DEFENCE INSTITUTION BUILDING SELF-ASSESSMENT KIT

A Diagnostic Tool for Nations Building Defence Institutions

Hari Bucur-Marcu

The Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces

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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
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The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG).

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PREFACE

The building of effective, efficient and democratically overseen defence institutions plays a crucial role in the good governance of the security sector. As a result, DCAF has been giving special attention to defence institutions ever since the partnership action plan on defence institution building (Pap-Dib) was established. A sourcebook and various smaller volumes with capacity-building materials (all realised with funding from the Swiss Ministry of Defence) testify to this commitment.

Given the success of NATO's integrity building initiative and the self-assessment kit in support of it, DCAF decided to commission this fine and handy volume written with a similar intention from Dr. Hari Bucur-Marcu. It is planned to make it available in the languages of the interested partner countries in the years to follow.

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Introduction

Background

The *Defence Institution Building Self-Assessment Kit* is an instrument developed within the framework of the NATO initiative called Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). It is aimed at the nations identified by the PAB-DIB document as primary beneficiaries of this initiative, as well as any other nation with an interest in building defence institutions, to look into their own endeavours and see where they stand in developing and sustaining efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions, including the armed forces, under democratic and civilian control.

With ten objectives and numerous lines of action in different areas—from parliamentarian control and oversight to organisational management, financial planning or international affairs—PAP-DIB is an ambitious enterprise, aggregating most, if not all of the defence reform domains into one comprehensive approach.

There are at least two immediate benefits from this initiative for any nation, one of which is functional. During the years after the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), it was observed that the reforms or transformations of the security and defence sectors in partner nations were, at times, hampered by the fact that their legislation and their governance culture were not suited to smoothly accommodate the profound changes in these sectors. It became obvious that a comprehensive approach at the institutional level was needed in order to facilitate change in the security and defence sectors. The other immediate benefit from the emergence of the PAP-DIB initiative is in the realm of inter-agency cooperation. The initiative came as an offer of clearly defined directions, not only for the defence sector but for the larger public sector and civil society, aimed at guiding and coordinating their contribution to defence reform.

We may add to these two immediate benefits mentioned here an international dimension. Starting in the 1990s, the nations in the Euro-Atlantic area started to have a more focused political commitment towards more transparency and better governance of the defence sector. However, in doing business on defence, especially in the formulation and implementation of defence policies, it became clear that they were not always well-equipped at an institutional level to fulfil these commitments. Hence, this initiative was welcomed for stressing the need for institutionalising the formulation and implementation of security and defence policy in a transparent and responsible

manner. On the other hand, in the context of enhanced international cooperation and increasing international assistance offered to nations embarking on security and defence sector reforms, PAP-DIB emerged as a clear requirement for better formulation of assistance requests and for effectively pinpointing assistance needs.

When we take into consideration the context in which PAP-DIB emerged, we have to note that PAP-DIB was not conceived as a new plan of defence or security sector reform but as a prerequisite for any plan or programme aimed at reforming or transforming these sectors to make them more effective within a democratic framework. As a consequence, the success of PAP-DIB cannot be described as complete when its ten objectives are attained but only when the institutional conditions for the proper functioning of the defence sector are established. We may say that defence institutions are properly established and well-functioning only when the defence sector is functioning effectively and produces the defence expected by the people; while the government produces coherent and transparent defence policies and is living up to its commitments made through those policies, for the benefit of its people and with the acceptance of the international community on defence issues.

On the other hand, whenever there are shortfalls in implementing plans and programmes for defence reform, there are fractures in interagency cooperation for the common goal of defence sector development or there are concerns voiced by the international community over the way a nation conducts its defence affairs, then there might be a problem with the defence sector institutionalisation, which should be properly identified and handled based on the PAP-DIB framework.

As a NATO partnership initiative, PAP-DIB does not have an implementing tool of its own, such as a programme or a plan, but is aimed to benefit from the existing tools and mechanisms within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace, including the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). In a dynamic fashion, these tools and mechanisms were adjusted to incorporate various PAP-DIB objectives and are currently used for evaluation and reporting on different stages of accomplishing these objectives.

Speaking of the self-assessment kit presented here, the immediate and obvious question is why anyone needs yet another instrument of this kind, while there are already PAP-DIB's goal-related evaluation and reporting mechanisms within the IPAP and PARP processes. There are several common sense arguments in favour of such a new self-assessment kit.

Firstly, nations should not wait until the NATO evaluation and reporting process takes place, usually once a year, to see if anything works well with their endeavours to build effective defence institutions. Especially when there are signs of dysfunction-

ality in any part of the institutional framework of the defence sector, the concerned nation should be able to trigger the process of self-assessment in order to identify the source of the problem and fix it.

There is not always a straightforward cause-effect relation in the realm of defence institutionalisation. As a hypothetical example, a mid-fiscal year cut in defence spending may cause visible and vocal dissatisfaction from military personnel and their families. And the defence leadership, starting with the commander-in-chief, may not be able to address these protests in a coherent manner and explain the rationale behind those cuts. It might be a problem of poor defence management or faulty public relations in this hypothetical example. But, at the same time, it might be a case of a lack of institutional regulations and procedures on how to handle defence policies when there is a requirement of revising them in accordance with new security and economic realities, and/or how to adjust defence budgets in the middle of budgetary execution, and/or how to develop and implement public information policies. If this were the case, then criticising the defence leadership or reprimanding the public relations personnel would not be appropriate and certainly would not fix the issue of military personnel being openly dissatisfied discontent over unexpected defence cuts. This latter case requires an institutional approach to defence.

Of course, it is less likely that the concerned nation would wait until NATO sends its questionnaire and eventually produces a report on PARP or IPAP and, only after this process and based on the recommendations in that report, the issue of effectively justifying defence spending cuts to military personnel and the public would be solved. Obviously, for such a case, as well as for others of the same nature, a nation would mostly benefit from a self-assessment kit on defence institutionalisation that can be employed internally at any time.

Secondly, NATO and its partner nations identified a need for national internal preparation for a systemic dialogue with NATO on specific issues. Recently, NATO published an Integrity Self-Assessment kit for building integrity and fighting corruption in defence establishments. This kit is seen as a process enabling the concerned nations to prepare with the appropriate answers in the event that they require NATO expert support in various areas of integrity building in the broader framework of defence institutionalisation. Why not have such a kit for the more general purpose of defence institution building? And why not use it in preparing assistance requests in this specific domain of defence institutionalisation within the bilateral dialogue of the nation concerned with other donor nations?

Thirdly, nations often see defence institutionalisation as a process in its own right. They are looking at some if not all of the ten PAP-DIB objectives as planning objectives and they take action to build defence institutions based on these objectives.

During this process, they would like to have mid-term reviews or status evaluation. Such an interest for mid-term evaluation of achievements could already be observed in previous instances. Since the PAP-DIB emerged in 2004, most nations welcomed such evaluations—both for internal purposes and for their dialogue with international organisations, especially with NATO. In the past, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova accepted to be subject to a PAP-DIB status and needs assessment process.

Finally, one of the most demanding conditions any defence institution should fulfil is transparency on most, if not all, defence issues, with a clear requirement on defence policies and defence budgets. This transparency would have never been achieved without the effective, direct and continuous involvement of civil society. It is common wisdom to recognise that civil society organisations should play their role in the realm of defence institutionalisation based on a set of instruments agreed among them, and acknowledged and accepted by the government they watch. Several years ago, the partner nations of Central Asia were scrutinised on the topic of PAP-DIB by representatives of civil society organisations based on a common methodology. Such an enterprise was well-received by civil society, governments and the international community alike.

This being said, this defence institutionalisation self-assessment kit will become a useful instrument for governmental servants, international officials and members of the public with a legitimate interest in learning how a given nation developed its defence institution in order to reflect its citizens' interests, needs and expectations for democratic and affordable defence.

Briefing

To whom it may concern:[*]

The national strategic objective of building strong, capable and affordable defence and security structures and forces by transforming or reforming existing ones can be achieved only in the context of effective and transparent defence institutions.

Your nation embarked on NATO's Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) initiative with the aim of fulfilling its ten objectives and thus creating the prerequisites for more focused and comprehensive defence reform. For the past years, these endeavours were done through the existing tools and mechanisms for NATO cooperation, especially through the Individual Partnership Action Plan and PfP Planning and Review Process. Also, through these tools and mechanisms, ap-

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[*] Chairperson of the Defence Parliamentary Committee or Commission, minister of national defence, chief of staff or equivalent, president of a civil society organisation or equivalent.

propriate assessments and reports were produced on the status of implementing PAP-DIB objectives, and your nation could take advantage of the findings and recommendations received in the context of those instruments. Whenever deemed appropriate, parts of those findings and recommendations were also made available for the general public and to the Euro-Atlantic community at large.

