sector organisations
- Corrosive impact of corruption
- Further development of national integrity
- Structural, legal and organisational aspect of security sector reform
- Approaches towards confidence, credibility, consensus and cohesion building

### APPENDIX 1.3 HANNS SEIDEL STIFTUNG<sup>18</sup>

The Hanns Seidel Stiftung activities in the security sector of Bulgaria after year 1999 were focused on the Ministry of Interior (MoI) National Services. The projects generally consisted of expert research on specific issues designed in cooperation with Police Academy and the Institute for Political and Legal Studies (NGO), conference with participation of civilian and uniformed experts and scholars and publication in Bulgarian language.

#### **1999**            *Modern Institutionalisation of the Security Services*

Reorganisation of the services in accordance with the Ministry of Interior Law. Status of financial police officers. System of measures for protection of the national security. Division of political power and security services in Bulgaria. European Human Rights Convention and the security issue in Bulgaria. Human rights and security services. Refugee status procedures. Public relations and national security. Transparency in MoI activities. Mass media interest in counterintelligence activities.

#### *Prisoners' Regulation*

Prisoners in Bulgaria. Prison as a last measure against criminality. System of places for dispensing freedom in Bulgaria. Alternative to dispensing freedom. Civil control over prison's administration. Working activities for dispensing freedom. Public opinion formation for support of the prison's reform. International control for overpopulation of prisons.

---

<sup>18</sup> The information is about projects realised after 1999.



## *Ministry of Interior at Threshold of the New Millennium*

Issues related to national security: Status and perspectives of the National Security Services. Harmonisation of MiO's Act with the European norms. MiO's Act as a legal basis for the fight against criminality. Information society: reality and perspectives. Counterintelligence. Information and information activities in National Security Service (counterintelligence). Confidence to special services. Organised crime. New century challenges and Bulgarian internal security. Refugees. Prevention in counterintelligence. Psychological war and counterintelligence. Bulgarian Police mission. EU cooperation in internal affairs. Civil control over police investigations. Administrative-legal aspects of the use of special equipment. Cooperation between police and the civil sector. Financial investigations. Measures against money laundering. Developments of the local police offices. Police control over the foreigners. Use of arms by the police.

**2000**

### *Police and 21st-Century Challenges*

The European Human Rights Convention and the Ministry of Interior' activities. Police education and training in accordance with EU requirements. Police permission. The Schengen standards and police collaboration. MoI reform: legal aspects. Police in solving refugee problems following EU standards. Education and training challenges in the MoI.

### *State Administration Reform and the Police*

The European Human Rights Convention in Bulgaria. Reforms in the Penalty Code. Local administration and police. Public order during elections. Administrative

reform and education in MoI. The human rights issue and the administrative reform. Intra-police coordination.

*Reform of the Penalty Code*

Tendencies in criminality. Specifics of dispensing freedom to ethnic groups. Civil control and monitoring commissions in places for dispensing freedom. Attorney's control in places for dispensing freedom. Prison's local public relations. Human rights and international standards for dispensing freedom. Prevention of criminality. Problems in reprieving procedures. The future of the prison's system.

**2001**

*The European Standards in Executing Penalties and Bulgarian Practice*

Situation in the national system of norms for executing penalties and its modernisation. Legal aspects of the reform. Legal status of dispensing freedom. International standards in executing penalties of dispensing freedom. Necessary changes in legal regulations. Rules of behaviour in prisons. Specific procedures in other than prison facilities for executing penalties. Dispensing freedom to women, underage people and foreigners.

**APPENDIX 1.4 NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
DEFENCE FACULTY<sup>19</sup>**  
at G.S. Rakovski Defence and Staff College

A *Defence and War Level Course: Strategic Leadership and  
Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*

This course has been in operation since 1994. Before 2000 the focus of the course was military art at a strategic and operational level. No more than 20 per cent of the study time was addressed to issues of national and international security, defence economics etc.

In 2001 the curricula was totally renovated in order to provide knowledge on the following main topics: study and analysis of external and internal factors and conditions of the national security and synthesis of security strategy; strategic leadership in defence; defence planning and management; force development and risk assessment; campaign and operations planning.

The ideal result is for members to receive knowledge and skills to perform the roles of strategic leaders, strategic practitioners and strategic conceptualists in the way that maintains all positive aspects of traditional Bulgarian strategic culture and simultaneously implements a modern European way of thinking about security, defence and armed forces. The effect of this should be an optimal strategic thinking and acting on a national level and a high degree of interoperability in the Euro-Atlantic and international context.

In 2002 the course was transferred to a master degree programme whose accreditation from the state Accreditation and Evaluation Agency was planned for 16 September 2002. Even before accreditation the programme was in operation for the 2002/03

---

<sup>19</sup> The other faculty is focused on the operational level of military art and has no programmes addressed to expert formation.

academic year. 25 per cent of the students are from the civilian sector of the state administration. Foreign students also attend the course.

*Binding disciplines:*

- National and international security
- Management of defence and armed forces, including strategic leadership, civil-military relations, personnel policy etc.
- Military strategy (national and coalition format)
- Operational art (national and NATO CJTF concept)

*Electives:*

- Information technology and C4I system
- Planning, programming and budgeting in defence sector
- Public administration in defence sector
- Political science (security and defence context)
- International humanitarian law (in peace support operations and other international missions)
- Military history (post-Cold War period)
- Bulgarian public psychology (in security, defence and war aspect)
- Doctrine of Land Forces
- Doctrine of Air Force
- Doctrine of Navy

The course is led through personal engagement with the leading teachers and the department in charge with all phases of the preparation, conduct and period after the lectures of each training module and the active personal collaboration of each member.

The individual works of the members together with uninterrupted faculty expert support, use of electronic sources of information, and preparation of essays and theses, are among the basic methods for learning.

Probably the most important innovation is the development of abilities to think critically (critical thinking was forbidden during the years of the Warsaw Pact at every level of military competence). During the course an interdisciplinary approach is applied, within the framework of which the participants study official documents and conceptions as well as alternative approaches and decisions on strategic issues of defence and security.

The study process is organised in training modules with a duration of 15 teaching hours minimum. The basic forms of training are a version of the modified Oxford Tutorial System and consist of lecture-discussions, lectures, syndicate workshops and different training activities, as familiarising tours, conferences and symposia. English and/or French, computer and communication skills are studied also. A special programme for developing personal leadership, psychological and physiological quality is included. The course is open to senior ranks from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council member countries.

There is a special programme for visiting places and familiarisation tours to strategic command facilities, governmental and local administration authorities, defence industrial units, mass media institutions. There are also visits to military academies of other countries.

The course members participate in the Annual Strategic Research Project of the Faculty. It reflects actual priorities of defence policy as well as military theoretical issues at a strategic level. Papers are presented to the Annual Scientific Conference, after which the theses are developed as graduation papers.

B *Defence Level Course: Strategic Leadership and Management of the National Defence and Armed Forces*

This is a postgraduate course for those civilian and uniformed personnel from the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, state and local administration that are in a leadership (decision-making) positions but who will command troops. Duration of the course is six months. Approximately 50 per cent of participants are civilians. The curriculum is similar to the previous course but operational art is not included.

*Study disciplines:*

- National and international security
- Management of defence and armed forces
- Military strategy
- Information technology
- Planning, programming and budgeting in defence sector
- Public administration in defence sector
- International humanitarian law
- Military history
- Bulgarian public psychology

C *Advance Distributed Learning Course on National Security and Defence*

This course is designed for high-level participants (head of department and higher) who cannot leave the office either for one year or for six months. The course combines ADL technology with in-contact lectures and discussions. It is organised in ten in-contact modules with a duration of five study days each. Between these modules education, consultations and examinations are through Internet-based technology. The experimental first course began 9 September 2002. The modules were organised in four thematic groups.

*Thematic group 'Environment':*

- Third Millennium vision; issues of global security
- European security architecture: situations, tendencies, problems and perspectives
- Southeast Europe: border or bridge between civilisations

*Thematic group 'Methodology':*

- National security system and policy
- National crisis management system and policy
- National defence and defence policy

*Thematic group ‘Instruments’:*

- Strategic leadership and management in security sector
- Technological aspects of national security

*Thematic group ‘Practice’:*

- Civil-military relations, civilian leadership and democratic control in security sector
- National security strategy formulation

D *Programme for Orientation and Expert Support of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector*

The programme is designed to contribute to strengthening democracy in the country through effective parliamentary leadership and oversight of security and defence policy formulation and implementation. For this purpose experts will provide knowledge, information and practical skills, necessary to the MPs and their supporting staff. The programme will also create informal environment issues of inter-parties’ and inter-institutions’ interest to be impartially discussed. An additional aim is a circle of experts from the professional and non-governmental sectors to be identified and consolidated.

Methodology of the programme performance consists of: seminar thematic modules with duration of a half-day each month; discussion lectures with key national and foreign experts and parliamentary practitioners; workshops for the supporting staff designed in accordance with the parliamentary agenda; occasional expert’ reports under request; systematic information support through bulletins and web-based information. Proposed topics for the period of the first year of the new Parliament (2001–02) are designed following the Parliament agenda.



*Lectures and discussions:*

- Defence planning process
- NATO enlargement and Bulgaria
- Democratic control of national security sector: resources in the Budget 2002
- Democratic control of national security sector: procurement procedures
- Democratic control of national security sector: legislation
- International security situation and perspectives
- Security sector reforms in Central and Eastern Europe
- Bulgarian and international efforts in risk reduction: arms production and trade control
- Democratic control of national security sector: personnel policy and career perspectives
- Democratic control of national security sector: transparency and civil society involvement.

*Workshops for Parliamentarian Experts:*

- Force Structure Review 01: presentation and discussion
- Annual National Programme for Membership Action Plan performance
- Good practices in parliamentarian control over defence budget
- ‘Off the shelf’ policy in defence procurement
- Law of Defence and Armed Forces: discussion on proposed amendments
- Defence reform: criteria for success and failure
- Bulgarian defence industry and the national security – round table

- Public communications between the security sector, Parliament and the civil society – round table
- Methodology of National Security strategy formulation

E *Programme for Orientation of the Political Cabinet of the Minister of Defence*

The programme is organised in ten topics with a duration of 2.5 hours, presented as a briefing and question and answer period:

1. National Security and Defence. National security: concept, terminology, security goals, priorities, factors and actors, risks and threats, challenges. Defence: political category, classical and contemporary dimensions of defence, components of national defence, national defence power and defence capacity, defence resources, preparation for defence
2. Defence doctrine. Use of the Armed Forces. Content, aims and functions of Defence Doctrine. Use of the Armed Forces in accordance with the Defence Doctrine
3. Force planning and development. Organisation of the AF. Force planning process. Alternative models. Review of defence planning practice since 1992
4. National military chain of command. Organisation, functioning, legislative basis and procedures. Problems during transition period. NATO compatible system
5. NATO and Euro-Atlantic security issues. What is NATO and how does NATO work? Political and military structures. Programmes for partner countries. Internal transformation. Enlargement. Transatlantic relations. Relations with Russia

6. Regional security. Geopolitics of the Balkans. Conflict areas and issues. Military factor in the regional situation. Regional military cooperation
7. Civil-military relations and democratic control. Civil-military relations (CMR) problematic. Characteristics of entire practice. Defence reform as a specific situation in the CMR. Perspectives for further democratisation of defence sector
8. Defence and force planning. Concept for planning. Planning, programming and budgeting process mechanism and instruments
9. Human resource management and career policy. Concept and model. Legislative basis. Organisation and management. Problems and alternatives
10. Strategic leadership and management. Prerequisites for successful leadership. Revolution in military affairs in Bulgaria. Instruments of political leadership and management

## **APPENDIX 1.5 POLICE ACADEMY: MASTER DEGREE PROGRAMME ON SPECIALITY ‘NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTION’**

The programme is designed for correspondence education of personnel with bachelor or masters degree in other specialities than ‘National Security Protection’. Duration of the programme is 30 months. The course consists of the following study disciplines.

### *Binding disciplines:*

- Constitutional law
- International public law
- Penal code
- Penalty-procedures law
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Strategic assessment and management in counterintelligence organisations
- Psychology in counterintelligence organisations’ management
- Counterintelligence for economic security

*Criminalistica:*

- Theory of intelligence
- Psychology of intelligence
- Intelligence counter measures
- Management in intelligence organisations
- Policy and public authority
- EU law
- Economic aspects of European integration
- Balkan people ethnic psychology and security
- Information security

*Electives:*

- Technical equipment in intelligence and counterintelligence
- Counterintelligence in armed forces
- Counterintelligence in war time
- Philosophy
- Sociology
- International relations
- Administrative law and process
- Marketing
- Environmental law
- Ethics

## **APPENDIX 1.6 THE NEW BULGARIAN UNIVERSITY (SOFIA): PROGRAMMES OF THE MASTER DEGREE FACULTY**

### **A**     *Administration in Security and Defence Organisations*

This programme is realised by the Centre for Public Administration. The graduates could occupy positions as civilian experts in the administration of all the security sector organisations.

#### *Binding disciplines:*

- European security system
- Analysis of public decisions in security and defence organisations
- Investment management
- Finance and budgeting in security and defence
- International crisis management
- Budget accounting in security and defence organisations
- Business relations in security and defence organisations
- Logistics in security and defence organisations

*Electives:*

- Financial control and business-planning in security and defence organisations
- Acquisition in security and defence organisations
- Administration of state and war-time resource reserves
- International cooperation in security and defence
- State arms double use goods trade control
- Administrative control and certification of arms production
- Archives in security and defence organisations
- Economic stability and national security
- Civil Protection Agency: organisation and management
- Research and development studies in security and defence organisations
- Environmental defence and armed forces
- State confidential information protection
- Defence industry
- Administration in special services (intelligence, counterintelligence, antiterrorist, fight against organised crime)

**B** *National and International Security*

This master degree programme is presented by the Department of Political Science. The graduates could occupy civilian positions in security and defence organisations and foreign policy administration.

*Preparation courses:*

- History of international relations
- Theory and doctrines in international relations
- International conflict and national security
- Introduction to European integration

*Binding disciplines:*

- Foundations of security policy
- Theory of intelligence
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Criminology
- Corporative and business intelligence
- Police intelligence
- Specialised courses on foreign languages

*Electives:*

- International and corporate law
- Common European security and defence policy
- Information aspects of security
- Economics and security
- Personal relations in intelligence and counterintelligence
- International finance security
- Psychology of security
- Civil-military relations
- Legal basis of security
- History of intelligence
- International security organisations



- International military and police cooperation
- Public communications and security
- European legislation for security
- International humanitarian law
- Human rights and security
- Management of counterintelligence activities
- Global approach in the fight against narcotics

## APPENDIX 1.7 UNIVERSITY FOR NATIONAL AND WORLD ECONOMY

### A *Department of International Relations: Curricula on International and National Security*

The Programme is designed for both in-contact and correspondence education. Basic thematic modules:

#### *Origins and sources of security*

- Objects and subjects of security
- Historical development of the concept of security
- Political basis of security
- Balance between national and international in the context of security
- Concurrence and conflicts
- Interdependence and dependence in security aspect

#### *Subjective prerequisites for security problems*

- Culture and risk perceptions
- Stereotypes and misperceptions

#### *Understanding national security*

- Political nature of security
- Security concepts
- Subjects and levels of national security

- National security and democracy

### *Interests and security*

- National ideal, interests and goals
- Civil society and national security formulation

### *National security policy*

- Legislation and organisation
- Concept and doctrine
- Resources
- National security system

### *Instruments of security policy*

- Traditional instruments
- Security dilemma
- Military doctrine
- Intelligence
- Non-traditional instruments, technologies, communication and information

### *International and national security*

- Stability and security in the international relations
- Sovereignty, independence and engagement
- Military threats, conflicts and wars
- International security systems
- Mutual, collective, cooperative and regional security
- Security concept
- International security organisations

### *Mutual problems and security dimensions*

- Global interests and global security
- Security problems: arms proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism etc. Solving security problems: prevention, crisis management, peace support, human rights, etc.
- Regional problems of security

### *National security and foreign policy*

- Alternative strategies
- Integrating national security into international. Intelligence information as a resource

### *Internal dimensions of national security*

- Public order
- Social security
- Demographic aspect of security
- Ecology
- National cultural traditions
- New threats: religious fundamentalism, separatism, terrorism, organised crime, corruption

### *Bulgarian security policy*

- National security concept
- National security system: organisation and functioning

### *Information security*

### *Economic security*

- Stability and regulations of world economy
- Economic dimensions of national security and instruments of national security policy

### *Corporate security*

- Issues of confidentiality
- Business confidentiality and security
- Organised crime and corporate security

### *European security*

- Concept and approaches
- Security organisations
- Cooperative and common policies

### *Bulgarian national security and foreign policy*

- Geopolitical factors
- Security environment
- National foreign policy priorities
- Approach towards alliances
- Membership in NATO and EU

## **B** *Department of National and Regional Security: Curricula on National Security and Defence Economics*

The programme is designed for a masters degree on Defence and Security Economics in contact and correspondence education. The course is the first basic one and is aimed at introducing the concept, theory, terminology and other fundamental knowledge related to defence economics problematic. The Curricula is organised in information blocks.

### *First information block*

1. Defence economics, methodology of study
2. National economy system in support of national defence
3. Economy of the public expenditures for defence
4. Public sector in mixed economy and the national defence
5. Resources for defence

*Seminars:* Introduction and macroeconomic issues in defence economics

*Second information block*

6. International trade and defence
7. International finances and defence
8. Defence expenditures and economic development
9. Economic aspect of security and national defence
10. International finance institutions, debts and defence
11. Investments in national defence and economic development

*Seminars:* International economic aspects of national defence economics

*Third information block*

12. Defence industrial base
13. Budgeting
14. Defence and rehabilitating funds
15. Social policy in defence sector

*Seminars:* Microeconomic issues of national defence economics

*Fourth information block*

16. Introduction to defence financial management
17. Defence budgeting concepts review
18. Foundations of budget planning

19. Defence financial management system
  20. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
  21. Accounting systems in defence sector
  22. Practising PPBS
- Seminars:* Financial management of defence expenditures



## **APPENDIX 1.8 VARNA FREE UNIVERSITY**

### **A Graduate Programme on National Security Protection**

The programme is designed to provide a bachelor degree in national security protection in eight semesters in contact and nine through correspondence.

#### *Binding disciplines:*

- General theory of state
- General theory of law
- Constitutional law
- Administrative law and process
- International public law
- Penalty code and process
- Labour law
- Police code of conduct
- Criminology
- Intelligence and protection of the Constitution
- Intelligence and economic security
- Psychology of intelligence
- Theory of counterintelligence
- Counterintelligence
- Theory of intelligence
- Information support of the national security protection
- Intelligence service management
- International and national security
- Environmental security
- Others

#### *Electives:*

- Bulgarian law history
- Economics
- Philosophy
- Marketing
- Legislation in the insurance business
- EU legislation
- Others

**B** *Graduate Programme on Counteraction to Criminality and Protection of the Public Order*

The programme is designed to provide a bachelor degree in Counteraction to criminality and protection of the public order in eight semesters in contact and ten through correspondence. Graduates could occupy positions in the prosecutor's system, in the institutions for preventive anti-criminal activities at national, regional and local level as well as specialists in guard business in state and private companies, banks and financial institutions.

*Binding disciplines:*

- General theory of law
- Constitutional law
- Criminology
- Administrative law and process
- Penalty code and process
- Police code of conduct
- Public order protection
- Theory of police investigations
- Investigations in financial sector
- Practice in criminal investigations
- Management of Police Service
- Psychology of police activities
- Organised crime
- Theory of state
- Pedagogic in penalty service
- Penitentiary law
- Information systems and technologies

*Electives:*

- Law of taxes
- Law of insurance
- Intelligence support to economic security
- Sociology
- Re-socialisation pedagogic
- International public law
- International penalty code
- Intelligence support for protection of the Constitution

- EU legislation
- Under aged criminality
- Judicial medicine

# **Mladen Stanicic, Stefan Imobersteg, Jan Trapans**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN CROATIA**

### **1.4 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

#### **1.4.1 Introduction**

Croatia, in comparison with other communist countries, has established more independence than the country experienced before. Prior to 1989, Croatia had been governed by the communist regime and had lacked any possibilities for independent development. Additionally, Croatia experienced gruesome years of war, which caused the country to lose even the smallest political, economic and social foundation for a new internal organisation. As a result, Croatia mainly focused on overall achievements and neglected democratic guidelines and procedures.<sup>20</sup>

Croatia's history has led to a predominant military influence, which strengthened its internal structures during the time of communism and war. As a consequence, the military apparatus almost completely lost its sensitivity to issues of civilians and the civil society. Many military members, including a high percentage of officers, lacked adequate civil as well as military education, which hardens the reshaping of this sector today. Civil-military connections cannot just be re-established but need to be developed from a zero basis.<sup>21</sup>

However, being one of the aspirant transitional countries, Croatia needs to undertake technical as well as organisational steps slowly to achieve the standards set by Western societies. Currently, Croatia focuses its efforts on an attempt to join international organisations such as NATO and EU, which themselves set requirements for participation. Being already member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

---

<sup>20</sup> Ozren Zunec.

<sup>21</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, Croatia continuously contributes to the work tasks and goals of those institutions.<sup>22</sup>

#### **1.4.2 How Are Different Experts Prepared for their Tasks and Assignments, and How Well?**

##### *(a) Parliament and Parliamentary Staffers*

In 2002, Croatia officially became participant of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which also serves as a first step to a possible later joining of NATO. The MAP sets clear demands on joining countries, which also affect parliamentary institutions. Nonetheless, most Croatian parliamentarians have not gained a chance to enhance their skills on democratic security sector reforms. Most Western influence has been directed to the military, and civilian structures have been predominately neglected. This imbalance negatively contributes to the security sector reform, because it prevents a successful exchange and compatibility between civilians and the military. Therefore, military as well as civilian personnel are required to gain new skills in the political, managerial and international areas. Specific fields include: ‘knowledge of international organisations, service in multinational headquarters, interoperability, interagency stratagems, and the procedures of multinational civilian-military bureaucracies’.<sup>23</sup> Besides previously mentioned achievements, the civil sector and the military need to strengthen their ties of cooperation. Closer and quality enhanced working relations between civilians and the military contribute to better integration of the Armed Forces into democratic governmental functions.<sup>24</sup>

However, at the beginning of the year 2002, the Croatian Parliament accepted two strategic documents – ‘National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’ and ‘Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia’ – which presents national security and defence policy objectives in accordance with NATO’s strategic concept. The first document contains

---

<sup>22</sup> Dario Cziraky.

<sup>23</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

<sup>24</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

new regulations on changes within the Armed Forces. The restructuring includes aspects concerning the military-territorial division, the reduction of professional brigades and the downsizing of overall military personnel. Croatia further established a network of cooperation with NATO and members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The cooperation is predominantly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consists of experts from the political, economic and security area.<sup>25</sup>

Two years earlier, the Parliament created a specific commission for the Oversight of Internal Politics and National Security Committee. Three official experts were appointed as its members. The committee was authorised for surveillance of previously mentioned services to detect any possible legal rights violations of the institutions in their daily work. The commission indirectly served the rights of citizens and guaranteed the proper working conduct of Internal Politics and National Security Committee. The committee consists of six members, appointed by Parliament for a four-year term. Prerequisites for possible appointment are Croatian citizenship and university education.<sup>26</sup>

(b) *Political Secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice*

Croatia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) currently consists of over 3000 members. This number is far too high and presents a clear overcapacity within this specific sector. The majority of members lack adequate education in the area of security sector reform and new educational programmes are unable to properly deal with such an immense number of people. Therefore, the main goal for a successful security sector reform requires the downsizing of the security and defence area community. This reform process not only affects military structures but also civil segments. Even if the total number was reduced by half, it would still be too large for the country's relevance in international security relations. Basically, the size of the Ministry retards the growth of the Ministry. However, the downsizing of the security sector would

---

<sup>25</sup> Dario Cziraky.

<sup>26</sup> Ozren Zunec.

have serious effects on the already high unemployment rate. Croatia has the highest unemployment rate among all other transitional countries, which comes close to 20 per cent. Furthermore, Croatia is concerned about laid off security experts leaving the country to seek employment in the local or international security labour market. Such a tendency could pose an additional threat to the level of national security in general.

Though government and MoD agree on downsizing the defence sector as part of the defence sector reform, no concrete plans exist among the significant documents of security, defence and military on how to implement those ideas.<sup>27</sup> Besides internal reorganisation problems, Croatia maintains successful bilateral and multilateral programmes and cooperation with NATO. Unfortunately, NATO almost exclusively focuses on technical and military cooperation and training, and therefore neglects organisational and command problem structures of the military and MoD.

(c) *Journalists*

The Croatian government has generally respected the protection of press and media by the Constitution. Further protected are speech, public expression and the establishment of institutions of public communication. At the beginning of 2001, the Law on State TV was adopted by the Parliament. From then on, public television has been controlled by an independent Council, which consists of representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and was confirmed by the Parliament. As a result, transparency on political control over state television was enhanced and more publicity on the identities of major media shareholders was gained.

Though the Croatian media is free, diverse media segments lack adequate experts. Generally, each media segment is assigned only one reporter. Furthermore, the media tends to pursue the path of a tabloid press and neglects serious and quality research, as well as reports. Information is predominantly disseminated into English rather than local

---

<sup>27</sup> Mladen Stanicic.



languages. The distribution of information is further limited, especially regarding the electronic press. The Croatian website has been under construction for over one year without any success. The flow of information is still limited and there are no experts to support the ongoing process.

(d) *Non-Governmental Experts Working in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)*

Croatia has never had a strong tradition of NGOs and civil society. ‘Citizen’s civil engagement for solving both individual and community problems has not been a common practice among the vast majority of citizens in Croatia.’<sup>28</sup> Croatian civil society was mainly established during the first half of the 1990s. Established NGOs were conceptually and financially supported by foreign institutions and mainly contributed to solving civil or humanitarian war related problems. However, this starting tendency soon found its turning point and declined during the second half of the 1990s. Active participants started to focus more and more on their personal problems and therefore neglected further activities in the sector of civil society and NGOs.

However, prevailing NGO structures were able to pay attention to activities of the intelligence and security structures. According to some Croat sources, several cases of abuse of political services in political interest have been documented.<sup>29</sup> Overall, the development of CSOs, also referred to as NGOs, is supported and driven by foreign programmes. Unfortunately, foreign experts often view Croatian problems in their own concepts, which prevent possible solutions from being successfully implemented. This lack of communication and understanding between foreign experts and members of Croatian NGOs reduces potential experts from being educated, and weakens the role of civil society in the larger Croatian society.

---

<sup>28</sup> Mladen Stanicic.

<sup>29</sup> Ozren Zunec.

Most NGOs were established after the political shift in the year 1990. It is assumed that Croatia currently maintains about 20,000 NGOs, of which 18,000 operate on a local level. Nonetheless, no statistics have been conducted on the number of active NGOs, but this number is estimated significantly lower. According to surveys, the work of NGOs only has a minimal effect on the public policy agenda. Normally, NGO representatives rarely get a chance to contribute actively to the generation and discussion of the legislation. NGOs lack major connections to the government and have minimal impact on new governmental policies. Often, they cooperate with public policy institutes (DCAF) abroad, which themselves maintain direct ties to the local government. This situation is more or less paradoxical, since Croatian NGOs have to get in touch with their government through public policy institutes abroad. In conclusion, NGOs are not successful in monitoring government regulations and policies. This is related to the fact that governmental representatives are unwilling to open their field of work to external organisations such as NGOs.

Regarding the funding of NGOs several problems exist. Most Croatian CSOs depend on foreign financial support and lack any state donations. Therefore, only bigger organisations tend to receive foreign funding, whereas smaller ones are neglected. In the long run, CSOs will have to find financial institutions inside the country in order to remain active over time. Possible financial sources include: 'donations, subventions and income generated from their own services'.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Mladen Stanicic.

### 1.4.3 What Courses Would Be Needed?

#### (a) *Assessment of Needs for Additional Courses*

Regarding CSOs or NGOs, the space of active operation needs to be extended. The space in which NGOs need to operate to maximise their power is defined by the legislative, political and social-cultural framework. ‘Civil society in Croatia needs to engage itself more with public policy issues in an attempt to establish a position for itself in the policy-making process.’<sup>31</sup>

Concerning military and civil society, incongruencies between the media and military seem to be decreasing slowly, mainly through increased levels of cooperation. Improvements have been achieved through press conferences, the attendance of media representatives at seminars, public debates and open conversations organised by the MoD. The MoD has acknowledged the media as a means to emphasise problematic issues related to the security community and has agreed to cooperate more intensively to strive for overall satisfaction. However, despite all efforts made, the problem of professional treatment on both sides concerning sensitive issues of civil-military relations remains. The MoD still controls and interprets large amounts of classified and confidential information without any counter interpretation from the civil sector, such as the media. On the other hand, the media lacks knowledge and number of experts to consider such sensitive topics appropriately.

A lot of educational efforts should be done. This is the most fine-tuning problem – journalists who are very competent in analysing military issues are not competent enough to analyse very sensitive civil-military relations especially in the terms of democratic oversight of armed forces.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, the MoD possesses all crucial information but seldom organises press conferences or individual meetings with journalists to increase the quality and quantity of the information being released.

---

<sup>31</sup> Mladen Stanicic.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

However, the press themselves do not always attend meetings offered by the MoD, which puts the blame for a lack of communication and cooperation on both sides. The few press releases tend not to include any information on civil-military relations or democratic oversight of armed forces.

Regarding Croatia's approach to international organisations such as NATO, both the military and civilian sector are required to improve their knowledge of 'international organisations, service in multinational headquarters, interoperability, interagency stratagems, and the procedures of multi-national civilian-military bureaucracies'.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence, military as well as civilian professionals need to replace current skills with abilities that meet today's standards and allow them to fulfil their tasks professionally and successfully. Therefore, the educational system of the security and defence environment needs to provide well educated and trained people with the ability to adapt appropriately to changes and challenges of today's security environment. 'Education, training and self-education are the first steps that should help to evaluate quality of the individuals and create a basis for further upgrade of their skills.'<sup>34</sup>

According to some views, the four-year mandate of the recently established Parliament may be too short to deal with existing problems efficiently. An example would be the definition of fine distinctions in all segments of civil-military relations. Therefore, the Parliament should take advantage of so-called staffers who are specialised in dealing with certain problems. Their expertise would assist parliamentarians and prevent members to agree on too early decisions.

The Parliament still has not been able to claim authority over defence plans and their implementation. Senior MoD Officials do not report to the Parliamentary Committees often enough. As a result, inefficiencies and failures are not appropriately discussed/communicated between Parliamentary Staff and Committees on Internal Policy and National Security. This structure still prevails from past political systems, where

---

<sup>33</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

<sup>34</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

the President had the authority and responsibility to discuss and decide upon defence issues.<sup>35</sup> Basically, the Parliamentary Internal Policy and National Security Committee missed the opportunity to adjust their duties according to the Republic of Croatia Security Services Act (ZoSS). The Council for Oversight of Security Services (VNSS) was not established and institutions for control and oversight still do not exist. Those negative aspects place Croatia in a situation that is uncommon in comparison to other multi-party democracies. The country lacks the implementation of the law, any guidelines, directions, control and oversight of the services, which prevents the system from functioning according to democratic principles.

The chaotic situation in the services as it existed before the passing of the ZoSS is getting worse and worse, the system is not coordinated, parallelism of activities and overlapping authorities still exist, leaving services unaccountable.<sup>36</sup>

It can be concluded that the situation in Croatian security services at the beginning of the year 2002 has been catastrophic. Unfortunately, no efforts were undertaken throughout the remainder of the year to at least strengthen the fundamental level of this sector. The passing of the ZoSS seemed nothing more than an entertaining activity of top ranking officials that detected another chance to grab more power for themselves instead of working for their people and country.<sup>37</sup>

#### **1.4.4 What Possibilities for Expert Formation Do Exist?**

- (a) *Documentation of Programmes Offered by National and International Agents*

To enhance education and training among highest ranked officers, an interdisciplinary multidisciplinary national security study should be established. Courses and seminars should be open to everyone –

---

<sup>35</sup> Tatjana Cumpek.

<sup>36</sup> Ozren Zunec.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

including public workers, civil servants, journalists, politicians, military commentators etc. Special attention needs to be paid to the education of military personnel regarding duties, and international headquarters, including NATO and SHAPE. The future demand of such personnel will rise almost definitely, which requires solid investment in this specific segment of education. The system further faces the obligation to educate higher ranked officers at a different level than lower ranked personnel. Higher ranked officers have to be provided with advanced lectures in the field of operational and managerial skills. Overall, the current Croatian military profession presents itself as inadequate compared with Western standards and asks for major reforms in the years to come. Specific reforms should be directed towards the following areas:

Intensive education and training, increased level of requirements due to the new equipment and weapons, emerging of the activities whose aim will be a better understanding of relations between the civil society and Armed Forces, and the requirements imposed by the civil institutions to their members, including soldiers.<sup>38</sup>

The management field should further establish a concept which allows recognition of gifted personnel and possible promotion to higher positions with an increased level of responsibility. The recruitment should consider all available sources in accordance with necessary criteria. Recruited personnel should feel obligated to reach a masters degree in specific military related sciences.

Further, young students with interest in later military careers should be provided with the opportunity to participate in activities of the Armed Forces during their time at regular civilian universities. This programme allows for more successful military careers, since future officers are exposed to this field at an earlier age and gain continuous experience until they actually start their career.

The military itself should focus on the aspect of hard security. In addition to its basic defence mission, the military should focus on the new aspects of security: peacekeeping operations, regional arms control

---

<sup>38</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

activities, demining, cooperation with neighbours and participation in PfP and MAP exercises.<sup>39</sup>

Further programmes concerning foreign aspects include: the formation of civil-military teams with the purpose of attending educational programmes outside Croatia (GCSP, Marshall Centre, and Baltic Defence College); supporting the development of parliamentary staff capability including institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly; enhancing the level of cooperation between the Western expert community and Croatian civil-military NGO groups.

Regarding internal needs, several programmes with differing criteria need to be considered. The defence media sector ought to develop and maintain a comprehensive, electronic, web-based information system in English and Croatian. Further, certain reporters need to gain knowledge on defence and security issues to be able to comment appropriately on issues related to this topic.

#### **1.4.5 Conclusion**

Croatia, like all other democracies, must undertake reforms despite the lack money and time. Programmes offered by the West have been helpful but often do not directly meet the needs of Croatia. The military has had more opportunities to profit from Western reform programmes than parliamentarians. The possibilities for parliamentarians to attend educational programmes have been more restrictive. Therefore, Croatia's restructuring process proceeds slowly and changes cannot be implemented efficiently.

---

<sup>39</sup> Zvonimir Mahecic.

## References

- Cumpek, T. (2002) Transparency and accountability in the defence and security sectors. Special study paper for DCAF.
- Cziraky, D. (2002) International requirements and influence. Special study paper for DCAF.
- Mahecic, Z. (2002) Capability building and good governance in security and defence reform. Special study paper for DCAF.
- Stanicic, M. (2002) Civil society and the security sector. Special study paper for DCAF.
- Zunec, O. (2002) Democratic oversight and control over intelligence and security agencies in Croatia. Special study paper for CAF.



**Lidija Georgieva**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN MACEDONIA**

### **1.5 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

#### **1.5.1 Introduction**

This paper presents initial work on Civil-Military Relations (CMR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) Expert Formation in the Republic of Macedonia. It is part of the broader assessment of the issue since the basic initiative for defining the status of CMR and SSR Expert Formation in Southeast Europe has come into existence as a first priority of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium SSR-Working Group. Being part of a broader overview on Expert Formation in Southeast Europe and the Stability Pact area, this study initially closes the gap on the current status and essentials of expert formation. Based on an initial research and qualitative assessment of various primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews conducted by officials on different segments of the security sector, such assessments need to be a priority on the agenda of security sector institutions. There are two reasons why security sector reform is of such high importance: first, Macedonia is going through serious and specific post-conflict peace building consolidations and secondly, because of previously outlined joint political decisions of bringing the Macedonian security sector closer to standards, norms and requirements for integration into Euro-Atlantic security institutions. One of the challenges within this process is to identify and classify priorities in SSR according to the assessment of previous achievements and to dispose the framework of activities that will match a set of governmental democracy consolidation programmes and activities according to the Framework Agreement.

Although the Republic of Macedonia has gone through specific peaceful processes of transition since last year, it is questionable whether the reform processes have been deeper and of more substantial significance. In this regard, reforms within the security sector institutions are considered slow and challenging. These characteristics have almost been imposed on the public and some of the critical analysts, due to inappropriate and uncoordinated actions taken by military-security forces during the Macedonian crisis. The image of partially reformed and adapted institutions, dependent on international security mechanisms, is strengthened by the constant so-called 'security recipient' position of the country. Alongside benefits from the status of partner countries and improved relations with NATO through Membership Action Plan (MAP), it can be concluded that there are still open issues subject to reforms in the security sector. However, the atmosphere of a post-conflict environment and the ongoing processes of political and democratic consolidations that are typical for peace building in war-torn societies will not be eradicated by simply advertising a Framework Agreement and/or Constitutional Provisions. The complexity of post-conflict environments additionally obscures the process of SSR, though the ongoing process has by no means been insufficient or unsubstantial.

Based on this introductory analysis on expert formation and its function in improving civil-military relations and the SSR process in Macedonia, it could be anticipated that the successfulness of the reform process will not only depend on domestic political will and decisions or international appraisal, but also on the availability and capacity of expert formation to support the process. Aside from anticipated political will for modification of security sector according to international and professional standards and principles, it should be noted that such reforms ought to contain support for the genuine identified reform needs. The best practices can facilitate the process of identifying possible solutions, but universal recipes do not exist.

Much criticism can also be found concerning the issue of the assessment of needs posed by specific expert formation in support of the national security strategy, excellence of academic and non-academic security strategy and policy, excellence of academic and non-academic

educational and training programmes, and continuous education and training of the experts and experts' profiles. This introduction also criticises the issue of appropriate methodology and strategy, because the assessment of needs often only deals with fractional, inconsistent or short-term based political and individual interests. Generally, a limited number of experts are capable of professional engagement in specific segments of the security sector, and a limited number are incompletely and inappropriately engaged.

In conclusion, this approach is not the best defined starting position towards security cooperation and integration in Euro-Atlantic military-security organisations.

### **1.5.2 Objective**

The main objective of the introductory analysis is to enable relevant political and academic institutions and the broader public of Macedonia to become more aware of the serious need of reconsidering the position of the democratic as well as civilian control of the security sector. The analysis constitutes a stocktaking research on the existing expert formation in the area of civil-military relations and security sector reform in Macedonia. It outlines the general situation of expert fulfilment in the segments of executive and legislative branches dealing with the security sector. It further overviews the role of civil society in influencing the processes relevant to civil-military relations and the SSR, particularly the role of NGOs. The specific questions addressed in the analysis are:

1. How well are security sector institutions (executive) staffed with civilian and military experts and how do they influence the activities of the institutions?
2. What is the quality of preparedness of specific experts for their task assignments and the potential need for additional training, programme coordination or assistance?

### **1.5.3 Relevance**

The analysis on expert formation in civil-military relations has not resulted in a serious attempt to initiate complex and coordinated strategies for reforms. Moreover, it has served as an emerging trend with large publicity by the acknowledgement that future, more serious reforms are necessary, aimed at improving the democratisation of civil-military relations and efficiency of the security sector. The debate on this issue is not encompassed by an all-inclusive and complex viewing of the SSR in general. However, there is certain unified political and institutional concern regarding the debate of driving the system towards new organisational/functional or rational/efficient challenges. The ongoing reforms were not a result of a general national strategy, but were perceived as the composition of diverse reform activities.

Different institutions within the security sector initiated and conducted their own reforms without any support or backup from serious scientific or expert research.

Experience has shown that dilemmas about civil-military relations have been considered an exclusive academic issue rather than a serious practical problem in the process of democratisation.

The improvement of civil-military relations, together with reforms in the security sector, were promoted and handled in terms of necessary criteria for NATO accession, rather than a fundamental necessity of the country. That is the only reason why this process is not perceived as new, but more as a continuous activity initiated by the decisions of the Macedonian Parliament to achieve NATO membership. The military reforms – including size, equipment and professionalism – overshadowed other aspects of reforms.

Questions of democratisation of civil-military relations and SSR that are prioritised within the process of post-conflict peace building in Macedonia are not considered newly integrated segments by the larger part of the security expert community. SSR is rather perceived as a step to address a new security environment and challenges that followed the

crisis in Macedonia. Here, the integration of unlearned lessons plays a crucial role as well.

This process plays a fundamental role in the future stabilisation and promotion of democratic security in the country. It remains unclear whether this process should incorporate first generation SSR's. However, old mistakes should not and cannot be repeated.

#### **1.5.4 Assessment of Expert Formation in Parliament**

The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia should have a key position in parliamentary oversight of the security sector. According to the highest normative acts, the Macedonian Parliament exerts key legislative and monitoring functions. Parliament's competence includes the following aspects: declaring the state of war or the state of immediate danger of war; monitoring the executive on defence issues; decision-making on the defence budget; international activities related to the defence issues as well as deciding on the concept of national security. Within the framework of its competence, parliamentary oversight of the security sector should be emphasised but the issue has not been sufficiently actualised within Parliament's activities. Such attributes about the role of Parliament come from the general estimation that Parliament, being a central political institution in a parliamentary democracy, has had a secondary role in the political process during the years that followed the independence of Macedonia.

This is particularly the case in fulfilling the monitoring function of Parliament with regard to the executive. The estimation that the role of Parliament is simply a voting instrument for decisions taken in the executive supported the previous opinion. Even the evaluation of the role and achievements of its agents has not sufficiently changed this image.

According to the established competence of Parliament, different Commissions were founded to support its function.<sup>40</sup> Regarding the issues of defence and security, the Commission on Defence and Security, as well as the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Integrations were set up.<sup>41</sup> Apart from the division of responsibilities between Commissions, the impression exists that the issue on defence and security is addressed by two aspects: one covers the sphere of defence and security of the state and its legal dimensions, whereas the other covers the international aspect of Euro-Atlantic integrations.

According to the sphere of responsibilities, the Commission on Defence and Security reviews the documents and legal acts proposed by the executive. Depending on the level of discussions, the Commission presents its comments in the form of reports. This is basically the total domain of activity of the Commission, not presenting a sufficient monitoring function or influence on the procedure.

According to some evaluations, this is a consequence of over-numbered competencies. For example, the competencies of the Commission include issues related to the census, legal proceedings, bankruptcy proceedings etc.

The inefficiency can be blamed on experts who considered the constitutional position of this Commission as weak.<sup>42</sup> The work of the Commission has been substantially dependent on the consciousness and presence of parliamentarians. Some indications show that discussions on these issues have been non-critical and most often formal. Instead of filtering and critically viewing proposals under discussion, the work of the Commission has often been guided to support received proposals. In

---

<sup>40</sup> With Rules of Procedures on the Parliament adopted in 2002, the number of Parliamentary Commissions was reduced from 23 to 17. While the former Rules of Procedures anticipated external members, the new one does not, but according to article 119 participation of external experts without a right to vote is enabled. The number of members in the commissions was also increased from 9 to 13.

<sup>41</sup> With the decision of the Parliament taken on 12.11.2002, the Commission on internal policy and defence was renamed to Commission on defence and security.

<sup>42</sup> Up to the present, this Commission has discussed the Law on Service in the Army, The Law on Defence, and The Law on Internal Affairs as the only acts related to defence and security.

addition, the work of the Commission has been burdened with internal political struggle and permanent efforts for quorum. Furthermore, the work was significantly influenced by its composition, including the professional orientation and interest of the members and the role of the Chairman of the Commission.

In this context, the capacity and preparedness of the members of the Commission for issues related to parliamentary oversight over security sector or democratic control are especially important. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that the members of the Commission are parliamentarians recommended by their parliamentary group (very often following the principle of personal affinity), any type of special expertise cannot be expected. Even the participation of two former Ministers in the Commission did not contribute to major successful activities.

In order to improve the work of the Commissions, Parliament introduced a new act on the Rules of Procedure, which defined more clearly the issues in the domain of the Commissions.

According to the competencies established with the new Rules of Procedure, the Commission on Defence and Security is to cover the issues related to: protection of the order established by the Constitution, supervision in the area of defence and security, issues related to civil defence; protection of life, personal safety and property of the citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution; production, trade, purchase, possession of weapons; maintenance of the public peace and order, public gatherings, identification and resolution of border incidents. In this case, the domain of the Commission is more clearly defined as a monitoring function over the executive. Although this is still a reactive function, it will improve the previously completely devalued position of the Commission.

The Commission on Defence and Security in its concept is directed towards the Commission on European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. A first glance at competences will not immediately discover possible

relationships.<sup>43</sup> The competence of the Commission is to address issues regarding European and Euro-Atlantic integrations; to provide an adjustment of views concerning Parliamentary activities on key issues related to the process of integration; to perform evaluations and initiate new activities that are of particular interest to Parliament; and to undertake activities on the harmonisation of the Macedonian legislative with the EU and the documents of international organisations. The Commission also initiates reviews of issues by parliamentary commissions, and other activities on coordination of parliamentary activities related to the process of integration. In terms of its competences, the Commission holds a position that allows bringing to the attention of the Commission on Defence and Security, different aspects concerning the country's integration into EU or NATO. In this respect, there are complex requirements for improving the role of Parliament in overseeing the security sector, while strengthening its monitoring, legislative and representative function. Accordingly, qualified civilian experts are needed to support the activity of the Commission.

A service was set up by Parliament for the purpose of expert and administrative support. In the domain of defence and security an important role belongs to the Sector for International Cooperation, Sector for Research and Analyses and Sector for Legislation. The Sector for International Cooperation, having been active since 1995 (since Macedonian inclusion into various international institutions), presents a competent institution for the multilateral and bilateral cooperation of Parliament. Six delegations were established with the new rules of procedure by Parliament, among which the Parliamentary Delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO can be found. In general, it could be noted that the parliamentary representatives have a greater interest to participate in the parliamentary delegations than in parliamentary commissions. But most importantly, there is no cooperation, coordination or exchange of expert opinion among the Commission of

---

<sup>43</sup> This commission is under the direct competence of the Chairman of the Parliament. Members of the Commission are the Vice-chairpersons of the Parliament, coordinators of the Parliamentary groups, chiefs, delegations and chairpersons of Parliamentary groups of the Parliament in the Parliamentary Assemblies of the European and Euro-Atlantic organisations.



Defence, Security and the Sector for international cooperation, or Parliamentary Delegation in NATO, regarding common issues associated with defence and security.

The sector for research and analysis should be capable of providing parliamentarians and staff with information relevant to the issues of defence, security and parliamentary oversight on the security sector. But this is not a regular parliamentary practice. There were individual requests referred to this sector but it hasn't been overloaded with research activities. Associating this sector with academies and research institutions, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organisations working on problems of democratic control on the security sector, would improve Parliament's role.

Initial analysis of the activities of Parliament and its commissions and sectors concerning issues related to defence and security shows that it is treated insufficiently and inappropriately. Parliament and its bodies, due to inappropriate and insufficient expert formation, failed to accomplish most of its functions with reference to defence and security issues (i.e. monitoring, legislative and representative function).

The evaluation of expert formation and expert preparedness for their assignments indicates an alarming situation in the structures of Parliament. Actually, there is not a single civilian expert on defence and security issues among parliamentary staff.

Based on that recognition, a deeper, systematic and unified analysis on expert formation and expert requirement is necessary. Furthermore, a survey on the new composition of the Parliament and its agencies would be necessary to identify the needs for additional education or training through formal or informal methods. Although different levels of requirements could be identified, this process should include members of Parliament, members of parliamentary delegations, members of Commissions and parliamentary staff. Another important issue suggests the support of the Commission on Defence and Security with appropriate expertise on parliamentary oversight of the security sector. For instance, a programme on Democratic Control has been active since September 2001, which is precisely an educational programme for parliaments and

parliamentary staff in SEE. This programme consists of a series of meetings on various topics such as: Bases of legislative control, Parliaments in SEE and reform priorities for the security sector, promotion of successful parliamentary control of the security sector, co-organised by CESS and ISPPi. There were no other activities on training and education of the deputies or staff on similar topics.

It should be emphasised that short study and working visits in relevant institutions or conferences, and/or seminar participation, are among the most appropriate forms to attract the interest of parliamentarians. In the case of parliamentary staff, specialisation and training are appropriate tools alongside the possibility for postgraduate studies. Such an opportunity is offered by the Institute for Defence and Peace Studies in Skopje.

### **1.5.5 Assessment of Expert Formation of the Ministry of Defence**

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia is an integral part of the segment of the executive authority. According to acts governing the role of the Ministry, that is, according to the Law on Defence, its competence has been regulated in details.<sup>44</sup>

The wide range of responsibilities of this Ministry and its successful, efficient and professional functioning is based on a row of prerequisites. Those include a well-defined sphere of responsibilities but also clearly established civil-military relations and expert formation. The domain of this initial analysis is not to penetrate into the paradigm of democratic and civil control over the military-security sector, but to locate and initiate the problem of expert formation in these institutions.

---

<sup>44</sup> The Ministry of Defence role is significant in the domain of creation of defence policy; preparation of the defence system; planning, programming and budgeting; education and training for defence as well as other activities. The Defence Law adopted in 2001 in Article 20 defines almost similar set of responsibilities for the Ministry of Defence. The accomplishments of the Ministry in the area of defence are posted on official site of the Ministry: <http://www.morm.gov.mk/zakon/eng/chapter03e.htm>

The evaluation of expert formation within the Ministry of Defence asks for the following aspects to be taken into account:

1. The evaluation should be based on the assessment of normative acts that regulate personnel formation and the status of the administration within the Ministry. It should evaluate their projection on the scope of inclusions of experts of various sectors and especially the inclusion of civil experts from the area of civil-military relations.
2. The evaluation should be conducted to the extent of the appropriate engagement of experts in accordance with the existing organisational scheme. These two aspects should be accompanied by:
3. the level of preparedness of different experts for their tasks and assignments.

Through such a comprehensive evaluation, some of the problems and dilemmas related to the issue of expert appointment and preparedness could also be defined.<sup>45</sup> Alongside the normative aspects of these issues, those challenges could be directed and defined by two processes:

1. different problems related to the politicisation of the process of appointment of personnel on managing positions but also in the administration of the Ministry, and
2. problems related to internal coordination and functioning of the structures in the Ministry, as well as coordination of the Ministry's activities with other governmental institutions, particularly those covering the security sector.

If the stated aspects were comprehensively analysed, a more complex idea on the importance of appropriate expert formation in this specific

---

<sup>45</sup> Some aspects related to service in the Army and its specifics and differences from the Law on State Servants are presented in Ristevski T: The Key for Higher Motivation (Kluc za pvisoka motiviranost). Odbrana. June 2002; and New Phase in Development of Defence System (Nova faza vo razvojoj na odbranbeniot system) Odbrana, September 2002; also available on: <http://www.morm.gov.mk/mak/publik.html>

institution would be achieved. If we intend to continue making a problem of this issue, it would be in terms of a more detailed analysis of certain indicators, which are assumed as influential over the preparedness of expert performance on expected assignments. But this initial analysis has not been directed at that aim. Therefore, this portion of the evaluation of expert formation and preparedness in performing assignments could be more complex than it appears at first sight.

This problem could also be addressed and analysed as a consequence of various reasons related to previous education of experts in specific areas, or as an issue of continuous education and training on specific tasks.

The next aspect which contributes to the complexity of the issue is found in the efficiency of the educational programme offered at national level, to generate an expert with similar performances compared to those who perform related tasks within the security sector of Partner States. This aspect of the issue could, for example, be explained by a number of challenges that appeared through the activities on additional expert education of the personnel in the Ministry of Defence through bilateral and multilateral programmes on cooperation and education.

Nevertheless, part of the needs of the executive authorities would be met by specific personnel. For instance, civil experts in the defence area related to the sphere of democratic and civil control of civil-military relations.

The issue of expert formation and preparedness in this segment has been attributed by one more aspect, which will have a significant influence on the complexity of the process, particularly because of the process of post-conflict peace building. The Framework Agreement contains the principle of proportional representation of the communities within the structures of the security sector in general and the Ministry of Defence in particular. The principle of appropriate representation of the communities has been planned and conducted since the actual independence of Macedonia. For many reasons the efficient inclusion of communities failed, except at the higher officer level, but even in this case with significant observations and inconsistency. As such, this process did not produce appropriate effects on confidence building

among society and military structures as well as certain communities. Therefore, positive effects in that direction have been necessary to contribute to the stability and security of the state. This was probably the basic reason that the process was planned very carefully and completed to avoid the obstacles that delayed and impeded the overall process of expert formation.

One of the main problems of having an influence on the continuity and efficiency of the operation of the administration and managing personnel in the Ministry is the frequent change of the acts governing the status of the administration. A frequent practice can be found in that each new minister introduces a new act on job description (systematisation). This generates personnel problems that reflect on the efficient operation because qualified personnel cannot fill specific positions. One of the repeated explanations is that such personnel are not available, or the other reason states that though experts exist, they are not specifically engaged.

The Act on Systematisation enacted by the Minister of Defence, following prior approval by the Government, determines the criteria for specific posts and positions apart from the description of expert needs.

Most common interview comments with personnel of this sector showed that certain professional positions require education in the area of social sciences. Positions that require civil-military expert knowledge need to be provided with adequate educational programmes.

This happens despite the fact that within the framework of the system of higher education in Macedonia there is permanent education of civil experts on defence. Although this issue could be given broader and more comprehensive elaboration, the most substantial problem was pinpointed to several areas. The education quality of these personnel, in relation to the previously mentioned, needs to be comparable to the expert profile of partner states. This is a necessary criterion to improve the credibility of experts who are in the process of establishing efficient defence systems. The experts were additionally marginalised during the process of establishing the defence system after the independence of Macedonia, without any previous evaluation of their expert preparedness. Even

institutions of the political system of defence issues forgot about the availability of such personnel. Briefly, the priority of reforms in society was set in a manner that imposed the reform of the military sector by putting a strong influence of military aspects on security. This atmosphere, specifically relations and ratio of civil military experts, has disturbed the meaning of expert formation of the Ministry of Defence. This ratio presented a constant imbalance until the year 2000/01, when military officers were appointed to posts which in advanced democracies which were usually covered by civilians. This was the case concerning positions of under-secretaries and assistants to the Minister.

The implementation of democratic and civil control over the army is a constant challenge for the Ministry of Defence.<sup>46</sup> The present evaluation states that the Ministry of Defence lacks sufficiently educated civilians and military professionals with regard to defence issues. Incidents of confrontation between civilian and military experts continue to worsen cooperation. According to military experts, civilian political officials in the Ministry of Defence do not possess the required expertise as is possessed by the colleagues of the General Headquarters. According to civilian experts, the General Headquarters lacks adequate civilian professionals who would be of assistance in various work processes. As a result, the Ministry of Defence has not efficiently pursued the establishment of a policy which is a prerequisite to comply with Western standards of democracy and civil control over the military.

Due to lack of experienced and qualified civilian professionals in the Ministry, military experts required an extension of the military segment to the portion that traditionally has been considered the area of civilian activity. The development of programmes in the absence of civilian expert personnel causes military solutions to prevail. However, there are still military personnel who do not feel sufficiently integrated into the Ministry of Defence.

---

<sup>46</sup> More detailed analysis on civil-military relations and current challenges may be found in Vankovska, B. and Wiberg, H., 'Civil-Military relations in Macedonia', *COPRI Working Papers*, No. 16.,(2000) and Handziski, B. and Goreski, V., 'Democratic Civil Control of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Macedonia', paper presented at the seminar on *Legal Framing of Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector Norms and Realities*, DCAF, 4-5 May 2001.

Civilian defence officials react in a reserved way to advice and criticism posed by military officers and, according to some opinions, try to extend civilian control and influence to the traditional military zone. But in the majority of cases, both civilian and military officials are forced to accept or support the objectives and philosophy of certain political parties.

This is one of the reasons it is imperative to achieve a better balance and appropriate positioning between civilian and military experts than is currently in existence. As a final result, the Ministry does not create any policies as is the case with the majority of defence systems in developed democracies.

The problem of expert formation has contributed to the process that even more erodes the capacity of the Ministry regarding expert formation. Examples show that certain personal decisions within the Ministry, starting with the Minister himself and the State Secretary, deputies and advisors, positions with key influence over the efficiency of operations in the Ministry, have permanently posed and discussed the issues of their qualification and professionalism. Factors that create suspicion over their qualifications were the application of principles of nepotism and/or party membership during the process of personnel selection. Such cases portray the fact that principles of depoliticisation have been violated, i.e. that policy involvement is part of the problem that erodes expert formation of the Ministry.

Another activity that influenced the process of expert formation in the Ministry is the continuous change of deeper portions of managing functions within the Ministry. The deep cuts are made in the administrative and expert formation of the Ministry as a result of the policy of political changes that are introduced with every new appointment of the government or minister. The staff, which created expertise for current positions has been repositioned. This fact creates confusion among expert opinions about the meaning and consequences of this process. For instance, a dual opinion exists on the solution of the State Secretary function. Some of the interviewed experts believe that this function should not be subject of change in order to maintain continuity and expertise and reduce policy involvement and its influence

over the Ministry's efficiency. The others share opposite opinions. According to them, this function has to be subject to change, but should also be followed by additional preparations (education and training) to perform anticipated tasks.

The Cabinet of the Minister presents another segment where the principle of expert formation needs to be observed. According to the summarised comments from the interviews, the Cabinet of the Minister plays an exclusively important role in the successful functioning and coordination of the activities. Previous experience of the functioning of the Ministry has shown that it generally served a bottleneck function due to inappropriate formation, or lack of organisational priorities. According to the formation development of this cabinet over the period 1992/93, no expert executive was established; since 1993/95 an individual executive covers the activities. At later stages, huge structures will be introduced, despite the earlier tendency of non-formation. This issue greatly influences the activities of the Ministry's structure and its efficiency. It affects the coordination of activities between different sectors and departments of the Ministry, where the meeting of its highest-level officials forms a main body for coordination. In this regard, there are a lot of comments and much pointing out the need of a serious approach to the formation of this segment and to overcome the stockholder position.

An additional problem concerns the efficient organisational structure, relations and coordination of the various independent sectors of the Ministry. According to some observations, they are not equally structured and supported by expert formation; some of them have a more emphasised role, as it was indicated in the case of the Sector on policy, planning and international cooperation, compared to the structure of the rest of the six sectors. In this case, inappropriate expert formation and burdened ratio of civil-military experts influenced the efficiency of the sectors and its cooperation. For that reason, a definition of the sphere of activities and responsibilities is necessary.

Probably due to oversized activities in this sector in the past, in order to create the defence system closer to NATO standards, an impression has risen that its function is identical to that of the Ministry in general. Some



suggestions directed this sector towards an organisational, with no overlapping executive function in the domain of defence policy, planning and international cooperation. Besides the estimated importance and influence of this sector, it is concluded that the sector faces problems of consistency in operation and expertise. The managing of this sector, along with the sector on civil defence and crises management, is carried out by the State Advisor. In this case, it could also be indicated that the expert level of the appointed person would influence the efficiency of action. This refers to the state advisors who manage the rest of the five sectors.<sup>47</sup>

The efficiency and functionality of the Ministry could be disturbed as a consequence of its incompleteness with sub-legal acts and regulations of internal character arising from the Law on Defence. The sphere of normative-legal aspects and its influence on the efficiency of the Ministry is already recognised. Even in this field there are informal expert proposals for Constitutional changes and amendments of the Law on Defence in favour of detailed and more appropriate regulations of civil-military relations. Expert formation that should support this process in accordance with previous experience exclusively comes from the domain of constitutional and legal experts. The inclusion of civil-military experts is not often practised in this procedure.

A further problem that encompasses previous ones is the lack of an appropriate planning process, programming and budgeting for all functioning domains of the Ministry, and consequently the lack of transparency in the Ministry's work.

It can be concluded that expert and sub-expert formation in different areas of the Ministry's scope of work are present, but not appropriately positioned and/or engaged in existing work processes. Expert formation is a good starting point but not sufficient to support necessary and long-term reforms due to previously mentioned problems and challenges.

---

<sup>47</sup> The organisational structure of the Ministry may be found on the official site of the Ministry of Defence: [www.morm.gov.mk](http://www.morm.gov.mk)

The need for the continuation of expert profiling and education process was recognised by the independence of Macedonia itself. But this process of expert preparation contains different dynamics (time scheme) and qualities. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the assessment of needs and the conducting of plans and programmes for education and training. It enacts the following regulations: expert qualification and advancement of the administration employed in the Ministry, regulations on education, professional qualification and improvement of Army personnel, and the organisation of scientific research studies for defence needs and scientific-technical cooperation with appropriate institutions. Since Macedonia became a PfP member, the country's educational and training needs are planned within the Annual National Programme. The Planning and Review Process and Individual Partnership Programme furthermore define in detail the requirements, priorities and methods of accomplishment. According to the understanding of the majority of interviewed experts, the process of anticipating and planning educational and training needs is the easiest part of the problem. In fact, the most difficult part is the implementation of programmes. Although an agreement has been made on specific bilateral or multilateral programmes, inappropriate education or preparedness narrows the selection of suitable candidates. In some cases, appropriate candidates could not be found. In other cases, potential candidates expressed some dissatisfaction regarding political or personal disturbances of the selection process.

Based on experience to date it could also be concluded that the international cooperation on education and training has not been set on a broad basis. There is an impression that military expert education prevails. It has not been accompanied by proportional civilian expert education.

Some of the interviewed experts estimate that the Ministry, due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, did not efficiently and entirely use the offered educational programmes. Security sector expert formation suffered significant oscillations because it did not rely on long-lasting planning and support in programme implementation.

In fact, this process has a major obstacle in the non-existence of assessment of the current expert situation and anticipated expert needs for support of the national security and defence strategy. Not only the Ministry of Defence, but also other security sector actors ignored the importance of assessment and failed to integrate and coordinate their specific needs into joint educational expert strategies. But it is improbable that such action appears due to rival and occasional competitive relations among security sector actors. Moreover, such a joint strategy should not be expected to arise from inappropriate treatment of the national security sphere from the legislative and executive branch. This is obvious from the examples of the non-existence of national-security strategy, inappropriately defined responsibilities of the security actors, insufficient institutional support and clear definition of the role of the security system in the complex security environment.

Within the framework of the educational system of the Republic of Macedonia, education and training of civilian and military experts is performed through two educational institutions. The Military Academy 'Gen. Mihajlo Apostolski' organises the military education for all branches of the military.<sup>48</sup> Cadets being educated in the Academy are better prepared to fulfil national or NATO standards and requirements in front of the military officer/expert.<sup>49</sup>

One of the problems that presents an immediate concern to Academy officials is unsystematic and uncoordinated enrolment, which is carried out on an ad hoc basis. The recent decision to stop the enrolment of new cadets for three years, in accordance with the advice of some military experts, does not correspond with the systematic planning of the needs for the support of SSR as a long-term process.

This implies that military education suffered significant difficulties due to insufficient military education management, planning, budgeting, as

---

<sup>48</sup> The aspects of the development of the military education in Macedonia is presented in S. Deskovski: Cvrsta osnova za odbrana (The Strong Defence Basis) Odbrana, No. 74, 2002, pp. 6.

<sup>49</sup> The Programme of the Military Academy 'Gen. Mihajlo Apostolski' is presented on [www.va.edu.mk](http://www.va.edu.mk)

well as a lack of developmental and support policy within the Ministry of Defence. Some of them are exposed as follows:

Although the Academy is organised according to NATO standards, it is questionable how many of the educational programmes can be conducted in the appropriate manner. Political, financial, organisational, personal and other factors adversely affect the success of those programmes.

The academy staff comprises military and civilian professionals. However, insufficient financial and other stimulating posts lower the chances of experts from other branches being attracted to open positions.

There is insufficient professional development support for lecturers with programmes for exchange of military experts and their future professional development in similar international academic institutions.

The Academy developed significant research programmes but there is a need for broader engagement of experts and academics that will strengthen cooperation in civil-military research and education.

Furthermore, the Academy has no resources for additional officer education after the completion of military education. There is no educational transfer after the specialisation or training has been completed.

The need for civil experts in the area of national security or defence was anticipated and supported as having great importance in most of the academic circles. But the complex situation that followed the act of independence recognised in the first place the need for situating the Army as a basis of the country's sovereignty and even later the necessity of the Civilian Defence Minister. As mentioned earlier, civilian defence experts were not considered of great importance for the creation of the defence system. This attitude influenced the interest and planning of the needs for civilian experts in the security sector. As a result, civilian experts have been constantly educated and promoted within the civilian system of higher education, but their expertise has not been recognised as necessary for the successful transformation of the defence system.

With the intentions of marginalising the need for civil experts on defence and their relevance for improving civil-military relations and the process of democratisation, the Institute for Defence and Peace Studies as a single academic institution related to defence issues, has gone through several modifications and adjustments with respect to its programme and curricula.

According to the newly initiated programme, the Institute is committed to educating students to become civilian experts on defence and peace issues. The main objective of the programme lies in preparing beginner experts for different tasks related to civilian expertise on political, social, economic, humanitarian and other aspects of national security. The institute organises postgraduate specialist, MA and PhD studies in peace and the defence area. Specific topics to be covered within group subjects include: Democratic Control of Security Sector; The Law on Armed Conflict; Political System and Political Institutions; National Security System and National Security Policy; Conflict Management and Crisis Management; European Security; European Integration and Peace and Defence Issues etc.

The Institute is currently preparing a programme for assistance and training on civil-military issues for military officials and parliamentarians, as well as other experts interested in defence and security issues. The programme intends to develop cooperation and training for NGOs that are interested in civil-military and security sector reform issues.

#### **1.5.6 Assessment of Expert Formation in the Ministry of Interior**

During the period following the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, and especially during last year's crisis, the Ministry of Interior and Defence were objects of wider public analysis and criticism. In that context, to a large part, ambiguity and lack of confidence prevailed in the public opinion on this segment and the executive power as well. This assessment results from a lack of openness and communication in the functioning of segments of this sector. As a result, the wider public gains the chance to judge activities of the Ministry

through acts and activities of individuals holding leading positions. In certain cases, their work is identified with that of the Ministry. However, despite the numerous criticisms concerning the work of this Ministry, the impression is that the situation (as in other security sectors) changes slowly except for that part requiring urgent qualification and acting of police forces in a multi-ethnic environment.

In that sense, the general qualification of certain analysts concerning expert formation of this part of the security sector does not seem surprising, i.e. that the Ministry of Interior has appropriate experts for realising competencies. Still, it seems that this issue is not raised as a primary problem. Greater importance is directed towards the problem of appropriate deployment of experts within particular areas, that is, their engagement and utilisation. Two elements can be recognised, which could refer to possible directions for analysis of the problem of expert assignment at the Ministry. On the one hand, it can be underlined that the estimation for expert preparedness is not recognised as a priority activity. On the other hand, it is assumed that the personnel educated according to the curricula of the Secondary Police School and the Faculty of Security Affairs are acceptable and ready to adjust to new requirements and challenges. However, not enough attention is paid to the type of personnel that would be appropriate for new requirements except, as mentioned above, acting in multi-ethnic surroundings. Therefore, the issue of expert assignment and preparedness, especially in the field of SSR and other segments of the security sector, is extremely important and is also a very complex matter.

Three aspects epitomize this complex issue: Professionalism, education and training; the ethnic representation and acting in a multi-ethnic environment; and the organisational and efficient restructuring of the Ministry of Interior. These different but not separated aspects happen through parallel processes with a continuous pursuit of both domestic public, and international community problems.

Besides those processes, most attention is paid to the proportional engagement of members of Albanian origin in various segments of this sector: education, training and the inclusion in professional multi-ethnic police patrols. The most frequent impression is that for part of the

communities the precondition for efficient police will be achieved through meeting the criteria for proportional engagement of the ethnic communities in the composition of police forces. As a result, the level of confidence could be raised.

However, according to some observations, a serious problem affecting the formation of an efficient and professional police is related to the selection process of persons for this profession. It is mainly carried out on unprofessional grounds through a highly politicised process, similar to other security sectors. As a result, serious consequences arise at a later stage of the education and training of cadets.

This problem is also partially caused by distinct changes in the process of education and preparation of regular and leading personnel for the needs of the Ministry. Three years ago, after a number of serious critical analyses, government officials closed the secondary school for police officer education regarding basic needs of the police. This only completed the elimination of the process of traditional education and promotion of police personnel, which started by terminating the Faculty of Security Studies in 1995 that educated personnel for leading positions at the Ministry. This Faculty still educates the remaining 65 students. The suspended expert education procedure process of the Ministry of Interior is not considered to have recovered on time, nor is it perceived that the transformation of the education system has been carried out without any distress and consequences. The problems that arose in the segments of professionalisation and organisational restructuring of the sector for internal affairs has made the situation more complex and set up other priorities.

As a result of accumulated and recognised problems in the functioning of the sector in June 2001, a working group was established composed of representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice to deal with police reforms. This process has been supported by relevant commissions of the EU Agency for Reconstruction. The joint working group should assess both judicial and policing aspects so as to assess the situation and to determine the needs of the police. One of the problems

noted is the organisational restructuring of the Ministry of Interior.<sup>50</sup> According to its characteristics, it presents a huge and inefficient organisation, which needs to be decentralised in order to establish a cheaper and more efficient service.<sup>51</sup>

One of the international organisations that is deeply involved in the process of education and training is OSCE. Police officials appreciate the cooperation with OSCE instructors and consider it most successful. Cooperation is necessary in the selection process of potential police officer candidates. Usually, problems arise in this area. One of the problems is the deliberate disturbance of the professional selection of candidates, which is later reflected through unsatisfactory results in the education and training process. There are candidates that fail the final examination even though they completed the three-month training course and the three-month field training. This educational process produces basic police personnel, but according to some experts proves to be insufficient, disregarding the intensive lectures and training. The framework for education courses provides for various topics, but the accent is on human rights education, policing in a democracy, political and administrative system, constitutional framework, policing in a multi-ethnic society and other academic and tactical courses. Experts involved in the realisation of the course contents emphasise the extraordinary cooperation and professional engagement of OSCE experts and certain countries contributing to this process. On the other hand, a special problem is the preparation of curricula for the maintenance of those courses at different levels of education. This problem clearly demands cooperation with domestic and international academic institutions that can offer qualitative police education.

In the context of overcoming the problems that rose through the process of expert education for the needs of the Ministry, a proposal was made

---

<sup>50</sup> According to the annual growth, the Ministry of Interior in 1992 had about 6700 employees, in 1998 about 8000, and in 2002 about 10,000 employees.

<sup>51</sup> Pursuant to the Framework Agreement, further consideration needs to be taken regarding the representation of the Ethnic-Albanians in the police and out of the current 6.6%, about 1000 new employees of Albanian ethnic origin need to be employed in 2003. The expert service in the sector for legal and personnel affairs should make an estimate of the additional number. With this tendency, the number of employees will gradually increase, but the number of persons who retire will be smaller.



for the establishment of a Police Academy that would prepare basic police personnel. The Government should estimate the extent of the needs and then come to a decision. According to the proposal, the education (instead of the current three-month's course) should last for two semesters (nine months) followed by six months of traineeship and a state exam. The cadets should be recruited at the Education Centre two weeks before the state exam. According to certain considerations and statements, the number of instructors to realise this programme is sufficient.

The Law at the Police Academy, apart from the basic police course, provides for special courses for principal personnel in the police. The potential experts will be educated through higher education courses organised with a duration of two years, the highest postings lasting four years, specialisation in certain spheres and postgraduate studies. One of the envisaged courses is a management course for principal personnel. This part requires the cooperation of various academic institutions and centres for education of police personnel from different aspects. The priority would be cooperation in designing the curriculum, elaboration of methodology of education, exchange and training of teaching and expert personnel. The broadening of the cooperation with other relevant institutions is also necessary for obtaining comparative experience, best practice, coordination and cooperation. One of the possible forms proposes the further qualification and education of instructors and lectures through exchange and interaction with international centres. For example, the meaning of cooperation and coordination with the judiciary has been mentioned and in that sense the functioning and role of the investigating magistrate. Certain experts in security matters underline the fact that the educational programmes at the Police Academy should provide for completion of the education of these cadres.

The reforms in the organisation, education programmes and supplying of the police structures should be completed by 2006. This process should also result in the professionalisation of the police, which will further imply responsibilities that have not yet been included in the sphere of this sector. This concerns the competencies of border police, which means that the process of expert profiling should certainly be understood as complex and serious.

### 1.5.7 Civil Society and SSR

Civil society in most post-communist or transition countries looks as if it has entered into a stage of renaissance. While the impression exists that civil society is exposed to constant change and development, some parts of society that have a completely contrary notion. Estimations of direct participants within this process are that civil society in post-communist or transition countries reflect on circumstances in other spheres of society. According to involved practitioners, this transition could not be evaluated with higher marks, and some analyses are even more positive.

Development of civil society in Macedonia follows the Humpty Dumpty walk evident in other parts of society. The turbulence that characterised the period after independence significantly marked the political process in Macedonia. Last year's crises additionally contributed to a deeper ethnic and political fragmentation. Civil society couldn't escape being influenced and therefore suffered the same consequences. It could be said that civil society in Macedonia is divided and influenced due to its dependence on the donor community and ignorant attitude of the Government. In both cases the relationship is inappropriate. While the donor community constantly maintains a relationship of financial dependence, relations between civil society and the Government are still unsteady. This situation could be averted if the new Government follows the Programme adopted at the very beginning of the mandate, which includes initiating cooperation with the civil sector.

While we are waiting for the initiative, relations among the NGO community and international donors will attract more attention. In contrast to previous relations, the NGO community in Macedonia has increased as a result of generous international programmes. Some perceived the Macedonian society as a good market for advertising different humanitarian and training programmes, of which a number of them had been previously implemented in other countries. As a result, over 3300 NGOs were registered. Over 200 NGOs presented their programmes on the Second NGOs Market, held in November 2002.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> The official programme and various thematic issues presented at NGOs Market in Macedonia is available on [www.graganskisvet.org](http://www.graganskisvet.org)

The number of NGOs that participated in the Market deserves recognition. It is a good indicator for cursory analysis but it does not improve the reality of civil society. Only one realistic overview of the NGOs Market will be enough to confirm previously critical analysis. Namely, for a large part of the visitors and the public, it remained unclear what was to be sold on the informal/marketing part. The smaller number of visitors with interest in authentic programmes based on the specific requirements of Macedonian society did not find anything innovative. The formal part of the NGO Market was consequently ignored by the public but not by the media. Local NGOs failed to promote the interests of the civil society, which were overshadowed by the search for donations. Failure to define and address the specific interests and needs of Macedonian society has caused the emergence of NGOs of a primarily humanitarian nature. This could result in an almost complete centralisation of the NGOs. Compared to their basic function or with dispersion of international NGOs settled in Macedonia, this presents an unexpected dynamic.

Due to an inappropriate organisational basis and inauthentic programme development, the effectiveness of the NGOs is undermined. According to some observations, most efforts are directed towards advertisement of programmes and sponsor donors, rather than to education and training. Favourite subjects among selected topics include human rights and conflict resolution.

Other remarks in this regard note that the same or similar topics and training programmes are prevalent in most NGOs. Transplanted programmes were sometimes introduced in other cases of post-conflict reconstruction three years before. Because some aspects of human rights protection and conflict resolution dominate the activity of NGOs, they obviously are more concerned with consequences than with reasons for problems they are dealing with. It can be concluded then that the civil sector in Macedonia is not on the right path, nor is its monitoring or preventive function in good proportion to its reactive one.

If we compare the specifics of this situation to the role of the international NGOs in Macedonia the picture will become clearer .

International NGOs in Macedonia are deeply involved in the process of donation provider-recipient and have a patron attitude towards local NGOs. However, they do not provide a monitoring or reactive role within their programmes.

The relationship between local and international NGOs, besides the donor-recipient relationship, is burdened with mutual distrust. If one party considers themselves as local experts with appropriate understanding of local specifics, the other considers them as having sufficient international experience to overcome or solve the problem.

During last year's crisis, a problematic phenomenon emerged representing a retreat from the norms of civil society. Suddenly, NGOs with programmes for conflict resolution were transferred into humanitarian assistance programmes and later into reconstruction programmes.

Analysis on the civilian sector in Macedonia and its programme's interest could be guided from different points. Nevertheless, regarding the role of the civil sector on security and defence issues it would be inappropriate to expect exhaustive analysis. The issue of civil military relations or security sector reform have not been successfully integrated into the programmes of various NGOs in Macedonia. Last year's crisis, apart from a humanitarian point of view, opened up other challenges for civil society concerning security issues. Therefore, some of the NGOs have been provoked to exchange public dialogue and protest over the process of disarmament and amnesty. Media reports have covered civil society dissatisfaction from symbolic disarmament of the armed paramilitary groups and dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in the process of amnesty law. Later, other issues related to individual security in the crisis region, the position of internally displaced people, and dissolution of paramilitary forces occupied the attention of civil society. Most NGOs dealt with the humanitarian aspect of the problems. Questions related to the role of civil society actors on security and defence affairs remained relatively silent.

Bearing in mind the characteristics and level of maturity of the civil society in Macedonia, it is doubtful whether original programmes

targeting defence and security affairs will be promoted. Due to the dependence of civil society actors on donation support, it can be expected that such an issue, if it appeared as a priority in international institution agendas, would be supported by local NGOs. In this case, international assistance is to play a key promoting role in the establishment and capacity building of civil society groups to influence defence and security affairs. It is important that the objects of support are grass roots NGOs and not conference managers. Even more important is supporting local partners in the promotion of the topic, as well as stressing that awareness of such a topic will enlarge the influence of civil society groups over a broader spectrum of society.

### **1.5.8 Conclusion**

Based on this introductory analysis on expert formation, it could be anticipated that enhancing democratic civil-military relations and the success of the process of SSR in Macedonia will depend on a number of factors, among them the availability and capacity of expert formation to support and propel the process. Alongside this is the expressed political will for modification of the security sector according to international and professional standards and principles. It should be noted that within the process genuine needs for reforms should be identified. Experiences of best practice can readily facilitate the process of detecting possible solutions and avoiding the most common traps. But a universal recipe for successful reforms cannot be expected.

The main objective of this introductory analysis was to bring to the attention of the relevant political and academic institutions and the broader public in Macedonia, an issue of democratic and civilian control of the security sector and the need for appropriate expert formation. The analysis provides an outline of the general situation with expert fulfilment in the segments of executive and legislative branches dealing with security sector and an overview of the role and possibilities of civil society to influence the processes relevant to civil-military relations and SSR, in particular the role of NGOs.

In general, it can be concluded that a limited number of experts are capable of professional engagement in specific segments of security sector and that a limited number of experts are incompletely and inaccurately engaged.

The main criticism concerns the assessment of needs from specific expert formation in support of national security strategy and policy, excellence of academic and non-academic educational and training programmes, continuous education and training of civilian and military experts on defence and security issues, and expert profiles.

An initial analysis of the activities of Parliament and its commissions and sectors concerning issues related to defence and security shows that they are treated in an insufficient and inappropriate manner. Parliament and its bodies, due to inappropriate and insufficient expert formation, failed to accomplish most of its functions with reference to defence and security issues (i.e. monitoring, legislative and representative function). The evaluation of expert formation and expert preparedness for their assignments indicates an alarming situation in the structures of Parliament. Actually, there is not a single civilian expert on defence and security issues among parliamentary staff.

Based on this recognition, a deeper, systematic and unified analysis on expert formation and expert requirement is necessary. Furthermore, a survey on the new composition of the Parliament and its agencies would be necessary to identify the needs of additional education or training through formal or informal methods. Although different levels of requirements could be identified, this process should include members of Parliament, members of parliamentary delegations, members of commissions and parliamentary staff.

It should be emphasised that short studies and working visits in relevant institutions, or conference and/or seminar participation are the most appropriate forms to attract the interest of parliamentarians. Concerning parliamentary staff, specialisation and training is an appropriate model alongside the possibility for postgraduate studies. The Institute for Defence and Peace Studies in Skopje offers such models.

The need for civil experts in the area of national security or defence was anticipated and supported as having great importance in most academic circles. But the complex situation that followed the act of independence has recognised in the first instance the need to situate the Army as the basis for the country's sovereignty. The civilian defence experts were not considered of greater importance for creating the defence system in Macedonia. This attitude influenced the interest and planning of the needs for civilian experts in the security sector in general and the Ministry of Defence in particular. As a result, civilian experts on defence issues were constantly educated and promoted within the civilian system for higher education, but have had serious employment problems.

The problem of experts' assignment at the Ministry of Interior can be recognised by the following two elements which highlight possible directions for analysis. On the one hand, it was noted that the estimation for expert preparedness is not recognised as a priority activity. On the other hand, it can be concluded that not enough attention is paid to the profile of the type of personnel that would be appropriate for new requirements, except acting in multi-ethnic surroundings. Therefore, the issue of expert's assignment and preparedness within the Ministry of Interior is considered extremely important and at the same time a complex matter.

One aspect of this complex matter is professionalism, education and training. Another aspect concerns ethnic representation and acting in a multi-ethnic environment, and thirdly the organisational and efficient restructuring and decentralisation of the Ministry of Interior.

The organisational reforms, education programmes and completion of police structures should be reached by 2006. This process should also enhance the professionalism of the police, which will also include responsibilities that have yet to be completely in the sphere of this sector until now. This concerns the competencies of border police, which reveals expert profiling to be a complex and serious process.

The analysis of the civilian sector in Macedonia and its programme's interest could be guided from different angles. But from the perspective of the role of the civil sector on security and defence issues it would be

inappropriate to expect abundant analysis. It is clear that the issue of civil military relations or security sector reform has not successfully infiltrated into programmes of various NGOs in Macedonia.

Bearing in mind the nature and maturity of civil society in Macedonia, it is doubtful that some original and well-driven programmes, initiating the issue of impact on defence and security affairs, will be promoted. Because of the high or complete dependence of civil society actors on donation support, it is expected that such an issue of priority among some international institution agendas would be supported by local NGOs. In this case, international assistance must play a key promoting role in the establishment and capacity building of civil society groups influencing defence and security affairs. It is important to reinforce that the objects of support should be grass roots and not conference management NGOs. Even more important is the support of local partners in promoting the topic as well as to acknowledge the awareness that such a topic will enlarge and strengthen the influence of civil society groups over a broader spectrum of society.



## **GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION IN MOLDOVA**

### **1.6 Assessment of Good Governance and Security Sector Expert Formation**

#### **1.6.1 Introduction**

In seeking more efficient governance in the sphere of human development it is necessary and very important to involve, alongside other key factors, transparency, accountability and participation in the decision-making process of the population. When a society such as that of the Republic of Moldova has chosen democracy as the governing system, political, social, and economical priorities along with economic transition, institutional reforms and human resources development, become contradictory aspects for dialogues, discussions and consensus among various social groups.

Because the ambiguity of transition generates different values in different layers of society, the governing process gains a more open character. This means that governance should be associated with offering vulnerable social layers of society equal possibilities to express their wishes and desires, so that they can be sure their problems are heard by decision-makers. Also, material and financial recourses for reconstruction and development would be allocated more efficiently and in their favour. The comprehensiveness of good governing rises from the joining of all above-mentioned factors, which present the compound part of the democratic process of human resource development.

Concerning ‘good governance’ in the area of defence and state security, it is extremely important that civilians and military possess required knowledge on security and defence matters at strategic level, and know how to work together successfully. However, that is only a necessary

attribute but not sufficient for good governance. Really important for good governance is that both civilians and the military work closely together regarding state defence problems.

The following research will present the education and training situation of both civilian and military personnel, the status of the recruiting and promotion system, and how the force ministries and Parliament as well as parliamentary staff cooperate together.

### **1.6.2 Military Education and Training**

Unlike most of the former Soviet republics, in which efficient military units on their territory smoothly transformed into national armed forces, in most cases the Republic of Moldova accepted under its jurisdiction military units in which officers and petty officers refused to make a pledge to Moldova and to serve in the National Army. For instance, the airforce regiment consisted of only 18 technical officers and no pilots; the artillery regiment contained only seven officers.

Despite the fact that by the end of 1992 most of the highly qualified officers of Moldavian origin returned to the country and actively joined the process of creating the National Army, the shortage of staff was nevertheless extremely acute. For example, a large portion of officers faced language problems, due to insufficient knowledge of the military and technical terminology in Romanian. The majority of the officers continued to maintain a Soviet military mentality, skills, and attitude to the service, which was incompatible with the new reality. However, in most cases, officers made efforts to meet the requirements imposed by the new situation.

Moreover, the remaining military units from the former Soviet Army were absolutely not suitable for Moldova from the following points of view: applicability, personnel and organisational structure and their location. The situation required not only a reform of the army, similar to other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, but also the creation of a National Army from scratch, by using only material and technical capacities of former military units.

According to the Law of Armed Forces, the military's main goal is to protect the state in case of military aggression, and to ensure the inviolability of the country's frontiers and airspace.

The Armed Forces were organised based on the following principles:

- keeping the Armed Forces actively strengthened by conscripts and enlisted personnel;
- preparing a military reserve based on compulsory military service performed by the country's citizens;
- a unified and centralised management;
- welfare and legal protection assured by the state to the military personnel;
- education of personnel in accordance to the spirit of patriotism, and compliance with the law and democratic ideas.

One of the principles of National Army building is education and training to instil high professional skills and a spirit of patriotism. To evaluate the prevailing situation in this area, a session of the Military Council (in Moldova we call it Military College) of the Ministry of Defence was conducted in December 1995, with the participation of the President of the Republic of Moldova as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The session was significant for a variety of reasons. The session included the presentation of an annual report on military education and training, and scrupulously analysed the entire period of the state's process of building the defence system. Further, strategic problems concerning the future development of the state's body were discussed.

In his speech the President of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, declared the following:

The army is making its contribution in building Moldova as a state by way of establishing the relations of cooperation with armies of different states. I appreciate the positive participation of the National Army in the framework of the PfP [Partnership for Peace] programme, which includes, first of all, granting the necessary assistance for personnel education and training, consulting, and the exchange of experience for conducting peacekeeping operations.

At the same time the President mentioned: 'It does not mean that Moldova has any intention to join the NATO military block, as secessionist leaders from the so-called Transdnistrian Republic of Moldova accuse us in a speculative manner.' In this regard, M. Snegur has emphasised that according to the Constitution the Republic of Moldova is a neutral state, which does not allow the accommodation of foreign military troops or military bases on its territory and is therefore unable to join any military alliances.

The important conclusion made by the Military College was related to the fact that the Ministry of Defence had produced the basic principles of national military art that corresponded to the real military-political situation in the region, to the state's economical status and to the military policy promoted by state leadership. To achieve this goal, a number of scientific conferences, seminars, workshops and other activities concerning that topic were conducted.

Since then, the training process at platoon and company level has improved significantly. Further, a number of military applications on the field and on maps have been conducted that contributed to the improvement of the commanders and headquarters ability to plan combat actions and to conduct military actions at company level.

(a) *The Structure and Curriculum for Education of the Professional Military Personnel*

A robust educational structure has a vital impact upon the army's capability to defend the country, because only well-educated and trained military personnel are able to conduct successful military missions. Therefore, the National Army developed an education and training system. From the very beginning the system has been similar to the former Soviet system, but now deviations are noticeable.

**Educational system**

*Tactical level*

*Operation level*

*Strategic level*

- The US war college
- Alexandru cel Bun Military Institute: special courses (in progress)
- Army Military education centre
- Marshal Centre
- Brigade Military education centre
- CIS Military Academy
- Military Institute
- Alexandru cel Bun
- Defence Resources Management Institute, USA
- Courses in Western countries
- Foreign military institutes
- The Academy of General Staff, Russia
- Civilian institutes and colleges

*At the tactical level* there were and still are institutions that prepare military personnel:

- *at the squad level* – squad leaders for technical maintenance units were prepared in the army-training centre. Squad leaders for infantry units were prepared in every brigade. For this purpose every infantry-motorised brigade has its own training centre. The training lasted 3–5 months (depending on the specialty). Squad leaders were taken from the conscripts and their term of service was one and a half years. Now, the term has been reduced to one year.
- *platoon and company leaders* were prepared up to 2002 in the Alexandru cel Bun Military College, the only military educational institution in Moldova. The first graduation took place in 1995 when 72 lieutenants successfully graduated.


Until 2001, the Military College had faculties that prepared officers for infantry, artillery and communication units. Due to unattractiveness of the military service (low payment, ‘foggy’ future prospects for both the Army and officers, shortage of houses, and better opportunities to make a career in civilian businesses) the National Army sees itself in real danger to remain without lower and middle-level officers if such a tendency is maintained. According to statistics, no more than 50 per cent of graduates remain in military units after one or two years of service. In September 2002 this educational facility became the Alexandru cel Bun Military Institute. Its objectives are the preparation of junior officers for the National Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ troops, Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops. Another source of platoon and company leaders is provided by officer corps from civilian colleges and universities, which offers 20–30 individuals to the Army per year. However, their quality is a little lower, and they basically serve in logistics and technical maintenance units.