Together with enhancing your nation's security and defence sector reforms, PAP-DIB is also aimed at accomplishing the political commitment your nation took when it adhered to the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and other relevant OSCE documents. Therefore, defence institutionalisation is at the core of your nation's efforts to meet its political commitments taken to the international community. It is also part of the international exchange of relevant experience among all NATO allies and partners.

For these reasons, your nation should be constantly interested to know where the process of defence institutionalisation stands, where further work is needed and what kind of assistance might be requested in order to fulfil the PAP-DIB objectives.

A stand alone self-assessment kit on defence institutionalisation would contribute significantly to identifying sources of dysfunctionality within defence institutions and channelling the endeavours aimed at fixing them. It would also facilitate the internal preparations of your organisation for systematic dialogue with NATO, other organisations within the government and with external donors, and it would provide a methodological platform for monitoring the very process of defence institutionalisation. Moreover, such a kit would contribute significantly to the transparency of all processes within the defence sector and would encourage the continuous involvement of the people in your government's efforts to render the security and defence sectors more effective, economically efficient and democratically accountable through appropriate reforms and transformation processes.

The self-assessment kit is composed of the present questionnaire and the methodology for applying it within your organisation. By employing these tools, you may be able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the defence institutions as they currently are and to redirect your defence institution-building efforts where they are most needed.

Appling this questionnaire is voluntary. You may use these tools for your own intra-organisational purposes, or you may wish that others from outside your organisation learn about your findings. In accordance with procedures for the exchange of classified information, you are responsible for determining the appropriate security classification for all documents resulting from the use of this questionnaire.

Definitions

Institution

An institution is defined as the complexity of rules, norms, beliefs, values and habits well-established among the members of a social entity, such as a government, a public sector or a governmental organisation.

Commonly, "institution" has often been used, improperly, as a synonym for "organisation." Nevertheless, there are semantic and conceptual differences between these two entities. An organisation is seen as a group of people bound together towards a common goal, each individual governed by mutual acceptance of clearly defined relationships with all other members that make their organisation function, while the institution is the set of formal and informal regulations and procedures governing that organisation. The organisation can be managed, while the institution can be built or established by creating the normative and procedural framework in which the management or the governance of the organisation will be performed.

The defence institution is the set of rules, norms, values and behaviours governing the organisations within the defence sector. This may be further classified into formal and informal institutions. A formal institution is composed of the legal framework of defence (usually a set of laws and regulations organising the defence system and allocating responsibilities to the legislative and executive bodies directly involved in this enterprise). This legal framework for the defence sector exists within the broader legal framework of governance at the national level (a broader set of laws and regulations that may be applied to all public sectors, the defence sector included, such as the civil code, or other regulatory, enforcing or auditing mechanisms of a general nature). An informal institution is composed of the customs and traditions well-established in the general government and the defence sector alike, such as respect for the military uniform, the military hierarchy and the precedence of political will over pure military considerations, etc.

In the language of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, expressed in the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, a defence institution is described mostly as those arrangements and procedures that should establish and regulate both the democratic relations among different components of the defence sector, and the good governance required for the defence sector to function at the expected level of effectiveness.

The bottom line is that a sound institution is a prerequisite for better governance of the defence sector in any nation but it cannot guarantee that, once established, the defence sector would increase its performance. It remains in the remit of the organisational management to take full benefits from the institutional setting and govern the sector effectively and efficiently. On the other hand, poor institutionalisation or the absence of properly built institutions is a clear obstacle in achieving better governance of the defence sector.

An organisation is a dynamic reality and any assessment of its performance may picture its status at a certain moment in time but also may depict the trends and, more than that, the prospects of achieving its organisational goals and objectives. An institution is a static reality and any attempt to assess or evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness would result in a static or frame-by-frame picture.

It is important to note that a rule, policy or procedure as a public document does not qualify automatically for an institution merely through its existence. For being part of an institution such as defence, that rule, policy or procedure should be effective in governing the actions within the organisation. For example, under the requirements of the OSCE Code of Conduct in Politico-Military Aspects of Security, a nation should present to the public a security and defence policy document, or a set of documents containing such a policy, in order to gain trust and confidence that the nation does not pose a threat to the international community and that all its endeavours to build military power are fully justified. In most nations, such a policy document would be called security or defence strategy. If such a policy document does not exist in that nation then, under the efforts for defence institutionalisation, it would be eventually introduced in the appropriate legislation with all the necessary provisions, such as who would be the issuing authority, who would endorse it, what would be its remit and time-frame, etc. But it would not automatically become part of the defence institution once it was stated in that legislation, not even when the strategy was published as required. Only when its provisions are addressed—beginning with identified threats and risks to national security, the identification of defence missions which inform planning assumptions for further development of defence forces, the development of relevant capabilities and doctrines, and all development of defence programmes based on the policy document—can that strategy be considered part of the defence institution.

Institutional Arrangements

Institutional arrangements are defining the formal and sometimes informal societal constructions or networks aimed at regulating inter- and intra-organisational cooperation. Under the general notion of arrangements are included: the constitutional and

legal provisions defining the place and role each organisation or agency should occupy and play within wider structures, the rules and norms that shall be observed by all the structural elements or network nodes (in order to render each one understood and accepted by all others), as well as the main values and beliefs on which the societal construction or network is based and functions.

Any existing or desired arrangements among the members of a society or the nodes within a network become institutional arrangements whenever they are formalised in legislation and regulatory provisions, and there are appropriate mechanisms for enforcing them. Moreover, those laws and regulations designed to govern the relationships between members of a society or nodes of a network are considered institutional arrangements only when there is evidence that the members of that society or the nodes of that network are consciously accepting and observing those legal or regulatory provisions.

Developing and implementing institutional arrangements is one of the most important parts of defence institution building. The nations or the governments that were successful in such an enterprise designed sound strategies or long-term policies at the national level for introducing proper arrangements by the legislative and executive branches of government.

One example is the complicated process of transforming the armed forces from conscription to professional armies. In such a case, most of the existing defence institutional arrangements would be revised and amended accordingly. There would be a tremendous amount of work at the institutional level, from settling the debate on whether to wave the constitutional provision that any citizen has an obligation to defend the nation by serving in the military, down to changing all the legislation related to the reserve forces that would also become professional or would remain conscription based. There would be a significant educational and societal effort to change the beliefs of the people that serving in the armed forces is no longer a compulsory stage of any man's life, to introduce the idea of armed forces' employment as part of the broader competitive workforce market, and to ensure equal opportunities in the armed forces. Then there would be new institutional arrangements related to the professional military, mostly related to their statute, work contract, retirement and benefits that would find an expression in the legislation outside the defence domain.

In such a case, the preparation phase would take several years after the strategic decision to build a professional army was taken and before any actual professional soldier could sign his or her contract with the armed forces. This would require a sound and focused transformation strategy. There are many other instances when introducing new institutional arrangements, or amending existing ones, is needed in order to render the defence sector more effective and efficient. In all cases, the process

of institutionalisation through new arrangements starts immediately after the decision for change is taken and ends only when those arrangements are in place and effectively guide the defence sector towards accomplishing its mission in an efficient and accountable manner.

In order to understand what institutional arrangements mean, we should also note that reform or transformation does not require by default new institutional arrangements. Only when it becomes obvious that the envisaged reform will not be successful in the existing conditions and that the current institutional framework does not allow for the desired change should a nation start the process of introducing new or revised institutional arrangements.

For example, reform to make the defence budget transparent does not require any change in existing institutional arrangements. Issuing and passing a defence budget that previously was a classified document should be done in the same manner as any other governmental agency issuing and presenting its transparent budget for approval. We expect that the same arrangements would be in place for drafting the budget, as well as for taking it through the executive process to the Ministry of Finance up to the prime minister for final adjustments and then to the parliament for approval. But when the defence budget is based on multiannual force development programmes, other political and planning documents would be required in order to make those programmes meaningful for the budget, its executors and supervisors such as a national security strategy, a military strategy, a defence review, a procurement strategy, etc. Wherever these documents have not been issued on an ordinary basis before, new institutional arrangements should be introduced in legislation and governmental practice to bring them into existence.

Institutional Effectiveness

In short, institutional effectiveness means that the required institution exists in good shape and functions properly. The ultimate expression of institutional effectiveness at the national level, as well as at the public domain level, is the rule of law. This well-known and often abused expression signifies that all provisions of the laws and regulations existing in a given society are observed by the members of that society and are enforced effectively by the proper authorities whenever necessary.

Institutional effectiveness is of paramount importance for the defence sector. It makes the difference between proper implementation and regulatory observance of any constitutional or legal provisions and the attitude of ignoring the constitutional and legal provisions and acting on the free will of the leader, regardless of the provisions of the law. Or, it signifies the difference between a defence policy document, such as a strategy or a programme that is implemented with diligence by all members

of the defence sector and a defence policy document that has no practical significance, as its provisions are not being followed by the defence planning system or by defence management actions. In other words, the work of defence institutionalisation could not be considered complete just by writing and passing new legislation or by issuing appropriate defence strategies or other defence policy documents as required by security and defence sector reform. In order to be considered institutionally effective, all those legal and policy provisions should be properly implemented or enforced within the defence sector.

Institutional Procedures

One important area of institutionalisation of any public domain is establishing appropriate procedures for most important activities within that public domain. Broadly speaking, "procedure" stands for a set or a series of actions that, when employed in predetermined conditions, ensures reaching expected results. Whenever a procedure is specified in the regulations governing a domain, that procedure becomes part of the institution of that domain.

All organisations should establish institutionalised procedures for ensuring success in attaining organisational goals and objectives. The most common examples are standard operating procedures and procedures for handling classified information developed within the organisation.

An organisation may also import procedures from external sources. Most of the time, these procedures are based on best practices or success stories from similar organisations or organisations dealing with similar problems or tasks. Institutional procedures are very important in organising intra- and inter-agency cooperation for a common task.

In the realm of defence, using pre-established procedures is part of the military culture. Most of the military activities are governed by manuals and other regulations containing appropriate procedures. However, in the process of defence institution building, defence organisations and agencies must consider revising the existing procedures or introducing new ones in approaching new tasks and missions, or in reforming different parts of the defence establishment.

One such instance is the process of enhancing civilian participation in defence matters. Especially when civilians are new to defence matters, their participation should be institutionalised by coherent procedures. They should benefit from their own codes and statutes, their rights and obligations should be well-described in procedural terms in the set of regulations governing the defence sector and their interaction with the military clearly regulated. They also should be properly trained to understand and follow these procedures.

Another good example of institutionalised procedures is given by unrestricted access to governmental or public information on defence matters. The law granting this access and the subsequent set of rules and regulations should introduce clear procedures on how the information is produced, stored, handled and made available to members of the public seeking to obtain the desired information.

These procedures are aimed at ensuring the success of the organisation whenever it performs the appropriate task but they are also aimed at protecting the organisation from the perils of improvisation by any member of that organisation or the abuse of power by its leadership.

Carrying Out the Self-Assessment

The Process

The process of self-assessment of defence institutionalisation was designed to be a discontinuous one. This means that there would be no need for a permanent body or authority to be employed full-time on assessing defence institutionalisation, nor a permanent activity called assessment of defence institutionalisation. However, interested bodies could consider repeating the process either as a cyclic activity, coordinated with other periodic events such as IPAP or PARP reports, or as a periodic follow-up process on findings and recommendations from previous DIB assessment reports.

The process of self-assessment consists of seven stages:

1. Identifying the right moment for employing the self-assessment instrument;
2. Obtaining the proper authorisation for self-assessment;
3. Organising the work;
4. Conducting the survey;
5. Reporting on findings;
6. Designing a follow-up plan on the findings of the report or an improvement plan, when appropriate; and
7. Including the defence institutionalisation actions that resulted from the survey into existing plans and programmes for security and defence sector reform.

Detailed Steps of the Process

1. Identify the right moment for employing the self-assessment instrument

There are several good moments when a self-assessment process on defence institutionalisation should be considered and eventually employed. One such moment is when something is not going well in the defence sector and the most likely cause of this dysfunction is of an institutional nature.

Another moment is in preparation for a periodic comprehensive dialogue with NATO and other international organisations on defence matters, or with donors willing to contribute to defence reforms. Yet another moment is when an interested governmental authority or a non-governmental organisation might be interested in the

status of defence institutionalisation in their nation. The right moment can also be a combination of these instances for initiating the process of self-assessment on defence institutionalisation.

2. Obtain the proper authorisation for self-assessment

This self-assessment instrument was designed to be employed by a large range of users, from the top political leadership to civil society organisations. It is important that these users obtain proper authorisation for self-assessment from the governmental body or non-governmental organisation that will most benefit from the findings of the survey and will implement its recommendations.

3. Organise the work

a) Designate the project leader for the self-assessment process: this project leader will coordinate the work of the team applying the questionnaire and the work for reporting on findings. S/he will also liaise with the authorities interested in the findings and with national and international experts, and will conduct the follow-up.

b) Establish the working group: the composition of this working group will be established based on two considerations, representation and expertise.

Because the institutionalisation of defence covers a large spectrum of defence sub-domains, representatives of each agency with a remit on a sub-domain should be included in the working group. By doing that, the project would gain better visibility within the defence sector, and would ensure fairness in handling the findings and trustworthiness in the recommendations.

Moreover, by establishing a proper composition, the working group will benefit from the expertise of people knowledgeable and experienced in each sub-domain surveyed by the self-assessment instrument.

c) Tailor the survey: depending on the reason the self-assessment instrument needs to be employed, the questionnaire can be tailored to fit that reason. In such an instance, only the relevant questions will be asked and only the relevant answers processed in order to consolidate the findings.

4. Conduct the survey

The entire questionnaire or the tailored one could be circulated for completion according to the reason for employing the self-assessment instrument. The more general the reason for the survey, the larger and more diversified the sample of questioned people. There is no need to ask all the questions to all interviewed people. The

questions could be separated into sub-domains and presented to the interviewed people belonging to each sub-domain.

However, when the questionnaire is applied to members of civil society, it is expected that they have an interest in all aspects of defence institutionalisation and it is advisable to ask them to answer all the questions of the tailored survey.

It is also advisable to apply the questionnaire to both governmental and non-governmental groups of people at the same time. This method will give a clearer picture of the merits and problems of defence institutionalisation and reveal the level of transparency in this field.

The survey team can apply the questionnaire in direct interviews with the appropriate persons or can send the questionnaire for completion to relevant agencies and departments.

5. *Reporting on findings*

The working group should consolidate their findings into a final report. This document should receive the proper classification and should be circulated for comments with all agencies and departments involved.

It would then be presented for discussion with the relevant senior officials at the level where the self-assessment was initiated. For example, if the initiating body were the parliamentary commission on security and defence, then the findings and comments included in the report would be discussed by the members of that commission. Likewise, if the initiator were the minister of defence, then the report would be discussed within the ministerial leadership board. This discussion body will also decide on the limits of circulation or range of publication of the report.

Whenever deemed appropriate, national and international experts or the NATO expert team could be involved in discussing the findings.

6. *Designing a follow-up plan on the findings of the report or an improvement plan, when appropriate*

Whatever the reason the self-assessment kit was employed, most likely there would be findings requiring attention and triggering improvement measures. In this case, it is advisable to design a plan containing those measures, time frames for implementation and responsibilities within the defence sector.

Some of those measures could be suggested by the working group but others could be envisaged by the authorities discussing the self-assessment report. Thus, the follow-up plan might take shape early in the process and the final decision for approving the plan could be taken simultaneously with the publication of the report or immediately after.

The type of actions that could be included in a follow-up plan are expected to be of an institutional nature. They may refer to revising, updating or suspending specific pieces of legislation, or implementing new or revised procedures intended to render the existing legislation more effective. They may also address issues of cooperation among departments or agencies, making reference to new or updated arrangements between those departments or agencies.

7.   Including the defence institutionalisation actions that resulted from the survey in existing plans and programmes for security and defence sector reform

If everyone agrees that the institutional framework is of paramount importance for ensuring the success of the ongoing security and defence sector reform, then any actions of an institutional nature that resulted from employing the defence institutionalisation self-assessment instrument should be regarded as part of security sector reform. Thus, the measures taken for improving the institutional framework should also be mentioned in the existing plans and programmes for security and defence sector reform, as well as in IPAP and PARP, where appropriate.