- Some extra company leaders or their equivalent, the National Army, do receive non-commissioned officers, once they obtain necessary tactical knowledge on special courses in Military


College. But that source is insufficient – approximately up to ten persons per year.

- Existing commanders for battalions and regiments were educated in the Soviet Regime. The new generation of that commanding level will be prepared at special courses at the Alexandru cel Bun Military Institute. Courses will last from six to eight months.

The Alexandru cel Bun Military College curriculum has the following distribution:



The Alexandru cel Bun Military Institute will have the following curriculum:



In any case, subjects that teach special courses designated for future military service maintain the biggest proportion of academic hours. But in the Military Institute the proportion of hours for fundamental subjects and general culture becomes a little larger than in college, which allows for the preparation of more educated future officers.

So far, the system of education and curriculum in Military College has produced fairly good officers. According to brigade and battalion commander reports conducted during tactical exercises in the MoD with young officers, Military College graduates possessed better professional qualities than lieutenants from military schools, Romanian colleges and CIS states.

At the same time, the Military Institute faces problems concerning an insufficient number of faculties and the improvement of technical and scientific research according to modern requirements.



Concerning civilian institutes that prepare officers mainly for technical maintenance units and subunits, military faculties provide the necessary knowledge to become an engineer officer. The ratio of hours in those institutes designated to the military subjects makes up only for 6–7 per cent of all academic hours. That is not sufficient to prepare a good officer.

*The operational level* – the level between tactical and strategic level – consists of brigade commanders and chiefs of departments in the MOD and Main Staff of the National Army. The operational level of the chain of command presupposes the conducting of military operations in large formation such as a brigade plus reinforcement units and higher.

So far, this level has been occupied with officers trained during the Soviet era. Almost all brigade commanders and chiefs of departments in the MOD and Main Staff did graduate work at different kind of military academies in the former Soviet Union (equivalent to postgraduate schools in the USA and other Western states). Unfortunately, they are getting older and no longer meet the requirements of the system. Therefore, they need to be replaced by younger personnel. Even today, officers of the operational level of chain of command are prepared with the assistance of Western states, Russia and the Ukraine. On average, 7–10 persons are educated in different countries. The curriculum in that case depends on the educational facility.

At the same time in the MOD, ideas to organise special courses for the chain of command level are being discussed. However, this is a problem for the near future.

*At the strategic level* – the National Army only had one person who graduated from the General Staff's Military Academy, the only educational facility that prepared a strategic level of chain of command in the former Soviet Union. The National Army needed that level because the Main Staff of the National Army is responsible for conducting military operations by Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova and during peacetime is responsible for its readiness. Those responsibilities already concern the strategic level. One has to know

what kind of Armed Forces to establish, what structure they need, how to conduct operations and so on and so forth.

The only possibility of educating high-ranking officers of flag officers was and still is the education overseas. On average, two persons per year are educated abroad. The courses are given at the US War College, the General Staff's Military Academy in Russia, the US Postgraduate School and the Marshall Centre.

The high-ranking officers of the strategic level actually communicate with the civilian-ministerial staff, cabinet, parliamentary staff and parliamentarians, presidential staff and the President. The MOD does have that level of officers, and continues to educate officers abroad.

During 1992–97, a group of 32 officers was educated in military academies, courses in the USA, France, Great Britain and Germany. Currently, a total of 89 military persons study overseas, including all educational levels.

(b) *Career Structure and Promotion System*

The military career structure is very simply organised and similar to that of different other countries.

*First level*

Minister of Defence (civilian or military) (Three-Star General)

*Second level*

Deputy Minister of Defence (Two-Star General)

*Third level*

Brigade commander, Chief of Department in MOD and Main Staff of the National Army (MSNA) (One-Star General, Colonel)

*Fourth level*

Regiment Commander, Chiefs of Section in MOD and MSNA (Colonel)

*Fifth level*

Separate Battalion and Battalion Commander, Chief of Section in department and equivalent (Lt. Colonel)

*Sixth level*

Deputy Battalion Commander and equivalent (Major)

*Seventh level*

Company Commander and equivalent (Captain)

*Eighth level*

Platoon Commander and equivalent (First and Second Lieutenant)

It was suggested that the promotion system should be as simple in its structure. The Regulation on Military Service by Soldiers, Sergeants and Officers of the Armed Forces, adopted on December 1994 by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, clearly states the promotion policy performed in Moldova. The regulation specifies terms for every military rank: Lieutenant – 2 years, First Lieutenant – 3 years, Captain – 3 years, Major – 4 years, and Lieutenant Colonel – 5 years. The term has not been established for colonels and generals. Unfortunately, the regulation presumes different exceptions in ranking promotion, which allows the promotion of officers in advance of their terms, sometimes based on personal loyalty to decision-makers. This tendency brings significant damage to the morale of the officer corps.

A more difficult situation is presented by the promotion issue. Despite the fact that the regulation clearly determines the sequence of promotion, the statement very often is violated. Again, the prevailing situation allows for the promotion of officers concerning their loyalty to superior officers and not according to their professional qualities.

(c) *Education and Training for New Missions and Force Structures*

Due to new obligations of the Republic of Moldova and participation in military activities in the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP) it became obvious that the National Army must have military personnel ready to accomplish missions during exercises and, mostly important, in future peacekeeping missions under UNO aegis.

As previously mentioned, the officer staff for the participation in peacekeeping operations has been prepared overseas in different Western countries. This process was enacted in 1993 when the first group of officers studied Western military science, NATO military procedures, staff standards, rules of engagement etc.

In 1997 the process of substantiation of the necessity of peacekeeping battalion started, and in 1998 that battalion was formed. The commanding officer and the major part of battalion's officers were and still are in their process of education in the United States.

Since 1997 the MOD actively participates in international military exercises where officers from different branches of the National Army and Main Staff develop and improve their ability to implement missions in the framework of the peacekeeping battalion in multinational peacekeeping brigades. At the same time, certain officers participated in exercises in the international headquarters. It is known that they performed duties in international headquarters fairly well. In conclusion, Moldova has a prepared officer's staff ready to carry out duties at high level, both in peacekeeping battalion and in international headquarters.

### **1.6.3 Education and Training for Civilians in Defence and Security Sector**

(a) *Training and Education of Civilian Staff, Attendance at Military Schools and Courses*

According to the Law on Preparing the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova for State Defence, adopted by the Parliament on July 2002, the

military education of the civilian population for defence purposes should be conducted on a voluntary basis. This system of preliminary education can be divided in two parts: the first part concerns the preparation of technical specialists for the Army, and is designed for the private and sergeant level. The second is designated for the level of junior officers. This level is prepared in institutes and universities with a special military faculty. So far, there have been two universities in Moldova that educate people on defence issues. Those are: Medical University, which prepares military medical staff, and the Pedagogical University, which prepares junior officers staff for infantry. In 2003–04 two more educational facilities, Polytechnic University and Transmissions Academy, will be ready to prepare junior technical officers.

However, those facilities only prepare the tactical level of the chain of command. When civilians become decision-makers, take over the cabinet or become a minister – for instance finance minister – in the best case their knowledge on defence issues remains at tactical level, in the worst case at zero level. Of course, self-education should not be neglected but it definitely is not enough.

In order to increase understanding of military problems among civilians in charge, annual seminars have been organised with the assistance of the US Government. The seminars mainly discussed the issue of the management of defence resources and questions related to this topic. Some parliamentarians, chief of departments in civilian ministries and their staff attended those seminars. The seminars can be considered significant in achieving a common understanding of defence building and the distribution of resources funds.

In addition to the seminars and workshops, some foreign educational facilities educate civilians on defence issues. Every year military officers and civilians from the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Economy are educated through special courses at the Marshal Centre, where they receive necessary knowledge regarding the management of state resources, foreign affairs, defence issues and their interconnections. The Marshal Centre periodically organises seminars on defence planning and economic analysis, where civilian and military officers from Moldova participate. Therefore, Western educational facilities are often

the only educational opportunity for high-level civilians and military officers.

(b) *Civil Service System: Recruiting, Selection, Promotion, and Dismissal*

The civil service system maintains a similar structure for every ministry or separate department.

*First level*

Minister, Separate Department and equivalent  
(State Counsellor of the Republic of Moldova (RM) first class – equivalent to Three-Star General)

*Second level*

Deputy Minister and equivalent  
(State Counsellor of the RM second class – equivalent to Two-Star General)

*Third level*

Chiefs of Department in Ministry and equivalent (State Counsellor of the RM third – equivalent to One-Star General)

*Fourth level*

Chiefs of Section in Ministry and equivalent (State Counsellor first class – equivalent to Colonel)

*Fifth level*

Main specialist and equivalent (State Counsellor second – equivalent to Lt. Colonel)

*Sixth level*

Leading specialist and equivalent (State Counsellor third class – equivalent to major)

*Seventh level*

Specialist and equivalent (Counsellor first class – equivalent to captain)

*Eighth level*

Junior specialist and equivalent (Counsellor second and third class – equivalent to First and Second Lieutenant)

The promotion system is similar to the system being maintained in the MoD, when the promotion of work experience, education and aptitude is considered. Unfortunately, the civilian promotion system allows for the promotion of people not according to their professional qualities, but according to their personal loyalty to superiors. The civilian situation has an even more significant scale than in the Army. Some posts in the civilian sector are subject to substitution on a competition basis. For instance, this tendency protects educational facilities from occasional persons in leadership. But legally established and open criteria for advancement and promotion, universal for all public bodies in Moldova, are not yet established and are subject for further development.

#### **1.6.4 Parliament and Parliamentary**

Because the final decision of the state budget issue belongs to the Parliament, which means the resource allocation for state defence, it is of vital importance that parliamentarians understand the importance of correct defence infrastructure building. Of course, not every parliamentarian has to have full knowledge on state defence and security matters, but every one of them should have the possibility to receive necessary expert information.

Parliament and Security Committee do not have a special staff on the state's defence and security issue. But some parliamentarians do have a military background and are familiar with that problem. In addition, as mentioned above, seminars that have been held in the framework of the MOD provided extra knowledge and updated their experience. In the decision-making process parliamentarians use assistance from experts of the ministries involved in defence and security matters – MOD, Ministry

of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Border Guard Troops and so on. In addition, the opinion of experts from different NGOs is occasionally used. Due to this fact, more people are involved in the decision-making process.

At the same time the possibility of using external expertise in defence problems has not been excluded, but Moldova has not made use of this option so far.

### **1.6.5 Conclusions**

1. In the Republic of Moldova there are premises for fairly effective civil-military relations in defence and security affairs to be established. In spite of the fact that civilians (civil ministerial and parliamentary staff) do not have full competence in military matters, the decision-making process is going on in a positive direction by way of using different kinds of expertise. This is the cheapest form of decision-making process, and it is explained by a backward economy, insufficient resources and lack of educational facilities for high-ranking civil and military officers.
2. The army does have prepared officers ready to implement their knowledge and experience in the establishment of state defence and peacekeeping missions.
3. The personnel management system, though far from perfect, does allow the promotion of officers according to their experience, knowledge and professional qualities. A clearly determined criterion for promotion in organic law should eliminate some of its imperfections.



## **Julian Bujoreanu**

# **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN ROMANIA**

### **1.7 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

Talking about security sector matters means talking about the main options of any country in the world. In this respect, Romania is no exception. One of the most important objectives of its policy-maker leaders is to ensure national security at the highest level, in accordance with our resources and needs. As a basis for the assessment of the necessary activities that have to be developed to ensure national security, security sector expert formation extends participation in Europe-wide security sector reform. This is important because the contemporary international system is currently characterised both by changes and continuity in the socio-political processes and economic relationships that constitute the foundation of state and non-state interactions. Post-Cold War *fin de siècle* international politics, rather than producing a new era of global peace, economic prosperity and symmetrical interdependence, are instead characterised by a widening scope and intensity of geopolitical fluidity and socio-economic effervescence which tend to undermine state sovereignty.

In a global environment, weak economies, internal tensions, external impositions and immature civil societies presently constitute some of the most formidable sources of assault on the decision-making autonomy and on the development of democratic practices in former communist states. New and unprecedented concepts appeared in describing the international arena, such as the internationalisation of external intervention, the theories of cultural globalisation, or the ethical liberal theories on international policy. The boundary between internal affairs and foreign policies of a country tends to be vague and the influence of non-state actors is increasing, along with the reconfiguration of the

classical world centres of power. The long expected multipolar system has not yet emerged and the present unipolar system is declining.

### **1.7.1 A Problem of Definition**

An explanation of how a country should ensure its own security in this so-called 'post-international system' (Rosenau), presents a difficult task for the main state authority bodies. Because of internal and external pressure, limited resources (generated by the absence of a viable system of alliances as well as an unpredictable environment) the Security Strategy is forced to take into account a large area of options and scenarios in order to evaluate correctly the level of security a country is capable of achieving.

First, let us generally define the meaning of national security. Many studies developed different theories on national and international security, starting with the definition of actors and concepts of power.

Some theories compare national with individual security. This approach ignores the often used distinction between internal and external dimensions of the concept. Other systematic approaches structure security on different levels (individual, national, sub-regional, regional, global) which continuously interact, adapting old theories to a new reality of globalisation with its consequences at micro and macro societies/levels.

Since domestic and international developments are dominated by uncertainty, strategists continually have to re-examine the security environment, goals, strategies, available resources and tools needed to achieve stated objectives. In this perspective, the term strategy could be defined not only as a link between ends and means or a 'game plan', but also as a subsequent, constant effort to identify and correct imbalances among key variables. The national security strategy reflects on the structure of international relations – not merely a country's sense of who its allies and rivals are but also its strengths, weaknesses and the capacity of its political body to accept challenges.

Moreover, conceiving security as a purely military matter in a world where most of the daily interactions between different actors are non-military would be a mistake. The political, diplomatic, economic, environmental and legal aspects are major elements of any long-term strategy to ensure the country's security. The interaction among these dimensions was also an object of research for academics, which started from the question of transformation of military into economic or diplomatic means after the end of the Cold War. To give an example, Susan Strange wrote about the concept of structural power, involving the system of state power in which the economy could be used as an instrument of deterrence in a successful manner. Consequently, the classical constraints of the military become unnecessary (case of Japan). Switching from military to economic power, or vice versa, still presents a problem which is under debate.

### **1.7.2 Romania's National Security Strategy**

The existence of an integrated defence planning system in Romania, compatible with the North Atlantic Alliance system, ensures a present overview on the defence resources allotting process, connected with the main goals of the national defence policy.

The system of defence planning at national level was established through the Law 63/2000, modifying the Government Ordinance no. 52/1998, which set up the volume, structure and manner of allotting natural, human, material and financial resources for implementing the fundamental objectives of Romania's national security and military defence.

The law also presents the fundamental institutional chain of decision in this field. In accordance with article 2 of the 'Ordinance on Romanian National Defence Planning', the Romanian Parliament, President and Government, as well as other public institutions that assume in accordance with the law, security and national defence responsibilities, base the defence planning on political and strategic decisions and options.

The place where National Security Strategy broadly occupies the planning system, arises from the main steps of the defence planning process:

- identification of values and national interests, as well as their risks and threats;
- defining national security objectives, policies for their achievement; counteracting the identified risks and threats;
- establishing state bodies responsibilities in the area of national defence and security;
- determining the required resources and their allocation for the accomplishment of security goals

The main documents issued in the framework of the national defence planning system are the following:

- Romania's National Security Strategy – fundamental document that underlies the defence planning at the national level; it has been put to Parliament by the Romanian President, within three months of when he was mandated; its evaluation scope covers four years, with a long-term view. The strategy establishes the national interests, risks and threats, the defence policy objectives, as well as the ways of acting in order to ensure national security.
- The White Paper of the Government represents an elaborated document with the idea of implementing the provisions of the Romanian National Security Strategy. The White Paper establishes detailed departmental strategies, including the main objectives and tasks of the institutions responsible for ensuring national security and defence, as well as the resources (human, material, financial etc.) that need to be allotted on an annual basis.
- On the basis of Romania's National Security Strategy and the White Paper, the Ministry of National Defence issues the

Romanian Military Strategy. This document contains the major military policy objectives and options of the Romanian State for the period the Romanian National Security Strategy is valid. The document establishes: forces structure, missions, organisation, procurement, level of training and readiness, logistic, support, and infrastructure necessary to the military system in order to achieve the national security objectives, as well as the concept of training and engagement in military operations.

In order to promote and defend its fundamental interests, Romania will act by political, judicial, diplomatic, economic, social, military, public relations and intelligence means, as well as by the cooperation with other states and international organisations. Each field of activity is presented in the security strategy with its specific main goals or long-term plans.

Each of the main modalities to achieve national security represents an entire chapter of our broad policy. Some of them need to be analysed here.

In the field of foreign policy, Romania has already been deeply involved in the creation of a European system of cooperative security, based on what was called 'interlocking institutions'. Joining NATO and EU, supporting the development of OSCE initiatives during our presidency, strengthening the subregional networks of cooperation through participation in different Southeast European bodies, and envisaging a process of eliminating in the current security deficit by diplomatic means were different steps in the total process. Without an umbrella of collective defence, Romania could presently face major difficulties in case of a massive attack on its borders.

A long-term policy of integration in the European space is an adequate response to the challenges of globalisation and the risks of fragmentation which has appeared in the Balkans and the CIS territory over the last years. The 'crossroad' metaphor which is used so often to describe the geopolitics of Romania could represent not only a potential risk, but also an opportunity, considering the new Eurasian transportation and energetic infrastructure projects.

In the field of national defence, the key factors of integration and regional stability are preceded by the optimisation of our defence capabilities to present the three main objectives. The main directions identified in order to fulfil these objectives are as follows:

- development of the capabilities of fighting structures;
- ensuring the necessary defence resources;
- development of human resources, intensifying the training of military personnel;
- modernisation of the military education;
- improvement of the procurement system;
- restructuring of the defence industry;
- strengthening the relations to the civil society;
- keeping tight relations to the armed forces of other states and international organisations.

The combination and balance of those modalities serves as a basis to ensure national security. Another main objective lies in the search of necessary resources for the successful implementation of single steps of the strategy. Furthermore, strategists have to focus on national objectives in order to prevent possible mismatches among the resources available and the associated objectives. A document of that kind should not be a declaration of intents, or a beautiful illustration of what could be, but a clear and consistent concept of what the survival and prosperity of a country signifies.

A well-defined security strategy represents the basic requirement for an accomplishment of the core values of the Romanian people in advancing our leadership goals in the world.

### **1.7.3 Identification and Assessment of Needs**

As the analysis deepens, one can see that, based on the core concepts of the very basic documents ruling our national security sector, one of the main provisions that can be taken separately and developed as another

main topic in this field is that of the training of the people acting, working, dealing or planning anything in this sector.

The very basics of national security are taught at the service level academies. Here, the future members of the Romanian military organisation learn what is understood by national security, how it can be achieved, what the main structure of the Ministry of Defence is, what activities are to fulfil the security sector objectives etc. The following subject matters serve as tools to accomplish this task: Defence Policy, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, Defence Resources Management etc. Most students find their way to those studies through some basic social sciences courses such as: psychology, sociology, ethics, pedagogy etc.

Later, at a different stage of their career, the Romanian officers pass through a series of long-, medium- or short-term courses, based on their career interest and/or leaders.

The highest level of training courses in the field of national security, as far as the Romanian Ministry of National Defence is concerned, are offered by the National Defence College (NDC), the Partnership for Peace Regional Training Centre (PPRTC), and the Defence Resources Management Regional Centre (DRMRC). A short presentation of each of those institutions is given in Appendix 1.2.

To ensure total transparency and civil control over the military, all three institutions provide highly qualified training in the fields of their curricula for several categories of personnel. That includes Parliament and parliamentary staffers; political secretaries of the ministries of defence, the interior and justice; intelligence agencies; leading representatives of the executive; representatives of civil society; journalists and non-governmental experts (working in NGOs), both Romanian and from abroad.

The National Defence College educates people at the highest level of training in the field of national security. The core subject matters of the curriculum mostly deal with the concept, documents, structure and development of national security itself, both from an internal and external (accumulated with foreign opinions) point of view.

The other two centres of which the PPRTC was already accredited, whereas the DRMRC is on its way to accreditation, are both members of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of the Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes. In this respect, their curricula consist of different percentages of specific topics concerning national security and applicable strategies. The two institutions deliver training at the same level as the NDC. The length of courses varies according to the main qualifications of the participants.

In conclusion, there are courses ranging from one month (RDRMC) to one year (NDC) in time, both at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Different degrees are offered in the field of national security topics, starting at 8 per cent for the short course offered by the RDRMC, and 100 per cent in the case of NDC.

Meanwhile, there still exist other forms of training in the security sector field. Those seminars, held at the national and international levels, take place on a non-periodic basis in different locations whenever the situation requires. They usually last for one week and consist of a series of lectures and discussions, which are delivered by well-known experts, both Romanians and foreign.

There also exist periodic long- and medium-term courses, which offer initial training. Further, enhanced training is offered through non-periodic seminars and other activities where Romanian experts are involved. Since the latter activities take place on a non-periodic level, they cannot be considered enhanced forms of training. In my opinion, a continuous formation of experts that graduated from one of the previously mentioned institutions should be based on a regular/periodic (quarterly) training system. The curricula should consist of very short seminars and courses (one or two weeks), which are to be delivered in a specific location. The more neutral the place, the better. That way each participant has equal opportunity. A series of such courses would update all current issues of discussion at the international level and enhance the abilities of the participating experts in identifying, assessing, and negotiating any issue of importance for the national security sector. This type of training offers several advantages, most of them dealing with the



enhanced level of communication among the members of the national and international security community.

I could list further details on the issue of implementing this specific form of education into practice, but there is no room for me to additionally document this topic in this report.

#### **1.7.4 Possibilities for Expert Formation**

Appendix 1.2 details ideas on the general objectives, types of courses, graduation papers and the duration of the above mentioned courses.

#### **1.7.5 Recommendations**

There is a certain need for future training of young officers and civilians in the field of national security, due to Romania's evolution towards the NATO and the country's involvement in a great number of international activities. Therefore, a training and enhancement system for experts in the national security field, both at a national and international level, should be enacted as soon as possible.

As previously described, there is a possibility of filling the identified gap in the continuous formation of experts. However, one should think twice before coming to a decision when choosing the course of action. We should carefully monitor the people involved in the formation of experts and make sure that they are equidistant and European, with no connection to local parties and/or other affiliations.

Furthermore, there is a need to predict what future training stages should contain and how to prepare students who start right after graduation. In my opinion, the training periods resemble a cooperative teaching activity where teacher and student develop together the modelling and simulation of real-life situations.

I do not question the work and presence of foreign advisors at different levels, not only at the MoND level. I just ask them to better administer

the improvement and understanding of the basic concepts of Romanian national security in the wider European and international context.

A diversification of the national security forms of training would be beneficial to anybody in this area. The more modes of education we use (internship, advanced distributed learning etc), the closer related and more cooperative experts we will get in terms of international cooperation.

In conclusion, this type of training should be offered by both national and international experts and for both national and international expert teams. It should serve as a tool to remove experts from their familiar environment once every two years, expose them to new and different situations and force them to adjust to unusual situations and to apply their knowledge to problem-solving processes. According to any scientific theory of pedagogy, this strategy would prove most useful and be a great benefit to any country investing in this training.

I hereby state that everything I have said so far is based on my personal opinion only and has not been influenced by any other person. However, I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues in the Romanian MoND: cpt. Dorin Moldovan and cpt. Mihai Iancu.


## **References**

- Bujoreanu, Iulian (2000) 'The Restructuring Process of the Higher Military Studies in the Romanian Armed Forces'. Final paper at the Economic Organisation Management postgraduate course, Brasov, 2000.
- General Staff – 'Romanian Armed Forces – Strategic Vision 2010'.
- Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History (1999), *Rebuilding the Armed Forces for the XXI Century*, (Bucharest, 1999).
- Larry L. Watts (ed.) (2002) *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, (Centre for Romanian Studies, Iasi), 2002.
- Romanian Central Public Institutions Guide (1997), *The Blue Book of the Democracy*, (Bucharest, 1997).
- Romanian National Security Strategy* White Paper of the Government.

# APPENDIX 1.1


## ANNEX No 1

### THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING



Age Stages of training Structure of training The institution where training takes place

**THE NETWORK OF MILITARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR SUBORDINATION**



## APPENDIX 1.2

### A *The Academy for Higher Military Studies*

*Type:* institution of higher education.

*Aim:* to upgrade officer training in various fields by means of postgraduate studies.

*Objectives:*

- To form joint service staff and HQ officers through courses for MD in military sciences
- To improve the operational-strategic ability for the strategic and joint-force levels through postgraduate courses
- To train doctorates in military science

*Graduation:*

- Postgraduate diploma
- Attendance certificate for refresher postgraduate and specialised courses
- PhD in military science (diploma)

*Duration:*

- 2 years for advanced studies
- Up to 6 months for advanced and specialised post-graduate courses
- 4–6 years for non-resident PhD studies

B *The National Defence College*

*Objectives:*

- To prepare military and civilian defence management specialists
- To provide political and military training for decision-making personnel in public administration, political parties, armed forces, media, independent institutions etc.
- To develop capacities for political, military and geostrategic analysis and decision-making in the context of Romania's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures

*Graduation:*

- Certificate of attendance, after the candidate has presented his or her paper in a public *viva voce* session

*Duration:*

- 6 months

C *The Training Centre for Human Resources Management Personnel*

*Objectives:*

- To upgrade and specialise teaching and command personnel in military education and human resources management
- To conduct scientific research in the fields of human resource management and military education
- To coordinate student training within the departments of teaching staff training in the institutions of higher military education

*Types of courses:*

- Advanced postgraduate courses on education management
- Postgraduate courses for teaching staff training
- Advanced courses on human resource recruitment and selection
- Advanced and specialised courses on human resource management
- Basic and advanced courses for office management and computerisation specifically designed for human resources management

*Graduation:*

- Certificate of attendance for postgraduate, advanced, and special courses
- Certificate of completion; graduated from the department of teaching staff training

*Duration:*

- Up to 4 months
- 1-2 weeks, for office courses

D *The PfP Regional Training Centre*

*Objectives:*

To improve the training of military and civilian personnel in operations, defence planning, development of joint military operations, multinational peace-support operations, as well as civilian-military cooperation during campaigns by using NATO command general staff procedures.

*Types of courses:*

- Advanced courses on NATO-compatible command and general staff procedures for land-force brigades
- Advanced courses on joint command and general staff procedures and multinational operations
- Advanced courses on general staff activity

*Graduation:*

- Certificate of attendance

*Duration:*

- 8–14 weeks, advanced courses, command and general staff procedures
- 2–3 weeks, advanced and guidance courses on military operations (multinational operations planning)



E *The Regional Centre for Defence Resource Management*

*Objectives:*

To provide and improve military and civilian personnel training in defence planning, defence resource management, and technical as well as logistical systems.

*Types of courses:*

- Advanced postgraduate courses for leading personnel
- Postgraduate courses for specialists

*Graduation:*

- Certificate of completion for postgraduate courses

*Duration:*

- 4-6 weeks for leading personnel
- 11-14 weeks for specialists

## **Miroslav Hadzic**

# **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN SERBIA**

## **1.8 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

### **1.8.1 How Are the Different Experts Prepared for Their Tasks and Assignments – and How Well?**

No exact data exists in FRY about the number of experts on security and defence issues. The Centre for Civil-Military Relations will prepare a questionnaire which will show what has been done until now and what will be further done in the field of security sector education. Over the last few years, many foreign experts in Yugoslavia have dealt with this topic.

The federal and republic assemblies have committees for defence and security, but those are not specialised services. Members of committees are also members of Parliament. They are politicians, not experts – they lack specific knowledge and a professional background. Also, they do not have permanent expert support services.

The President of FRY has an advisor for security and defence, but there is no evidence of his participation in the proposal for security sector reform. Also, the MoD has specialised services, but the public is not informed about their activities in this process.

In civil society, the growth of interest in defence and security sector is noticeable, but a lack of experts in this area still exists. Only one NGO (Centre for Civil-Military Relations) in FRY systematically deals with this topic.

There are only a few journalists who specialise in defence and security topics. The majority of journalists observe this topic on a daily basis.

Many of them do not have an opportunity to attend specialised courses. The Centre for Civil-Military Relations, in cooperation with the Media Centre, organised courses on this theme three years ago. The Media Centre will organise training courses for journalists in 2003. One part of the training will be defence and security issues.

### **1.8.2 What Courses Would Be Needed?**

It is necessary to create a specialised programme that will include, among others:

- Security integration of FRY in the Euro-Atlantic community
- Budget planning and control of budget
- Conversion of the military industry
- Training for work on conditions of democratic control and oversight

Participants in courses will be Member of Parliament, parliamentary staff, representatives of the MoD and the Yugoslav Army, members of political parties, NGO activists, journalists and students.

### **1.8.3 What Possibilities for Expert Formation Do Exist?**

There is no precise insight into specialised educational programmes in this field. As far as has been known over the last year, the Centre for European Security Studies, the University of Groningen, in cooperation with the Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, organised two workshops on security Sector Reform for members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, journalists, representatives of the MoD and Yugoslav Army and experts on civil society.

The OSCE Mission to the FRY organised two workshops 'Legislative efficiency in Security Sector' and 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Implementation of Code of Conduct' in October and November of 2002.

The Centre for Civil-Military Relations will hold ten workshops on ‘Democratic Control of the Army of Yugoslavia’, regarding security sector reform and modern civil-military relations, in ten towns in Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Also, the Centre, in cooperation with G17+, will organise a winter school, ‘The Security Sector Reform’, in March 2003, for representatives of the MoD and the Yugoslav Army, members of the parliaments, members of political parties, NGO activists, journalists and students.

#### **1.8.4 What Possibilities for Expert Formation, which You Would Consider Necessary, Are not Available and Who Would Ideally Offer Them?**

There is a need for a specialist educational programme<sup>53</sup> which would include experiences of other countries in security sector reform, civil-military relations, legislative oversight, armed forces reform, respect of human rights in the security forces, role of civil society and media in the democratic control of the armed forces and the importance of joining the Euro-Atlantic community.

It should prepare scientific research, analysis and a report on security sector conditions. Regional cooperation in this field is also necessary.

#### **1.8.5 What to Do?**

We recommend organising specialist courses for:

- armed and security forces (in this case, cooperation with the state is necessary);

---

<sup>53</sup> Centre for Civil Military Relations, in cooperation with DCAF, has prepared an educational programme for officers of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General Staff HQ. This programme was not accepted by the former chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.

- members and staff of parliaments, political party activists and government officers;
- actors of civil society;
- university students (specialist studies);
- journalists.

**Leonid Polyakov, Anatoliy Tkachuck**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN UKRAINE**

### **1.9 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation**

#### **1.9.1 Introduction**

The current level of expertise within the security sector of Ukraine is an evolutionary product of eleven years of independent development formed under the influence of three main factors: the heritage of the Soviet past, the security environment in independent Ukraine (internal factor), as well as the influences of regional and global security developments (external factor).

Naturally, these factors are often of a contradictory nature and time has proven that eleven years of independence has not been enough to overcome all challenges, and to form a high-quality, truly national security sector expert community which meets the needs of the country.

In terms of structure, the most illustrative achievements in the Ukrainian security sector expert formation can be found in the military sector, while the non-military sector still remains in great need of improvement. Regarding expertise itself, Ukraine's security experts have demonstrated their still prevailing incongruencies. They are more proficient in issues of the national system on a general and conceptual level. Concerning the level of practical and specific substantiation, planning and execution, they are better versed in some of the narrower sectors, often unable to integrate those under the general conceptual framework (platform requires the package of services etc.).

In general, despite many evident achievements in form of institutionalisation and pure functioning, the Ukrainian security sector expert community still undergoes certain forms of transition, in need of

the eradication of visible disproportions in both its structure and functioning. First, the state needs to develop an effective institute of civilian service in the security structures.

## 1.9.2 General Factors

### (a) *The Heritage of the Soviet Past*

On the one hand, after the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine inherited an extremely high number of Soviet scientific and educational systems. In 1991, some 150 colleges and universities were located within Ukraine. One-third were military counterparts. At the same time, a total of over 300 specifically military oriented research institutions and design bureaus existed as well in Ukraine. According to statistical data, a total of 1344<sup>54</sup> scientific and educational centres carried out military-oriented research work. During the time of the USSR, Ukraine comprised a 17 per cent share in the military-industrial complex output, while 1840 enterprises and research centres employed 2.7 million people on a permanent basis.<sup>55</sup>

On the other hand, all the above mentioned potential was oriented towards servicing the security interests of a larger totalitarian state. It was fractional in form and unsystematic in substance. Therefore, when Ukraine gained its independence, there was no National Security and Defence Council, no Ministry of Defence, no General Staff of the Armed Forces, and no Armed Forces themselves, along with other military formations. Further, Ukraine did not have a scientific and analytical infrastructure within the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) and lacked a government to support strategic planning mechanisms. Ukraine's military-industrial complex simply presented an imitative element of the USSR complex. For 96 per cent, the complex was dependent on supply parts from abroad. The capabilities of the Ministry

---

<sup>54</sup> See: 'Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine and Civil Control over their Activities' – Analytical report of Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies. Kyiv, 1996.

<sup>55</sup> V. Shekhovtsov and R. Bodnarchuk. 'Ukraine's Defence Industry Complex: Status and Prospects of Development', *Stratehichna Panorama*, No. 3-4, 1998, p. 138.

of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Security Service of Ukraine were limited, given their republican subordination (within the USSR). Another discouraging aspect was the constant migration of the best security experts to Moscow.

The security structures, even at the republican level, lacked an institute for civil servants with important positions. Civilians in the security structures, especially the military, were only employed for unimportant servicing functions.

(b) *The Internal Security Environment in Independent Ukraine*

During the first years of independence, the military sector remained a main priority of the country. Later, due to the absence of a direct military threat, the political, economic, social and energy sectors gained more attention among authorities and the public. Public opinion polls have showed that since 1995, problems such as personal welfare (76%), food prices (39%) and unemployment (22%), have been the most pressing issues. Citizens were no longer concerned about the defence potential of the state. The issue of defence ranked second last and was considered of importance by only 1 per cent of respondents.<sup>56</sup>

The economic crises of the 1990s aggravated the situation due to lack of managerial experience. The growth of corruption also negatively contributed to the neglect of security issues. For instance, in 1992, almost 72 per cent of expenditures on defence research and development were channelled towards fundamental research, but in the years 1999–2002, this figure dropped to 0.01–0.02%. In 1995, only 133 research and design bureaus worked on the orders of the military-industrial complex.<sup>57</sup> This number had experienced a great decrease from a total of 300 in the year 1991. Towards the end of the century only 20 research establishments were still in existence. As a result, tens of

---

<sup>56</sup> Ukrainian Political and Economic Index (June 1995, p. 1; December 1995, p. 1).

<sup>57</sup> See V. Badrak. 'The Magnificence and Misery of the Defence Sector', *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 17 July 1999, p. 4.



thousands of talented managers and specialists left the security sector in search of a better future abroad, or in private businesses.

For years, the power branches of Ukraine struggled to establish their authority and only focused on the constitutional processes. The reform of the security sector and the level of its expert proficiency were not among the main priorities in the struggle of a new power system. Ongoing activities mainly focused on the subordination of security structures and the reduction of the Armed Forces. The continuous distrust and occasional hostility between the legislative and executive power branches presented another political factor, which hampered security sector reform. Until recently, the Verkhovna Rada was excluded from the security sector reform process. Each security structure developed its own concepts and programmes, limiting governmental involvement to a minimum. On the level of national security policy formulation, the laws, concepts and programmes were often too generic in nature, lacking proper financial and resource substantiation, as well as specific plans for implementation.

After time, the levers of presidential control became much stronger than the levers of influence on security structures on part of the Cabinet of Ministers, or the Verkhovna Rada. The civil society, among the three, had the least influence on the process. In 2002, the best available strategic and international security studies institutions were almost exclusively working for the executive branch of power. The role of the Parliament was mainly confined to the formal approval of the defence and law enforcement budgets, and the review of bills concerning security structure operations. In result, the military was reduced by its size and became three times smaller than it was in 1992. At the same time, the overall size of the police structures (Ministry of Interior, Security Service, Border Troops and Tax Police etc.) grew steadily and is currently twice as large as the still over-manned military.

On the other hand, by the end of the last decade, the regulatory-legal basis was formed, which governs different aspects of security sector activities. The cooperation of different authorities regarding matters pertaining to the formation of the defence budget and the development of state programmes in the security sector, is slowly improving.

Ukraine has managed to numerically retain and even increase its system of higher education. The number of institutions of higher education has more than doubled, which in 2002 constitutes over 300<sup>58</sup>. Ukraine has successfully adapted the system of military education<sup>59</sup> to the uniform standards, which are compatible with the civilian ones.

Even in the absence of a system of goal-oriented training of civilian specialists for executive positions within the security structures of Ukraine, the number of experts that could occupy such positions is still rising. Time has done its work. Dozens of civilian specialists (diplomats, economists, lawyers) from different governmental bodies, who were involved in relevant activities within the framework of formulating the state-level programmes, now present the cadre reserves that over time can reinforce security structures and strengthen the civilian component in their management. The cadre reserve could incorporate civil servants who acquired experience in the resolution of defence issues in the Presidential Administration, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, the National Security and Defence Council Staff, the State Export Control Service, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Further, experience can be obtained in economy, world of finance, judicial system, educational department and/or science components. The security sector can also employ Ukraine's former parliamentarians, who previously worked on Verkhovna Rada committees, dealing with national security, defence and legislative support for law enforcement.

However, today, the potential of employing former governmental officials and military leaders – those who quit the civil (military) service and possess the knowledge, experience and desire to work – has not become reality in many cases. Another major factor that negatively impacts the security sector expert formation should also be noted: most experts working in governmental structures and in parliamentary

---

<sup>58</sup> See 'The System of Education in Ukraine: the State and Prospects of Development', Analytical report of Razumkov Centre, *National Security and Defence*, No. 4, 2002.

<sup>59</sup> Ukraine's system of military education currently includes 3 senior level academies, 5 military institutes, 6 military institutes within civilian universities, 4 military faculties at civilian universities, 30 reserve officer training departments at civilian universities and colleagues.

secretariats have received humiliatingly low levels of social benefits and incentives.

(c) *The Influences of Regional and Global Security Developments*

Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were quite a number of important security developments taking place within and outside of Ukraine. Some external projects were located in the Kosovo, Chechnya, USA (after September 11) and NATO as well as the EU. Ukraine's military leaders no longer hesitated to mention foreign military threats close to the Ukrainian borders. 'The probability of the state's participation in low and medium intensity conflicts remains realistic. This is conditioned by the existence of territorial claims to Ukraine on the part of certain circles of some neighbouring states.'<sup>60</sup>

Regarding the previous statement, Ukraine's society, or at least its security expert community, started to think about defence and security once again. However, so far it has not taken any chances to initiate the much needed radical security sector reforms and to go beyond the modest pay increases of security sector personnel. The evident revival of attention towards security matters was made clear to all after September 11 and, indeed, after Ukraine's 'own' catastrophes. First, the downing of the Russian passenger airliner by a Ukrainian missile over the Black Sea on 4 October 2001, and, secondly, the crash of a fighter aircraft into a crowd of spectators during an air show in Lviv on 27 July 2002. Immediately after these events, politicians called for a strengthening of security and an increase in security-related expenditures on the level of intelligence and defence. However, a few months later, Ukrainian parliamentarians passed a defence budget for the 2002 fiscal year that did not even satisfy the minimum (critical) requirements for the Armed Forces. The same happened one year later. In that case, it was unrealistic to expect a meaningful increase in expenditure for defence and foreign intelligence, if the importance of the foreign threat oriented segment of the security sector still remained at such a low level.

---

<sup>60</sup> M. Palchuk. Some views of the prospects of further development of Armed Forces of Ukraine. *Nauka i Oborona*, 2001, No. 4, p. 29.

### **1.9.3 Expert Preparedness for Tasks and Assignments**

#### **(a) *Ukrainian Parliament and Parliamentary Staff***

As far as the Ukrainian Parliament and parliamentary staff is concerned, a shared opinion is held about the current insufficient level of expertise among the members of the Verkhovna Rada in security matters. Few of them have the required necessary personal experience on security issues, and equally few have experienced personal aids that are qualified to work on security related legislations.

According to some unofficial estimates, the majority of parliamentarians neither have a conceptual understanding of the country's security sector problems, nor do they have any personal incentives to get engaged in the process of resolution. Even for democratic countries, traditional parliamentary hearings on security matters are a rare and generally random occurrence. In addition, the Ukrainian Parliament does not benefit from the formal support of a single research institution.

The parliamentary staff generally possesses a necessary expertise, but their effectiveness is objectively limited by significant impediments. In particular, the mere number of qualified personnel within the Verkhovna Rada Staff is insufficient to perform all assigned tasks at the required level of quality. In addition, the staff members are only equipped with the necessary information, materials and analytical tools. Occasionally, they do not even possess a personal computer, which prevents them from receiving required literature or from requesting necessary information on security structures.

The training of parliamentary staff is still unsystematic and generally left to their own consideration. Episodically, they participate in expert conferences via their personal contacts, rather than through programmes of cooperation or training plans.

(b) *Political Secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice (Possibly Others)*

The first and most dangerous defining feature for all security structures (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Security Service, Ministry of Emergency, Border Troops and others) in terms of expert preparedness, is the virtual absence of the institution of civilian servants within key positions of every security establishment. Thus, Ukraine still has no mechanism of direct control, and no responsibility towards its civilians. As a result, the key sectors, which in democratic countries are traditionally controlled by civilians (oversight of the implementation of policy, logistics, maintenance, personnel education and training, international cooperation, legislative activity, relations with higher authorities etc.), are in Ukraine governed by uniformed officers. Therefore, Ukraine's security structures went through several years of crisis.

An important element of the system, which provides control from the inside to the military and to other security structures, has yet to be established. For example, the institution of civil servants at responsible posts (including political secretariats). A positive step can be considered the appointment of a civilian executive (former mid-level official of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, Alexander Oliynyk) in January 2002.

The institution of State Secretaries (supposedly civil servants) was introduced into the security structures in 2001. Their offices were recently filled, along with the development of relevant regulations and procedures for their operability. At the same time, State Secretaries, as well as other top leaders of the security structures, continued to be supported primarily by already existing, so-called Information-Analytical Sections (IAS). The Information-Analytical Sections were introduced into all security structures in 1997.

These structures serve a typical mission for the collection and analysis of information on the state of readiness of subordinate units and their problems. They could also be asked to provide relevant proposals for the improvement of a subordinate unit's effectiveness. The most

sophisticated network of IAS was created in the Armed Forces, where they exist in each service and are coordinated by the Information-Analytical Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

While the average level of professional expertise in the IAS could be assessed as satisfactory, the still prevalent and widespread shortcomings should be noted. These deficiencies include a lack of theoretical knowledge and practical experience in defence and security resource management. Another widespread problem is posed by low level salaries and other social benefits, which prevents the department from attracting and retaining qualified personnel in order to produce quality products. Further, the IAS budget is scarce and does not allow the purchasing of necessary equipment and software, as well as subscription to national as well as foreign literature.

The above-mentioned problems are similar in specialised defence research institutions, which should provide expert advice, such as for example the Ministry of Defence's major research structures: the Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces, the Central Research Institute of Armaments, the National Research Centre of Defence Technologies and Military Security etc.

In all security structures, the expert community includes the instructing staff of educational establishments, especially those of senior level academies. Their average level of expertise can also be considered satisfactory. Recently, especially in the Ministry of Defence, intensive efforts have been undertaken to improve the inside structures, programmes and curricula in accordance with the new requirements posed by internal, regional and global security developments. However, as minister, General Volodymyr Shkidchenko recently indicated in his speech to the students of the National Defence Academy of Ukraine<sup>61</sup> that significant obstacles still need to be removed. One of those obstacles is the lack of practice in organising joint peacekeeping operations, stereotypes of the past, lack of initiative etc. The Minister was

---

<sup>61</sup> See K. Bekeshchenko. 'Ukraine needs Officers of New Formation', *Narodna Armiya*, 4 September 2002.

particularly disturbed by the low number of students training at senior academic (operational strategic) level.

It should also be noted that in comparison with similar senior level military and security colleges in the West, Ukrainian curricula, despite all efforts, still lag behind and do not benefit from the most advanced developments in subject studies related to the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations and conflict studies. This is related to the fact that Soviet scientific schools, which were inherited by the Ukrainian senior level educational system, were rather weak and highly politicised on the strategic name of security. Ukraine, throughout its process of independence, has had little time to develop and establish its own security strategy.