Following-up – Initiating an Improvement Process

The outputs of engaging the defence institutionalisation self-assessment instrument are the report and the improvement plan. However, the process of self-assessment cannot be considered complete unless the institutional framework is improved.

However, to ensure this improvement, simply issuing the follow-up or improvement plan is not enough. The appropriate authorities should consider all aspects that could render this plan effective during its implementation.

Among these aspects is the involvement of civil society organisations and public opinion, generated by publishing both the report and the improvement measures for a larger audience. They could also include NATO expertise and bilateral resources that can be employed in solving the eventual institutional problems and render the institutional framework for reform more effective. By doing so, they make a political obligation to effectively implement the improvement measures and report on the implementation success to all those involved.

Questionnaire

A. Holistic View on the Status of Defence Institution Building

This section of the questionnaire refers to general or holistic aspects of defence institutionalisation. The answers may give a broad picture of the status and functionality of the existing institutionalisation measures in the field of defence.

It mostly covers the institutional process of formulation, endorsement and implementation of defence policies as the essential framework for any reform or transformation endeavours. This process may be observed at four levels:

- Legal and regulatory framework, comprising the legal texts regulating the way defence policy is formulated, endorsed and implemented;
- Established procedures for proposing, approving, implementing and reporting on defence policies;
- Existing practices in these fields; and
- Indicators of effectiveness of or satisfaction for the defence policy implementation process.

For each question, the survey team should look into answers taking into consideration these four levels.

There should be constitutional and legal provisions assigning the parliament, the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, the minister of defence and other executive authorities their specific roles in the field of defence policy formulation, endorsement and implementation. In various regulatory documents—such as regulations, manuals, instructions or guidance—there should be appropriate procedures on how these legislative and executive bodies are supposed to carry on their functions in the realm of defence policy. The practice of handling defence policies by various legislative and executive authorities should also be visible.

The people answering the questions in this section should be familiar with legal and regulatory provisions and with the existing practices in the field of defence policy.

Of most relevance to institutionalisation is the outcome of the defence policy formulation process. In institutional terms, it is not relevant what the actual content of defence policies is, even if this content is of utmost importance for the defence sector and for the security of the nation at large. What is important for the institutional framework is whether the process results in strategies, white papers, reviews, politi-

cal guidance and other policy documents that are meaningful for the defence sector, are properly observed and referenced in subsequent implementation plans and programmes, and effectively organises and guides the work of various departments and agencies within this sector to achieve clearly and politically defined goals.

It is also important that the state powers involved in defence policy should benefit from the work of staff specialised in defence matters to gain credibility for defence policy decisions and for reporting on policy implementation. These staff members should be properly incorporated in the defence sector, with clearly stated remits, mission statements, procedures and practices. Their roles and importance should be recognised by all other departments and agencies within the defence sector.

In order to render the defence domain institutionally relevant, there should also be appropriate arrangements for the coordination of work among various departments and agencies involved in defence policy. These arrangements could be extended to cover cooperation with organisations outside the defence sector and with civil society organisations.

1. How can the role of the parliament in defence policies be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The role of the parliament is not explicitly defined in the constitution or the relevant legislation. No specific defence policy document is mentioned in the legislation as being in the remit of the parliament to formulate, endorse or receive reports on its implementation. The parliament is involved in defence policy only at a procedural level and its actual involvement may change over time without any recourse to legislation.

b) The role of the parliament is unrestricted. The parliament is able, without the consent of the executive power, to amend strategic objectives on defence (reformulate, introduce new objectives, delete objectives), to vary defence expenditures, to revise defence missions, etc.

c) The role of the parliament is restricted. The parliament is allowed to make amendments only in consent with the executive power and the president.

d) The parliament only has the power of endorsing or rejecting the defence policy documents submitted for its approval.

2. How can the process of parliament preparing its opinions on defence matters be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The parliament has an independent body/staff of experts on defence working solely for the parliamentary commissions.

b) Each parliamentarian within the defence commission has at least one specialist member of his/her staff on defence matters.

c) The parliament uses a system of questions, hearings and interpellations to make decisions on defence matters.

d) The parliament is commissioning research to public defence research institutes in the country.

e) The parliament is commissioning research to private defence research institutes in the country.

f) The parliament is applying for external assistance from public defence research institutes from abroad.

g) The parliament is commissioning research to private defence research institutes from abroad.

h) Parliament members are following the party or coalition lines in deciding on defence matters.

3. How can the role of the president in formulating and/or endorsing defence policy decisions be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The role of the president is not explicitly defined in the constitution or the relevant legislation. The president establishes what documents stand for defence policy and their relevance for defence planning and defence management.

b) The president endorses all defence documents in the same manner as any other piece of legislation, according to constitutional provisions.

c) The president chairs a national defence council or similar body where all the defence decisions at the presidential level are taken. The president follows whatever decisions are taken by that body.

d) The president issues defence policy documents that are submitted for approval to the parliament, after the endorsement of the national defence council or a similar institution.

e) The president issues defence policy documents that are compulsory for the entire defence establishment without the endorsement of the parliament, after the approval of the national defence council.

f) The president issues defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment without the endorsement of the parliament or the national defence council.

4. How is the president preparing his/her opinions on defence matters?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The president has an independent body/staff of experts on defence working solely for him/her.

b) The president is commissioning research to public defence research institutes in the country.

c) The president is commissioning research to private defence research institutes in the country.

d) The president is applying for external assistance from public defence research institutes from abroad.

e) The president is commissioning research to private defence research institutes from abroad.

f) The president is observing the decisions taken by the national defence council or a similar institution he/she is chairing without an independent analysis.

5. How can the role of the head of the cabinet of ministers (prime minister) in formulating and/or endorsing defence policy decisions be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The role of the prime minister is not explicitly defined in the constitution or the relevant legislation.

b) The prime minister endorses all defence documents issued by the minister of defence, according to constitutional provisions.

c) The prime minister issues defence policy documents that are submitted for approval to the parliament, after the endorsement of the Council of Ministers.

d) The prime minister issues defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without the endorsement of the parliament and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

e) The prime minister issues defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without the endorsement of the parliament or the Council of Ministers.

6. How is the prime minister preparing his/her opinions on defence matters?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The prime minister has an independent body/staff of experts on defence working solely for him/her.

b) The prime minister is commissioning research to public defence research institutes under governmental authority.

c) The prime minister is commissioning research to private defence research institutes in the country.

d) The prime minister is applying for external assistance from public defence research institutes from abroad.

e) The prime minister is commissioning research to private defence research institutes from abroad.

f) The prime minister is observing the decisions taken by the council of ministers without an independent analysis.

7. How can the role of the minister of defence in formulating and/or endorsing defence policy decisions be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The role of the minister of defence is not explicitly defined in the constitution or the relevant legislation.

b) The minister of defence endorses all defence documents issued by the chief of defence and the departments in the Ministry of Defence, according to legal provisions.

c) The minister of defence issues defence policy documents that are submitted for approval to the parliament, after the endorsement of the Council of Ministers.

d) The minister of defence issues defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without the endorsement of the parliament and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

e) The minister of defence issues defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without the endorsement of the parliament or the Council of Ministers.

8.   How is the minister of defence preparing his/her opinions?

Possible aspects to consider:

- a) The minister of defence has an independent body/staff of experts on defence working solely for him/her.
- b) The minister of defence is commissioning research to public defence research institutes under his/her authority.
- c) The minister of defence is commissioning research to private defence research institutes in the country.
- d) The minister of defence is applying for external assistance from public defence research institutes from abroad.
- e) The minister of defence is commissioning research to private defence research institutes from abroad.
- f) The minister of defence is endorsing defence policy documents issued by the chief of defence and the departments within the ministry without an independent analysis.

9.   What are the legal provisions or customary practices for formal guidance from a higher authority, before any strategic document on defence policy is issued for endorsement?

Possible aspects to consider:

- a) There are no legal or customary requirements that an issuing or endorsing authority should produce political guidance for defence policy implementation.
- b) There is a legal or customary requirement for political guidance but the guidance itself is not disclosed to the public. Hence, no member of the public could have an opinion on the content of such guidance.
- c) There is a legal or customary requirement for political guidance, and the implementing agency or department is entitled by law and established procedures to express its expert opinion or advice before the guidance is approved by the issuing authority.
- d) There are legal provisions and customary practices establishing not only the requirement for political guidance within the process of defence policy implementation but also the content of such guidance. This content may include:
  - Threat assessment
  - National objectives

- National interests
- Strategic missions of the armed forces
- The instances when military power may be engaged
- Intended size and structure of the armed forces needed to accomplish strategic missions
- Broad budgetary allocation for defence as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP)
- Time frame for attaining national objectives.

10. Do the institutional provisions indicate what sources of knowledge government authorities use for fulfilling their obligations in formulating national defence policies?

Possible areas considered as appropriate:

a) National literature on the theory of governance and related well-established practical mechanisms. Please give some references of such literature.

b) Literature, models and examples from other nations with recognised success in good governance and/or sound national defence planning. Please name some of the inspiring nations.

c) Internationally accepted codes of conduct and best practices in governance and/or defence planning.

d) Specific recommendations of international organisations such as the OSCE or World Bank directed to your nation.

e) NATO expert programmes and other activities within the framework of the EAPC.

11. Is there an institutionalised role for the research institutes on defence matters?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) Only public (state owned or state coordinated) institutes are based on legal and procedural provisions, while private or non-governmental ones have no institutional role in defence policy matters.

b) Private institutes are of a more general scope (security, international relations, transparency, etc.) but occasionally cover defence issues. Their work is not necessarily known or acknowledged by the state authorities.

c) There are legal and customary provisions establishing the role of non-governmental organisations in debating defence policy issues and the attitude of the governmental authorities towards the products of these organisations. The main products of these organisations include:

- Research papers
- Occasional papers
- Review series
- Commissioned reports
- Alternative strategies
- National conferences on defence policy matters
- International conferences on defence policy matters.

12. How can the relevance of public and private organisations to governmental authorities on defence policy matters be described?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) The parliamentarian commissions contract independent research on defence policy to public/private/both public and private institutes.

b) The government (Prime Minister's Office, minister of defence) uses commissioned research on specific issues of defence policy from the subordinate research institutes in their decision-making process.

c) The government (Prime Minister's Office, minister of defence) publicly comments on findings published by independent research institutes.

d) The public debates on defence policy make reference to products of research institutes.

13. Are there officially or privately commissioned surveys on defence policy issues?

Possible aspects to consider:

a) There are both officially and privately commissioned surveys on defence policy issues. The findings of these surveys are made public. Some of the findings are used for fine tuning of existing defence policies, plans and programmes.

b) There are both officially and privately commissioned surveys on defence policy issues. Only the findings of privately commissioned surveys are made

public. It is not known if any of the findings are used for refinement of existing defence policies, plans and programmes.

c) The government and the parliament commission surveys on defence policy issues on a regular basis. The results are made public.

d) Official bodies are issuing defence policy statements in response to the outcome of officially and privately commissioned surveys.

e) Official bodies are taking defence policy decisions based on the outcome of such surveys.

B. Status of Defence Institutionalisation Focused on PAP-DIB Objectives

This section comprises questions related to each of the ten objectives stated in paragraph V of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) document. It covers the process of implementation of these objectives in a comprehensive manner. Like the previous section, these processes are followed at four levels:

- Legal and regulatory framework, comprising the legal texts regulating each objective;
- Established procedures developed within the relevant domain and referring to each objective;
- Existing practices in all of these fields; and
- Indicators of effectiveness of or satisfaction with defence institutionalisation processes.

For each question, the survey team should look into answers taking into consideration these four levels.

Especially when the reason for employing this self-assessment instrument is to investigate specific departments or areas of the defence sector, this section could be tailored to focus on that specific topic.

Democratic Control of the Defence Sector

In institutional terms, the democratic control of defence comprises:

- Key divisions and agencies in the legislative and executive branches of government involved in the formulation, endorsement and implementation of defence policies and in the decision-making loop on defence issues;

- Legislation setting out their legal and operational role and responsibilities, and legal and regulatory provisions governing the processes within the defence sector;
- Appropriate procedures for ensuring observation of existing legislation, as well as for implementing defence policies and guidance; and
- Coordination arrangements for having these agencies work together.

The effectiveness of institutionalisation on democratic control of the defence sector refers to the fact that the legal texts are followed in practice, and both the controlling and the controlled bodies observe all rules and regulations based on well-established customs and practices.

These aspects can be evaluated in the following ways:

a) Assess the effectiveness of constitutional and legal arrangements establishing public control over people's representatives on defence matters.

b) Assess the effectiveness of constitutional and legal arrangements establishing clear roles of the state powers in the political and administrative decision-making process, and effective procedures for integrating them for endorsing, revising or reversing decisions concerning the use of military power.

c) Assess the effectiveness of constitutional and legal arrangements enabling the people's representatives to decide on the appointment of high-ranking officers, on the flow of resources for defence, including the defence budgets, on defence policies and on the missions of military forces.

d) Assess the effectiveness of the legal arrangements governing the authorisation for deployment of forces in missions abroad in terms of size of military force, duration of the mission, transfer of authority, rules of engagement, etc., as well as for authorising the resources required for each operational mission of military forces abroad.

e) Assess the effectiveness of the constitutional provisions and of the legislation empowering the parliament to enforce international law, including international humanitarian law regarding the deployment and engagement of military force of the nation in military missions abroad. Aspects to consider are:

- Legal aspects regulating the rationale for engagement of military forces and their missions;
- Procedures for implementing grand strategies, especially supporting foreign policy with military actions; and
- Type and relevance of policy and planning documents organising the involvement of the military force in foreign affairs, such as strategies,

strategic political guidance, white papers, defence planning directives, etc.

f) Assess the effectiveness of any other arrangements enforcing procedures and practices of how the military would follow the political decisions of civilian authorities, and arrangements preventing the military from independently establishing any political goals or strategic missions for the use of force abroad or at home.

g) Assess the effectiveness of legal arrangements and/or procedures establishing that the main legal and operational aspects of a deployment of national forces abroad are endorsed by the people's representatives, and that the people could have access to relevant information about why and how the military force is used only on their behalf. Aspects to consider are:

- The mission statement, operational order, rules of engagement and other significant aspects of the military use of force abroad are considered and approved by the parliament or the parliamentarian commission on defence issues, under a mandate from the General Assembly or the appropriate chamber of parliament.

- The parliament receives mission reports on how these provisions approved by the parliament are observed during the mission execution.

h) Assess the effectiveness of the constitutional and legal arrangements defining the roles and responsibilities of the parliament and the executive government (Cabinet of Ministers) in formulating and approving defence policies.

i) Assess the effectiveness of adequate legislative and executive measures to have the people directly involved, alongside with their representatives, in formulating and supervising defence policies and their implementation.

j) Assess the transparency of democratic control of defence. Aspects to consider are:

- To what extent the legislation concerning defence and establishing the responsibilities of different state agencies on the democratic control of defence is open to the public.

- All political documents referring to defence (political programmes, security and defence strategies, white papers, strategic reviews, doctrines, budgets, etc.) are or are not of public knowledge.

- How effective is the legal framework allowing the public to be informed on governance issues, including defence?

- How effective and legally protected are the rights of the people to freely express their opinions on government in general and on defence matters in particular?
- How large is the people's participation in the debates concerning decisions on strategic issues such as defining or redefining defence missions, joining an alliance or coalition, engaging forces in missions abroad, identifying new defence threats and risks, among others?
- Draft defence policy documents are or are not made public and are or are not subject to public debate.

Formulation and Implementation of Defence Policies

No nation can have an effective, efficient and democratically responsible defence sector without proper institutionalisation of the processes of defence policy formulation and implementation.

These observations should guide the assessment process of the topic of defence policy formulation and implementation:

The institutionalisation of defence policy formulation and implementation includes:

- Legally binding requirements to promote the participation of civilians in governmental defence organisations and agencies;
- Transparent procedures for civilian participation in developing defence and security policy;
- Transparent procedures for cooperation with non-governmental organisations; and
- Legally binding arrangements to ensure appropriate public access to information on defence and security issues.

The effectiveness of these requirements, arrangements and procedures is exhibited by the fact that the defence policy is formulated mostly if not exclusively by civilians as political appointees or senior civil servants, and by the fact that the staff drafting or preparing such policies are predominantly civilians with appropriate expertise.

Effectiveness is also shown by the fact that the military is involved in defence policy formulation in a consulting or advisory role only, and reports on the status of policy implementation to higher civilian authorities.

Most importantly, the effectiveness of defence policy institutionalisation is demonstrated by the fact that the provisions of defence policy documents are thoroughly translated into plans, programmes and managerial decisions. In other words, no plans and programmes and no leadership or managerial decisions are taken outside or in disregard of approved defence policy provisions.

a) Assess the legal provisions empowering the appropriate governmental authorities to issue defence policy documents, to approve or endorse them, to implement these policies, and to evaluate and review their implementation. Aspects to consider are:

- The parliament should be the final authority in arranging the remit and authority of governmental bodies on defence policy formulation. The Cabinet of Ministers (the executive body) may propose or forward the legislation governing this matter but the final decision remains with the parliament.