(c) *Other Leading Representatives of the Executive*

The category of other leading representatives of the executive includes the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) and its staff members, and the Cabinet of Ministers. While the first two representatives of the executive – the Presidential Administration and NSDC Staff – primarily exercise the overall (often overlapping) functions of coordination and control over the security sector in Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers is mainly responsible for the everyday material and financial support.

A uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon is that both the Administration of the President and the NSDC Staff formally exist outside the executive branch of power. According to the constitution, it should be under the Cabinet. However, in reality and in essence they form the executive and exert major influence on security structures. Both political bodies structurally contain operational and research segments, and employ the best experts available in the governmental service. However, in most cases these experts are over the age of 50. On the one hand, they possess professional and life experience, but on the other hand, a ‘respectable’ age naturally limits an expert's ability to learn, risk and improve.

The Administration of the President consists of two subdivisions that deal with security-related aspects. Operational support for the President of Ukraine on security related issues is provided by the Administration's Main Department for Activities of Military Formations, Law Enforcement Structures and Judicial Reform. This department focuses on the general presidential oversight of Ukraine's security structures. The department primarily employs retired military and law-enforcement personnel, as well as retired generals and senior officers. Due to the non-accessible and rather closed nature of work, it is difficult to assess their level of professionalism. However, some indicators suggest that the level is satisfactory.

Basically, the same is true regarding another Administration's subdivision – the National Institute for Strategic Studies, which provides analytical support to the activities of the Administration. It consists of several regional branches and possesses the overall capability of producing quality analyses of security issues.

The Staff of Ukraine's NSDC specifically focuses on security related coordination and analytical activity. It renders everyday information and provides analytical and organisational support for Ukraine's NSDC. It employs mostly civilian experts, though there are many retired servicemen too. The NSDC Staff operates a specialised Department on Defence Security Planning whose competence encompasses issues of defence and military-industrial policy. The NSDC's analytical efforts are supported by subordinate research institutions such as: the National Institute for International Security Problems and the Ukrainian Institute of Environmental and Resources Studies. In comparison with a similar research branch of the Administration of the President (National Institute for Strategic Studies), it should be noted that research institutions under the auspices of NSDC generally have more acute personnel problems and receive less language training.

The Cabinet of Ministers exercises everyday support of the security structure's activity, and drafts their budgets consequently, in order to be submitted for the Parliament's consideration and approval. The former exercise is rather technical and rarely evokes complaints, as opposed to the latter, which is prepared primarily by the Ministry of Finance under



the oversight of the Cabinet's Committees. In case of security related expenses, it is overseen by the Committee of Defence, Defence-Industrial Complex and Law-Enforcement Activity.

Every year, the budgeting process provokes sharp discussions and severe criticism. Every security structure complains about financial shortages. However, almost all complaints subside with the exception of the most unsatisfied, which usually tends to be the Ministry of Defence. The reasons for this problem are the inability of the state to support a still rather large military and a deficient overall defence budgeting process. Defence expenditures are only planned for the following year, without any meaningful long-term arrangements. The limitations of an annual plan and practice have long proven ineffective.

The procedure of defence budget formation and substantiation requires serious changes, whereas the level of planner's expertise demands serious improvement concerning their competence. The world experience offers rational approaches to the defence budget drafting and approval. As a rule, they are based on the cyclical (one cycle being equal to two or three years) goal-oriented planning method of 'planning – programming – budgeting'. This process is based on long-term development plans, which undergo adjustments every year. Nevertheless, the transition from a year-long term to a cyclical approach in defence planning in Ukraine is still far from becoming reality.<sup>62</sup> The lack of necessary expert knowledge and practice with regard to different levels of the defence budgeting process could be one of the many reasons for this problem.

---

<sup>62</sup> Time limitation is not the only problem of the budget process. No less important are the frequent changes in tax legislation, a significant 'shadow' sector of economy, and the non-functional character of the budget. These factors complicate both the collection of budget revenues and the effective use of the allocated funds. Meanwhile, without resolving those issues one can hardly hope for a stable funding of security structures, the transition from 'fight for survival' to development, and drawing closer to the standards of developed democratic countries. Here, the role of parliamentary control (in the broad sense) over the security sector could be stronger.

(d) *Representatives of the Civil Society*

*The academic segment* of Ukraine's security sector expert community is represented by three major branches: research institutions under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; the design bureau of the defence industry; and emerging security studies centres, which belong to some of the most advanced higher educational establishments. The first two categories often stagnate because of general financial problems, ageing of personnel, lack of orders, lack of language training, outflow of the most qualified personnel to private businesses abroad, etc. Only a smaller part manage to transform.

Within the apparatus of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine there exists a specific security research coordination body, called the Section of Applied Problems. The section's main objective is to provide expert assessment and coordination of academic studies in the interest of national security and defence. So far, the significance of this structure has been rather limited due to financial constraints, but the Section is expected to play a more prominent role if the attention to security sector applied research continues growing.

The situation in the third category is rather different. The practice of having security study centres within universities had not been known in Ukraine before. But today, they are steadily growing in number, and reasons exist to expect that they will grow in substance too. This natural process is supported both from within and from without. Support from foreign structures in the form of grants, along with natural demands by a developing civil society in Ukraine, will surely bring those young centres, at some point in the future, to a mature condition. This tendency will further promote an expert development process, which is already common among developed democracies.

Currently, however, neither the state, nor Ukraine's local authorities provide meaningful support for university research centres. Therefore, they primarily rely on financial grants from abroad. For instance, by the end of 2002, well over 600 Ukrainian researchers received grants from the NATO, and from the beginning of Ukraine-NATO cooperative

programmes in 1994, over 1000 Ukrainian scholars were granted financial assistance for seminar participation and other events.

(e) *The Role of Journalists*

The role of journalists as security experts is generally growing in Ukraine, though this is more true regarding defence issues, than areas of law-enforcement, arms trade and intelligence activity. On the one hand, the declared course towards building the fundamentals of democracy in Ukraine had steadily brought more and more positive effects on the consolidation of mass media positions regarding the treatment of military subjects. The number of institutions that have dealt with military issues over the last few years has risen significantly. The range of defence-related issues covered by the press has clearly expanded. As a result, the authorities' and society's attention can be drawn to a wider range of defence problems.

However, the situation of publication for non-military security structures is completely different. Few journalists dare to publish openly about law enforcement or special service body activities, especially if the topic concerns their involvement with corrupt officials or the criminal world. However, there are still those who pursue this path and bring with them the spirit of hope.

There are some important restrictions to Ukraine's media coverage that need to be mentioned: First, limited freedom of press in general, and secondly, uneven distribution of writing and/or broadcasting rights of different media segments on security matters. The distribution primarily depends on the cost of the media outlet. The higher the costs, for instance in the case of TV, the less freedom there is, and consequently, the lower the journalist expertise. The least expensive and least 'harnessed' by authorities is the electronic media, which is currently the most advanced on security issues. The print media holds the intermediary position. There are only a few authoritative and open publications. So, the level of expertise of journalists regarding Ukraine's security matters can be considered a victim of an unfriendly attitude on behalf of security structures towards themselves, or an inability of their

personnel to communicate with the press. Overall, problems can be related to the generally limited freedom of the press in the country.

(f) *Non-Governmental Experts Working in NGOs*

As far as non-governmental experts working in NGOs are concerned, a tendency of quality improvements and a growing role in the security sector reform can be noted. From being mainly enthusiastic amateur organisations during the early 1990s, they grew and evolved into hundreds of different types of NGOs, including several influential ‘think tanks’, which are capable of producing first-rate policy studies, independent research, substantiated proposals, as well as hosting international conferences. They are most active in foreign policy and military spheres. The centres include Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (Razumkov Centre); the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy; the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; the Ukrainian Independent Centre for Political Studies; the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies; the Centre for European and International Studies; the Atlantic Council of Ukraine; Kyiv’s Centre of East-West Institute; the Europe XXI Foundation and a few others.

Due to the help and support of Western grant-giving organisations and progressively minded businesses in Ukraine, the network of non-governmental research and public organisations is currently expanding. The non-governmental research centres in Ukraine have accumulated significant and active intellectual potential. The above mentioned ‘think tanks’ issue regular (monthly or quarterly) analytical publications. Also, their leading experts rank among the most frequent commentators on TV, in the printed press and the electronic editions. Many of them, such as the Razumkov Centre and the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies have created highly developed websites.

Over the last few years, both the Ukrainian Parliament and government started to pay more attention to the use of this potential. Often, this attention is still declarative, just to show the democratic character of the authorities, but in many cases it is indeed mutually beneficial. The

advantage of strong non-governmental analytical centres is found in their independent, alternative and unbiased view of urgent problems that need to be resolved. Furthermore, they employ charitable funds, sponsor funds or their own assets for such research rather than limited budgetary resources.

There exist various ways of how official structures interact with NGOs. For example, the establishment of the NGO Advisory Board by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the minister's auspices, looks very promising. A second example shows how each member of the Parliament receives a free copy of the Razumkov Centre's monthly magazine, *National Security & Defence*, and many experts of the Razumkov Centre possess the status of freelance consultants for various parliamentary committees. Until recently, the Razumkov Centre and some other NGOs regularly got invited to contribute their analysis to the yearly Presidential address to the Parliament. As witnessed by foreign observers: 'An impressive feature of the seminar and conference scene in the Ukraine shows that, even if attendance is restricted to small numbers and very senior official participants, representatives of the more prominent NGOs now tend to be invited as a matter of course.'<sup>63</sup>

However, there are two very strong limitations to the activities of the Ukrainian think tanks. First, the majority of the really influential think tanks are located in the capital city of Kyiv. Secondly, they are not yet strong enough to touch on very politically sensitive areas of law-enforcement and intelligence activities. Further, it is not at all easy for an independent NGO to conduct research in the current environment of Ukraine, when being independent and open often means to step on someone's toes. As far as the area of non-military security activities is concerned, Ukrainian think tanks play a very marginal role. As rightly

---

<sup>63</sup> 'Although this still cannot be said of the news media, here too, shyness and hostility are disappearing. Western activity and presence by means of NATO and bilateral training programmes and the funding of NGOs has reached significant levels. A number of foreign specialists now regularly collaborate with official structures as well as NGOs on defence reform and other issues relevant to Ukraine's national security. This activity has played an instrumental role in breaking down barriers in Ukraine.' See J. Sherr, 'Security, Democracy, and Civil Democratic Control', in D.P. Moroney, T. Kuzio and M. Molchanov (eds), *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, (Praeger, 2002), p. 103.

noted by the same insightful observer James Sherr: ‘Within recent years, NGO research on the Armed Forces and defence sector has become bolder, better and more respected by the armed services themselves. One would be hard put to find any critical analysis, let alone an equivalent standard of analysis of the MVD [Interior Ministry], SBU [Security Service] or State Tax Administration.’<sup>64</sup>

Indeed, while experts often generally speak about the need to build a democratic civilian control not just over the military, but over other security structures as well, it rarely becomes quite specific. This development prevails for many reasons. However, the question remains why no influential think tanks have ever come up with a specific analysis of non-military security structures, which could be distantly compared to the analysis of Armed Forces.

#### **1.9.4 Existing Possibilities for Expert Formation**

It should be stressed that important assistance in personnel training for the higher headquarters of security structures is already rendered by Ukraine’s foreign partners. Ukrainian representatives are regularly invited to attend training courses (undergo probation), all the more so as their organisers encourage the priority of participation for civilian specialists dealing with security issues. However, the bulk of specific training courses, provided by foreign partners for rank and file personnel, have been so far directed to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

For instance, the Armed Forces of Ukraine maintain military cooperation with 76 different countries; almost 300 documents on cooperation issues have been signed by the end of 2002; considerable assistance packages have been received from partners over the years of independence (the biggest from the US, amounting to some \$650 million overall). Ukraine enjoys very fruitful cooperation with the NATO as an organisation. Within the framework of the ‘Partnership for Peace’ Programme, Ukraine’s cooperation with individual NATO member states and NATO

---

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p.105.

partners (including non-aligned Austria, Switzerland and Sweden), has been developing both promisingly and qualitatively. For example, about 600 joint activities between the NATO and Ukraine have been planned for 2002, and the most part of the costs is taken on by the USA, along with other developed democracies.

Indeed, Ukraine obtains a significant amount of assistance within the framework of the PfP Programme. Its representatives are invited to courses on civil-military relations, which are organised in Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden and other countries. Many other type courses, including courses offered at the NATO Defence College, are regularly offered to Ukraine, too. One of the most promising PfP arrangements in terms of security sector expert formation is certainly the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes (US–German initiative supported by Switzerland) – an international organisation dedicated to the strengthening of defence and military education and research, through enhanced institutional and national cooperation. Currently, the Consortium consists of more than 200 organisations that are located in 42 countries, which comprise the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) region. This arrangement enables specific groups of experts to share and exchange knowledge within a particular field, which could be especially beneficial for Ukrainian instructors, scholars and members of different NGOs.

The Secretariat of the Consortium is located at the George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies, which also offers significant opportunities for Ukraine's expert formation. By the end of 2002, a total of 155 representatives of Ukraine, including over 50 civilians, will be educated in all three main training courses at the Marshal Centre. In addition, more than 300 Ukrainians were trained in short-term courses, or took part in seminars in Ukraine and the Centre.

Many opportunities for expert training are offered by the governments of individual NATO member countries and partners. The US IMET (International Military Education & Training) programme also offers

vast possibilities for personnel training.<sup>65</sup> Between 1994 and 2002, Ukraine was allocated over \$10 million within the framework of that programme. This allowed for 357 people, including 81 civilians from the Staff of the Verkhovna Rada, government and security structures, the Ministry of Defence (see Table 13.1) to undergo training.

**Table 13.1** The US IMET programme for Ukraine: general indicators<sup>66</sup>

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Training expenses, \$ thousand</i>	<i>Number of students, total</i>	<i>Participating civilians</i>
<b>1994</b>	0,600	8	1
<b>1995</b>	0,707	40	23
<b>1996</b>	1,020	33	9
<b>1997</b>	1,015	37	9
<b>1998</b>	1,250	46	16
<b>1999</b>	1,250	48	4
<b>2000</b>	1,338	43	2
<b>2001</b>	1,443	49	5
<b>2002</b>	1,560	53	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,493</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>81</b>

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces provides another type of expert training support for Ukraine by conducting a continuous series of high profile conferences on a variety of important security subjects within the Ukrainian Parliament, and by offering financial and other types of support to many NGOs throughout Ukraine.

The Canadian Government has arranged a month-long course of Democratic Civil-Military Relations – in addition to language and other

<sup>65</sup> It is worth noting that special training within the framework of the I\_\_\_ Programme and in the G. Marshall Centre was undergone by high-level civilian and military executives: among the former – top executive officials like K. Hryshchenko, L. Minin, V. Chumakov and some parliamentarians; the latter included high ranking generals I. Bizhan, M. Hudym, S. Malynovskyi, V. Muntiyani, V. Paliy, B. Pylypiv, V. Sytnyk, O. Shchykotovskyi and many more.

<sup>66</sup> According to the Office of Defence Cooperation of the US Embassy in Ukraine.



type courses – for mid level governmental officials and personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

There are examples of Western non-governmental organisations that also play a prominent role in the organisation of expert training in Ukraine. Since 1997, the Harvard Programme ‘National Security of Ukraine’, organised by Harvard University (USA) in cooperation with the London based International Institute for Security Studies, has involved over 100 of Ukraine’s representatives, including generals and their civilian equivalents. Among them were Ukraine’s People’s Deputies, representatives of the Presidential Administration, the staff of the Cabinet of Ministers, Ukraine’s NSDC, security structures, ministries and agencies, academic research institutions and NGOs.

Many countries, such as the UK, France, Germany, Hungary, Austria and others offer specific individual education, training and exchange programmes, which provide Ukrainians with the opportunity and pleasure to participate. For example, hundreds of Ukrainians have already graduated from colleges and courses abroad. Conversely, within the National Defence Academy of Ukraine exist provisions for the employment of foreign instructors. Currently, one French colonel and one Canadian major teach officer courses of a multinational staff committee. In the past, two American officers studied courses at the Ukrainian Army Institute.<sup>67</sup>

It should be noted that within Ukraine certain possibilities for further improvement of parliamentary, governmental and NSDC Staff expert training exist. For instance, this situation is true for the National Defence Academy of Ukraine, the Academy of the Interior Ministry, or the Academy of State Governance under the President of Ukraine. One of the problems within the national dimension of security sector expert development could partly remain in the mere low interest and lack of

---

<sup>67</sup> In October 2002 there were more than 150 foreign military students from 7 different countries (including NATO member Hungary) studying at various Ukrainian military institutions. See V. Knysh. Our instructors and methods are valued. *Narodna Armiya*, 5 October 2002. Starting from 1992, over 1500 foreigners had undergone military training in Ukraine. See ‘Within the Framework of a United System of Education’, *Narodna Armiya*, 5 October 2002.

concern on part of the current Parliament's and other structure's leaderships, which then may result in low coordination and control. For example, the former Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Olexandr Kuzmuck (now member of the Parliament), recently complained<sup>68</sup> that almost all courses that are organised for civilian experts in the National Defence Academy of Ukraine were of an unacceptably low status. This statement undermined the idea of civilian expert education in the military.

However, besides the low status of expert education, the incompatibility of foreign diplomats with the standards of the Ukrainian educational system poses another major problem to the successful training of experts within this sector. The latter problem has been waiting to be resolved for years, but so far no attempts have been made.

### **1.9.5 Desired Possibilities for Expert Formation (What to Do?)**

The key to further progress in the security sector of Ukraine is held by Ukrainian authorities. If the current plans shift more responsibilities from Presidential power to the Parliament (in forming the government and controlling the security sector), and if in the near future a meaningful progress in establishing potent civilian control can be accomplished (political secretariats included) within the security structure, then the new system will require many more qualified civilian experts than there are currently available, and consequently, more diverse (general and specific) courses would be desired.

Some room for improvement, even within the existing system of Ukraine does exist. For example, the National Defence Academy of Ukraine (and similar institutions of other security structures) could initiate regular seminars for journalists, specialising in security and defence matters. The Academy could invite authoritative Ukrainian and foreign civilian guest-speakers who have the experience of working at

---

<sup>68</sup> During the discussion at the International Conference 'Parliamentary Oversight over the Security Sector and Defence' held in Kyiv on 27–28 September 2002. Conference organisers were the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, NSDC of Ukraine and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

executive positions in the security structures or who are famous for their theoretical work.

The planned training of civilian specialists in specifically designed courses on the basis of the National Defence Academy should begin two years after those courses were announced. Civil servants of high executive categories, involved in the defence decision-making processes, should be trained at the Academy in relation with military servicemen.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, in cooperation with security structures, should work out a programme to establish a network of security research organisations (centres) in leading universities. Educational courses and research programmes dealing with civil-military relations, international security, conflict study, etc., should be introduced to Ukraine's higher educational establishments. The programmes of officer training for all security structures ought to include a mandatory course of civil-military relations.

Based on the current situation of help being offered to Ukraine from foreign countries, as well as by still existing needs of improvement of expert activity in specific areas, the following observation can be made: courses offered should be less general, more specific, and more coordinated and targeted towards the needs of a specific structure and activity. General knowledge about the foundations of civilian control over the military and other democratic mechanisms is already available to Ukrainian experts and mostly understood by those who were willing to receive new knowledge.

Therefore, the new courses should primarily focus on areas where external help can make a difference and where it is mostly needed. Those areas include the following:

- parliamentary staff;
- everything that helps to democratise law-enforcement and security service structures (their personnel, journalists writing

about these structures, NGOs analysing them, parliamentarians of the relevant committees etc.);

- civilian candidates for responsible posts in all security structures;
- experts, who practically deal with drafting budgets for security structures;
- experts working for Information-Analytical Sections of different security structures etc.

Language training for experts and all possible support regarding emerging security studies centres at universities should remain a major focus.

Currently, two groups of Ukrainian experts present the greatest need for additional courses. Those are: parliamentary staff and personnel of non-military structures. The other two groups are in need of better management and more money. The military probably receives enough money (keeping in mind that Ukraine's military continues to downsize), but is often unable to realise strategies that have been suggested by foreign partners. Non-governmental and university research centres, as well as journalists, often have plenty of new ideas and projects, but lack the money to realise and implant those plans.

Concerning practical measures, it helps to remember that an emphasis on different problem-solving approaches needs to be improved. For instance, the parliamentary staff should emphasise technical rather than ideological matters. They need to gain more knowledge on Western practices of the preparation of draft laws in the sphere of security and defence, expert analysis of such draft laws, and other country's practices and standards. Here, courses could be offered both in Ukraine and abroad, with the method of Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) as one very promising option.

However, for the non-military security structures of Ukraine, which still remain in the form and substance of unreformed Soviet era relics, courses on traditions of securing basic human rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression, Western practices of managing classified information, and working with the media should be considered. Practical experiences/courses abroad (especially instructor training) are of high importance in providing first-hand experience (most instrumental in changing psychology). Foreign advisors in ministries/headquarters are desirable, but the pragmatism of such a method should be tested in practice.

As far as the military is concerned, in addition to what has already been done, foreign instructors on the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations, joint and combined operations and conflict studies for the National Defence Academy and other military educational institutions could help. ADL courses and internships should be offered whenever appropriate.

For non-governmental and university research centres, academia and journalists, more internships along with broader ADL opportunities would be desirable.

### **1.9.6 Conclusion**

The problem of expert formation in Ukraine is complex and possible solutions are not simple. In many areas, prominent analysts and potentially capable young experts just refuse to serve due to humiliatingly low salaries, or other social as well as career difficulties. On the other hand, many retired servicemen after a career in the military or security structures, pull money from their retirement pension and adult children, which lowers the sensitivity issue of the salary and therefore reaches a completely different status than for younger civilian employees. So, the development of more effective personnel management and social reward cultures remain among the major challenges for the success of the security sector expert formation process at this point of transition in Ukraine.

The most urgent problem of security sector expert formation in Ukraine – in terms of focus and needs – goes beyond the pure military sector, to non-military security structures. As many top experts indicate, the majority of current security threats to Ukraine are of a non-military nature. The same kind of support in expert formation, which has been offered to the military so far, should certainly be offered to non-military structures as well.

Another key problem of this process is posed by the very slow development of the ‘class’ of civilian servants at responsible posts within security structures. This layer should serve as a driving force beyond security sector reform and expert formation. Ukrainian experience has proven once again the correctness of the dictum – military and other security structures cannot reform themselves. Until a meaningful process has been achieved in the creation of responsible civil insiders in the security structures, the talk about expert formation within these structures will remain largely irrelevant, and should probably be set aside until after this problem is solved in Ukraine.

While keeping these major problems in mind, let us first do what is doable. In the near future, a major focus should be held on the segments that are most receptive to outside support. Those include the following: parliamentary staff and parliamentarians' aids, journalists, university security studies centres and independent think tanks. The latter already proved its capability to expedite the reform process and raise an expert cadre for both legislative and executive branches of power. They will likely be producing more and more qualified experts given further Western support and further progress in democratic reforms in Ukraine. Let us hope that this support and this progress are irreversible.

**Pal Dunay**

## **SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES**

### **Introduction**

Since security sector reform has started to dominate the agenda of analytical work in international security it has been expanding horizontally. It means to cover security sector reform on the surface, extending analysis to new areas rather than deepening it. This extension is particularly troubling in such areas, which are difficult to analyse due to the limited availability of information. This is certainly the case in such fields as the formation of experts or the training of professionals in security policy matters. Their information is scarce and distorted when available. This scarcity is due to the fact that the national bureaucracies and training institutions which hold the information do not find it necessary to make it widely available. Interestingly enough, information on the topic is regarded as highly technical and is very seldom subjected to analysis. Distortion is due to the fact that most information on the topic has been made available by organisations, which carry out such formation/training. These factors set the analytical confines of this paper.

The Visegrad group, practically the only sub-regional cooperation framework in East-central Europe that has become part of the political map of Europe,<sup>69</sup> is a loose cooperation framework of originally three, now four countries of the region: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Even though the group has become highly visible both between 1991 and 1992 and then again since 1998, it has not become institutionalised. Although the focus of cooperation centred around security related matters (in 1991–92 coordinating policy on the

---

<sup>69</sup> The other sub-regional cooperation framework, which has ‘found its way to the map’ beyond a narrow circle of experts is the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). It has become known among economists primarily due to its area of activity.

withdrawal of Soviet troops and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, after 1998 supporting the NATO membership aspiration of Slovakia), and the meetings of leaders of the defence establishment have been one of the (if not *the*) most frequent and regular, it would be a misunderstanding to present the Visegrad group as one that has been centring around security and defence. The relative and ostensible prominence of defence cooperation has been due to a host of reasons, including the lack of institutionalisation, the half decade long temporary decline between 1993 and 1998 and the eventual further decline in the future as well as the lack of intimacy among the leaderships of the four constituting countries. Its limitations have been clear due to the lack of intensity of cooperating in some crucial defence areas, including procurement and training.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, after the NATO and EU accession of the four participating states of the group the Visegrad agenda (first coordinating the departure from the Warsaw Treaty, secondly cooperating during the accession processes) will have been exhausted and there is no objective reason to assume that it will be filled with content again. The remnants of some regional togetherness in the geographical sense of the word supplemented by joint transition efforts will not be sufficient to speak about a group and its agenda.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> I have followed with interest the evolution of cooperation in the Visegrad group and published extensively on the topic. Hence, I have no reason to repeat my earlier conclusions. It suffices to refer to some of those publications. For more details see Pál Dunay, 'Security Cooperation in the Visegrad Quadrangle: Present and Future'. In Andrew J. Williams (ed.), *Reorganizing Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 121–44; Hungary and Subregional Cooperation. In Berthold Meyer and Bernhard Moltmann (eds), *Neuer Osten – Alter Westen: Die europäischen Staaten zwischen Annäherung und Distanz* (Frankfurt am Main: Haag + Herchen Verlag, 1996), pp. 186–205; 'Regional Cooperation in Central Europe: Input Without (Too Much) Outcome?', in László Póti (ed.), *Integration, Regionalism, Minorities: What Is the Link?* (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 53–83 and Ansätze subregionaler Kooperation – Visegrád-Gruppe, CEFTA und ZEI. In Wolfgang Zellner and Pál Dunay, *Ungarns Aussenpolitik 1990-1997: Zwischen Westintegration, Nachbarschafts- und Minderheitenpolitik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), pp. 403–43. Most recently see Pál Dunay, 'Subregional Cooperation in East-central Europe: the Visegrád Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement'. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, No. 1, 2003 (forthcoming).

<sup>71</sup> It is possible some low-intensity cooperation will continue among the four countries in order to harmonise their movement from the periphery to the centre of the European Union through a long period of transition. This will extend to achieving the same treatment for the farmers of these countries as for the 'old' member-states, to joining the Schengen



## 2.2 Historical Background

For the reasons above the study of security policy expert formation in the Visegrad countries is an artificial construct in two senses of the word: (1) the group does not exist as a cohesive entity; (2) expert formation in the four states carries some similarities. It has been influenced by factors, which make differences at least as important as similarities. It may well be that current factors give premium to similarity, whereas historical ones are more important in terms of differences. It may seem sufficient in hindsight to conclude that these countries were members of the Warsaw Treaty and hence share the same military legacy. Nothing could be more misleading than that. Such a starting point would highlight some important aspects though it would neglect many others. It would correctly point to the fact that providing for external security of the Warsaw Treaty member-states was in the hands of the defence establishment. Hence, and this is relevant for this analysis, there was no civilian expertise in defence matters. Furthermore, and this is less frequently mentioned than the previous point, the strategic aspects of 'common defence' in the Warsaw Treaty were concentrated in the hands of the Soviet High Command. Therefore, not only was civilian expertise largely absent in the smaller Warsaw Treaty member-states but relevant military expertise as well. Namely, when the system change occurred there was no military expertise present in the smaller Warsaw Treaty countries that would have been suitable to organise the defence of these countries. That is why it is important to emphasise that it was not the case, as sometimes presented, that competent militaries were facing incompetent civilians. It is probably more appropriate to speak about two incompetent groups facing each other. Commonality stops here, however.

The three countries played different roles in the Warsaw Treaty as Czechoslovakia was a 'frontline' state whereas Poland and Hungary were military springboards. It may be even more important that the

---

regime and the Euro zone. It is an eloquent demonstration of the doubts concerning the long-term future of the group that the member-states practically immediately after the end of the EU accession talks, and the invitation of Slovakia to NATO, found it necessary to emphasise that they would continue their cooperation. See Visegrad four vow to continue cooperation within EU. RFERL, TASR, CTK, 14 January 2003.

political reliability of the armed forces of the three differed greatly. Whereas the Hungarian and the Czech armed forces in 1956 and 1968, respectively did not fight for the independence of the two countries, the Polish armed forces were available in 1981 to prevent eventually an international armed conflict. Hence the assessment of the political loyalty of the armed forces of the three countries differed as well. Whether this has something to do with the differing military traditions and the role of the armed forces as a national institution in case of the latter is difficult to contemplate. There is a saying about the Polish armed forces according to which it was similar to an apple in the Socialist/Communist era: it was red on the outside and white inside.

It is another important difference that whereas Czechoslovakia lost 21 years of its history under the oppressive and intellectually tragic and at the same time comical Husak/Jakes regime (comical for the outside observers, tragic for the population of the country), Hungary and Poland enjoyed a relatively liberal atmosphere particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. The transition in Warsaw and Budapest was gradual and could be regarded as a 'negotiated revolution' to use Rudolf T\_kés' term.<sup>72</sup> The change was sudden in Prague. It resulted because the elite was poorly prepared for it intellectually. For all these reasons there were different starting points, development patterns and learning curves. Furthermore, by now the group consisted of four states. Slovakia had genuine problems due to the fact that its independent statehood could hardly be supported by experience in state building. Irrespective of how rapidly Bratislava has caught up with the other three, the lack of experience in state-building and governance has been felt. The illiberal democracy introduced by Vladimir Meciar has aggravated the situation. The Meciar era is not the exclusive reason, however, that Slovakia is lagging behind the other three states in consolidating its security policy training.

Since the system change of 1989–90 in East-central Europe significant external attention has been paid to the civilian control of the armed forces. It was also an important matter for the political establishments of the new democracies partly due to genuine concern about the eventual

---

<sup>72</sup> See Rudolf L. T\_kés, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

interference of the armed forces with political processes and partly due to their unwillingness to challenge the main tenets of the West concerning civilian control. The narrow focus on the danger of Praetorianism has vanished quickly at least in East-central Europe. The armed forces never interfered with politics after World War II, not even when the possibility of playing a political role was apparent. The only major exception was in Poland on 13 December 1981, as mentioned above. The emphasis of analysis should have shifted to civil-military relations (and not to civilian control in the narrow sense of the word) and the participation of the military in the formation of defence policy. The change was nevertheless gradual at best. Due to insufficient differentiation between East-central and Eastern Europe the time and energy was spent on matters which had no political relevance in countries like the Visegrad states. The ideological emphasis has thus resulted in loss of time and lack of attention to matters which really influence the security and defence policy posture of the East-central European countries.

It has been my impression for some time that Western analysts, often due to their background in Soviet studies, have found it difficult to understand the difference between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw Treaty. It is not necessary to address this matter in historical terms.<sup>73</sup> It is important to emphasise, however, that the phenomenon persisted for some time with further decreasing returns. Fortunately, there are an increasing number of experts who rightly conclude the difference:

In contrast to those of Central Europe, the majority of the post-communist states in Eastern Europe remain heavily militarised ... The armed forces are heavily oriented to offensive tasks and, in most countries, are complemented by equal numbers of internal police and secret security services

---

<sup>73</sup> The book of Zoltán Bárány on Hungarian defence during socialism is one of the worst examples. He has systematically drawn conclusions from Soviet studies for Hungary when civil-military relations, particularly due to the weak bargaining power of the defence establishment in Hungary, were fundamentally different. For more details see his *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945–90: The Case of Hungary* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) and my review of the book in *Survival*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 176–7.

which look to different ministries, chains of command and mechanisms for civilian control.<sup>74</sup>

It is not only members of the establishments in East-Central Europe who emphasise the difference, it is, to the regret of many, those in Eastern Europe who, of their own volition, have not aspired to 'jump on' the bandwagon of modernity.

The fact that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999, as expected, five years earlier than Slovakia, does not play a major role in that the countries are in different phases of their evolution as far as the development of security expert formation. Rather than dwelling extensively upon the matter it will suffice to mention two factors:

1. Not long after the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO the Alliance concluded that it was necessary to pay more attention to the military preparedness of potential candidates for membership and launched the idea of a Membership Action Plan (MAP). This meant that the preparation of Slovakia for NATO membership in a military sense started approximately at the same time that real attention was paid to the military contribution of the three new members to the Alliance. Hence there was no gap between interest devoted to the military preparedness of the three East-central European member-states and Slovakia as a candidate country by the most important point of reference for these states, NATO.
2. The performance of the three countries that joined NATO in 1999 continued to be problematic, particularly in the sense of military interoperability. Even though shortcomings were more clearly identified in areas other than security policy expertise, it is a fact that particularly in the case of the two smaller new member-states, human compatibility was often referred to as a problem. (To some extent this has also characterised the situation

---

<sup>74</sup> Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, 'The Challenges of Security Sector Reform', *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 192.

in Poland.) As this has been due partly to the insufficient effort to create human compatibility since the system change, one can guess what has been the source of the shortcoming.

### 2.3 The framework: what is common in security expert formation in the four Visegrad states?

The category of expert formation in security policy is not well established and hence it is problematic in the sense that there are a number of options in defining it.

1. It is possible to identify it with expert formation in (or for) the armed forces and thus for the artificially narrowly defined security sector.
2. It is possible to broaden the scope and analyse expert formation for the full security sector that includes the armed forces as well but certainly cannot be identified with it.
3. It is also possible to address the forming of a scholarly community, the general increase of security policy competence in the society.

Every approach is legitimate and may bring interesting results. Some sources are available in the first area. It would be extremely difficult to draw conclusions on security expert formation for the entire security sector, however. Due to the background of the author this study makes an attempt to focus on the first area (security expert formation for the armed forces and military security more broadly) although it regularly refers to the third one (building of security expertise in society through a competent scholarly community). This would be relevant as, in my opinion, the general increase of knowledge on security policy has a spillover effect on the level of expert formation. This effect is both direct and indirect at the same time. It is indirect in the sense that it is difficult to identify the interface between the increase of professional expertise and its effect on the society. It is direct as most experts contribute to

expert formation not only through their writings but also through their teaching activities and participation in public life.

Security expert formation is part of the security sector and in those cases when security sector is to be developed is also part of its reform. It is obvious that the developed world had to go through security sector reforms in light of the basic rearrangement of the nature of threat; hence expert formation should be regarded as a part of reforms nearly everywhere. This formation made the reforms more demanding if the unavoidable changes went in parallel with a fundamental change of the socio-economic system. These reforms meant, among other things, depriving the defence sector of its stable (though stagnating) socio-economic basis. Expert preparation has burdened the reform process among others through drawing upon the same financial resources as any other sector of the socio-economic structure at an early phase. At a later stage the prime problem has stemmed from the shortage of competitive human resources.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore expert formation, similar to other parts of defence reform, is an organic, time-consuming process. The results appear gradually and reliable conclusions can only be drawn retroactively.

The paper intends to demonstrate that despite the declared existence of group identity and similarities in the development of the four countries, evolution in the field of security policy expert formation can be better characterised by parallelism rather than similarity. It is for this reason that the paper will stop short of giving a comprehensive and comparative analysis of expert formation. After outlining some common problems it will be necessary to go into national details. It is hoped that it will be possible to strike a balance between the two.

The most important source of parallelism has been the defence reform needs generated by the change of the international political environment.

---

<sup>75</sup> Interestingly enough, one of the finest analysts of the topic has complained, however, that reform has been 'a process led by a few senior officers of vision, courage, determination and technical knowledge'. This criticism, however, does not clearly express that the phenomenon has been partly due to the non-competitiveness of the defence sector in the booming market economy of the most developed transition countries. See Chris Donnelly, 'Reform Realities', *NATO Review*, vol. 49, Autumn 2001, p. 33.

Since the end of the Cold War three waves of reform were deemed necessary by these changes.

1. The first stemmed from the need to establish armed forces, which are able to operate nationally. Although this would have presented a major challenge, particularly as far as national defence planning was concerned (due to the fact that the former smaller member-states of the Warsaw Treaty did not face any military challenge), their change over to national defence has never been put to test.
2. The second wave of reform was made necessary by the declining importance of the defence of national territory and the increasing importance of contributing to international operations (with a declared emphasis on peace operations), i.e. power projection.
3. The third wave has been made necessary by 11 September 2001 when the central element of the international system faced asymmetrical military challenge and all allies and like-minded countries had to associate themselves with the priority of counter-terrorist activity as a priority of their national defence.

The need for these reforms followed each other too rapidly and presented particularly heavy burden for states, which had to carry them out in parallel with a fundamental rearrangement of their socio-economic structure. Furthermore, countries which do not operate on the full array of the strategic spectrum were particularly disadvantaged by the change. For them the series of reforms did not mean merely changing the emphasis of their defence efforts. It also meant fundamentally revising their defence reform several times. Moreover, these small and medium-size states have had limited resources. In sum, the Visegrad countries (similar to the other East-Central European states) were disadvantaged in multiple ways. The subjective mistakes, which have been made in the process over the last decade, burdened the situation further. The fundamental dilemma stems from the constant need for military reform that has, of course, required adaptation of security expert formation as well. However, as these changes were not self-initiated, not to say self-

imposed, the need for adaptation— at least in case of the second and third waves – was generated by the world at large.

Hence, security expert formation appeared as an external predicament that could not be met domestically, particularly as far as the training of those professionals who later have to provide for the multiplier effect. The training of the trainers has represented the most severe challenge and will continue to do so for some time to come. The situation could change if the pace of rapid-fire reforms, following one after another, slows down and stability dominates the defence agenda of Europe. It is for this reason, among others, that the defence establishment of smaller allies may favour specialisation that could also stabilise the international contribution they are expected to make. This is associated with the November 2002 Prague agenda of NATO, which presupposes such specialisation for most European allies beyond some core capability that every nation must possess. It must be noted, however that this positive attitude presupposes full confidence in the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance. In case doubts prevail, specialisation should be regarded as an unacceptable risk for the small countries as they certainly would not like to be left with highly specialised military capabilities in case of their defence re-nationalisation or alignment with some other group.

The modernisation of the security sector of the Visegrad states took place under conditions which provided little support to the process. Resources, both human and financial, were scarce and little public attention was devoted to the matter. In order to go beyond this generalisation the attention of the public – as will be demonstrated later – has been selective, whereas the political elite has lost interest when it became evident that there was no reason to fear defence involvement in political matters.

As far as public attention was concerned, it was selective. Opinion polls have consistently shown readiness of the public to devote resources to the defence sector when asked *in abstracto*. When, however, the question was posed differently and the respondents had to prioritise different tasks and sectors, defence has practically lost out immediately and priority was given to areas like health care, social services and education. The picture has been influenced by seasonal developments. In



Poland it was developments in the CIS, primarily in Russia, which coloured the picture whereas in Hungary it was the evolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that affected the attitude of the public, reflected in opinion polls.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore the Czech Republic felt its security lagging after the Velvet Revolution but since the Velvet Divorce the picture has been increasingly rosy.<sup>77</sup> In sum, there has been some limited support for increasing defence efforts in the Visegrad states. The most lasting and determined was the Polish public whereas the three smaller Visegrad states were hesitant and for long periods outright reluctant to increase resources allocated to defence. This has underlined the assumption that it is difficult to argue for any increase of defence efforts in a largely threat-free environment.

Professionals have made attempts to overshadow this phenomenon. A leading Hungarian military sociologist put it as follows:

In the civil society next to those citizens who want the most reliable security for their tax forints [the national currency of Hungary – P.D.] we also find those citizens who do not want to take any defence burden.<sup>78</sup>

If one takes a close look and analyses the statement of Prof. Szabó it is clear that he juggles with two categories. Namely, he does not clearly distinguish between ‘security’ and ‘defence’. It is not a coincidence. It is due to the fact that the *security concerns of the population were associated with activities other than defence*. Szabó does not want to state the obvious. Namely, that the citizenry wanted to increase internal security, have a more reliable (and less corrupt) police fighting (transnational) organised criminal and more effective border guard,

---

<sup>76</sup> Ferenc Molnár, A közvélemény alakulása a biztonságról és a hader\_k szerepér\_l a Cseh Köztársaságban, Lengyelországban és Magyarországon / The evolution of public opinion about security and the role of armed forces in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary/, *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 8, 2000, p. 9.

<sup>77</sup> See Jeffrey Simon, Central European Security, 1994: Partnership for Peace (PfP). *Strategic Forum*, No. 1, 1994, p. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Prof. János Szabó, *Hader\_átalakítás: Az ezredforduló hader\_reformjának el\_zményei, jellemz\_i és perspektívája /Defence reform: The antecedents, characteristics and perspective of the defence reform of the turn of the millennium/* (Budapest: Zrinyi, 2001), p. 11.

preventing illegal migration. In this respect there have been striking similarities in the Visegrad states. *The entire security agenda has moved from the main external security provider, the armed forces, to internal security providers.* In sum, the decline of external threat went in parallel with the very limited increase of the prestige of the armed forces. The improvement of the status of the armed forces remained confined to Poland where the armed forces have been regarded traditionally as a national institution and were mostly associated with temporary developments in the three other countries. In the other countries, not even the increase of prestige (stemming from the fact the armed forces could have been regarded as national institutions of sovereign states), helped to maintain their standing in the long run. Interestingly, whenever events relevant to the military took place in Europe, the importance attributed to the armed forces increased, although the change remained temporary. This has had an impact upon the transition to a modern military and professional thinking on international security.

It turned out that the modernisation of the military draws on scarce resources and there is no chance to cash in the peace dividend any time soon.

This has meant that the long awaited ‘peace dividend’, which a reduction in the size of the armed forces might bring about, can only be achieved after a long period of sustained reforms which increase efficiency in the armed forces, usually concomitant with an overall transformation of the economy.<sup>79</sup>

It was for this reason that the establishment had little interest in defence matters. One cannot even speak about ‘lost interest’ as ‘interest’ has never even been there. The system change burdened the political class and the society with such a complex agenda of transformation, extending to institution building and the modernisation of every sector of the socio-economic structure, that no energy was left for areas that were not particularly urgent. Except for those who exaggerated the problem of external threat, it was obvious that the security perception of the

---

<sup>79</sup> Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, op. cit. p. 198.

population was left largely unaffected by the development of the armed forces (this view was shared in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia at least). At the same time, any noticeable improvement in the defence sector would have required huge (primarily financial) resources. Hence many (if not most) defence reforms were carried out for several years for no other reason than to meet external expectations. Therefore it is understandable that many of them have remained half-hearted.

It is a common characteristic of the transformation of the armed forces in the Visegrad states to carry out development selectively. This has resulted in ‘a lack of balance between the elite cadres, which are used for international missions, and the rest of the armed forces, which focuses on territorial defence’.<sup>80</sup> For instance, ‘Slovak armed forces are organised around two components – the largely untransformed main defence forces alongside a few professionalising elite units capable of participating with some degree of interoperability in NATO-led operations’.<sup>81</sup> In case of Hungary the same differentiation was reflected in the establishment of immediate and rapid reaction forces. This boiled down to the fact that there were a few units which could send troops to international operations and then the great majority suitable for the unlikely event to defend the territory of the country.<sup>82</sup> It is fully understandable in light of scarce resources that development had to remain selective. Tacitly this has resulted in a situation where the armed forces were divided into two parts: One with relevant purpose, motivation and prospects, and another without any of the above.

As the armed forces of the Visegrad countries are heading towards professionalisation it will be a major challenge to bridge the motivation and competence gap created – understandably – due to ‘selective development’. Although it is common sense that such internal division of the armed forces is meant to be temporary, it is going to be one of the

---

<sup>80</sup> Marie Vlachova, ‘Defence Reform in the Czech Republic’. In István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds), *Post-Cold War Defence Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*. (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 395.

<sup>81</sup> Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, ‘Professionalisation of the Slovak Armed Forces’. In Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*, (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 50.

<sup>82</sup> Prof. János Szabó, op. cit. p. 51.

biggest challenges to 'reunite' the professional forces when every unit will have to be able to participate in international assignments. As far as the full professionalisation of the armed forces is concerned, the Visegrad countries seem to differ only in the projected date of introduction. Even though the matter is controversial domestically, in some of the four countries, the reasons for its introduction vary but the transition to professional armed forces remains an undisputed reality. It is only a matter of time before it is introduced in the respective countries.

The intention to meet Western expectations in defence or, at least, not to challenge them, has been coupled by Western support and assistance. It has resulted in a situation where the international military cooperation of the Visegrad states, much like other transition countries centred upon the West, relies intensively upon the resource rich large members of NATO. Geographical factors and certain traditional pre-Cold War sympathies have somewhat modified this simplified picture, however. Hence, an overwhelmingly concentric structure of relations has evolved where the Visegrad countries have developed more intensive uni-directional links with some major NATO members than with any others. The support of these major players has extended from the supply of surplus equipment, to contribution in training and military education as well as to screening the performance of the armed forces of the Visegrad countries. The advice has most often come from countries and defence establishments which were in a fundamentally different situation from any what were then NATO candidate countries. It was partly unavoidable, as none of the 16 member-states went through the post-World War II experience that the transition countries had. It was somewhat difficult for the large NATO countries to understand the kind of confines which the defence sector of small East-central European countries had been facing.

It would deserve a separate study to analyse the zigzags of the effects of Western military assistance. Suffice it to mention here that, as with any human endeavour, it has been carried out with a certain amount of waste and redundancy. If one could mention some shortcomings relevant to the purposes of this study, an emphasis would be put on an early failure to establish civilian expertise in defence. This assistance took place at a time when there was so much fluctuation in the political system that very

few trained people were still addressing defence matters. Later, maybe in light of this experience, the emphasis shifted towards the training of military professionals. It was a reflection of the fact that the lack of military competence hindered the ability of military professionals to carry out their task, including their contribution to shaping defence policy. Simultaneously, the importance of contributing to the development of civilian expertise has been fading, which is regrettable. This happened in spite of the fact that the political establishment, and to a lesser extent the civil service, has stabilised in most transition states (including the Visegrad countries). This would give ample opportunity to return to developing civilian expertise, which is still thin in most countries. It is, of course, not necessary to start massive retraining on the basics to develop civilian expertise in defence more than a decade after the system change. Such training should be targeted and discriminate. The transfer of knowledge and experience should come selectively and be addressed to persons who are in need of the knowledge of certain aspects of the problematique.

It was one of the most severe shortcomings of the external support that it tacitly, and in some relationships explicitly, carried expectations by subserviently following western models. It is difficult to contemplate whether it was the expectations of the West or the willingness of the new democracies that resulted in this situation. It is safe to conclude nevertheless that '[G]overnments and armies have gone from the one extreme of rejecting any Western influence to the other of rushing to embrace Western ideas ... without any real understanding of what it involves – or costs.'<sup>83</sup> It suffices to listen to the representatives of the security sector of various countries, which are going through the same experience nowadays, to see how much resentment is generated by the intention to impose a model upon the countries in transition.

This has resulted – particularly in those countries which went through more successful domestic transition – in paying lip service to external advice rather than following it. The situation has not been particularly helpful and is largely responsible for the fact that transition has remained partial. That is how the national and subjective elements have not

---

<sup>83</sup> Chris Donnelly, *op.cit.* p. 32.

supported fully and consistently the bringing about of military reforms. Experts argue that such reluctance has been due to the fight between the 'old guard and the new guard'. This assessment is just as simplistic as it is overwhelming. The 'old guard' attitude – although it has represented some resistance towards reform – cannot be identified with it. In some cases legitimate concerns of total ignorance of national traditions and capabilities in the defence reform process formed the underlying reason, whereas in other cases it has been due to the resistance to any change. The latter approach could not be simplified to the subversive activity of 'Moscow-educated military leaders who were neither committed to implementing real change nor had the relevant skills to conduct such a review'.<sup>84</sup> Although this may be among the reasons, oftentimes it could well be that the traditionally conservative mentality of the defence establishment prevailed (particularly when military reforms have only partly been nationally initiated). Furthermore, reforms have often been associated with instability in the defence sector that was understandably not favoured by those who had to implement them. When such instability is portrayed in objective terms and without empathy with regard to the human factor, it may be rightly concluded for each state of the group: 'Clear rules of career and promotion do not exist or are not implemented fully, creating opportunities for those individuals who remain in positions of sufficient influence to thwart any change that could jeopardise their easy and comfortable lives.'<sup>85</sup>

There has been one element of training which was actively pursued in each state. This was language training primarily in English and to a lesser extent in some other languages of major NATO member-states. It has extended to both civilians and military professionals. National efforts were actively supported by the member-states of the Alliance in a number of ways. This included the sending of language teachers to the respective countries as well as hosting their professionals at language courses in NATO countries. It has resulted in the situation that by the end of the 1990s the number of civilian experts and military professionals with adequate knowledge of the working languages of NATO, primarily that of English, was more than 1000 in the Czech

---

<sup>84</sup> Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *op. cit.* p. 52.

<sup>85</sup> Marie Vlachova, *op cit.* p. 401.

Republic, Hungary and Poland and has exceeded critical numbers in the Slovak Republic as well. A PfP language training centre was also established in Hungary (the Partnership for Peace Military Language Training Centre) where the professionals of new members, aspirants and other PfP participating states are trained at shorter or longer courses. The courses are of varying length, ranging from one week to one academic year. The average duration of a course is five months.<sup>86</sup> English, French and German are the languages taught. The primary task is pragmatic, to teach ‘military’ language. It is a major task of the next phase that those professionals who have completed their studies at military high schools and defence academies since the beginning of the 1990s acquire an adequate command of English. After the catching up phase, it is imperative that language training reach the necessary level as part of the regular curriculum of military academies and other training facilities. As there is reason to assume that the students of these institutions are fully aware of the importance of having a good command of English, it is reasonable to assume that cadets and junior officers will devote energy to their language studies. The knowledge thus acquired makes participation in international activities, including international operations and the filling of posts in international (NATO) headquarters, much more feasible than a few years ago.<sup>87</sup> One could conclude that this has been the most convincing success story of developing expertise.

It would be false to assume, however, that the significant improvement of language abilities and the increasing importance of a good command of a foreign language were well received and supported without exception. This has resulted in a situation that proficiency ‘in English has become a valued skill, though it has led to fears among some that language abilities are valued more highly than other military

---

<sup>86</sup> For more details see <http://www.zmne.hu/tanszekek/bknyk/index.html>

<sup>87</sup> Memorably, each of the three NATO members admitted in 1999 had taken a tough stance to be eligible to fill as many international posts as possible after accession. Poland, for instance, wanted to be entitled to have 200 posts, Hungary got 50. Both countries realised quickly that they are simply unable to fill the posts due to a lack of qualified professionals. I do not blame those who negotiated their countries’ accession for this as it has been in the interest of the new member-states in the long run to have more positions available when the number of competent professionals reaches higher numbers.

professional skills'.<sup>88</sup> This has resulted in tension between military professionals who participate in international assignments and those who have no chance to do so. This is understandable as the income of officers and NCOs serving in Hungary is approximately one-eighth the NATO average, while it matches the NATO average in international missions.<sup>89</sup> As a result, those officers who are internationally 'marketable' have a chance to catch up with the incomes of employees in civilian sectors of the economy. Finally, international duties have also served to widen the gap between the professional standards of these service personnel and the remainder of the armed forces – arousing jealousy and contempt from both groups and eroding a shared sense of professional pride in the Hungarian Defence Forces.<sup>90</sup> It is obvious that time, and thus the broadening and improving language knowledge of the members of the armed forces, will bring about a solution to the problem. In sum, for a number of reasons there are some internal divisions in the armed forces of the Visegrad states. These ruptures should be eliminated so that they do not have a negative influence on the performance of the armed forces of the Visegrad countries.

It is a further common feature of the military education of [at least three of] the four Visegrad states that they are willing to consolidate their training system. The number of training institutions, particularly those of training officers, has been reduced primarily through mergers, which has been principally due to changing needs.

1. Downsizing of the armed forces has reached significant proportions. On the average in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the size of the armed forces will soon equal roughly one-third of the total peacetime personnel of the armed forces at the end of the Cold War.

---

<sup>88</sup> See László Makk, NATO-csatlakozás, értékvtáltás, egzisztencia, esélyek, karrieréptés /NATO accession, change of values, existence prospects, career-building/, *Humán Szemle*, No. 3, 1999, p. 11.

<sup>89</sup> Lajos Hülvely, Javaslat a személyi kiegészítési rendszer átalakítására II /Proposal for the change of the system of personnel substitution, part 2/, *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 6, 2001, p. 34.

<sup>90</sup> According to the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study the situation is very similar in each of the four Visegrad states.



2. The structure of the armed forces should also change. The officer corps should form a smaller part of the armed forces than in the past and the number of NCOs should increase.
3. The generation change has been facilitated by the officer corps, which retires earlier nowadays and is comparatively large, and will thus result in an increase in mobility, giving an opportunity to younger officers to move to responsible positions.

It remains to be seen, however whether the consolidation of the structure results in qualitative change. Hungary, which carried out (and seems to have completed) such consolidation first among the four in two waves, does not give much reason to feel encouraged.

## **2.4 Some National Characteristics of Security Expert Formation in the Visegrad Countries<sup>91</sup>**

It is impossible to describe security expert formation in the Visegrad group without paying adequate attention to national peculiarities. A short overview is given of some of them, which may affect their competence in security matters in the long run.

### **2.4.1 The Czech Republic**

Czechoslovakia lost 21 years of its history between 1968 and 1989. The disappointing situation as far as expertise in the national bureaucracy resulted in a situation in which the political arena, and the highest echelons of national bureaucracy, were occupied by dramatists, boilermen and window cleaners. The defence sector (similar to the broader security sector) also faced a cleaning out process that rapidly decapitated the armed forces. To put it more positively, it resulted in a quick and comprehensive depoliticisation of the armed forces. The return of a small number of defence professionals who served during the Prague spring could not compensate for the irrelevance of knowledge acquired in the Warsaw Treaty. Not to mention that the historical legitimacy of these individuals could not compensate for their lack of expertise in a genuinely democratic multi-party political environment. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Czechoslovakia, and even more the Czech Republic, after 1992 were 'relaxed' as far as security threats were concerned.<sup>92</sup>

It is interesting that the defence community still lacks extensive links and institutional base.

---

<sup>91</sup> I gratefully acknowledge the support of Dr Marie Vlachová, Ms Gabriela Mrugová, Dr Andrzej Karkoszka and Mr Mariusz Kawczynski in the writing of this part of the paper. Needless to say that the responsibility for the content rests with the author.

<sup>92</sup> I do not intend to refer to Jaroslav Hasek's Svejik in order not to offend my Czech friends. It is a fact, however, that Czechoslovakia as part of a multinational empire and later as an independent country was not particularly renowned for attributing particular importance to the armed forces among the factors of national survival and preserving national identity.

It has no 'core' of strong personalities who would present the defence community to politicians and the public and whose prestige would attract the interest of other important expert groups.<sup>93</sup>

Although the prestige of the armed forces has increased through those international operations in which they have participated, most extensively in the Balkans, it was more clearly the recognition of its operational capacity than its wider security expertise that has been recognised by the public. In the light of this, it is logical to conclude that the Czech Republic continues to have a small community of security policy experts that largely lacks socio-political influence.

The influence of non-governmental experts on defence policy is negligible in the Czech Republic, reflecting the small size of the non-governmental defence community ... and mistrust of civilian non-governmental expertise by politicians.<sup>94</sup>

This shows that the same tendency characterises the situation in the Czech Republic, which prevails in the other countries of the Visegrad group. The foundations of this situation are somewhat different from those in the other three states, nevertheless. In Hungary and Poland it is conditional on marginalisation of experts on political grounds and the 'revolving door' effect of change of government, which wipes out a good portion of the defence establishment, including more often than not the chief of general staff. In Slovakia, where the security expert community is also small, deep political division of the elite is easier to understand due to the fundamental difference between the political course of the Meciar regime and democratic (and not only democratically elected) governments. It is surprising that the influence of the expert community remained as limited as it was in the Czech Republic, which first consolidated its research in international relations and established an internationally recognised research institute; first

---

<sup>93</sup> Marie Vlachová and Stefan Sarvas, *Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic: a Journey from Social Isolation*. In: Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds), *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 51.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

under the leadership of Otto Pick and then Jirý Sedivý.<sup>95</sup> Although the agenda of the institute is dominated by broader topics than security, it has been playing an instrumental role in defining the long-term national interests of the country in this area as well.

As far as the development of security expertise in the armed forces, there are different ways to approach the matter. It is probably most simple to address the reform of the military school system. There is a tendency to downsize the military school system, which is too expensive and offers far more generous teacher–student ratios than, for example, Charles University.<sup>96</sup> Although such structural consolidation is necessary it is far from sufficient. The content of courses should be adapted as well. According to Czech experts military studies have been divided into ‘a host of different subjects and specialities’ which are not relevant for the existing or future needs of the armed forces. If there is a fairly small base of expertise in international security, there is reason to assume that training in international security may not meet international standards. External support may well be needed in this area.

The dissatisfaction with the current level of training is only one aspect of the problem, however. There are two further elements of the picture. One of them is the composition of students. According to experts the situation has improved significantly in this respect due to the increasing demand for higher education in the country. This means that the potential to provide better and more intellectually demanding education in this field is there as far as the audience is concerned. If one broadens the perspective further there is the question of what happens to those who have acquired officers’ training. Although this is not the subject matter of this paper, expert opinion reflects that as of now the qualification is not connected with a position in the Czech military. This may well be a factor which may discourage young Czechs from pursuing their studies in the military and from choosing a military career. It is obvious that the objective to improve security expertise may be achieved in a number of ways. It is indispensable to increase the knowledge that

---

<sup>95</sup> For more details see Appendix 14.1.

<sup>96</sup> This paragraph relies heavily of the analysis of Ladislav Halbestät and Marie Vlachová, ‘A Casual View in the Future: Reform of Military Education in the Czech Republic’ (unpublished manuscript), pp. 9–10.

can be acquired through military education as a precondition for improving the security expertise of those professionals who are engaged in decision-making.

#### **2.4.2 The Slovak Republic**

The situation of the Slovak Republic, a relatively young state, is not much different from that of the Czech Republic. It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that there was very limited expertise in international security matters when the system change occurred. The legacy of Slovakia has been burdened by two factors:

1. Slovakia inherited a smaller portion of professionals and thus the competence in security matters when Czechoslovakia went through the ‘velvet divorce’. Many Slovak professionals stayed in the Czech establishment.
2. The populist leadership of Vladimir Meciar and the constraints of democracy did not provide fertile ground to develop free exchange of views on such matters. It was often loyalty and not competence that mattered when selecting persons to fill key positions.<sup>97</sup>

In Czechoslovakia military forces were traditionally deployed in the western part of the country whereas the military industry and training facilities were located further to the east. The division of the country resulted in some interesting phenomena. Namely, Slovakia inherited many of the facilities and had to decide what to do with them.<sup>98</sup> The

---

<sup>97</sup> I find it necessary to repeat here that the situation might only have been somewhat better in other Visegrad countries. The difference was fundamental in several other respects. Namely, the abuse of state power (by, among others, the Secret Service) to interfere with political processes and the more extensive interference in career path on the basis of political loyalty was certainly present.

<sup>98</sup> It suffices to mention that with the exception of the Antonin Zápotocky Military Academy, located in Brno, each of the other major military training institutions were located in Slovakia. The Military Political Academy (so-called POLYTRUKS) of Bratislava, the Military Academy of Logistics in Zilina, the Military Technical Academy in Liptovsky

consolidation of this monstrous edifice resulted in the fact that only two academies are still in operation. The Military Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš and the well-known Military Air Academy in Kosice have survived. These two facilities carry out the training of officers, including foreign ones in the latter. Their curriculum is more practice-oriented and does not focus on security policy matters extensively. Slovakia thus, somewhat similarly to the Czech Republic, has relatively little to offer in security policy expert training to its military professionals.

Interestingly, no particular effort has been made to integrate broad-ranging security thinking in these institutions. Rather, another path was followed. Similar, for instance, to Poland, security policy related training concentrated on civilian institutions. At the faculty of political science and international relations of the Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, postgraduate studies can be pursued, which extend to international law, diplomacy and international affairs. There, security policy is also studied.<sup>99</sup> The introduction of postgraduate studies on international relations with specialisation in security matters occurred during the term of office of Prime Minister Mečiar and thus could be interpreted as an attempt to broaden the competence base of forces close to his government. It did not turn out that way, however. At the Comenius University of Bratislava the Institute of International Affairs and Law Approximation, the so-called Rybarik Institute of International Affairs, has a two-year postgraduate programme. The graduates are trained primarily for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to trends, an increasing number of graduates will join the state administration from the University of Economics, Faculty of International Economic Affairs, Bratislava and some will certainly address security policy matters primarily in the MFA.

---

Mikuláš and the Military Air Academy in Kosice were all part of the legacy left in Slovakia.

<sup>99</sup> Interestingly, in Cold War Czechoslovakia, postgraduate studies could be pursued in security related matters at three institutions, at the Faculty of Physical Training and Sports in Prague, at the Comenius University (pharmacy) in Bratislava and at the Faculty of Law at Brno University. From the specialisation of these institutions it is clear that studies in international security practically did not exist at the time.

The intellectual base on security matters has significantly broadened over the years in Slovakia. It is a fact, however, that security policy research centres haven't gained the level of independence that would be desirable for the proper functioning of the NGO community. Some think tanks are part of the state administration, like the Institute for Defence and Security<sup>100</sup> and the Scientific and Information Centre of the MOD. The Research Institute of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, which was no doubt closer to the opposition during Vladimir Meciar's tenure, has gained prestige both domestically and internationally. It has become part of the social and political life of Slovakia, organising public meetings regularly and publishing its high-quality English language quarterly, *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*. It is open to question, however, whether its influence will be sufficient to contribute to shaping the security policy agenda and spreading security policy expertise in the country.

### 2.4.3 Hungary

In contrast to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the transition process was gradual in Hungary. Due to some, although very limited efforts to gain some independence internationally in the mid-1980s, primarily during the so-called second Cold War, there was some foreign and security policy thinking present before the system change. It would certainly be false to speak about independent Hungarian foreign policy before 1989. Nevertheless, it is also correct to state that there was no shortage of general expertise in thinking about security when the system change occurred. Expertise became concentrated in some research institutes and university departments as well as in the foreign ministry and was to a far lesser extent present in the defence establishment.

The development of foreign and security policy expertise took place both at universities and in the process of officers training. As far as the former was concerned, teaching extended to both more systematic graduate and newly established postgraduate training, primarily at the

---

<sup>100</sup> Strangely enough, the Institute has no public website; the website is available only on the intranet of the MOD.

Budapest University of Economics (formerly Karl Marx University of Economics). International relations have already been taught for some time there, serving as alternative to studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). The latter used to serve as the prime recruitment base of Hungarian diplomacy. At the postgraduate institute, the Budapest Institute of Graduate International Studies (BIGIS) , established in 1991, the same faculty teach there as well as at the international relations department of the University of Economics. The Századvég Politikai Iskola ('End of Century' Political School) aimed to teach the future political elite. There, international relations have also been studied, although their role has understandably always been marginal. In the late 1990s the study of international relations with an emphasis on European studies started to flourish at many universities. Due to the shortage of competent professionals the level of teaching varied significantly. Due to the large portion of university graduates who studied international relations, including security policy, a situation resulted in which Hungary has become a country of self-appointed security experts. Consequently, the base of expertise is broad though the systematic knowledge is shallow.

The system of military education in Hungary went through the same change as the other Visegrad countries. Downsizing and consolidation dominated the process. It is an important difference, however, that the transformation, formally completed in 1996, took place earlier in Hungary than in other countries of the region. This process climaxed shortly after the parallel teaching of former eastern and more adequate Western command methods were terminated in military higher education. The course curriculum continued to focus on practical knowledge. It happened in 1997 when security and defence policy specialisation was introduced at the Zrinyi NDU. It has been its purpose to help develop civilian expertise in this field. The curriculum is similar to a comprehensive course in international relations in other (mostly civilian) institutions in East-central Europe with some emphasis on defence-related matters.<sup>101</sup> The launching of such a course was also a

---

<sup>101</sup> The curriculum includes courses on the theory of international relations, theory and history of strategy, history of diplomacy (including military diplomacy), arms control, comparative defence policy, regional security issues and European studies.



demonstration that it was the intention of the NDU to be a focal point of developing civilian expertise in security policy in contrast to the two successor states of Czechoslovakia. In the Czech and Slovak Republics security policy training will continue to be concentrated in civilian education for some time to come. The fact that many of the first security policy experts, trained at the Zrinyi NDU and graduated first in summer 2002, have been facing difficulties in finding appropriate jobs is an illustration that more lip service is paid to the need for civilian expertise in security matters than real recognition given.

The Zrinyi Miklós National Defence University inherited a good part of the faculty of the Zrinyi Military Academy, which has not made transition easy. The NDU, in spite of downsizing, is overstaffed and the selection of faculty has not in each case been the most successful. It remains to be seen when willingness to catch up will be backed by determined action to carry out sufficiently comprehensive reform.

It is interesting that it was made clear for the public in Hungary that the training of military professionals did not reach the required level. It is clear that dissatisfaction exists primarily regarding the tactical and operational abilities of the Hungarian armed forces and has never been pointed particularly towards their understanding of security policy. It was probably unique that it was the (now outgoing) Chief of General Staff who expressed the critical view in an article after three years in office. As responsibility for training rests with him ultimately, it is difficult to interpret his criticism for the average trainee.<sup>102</sup>

Hungary has a good number of security policy (or more broadly international relations) experts and a tradition of developing security expertise dating before the system change of 1989–90. This is the case in spite of the fact that research in this area could be more closely intertwined with some persons than with institutions, i.e. contrary to the Czech Republic and Slovakia where during the 1990s one prominent institution has developed its image and has become an important player both domestically and internationally, the same cannot be said about the

---

<sup>102</sup> See Lajos Fodor, 'A kiképzés a készenlét alapköve [Training is the keystone of preparedness]', *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, No. 12, 2001, pp. 3–6.

Hungarian 'scene'. There are several institutions acting in the area, but recognition centres on a few personalities, rather than institutes. The lack of pooling of resources, unstable leaderships and insufficient governmental support to institutions dealing with international security resulted in a loss of competitiveness compared with other countries of the region. The gradual elimination of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs by merging it into the structure of the László Teleki Foundation is a part of this comparative loss of competitiveness. The leadership of that institution 'changed with the wind' without any reform that would have made it suitable to serve as the centre of research on international relations. The Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, an institution which could serve as a natural centre of research and outreach in international security, has been changed to be an 'Office' for Strategic and Defence Studies. It is now a background institution of the Ministry of Defence. The fact that these two institutions, in spite of the efforts of some of their professionals, have not been able to play central role in the study of international security resulted in two phenomena:

1. Some old institutions, notably the Institute of World Economy, modified their agendas and expanded their programmes to international relations generally.
2. Some new institutions have been competing in this field, which is a healthy sign.

It is questionable, however, how often these institutions could carry out independent research due to the lack of adequate financing and shortage of intellectual resources.

In sum, in spite of the efforts of some individuals due to the absence of a long-term concept of training and research in international security and inadequate financing and fragmentation of the institutional framework, the comparative advantage Hungary might have enjoyed at the end of the 1980s has gradually disappeared.

#### **2.4.4 Poland**

Poland, similarly to Hungary, experienced a gradual change to democracy. In spite of martial law introduced in December 1981 there was an intellectual awareness of international security well before the system change. The Polish Institute of International Affairs and its activities in the 1970s and a part of the 1980s should be mentioned in particular. Although the institute was prematurely closed, many of the leading Polish experts in this area were once collaborators of that institute.

It seems that the last decade was efficiently used to develop the necessary institutional framework either to teach or to study international security according to the needs of an integrated middle power of Europe. In contrast to any of the other three countries, Poland has been developing a system where both civilian and military higher education can make a relevant contribution to the teaching of international security. While the civilian educational institutions have gradually built up their expertise and now have a lot to offer, particularly as far as postgraduate studies military training institutions are concerned, they still have their own input and will have to face some consolidation and downscaling in the years to come. It is not clear how this will affect their approach to security policy. The consolidation has started with merging a civilian and military institution of medical training. It is premature to conclude how the process will continue. It is certain, however, that the consolidation of military training through downsizing is indispensable when considering the downsizing of the Polish armed forces continues uninterrupted. It is a further question whether difficulties that are so familiar in other Visegrad countries, most importantly the insufficient adaptation of course curricula to the changed conditions, also characterise Poland.

There are two civilian institutions which offer postgraduate studies in international security. They are the Institute of International Relations of Warsaw University and the recently established Diplomatic Academy. The latter was recently established in order to meet the emerging needs of the Polish foreign service. It is clear that Poland has realised that its security policy training has become increasingly obsolete, despite the

fact that international cooperation, in the form of the training of some professionals abroad, contributes to the evolution. Such courses, offered by the Marshall Centre, the NATO Defence College, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and several Western European and North American national training institutions may be complementary, but they certainly cannot satisfy more extensive needs. The formation of a larger group of security experts can only be carried out nationally. This should not exclude reliance on international experience, however.

## **2.5 Conclusions**

In spite of the author's sceptical opinion about the Visegrad group and its prospects, one may conclude that there are some similarities in the expert training of the four countries that make analysis possible. These are primarily due to the common Warsaw Treaty background of the four, the similar external expectations towards their militaries and the same confines these states have been facing during their socio-economic transition. There are also major differences, however, due to the different size, duration of sovereign statehood and history of the countries which makes it impossible to confine the analysis to similarities.

The most important determining factor of security policy expert training in the Visegrad group is that since the end of the East–West conflict a series of defence reforms and adaptations have taken place in East-central Europe. They were partly due to developments in the world at large, ranging from the end of the Cold War (including both the revolutions in East-central Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union), to the dominance of non-international armed conflict and the highly effective application of asymmetric warfare by non-combatants, partly due to the perceived internal need of practically every new government in the region to address and reform the structure of defence. These, taken together, have resulted in a situation in which the organic development of the defence sector has been interrupted several times. Consequently, it was extremely difficult to set the priorities right in expert formation and the efforts have remained at best partly successful.

It is interesting that although extensive information is available concerning the shortcomings in the performance of the four, particularly by their not meeting the expectations of military (including both material and intellectual) interoperability in the Atlantic Alliance, the information on preparation/training/formation that has resulted in this situation does not exist or is not accessible. Therefore it is possible to speak about a *black box* where we know the output and, in a formal sense, also the input, but we are ill-informed about the process between the entry and the exit points.

The formation of security policy experts has taken place on different grounds. Whereas in the two countries, Hungary and Poland, where transition from 'socialism' was gradual, there is sufficient, if not abundant, security policy expertise. On the other hand, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia it is scarce. There is a small group of competent persons in those countries as well, but the broadening of the intellectual base is a necessary task. In the case of Poland and Hungary it may be more important to contribute to the development of strategic thinking and the neglected operational capability than to assume that further security policy expertise should be imported by the two. It is apparent, however, that the expertise of the security policy community of Hungary and Poland is also pretty slim when faced with new challenges. Namely, it was disappointing to listen to the clichés presented by the most renowned experts of some of these countries immediately after 11 September and the subsequent re-arrangements of some of the foundations of international security. There is reason to conclude that the situation is not much better in other countries of similar size and that it is rather exceptional that small security communities are able to develop comprehensive expertise in international security.

It is an interesting commonality of the process that, although we are quite familiar with shortcomings in competence attained by security experts and military professionals, it is difficult to gain direct information about the shortcomings of expert formation and training. This results in a *black box* effect where it is only assumed that formation and training are responsible for the rather poor output.

Even though the four countries have travelled a long way and the foundations of thinking about security and defence is present more than at the time of the system change, their security expert formation is far from finished. The national efforts and also some collective efforts inside NATO through some institutions, which have the development of such expertise among their core missions, can still be complemented by targeted assistance. According to my impression such assistance may be necessary as follows. It is necessary to start out from the tasks of the defence sector of these countries and conclude that there is some selection of unfittest in each country. This means that some experts are kept away from directly influencing the development of security policy while incompetent people are shaping the agenda. Hence, it is necessary to train those who have the influence, though not the competence, rather than trying to influence the countries to absorb those competent persons who are systematically marginalised for political or other reasons.

It is a fact that there is little stability in the higher echelon of the national bureaucracy who address security issues. Although lip service is paid to the stability of the civil service, in the end loyalty and political sympathies have mattered more than sheer competence. There is reason to assume that the situation will not change fundamentally any time soon. This means that after every election a number of persons enter the higher echelon of the national bureaucracies who need urgent training in their field of responsibility, though not expertise. Such training could be provided at short executive courses in case the national bureaucracies are ready to recognise such need. The process of providing such expertise has started though it has neither been extensive nor targeted enough.

According to the impression of the author, one of the weak points of the system is the competence of those who train the next generation of military professionals. As their replacement is gradual, it may be necessary to accept that it is an area where these countries may need urgent external support. As the security expert community of the Visegrad states, similarly to many other countries of East-central and Eastern Europe is small, the 'teaching of the teachers' programme may contribute effectively to the completion of transition.

Last, but not least there is one common challenge each Visegrad country will face in the short run. It is the transition to fully professional armed forces. There is apparently little understanding about the complexity of such transition and about the fundamentally different character of fully professional armed forces compared to mass armies based on conscription. It is an area where targeted training by professionals of those countries, which went through similar transition lately in all its aspects, may offer significant returns.

It may well be that it is not the Visegrad countries which cause the biggest headache to the Atlantic Alliance as far as security expert formation is concerned. Due to the fact, however, that three states of the group joined NATO in its first wave of eastern enlargement, it may be of wider interest to demonstrate that they have the potential to catch up with other countries of longer democratic tradition in terms of their professional expertise in international security.

## **APPENDIX 1      USEFUL WEBSITES TO STUDY SECURITY POLICY EXPERT FORMATION IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES**

### **1.1      Civilian Training Institutions**

*Czech Republic*

*Slovak Republic:*

www.fpvvmv.sk Matej Bel University, Faculty of Political Science and  
International Relations, Banskà Bystrica (in Slovak and English)

*Hungary:*

www.bke.hu Budapest University of Economics (in Hungarian and English)

*Poland:*

Institute of International Relations of Warsaw University

www.msz.gov.pl Diplomatic Academy (in Polish and English) (available  
through the website of the Foreign Ministry of Poland)

www.ie.lodz.pl European Institute, Lodz (in Polish)

### **1.2      Military Training Institutions<sup>103</sup>**

*Czech Republic:*

www.vabo.cz Military Academy in Brno (in Czech and English)

www.army.cz (in Czech and English)

*Slovak Republic:*

www.vlake.sk Military Air Academy, Kosice (in Slovak and English)

*Hungary:*

www.zmne.hu 'Zrinyi Miklos' National Defence University (in Hungarian and  
English)

*Poland:*

www.wp.mil.pl (in Polish and English)

---

<sup>103</sup> Please note that course curricula are only exceptionally available through the websites, they are often sketchy and dated; particularly the English versions.



[www.aon.edu.pl](http://www.aon.edu.pl) National Defence Academy (in Polish)  
[www.wat.waw.pl](http://www.wat.waw.pl) Military Technical Academy, Warsaw (in Polish)  
[www.amw.gdynia.pl](http://www.amw.gdynia.pl) Naval Academy, Gdynia (in Polish and English)  
[www.wsosp.deblin.pl](http://www.wsosp.deblin.pl) Air Force Officer's College, Deblin (in Polish)  
[www.am.lodz.pl](http://www.am.lodz.pl) Medical University in Lodz (based on the former Lodz Medical Academy and the Military Medical Academy)

### **A1.3 Think Tanks**

#### *Czech Republic:*

[www.iir.cz](http://www.iir.cz) Institute of International Affairs Prague (in Czech and English)

#### *Slovak Republic:*

[www.sfpa.sk](http://www.sfpa.sk) Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (in Slovak and English)

[www.ivo.sk](http://www.ivo.sk) Institute for Public Affairs (in Slovak and English)

[www.sims.sk](http://www.sims.sk) Central European Institute for International Studies (in Slovak and English)

#### *Hungary:*

[www.tla.hu](http://www.tla.hu) László Teleki Foundation (includes the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, the successor of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs) (in Hungarian and English)

[www.vki.hu](http://www.vki.hu) Institute of World Economy (in Hungarian and English)

#### *Poland :*

[www.kbn.gov.pl](http://www.kbn.gov.pl) Committee for Scientific Research (in English)

[www.osw.waw.pl](http://www.osw.waw.pl) Centre for Eastern Studies (in Polish, Russian and English)

[www.eurodialog.org.pl](http://www.eurodialog.org.pl) Institute of Central and Eastern Studies (in Polish and English)

[www.omp.org.pl](http://www.omp.org.pl) Centre for Political Thought (in Polish and English)

**Janos Szabo**<sup>104</sup>

## **CONCLUSIONS I: THE FORMATION AND PROSPECTS OF EXPERTS IN THE SECURITY SECTORS OF SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**

### **3.1 Introduction**

The defence sectors of Southeast European countries devoted to a fully fledged change in their social structure and oriented towards democratic parliamentary systems and competitive market economies. These countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldavia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine also recognized the necessity of adapting to the requirements of a civil or democratic control. Within this adaptation to the new norms the most important questions are: whether there are defence experts – and if so, of what quality – and what institutional background can guarantee the activities of new type of defence experts in the institutions of defence sector? The present study will summarise those needs and experiences felt to be synthesisable on the issue of recruiting, training and activities of the defence experts of the above-mentioned countries in order that such general interrelations may be utilised.

---

<sup>104</sup> Professor Szabo, who had been researching the Stock-Taking topic independently, has kindly consented to share his thoughts with us on the future of expert formation in transition countries.

### **3.2. Changes in the Social System in the Former Soviet Bloc Countries**

The Soviet-type party-governed countries were far from identical. Behind the similar symbols and ideologies fairly different structures and systems existed. However, common to all the Soviet-model countries was the lack of pluralism and party-state system. And this is no wonder as the history and social-economic realities are very different for each country in the region.

The civil-military relations in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc can be analysed by taking into account the great variety of differences. It is paramount to emphasise the well-known fact that armed forces in these countries had a twofold mission: an external mission – to protect the country from its potential external enemies, and an internal mission – to protect the party-state system from its internal opposition. Within these states the armed forces functioned under a close control of the hegemonic, often monopolistic Communist Party.

At the same time, however, there were clear signs of an extremely close relation between political and military structures and personnel. This fundamental difference in civil-military relations between the Soviet model and the Western democracies originated from the simple fact that a democratic political system is able to survive without supportive military structures while a Communist system is not.

Militarist tendencies were easy to detect in the social life of the countries based on the Soviet model. Certain elements of military education, for example, became a part of general socialisation and were embedded into the education of young children and youth. Various types of paramilitary organisations were established by the state-parties. Apart from these organisations, science, technology and national economy were militarised and the armed forces also took up the task of political socialisation and indoctrination.

The Communist Party needed armed forces that were loyal to the social system and willing to defend it both from its external and internal enemies. For this reason, the armed forces were so deeply penetrated by

the Party and one of the preconditions of taking a military career was the loyalty to the Party as well. On the other hand the armed forces – or at least the military elite – also needed the Party in order to preserve or improve their financial condition, their share of power, and some elements of their social prestige. (The improvement of all elements of social prestige would have been made possible by a general legitimacy of the armed forces which was, however, impossible for various reasons.)

Analysing the changes, it should also be highlighted how important the differences among the armed forces of various countries were.

The post-1989 changes of the social system liberated the aspirations of the peoples in the Central European region, populated by nearly 100 million people. Those, however, developed not only towards rational economic and political forms but also towards ethnic urges and unfounded hopes, marked as backwaters of history. The armed forces played a distinct role in this process in every country depending on whether they remained the supporters of reasonable aspirations or followed the sounds of sirens.

The multifunctional character of the armed forces became a daily issue again in the countries of the region. It greatly depended, however, on whether the armed forces became the protectors of national sovereignty and security or openly intervened in policy-making and changing the internal balance of power. The temptation of praetorianism (the emergence of the armed forces as an independent power factor) was mentioned as a permanent threat in the societies of changes.

At the time of the collapse of Soviet model-based Central and Eastern European regimes the option of deploying the armed forces was seriously contemplated by both the conservative supporters of the regimes and the radical driving elite of the changes. The direct participation of the armed forces in the Romanian ‘revolution’, for example, was considered as obvious, for instance, as servicemen were said to have fought on both sides of the barricades. Before 21 December 1989 the Romanian Armed Forces executed the orders to open fire at demonstrations in Timisoara, Bucuresti and Cluj. Later, however, they

refused to carry out Ceausescu's orders and played a crucial role in capturing, bringing to summary court martial and executing the dictator. A separate study could be devoted to the role of armed forces in the breakout and conservation of the Yugoslav crisis and in the peace process or in the preparation and suppression of the Russian coup d'état.

A superficial analysis of the facts that have been not yet entirely explored shows that the armed forces of the Central and Eastern European countries played a significant role in domestic policy on both sides: both in undermining the previous regimes and in their preservation. Career soldiers played fairly different roles in influencing political processes and supporting conservative or radical forces even within one country. In the process of the changes of the social system the role of the armed forces is of importance in two interrelated fields: on the one hand their influence on the support of impediment of political, economic, and social processes of the transformation and on the other hand their achievements in the field of their self-transformation which is rebuilding their own structures, values and ways of operation.

Researchers of democratic transformation have short-listed a great number of steps which should be made during the process by a country that has chosen that way of development. They agree on the fact that features like control over the decisions made by elected officials, regular free elections, a general right to vote for the adults, the right to be elected to a wide range of offices, the freedom to found a political party or a civil society, the right to join a political party or society, and civil control over the armed forces are regarded as preconditions and requirements of a democratic transformation.

Essentially the field of civil control over the armed forces or in a wider sense the democratic military-societal relations are regarded by most researchers as a synchronising of political pluralism and the armed forces and their professional personnel and also as a subordination of armed forces to civil policy-making. Some also add that it is very problematic if there is too close a relation between officer corps and any political party as it is inconsistent with the role of armed forces in modern society.

During the process of structural military transformations within the general transition, dramatic changes took place both in national security policy and defence systems. After getting rid of the old party-state structures the democratic transition in the defence sector, according to most experts, could develop in three main fields: exercising democratic control over the entire defence sector, reorganising civil-military relations, and accomplishing defence reforms.

The new developments generated by changes in social system in the Central and Eastern European regions resulted in a new approach to the armed forces. In each of the affected countries, although to a different extent and at different times, a reduction of the armed forces was launched. In all, these reductions were of larger scale than similar changes in the developed democracies. The reason for this is that the armed forces of the former Eastern Bloc were generally oversized and societies following the Soviet model were over-militarised. The new ideal armed forces were ‘small but highly professional armed forces’.

As has already been mentioned, reductions of armed forces varied greatly. In countries where the perception of threat was low and the armed forces were not very prestigious (for example in the Czech Republic or in Hungary) the changes were much more deep, rapid, and intensive than in countries with a higher perception of threat and more prestigious armed forces (in Romania or Poland, for instance).

Apart from this, a redefinition of security policy principles and structures also became an imperative.

### **3.3 Some Specific Features of the Changes of Defence System in the Southeast European Countries**

At first glance Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldavia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine seem to be countries with similar characteristics of the same geographic region. At least three very important differences should be identified in this group of countries. The first difference is the conflict-rich state of former Yugoslav republics of the Balkan region characterised by wars, military

clashes, demands towards one another and multiple sovereignty. Bulgaria and Romania belong to another group dominated by post-communist relations and extremely problematic economic situations and stabilisation efforts. In the case of Romania this situation is further complicated by the legacy of an armed revolution and the deployment of Romanian armed forces by both players. An important feature of both countries is their long-time sovereign statehood, which the others do not have. The third group of countries comprises Moldavia and Ukraine, whose secession from the Soviet Empire resulted in a number of unfortunate legacies and extraordinary deficiencies. A unifying factor in the region is, however, that all three country-groups are forced to manage some very specific conflicts rooted back in history, and also in modern times generated by the change of social system.

Therefore, it should not be assumed that ambitions to approach EU and NATO standards are motivated by similar conditions. Realities and values behind these objectives reveal very diverse importance when these countries declare their intentions to develop defence sectors in this direction. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria – due to their long-time independence and the fact that Romania was not ruined by the events of the 1989 revolution – the economic, political situation and conditions and problems are fairly similar. The positions of the armed forces, however, are not identical. In Romania the armed forces seem to be more present; their dominance being supported by a higher level of threat perception. In Bulgaria the role of the armed forces is somewhat less significant. The institutions of civil control and expert training within both countries have relatively good chances of achieving a European level with the support of international organisations, the Partnership for Peace program, and Higher Education Consortium. As for Ukraine and Moldavia, their completely new statehood was impaired by a characteristic legacy of governments, power structures and media, coupled with the novelty of independence and national confidence. Besides these hardships, the lack of traditions in the field of civil control should also be mentioned. All this conditioned those difficulties whose resolution can support the progress (among others) in the field of civil control, expert training for these institutions and the making available of their expertise.

The most serious problems can be observed in the group of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. These states struggle with extreme tensions, and a nearly permanent threat of war in spite of the fact that peacekeeping operations have been able to localise armed conflicts for a long time.

It can be claimed that these countries are situated in the crossfire of emotions generated by wartime damage, large and suppressed societal unrest, despair due to losses – in each country many lives were lost during the war. Simultaneous to wartime destruction and disorganisation, resources required for developing democratic institutions necessary for the development of the armed forces were also destroyed by the war.

Nowadays, these countries are harbouring a significant amount of aversion to internal strife. Their success in managing this problem could be crucial in harmonising their efforts and resources with the democratisation of their countries including the improvement of conditions of civil control over the armed forces which also includes the creation of expertise and a pool of experts without which the systems are not operational.

### **3.4 Civil-Military Relations as a System of Relations**

The reform of civil-military relations and the introduction of civil control over the armed forces became a key issue for the Central and Eastern European countries. This situation presented unavoidable problems for the political elite and their armed forces. Civil-military relations include defence, governmental, administrative and legislative relations and also relations between armed forces and society. Taking a closer look at defence and governmental relations basically means focusing on the institutions of democratic control.

Chris Donnelly is said to have declared: ‘if there are no problems with civil-military relations and democratic control over armed forces in a country, there is no democracy in that country’. In fact it can be considered logical that there is a permanent tension between military and



civilians in the course of the day-to-day control. The quality of relations has always depended on the quality of those channels through which these tensions can freely move toward resolution.

In the Central and Eastern European countries two fundamental tendencies can be noticed with regard to civil-military relations. One of them is the traditional trend characterised by the great prestige attached to the armed forces within society. The military profession is highly appreciated by these societies. It is well indicated by a relatively high salary, which is over the average, to those who pursue this career; the public accepts the institutions of compulsory military service; and the citizens meet these expectations. The armed forces are relatively influential and are regarded as a guard and supporter of national sovereignty. The armed forces are widely supported by the public and regarded as a school of the nation. A typical feature of traditional relations is the less developed informal sector and defence community. In these cases soldiers or former soldiers are the greatest experts in the field of defence and security questions (as it can be seen in Romania and Bulgaria).

Another tendency, which exceeds the traditional one, is characterised by disillusioned popular attitudes towards the armed forces. Here the armed forces have little social prestige, which is demonstrated by the average or below-average salary of career soldiers, the relatively low-level attractiveness of military professions and by a growing demand for preferences, professional career-stimulators. The political influence of the armed forces is minimal, the dominance of politicians – even in defence-related issues! – is obvious and accepted unconditionally. In the societal attitudes there are fairly significant doubts about the preparedness, and deployability of the armed forces in conflict situations. An increasingly small proportion of population regards the armed forces as the main factor of defence, and security. In this trend the political and diplomatic elements and institutions of security are growing increasingly significant.

It should be noticed here, that in these countries there is a significantly different attitude towards the armed forces between particular social strata. It is a general fact that older strata, with lower level of education

and little mobility support the armed forces and have a positive attitude towards them, while the younger, better educated and more mobile strata have a high level of apathy and disillusionment towards the armed forces and reinforce tendencies in opposition to the traditional trends.

### **3.5 Democratic Control as a Process**

Democratic control has always been a two-way process between the armed forces and society, which can never be simplified to a dictatorship of politicians over the military. Since the post-1989 changes of social system the building of institutions and functions of democratic control has been a significant objective that must not be ignored.

For the new political elite one of the first things done was to remove formally the interconnections between the Party and the military thus making the armed forces a policy-free institution. Power was divided in accordance with the presidential, governmental, and parliamentary fields of responsibility. Civilian Ministers of Defence were appointed and the General Staffs were placed under governmental control in peacetime.