- The legislation does or does not comprise provisions related to the periodicity and validity of defence policy documents.

- What are the legal arrangements institutionalising public involvement in defence policy formulation and implementation, for establishing appropriate procedures for public information on security and defence matters, and for involvement of the members of the public in drafting defence policy?

b) Assess the extent to which defence policy documents are identified as such in the legislation and governmental practice. Aspects to consider are:

- Is there an institutional difference between policy and planning documents, such as a national defence strategy and a military strategy, or between political guidance and a planning directive?

- Is the legal and organisational status of policy documents properly known and observed by all the staff members and the divisions and agencies within the defence sector?

- Is the broad format or content of defence policy documents established in written procedures?

c) Assess the extent to which existing defence policy documents answer the strategic questions any nation should ask itself in the realm of security and defence. Samples of strategic questions are:

- What are the main values, national aspirations and interests that should be defended with military power?

- What are the national goals aimed to be fulfilled by military means?

- What are the main threats and risks to values, national aspirations and interests?

- What are the main opportunities in the international security environment?

- What is the place of defence among other public goods (education, health, the environment, etc.) provided by the government?
- What is the trade-off between defence and diplomacy the society is willing to accept in addressing international security issues?
- What is the trade-off between defence and other security sector components the society is willing to accept in addressing internal security issues?

d) Assess the effectiveness of institutional provisions for civilians within defence organisations. Aspects to consider are:

- Civilian participation in defence organisations is covered by appropriate legislation on civil or public service, civil servant status, codes of conduct, career development, rights and obligations, etc.
- The existence of personnel management practices for civilians, including attractive wages, professional development programmes and other incentives, and efficient recruitment campaigns.
- The existence of organisational management practices, such as establishing or earmarking positions only for civilians within defence organisations, proper working procedures for civilians in executive and subordinate positions, security clearance procedures and others.

e) Assess the level of acceptance of politically appointed civilian leaders into the military culture. Aspects to consider:

- Are the civilians in politically appointed positions expected to master specialised issues of security and defence, and to have an appropriate educational background and work experience in these fields, or would it be sufficient for civilian and military staff if they had generic leadership skills?
- Are the civilians in politically appointed positions expected to display political vision and to rely on their staff to translate that vision into policies and managerial actions?
- Are the civilians in politically appointed positions expected to follow democratic norms and to understand people's interests, needs and opinions on national security and defence?

f) Assess the effectiveness of civilians on staff tasked with drafting defence policies. Aspects to consider are:

- What is the contribution of civilian staffers to processing the huge amount of information required for preparing defence policies, how appropriate are their analytical and planning skills, how well do they work with uncertainties, what are their abilities for accurate assessment of social, economic, cultural, security and defence realities, and how good are their powers of prediction?

- How well-imbedded in the national and organisational culture is the principle of primacy of political decisions over military arguments or reasoning? How good are the civilians within the defence staff in giving value to this principle?

- How well-valued by civilians in the defence staff are the requirements of political trust, confidence and loyalty?

- How effective are the legal and organisational arrangements for civilian career planning and development, professional evaluation of civilians and for continuous training/education of civilians within the military organisations?

Legislative and Judicial Oversight of Defence

Legislative and judicial oversight of the defence sector is not only an expression of democracy and governmental accountability but a necessary condition of balance of state powers in governing the defence sector. This oversight cannot happen unless the oversight process is thoroughly institutionalised.

The objective of legislative and judicial oversight of defence is the performance of the defence sector, its management, the quality and results of defence operations, and the quality of programmes within the legal remit and functions of defence organisations and the limits of public funds appropriated or approved by the parliament.

The institutionalisation of legislative and judicial oversight of defence comprises:

- Constitutional and legal provisions stating the remit and obligations of the parliament and the courts in overseeing the actions of the executive branch of government.

- Arrangements, norms and procedures regulating the process of defence sector oversight.

- Specialised authorities, agencies and/or staff with the remit of facilitating defence sector oversight.

- Customs and good practices in reporting on executive actions and in appealing legislative and judicial actions triggered by the defence oversight process.

The effectiveness of legislative and judicial oversight of the defence sector is given by the fact that the defence sector, as part of the public sector, reacts positively and adapts itself to measures or actions taken by the parliament and the courts in the process of overseeing this sector.

A necessary condition for oversight effectiveness is the transparency of the oversight process. This transparency is ensured by publication of the legislation governing this process and of oversight products such as parliamentary reports and decisions or court proceedings and rulings.

The surveying team should look only into the aspects of the work of legislative and judicial bodies related to defence sector oversight. In institutional terms, the outcome of this oversight process is not relevant; in other words, the performance of the defence sector as seen from the parliament and the courts. What is institutionally relevant is the overall and detailed performance of the legislative and judicial branches of the government in accomplishing their oversight roles.

a) Assess the effectiveness and transparency of the constitution and relevant legislation on overseeing functions of the parliament and the courts. Aspects to consider are:

- Clear constitutional and legal provisions stating the remits and obligations of the legislative and judicial bodies in the realm of defence sector oversight.

- The effectiveness of the legal framework in introducing comprehensive procedures for the parliament and the courts to perform defence oversight functions.

- The clarity and transparency of oversight products and the follow-up measures and actions aimed at improving the executive's performance in defence.

b) Assess the capacity of the parliament and the courts to constantly improve their activities based on findings and conclusions resulting from oversight processes.

c) Assess the performance of the parliament in monitoring the executive branch of the government in applying the legal provisions and implementing approved defence policies. Aspects to consider are:

- The regulations and the practice of reporting on defence matters to the parliament.

- The reaction of the parliament to executive initiatives related to improving the reporting system on defence policy implementation and to initiating new legislation on defence matters.
- The levels of fairness, effectiveness and impartiality displayed by the courts in prosecuting defence matters.

d) Assess the capacity of the parliament and the courts to apply political and legal sanctions when appropriate in a fair and constructive manner. Aspects to consider are:

- The effectiveness of the parliament or its specialised committees in applying political sanctions to any dysfunctionality seen in the activity of the executive in implementing policies and parliamentary decisions.
- The effectiveness of the courts in sanctioning any breaches of defence-related legislation.

e) Assess the effectiveness of the parliament in enacting legislation as a direct result of the defence oversight process. Aspects to consider are:

- The methods and procedures employed by the parliament in performing a continuous and elaborate process of monitoring the way defence organisations and agencies observe the laws in force, and whether the performance of these organisations and agencies is tempered by inappropriate legal provisions or by the absence of appropriate legal provisions.
- The activity of parliamentary bodies in assessing the functionality of enforced legislation, especially on how these laws really serve the public interest in defence matters.
- The parliamentarian exercise of passing new legislation, altering existing legislation or deregulating obsolete or inappropriate laws.

f) Assess the effectiveness and transparency of the parliament and its committees in binding the executive and the defence bodies to implement the defence policies as endorsed or approved by the parliament.

g) Assess the effectiveness of the parliament in performing its authorisation function as a major component of the oversight process. Aspects to consider are:

- The practice of the parliament to ask about policy and long-term planning provisions related to the spending of public money that parliament is called upon to authorise.

- The practice of performing independent surveys and enquiries on implementation of defence policies, and to base parliamentary decisions for authorising further action on their findings.

h) Assess the effectiveness of the legislative oversight function of holding accountable in political and legislative terms persons in political, administrative and other public positions. Aspects to consider are:

- The role of the parliament in nominating and appointing candidates to key public positions in the executive and the defence sector.
- The parliamentary practice to hold hearings, listen to testimonies and conduct interviews with key persons in higher public office on defence.
- The capacity of the parliament to revise and reverse appointments when deemed necessary.

i) Assess the effectiveness of the legislative oversight function of holding defence departments and agencies accountable for observing the provisions of ratified international and bilateral documents with relevance to the defence sector.

j) Assess the effectiveness and transparency of internally established parliamentary arrangements and procedures for performing defence sector oversight. Aspects to consider are:

- The procedures organising the work of permanent parliamentary staff in the realm of programme assessments and analysis, conducting independent studies on policy and strategy implementation, budget analysis, data collection, audits and special reports.
- The procedures organising the work of the standing commissions carrying out investigations, hearings, testimonies, etc.
- The arrangements and procedures for requesting and handling reports from the defence sector departments and agencies on policy and programme implementation or on legislation enforcement.
- The procedures for inclusion of defence matters into parliamentarian plenary activities such as debates, questions and interpellations.

k) Assess the effectiveness and oversight relevance of parliamentary instruments employed for active legislative investigation of the performance of the defence sector such as internal reports, independent enquiries, parliamentarian hearings, testimonies, questions and interpellations, as well as parliamentary debates, motions and decisions.

l) Assess the courts' behaviour on defence sector oversight. Aspects to consider are:

- The judicial practice of supervising the acts taken by the parliament, heads of state and the executive on defence matters with a clear goal of establishing their constitutionality and legality.
- The relevance of the criminal and civilian codes for defence matters.
- The capacity of the public and military alike to appeal to the courts on matters of violation of their human rights and freedoms by defence organisations.
- The existence of separate courts for defence matters and their relevance for civil society, in terms of fairness, trust and transparency.