Besides the formal measures, however, the operation of structures and functions generated more symbolic than real changes in many cases. The analyses disclosed a number of signs indicating that the new structures had not met a lot of requirements of democratic control yet. The major problems are as follows.

First, there are a lot of inconsistencies in the legislative and constitutional regulation of defence issues. Today they generate significantly fewer problems than in the early 1990s; however, their existence is still detectable. One of these inconsistencies is that the division of power is not defined clearly, concretely and precisely enough for the spheres of authority of the President, government, Defence Minister, and Chief of General Staff. In this respect the main problem is that in the execution of the existing acts the elements of constitutional responsibilities can be interpreted in various ways by the various players. Lately, as NATO-aspirations grow stronger a great number of countries have made significant progress in eliminating these

inconsistencies of the constitutional regulation. However, this driving force is insufficient where the amount of interfering features is significantly higher.

The second problem is the lack or very limited number of well-prepared civil experts supporting these processes. It is partly because of the low-level societal and political affinity towards military issues and partly because of the underdeveloped civil expertise in the field of security and defence issues. Even if accepting the explanation that the limited and unprepared nature of the experts is a direct result of the military separation from the party-state era, the efforts made for eliminating the negative legacy 10–12 years after the change of social system should be evaluated – as some country studies point out – as problematic.

The third difficulty is that the armed forces often avoid measures aimed at executing the elements of democratic control and as a kind of response they launch campaigns for reinforcing their own structure and staff. The post-communist armed forces are linked to civil society as a special military community.

The fourth characteristic is that among certain political parties and the armed forces some old-type relations which were aimed at mobilising the armed forces for providing support to particular interests, (relative to all-national progress) remain intact. These nationalistic tendencies may generate unjustified hopes and expectations in the armed forces – or in certain groups within the military – concerning their ambitions to regain their former positions and societal dominance as the guards of national sovereignty.

The fifth point is that from time to time there are overt attempts made by the military to break the principles of democratic control and have some political influence as supporters of the newly elected elite.

Some analysts clearly claim that democratic control grew into a tactic instead of a general strategy and there is a permanent discrepancy between structures and the realities of civil dominance. Others challenge this opinion warning about realism. They highlight the fact that a full-scale establishment and comprehensive introduction of democratic

control requires a long-term process and the identification of efficient resolutions cannot be independent from the existing (and very much different) cultural, historical, and economic factors of the involved countries.

Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that especially ambitious and more or less consistent measures were taken by those countries which committed themselves towards changes in accordance with their NATO membership and EU integration.

### **3.6 The Position of Civil Defence Experts**

The civil defence-security experts who were naturalised in the democratic institutions of these countries form a specific factor in the civil control of the countries of the region. Analysing this stratum the preparedness of Members of Parliament and defence administration staff of local municipalities; the positions of their advisory boards and personal experts; the qualification of the leaders and personnel of civil security services should be discussed. The level of training and qualification of personnel, civil servants and administrative staff of police forces, justice, penal authorities, and other fundamental law-enforcement agencies should also be analysed. Those qualified experts who participate in scientific research and public discourse employed by universities, research institutions and NGOs should also be taken into consideration.

The establishment of NGOs, a fundamentally new event in this region, deserves special attention.

The preparedness of media managers – both in electronic and printed press – and journalist staff, their working conditions and – especially – qualifications are to be discussed here.

As research indicates, for different reasons, the defence sectors of Southeast European countries (and the pool of defence experts as well) have been basically characterised by regional disorganisation since the early 1990s. Typically the features are: survival of institutions and

knowledge acquired during the previous party-state period and based on the Soviet model; and the lack of resources and coordinated efforts to introduce and implement new structures compatible with Western ones. The interpretation, naturally, differed everywhere, and the reform of security and defence sectors was launched while the elaboration and execution of defence policies began. Parallel with the realisation of military doctrines the reduction of armed forces, reduction of compulsory service time, and introduction of civil service were launched. In all, democratic control over the armed forces was institutionalised and spread over previously closed areas such as defence budget planning, and its transparency. (The transparency of budget planning has already been introduced in establishing new forms of border guards – especially in the new countries.)

The analysis of civil control over defence sector indicates that its efficiency depends primarily on the expertise level of participants. The major question refers to the expertise of bodies and institutions executing civil control.

Defence experts belong to the first group. Many of the decision-makers simply do not have advisory backup and frequently, if there is a very primitive advisory-like network, it is usually based on political party preferences or sometimes family relations and has no solid backup of studies or experience.

In spite of the fact that military advisory activities play an extremely important role in a number of questions – ranging from domestic defence decisions to military diplomatic issues – the centre-right parties lack their advisory network and even the advisory groups with highly developed connections have limited influence within their circles. In this situation only very slow progress can be made.

If and where there are advisors, they come from former military personnel, and/or retired officers who have fairly low-level ideas concerning new trends and values in the armed forces. Their fundamental experience is rooted back in the old military structures and their personal bonds, connections, confidence and preferences are stronger than their expertise.

The fundamental expertise of non-military experts is concentrated on economic and legal fields. Besides, there is a significant difference between the up-to-date nature and the quality of their preparedness. Most of these experts graduate from short-term seminars and usually lack that experience which is necessary for knowledge of European values in security policy. Some of them speak foreign languages and have a good knowledge of information technology but most of them lack these kinds of capacities. Non-military experts do not make up a coherent group in these countries and tend to consist of certain politicians operating in randomly formed groups. They have little or no intention and interest in further and continuous training as their positions are rather instable and can be made redundant any time, which makes excessive invention very risky.

The heads of civil services are usually civilians – Heads of Departments, Directors, Heads of Directorates – with support from international companies and institutions but with fundamental military backup. These are employees who have close connections with various agencies of the Ministry of the Interior and usually cooperate with Interpol. The expertise of MPs presents an especially difficult problem as they are expected to make decisions at legislative level. They are assigned to various working committees, programmes, councils and delegations, in most cases basically by the trust of their voters. The existence of necessary expertise and professional background is hardly a crucial issue for the Parliamentary bureaucracy ('If office is given, talent is given'). Unfortunately, with similar backgrounds, assignments even in international committees can be taken, which include public appearances in international affairs, without expecting them to have such preparations. There are very few countries – Poland can be an exception – that have certain expectations towards MPs to do certain prep-courses and MPs can begin their activities in the Defence Committee only after accomplishing them. No similar MP obligations are known in the countries of the region in question.

It is very important to evaluate the professional knowledge of the armed forces, police, penal authorities and various security services. Some of their personnel graduated from military training establishments and

institutions while others were recruited from graduates of civil institutions, colleges and universities. The range is very wide: it can be stated that General Staffs and Joint Commands which are usually responsible for carrying out military reforms are well-prepared in the field of military issues; however, in other cases this is rather problematic. At the same time, the knowledge acquired by military personnel and taught in military training establishments is too little for civilians' expectations. What they miss the most is that military personnel is not provided with the background knowledge necessary for civil policy-making which – according to widespread opinions – can be taught in civil research institutes, universities and other institutions regarded by politicians as democratic and not in military training establishments. The number of qualified experts with a masters degree, PhD diploma, sufficient scientific works published, is relatively low in the defence sector. Not only is there a general deficit in this sector in most countries, but the academic acknowledgement of the few existing ones is extremely low. The most common explanations of their under-representation are claimed as follows: resistance to accepted changes, military isolationism for multiple reasons and a low salary. Sometimes – seldom – university departments also take up certain elements of teaching that can be useful for the defence sector but these hardly ever make up a systematic and consistent knowledge.

Naturally, through their international relations, they receive an increasing amount of university cooperation models that they utilise fairly well.

The best-prepared civil research institutes – the NGOs – have done significant work since the change of social system and have developed a great deal but the number of NGOs specialising in the defence field is still rather low. However, they maintain highly sensitive societal relations and are able to communicate defence-related issues efficiently. Most of them are characterised by random structures and non-systematic organisations. Their best-prepared military experts are former military officers and also civilians with some affinity to the issues of armed forces.

The position of the media is fairly typical. On the one hand the previous party-state style approach, playing down problems, advertising positive features and events, is definitely over. On the other hand, however, depending on the political dominance of the armed forces in a country, the press is inclined to hold its criticism. In countries where a critical approach is clear and comprehensive it is an obvious sign that the political dominance of the armed forces is over and the media has taken a key position in civil control.

Within the activities of local municipalities defence issues are, for the most part, not even of secondary importance. Usually local municipalities do not have resources nor experts. Their main problem is how to live off the economic capacities in their territory and how to run local administration. That is why defence matters come to the foreground only in endangered regions and involve the best experts.

Similar to the media, local municipalities also frequently use counter-selection for filling the ranks of their defence staff where the committees are made up or headed by experts who are useless in any other fields.

In the present situation it is paramount – and absolutely understandable – that these countries rather frequently utilise foreign support when and where international organisations and/or foundations offer training opportunities. The support provided by the Centre for European Studies, Tempus, and other foundations, are used by them for training their new generation of experts.

As far as civilians are concerned it is very important to provide a proper management for deficiencies experienced in expert training, to couple the control of defence issues with the required level of expertise, and to keep defence, security and armed forces under control in the framework of open and public discourse.

The most crucial part of new training and education consists of gathering and adapting foreign models. In this aspect the role of international seminars and workshops can be considered crucial not only for the naturalisation of international standards but also for establishing a pool of experts in every country, which has authentic information and reliable



knowledge and able to discuss new developments. In general, it can be claimed that both the NGOs and trainings are poor and under-financed, begging for resource improvement.

### **3.7 Military Education in the Post-Communist Armed Forces**

Due to the large-scale downsizing of the armed forces, systems of military education also experienced fairly significant cutbacks. Education reform had a comprehensive impact on the institutions of officer education and NCO training. There was unlimited quantitative reduction of military schools and training centres and widespread depoliticising and de-ideologising of education.

The isolation of military education from the civil sector was abandoned everywhere. Civil institutions of higher education (universities and colleges) took up a number of research projects while military personnel were provided a chance to study at and graduate from civil colleges and universities. Military schools opened for civilians, even for those who did not plan on taking up a military career. The easy accessibility of defence knowledge and openness of military higher education to the entire society has emerged in every country of the region.

Another extremely important factor is the opportunity to graduate from foreign military schools. Not only is it significant for the increase of education level of officer corps but also for learning and adapting the experience and models of armed forces in Western democracies. Western military academies, colleges and other forms of education became accessible for the best of the current servicemen of the former Warsaw Pact states. Hundreds of soldiers graduated from Western military schools. In most of the countries, however, inserting the well-trained and educated personnel in the military structure, their assignments, utilisation of their special knowledge and qualification present a serious problem. It is not surprising that young officers and non-commissioned officers sent to foreign training feel uneasy under the command and supervision of their older colleagues affected with obsolete conditioning after return to their countries. Quite a few officers

who took their high qualification in Western educational institutions leave the defence sector for financial reasons.

Since the change of social system, part of the changes in the structures of military schools are aimed at the same objectives and the only difference between countries is the extent of the progress. In another field of changes bigger differences exist among the military education systems of the countries of the region. Nevertheless, it would be premature to speak about the final and ultimate state of the officer training systems in these countries as they are in a state of rapid changes and reorganisation.

Military experts are prepared both at a higher level of education (university and college levels) and at special and postgraduate levels by the military schools of the region. The curricula of the military schools are adjusted to those of the civil training systems so that in-service and prospective soldiers attending these courses – except for special courses – are allowed to graduate in social or medical sciences, arts or technology. It is not extraordinary, however, that curricula do not follow Western standards as they are often based on the knowledge and capacities of the academic staffs which are under retraining themselves.

Nearly all military schools have already adapted the Western model of education allowing a two-stage training. After 2–4 years of studies cadets/students can graduate and after five years of studies a full scientific qualification is provided. Nevertheless, security, political and social studies have just begun to target civil–military relations.

### **3.8 Relations between Media, Research on the Armed Forces**

In the countries of the region public civil control over the armed forces (exercised through mass media) is a common phenomenon. Every important medium delegates its independent journalists to continuous monitoring of the events in the defence sector and the armed forces. The attitude of these journalists largely depends on traditions, the extent of transformation in the armed forces, real independence of media, and the civil-military relations in the country.

It is remarkable that journalists in Romania have by-and-large a positive approach to the armed forces while in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia the media is extremely critical about the transformation of the armed forces, focusing more on failures and problems than on highlighting successes.

The public in Romania has a positive attitude towards the armed forces and judged by the images reflected by press the relations between mass media and the armed forces are nearly idyllic and the same is revealed by public survey information. This image is especially flattering if compared to that of other post-communist countries. Some experts, therefore, have serious doubts concerning the freedom of media, or their independence in connection with military issues, to be more precise.

The armed forces in every country of the region have their own military periodicals (newspapers and magazines with different circulation and issuance) that inform personnel on current issues of the military. Some of these publications are also on sale publicly but have little or no influence outside the armed forces.

Military-related research in societies structured by the Soviet model belonged to the ideologically controlled sector, i.e. it was under the control of the Party. Independent scientific research was non-existent and leaving behind this legacy makes for a long and difficult uphill struggle. Civil research institutes are not very much interested in defence issues. This, compounded with a serious deficit in qualified civil experts dealing with security, defence and military science issues makes open debates over defence issues poor. Last but not least, it is extremely difficult to obtain the required resources for important research projects like research in the field of military society, for example.

Nevertheless, within the armed forces of each country mentioned above there are social studies conducted by departments, institutes of various military schools, certain directorates of MoDs, background institutes or research institutes in subordination to and under supervision of general staffs. These institutes are structured on the basis of new principles; their researchers are recruited on professional grounds and their assignments include both security studies and public opinion polls.

### **3.9 Prospects**

In the countries of the region, although in a characteristically uneven way of development, all the necessary factors have been established for a would-be consistent institutional system of civil control and there is a good chance it can be filled with the appropriate expertise. It can be rightly supposed that this chance would be supported by military and civil training establishments with defence and security academic subjects in their curricula, by a decreasing gap between their curricula and by the introduction of appropriate norms and regulations for various institutions and public figures of civil control urging them to have sufficient professional knowledge. It follows, for this reason, that there is a need to close the gap to the curricula of civilian higher education institutions, allow a certain overlap of subject areas and to promote their opening up towards one another. Besides this, however, the structuralisation of training also requires certain forecast with short- and long-term planning, building military reforms, structuring and exploiting budget, defence priorities and securing resources.

One of the prospects is, of course, establishing a continuous and well-planned cadre of experts. It seems to be paramount to further provide a pool of well-prepared teachers, researchers, specialists, and also supply MPs, media experts and NGO staffs with up-to-date, continuously upgraded information and preparedness.

In the personnel management a transparent and reliable budget, quality-oriented development and regular rotation in various committees are necessary, coupled with the employment of full-time experts possessing the necessary experience. The activities of various conferences, seminars, workshops and other forms of exchanging knowledge and experience are of great importance for experts as points of reference.

## Literature

1. Dr Szabó János: Humán erőforrás és NATO-kompatibilitás. [Human Resources and NATO-compatibility] UHSz 1996. No. 2. pp. 12–20.
2. Dr Szabó János: A honvédtisztek képzettségi mutatóinak változása a rendszerváltás során. [Changes in the Level of Training of Hungarian Commissioned Officers During the Change of Social System] UHSz 1996. No. 5. pp. 14–25.
3. Dr Szabó János: A fegyveres erők arculatváltozása a volt VSZ-országokban. [An Altered Image of the Armed Forces in the Former Warsaw Pact Countries] UHSz 1998. No. 4. pp. 102–16.
4. Dr Szabó János: A NATO-csatlakozás kihívásai. [Some Challenges of NATO Accession] Ht. 1998. No. 3. pp. 23–36.
5. Dr Szabó János: Hadsereg és civil ellen\_rzés. [Armed Forces and Civil Control] Társadalmi Szemle 1995. 4. pp. 68–76.
6. Dr Szabó János: A társadalmi modernizáció új értékei és a hadsereg adaptációja. [The New Values of Social Modernisation and the Adaptation of the Armed Forces] Valóság 1996. 9. pp. 30–40.
7. Gazdag Ferenc: Tények és vélelmek. A NATO-hoz 1999-ben csatlakozottak és a második körre váró nemzetközi megítélésr\_l. [Facts and Presumptions. On the International Opinions on the New NATO member states and the Candidates of the Second Round of Enlargement] Új Honvédségi Szemle 2000.
8. Juhász József: A délszláv háborúk rövid története. [A Brief History of the Wars in Yugoslavia] Védelmi Tanulmányok 11. SVKI, Budapest, 1996.
9. Kisebbségek és biztonságpolitika Közép- és Délkelet-Európában. [Minorities and Security Policy in Central and Southeast Europe] M\_helytanulmányok. Budapest, 2000.
10. Ujj András: A politikai irányítástól a civil kontrollig. [From Political Guidance to Civil Control] Védelmi Tanulmányok 35. SVKI, Budapest, 2000.

## English Language Literature

1. Gambles, Ian (1991) European Security Integration in the 1990s, Chaillot Papers No. 3, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
2. Gazdag Ferenc (1997) The Visegrad Countries toward NATO. Defence Studies (Special Edition). ISDS, Budapest.
3. Gorka Sebestyén (ed.) (1995) The Individual Partnership Programme between Hungary and NATO. Defence Studies (Special Edition). ISDS, Budapest.
4. Grand, Camille (2000) The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Chaillot Papers No.37, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
5. Griffin, Michele (1999) Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalization: Trends in UN Peace Support Operation. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring.

6. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma.
7. Opello, Walter C. and Rosow, Stephen J. (1999) *The Nation-state and Global Order. A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics.* Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.
8. Schmitt, Burkard (2000) *From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe,* Chaillot Papers No. 40, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
9. Simon, Jeffrey (1983) *Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe: Six Crises,* New York: Praeger.
10. Simon, Jeffrey (1985) *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control.* Boulder: Westview.
11. Simon, Jeffrey (1986) *Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe.* Boulder: Westview.
12. Simon, Jeffrey (1988) *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
13. Simon, Jeffrey (1991) *European Security Policy after the Revolution of 1989.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
14. Simon, Jeffrey (1995) *NATO: The Challenge of Change Enlargement: Opinions and Options.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
15. Simon, Jeffrey (1996) *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.
16. Simon, Jeffrey (1996) *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe. A Study in Civil-Military Relations.* Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University.
17. Szabó Máté (szerk.) (1996) *The Challenge of Europeanization in the Region: East Central Europe.* European Studies 2. HPSA – IPS HAS, Budapest.
18. Szemerényi Réka (1996) *Central European Civil-Military Reforms and Risks.* Adelphi Papers No. 306, IISS, London.
19. Walker, William and Gummert, Philip (1993) *Nationalism, Internationalism and the European Defence Market,* Chaillot Papers No.9, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
20. Wohlfeld, Monika (1997) *The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe,* Chaillot Papers No.26, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris.

**David M. Law and Philipp H. Fluri**

## **CONCLUSIONS II: SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: THE CHALLENGES AFTER 9/11 – NEEDS ASSESSMENT**

### **Introduction**

Over the last fifteen years, the security sector in what has become the Euro-Atlantic area has undergone changes that have been sweeping, structural in scope, and on occasion even surprising. Two major transitions delineate this period.

The first came with the end of bloc to bloc and superpower confrontation and the passage to the post-Cold War world of rapidly transforming relationships among erstwhile enemies, neutrals and bloc-free states. In this first post-Cold War decade, initial contacts were established, hands of friendship were outstretched, partnerships and new institutional affiliations were forged and the overall environment, with the exception of the countries and communities that were plunged into ethnic conflict, was one of deepening cooperation of all kinds.

The other transition has just recently come underway. It is being shaped by four developments that promise to alter the security sector no less radically than it was in the 1990s.

First, there are the mounting pressures to devolve a range of security responsibilities in and for Europe, and for its immediate periphery, from NATO to the European Union.

Second, a substantial enlargement of the two institutions is now on the agenda. Its likely result is that during the course of this decade a clear majority of the Euro-Atlantic states will be able to count themselves among the members of both the Alliance and the Union.

Third, as security realities are becoming increasingly globalized, which states end up working together to address one or the other issue or contingency is more and more defined by factors other than geography. As a result, we are witnessing new patterns of security interaction and cooperation on a global scale.

The fourth major development that preoccupies us this decade is how to respond to the triple challenge laid down by catastrophic terrorism, outlaw states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The threat spectrum is undergoing a radical transformation, one that seems likely to be as significant as that which occurred after the first use of atomic weapons on the battlefield of World War II.

Taken together, these four developments point to a more daunting task that is no less necessary; namely, how to ensure that this evolving security sector is sufficiently transparent, accountable and responsive to those whom it is meant to serve.

Security sector education and training must clearly take its cue from what is at work in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and in the wider world. The approach in the second reform decade needs to be one of both continuity and innovation. In the 1990s the leitmotif was, understandably, for western states to show the way to eastern states. Henceforth, the emphasis will be much more on states sharing their respective learning experiences as all members of the Euro-Atlantic community are called upon to make major adjustments in their security thinking, planning and behaviour.

Against this background, this paper will first briefly review the accomplishments and shortcomings of the first decade of education and training efforts within the security sector. The second step will be to discuss the new educational and training requirements that the very different circumstances of the second post-Cold War decade of reform would seem to impose. Finally, I will develop some ideas on how we might go about optimally organising and delivering educational and training programmes for the tasks at hand.



## The First Reform Decade<sup>105</sup>

During the first reform decade, security specialists from the transition countries attended in great numbers courses and training programmes of various kinds organized by western countries. Just how many specialists were involved is unknown, but probably they can be counted in the thousands. These activities brought a wide range of benefits to those who took part as well as to their countries. Participants gained insights into western best practices in civil-military relations. They were provided with opportunities to do so in a context conducive to discussion and reflection, oftentimes in very mixed groups of specialists which ideally included professional military and civilians from several countries from across the Euro-Atlantic area. Through these activities, contacts were established that would prove useful at the working level. The programmes were part of the larger western outreach effort to help reform and stabilize transition country security sectors, where disarray, fragmentation and social marginalization was far too often the order of the day. As such, educational and training programmes for the security sector made a significant contribution to the overall reform process.

To paraphrase the analysis made in the Ukrainian contribution to this volume, which would appear to be representative of the situation as it evolved in most transition countries, by the end of 1990s the legal and regulatory basis for the security sector had been established, a start had been made in securing inter-agency cooperation in dealing with the defense budget and other areas, the number of educational institutes had more than doubled and an effort had been made to ensure compatibility between military and civilian curricula.<sup>106</sup>

While the overall trend was definitely positive, in certain respects, the accomplishments of the first reform decade fell short of expectations and requirements. One of the more serious deficiencies that transition countries have inherited from the 1990s is an ongoing shortfall of qualified military professionals, security specialists for work in the

---

<sup>105</sup> The analysis in this and the subsequent section is based on views formulated by security sector practitioners in transition countries in their contributions to this volume, which have been complemented as appropriate by the authors's own findings.

<sup>106</sup> Leonid Polyakov, Anatoliy Tkachuk, Ukraine, p. 155

security sector ministries and parliamentary structures and, outside government, in the media and the NGO sector. The problem in the new countries that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union has been especially chronic. For example, we are told that Moldova ushered in its newly won sovereignty with "... in the air force... only eighteen technical officers and no pilots ...(whereas) in the artillery ... there were only seven officers."<sup>107</sup>

At the same time, civilian experts remain seriously underrepresented relative to their military counterparts. This is a matter of no little concern. As one contributor to this volume has remarked, "... the development of programmes in the absence of expert civilian personnel causes military solutions to prevail..."<sup>108</sup> Yet another problem is the still poorly developed security sector infrastructure, which manifests itself in a variety of ways, from a lack of quality national learning institutions to a deficit of reference materials to feeble support of security sector decisionmaking.

If much more remains to be done, what needs to be done also needs to be done better. A major shortcoming that has been pointed out by the assessments of the contributors to this volume is that the first generation of programmes were not always conceived and delivered with a view to the most pressing needs of transition countries's security sectors. For example, an assessment made in the contribution on Croatia is that "programmes offered by the West have been helpful but often did not meet the (its) needs."<sup>109</sup> Another evaluation, this time in the Moldovan contribution, is that "...the majority of courses that have been offered by foreign institutions... (have so far not focused) on the future job (requirements) of personnel or (tried) to fill gaps in expertise."<sup>110</sup>

There would appear to be two main reasons for such failings. One is that western practitioners sometimes lacked sufficient knowledge of the security sector in individual countries and of specific requirements in the area of education and training. The other reason is that western

---

<sup>107</sup> Viorel Cibotaru, Moldova, p. 130

<sup>108</sup> Lidija Georgieva, Macedonia, p. 117

<sup>109</sup> Mladen Stanicic, Stefan Imobersteg, Jan Trapans, Croatia, p. 107

<sup>110</sup> Zija Bahja, Albania, p. 21

practitioners were not always sensitive to the need to adapt their approaches to the very distinct conditions prevailing in the transition countries. Programmes needed to be, in the words of one contributor, “...less general, more specific, more coordinated and more targeted...” on specific requirements.<sup>111</sup> Most western programmes used evaluation schemes of one sort or the other to elicit critical comments from participants in training programmes, which led to improvements made as the decade progressed. Nevertheless, the responsiveness of western programmes to transition countries’ needs has remained a central issue.

## **Second Decade Requirements**

This section will look at second decade requirements from several perspectives: the objectives of security sector reform, the approach to be taken, key themes for courses, and teaching methodologies.<sup>112</sup>

### *Objectives*

What should be the objectives for the second reform decade? The contributors to this volume make it abundantly clear that they see training and education programmes as a vehicle for not only upgrading the competencies of individuals and the various groups that are active in the sector, but also for transforming relationships at home and across national borders.

Summarised, the overarching goals that they identify for security sector education and training activities are the following. A first objective is to enhance civil-military interaction, *inter alia*, by improving the qualifications of civilians, ensuring a better integration of the latter within the security sector and a more balanced representation of civilians and professional military. A second objective is to raise the overall efficiency of the security sector, especially as concerns the decisionmaking process. Third, the focus in their view must be on

---

<sup>111</sup> Leonid Polyakov, Anatoliy Tkachuk, Ukraine, p. 168

establishing a cohesive national security community, one with a common language and purpose. A fourth concern is that security sector reform have the effect of improving the social, economic and administrative status of those who work within it. Fifth, the idea is to replicate these goals on the regional and extra-regional levels with a view to forging a wider community of like-minded experts capable of maximising cooperation in addressing common security concerns.

Needless to say, these are ambitious but also unquestionably worthwhile objectives that education and training programmes should aim to support.

### *Priority Approaches*

In view of the above, what approaches should be privileged by security sector educators and trainers? Several ideas recommend themselves. The key concepts here are enhancing differentiation, building decisionmaking capacity, teaching teachers and developing educational infrastructure.

In the past, programme development and delivery tended to cater to the general training needs of the security sector. To quote from the Bulgarian submission to this volume, a priority in this second reform decade must be to find a synthesis between these general needs, the varying requirements that exist on the “...functional level...” and the necessity of possessing “...much more interdisciplinary knowledge...”

<sup>113</sup> Civilians and military may have similar objectives, but they also typically have different backgrounds, work in different environments and, as they go about their functions, are faced with different sides of what is often the same coin. The situation is similar for subordinate categories of security sector professionals – from serving soldiers, intelligence specialists, police officers and customs officials, to the specialized media, parliamentary staff and the personnel of non-governmental organizations. All these groups have different training

---

<sup>113</sup> Valeri Ratchev, Bulgaria, p. 71. Differentiation should also take into account the needs of senior-ranked individuals, those at the beginning of their careers, and those in mid-stream.

requirements. At the same time, however, they are increasingly called upon to cooperate across specializations and departmental compartments.

Country situations also differ considerably. The three transition countries that became NATO members in 1999 are already well advanced in the process of integration into western institutions. They are scheduled to be joined by a further five transition countries in 2004. Others may be brought into this process in a third wave of NATO expansion or a second wave of EU enlargement. Then there are those that may never be engaged in either integration process because of their recent history of conflict, sheer size, peripheral status or preference for neutrality. While these groupings will share many common needs, certain requirements will vary considerably. For example, transition countries that underwent serious conflict during the 1990s – the case of approximately half of the new states that emerged after the end of communism in Europe – will have a need for capacity-building in the area of post-conflict resolution that others which have been spared armed strife will not. Similarly, there are the newly constituted or reconstituted countries - a group that largely overlaps with the former group - that emerged after the end of the East-West conflict. These states, not a small group representing as they do over 40 percent of the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are not unsurprisingly still in the process of constructing the apparatus of the state, including its security sector, on the basis of what was often inherited piecemeal and in a state of dilapidation a little more than ten years ago. The submission on the recently renamed Serbia and Montenegro, which falls into both these categories, underscores that this country is in many ways several years behind many other transition countries, and is still really only in the process of taking stock of available resources within the national security sector and its anticipated requirements.<sup>114</sup> Other countries, in particular, Romania and Bulgaria, have made great strides in recent years, especially since NATO membership began to be seen as a real prospect. Such circumstances again underscore the need for differentiation.

---

<sup>114</sup> Miroslav Hadzic, FRY, p.1

A second priority must be to expand decisionmaking capacity within the security sector, the lack of which is common to all transition countries, again with major differences of degree. After the fall of communism in Europe, what typically happened was that the decisionmaking capacities that had been concentrated in the party were dispersed or became discredited. Bodies that had hitherto been responsible for mainly executing the decisions of the party and its apparatus almost overnight found themselves entrusted with not only policy implementation but also policy development. Contributors complain for example of "...experts' limited scope for addressing the key issues of today's debates...", or of the lack of "...experts capable of long-term strategy development..."<sup>115</sup> A crucial dimension of security sector training and education must therefore be to help develop the personnel resources on which these critical new responsibilities must now rest.

Thirdly, the onus has to be on teaching teachers. The situation at the national military described in the contribution for Albania seems to be typical: there is a chronic shortage of "... qualified teachers in fields ...( ranging from) ...management...(and) ...research methodology to security studies, social and development studies and political studies..."<sup>116</sup> Western resources are too modest and transition country needs too great to expect that they can be met by putting all transition country specialists through courses and programmes sponsored by western countries. Rather, one should seek to train those in transition countries who can then train others, wherever this is possible and also sensible. This implies that those who are involved in programme design will have to turn a conceptual corner, focussing not only on teaching best practice to transition country practitioners but teaching trainers how to impart such knowledge to others. Several areas where such an approach recommends itself were mentioned by transition country contributors to this volume. One is teaching personnel managers how to design and institute effective systems for personnel management and advancement. Another is how to devise "...and man a multi-year, multi-level and multi-agency budgetary planning process"<sup>117</sup>. Yet another

---

<sup>115</sup> Valeri Ratchev, Bulgaria, p. 62

<sup>116</sup> Zija Bahja, Albania, p. 224

<sup>117</sup> Zija Bahja, Albania, p. 9

problem of critical importance for the overall functioning of the security sector is how to develop and implement the various information systems that are required in today's environment. Transition countries security sector specialists also seek instruction on how to set up an efficient structure for national security policy decisionmaking - for example, on how to go about establishing a national security agency. In addition, advice is sought on how to found think tanks and "...establish a network of security research organizations in leading universities".<sup>118</sup>

A fourth and related priority has to be support for the rebuilding of educational infrastructure in transition countries. Critical shortcomings in this regard remain prominent throughout the region. The educational sector remains fragmented. Training programmes do not always support the very different paths that can lead to a career in the security sector, nor the need for continuous learning opportunities. Institutions of learning lack critically important resources. More indigenous educational opportunities are required, particularly in the area of graduate and post-graduate education. Military academies need to be re-energized or built anew. Libraries are under resourced, key documents are not always available in local languages and access to the internet remains limited. Teachers need advice on how to design curricula as well as instruction on the latest teaching techniques. The list is almost endless.

Finally, there is a requirement for expanded interchange among the security sector practitioners of different countries. There is a crying need for more exchanges, internships and placement opportunities of all kinds both in national administrations and with international bodies. Transition country experts can profit enormously from exposure to western security sector environments, as can western practitioners when they are put in a position that allows them to come into more intense contact with transition country realities. This should be very much a two-way street. A related issue that is seen to be critical by several contributors to this volume is that, whenever appropriate, participants in training programmes and traineeships should receive credit for their involvement

---

<sup>118</sup> Leonid Polyakov, Anatoliy Tkachuk, Ukraine, p. 168

towards their education and suitable recognition within their professional environment.

### *Programme Subjects, Methodologies and Formats*

Themes identified by transition countries' security sector specialists for inclusion in training and educational programmes are numerous and varied. However, three main, loosely grouped, areas stand out: system knowledge, sectorial expertise and technical competence.

By system knowledge is meant subjects such as international relations, conflict and peace studies, dynamics of the international system and similar courses that have traditionally been available in quality university curricula.

Sectorial expertise includes familiarity with the decisional culture and operations of the international institutions with a role in Euro-Atlantic security as well as those of the various actors that comprise the domestic security sector, and its overall organization and direction. Issues ranging from civil-military relations and parliamentary oversight to defense management fall under this heading. The Croatian contribution emphasizes in this regard the kind of knowledge that is needed for service with an international organization, namely, "...interoperability, inter-agency stratagems, and the procedures of multi-national civilian-military bureaucracies."<sup>119</sup> Then there are a series of other issue areas that can straddle the mandates of several national jurisdictions or which by definition necessitate a cross-border approach: management of large movements of people, the struggle against corruption, organized crime and human trafficking, civil emergency preparedness, small weapon monitoring and control, and so on.

Under the third broad category - technical competence – falls everything from courses to improve proficiency in English, or other languages, and in the use of information technology to training in negotiating and conflict resolution techniques and change management.

---

<sup>119</sup> Mladen Stanicic, Stefan Imobersteg, Jan Trapans, Croatia, p. 105



Education in many of these subject areas either did not exist under the communist system, or tended to be reserved for the party elite. Even now opportunities to study them in transition countries remain limited.

With respect to methodologies, several suggestions have been put forward. There seems to be a marked preference for learning environments that are interactive, offer opportunities to work in teams, are oriented towards case studies and use modelling and simulation. The Romanian contribution, for example, makes reference to the importance of "...cooperative teaching activity, where teachers and students work together in developing all kinds of subjects, including the modelling and simulation of real-life situations"<sup>120</sup>.

There is indeed a great deal that can be offered along these lines. For example, to reinforce lecture material, students can be given an opportunity to draft and debate different kinds of documents that are commonly used in national and international institutions such as talking points for meetings, communiqués, press lines, questions and answers, or policy planning papers. Another interactive learning methodology is scenario planning, which involves a group in a multi-step exercise on an issue such as the future of transatlantic relations or of the European Union. The exercise is designed to give them insights into the many forces at work in shaping such phenomena over the longer-term and into the various ways that the present can become future. Simulation exercises that allow participants to role play in crisis situations can also be a highly useful tool for bringing to life the operational and decisional culture of different security actors.

In terms of programme format, for transition countries' security specialists the key criterion is accessibility. The longer the programme, the more difficult it becomes for more senior people to take part. But with personnel resources scarce in the transition countries' security sectors, even junior staff can experience difficulty in attending programmes that keep them away from their desks for any length of time. Hence the various suggestions that have been made for short

---

<sup>120</sup> Julian Bujoreanu, Romania, p 145

courses for security sector managers, study tours for media representatives and working visits for parliamentarians, and so on. This does not mean that multiple-month programmes do not have their place, but the short-formatted activities are clearly more within the reach of most practitioners. One also sees greater potential for online and distance learning as a way of complementing traditional teaching environments and extending the reach of programmes on offer.

### **Some Ideas on the Way Ahead**

The training and education requirements formulated above are as ambitious as they are worthwhile. Meeting them will be challenging even if the necessary resources are forthcoming. But the prospects of responding successfully to these needs can be enhanced if we ensure that the resources that are available are deployed in an optimal fashion.

How to go about this? What is above all necessary is a transparent, timely and easily accessible system of conveying and retrieving information about the programmes and courses that are on offer. The initiative to produce this volume marks an excellent step in the right direction. Having hopefully now proven its value, it needs to be complemented by a more comprehensive and systematic effort. A listserv for the circulation of information about training courses and education programmes open to transition country experts would be of great assistance in this regard. This would be a vehicle for participants as well as for those who develop and deliver educational products to post their assessments of the programmes, courses and exchange opportunities that they have participated in or sponsored. Ideally, this would be enhanced by a website where the information made available on the list serve would be presented in a more systematic framework.

There would be several advantages to such an approach. Specialists looking for training in a specific area would be able to make a more informed choice about the best programme for their needs. Programme developers and deliverers, for their part, would be encouraged to ensure their product optimally met practitioners' requirements. Such a system should also lead to a more effective deployment of resources. Countries

sponsoring activities could more readily decide whether they should join forces with other sponsors to avoid duplication or rather not to do so where a continuing overlap might be beneficial. A list serve, supported by a website, could also serve as a repository and disseminator of insights into best practices and changing priorities for training and education activities in the security sector. They could be complemented by periodic gatherings of those who produce and deliver programmes, and those who consume them. There are several precedents for such an approach. For example, in the context of its reconciliation activities for the ex-Yugoslav states, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has recently launched an online database to catalogue mechanisms and strategies that have been developed to reduce the potential for conflict in the area, overcome hostility and foment cooperation and mutual respect.<sup>121</sup>

The Stability Pact, which has inspired this volume, would be well placed to assume responsibility for spearheading an initiative to follow on this project. Its writ extends to not only Southeast Europe but also other neighbouring transition countries, many of which have participated in this study, and it encourages regional approaches. It entertains privileged relations with the main actors on the institutional scene, with the EU, NATO and the OSCE and the IFIs, as well as with regional bodies such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact. It is on record as being interested in expanding the successful cooperation patterns that it has sponsored in Southeastern Europe to other geographical areas. Moreover, the Stability Pact seeks to be a gathering of equals, in much the same way as does the OSCE, whose example has served as its guide. Similarly, it operates multidimensionally, recognizing the need to promote in parallel initiatives to promote a secure environment, good governance and economic welfare. Stability Pact programmes have targeted several areas that are crucial to successful security sector reform – for example, the retraining of military officers and police officials as well as the strengthening of media and parliamentary expertise in the area of security. Beyond that, the Stability Pact has a certain experience

---

<sup>121</sup> “Newsletter of the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”, Issue 17, 17 February 2003, p.6

acting as a promoter of transparency and as a clearing house when it comes to initiatives in the area of education.

When this study was being conceptualized (in 2001), Security Sector Reforms as a comprehensive notion (and thus as a departure from mere defense reform) was only just beginning to be discussed. The future priorities of the Stability Pact were then only starting to take shape<sup>122</sup>. The results of this study may thus be a bit vague on the Pact's specific priorities. The acknowledged need for further and more comprehensive expert formation on all levels pertains, however, also to the areas the Stability Pact specifically wants to address.

The Stability Pact's notion of even playing field for participants opens the way to another idea that we would like to promote in this conclusion, namely, that developed and transition democracies need to rethink the way that they work with one another in developing and delivering programmes. As pointed out in the introduction, the philosophy of second decade reform efforts should be rather different from that of the first. The state of the security sector in western countries remains in many critical respects qualitatively different from the situation in the transition countries. That being said, the circumstances of the second reform decade tend to present to both transition and western countries a similar array of challenges and unknowns, even if their starting points and perspectives on one or the other issue can vary considerably.

Several examples can be cited. The partial devolution of NATO responsibilities to the EU means that members of both organizations countries will need to be able to operate in one or the other jurisdictions or in both simultaneously. Western and transition countries understandably approach the issue of NATO and EU enlargement from different vantage points, but all will have to address the major

---

<sup>122</sup> We take these priorities to be (following the 2003 Policy Outline) Media, Local Democracy and Cross-Border Cooperation, Interregional Trade/Investment, Regional Infrastructure/Energy, Organised Crime, Migration and Asylum/Refugees. Not all of these priorities have directly to do with Security Sector Reform and expert formation. But none of them will be successfully addressed a comprehensive understanding of the operational culture of the various European and regional security sector actors and the nature of their inter-institutional cooperation.

adjustments that the two processes will entail. Several members of the Euro-Atlantic community have recently found themselves operating well beyond the bounds of the NATO or the EU treaty areas, something that for most of them was unimaginable just a decade ago. Who would have thought, for example, at the beginning of the 1990s that countries with such diverse security profiles as Bulgaria, Canada and Germany would find themselves deploying in Afghanistan to do battle in the struggle against terrorism? However, despite the fact that the threat emanating from weapons of mass destruction, outlaw states and catastrophic terrorism is not perceived uniformly from country to country within the Euro-Atlantic community, no one state can escape the consequences of what the United States and others see to be a tectonic shift in the international threat environment. Finally, there are the common challenges of ensuring security sector transparency, responsiveness and accountability. The persistent weakness of democracy in transition countries is well known. But the performance of developed democracies also leaves very much to be desired. Here, the pattern is one of diminishing electoral turnouts, decreasing party memberships, failing trust in the rationale behind government decisions, and in certain cases even gross miscarriage of electoral procedure.<sup>123</sup>

In view of this, there is a strong case to be made for reorienting the way western and transition countries deal with one another, both generally in addressing the overall process of reform as well as more particularly when it comes to security sector education and training. At a minimum, western and transition countries should act as partners in determining curriculum requirements, formats and teaching methodologies. Beyond that, there is much to be gained by ensuring that training and education programmes offer ample opportunity for co-learning and the exchange of best practice from all quarters.

---

<sup>123</sup> For more on this point, see David M. Law, 'Democratic Deficits, North America and Security', *Connections*, Partnership for Peace Consortium, Volume 1, September 2001.

# Stefan Imobersteg

## ANNEX I: A SYNOPSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS AS IDENTIFIED BY OUR AUTHORS

### Albania

#### *Achievements*

According to Zija Bahja (2002), Albania, after reassessing current threats by foreign powers and prevailing resources, downsized its active strength of Armed Forces drastically. The personnel of 31,000 will be reduced to a final number of 16,500 in 2010. In 2000, Albania published the National Security Strategy (NSS) and supporting Defence Policy, and in 2002, approved the National Military Strategy which specifies on the implementation of the MoD Defence Policy. The NSS presents the strategic framework for the execution of MoD responsibilities at the leading Ministry for Defence issues in Albania. ‘The NSS addresses all essential aspects of national security and provides a clear picture of Albania’s perspectives on its environment, threats, risks, and enduring national interests.’

Albania has established two courses called ‘Defence College’ in the Albanian Defence Academy every year. The courses are led by civilians, military experts, certain Members of Parliament (MPs) and journalists. They focus on organising principles of effective democratic oversight and management of the military. In more detail, the courses emphasise:

- division of authority between the President and the government and suggest a clear chain of command for the military in times of peace, crisis, and war;

- legislative oversight of the military and control of the defence budget, including all minority and opposition parties in appropriate committees;
- interagency coordination;
- a civilian defence minister;
- ‘peacetime oversight of the General Staff and military commanders by civilian defence ministers and staffs’;
- ‘development of qualified civilian defence experts in the government, the legislature, and in public institutions, as well as training military officers on the principles of civilian control’;
- ‘ensuring military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability through an active outreach programme to the nation’s citizenry’;
- ‘clarification of the role of the judiciary in the military justice system’.

Furthermore, Albania has consecutively established principles for the legal foundation for civilian control of the military. The criteria have been put in place according to the Constitution and are directly reflected in documents such as the NSS and the Defence Policy.

Regarding the educational aspect of security and defence institutions, the system provides its staff with adequate training to support efficient functioning, self-initiative and exchange of knowledge and ideas. Besides the area of civil education, employees benefit from training courses at regular intervals throughout their education. The schema of education presents itself as follows: ‘workshops, training courses, upgrading seminars and others’.

## *Needs*

Though achievements have been made over the past two years, Albania still lacks a multi-year planning, programming and budgeting process, which links defence priorities and available resources over time.

This aspect presents a need to focus the efforts of expert formation programmes on the future, preparing proper teachers and specialists working in these spheres, as well as the parliamentarians, journalists and NGOs, concerning transparency, accountability and parliamentary oversight of defence spending.

The development of a personnel management system should also be pursued. It should help the development of a quality force, including timely retirement for all grade levels. Regarding defence policy and planning, Albania is encouraged to establish the Inter-Ministerial Committee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (ICI). The Committee holds a crucial role in the coordination process of country policies towards NATO and NATO member states, including participation by all leading ministries. Furthermore, the Committee presents itself as being important in reconsidering defence policies and planning within the context of general national priorities. However, this Committee requires full-time experts and certain bureaucratic principles. Experts need to be well educated in the fields of nation state and social development, ‘such as conflict and cooperation, security analysis, power and regime theory, as well as conflict resolution and transformation in the complex emergency situations’.

Concerning the defence planning system, a more developed and analytical system is necessary. The system should follow a multi-year timeline, which requires the introduction and strengthening of programming and budgeting mechanisms. Without the establishment of such a system reforms will be ineffective. ‘Therefore, the expert formation initiative needs to be focused nationwide according to the framework of the EU.’

In the field of democratic control of armed forces, expert education has not yet reached a high standard. There are only two to three teachers of



this subject in Albania. Furthermore, none of the NGOs conduct any research in those fields. Therefore, experts need to be educated with the help of short-term courses in the area of democratic control of armed forces and Civil Military Relations (CMR). In order to enhance previously mentioned structures, MoD and General Staff need to cooperate more closely and intensively to reduce suspicion and organisational tensions between the two staffs. To achieve proper and smooth transitions, trained defence specialists and military professionals with civilian working experience could provide the necessary institutional knowledge. International assistance would further allow civilians in the MoD, National Security Agencies, and the Albanian National Assembly to gain more knowledge in defence-related matters.

Regarding command and control, an existing gap still needs to be filled. It is the responsibility of the MoD and Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) to assess the modest size of the military structure. The consolidation of all service components directly under the General Staff might be viewed as a good proposal.

Concerning the education of security and defence institutions, high priorities have been set. Education in defence transformation plans and with regard to security and defence institution plans throughout the country have gained major importance. People should be trained and educated to understand and adapt to processes, changes and challenges of the new security environment. They ought to possess the ability to apply and transfer obtained information in order to benefit environment and the national security system. Specific institutions for higher education, such as Tirana University, have not yet included defence studies in their academic structure. However, the university has begun to set up courses in managing defence in democratic societies, to provide education in the area of defence, and to participate in various defence system activities.

Therefore, National Security Studies should be added as part of the structure of civilian university education. An interfaculty multidisciplinary postgraduate course should be set up and provide for the possibility of obtaining scientific degrees in the field on National

Security, in accordance with regulations applicable to higher education and scientific research.

Additionally, postgraduate institutions should offer courses of short duration that deal with strategy and security studies. 'An inter-university multidisciplinary national security study should be established including civilian universities, to provide education and training for highest-ranking positions in the management and commanding structure.'

Quality personnel present one of the crucial factors to differentiate among various armed forces. The cooperation between military and civil personnel proves important for the level of readiness of the armed forces and their ability to carry out tasks and respond to possible threats. The future should even increase the importance of civilian servants – government employees and staff members – which allows them to gain a significant functional role in the MoD and the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania.

Improvements also need to be made in the emergency environment of the soldier. Therefore, the military education system should provide soldiers with skills that are necessary for the successful execution of their tasks and survival in the environment of operation. The country has made efforts to provide junior officers with a BSc. and BA degree in management and the possibility of electives in technology, telecommunication, navigation and political science.

However, in organising and starting the new curricula for cadets in September 2004, Albania lacks the appropriate and well qualified teachers in the fields of management, anthropology, security studies, conflict studies, research methodology, social and development studies, and political studies.

In conclusion, the Chief of the General Staff should annually propose to the Minister of Defence a selection of specialties that are in high demand for each service and support the command of the AAF. As a consequence, people from all sources could be considered for recruitment as long as their qualifications are appropriate and they meet the necessary criteria.

## **Bosnia and Herzegovina**<sup>124</sup>

### *Achievements*

According to Nikola Radovanovic (2002), a lack of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) may threaten the political, social and economic development of the country. Diverse processes have already successfully contributed to internal improvements regarding security sector reform. Those include the following: the final phase of the security policy definition, beginning of the defence policy implementation, creation of the military doctrine, reduction of the armed forces, reduction of compulsory military service to six months, introduction of the civil service, an increased level of the democratic control of armed forces, better defence budget planning and transparency, creation of the State Border Service and better cooperation among interior security services.

Advisors tend to be appointed by officials in their specific mandates. Military advisors exchange and complete personal knowledge on security sector issues with other advisors. They usually benefit from detailed knowledge in military education, practice and experience. Furthermore, the majority of them have gained additional experience due to active support from international community representatives and have passed through several different training forms. In conclusion, military advisors play a crucial role in the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) decision-making and decision-implementation processes, in military diplomacy and in the defence part of overall reforms. However, they lack connections to civil parties and maintain less influential and developed social contacts.

Most non-military advisors have achieved expert knowledge in economic law. Nonetheless, huge discrepancies among different advisors can be noticed. Some have attended seminars dealing with

---

<sup>124</sup> The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official position of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

security sector reforms, whereas others still lack such experiences and have just entered the working field by means of their undergraduate diploma. Certain advisors have mastered several foreign languages and IT technologies, whereas others lack all these capacities. Therefore, non-military advisors present a less coherent group of people than military advisors. Overall, the majority of advisors have little interest in further and permanent education and training.

The category of leading civil servants includes civil servants, heads of departments and directors of directorates. An expert level is required to meet basic legal principles such as legality, transparency, publicity, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness and professional impartiality. The process for the enhancement of expert level is also supported by different international community institutions. However, at a state level, leading members predominantly present military backgrounds. The employees at the department of interior affairs maintain a special cooperation with INTERPOL. Though such advancements have been accomplished, the department itself provides no room for reform planning activities.

Parliament staffers at different parliaments consist of civil servant employees. The MPs who are of interest for our report either join work programmes of various councils, committees and delegations in association with international organisations, or actively publish on security sector issues. For many years, diverse demands for the better education and training of MPs in the security sector were ignored. Political as well as public awareness has neglected any specific means of support for an educational improvement of MPs in the security sector, either in the democratic control of armed forces or in the area of reforms. Therefore, improving factors have to be implemented on the basis of the Muslim-Croat Federation (FBiH) Parliament and the Repulika Srpska (RS) Parliamentary Assembly. Both of them play an important role regarding security sector issues.

Among military, police and law enforcement agencies, professional technical expertise is highly emphasised. Employees within those structures are all supposed to work at expert level. However, the educational background of individual employees plays a crucial role for

the successful implementation of later steps in security sector reforms. Concerning military structures, both the General Staff and Joint Command participate in reform processes. All commanding officers, usually at the rank of general, are required by law to pass through a process of the structures of the executive and legal branch in order to be eligible for possible appointment. The final nomination of every single commander has to be approved by members of the Commander of the Stabilisation Force (COMSFOR). The COMSFOR further possesses the right to dismiss any military personnel who purposely intend to threaten or disrupt the implementation of the Peace Accords.

Before 1992, several institutions educated students from high school to PhD level. Unfortunately, many of those centres were destroyed or no longer existed for various reasons. As a consequence, security sector scholars lacked appropriate opportunities to re-establish their academic authority within the country. 'Reasons were: resistance to accept changes, staying out of science for an extensive period of time, sanctions, isolation and low salaries.' Today, a total of seven universities provide an approach to Western standards by offering law studies (for example, international law) that contain links to security sector issues. Often, helpful relations to foreign universities can be established and the OSCE mission to BiH supports the establishment and work of an Inter-University Steering Committee on Security Studies.

In BiH, NGOs have gained more importance due to serious and systematic work after the year 2000. Universities originally established in ex-Yugoslavia served later during the democratisation process as an active source for the functioning process of the first NGOs. However, it has taken a long time to generate important processes on the side of NGOs dealing with the security sector. Even today, security sector issues tend to be kept classified or at least present themselves as sensitive societal topics and issues.

Several steps have been undertaken over the past couple of years to enhance the status of the media and its level of independency. Positive changes can be noticed in the media's approach to reaching international standards. The electronic and print media mainly report on security sector issues. The training of young journalists has been a crucial factor

in professionalising the media. Another attempt was made to include them into public life. However, an insufficient number of journalists has had the chance to specialise in security sector issues due to weaknesses in the educational system.

International organisations situated in BiH have employed local staffers and provided them with a unique opportunity to work directly with international experts. Most local employees hold graduate diplomas, are fluent in English and possess in-depth knowledge in IT technologies. As a result, many of them have accomplished a level of knowledge comparable to that of international experts.

Overall, possibilities in the field of expert formation remain modest in Southeast Europe. Only one institution – the Department of Criminal Sciences at Sarajevo University – provides a four year of undergraduate, as well as postgraduate studies concerning security sector issues. The Centre for European Studies offers a younger approach to the field of international relations and democracy. Those programmes have been supported by EU Tempus programmes, which symbolise a new tendency in the educational process of BiH. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, NGOs have started to take a leading role in the process of security sector expert formation. International efforts in every aspect are necessary and push the reform process forward.

### *Needs*

Due to the complex relations network in the security sector, the demand for more competent officials is high. Regarding representatives of the executive, more top-level decision-making meetings are necessary. The meetings should focus on the enhancement of general and military diplomacy skills and develop the potential of public relations.

Concerning Parliament and parliamentary staffers, years have passed without sufficient energy and time devoted to the personal education process of security sector experts. Parliaments at the canton and district level lack specialised bodies to handle security sector issues. Members of Parliament often lack personal advisors due to lacking financial and

other appropriate resources. Additionally, parliaments at all levels are understaffed and only gain professional support in functional and technical areas. All other elements remain mostly uncovered and therefore provide another obstacle to further improvements.

Though most military employees have attended specific military academies, they often lack the knowledge on how to successfully implement new strategic concepts in the security sector. Current international seminars only provide professional development in accordance with international standards in the ARS, but cannot be specifically applied to prevailing concepts in BiH. Furthermore, staff officers that are important for security sector reforms range in terms of education, age and experience between two extremes. Therefore, this group faces a high level of incoherency which negatively impacts a common understanding and approach to reform processes. In conclusion, military experts are small in number and face professional as well as political pressure concerning their work on reforms. Then they are too numerous to be effectively trained within a short period of time.

NGOs often lack an appropriate number of experts within their institutional setting. This deficit is related to the system of higher education, which struggles to educate enough experts for possible engagement in NGOs. Also, the budgets of NGOs are fairly small, which prevents them from attracting a bigger and wider number of experts. This negative chain reaction even prevents NGOs from establishing at least one think tank in the security sector area. In conclusion, experts within NGOs demonstrate the necessary amount of motivation to learn and advance in terms of international understanding, but lack financial as well as structural support.

With regard to the media in BiH, analytical and research journalism has not been well developed. Only a short period of time has been dedicated to specialised programmes regarding the electronic media. Additionally, BiH still faces the trend of high military personnel trying to avoid publications in military magazines. Journalists also tend rather to occupy themselves with other topics than the security sector, mainly because BiH still maintains political sensitivity to security sector issues.

## **Bulgaria**

### *Achievements*

According to Valeri Ratchev (2002), the Bulgarian Parliament consists of a proportional representational system, which enables diverse interests and groups in society to be represented in the Parliament. As a result, prevailing policies improve the legitimacy of the political system. After 1990, the first National Security Committee was established on the order of the National Assembly. The newly established committee was further broken down into the sectors of foreign policy, defence and security, to combine similar issues under one specific state body. However, only a small percentage of parliamentarians possessed enough professional political experience to contribute successfully to further improvements within their sector. This tendency was changed after the 39<sup>th</sup> parliamentary session. More and better educated experts were consulted to improve conditions among parliamentary staffers. As a result, the current use of experts in the Parliament has never been greater since the start of the democratisation process.

Regarding the presidential staff, the first democratic president decided to establish a military cabinet that consisted of four senior officers. The overall perception of the cabinet was positive, but critics noticed a certain incompatibility between the general and presidential staff. Under the next president, the cabinet was abolished and replaced by a defence secretary. The following president decided to maintain the two advisory positions, but for the first time they were occupied by civilians. Therefore, those changes only partially contributed to positive improvements, since the ongoing disruptions weakened the fundamental structure of the system. In addition, the President is part of the Consultative Council for National Security. 'The council has a unique task by bringing together the President, the Prime Minister, all ministers being related to national security responsibilities, all parliamentary leaders and the Chief of General Staff.' The council's decisions have strong domestic and foreign implications and play an important role in the decision-making process in times of crises.



The Council of Ministers is supported by the Security Council. This separate council was established in 1998 on the basis of the national security concept. Its main tasks include the conduct and analysis of incoming information on security risks and threats, the processing of short- and long-term risk assessments, the proposition of concrete resolution plans in times of crises, and the decision on the consultation of the executive regarding the allocation and use of resources.

Concerning political cabinets, the Act of Public Administration and the Act on Civil Servants have drastically changed the area of public administration. This change positively impacted the work of law enforcement agencies, because the key elements included a transparent and clearly structured system of administration, a clear delineation of expert and political levels in the system, the introduction of political cabinets and the introduction of common educational and professional criteria as well as well-defined career paths.

Since 1997, the judiciary and executive fell under the control mechanism of European Union practices, laws and directives. The judiciary was far from up-to-date, which caused international institutions (both EU and world related), to emphasise modernising the judicial branch of the government. Since 2000, attempts have been made by way of training offers by NGO-government cooperations. Those have become characteristic for Bulgarian politics and have spread to many other fields too.

Among civil academies, universities were among the first institutions to notice a lack of knowledge and training in the security sector field. Before the 1990s, most educational programmes belonged to the military sector. For the first time, during the 1990s, expertise among civil academicians on security matters was developed. To fill the identified gap on security issues, the Centre for Personnel Training on National Security was established within the framework of the Ministry of Defence. The centre, as the only institution, provided an environment where civilian and military personnel could work together. The centre further contributed to the organisation of the first national and international conferences. Published by the centre was the security and

defence magazine called the *Bulgarian Military Review*. Besides the Centre for Personnel Training on National Security, the Police Academy presents the second important training institution. The education within the academy focuses now on three separate departments of the prevailing police system: 'The Department for the Theory of Investigative Work, Crime Prevention, and Legal Matters'. Furthermore, the Centre for Specialisation and Advanced Training has been created in recent years. In the year 1998, a Master of Arts programme on Countering Crime and Maintaining Public Order was established. The programme mainly focuses on EU law, strategic management, policing strategies, and psychology of policing.

Since 1990–91, Bulgaria maintains freedom of speech and diversity within the media throughout the country. Problems have only prevailed regarding state-owned radio and TV stations. The perception of the public towards security issues predominately depends on the level of education, access to new information and age. Those factors crucially determine the citizen's commitment to their country's security. Further, a tendency among interviewees with residency in large cities – highly educated and middle aged – are more likely to defend their country's security. After 1998, more and more people have become concerned about security sector issues.

Issues such as personnel arms reduction (especially destruction of SS 23 missiles during the summer/autumn period of 2002), the debate over the political control of the Special Services, the preparation for the integration into the NATO, and the fight against organised crime and corruption became a focus in the daily agenda of most Bulgarians.

Two reasons were led to this change: a more transparent functioning state administration and an enhanced professional reflection of the media. In conclusion, the influence of the media on defence and security issues considerably increased. Regarding the written media, the majority regularly reflect on the security situation and institutional activities. Several newspapers even hire specialised journalists to conduct in-depth news on security sector and defence issues. Concerning the electronic media, independent TV programmes with national coverage provide the best source for the state of Bulgaria. They also occupy specialised

journals on defence and security sector issues. However, independent expertise still tends to be a rarity on television.

Over time, a large number of NGOs have been established in Bulgaria. By the year 2000, a total of over 4500 were registered. Around 700 present full-time organisations. Those institutions are well funded even on a financial level and take over an amount that is equal to 1.5 per cent of the total GDP. Bulgarian NGOs further receive support from Western societies and international foundations. They attract one-tenth of all foreign investments, of which the majority is funded by EU and U.S. projects. NGOs have been a driving force in the accomplishment of democratic principles in Bulgaria. They actively support and contribute to governmental and parliamentary processes on their path to modernisation. Crucial to mention is the fact that NGOs exist in the fields of economic development, foreign policy and security, too. In this regard, an NGO commission in the National Assembly has been set up to enhance and improve control over governmental policy formation and legislative intentions.

General first efforts in the field of expert preparation were made in 1988. A significant influence on those first moves within this still young sector was the Vienna process of arms control and a non-proliferation policy. This first approach mainly dealt with international relations, arms control, early warning, and international military cooperation for conflict prevention. Further efforts have been made to exchange experts and speakers with more competent personnel in order to enhance the quality of the security sector to a maximum.

Since 1995, the Marshall Centre has provided Bulgarian experts, executives and parliamentarians with a series of seminars, workshops and conferences to support the democratisation process of the security sector and the modernisation of the security sector management. Until the year 2002, the focus was towards defence management (1995), defence planning and budgeting (1996, 1997 and 1998), civil-military planning and performance in crisis and management (1999), resource planning and management (2001). High training quality and an adequate selection of topics with regard to national needs, is guaranteed by professors from the College of International and Security Studies,

experts from the Defence Analysis Institute (Virginia), parliamentarians and experienced generals and senior officers from Germany, the USA, and other countries, as well as distinguished institutes and research centres.

### *Needs*

Many Members of Parliament (MP) lack useful professions to contribute successfully to parliamentary committees. The highest number of MPs occupies a position in the profession of an engineer, lawyer, economist, lecturer or medical doctor. This lack of educationally prepared and experienced MPs is well portrayed by amendments and draft laws related to the national security sector. The fundamental draft laws and normative acts were prepared by executives and therefore do not properly mirror changes concerning democratisation and the power sector by parliamentarians. This practice further negatively impacted the process of overcoming the division of labour within the security sector organisations. It also had an influence on the interest of security related parliamentary committees to participate in certain training activities. In conclusion, most political parties lack members that have the knowledge and experience to effectively perform in their parliamentary job and to contribute positively to areas of change.

Parliamentary committees lack internal knowledge on how to support permanent and invited experts. On the one hand, party members oppose the sharing of certain information with external support personnel and, on the other hand, they cannot benefit from professionalism at individual as well as parliamentary party group level.

Diverse problems exist at the presidential level. The President faces the obligation of approving diverse documents, which he is unable to do systematically due to a lack of appropriate staff. He is further prevented from an adequate access to information which would crucially assist him in executing certain acts. As a result, his actions take place without any awareness of possible consequences. The President's appointment or dismissal of the higher command of the Armed Forces could only work positively if he had a sufficient relationship to his advising experts. He

totally lacks the opportunity to create new personal connections within the prevailing system.

Generally, there is no expert organisation within the Council of Ministers that is oriented towards security issues. Additionally, the Council lacks an appropriate number of staff members, which has remained unimproved because of no political will and understanding. However, an improvement is more than necessary, because the council starts to play an important organisational and coordination role. For instance, the press secretary, as the link between military and civilian structures, lacks practice in defence and security related topics. 'This connection presents itself as the weakest connecting link in the line of communication between the uniformed and civilian sectors.' Another weak element is the fact that serious organisational problems within the political cabinet of the Ministry of Defence have been in existence since the beginning. As a consequence, the ministry is overloaded, lacks time for in-depth analysis or problems and is unable to come up with suggestions for possible solutions.

The media sector still shows problems of in-depth analysis regarding the security sector information and therefore reports more vaguely than substantially on such issues. Experts believe that the strengthening of NGO expertise and the enhancement of transparency will accordingly improve the value of media reports. To achieve further improvements, the number of journalists that focus on security policies should be increased. Possible topics could include the following: 'methods of journalist investigation in the area of security and defence policy, procedures in defence planning and procurement, illegal arms trade and proliferation, global threat of nuclear and biological weapons and the spread of political terrorism'.

An assessment of possible courses for the improvement of the security sector is crucial and of great importance. Certain key topics should be covered concerning the education in civilian universities as well as security institutions. The course titles could be listed as follows: 'Peace and war studies, national security, democracy, civil-military relation studies, governmental studies, strategic leadership, crisis management and conflict resolution, human rights and humanitarian and international

law, and national security decision making processes.’ Those previously indicated courses provide only basic improvements and therefore need to be interrelated with additional training in order to be relevant in a comprehensive modern context. Further, national security sector experts with the competency to overlook security organisations are either elected or promoted from parliamentarian, executive or management positions. Often, they negatively impact relations between society and security sector professionals due to their formal appointment. Experts from the non-governmental sector are only provided with fundamental education in the security field and, therefore, only few see themselves capable of participating in important debates. The absence of periodic forums prevents civilians and uniformed people from establishing a closer network of cooperation with each other.

In addition to general improvements within the security sector, new areas of security need to be discovered and expanded. Examples are: ‘political and criminal terrorism, non-traditional military missions abroad and at home, cross-border corruption, international crime networks and cyber criminality’. Also, more experts need to be found that are able to deal with issues in the NATO and EU context. Other areas that require more precise work on security issues include the legislative sectors of the executive and Parliament, the presidential staff, constitutional and administrative courts, the civil sector and media. Future experts should also benefit from training and educational programmes that are set up in accordance with allied countries.

What problems still remain regarding the security sector and how do they negatively contribute to its positive advancement? Many state officials still lack the ability to consider independent security organisations as being part of the security sector. Expert and policy institutions are separated in their structures and therefore prevent an establishment of a coherent security sector concept. Additional problems for a solidification of the security sector are given by the fact that professionals lack interdisciplinary knowledge, current information and major practice. Also, the tendency of political parties and private businesses to hire former security experts prevents long-term investments into education and training. The country further lacks the necessary expertise to improve the educational system according to

modern standards. Even the help of foreign experts does not always find its optimal implementation if they are not well enough aware of the political system in Bulgaria. However, possible support institutions could provide Bulgaria with help in the following areas: comprehensive programmes, security expert training programmes, professional training, multinational research and other specialised programmes.

Despite the progress that has been achieved in Bulgaria over the past ten years, security sector reform processes remain among the top priorities in the country.

In this context, the primary mission of the security sector expert formation is to prepare civilian and uniformed leaders that are skilful to formulate ends (objectives), coordinate (balance of interests), communicate (motivate), and provide resources (motivate defence as a priority).

As a prerequisite for such achievements would be excellence in the art of security vision, planning and performance skills that have not existed so far. A top programme in security sector issues would be based on actual achievements and EU/NATO practice. The following areas indicate specific programmes that serve as possible means to fill identified gaps in the security sector:

- conceptualising the security sector with a general design for security sector reform;
- education of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed professionals;
- training of civilian and uniformed experts;
- comprehensive and systematic security studies;
- development of a system for the collection and deliverance of security related information;
- creation of legal, administrative and social status of security experts;
- establishment of a security community.

## Croatia

### *Achievements*

According to Mladen Stanicic, Stefan Imobersteg and Jan Trapans (2002), overall achievements of Croatia include membership of the organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Since the start of its participation, Croatia has continuously contributed to the work, tasks and goals of those institutions.

Regarding Parliament and parliamentary staffers, there have been several achievements. In 2002, Croatia officially became participant of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the beginning of the same year, the Croatian Parliament further accepted two strategic documents – National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia – which present national security and defence policy objectives in accordance with NATO's strategic concept. The National Security Strategy includes specific concepts for the restructuring of the military-territorial division, the reduction of professional brigades and the downsizing of overall military personnel. Additionally, Croatia established a network of cooperation with NATO and members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Two years earlier, the Parliament created a specific commission for the Oversight of Internal Politics and National Security Committee. The committee's main task was the surveillance of previously mentioned services to detect any possible legal rights violations of the institutions. The commission indirectly served the rights of citizens and guaranteed the proper working conduct of Internal Politics and National Security Committee.

Concerning journalism and media, the government has generally respected the protection of press and media by the Constitution. Further protected are speech, public expression and the establishment of institutions of public communication. At the beginning of 2001, the Law on State TV was adopted by the Parliament. From then on, public television has been controlled by an independent Council consisting of representatives of CSOs and confirmed by the Parliament. As a result, transparency on political control over state television was enhanced and more publicity on the identities of major media shareholders was gained.



In terms of non-governmental organisations, starting efforts were made during the first half of the 1990s. Established NGOs were conceptually and financially supported by foreign institutions and mainly contributed to solving civil or humanitarian war related problems. Additionally, prevailing NGO structures paid attention to activities of the intelligence and security structures. According to some Croat sources, several cases of abuse of political services in political interest have been documented. Currently, around 20,000 NGOs exist in Croatia and contribute to previously described tasks.

Concerning military and civil society, incongruencies between the media and military seem to be decreasing slowly, mainly through increased levels of cooperation. Improvements have been achieved through press conferences, the attendance of media representatives at seminars, public debates and open conversations organised by the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence has acknowledged the media as a means to emphasise problematic issues related to the security community and has agreed to cooperate more intensively.

### *Needs*

As one of the aspirant transitional countries, Croatia needs to undertake technical as well as organisational steps slowly to achieve standards set by Western societies. In the field of Parliament, possibilities for education are still wanting. Most Croatian parliamentarians have not gained a chance to enhance their skills on democratic security sector reforms. Most Western influence has been directed to the military, and civilian structures have been predominantly neglected. This imbalance detracts from effective security sector reform, because it prevents a successful exchange and compatibility between civilians and the military. Therefore, military as well as civilian personnel are required to gain new skills in the political, managerial and international areas. The Parliament specifically needs to claim authority over defence plans and their implementation. Currently, Senior Ministry of Defence Officials do not report often enough to the Parliamentary Committees. As a result, inefficiencies and failures are not appropriately discussed or

communicated between Parliamentary Staff and Committees on Internal Policy and National Security. The Parliament further did not succeed in establishing the Council for Oversight Security Services (VNSS) and institutions for control and oversight. This lack of guidelines, directions, control and oversight of the services prevents the system from functioning according to democratic principles.

Croatia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) consists of over 3000 members. This number is far too high and presents a clear overpopulation within this specific sector. Most members lack adequate education in the area of security sector reform and new educational programmes are unable to properly deal with such an immense number of people. Therefore, a successful security sector reform requires the downsizing of the security and defence area community. Though government and MoD agree on downsizing the defence sector as part of the defence sector reform, no concrete plans exist among the significant documents of security, defence and military on how to implement those ideas. Furthermore, the MoD still controls and interprets too large an amount of classified and confidential information without any counter interpretation from the civil sector, such as the media. On the other hand, the media lack knowledge and an adequate number of experts to consider such sensitive topics appropriately. Press conferences are seldom organised by the MoD to increase the quality and quantity of the information being released. However, the press themselves do not always attend meetings offered by the MoD, which places the blame for a lack of communication and cooperation on both sides.

Though the Croatian media is free, diverse media segments lack adequate experts. Often, only one reporter works per media segment. The media further tends to pursue the path of a tabloid press and neglects serious and quality research, as well as reports. An imbalance exists with regard to the dissemination into English and local languages. Information is predominantly disseminated into English rather than local languages. The distribution is rather limited, especially regarding the electronic press. The Croatian website has been under construction for over one year without any success. The flow of information is still limited and there are no experts to support the ongoing process.

Problems regarding Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) exist in terms of foreign experts viewing Croatian problems in their own framework, which prevents possible solutions from being successfully implemented. This lack of communication between foreign experts and members of Croatian NGOs reduces potential experts from being educated. Furthermore, NGOs lack major connections to the government and have minimal impact on new governmental policies. This is mainly due to the fact that governmental representatives are unwilling to open their field of work to external organisations such as NGOs. Unfortunately, most Croatian CSOs do not receive any state funding and therefore completely depend on foreign financial support. For CSOs to remain active over time, they will have to find financial aid from institutions inside the country. In conclusion, the space of active operation of NGOs needs to be extended. The civil society sector is forced to engage itself in a wider range of public policy issues, attempting to establish a position in the policy-making process.

Specific programmes should focus on the training of highest ranked officers, considering the establishment of an interdisciplinary multidisciplinary national security study. Courses and seminars should be open to everyone – including public workers, civil servants, journalists, politicians, military commentators etc. Further attention needs to be paid to the education of military personnel regarding duties, and international headquarters, including NATO and SHAPE. Higher ranked officers have to be provided with advanced lectures in the field of operational and managerial skills. The military management field should further establish a concept which allows the recognition of gifted personnel and possible promotion to higher positions with an increased level of responsibility. Young students should be provided with the possibility of gaining a military insight during their time at civilian universities, with the purpose of enhancing the chances of later success in their military careers. The military itself should focus on new aspects of security such as peacekeeping operations, regional arms control activities, demining, cooperation with neighbours and participation in PfP and MAP exercises. Further programmes concerning foreign aspects include the formation of civil-military teams with the purpose of attending educational programmes outside Croatia (GCSP, Marshall Centre, and Baltic Defence College).

## **Macedonia**

### *Achievements*

According to Lidija Georgieva (2002), transformational processes in the Republic of Macedonia have been fairly slow. The start of reform processes of the security sector in 2001 has proven challenging and slow to proceed. The strengthening of the security sector depends highly on international help and funding, and improved relations with NATO and MAP conclude that there are still open reform issues to be covered in the security sector. However, the assessment of the current level of expert formation in civil-military relations has not led to any well-developed reform strategies. Moreover, the analysis has caught people's attention due to large publicity and strengthened their beliefs that future reforms with the goal of improving democratisation, civil-military relations, and efficiency of the security sector are necessary. Nonetheless, the main reason for the agreement to reforms in civil-military relations and the security sector is based on criteria set by NATO, and not due to a fundamental necessity of the country.

Regarding expert formation in the Parliament, two commissions on defence and security – the Commission on Defence and the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Integrations – were established to support the function of the Parliament.

The competence of the Commission is to address issues regarding European and Euro-Atlantic integrations; to provide an adjustment of views concerning Parliamentary activities on key issues related to the process of integration; to perform evaluations and initiate new activities that are of particular interest to the Parliament; and to undertake activities on the harmonisation of the Macedonian legislative with the EU and the documents of international organisations.

This commission has the opportunity to advise the Commission on Defence and Security with the country's integration into EU and NATO. Additionally, since late 2001, a democratic educational control

programme has been active for parliaments and parliamentary staff in South East Europe. The programme discusses following topics: 'bases of legislative control, Parliaments in South East Europe and reform priorities for the security sector, promotion of successful parliamentary control of the security sector, co-organised by CESS and ISPPI'.<sup>125</sup>

Concerning expert formation in the MoD, Macedonia maintains educational programmes for civil experts on defence within the framework of higher education. However, the main societal reform focused on the military sector, which enhanced the impact of military aspects on security. This tendency specifically manifested itself in the ratio of civil-military to military experts. Since 2000/01, this ratio has presented a constant imbalance. Many positions (under-secretaries, assistants to the Minister), which in other democracies would be covered by civilians, are occupied by military officers. A recent assessment showed that the MoD lacks sufficiently educated civilians and military professionals regarding defence issues. Civilian experts have been exclusively educated in the civilian system of higher education but their expertise has never been recognised as successfully transformable to the defence system. The imbalance even reaches levels of confrontation between civilians and military experts, which worsens overall cooperation. Each side accuses the other of not having an adequate number of experts to support various work processes. Unfortunately, programmes are often being developed in the absence of civilian expert personnel, which causes military solutions to prevail. Therefore, a well-balanced positioning of civil and military experts is desirable and should be pursued with great effort.

However, it can be concluded that expert and sub-expert formation does exist in the Ministry but is not appropriately placed or engaged in the existing work processes. Further achievements include the joining of Partnership for Peace (PfP), where Macedonia's educational and training needs are determined and accordingly planned in the Annual National Programme. The pursuit and accomplishment of set goals is defined by priorities and methods of the Partnership programme. However, the

---

<sup>125</sup> Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen, Netherlands; Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (ISPPI), Skopje, Macedonia.

Republic of Macedonia possesses two institutions where civil as well as military experts are educated and trained. Members at cadet level are trained according to national and NATO standards. The staff comprises military and civilian professionals to best educate the students. However, the institutions lack funding and therefore prevent external experts from being attracted to open or newly created positions. The institutional achievements in terms of programmes include postgraduate specialist studies in the peace and defence area on the level of MA and PhD. 'The institute is currently preparing a programme for assistance and training on civil-military issues for military officials and parliamentarians, as well as other experts interested in defence and security issues.'

The Ministry of Interior comprises an adequate number of experts. Nonetheless, their inappropriate placement within various areas prevents them from successful engagement and utilisation. As a result of accumulated problems, a working group was founded – consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice – to deal with police reforms. Another goal of the joint working group is the decentralisation of the Ministry to turn it into a less expensive and more efficient service. The Police Academy, besides the basic police course, provides courses of higher education over the period of two years, with a high of four years and the opportunity for specialisation in specific spheres and postgraduate studies.

Regarding Macedonia's civil society, several improvements have taken place. The number of NGOs has risen and strengthened its community due to generous international programmes. International programme coordinators must have considered Macedonia an ideal market for various humanitarian and training programmes. A number of them had been implemented many times in other countries. As a result, around 3300 NGOs were registered and 200 presented their programmes at the second NGO market towards the end of 2002. However, many NGOs lack a solid organisational basis and therefore misdirect their efforts towards advertisement of programmes and sponsor donors instead of education and training. In conclusion, the civil sector is not on the right track and faces a great need for further development.

## *Needs*

The Macedonian security sector is characterised by a rather small number of experts that have the capability of professionally engaging in diverse tasks related to the sector. Certain experts even find themselves dealing with issues that do not meet their specific knowledge and capabilities in any way, which necessarily leads to inefficiency and additional problematic situations.

Concerning expert formation in Parliament, it should have a central oversight function in the security sector. Parliamentary development, which builds a central aspect within a parliamentary democracy, still lags behind due to its secondary role in the political process following the independence of Macedonia. The Parliament soon gained help from established commissions such as the Commission on Defence and Security, and the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Integrations. Therefore, it is crucial that members of the commissions in assistance to Parliament possess solid knowledge to advise Parliament appropriately on the oversight of the security sector. There is further need for qualified civilian experts to support the different tasks of the Commission. However, an analysis on activities of the Parliament and its commissions related to defence and security showed that assignments have been handled unsatisfactorily. Therefore, a more detailed analysis on expert formation and its requirements is necessary. It has to be further determined what the needs of Parliament, its delegations and commissions are, and what educational methods can improve the situation. 'Another important issue suggests the support of the Commission on Defence and Security with appropriate expertise on parliamentary oversight of the security sector.'

The MoD has the need for civil experts in the defence area with knowledge and coordination capabilities in democratic and civil control of civil-military relations. The MoD also failed to establish a policy, which is a prerequisite to comply with Western standards of democracy and civil control over the military. Due to a lack of civilian experts within the MoD, military experts take over positions that should be occupied by civilian personnel. As a result, the development of programmes happens in the absence of civilian experts, which causes

military solutions to prevail. Therefore, it is important that a better balance between civilian and military experts prevail in the future.

The Cabinet of the Minister presents another target for expert formation reforms. It exerts a crucial role in the functioning and coordination of activities. However, until 1992/93, no expert executive had been established and an individual executive has only existed since the years 1993/95. A further problem prevails among the independent sectors of the Ministry. They lack adequate and efficient structure, relations and coordination. Observations state that certain segments receive more expert support than others, which threatens the successful achievement of goals of the Ministry itself.

In this case, inappropriate expert formation and burdened ratio of civil-military experts influenced the efficiency of the sectors and its cooperation. For that reason, a definition of the sphere of activities and responsibilities is necessary.

The Ministry also did not successfully implement educational programmes being offered. Basically, the security sector did not emphasise long-term planning and support in the implementation of educational programmes.

Regarding expert education in the two existing military academies, a lack of financial stimuli prevent external experts from being attracted to open positions. Though the Academies have developed several research programmes, a wider range of experts needs to be engaged in order to strengthen civil-military research and educational ties. Furthermore, the Academy does not provide officer education as a continuation after basic training and education. This is just another reason why the Academy desires civil experts in the area of national security. The institute even established an internal programme with the objective of educating students on political, social, economic, humanitarian and other factors of national security. The programme clearly intended to educate students specifically in the area where the MoD lacks an adequate number of expert personnel.



Regarding expert formation in the Ministry of Interior, the creation of a Police Academy for the preparation of basic police personnel was suggested. The academy should provide police aspirants with a more thorough education and raise the level of difficulty of courses offered. Another possible course would cover the management segment. The realisation of this course needs the cooperation of different academic institutions. 'The priority would be cooperation in designing the curriculum, elaboration of methodology of education, exchange and training of teaching and expert personnel.' Cooperation can primarily be enhanced through exchange and cooperation with international centres.

## **Moldova**

### *Achievements*

Regarding good governance in Moldova, by Viorel Cibotaru (2002), civilians and the military are required to possess knowledge on security and defence issues at strategic level and the necessary know-how concerning successful cooperation. The following text will elaborate on achievements and needs concerning the education and training situation of civilian and military personnel, the recruiting and promotion system, and how force ministries, Parliament, and parliamentary staff work together.

To evaluate the level of education and training of the National Army, the Military Council of the MoD conducted a session in December 1995 in the presence of the President of the Republic of Moldova as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The session was crucial for the fields of military education and training, and the building of the defence system. In detail, the session included the presentation of an annual report on military education and documentation of the analysis on the development of the defence system building. The President in his speech declared that the army positively contributes to the cooperation with armies of different states. He further expressed his appreciation for the positive participation of the army in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. This mainly includes the following aspects: 'granting the necessary assistance for personnel education and training, consulting,

and the exchange of experience for conducting peacekeeping operations'. Furthermore, the MoD created fundamental principles on national military art, which met the characteristics of the military-political situation, the economical status and the military policy. As a result, the training quality at platoon and company level improved considerably. Additionally, a number of field applications improved the commanders' and headquarters' ability to plan combat actions.

In order to strengthen the army's overall capabilities, an education and training system was developed by the National Army. The system resembles that of the former Soviet Union with a few noticeable deviations. The tactical level still consists of institutions that prepare military personnel. Until 2001, the Military College educated officers in infantry, artillery and communication units. In the year 2002, the institution turned into the Alexandru cel Bun military institute, where junior officers are educated for the National Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, Gendarmerie and Border Guard Troops. Overall, the Military College has been successful in educating its officers. Graduates from this institution possess better professional qualities than lieutenants from military schools, Romanian colleges and CIS states. Regarding the operational level of military personnel, it has to be noted that almost all commanders and chiefs of departments participated in graduate studies at universities in the former Soviet Union. Concerning the strategic level, opportunities are more limited. The only possibility to educate high-ranking officers has been in abroad programmes. The few officers that received the chance to study abroad attended courses at the US War College, the General Staff's Military Academy in Russia, the US Postgraduate School and the Marshall Centre. A further positive factor is the high level of communication that officers maintain with the civilian-ministerial staff, cabinet, parliamentary staff and parliamentarians as well as the presidential staff and the President. In conclusion, 32 officers were educated between 1992 and 1997 in military academies abroad. Currently, 89 military members study overseas.

Since 1997, the MoD has continuously participated in international military exercises with the goal to strengthen the framework of peacekeeping missions. Officers further participated in exercises at the

international headquarters and generally successfully completed their tasks.

Regarding the education of civilians in the defence and security sector, achievements have been made at different levels. Two universities in Moldova educate people on defence issues. The Medical University prepares military medical staff, and the Pedagogical University educates junior officer staff for infantry. The US Government in annual seminars contributes to a more advanced understanding of military problems on the part of civilians. Most courses discuss issues related to the management of defence resources. The seminars are mainly attended by parliamentarians and chief of departments in civilian ministries. Another contributor is the Marshall Centre which arranges seminars on defence planning and economic analysis. The audience consists of Moldavian civilians and military officers.

It is also of great importance that certain parliamentarians have knowledge on state defence and security issues and are provided with access to expert information in order to update their skills whenever necessary. So far, seminars held by the MoD have positively contributed to an increase of knowledge among parliamentarians regarding defence and security matters. In decision-making processes parliamentarians receive support from experts of the following ministries that are involved with defence and security tasks: 'MoD, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Border Guard Troops etc.'. Even expert knowledge from NGOs influence the decision-making process of parliamentarians.

### *Needs*

Though a high percentage of highly qualified officers of Moldavian origin returned to the country by the end of 1992 and actively contributed to the establishment of the National Army, a shortage in staff was still prevailing. Officers lacked language skills and often maintained a Soviet military philosophy which was incompatible with the new reality of the country.

Regarding professional military personnel, the National Army struggles to win the younger generation for a possible career in the military. The unattractiveness of the service – low payment, undefined future possibilities for army and officers, and better opportunities in civilian businesses – leads to the fact that less than 50 per cent of graduates pursue a military career after one to two years of service. If the army is unable to resolve these problems, it will soon lack the required number of low- and mid-level officers. Additionally, the military is short of faculties and lags behind the modern requirements of technical and scientific research. At operational level, brigade commanders and chiefs of departments of the MoD and main staff no longer meet the requirements of the system, and therefore should be replaced by younger personnel. At strategic level, the situation is even worse. Only one person of the National Army graduated from the General Staff's Military Academy, which also is the only educational facility that prepared a strategic level of chain of command in the former Soviet Union.

Regarding the education of civilian personnel on the defence and security sector, facilities only focus on the tactical level of the chain of command. Therefore, civilians in the role of ministers with decision-making competences only possess knowledge on defence issues at a tactical level, lacking any other type of knowledge that would be crucial to fulfil the assigned tasks of their position appropriately. Often, high-level civilians and military officers can only be educated through the help of Western facilities, since the necessary infrastructure in Moldova itself is missing.

Problems are also prevalent in the civilian promotion system. Occasionally, civilians are not promoted based on personal achievements and professional qualities, but according to their loyalty to superiors. This tendency weakens the quality of the civilian system and threatens the conducting of tasks among civilians and related institutions. Unfortunately, there are currently no legal criteria for the promotion of all public bodies in Moldova. They are still subject to further development.

Regarding Parliament and Security Committee, only some members have background knowledge on defence and security issues. The assistance of a special staff committee is still missing and needs to be developed to support Parliament and the Security Committee properly wherever needed.

## **Romania**

### *Achievements*

According to Julian Bujoreanu (2002), the national system of defence planning in Romania was established by law and has ever since served as the basis to collect natural, material, as well as human resources to implement fundamental changes in the field of national security and defence. The National Security Strategy (NSS) develops from the basic defence planning process and relies on the following specific subdivisions:

Identification of values and national interests, as well as their risks and threats; definition of national security objectives and policies for their achievements; establishment of state bodies in the area of national defence and security; determination of the required resources and their allocation for the accomplishment of security goals.

Additionally, the Romanian Military Strategy is released by the Ministry of National Defence, which depicts the central military policy objectives of the Romanian State as long as the NSS is valid. This strategy describes and elaborates on force structure, missions, organisation, procurement, level of training, logistic, support and infrastructure. This information is crucial for the military system to pursue national military objectives, as well as the concept of training in military operations.

Romania has already made efforts concerning the establishment of a European system of cooperative security, attempting to join NATO and EU, support OSCE developments, contribute to a successful strengthening of the subregional networks of cooperation and eliminate current security deficits by means of diplomacy. Several courses on

national security are being offered at service level academies. For example: geopolitics, geostrategy and defence resources management. Those courses tend to be selected by students after the successful accomplishment of a basic education in psychology, sociology, ethics and/or pedagogy. At a later stage, Romanian officers pass through a number of courses – long-, medium- and short-term – that are specifically related to their field of study.

The highest level of training courses in the field of national security, as far as the Romanian Ministry of National Defence is concerned, are offered by the National Defence College (NDC), the Partnership for Peace Regional Training Centre (PPRTC), and the Defence Resources Management Regional Centre (DRMRC). A short presentation of each of those institutions is given in Appendix 11.2.

Each of the three institutions provides competent training in its specific field for different categories of personnel. Among the institutions are Parliament; parliamentary staffers; political secretaries of the ministries of defence, the interior and justice; intelligence agencies; leading representatives of the executive; representatives of the civil society; journalists and nongovernmental experts (working in NGOs), both domestic and foreign. Courses last from one month to one year and are held on undergraduate as well as postgraduate level. Additional courses are offered whenever necessary and can be nationally or internationally focused. Courses in this area last for approximately one week and consist of various lectures and discussions, which are held by competent domestic as well as foreign experts.

### *Needs*

Prerequisites for an integration in the European community and regional stability are an optimisation of the defence sector and a focus on the following objectives: enhancement of fighting structure potentials to guarantee the necessary defence resources; development of human resources; updating military education to a modern level; improvement of the procurement system; restructuring the defence industry; strengthening the bonds to civil society; and maintenance of strong

connections to the armed forces of other states and international organisations. Another objective deals with finding appropriate resources for the successful implementation of individual steps of the strategy. In conclusion, the training of employees within the sector remains crucial for the overall success of national security tasks.