Security Risk Assessment and Defence Requirements

The institutionalisation of the process of security risk assessment should have several major components:

- Legal provisions stating the remits of different governmental and defence agencies in assessing risks and threats to national security.
- Arrangements and procedures determining which governmental bodies are entrusted with the responsibility of identifying and analysing security risks and which are empowered to take political decisions based on the work of the former.
- Procedures governing the process of including the approved security risks and threats into national security and defence policies and strategic planning documents, and further into defence requirements.
- Practices of revising the lists of security threats and risks and of amending the defence requirements accordingly.

The effectiveness of this institutional setting is given by the fact that risks and threats are not just political declarations but they have transparent consequences in the defence planning process, especially at the level of establishing defence requirements and defence missions, and at the level of resource allocation.

a) Assess the transparency of the security risk assessment process. This process is important for the public as it gives interested members of the public relevant information on how the government is organised to act on their behalf in this specific field of national security. Aspects to consider are:

- Appropriate arrangements properly designating the national agencies entrusted with the missions to identify, analyse and accept risks

to national security, and establishing the documents they shall pub-
lish and their periodicity.

- Arrangements and procedures established at the inter-agency and
  intra-agency levels, enabling these agencies to actually perform the
  required security risk assessment.

- The effectiveness of institutional arrangements and procedures
  when they guide these agencies through the security risk assess-
  ment process.

- The transparency of each stage of the security risk assessment proc-
  ess:

    - Risk identification;
    - Risk evaluation;
    - Risk prioritisation; and
    - Risk acceptance.

b) Assess the effectiveness of the process of security risk assessment in play-
ing its role within the process of defence policy formulation. Aspects to con-
sider are:

- Security risk assessment is part of the assessment of the security
  environment, along with security opportunities and challenges.

- The relationships between the process of security risk assessment
  and the development of a strategic vision identifying national values,
  goals and interests that should be defended and/or promoted with
  military means.

c) Assess the effectiveness of the institutionalised process of security risk
assessment. Aspects to consider:

- Are the identified security risks addressing the peoples' concerns
  and is national security challenged by these risks referring to the
  peoples' interests, aspirations and well-being, or are they addressing
  only state security and is national security referring only to state au-
  thorities and state sovereignty, integrity and independence?

- Is there an expression of the political will and determination to revise
  already identified risks and to assess new ones, or is the process of
  risk assessment engaged only when new security risks and threats
  are on the public or international agenda?

- Is there a manifest or presumed political sensitivity towards specific risks not fully explained to and understood by the public?
- Is there any institutional obligation to render transparent both the process and the outcome of security risk assessment, or only for the latter?

d) Assess the effectiveness and the transparency of the implementation process of the identified risks and threats to national security. Aspects to consider are:

- The threats and risks to national security incorporated into relevant documents are acting as powerful strategic arguments for the development of defence forces and capabilities, able to defend national values, objectives and interests against these threats and risks.
- In terms of security relevance, the risk assessment is meaningful for decision makers on the defence establishment and defence planners, and also for the international community.
- The agencies entrusted with the task of identifying threats and risks to national security are restraining themselves from pre-judging the relevance of those threats and risks for defence requirements.

e) Assess the effectiveness of the evaluation and prioritisation stages of the process of security risk assessment. Aspects to consider are:

- Risk evaluation is indicated as a stage in procedures regulating the risk assessment process and is defined or assumed as the stage where the identified risks and threats are measured in terms of their relevance, importance or urgency to national security.
- The risk evaluation is or is not in the remit of intelligence agencies, or is mostly a matter of inter-agency cooperation, with each agency bringing in specialised knowledge and expertise in various fields of national security.
- Risk prioritisation is indicated as a stage in procedures regulating the risk assessment process and is defined or assumed as the political task of showing preference among multiple alternatives.
- Risk prioritisation is solely in the remit of political authorities.

f) Assess the effectiveness of inclusion of a security risk assessment into the defence planning process. Aspects to consider are:

- The outcome of a security risk assessment is translated into defence requirements and, ultimately, into force and capability development.

- The policy documents are reflected in the defence planning documents and the planning assumptions incorporate the outcome of a security risk assessment.
- The executive and legislative authorities approve or endorse defence capabilities development proposals based on a security risk assessment outcome and translated into plans, programmes and budgets, and oversee the implementation of political decisions.

g) Assess the effectiveness and transparency of the process of determining defence requirements. Aspects to consider are:

- Is there a public perception that the defence requirements expressed in defence policy documents are based on well-articulated and generally accepted rationales, such as national values, goals, interests, risk assessment and international commitments?
- Is there a public perception that the envisaged defence requirements are affordable in social and economic terms?
- Is there a public opinion that the burden of developing defence along these requirements is generally acceptable?
- Is the public confident that their government will deliver national defence as required?

Defence Management

The management of the Ministry of Defence should be institutionalised along the following general lines:

- Legislation enabling the minister and his/her staff to perform managerial functions;
- Rules, regulations and procedures introducing a managerial system within the Ministry of Defence and within agencies with responsibility for defence matters, as well as associated force structures;
- Arrangements for inter-agency cooperation; and
- A managerial culture and good managerial practices to identify and solve organisational problems and to implement solutions for constant improvement of the performance of defence organisations and agencies.

The effectiveness of this institutional setting is given by the fact that the minister and the civilian heads of defence and defence-related agencies freely perform their managerial functions in a transparent manner, and the results are visible at the level of ministerial and organisational staff, and at force structure levels.

a) Assess the effectiveness of the institutional framework in providing for managerial requirements of legality, supervision, accountability and inclusiveness in the Ministry of Defence and defence agencies. Aspects to consider are:

- Legal provisions regulate organisational structures within the Ministry of Defence and their managerial attributes.
- A legally established decision-making system allows for flexibility in defence policy translation into defence planning and defence management.
- Legal provisions and internal regulations arrange the remit and functions of civil servant positions at all levels of the organisational hierarchy with clearly stated managerial remits.
- Within the managerial structures, there are well-established procedures and practices ensuring the flow of information in both directions, and define the remit of supervision of different hierarchical positions.
- Internal provisions regulate the reporting systems within and between defence structures, hierarchical and peer exchange of information and clear competencies for auditing.
- Organisational regulations, such as standard operating procedures, allow and encourage members of the defence staff to be part of the process of managerial decisions.

b) Assess the effectiveness of managerial instruments employed by defence managers and their staff.

c) Assess the effectiveness of arrangements and procedures for inter-agency cooperation within the defence sector. Aspects to consider are:

- Adequate coordination;
- Knowledge and information sharing;
- Transparent resource allocation among agencies;
- Accountability; and
- The practice of establishing a leading agency and supporting agencies within the cooperation arrangements.

Compliance with Internationally Accepted Norms and Practices

In institutional terms, compliance with internationally accepted norms and practices established in the defence sector is ensured by:

- Appropriate legislative provisions for enabling defence organisations to comply with the established norms and practices of international origin.
- Arrangements and procedures establishing national competencies within the existing governmental agencies for export controls on defence technology and military equipment.
- National mechanisms of control and reporting and means for transparency and inter-agency exchange of information.