Romania experiences a need of additional training of young officers and civilians in the field of national security. This tendency has mainly come into existence due to Romania's involvement towards NATO and the country's involvement in a great number of other international activities. Therefore, a training system for experts in security related issues on national and international level should be enacted as soon as possible. Everyone involved in the expert formation process needs to be European and not in any way affiliated with local political parties. Furthermore, the training of future experts should be based on a cooperative concept between teacher and student, so that the exchange of ideas and messages is guaranteed. This condition enables students and teachers to develop together real-life situations, which will provide the best training fundamentals possible. The work and presence of international experts is acknowledged and appreciated, but needs to be improved in accordance with basic concepts in the wider European and international context. In conclusion, the suggested training methods target national as well as international experts and intend to remove experts out of their familiar environment once every two years to adjust better to new and untraditional situations. In result, they are forced to cope with specific life situations and forced to apply their knowledge in diverse problem-solving processes.

## **Serbia**

### *Achievements*

According to Miroslav Hadzic (2002), no current data exist on the total number of security and defence experts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). An upcoming questionnaire, issued by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, will provide more detailed insight into already existing achievements, and what needs to be done in the nearer future. Over the past few years, mainly foreign experts have been occupied with the analysis and development of new strategies within the security sector. Regarding FRY, federal and republic assemblies included committees that deal with defence and security issues. However, those committees do not represent any specialised services, because all committee members are Members of Parliament as well. Basically, they have never gained specific expert knowledge. Further, the President of FRY has been assigned an advisor for security and defence. Unfortunately, the advisor seems not to be involved in the establishment of new proposals for security sector reform. Regarding the civil society, an increased interest in issues concerning the defence and security sector can be noticed. Concerning NGOs, only one institution (Centre for Civil-Military Relations) has so far successfully dealt with security sector issues. The media sector only occupies few journalists on the level of the security sector. However, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in cooperation with the Media Centre has organised courses on this topic over the past three years.

Unfortunately, no current information exists that would allow a precise statement on specialised educational programmes. As far as is known, the Centre for European Security Studies, the University of Groningen, in cooperation with the Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, organised two workshops on Security Sector Reform for Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff, journalists, representatives of the MoD and Yugoslav Army and experts on civil society.

Another two workshops – legislative efficiency in security sector and democratic control of armed forces as well as implementation of conduct



– have been established by an OSCE mission in late 2002. Planned for the upcoming year are ten workshops on the democratic control of the army of Yugoslavia in association with the security sector reform and modern Civil-Military Relations (CMR). An additional seminar will be offered on the security sector reform in cooperation with G17+ at the beginning of 2003.

### *Needs*

Politicians in FRY have to be provided with permanent expert support services in order to be capable of handling issues regarding the security sector. Furthermore, the President's security advisor should be able to influence directly proposals made concerning security sector reforms. The MoD exerts additional functions in the security sector, which are inaccessible to the public.

Regarding civil society, an increased interest in security sector aspects is noticeable, but unfortunately not professionally supported due to a lack in the number of experts. Especially people from the media field, such as journalists, demand more opportunities to gain detailed knowledge in the area of security. As a result, more educational courses will be organised by the Media Centre in 2003. Specific courses would have to be created in the following areas:

- Security integration of FRY in the Euro-Atlantic community
- Budget planning and control of budget
- Conversion of the military industry
- Training for work on conditions on democratic control and oversight

Regarding educational advancements that include experiences and knowledge of foreign countries, the following programme with specific contents in the indicated areas would have to be established:

- Security sector reform, CMR, legislative oversight, armed forces reform, respect of human rights in the security forces, role of civil society and media in the democratic

control of the armed forces and the importance of joining the Euro-Atlantic community.

## **Ukraine**

### *Achievements*

According to Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy Tkachuk (2002), the level of security sector expertise in Ukraine has developed over eleven years of independence in strong association with three factors: ‘the heritage of the Soviet past, the security environment in independent Ukraine (internal factor), as well as the influences of regional and global security developments (external factor)’. However, eleven years is too short a period to overcome previously established security principles of a larger totalitarian state. Most qualitative achievements that have been made over the years of independence are reflected in the military sector, whereas the non-military sector still remains in great need of improvement. In conclusion, despite achievements in the area of institutionalisation and functioning, the security sector is still in the process of diverse forms of transition.

Although Ukraine inherited many Soviet scientific and educational institutions, it struggled to transform the prevailing potential from the security interests of a totalitarian state into an independent (according to Western standards), adjusted system. Therefore, Ukraine at the beginning of its independence lacked a National Security and Defence Council, MoD, General Staff of the Armed Forces and Armed Forces with other military formations.

During the first years of independence, the military sector gained major attention, until later the political, economic, social and energy sectors slowly gained more attention. ‘For instance, in 1992, almost 72 per cent of expenditures on defence research and development were channelled towards fundamental research, but in the years 1999–2002, this figure dropped to 0.01–0.02 per cent.’ Regarding the establishment of new national security policies, the laws and concepts were too basic in nature and prevented specific plans for a successful implementation. Finally,

towards the end of the 1990s, a regulatory legal basis was reputable, which included several aspects of security sector activities. Furthermore, the country was not only able to retain its number of academic institutions, but even successfully increased it to a total of 300 in 2002. This military system is now compatible with the civil system, and the number of experts that could occupy top-level positions is still rising. Many civilian specialists now hold positions that allow them to influence security structures and strengthen civilian tendencies in the managerial department. Certain politicians even emphasised an increase in expenditures on the level of intelligence and defence. However, Parliament did not follow the request and passed a budget that did not even cover what was needed by the Armed Forces.

In 2001, the institution of State Secretaries was introduced to the security structures. At the same time, Information-Analytical Sections (IAS) continuously developed, and became supportive of previously mentioned structures. IAS sections are crucial for the collection and analysis of information concerning the state of readiness of subordinate units and their problems. The most developed structures were created in the Armed Forces. Here, they prevail in each service and are coordinated by the Information-Analytical Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In addition to the previously described improvements, the MoD- enhanced the quality of its inside structures in accordance with new requirements posed by internal, regional and global security developments. Furthermore, the Ukrainian political system portrays certain problematic characteristics regarding the use of power. The President and the NSDC Staff rule separate from the executive power branch, instead of being controlled by the cabinet. This distribution of power is crucial since the two political units contain operational and research segments, which employ among the best experts available in the governmental service. The NSDC Staff further controls a specialised department on Defence Security Planning. The tasks mainly deal with defence and military-industrial policy. The main structures described here are again supported by subordinate research institutions such as: 'the National Institute for International Security Problems and the Ukrainian Institute of Environmental and Resources Studies'.

Regarding civil society, the Ukrainian security sector expert community consists of three major branches: several research institutions, the design bureau of the defence industry, and newly developed security studies centres. For a long time, security studies centres have not been part of Ukrainian university structures and therefore represent a new, positive development. The financial aid of foreign institutions helps organisations grow to a more advanced and mature condition. ‘For instance, by the end of 2002, well over 600 Ukrainian researchers received grants from the NATO, and from the beginning of Ukraine–NATO cooperative programmes in 1994, over 1000 Ukrainian scholars were granted financial assistance for seminar participation and other events.’

More and more often journalists take on the role of security experts in Ukraine. However, their area of occupation deals predominately with defence issues rather than law enforcement, arms trade and intelligence activity. However, the number of media institutions dealing with military issues has risen significantly over the past few years.

Quality improvements can also be noticed regarding the work of NGOs. They have significantly extended their role in the security sector and reached the status of professional agencies. ‘From being mainly enthusiastic amateur organisations during the early 1990s, they grew and evolved into hundreds of different types of NGOs, including several influential think tanks, which are capable of producing first rate policy studies, independent research, substantiated proposals, as well as hosting international conferences.’ Due to financial support from Western countries, the system of non-governmental research and public organisations is still expanding. NGO research centres have gained considerable intellectual potential and their think tank experts rank among frequent commentators in the printed and electronic media.

In the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), Ukraine maintains connections to NATO member states, as well as NATO partners. Those relationships have developed continuously and qualitatively. Close to 600 joint activities are supposed to be carried out between Ukraine and NATO, which are, to a major extent, financially carried by the United States and other democratic countries. The PfP Consortium of Defence

Academies and Security Studies Institutes represents one of the most promising arrangements in terms of security sector expert formation. This international organisation intends to strengthen the military and defence education, as well as research, through increased cooperation. Further opportunities are being offered by governments of various NATO countries and partners. Among those, the US IMET (International Military Education & Training) programme presents one of the most efficient and financially strong programmes. Between 1994 and 2002, Ukraine received more than \$10 million for academic purposes and succeeded to educate 357 people. Additionally, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces provides another type of expert training support. It organises many conferences on essential security subjects and offers financial aid to different NGOs throughout Ukraine. Further, the Harvard Programme 'National Security of Ukraine', established by Harvard University (USA) has over 100 Ukrainian participants, including generals and their civilian participants. Several other Western countries – for instance, the UK, France, Germany, Hungary, Austria as well as others – offer specific individual education, training and exchange programmes that enable Ukrainians to participate.

### *Needs*

Most achievements in Ukraine have been made in the military sector, whereas the non-military sector still calls for major improvements. The security sector is characterised by severe disproportions in its structure and functioning. Therefore, the state needs to come up with an efficient institute of civilian service in the security structures.

A general problem with the development and strengthening of the security sector is posed by low social benefits and incentives among experts working in governmental and parliamentary structures.

Regarding Ukrainian Parliament and parliamentary staff, more experience on security issues is required. Only a few Parliament and parliamentary staff members have received adequate aids to qualify to work on security-related legislations. It is said that the majority of

parliamentarians have no conceptual understanding of security sector related problems and that no personal incentives exist that would raise the interest of participation in the process of resolution. The absence of a single research centre presents another major obstacle to a better development of the Parliament in terms of security sector concepts. As a result, the Parliament is unable to perform all necessary tasks at the quality required.

The absence of civilian servants within political secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice, prevents Ukraine from establishing a direct mechanism of control and responsibility towards its civilians. 'An important element of the system, which provides control from the inside to the military and to other security structures has yet to be established.' Obstacles such as the lack of practice in organising joint peacekeeping operations, stereotypes of the past, and lack of initiative first need to be removed. Highly negative is also the low number of students training at senior academic level. This condition contributes to a worsening of the situation. However, the fault cannot only be found on the side of the students, but is strongly related to old curricula that do not correspond with modern standards. The curricula do not benefit from current knowledge in national and international security, theories in international relations and conflict studies. In conclusion, Ukraine has had little time to enhance its own security strategy and has not benefited from international reforms within this sector.

Financial shortages present another problem for the successful development of the security sector. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the defence budget formation, which at the same time requires improvements on the competence level of planners. Again, the evil circle remains closed, due to the lack of necessary expert knowledge and practice on the various levels of the defence budgeting process. The most qualified members often find themselves escaping to private institutions where they receive higher salaries.

The role of journalists could still be improved. Only few have the courage to publish articles on law enforcement and special service institution activities. The number even decreases if the topic deals with corrupt officials or possibly involves the criminal world. Further

restrictions to the free conduct of journalism are evident in the generally limited freedom of press and uneven distribution of writing/broadcasting rights of various media segments concerning security issues.

Regarding NGOs and think tanks, two major limitations exist. First, the majority of think tanks are located in the capital city of Kyiv and secondly, most think tanks have not risen to the level where they are able to conduct research on politically sensitive areas of law enforcement and intelligence activities.

Nonetheless, there are opportunities for improvement in Ukraine. For instance, the National Defence Academy of Ukraine and other similar institutions could provide student seminars in specialised fields of security and defence issues. Also, invited competent Ukrainian and foreign civilian guest speakers could offer a detailed view into the advanced field of security structures. Further improvements could and should be made by training civil servants of high executive categories in relation with military servicemen. This would lead to enhanced defence decision-making processes. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine faces the task of establishing security research centres at leading Ukrainian universities. Regarding the help of foreign countries, courses being offered ought to be more specific and targeted towards the needs of the individual country, in this case Ukraine. Therefore, additional and new courses need to be specific and aim on the following areas: parliamentary staff, the democratisation of law-enforcement and security service structures, civilian candidates who obtain responsible tasks in security structures, and experts who draft budgets for the security structures. Currently, two expert groups, parliamentary staff and personnel of non-military structures, demonstrate the greatest need for additional courses. The method of Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) could be beneficial in this case and enable participants to receive adequate knowledge without having to be present at some institutions for extensive periods of time.

For the non-military security structures of Ukraine, which still remain in the form and substance of unreformed Soviet era relics, courses on traditions of securing basic human rights, the rule of law, freedom of

expression, Western practices of managing classified information, and working with the media should be considered.

As far as the military is concerned, in addition to what has already been done, foreign instructors on the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations, joint and combined operations and conflict studies for the National Defence Academy and other military educational institutions could help. ADL courses and internships should be offered whenever appropriate.

More extensive internships and more ADL opportunities would be desirable for non-governmental and university research centres and journalists.

In conclusion, there are no simple solutions for the complex situation of Security Sector Expert Formation in Ukraine. Often, inappropriate salaries cause competent analysts and young experts to reject possible work opportunities. Therefore, 'the development of more effective personnel management and social reward cultures remain among the major challenges for the success of the security sector expert formation process at this point of transition in Ukraine'. Further, current threats to Ukraine are predominately of a non-military nature, which require future training and support within the field of expert formation to be accessible to non-military structures as well. As a first step in the new problem-solving process the following should be done:

A major focus should be on the segments that are most receptive to outside support. Those include the following: parliamentary staff and parliamentarian's aid, journalists, university security studies centres and independent think tanks.



## ANNEX II: WORKING GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE EVALUATION

### 4.1 Introduction

The Security Sector Reform Working Group of the PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes initiated a stocktaking study in the field of expert formation in the security sector. This was achieved by the distribution of a questionnaire to all members of the PfP-Consortium. The goals of this project are threefold.

First, it aims to provide a much needed overview of existing programmes of security expert formation. It will be one of the first studies, if not the first, to provide a global overview of courses offered in this field. In our understanding it is crucial for institutes organising courses to be accurately informed on the offer provided by other organisations or institutions. This is necessary in order to minimise duplications or omissions and in doing so to maximise the payoff of the courses or trainings. On the other hand, such an overview is also very useful for potential participants so as to be comprehensively informed of the offers in this field.

Secondly, after assessing the offers, this project aims to assess the demand and need in field security expert formation in Southeast Europe. We try to find out what is needed to guarantee effective democratic oversight of the security sector. This includes the consideration of which groups do not yet receive sufficient training in these matters, as well as the question of whether the courses offered address societies' needs.

The third aim of this project is to assess what has been omitted, after having assessed the offer and demand. This implies making concrete recommendations and proposals to what kind of training courses should be offered to which groups. We think that today this offers very timely

and much needed guidance to the further development of security expert formation, instead of proliferating programmes which are very similar and which do not really address the specific needs of societies to democratise the security sector or to keep the security sector democratic.

This chapter is structured according to the goals delineated above, i.e. first we discuss the various training courses on offer in the field of security expert formation, and then in the final section of this chapter we look at the demand side to assess what is missing.

## **4.2 Evaluation of the Questionnaires**

We received roughly a hundred evaluations and descriptions of different training courses from participants as well as organisers. The largest proportion of those completing the questionnaires were either members of the armed forces (mostly staff officers or commanding officers), or persons working in government ministries or research institutes. The large majority of them had finished higher education and were in possession of a Masters or PhD. Their average age was between 30 and 40.

### **4.2.1 Offer of Educational and Training Courses**

In the following we are going to describe what courses are available in Southeast Europe as well as those courses accessible to participants from European countries. In the annex to this chapter you can find a complete list of all the institutes and organisations mentioned in the questionnaires.

In today's globalised world it would hamper the accuracy of the findings if we included only the courses taking place in Southeast Europe, because the geographical location is becoming less and less important. A course or training offered in a region other than Southeast Europe can be as useful as one offered in this region for participants from Southeast Europe. This fact is even more evident, when taking into account the

increasing possibilities of distance learning, where the geographical location of students does not matter at all.

We break down the description of the offer into two main sections: first we describe the external or administrative aspects and in the second part we concentrate on the content and participants of the training courses.

(a) *External and Administrative Aspects*

Based on the evaluation of the questionnaires, it can be said that the offer of courses in civil-military relations, security sector reform, and democratic control of armed forces appears to be quite stable. This is because (i) the large majority of the courses mentioned in the questionnaires are offered very regularly, mostly on a yearly basis; and (ii) almost all courses have existed already for more than five years and there was no drastic increase in such courses in the last five years. Neither do the answers provided suggest that there will be a drastic increase in training courses in the near future.

Another very interesting observation concerns the language in which the training courses are taught. Many programmes are either taught only in English, or bilingually, i.e. in English and another language (often Russian). This clear predominance of the English language can be understood as an indicator for the importance of regional and international cooperation in security sector expert formation. Course providers are not mainly focusing on the national participants, but on the contrary they try to attract international participants.

Another trend that can be seen is that the large majority of courses are offered as part of an undergraduate or postgraduate programme, and approaching the topic forms an academic and theoretical perspective. Most of the audience in these courses are students still in school. Those courses are broadly unsuitable for experts working in the security field for different reasons: they are mostly part of a full-time educational programme that extends over several years and are not accessible to people outside of such programmes; they cannot really be followed by anybody who is working more than 50 per cent. Additionally, such

courses are normally stretched over a minimal timeframe of several months, which is too long a time to take off from a job. Only a very small proportion of all available courses, e.g. the courses of the Partnership for Peace, are intended and suitable in their format for experts and practitioners.

Almost all courses are taught as residential courses, meaning in a conventional setting of a teacher or professor lecturing on the topic in front of a smaller or larger group of students. Most of the described courses have had between 10 and 30 participants.

Very few courses use elements of new information technologies in their teaching. The institutes and academies generally seem to refrain from using new ways and possibilities of education and training, as tools such as the Internet, computers and even videos are rarely employed. Given this background, it does not come as a surprise that fully fledged distance learning courses are even rarer in this field. Only two institutions were mentioned in our study giving leeway in this direction, those were the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies in Germany and the International Relations and Security Network in Switzerland.

A last point can be made regarding the external aspects of the courses. Normally, the costs are not paid by the participants themselves, but in most cases the institution they are working for or the governmental administration covers the costs for their participation. It is also quite common that the hosting institution covers at least a part of the costs.

#### (b) *Content and Participants*

In this section we are going to evaluate the parts of the questionnaire providing information related to the two questions; what subjects are taught in the courses and who are the students?

Most of the courses offered address the field of civil-military relations in a very broad way. No more than a third of the courses focused on more specific aspects, such as security sector reform and democratic control of

the security sector. Even more focused programmes, such as courses on the specific role of an actor or institution of the security sector or its role in respect to the security sector, are almost entirely lacking.

Almost three-quarters of the courses are largely attended by military staff, mostly officers. The participation of other groups of the society, such as civil servants, parliamentarians, politicians, non-governmental organisations, civil society, is very restricted. This is mostly due to the fact that more than half of the courses are exclusively for military personnel, excluding the participation of other interested persons. Few programmes are open to the participation of civil servants and members of the national ministries. Rarely are any courses on the subject of good governance of the security sector accessible for civil society actors, such as the general public and non-governmental organisations. However, we can conclude that the members of the armed forces have broadest access to courses on these subjects. This implies that they are often better informed and trained than their civilian counterparts and the civil society on principles, mechanisms and tools governing this field.

The question of how the participants of the courses are selected provides important information on the composition of the classes. In this context we can observe, first of all, that in almost half of the courses it was not the participants themselves who chose the training course. Often their participation is dependent on a superior's recommendation, a ministry's choice, educational background, military rank or professional experience. This shows that in most cases participation is based on criteria different from the interest and/or willingness of participants themselves.

Almost all persons answered that the courses have been beneficial for their careers. This indicates that knowledge on the issues related to civil-military relations seems to be an important factor when hiring new personnel.

## 4.2.2 Demands and Needs of South East European Countries in Security Expert Formation

### (a) *What Training Courses are Needed?*

Training courses and trainings appropriate for experts should not be longer than a month, preferably only one week. Experts working in the armed forces or civil servants are generally not interested in following entire academic programmes, as they have already finished their education. They rather wish to update their knowledge on certain subjects besides their work, e.g. civil-military relations. As we have seen above in the part describing the offer, such courses are very rare, because most courses addressing civil-military issues are part of an academic programme, which are certainly much longer than a month. However, we can indicate a clear need for shorter courses and training specifically addressing the needs of experts.

As we have seen above, most courses have between 20 and 30 participants. Some persons filling our questionnaires estimated that this number is too high and that more courses would be needed with fewer participants in order to allow more extensive discussions and greater exchange of knowledge and experiences among the participants.

The traditional method of instruction, residential courses, is estimated as most appropriate by many persons completing the questionnaire. The interaction between teachers and students and maybe even more importantly among students is perceived as a crucial element of the learning process. Many of the persons completing the questionnaire felt that it is difficult to create an equally fruitful learning environment in a computer-based or web-based training, as in a residential course. Therefore, we can say that courses and trainings should at least partly be taught as a residential course.

On the other hand, a large percentage of those answering the questionnaire thought that residential courses could be much more effective, when combined and enriched with web- or computer-based training and learning elements. The different new multimedia methods

should be used much more, as they can be a very good tool to enhance and increase the sustainability of the learning process of participants.

(b) *What Should Be Taught?*

Regarding the content the most burning need is, according to the answers in our questionnaire, to have more specialised courses, focusing on certain actors or mechanisms of the security sector. These programmes should provide profound analysis and not only basic knowledge on civil-military relations. Not only the general theory should be taught, but also the latest changes and updates in civil-military relations should be presented and discussed. The following topics were suggested as topics for more specific courses: democratic control of armed forces, defence budgeting, requirements of defence policy, civil-military relations in transitional societies, new threats and their impact on civil-military relations. Few of the persons completing the questionnaire thought that more general or introductory courses on civil-military relations were needed.

It was repeatedly suggested that the training courses should not only focus on the theoretical aspects of civil-military relations, but should also include practical applications and case studies, as for example discussing examples from Western countries' crisis management training. The courses should consist of a combination of formal education, experience and demonstrated accomplishment in the field. Many persons estimated that this would enhance the efficiency of the learning process.

Generally speaking, courses and trainings should not only focus on the armed forces, but also on other parts of the security sector, including police, boarder guards, internal troops, intelligence services, private security actors etc. Not only was a broadening of the understanding of the security sector suggested, but also the inclusion of discussions in the programmes presenting the connections between civil-military relations and economic and/or social processes in order to achieve a comprehensive view and understanding of the topic and interlinkages was mentioned.

(c) *Who Should Be Taught?*

According to our study there seems to be a great need for more civilian security experts. In order to achieve efficient and effective democratic oversight of the security sector the civilian counterpart, including parliament, government, media, civil society etc., must know what their role is, what tools and rights they have, as well as understanding the processes and mechanisms regarding the security sector. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers were mentioned most often as being in need of more and profounder knowledge on the security sector, shortly followed by the media and the staff of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civil society in large. Another civilian group largely in need of more and better expertise on civil-military issues are civil servants in the ministries of defence and the ministries of foreign affairs. Generally speaking, there seems to be a great need to increase and promote the efficiency of civilian control and oversight mechanisms, including parliamentary overseers and other watchdogs, such as civil society actors.

In order to achieve better information and training of the civilian counterparts on the principles and mechanisms of good governance of the security sector, tailor-made courses and trainings should be offered addressing their needs and informing them about the importance of their respective roles. By offering specific courses for civil society this important actor will be more involved in civil–military issues. It was mentioned repeatedly that it might be fruitful for certain types of training courses on civil-military relations to have a mixed audience of civilian and military participants. Such a setting could increase mutual understanding and trust and improve contacts among those two groups.

Turning towards the security sector itself and its needs for security experts, our study provides for different groups which are in need of more specific expertise. Many persons completing the questionnaire stated that it is crucial that not only officers participate in training courses, but also lower ranks in the hierarchy be targeted. As described above in the section on what educational and training courses are offered, today's courses mostly concentrate on the higher levels of the



military hierarchy. Additionally, it was frequently stated that it is crucial that better training be given to most of those elements of the security sector (including lower military ranks) who are dealing directly with civilians and civilian issues, such as paramilitary forces, militia, police, security services. Also, military staff preparing to go on missions or on peace support operations should be trained, for example, in human rights and humanitarian law.

Regarding the selection criteria for participation in security training courses, it was often mentioned that selection for the courses should not exclusively be based on military rank or on superiors' recommendation. Other criteria such as the participant's interests and motivation, his or her professional background and language abilities, should be included. As described above in the section on the offer of courses, we have seen that the large majority of courses are not taught in national languages; therefore, evidently, language criteria is and should remain crucial for participation.

### **4.3 Assessment and Recommendations**

The evaluation of the questionnaire made quite clear that in most countries in Southeast Europe a basic level of knowledge on democratic civil-military relations has already been achieved. Now, in order to promote and stabilise the democratic structures in respect of the security sector, a next step has to be taken. It seems to be crucial to increase or create the offer of security courses and trainings focusing on specific aspects of democratic civil-military relations or on the role of certain actors. Such courses could eventually be provided in the framework of the PfP-Consortium, as it has been acknowledged that international cooperation and coordination is generally very fruitful and beneficial in this area. Courses including Western and Eastern European participants can help to create new contacts for future cooperation and developments.

We have seen that generally the armed forces have more possibilities and chances to participate in training courses on civil-military relations than their civilian counterparts. This unbalanced situation can hamper the process of democratisation and eventually even reverse it. A basic

rule of democracy and good governance is the democratic oversight of the security sector, but if neither politicians nor civilians in the ministries have the necessary knowledge and training to perform their role appropriately this basic democratic principle is endangered. An example of a possible reversal of democratisation is the dangerous remilitarisation of many ministries of defence in some countries in Southeast Europe due to the lack of qualified civilian security experts. From this point of view it is crucial to rebalance the security experts' repartition by offering more possibilities to civilians to increase their knowledge on crucial issues of civil-military relations, democratic control of the security sector, security sector reform and to become qualified experts in this field.

The problem mentioned in the previous paragraph is emphasised by the fact that a further watchdog of democratic oversight, civil society, which should normally contribute to the scrutiny of the security sector, is largely absent in many parts of Southeast Europe. This is due to the fact that civil society is often not very well informed, and is generally uninterested with respect to security sector processes and rules. Therefore, it is very important to better inform civil society on civil-military relations, for example by organising courses on these topics for the media or by training staff from NGOs.

As we have seen, the interest and willingness of participants is only a minor criterion for participation in security trainings and courses. More often participation depends on military rank, which excludes all civilians from the beginning. This is problematic, even more so when taking into account the fact that many persons filling in our questionnaires thought it beneficial for both sides to have mixed courses including military and civilians participants. Therefore, the courses already offered should, whenever possible, be opened to civilian participation.

Another critical point regarding participation is that superiors have such an important say in who will participate in the courses. This can possibly lead to a situation where only those who please their superiors have a chance to participate in courses and trainings that help to enlarge their knowledge on civil-military relations. It could be the case that those who have new, provocative views and opinions, differing from the

perspectives of their superiors are inhibited from participation in those formation courses. This would in turn crystallise certain ways of thinking and certain practices in civil-military relations, which could be harmful in the context of security sector reforms. In this process organisations of the security sectors and ministries have to adapt their ways of thinking to new realities in order to be able to overcome their natural organisational inertia.

#### **4.4 Conclusions**

Due to drastic changes in the security environment and the modifications of the security strategies and policies that have taken place during the last decades, there exists a great need for continued security expert (re)formation. As we have seen, there seems to be an enormous need for more courses in these subjects, otherwise the achievements of democratisation and good governance are endangered.

There not only needs to be more courses but the offer would need to be more balanced in two ways. First, there needs to be more general instruction for civilians in about their roles, rights and the functioning of the security sector. Secondly, the training courses need to be more focused, i.e. addressing specific roles of certain actors or target specific aspects of civil-military relations.

Only a society with enough civilian and military security experts can respond to today's security threats without endangering its democratic structure and the respect of human rights.

## Philipp Fluri, Ph.D. DCAF Deputy Director

### ANNEX III: DCAF'S SOUTH EAST EUROPE AKTIVITIES

True to its mandate, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)<sup>126</sup> focused its initial activities on South Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union.

In its short existence, DCAF has supported and initiated over a hundred seminars, publications and international cooperation projects. After being heavily engaged in strategically advising then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kostunica on security sector reform during the transition period after Milosevic's fall, DCAF has offered to set up an International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) for South East Europe (SEE)<sup>127</sup>, actively supports both Demobilization and Retraining effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>128</sup> and Border Management Reform in

---

<sup>126</sup> Established in 2000 as an international foundation under Swiss law on the joint initiative of the Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. 42 governments have hitherto joined the foundation ([www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)).

<sup>127</sup> *International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) for SEE Countries*

The ISAB is to review the progress of security sector reform in interested SEE countries and offer advice to senior policy makers, and consequently to key government agencies, regarding policy orientation, approaches, priorities, and specific solutions. In itself, ISAB will consist of a group of senior experts, but will also work with a larger network of experts who may be engaged on an *ad hoc* basis to assist in the execution of specific projects. Its work shall be conducted through periodic consultations, meetings, and seminars, with either all or some of the members taking part.

ISAB is to engage experts on defense, demobilization, intelligence, police, border security, parliamentary oversight, etc. It aims to identify needs, bring together the policy makers and their staff in the host country with outside experts, and help develop a coherent reform program. It would respond to requests from senior policy makers to the best of its ability.

<sup>128</sup> *A Qualitative, Quantitative and Effectiveness Analysis of Armed Forces Demobilization and Retraining in Bosnia & Herzegovina from 2000 to date*

A research programme focusing on the demobilization and retraining programs conducted by the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since March 2000. The study will include a critical analysis of the information provided and will be published as a joint DCAF/BICC (Bonn International Centre for Conversion) Study.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia & Montenegro<sup>129</sup>.

In the field of Parliamentary Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector, DCAF will make the Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight (jointly edited with the Inter-Parliamentary Union – Geneva 2003) available in Albanian, Macedonian and Serbian. This handbook, together with other materials of foundational character prepared by DCAF, will be used in DCAF-organised seminars for parliamentarians and committee staffers.<sup>130</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup> *Lessons Learned from the Establishment of Border Security Systems (on-going project 2001-2004)*

In order to assist the Governments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia & Montenegro, and particularly their respective Ministries of the Interior, responsible for creating new border security systems, DCAF has developed a program - with the full consent of the above mentioned countries – to help address the strategic considerations and needs involved in this process. Through a series of tailor-made workshops DCAF has, together with seven donor countries, been offering an inside view at how Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Russia, Slovenia and Switzerland (countries with advanced border security systems already in place) have reached their respective levels and what lessons they have learned in the process.

<sup>130</sup> *DCAF Funded Parliamentary Staff Experts Program in SEE* The current DCAF project on Parliamentary Staff Experts in SEE aims to develop a network of parliamentary experts in defense and security issues. Furthermore, it hopes to facilitate communication between parliaments, contribute to the harmonization of democratic standards and encourage the development of cooperative patterns in the region. To assist the parliaments in SEE and facilitate local parliamentary research capacity, the project funds local experts to the parliamentary security and defense committees in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova. The funding will cover the cost of between 1 to 2 positions for a two-year period. The OSCE missions in the region will act as the key partner in this initiative, in close cooperation with the respective parliaments.

*Joint DCAF/OSCE (Serbia & Montenegro) project on 'Legislative Oversight of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Serbian Parliament'* The DCAF/OMIFRY study on "The Security and Defense Committee of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia", which commenced in Dec 2002, has now been completed. The project shall conclude with a workshop at which the above-mentioned study will be discussed and there will also be a debate on the implementation of the recommendations. The final outcome of the project should, therefore, be the elaboration of recommendations for improved oversight mechanisms vested with (or hopefully added to) the Serbian Parliament.

*Series of workshops in several SEE countries on the joint DCAF/IPU Handbook on the Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector* Through these workshops, the recently published DCAF/IPU Handbook on parliamentary oversight of the security sector will be introduced, first and foremost, to parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers in the region, but also to governmental representatives, the academia and NGOs. For this purpose, DCAF will assist in the translation of the Handbook into some of the languages of the region.

## **ANNEX IV: THE WORKING GROUP ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONSORTIUM OF DEFENCE ACADEMIES AND SECURITY STUDIES INSTITUTES**

### **3.1 The Story**

On 12 June 1998 in Brussels, 44 ministers of defence met as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) welcomed the US–German initiative to establish, as a permanent PfP activity, ‘The Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes’. The establishment of the Consortium is a contribution to the enhanced Partnership for Peace and in particular a means of placing greater emphasis on defence and military education and training – a top priority within the Partnership.<sup>131</sup>

The Consortium’s primary purpose is to strengthen defence civilian and military professionalism through enhanced national and institutional cooperation among the NATO and PfP nations. Such an effort will help Partners and Allies alike to concentrate energy and resources, while collecting and sharing lessons learned. It will increase the number of individuals in Government and private sectors with defence and security policy expertise, further promote professional military education in participating nations, and encourage collaborative approaches to defence education.

---

<sup>131</sup> Stamey, Victor, Rapporteur in Workshop 3 the PfP Consortium; ‘The Way Ahead’ in ‘Networking the Security Community in the Information Age’, Conference Report on the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Security Forum, 1998, p. 91ff.

The Consortium is an international cooperative arrangement ‘in the spirit of PfP’,<sup>132</sup> and nations will meet the costs of their own participation.

It was launched at the International Security Forum Conference held in October 1998. The single important principle was the notion that ‘it will be for the participating countries to define and develop fully both the scope for the Consortium and how it will operate’.<sup>133</sup> The United States of America and Germany provided funds which helped the Eastern European partners to participate in Consortium activities.

Therefore the Consortium is ‘of the willing’; it has no official standing as an organisation with documents of record, but it does provide a coherent framework from which to adapt in developing an operational plan for the Consortium, based upon the experience of its participants.

---

<sup>132</sup> *Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs)* are drawn up between NATO and Partner countries from an extensive menu of activities – the *PfP Work Programme* – according to each country’s specific interests and needs. The biennial programme contains more than 2000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to small workshops. Areas covered range from the purely military to defence-related cooperation in fields such as crisis management, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, air-traffic management and armaments cooperation. Outside the Partnership Work Programme PWP, there are a large number of bi- or multi-lateral or regional events annually between individual NATO Nations and Partners, and also among Partners themselves or even with non-Partner states, that fall within the PfP rubric, but have no official NATO involvement. These are termed ‘*In the Spirit of PfP*’ activities and do not qualify for NATO funding. ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int))

<sup>133</sup> Funding: The PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes are carried out in accordance with Article 3 of the ‘PfP Framework Document’ governing participation in activities of mutual benefit. Funding would be implemented in accordance with Article 6 of the PfP framework document, which stipulates that Partners will fund their own participation. In addition, Allies and NATO directorates could be considered members of the Consortium and encouraged to participate in it fully as a means to improving the execution of existing programmes. For all concerned, including Allies, funding will operate on the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall.’ This means that each nation or joining organisation is responsible for paying its own expenses to participate in and benefit from the activities of the Consortium according to its own volition.

### 3.2 The Success of the Consortium

The Consortium created a community: a community of individuals, a community of institutions with emphasis on education. Education was deliberately chosen because there is an important distinction between education and training. There are a lot of important places and a lot of important initiatives where the focus is on training but the vision of the Consortium is to focus on education. To concentrate on the education of the military officers; to focus on the education of civilian dealing with security and defence issues. Synergy effects are a desired outcome of a not-inclusive community. There is no exhaustive list of participants. The Consortium is one of the first efforts where formal military academies and non-governmental institutions, universities and the range of security institutes are brought together. There is a synergy by putting together these diverse institutions and organisations that cannot be achieved through the separate, individual efforts of each of these institutions or organisations on their own.<sup>134</sup>

The Consortium supports the PfP efforts to promote effective civil-military cooperation and improved military interoperability among all Allied and Partner nations with the following goals:

- Contributing to an expanding dialogue, common understanding and broad range of cooperation in security issues among the EAPC countries.
- Helping to build a cadre of professionals and security specialists in government and the private sector in partner nations with an expertise in a wide array of defence issues, including defence strategy, parliamentary oversight, public information policies and the like.
- Facilitating greater information-sharing in partner countries about NATO, EAPC and PfP, and other Euro-Atlantic and

---

<sup>134</sup> Bronson, Lisa, Director for NATO Policy, US Department of Defence, at the 3rd ISF in Zurich, 1998 in the Workshop on the Vision for the PfP Consortium; in 'Conference Report on the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Security Forum and the 1<sup>st</sup> Conference of the PfP Consortium, NATO Defence College Monograph Series, Summer 1999, p. 103 ff.



European security institutions, particularly in the absence of NATO information offices in most Partner countries. Within individual nations, cooperation between national security studies institutes and academies is well established, and internationally there is cooperation between academies on the one hand and between security studies institutes on the other, but international exchange between these two groups appears to be limited. The Consortium is meant to bridge this gap and establish contacts between academies and institutes throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>135</sup>

- Providing a forum to assist private foundations, ‘think tanks’, governmental and non-governmental agencies to offer practical assistance (enhanced academic standards and recognised accreditation; regular publication of scholarly journals and articles in topics related to European security).
- Providing a mechanism to bolster Partner capabilities in areas such as: (1) command post exercises involving computer simulations; and (2) staff training in procedures incidental to the conduct of effective multinational participation in non-Article V operations.

### **3.2.1 The Working Groups**

The actual work being conducted is done by working groups throughout the year; this is the source of synergies. There are 11 to date and they cover a wider range from e-learning, curricula development to regional stability in South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, from European security and NATO enlargement to military history, from asymmetric threats and simulation to security sector reform.

---

<sup>135</sup> Swiss Defence Minister Adolf Ogi, Report at the EAPC-Defence ministers meeting Brussels, December 1998.

### **3.2.2 The Annual Conference**

The annual 'Partnership for Peace Consortium' Conference is the main gathering to review the results and achievements of the working groups. It is the platform to present views, and to introduce and test new ideas which eventually find their way into the political agenda of NATO/PfP. Therefore the defence minister hosting the annual conference not only invites either his counterparts or representatives of the partners to the annual conference, but also reports in the EAPC Defence Ministerial about it.

The fully developed Consortium includes a secretariat, an annual conference and working groups; a dedicated, permanently updated website enables the continuing exchange of information. Furthermore, the Consortium has its own publication series in which appropriate topics are discussed for a broad public.

### **3.3 The Link to NATO/PfP**

The work of the Consortium is 'in the spirit of PfP', which means that it is not following rules and regulations of NATO/PfP. The Consortium's work includes providing update briefings to NATO's political-military steering committee (PMSC). The military committee meeting with Partners should also be provided with updates on ongoing work. NATO assigned the NATO Defence College in Rome as the point of contact for both sides to exchange information. In spring 2003 NATO/PfP tasked the partners with providing a TEEP (Training and Enhanced Education Program) progress report. One part of it is devoted on results, benefits and way forward of the Consortium's activities. (The other deals with the NATO/TEEP-effort in ADL and simulation and the role of PfP-Training Centres).

### **3.4 The Consortium Today**

The Consortium has proven that it is an informal but well-structured platform which is open to participation for all interested partners and therefore gives the Consortium a degree of flexibility to develop new ideas and projects in the framework of NATO/EAPC, but without being subordinated to the rules and regulations of NATO. ([www.pfpconsortium.org](http://www.pfpconsortium.org))

The study and working groups form the core of the Consortium and provide the possibility for individuals and organisations to work together on specific topics, issues, problems or interests and to share and exchange their knowledge within this particular field.

Faced with the enlargement of NATO and the EU, the Pfp Consortium has to adapt to the changes that have been decided at those two summits. But it is clear that the unique possibility of cooperating on an international and interdepartmental way, to build networks and to benefit from other partners experience should be maintained at all costs.

It is agreed that after the build-up and the consolidation phase of the Consortium the time for a change has come. The Consortium's success is amazing; it developed from 6 to 17 working groups and some projects, from a few dozen to 1500 participants, and from 20 to over 300 institutions. In the first reform stage the Working groups have been assessed and reduced to 11. the work will further be better focused to be relevant for decision-makers.

How can the strength of the Consortium best be used as a continuing multiplying factor in the post-enlargement phase? What is the role of the Consortium in sharing the joint values of the EAPC-communities in bringing those countries closer that are now at the fringes of the EAPC area? How could the Consortium react to the post-September 11 challenges? It could – as in its early days – serve as a playground for new ideas, before they are later taken up by NATO or any other organisation, therefore testing new initiatives and paving the way in which NATO and EU could encounter the changing security risks together.

The reform process started after the 2002 Annual Conference and is not finished yet. The format of the Annual Conference changed, from a mere Working-Group meeting to a politically relevant event; to bring the Consortium back on the agenda of decision-makers. It will not diminish the work achieved by the groups throughout the year, but will strengthen the links to the political environment of EU and NATO and take into account the changes in the security agenda for the future work. Furthermore, the Working Groups are aligned in five tracks that reflect the results of NATO/PfP after the Prague summit in November 2003. The idea of the tracks came up in order to improve the focus of the work, show synergies and promote cooperation among the groups. The five tracks are: Education and training, regional stability (in South-East Europe, Central Asia and Caucasus), asymmetric threats, European security and security sector reform. DCAF has been trusted with the responsibility not only for the Working group, but also for the track as a whole.

### **3.5 The Working Group on Security Sector Reform (SSR-WG)**

The SSR-WG is chaired by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Its main objectives are to assist in developing policy relevant strategies, studies that give an input to those partners who are in the middle of reforming their security sector. The work being done should enhance democratic civil-military relations through cooperation in joint research, outreach and expert formation initiatives; it further enhances the exchange of ideas, insights, experiences and best practices of security sector reform and democratic civil-military relations between consolidating and consolidated democracies in the Euro-Atlantic Area.

The SSR WG was established at the Annual Conference in Moscow, 2001. It began by defining their tasks around the well-known and often used name of 'civil-military relations'. The quickly growing interest and political development indicated that – also in the aftermath of September 11 – a priority of dealing with security sector reform (SSR) as a whole has gained importance, encompassing not only the armed forces, but also

police, border-guards, intelligence agencies and other agencies dealing with security aspects, civil-military relations – meaning ministries of interior, justice and police. Therefore it changed its name to ‘Security Sector Reform Working Group’ in 2002.

DCAF receives input on topics which could be interesting for the Track from a board of high-level advisers. This board evaluates the proposals before the members of the PfP-Consortium and is then tasked to provide expertise. The Track/ Working Group assembles experts from different regions as well as academics to cover a previously set range of topics twice a year. It has its own permanently updated website at [www.dcaf.ch/cmr-wg](http://www.dcaf.ch/cmr-wg) or [www.pfpconsortium.org](http://www.pfpconsortium.org). All the After Action Reports, presentations and papers are published electronically.

A newsletter informs regularly about the activities of the WG and will also be available online.

### **3.6 Current projects**

The SSR WG concentrates on two aspects – security sector reform (SSR) and the regional differences in approaching this topic and expert formation in the area of SSR.

### **3.7 Expert Formation**

The SSR-WG covers with this book the very first priority of the Consortium as such, which is expert formation. This study shows clearly that the needs for education and formation of military and civilian experts do not end with the accession to NATO and/or EU. On the contrary, the potential new members and the rest of the PfP-countries still have a growing need for well-trained experts in the area of civil-military relations and security sector reform.

Therefore this book project was launched and will hopefully provide a good overview on expert formation not only in Southeast Europe, but in the so-called ‘Stability Pact’ area.

The Working Group created a questionnaire. It should provide a collection of information about existing educational and training courses in the field of civil-military relations. This study has been conducted in 2002 with the aim of evaluating existing courses as well as the need for more or different expert formation courses. Through a comparison of the availability of education, academic departments will improve the efficiency of education and training based on the increased availability of accurate information from different sources in their own country, in the region of interest, and from external countries, thus helping to find a neutral and professional appreciation of a given security situation.

Security studies institutes will be able to funnel their results directly into the education and training systems and can maintain mutually beneficial contacts with decision-makers. In addition, they will, in a similar way to university departments, profit from the international exchange.

Students in participating institutions will have the same broad scope of information available. They will also be able to share the results of their own studies and discuss them via the Consortium network. Equally important, they will maintain access to the information sources as alumni and can utilise them in their later work.

The impact of education delivered by modern information technologies in altering civil-military relations and strengthening efforts in security sector reform in transition countries is not to be underestimated. Any effort in e-learning should be based on the needs of the receiving end; any contribution should be demand driven, i.e. needs oriented.

To complete the stocktaking exercise with the questionnaires, this study focuses on stocktaking about ongoing SSR processes in South-Eastern Europe in cooperation with the Stability Pact. The different authors describe the status of expert formation in their countries, identifying the formation and professional preparedness in all segments of the security sector, listing the needs and giving recommendations. As a summary, the country reports will be assessed and commented on by DCAF.

Other projects deal with security sector reform as such and will also be published in the Consortium framework.