These arrangements, procedures and practices are effective whenever the obligations assumed by the national authorities are fully observed.

a) Assess the effectiveness of the arrangements for arms control. Aspects to consider are:

- Arrangements for reporting on the ratification processes of arms control instruments.
- Arrangements for the exchange of information on transactions and policies related to armaments.
- Arrangements to provide assistance to states facing security risks resulting from the existence of stockpiles of ammunition, or to request such assistance accordingly.

b) Assess the effectiveness of the legislative and executive branches of government in the realm of controlling and overseeing the activities related to armaments. Aspects to consider are:

- Special legal provisions and governmental directives and decisions in the field of arms control.
- Procedures for the identification of national conditions for proper implementation of internationally accepted norms and practices, including eventual national caveats and their relevance for implementation.
- The authority to issue the policy on control of the export, re-export, import and transit of strategic goods and to approve the list of countries to which restrictions on the export, re-export, import and transit of strategic goods may be applied.

- The authority of enforcing procedures and mechanisms to oversee current arms control activities.
- Mechanisms for enabling the arms export control policy, especially for approving lists of controlled strategic goods, exercising legislative initiative in this area, and approving regulations and other acts governing the procedures for control of defence technologies and military equipment.
- Legal provisions and arrangements stating clear remits for providing information on the national control system and in prosecuting violations, as well as to coordinate with international agencies and to represent the state in arms transfer matters.

c) Assess the effectiveness of inter-agency cooperation for arms control. Aspects to consider are:

- Coordination of authorities at the inter-departmental level.
- Responsibilities for implementing international commitments, including the ability to make decisions and issue authorisations.
- Monitoring mechanisms for the observance of laws and regulations on arms control and transfer activities.

Personnel Structures and Practices

The institutional aspects of personnel structures refer to:

- Legal provisions defining the responsibilities and requirements of military and civilian personnel within defence organisations;
- Arrangements and procedures for the formulation and implementation of personnel policies;
- Statutes and codes of conduct for different categories of personnel of defence structures; and
- Personnel practices and customs well-established within the defence sector.

Personnel structures and practices are effective when they enable the fulfilment of organisational missions and provide for transparent promotion and career development, and for protection of the civil rights and freedoms of members of the armed forces.

a) Assess the effectiveness of the regulatory framework for personnel in defence organisations. Aspects to consider:

- Legal arrangements defining general and special responsibilities of military and civilian personnel, including the right to use lethal force and to handle classified information.

- Legal arrangements defining which civil rights of military and civilian personnel, if any, are suppressed, for what reasons and to what extent.

- Legal arrangements defining what incentives, bonuses or privileges, if any, are granted to military and civilians while on active duty or in the reserves.

- Legal protection of military and civilian personnel for their acts in the line of duty and against abuses.

- Regulations at the defence sector level defining personnel procedures and practices such as terms of reference, mission statements and related job descriptions; standard operating procedures; work and discipline regulations; personnel records; and individual evaluations.

b) Assess the effectiveness of personnel policies within the defence sector. Areas to consider include:

- Draft defence policy documents are evaluated in view of their possible impact on human resources.

- Defence policies are the basis for personnel policies.

- Defence personnel policies address the issues of providing combat manpower, civilian personnel, maintaining required readiness of existing forces and their fighting capabilities, the impact of new strategies and programmes on defence personnel and other similar issues.

- Personnel policies establish manpower requirements based on efficiency criteria of workload, specialisation and performance in accomplishing the defence and organisational missions, optimisation of personnel engagement and realistic measurements of performance.

c) Assess the effectiveness of the organisational arrangements and personnel practices for career development. Aspects to consider are:

- Arrangements providing for a fair and transparent career path based on personal merit and professional achievements.

- Open access to continuous education and training.

- Measures to combat corruption, political interference or "nepotism" in personnel practices.
- Arrangements for a personnel information system, addressing issues such as organisational diagrams, job descriptions, relevant information about positions/functions, education and training opportunities, etc.
- Organisational procedures for individual performance evaluations and personnel selection.

d) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements of the defence education system. Aspects to consider include:

- Legal provisions for allowing the defence organisation to develop an educational system of its own.
- The requirement of a military education policy, establishing the rationale for military education, organisational and educational goals and objectives, missions for educational organisations and their terms of reference, requirements of specialisation, and resources needed.
- Arrangements for a control system governing military education both in academic and organisational terms.
- Rules and procedures organising educational activities within the defence sector.

e) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for training. Aspects to consider are:

- Arrangements and procedures for basic and specialised military training of military and civilian personnel.
- Arrangements to use the training system for introducing new doctrines and concepts resulting from evolving defence policies, military strategies and developments of military science.

f) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for international humanitarian law. Aspects to consider are:

- Legal arrangements to recognise the conventions, protocols and other legally and politically binding international documents, including appropriate provisions in national criminal codes.
- Provisions in policy and planning documents guiding the implementation and observance of international humanitarian law.

- Inclusion of international humanitarian law provisions in doctrines, manuals and other reference literature for military education and training, and inclusion of international humanitarian law matters in military education curricula.

g) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for guaranteeing the civil rights and freedoms of military personnel. Aspects to consider include:

- Legal arrangements to guarantee the protection of fundamental civil rights and freedoms for military personnel.

- Legal and organisational procedures enabling the military to regain whatever civil rights and freedoms have been restricted to them. In practice, an individual in uniform wanting to exercise a civil right that is at the time restricted should smoothly trade his or her military status for a civilian one.

- Complementary measures to ensure that military personnel are still protected whenever a civil right is restricted, including the office of the ombudsman for military personnel, procedures for petitions and complaints, access to military and civilian justice systems, etc.

- Practices for public and parliamentarian debates on pieces of legislation imposing restrictions on the civil rights of the military, and free access of the military interested in these debates to express their views and opinions.

- Public information policies on matters addressing the protection of civil rights, freedom of the military and eventual restrictions on these rights.

Financial Planning and Resource Allocation

The domain of financial planning and resource allocation within the defence sector should be institutionalised along the same lines as other domains of public governance:

- Legal provisions regulating the role and remit of the financial system within the broader defence planning system and the public sector;

- Legal and organisational arrangements establishing the attributes, functions and activities of the financial system and its components; and

- Legal and organisational procedures for guiding the activities for financial planning and resource allocation.

The effectiveness of these institutional arrangements is given by the fact that the financial system is properly guided by policies and planning instruments, the budgetary exercise produces the funds needed for completion of defence missions and activities, and resource allocation activities are channelled according to pre-established priorities.

a) Assess the effectiveness of the defence planning system. Aspects to consider are:

  - Governmental organisations and agencies (legislative and executive bodies) involved in defence planning, their role, remits and relevance.
  - Legal arrangements for defence planning, including budgeting and other regulatory, enforcing or auditing mechanisms that apply to the defence sector.
  - The level of authorisation or approval of defence planning documents and planning execution.

b) Assess how effective the resource allocation system is. Aspects to consider:

  - Is there a resource allocation system at the defence sector level similar with or separate from the national resource allocation system?
  - Are there any differences in handling defence budgets from civilian budgets?
  - Are there effective mechanisms for handling defence budgets through the authorisation chain up to the parliament, and then back to executors and comptrollers?
  - Is the budgetary system comprehensive for all defence agencies and structures, and is it supported by appropriate legislation and supervised by executive orders?

c) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for granting the financial system its appropriate functions. Aspects to consider:

  - Legal and organisational arrangements and procedures enabling the financial system to regulate and supervise, and facilitate payments.
  - Legal and organisational arrangements and procedures for the raising and allocation of financial resources.

- Organisational arrangements enabling financial departments to manage the risks and uncertainties associated with the processes of payment and resource allocation.

d) Assess the effectiveness and transparency of institutional arrangements and procedures for accounting and financial policies. Aspects to consider:

- Rules and procedures for the development of budgets.
- Procedures for processing financial assets such as receiving, recording, securing, deposing and spending.
- Rules and procedures for the authorisation, recording and monitoring of expenditures.
- Arrangements and procedures for auditing and controlling authorities and agencies, establishing their remits and operating procedures, and the procedures for contracting, sub-contracting and outsourcing.

e) Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for financial functions. Aspects to consider:

- Legal provisions and organisational arrangements for the acquisition of financial assets, and procedures to minimise the risk of unavailability of funds and to maximise the raising of funds during the execution of the defence budget.
- Procedures to minimise the risk of allocating funds to low priority programmes to the detriment of high priority ones, and to maximise resource allocation to those programmes and activities that have higher returns with respect to policy objectives and accomplishment of defence missions.
- Procedures to minimise investments for utilities of lower relevance and to maximise the utilisation of funds for investments that would have a higher ratio of turnover.
- Arrangements and procedures enabling the defence management to establish priorities, efficiency criteria and resource ceilings for budget recipients.

Management of Defence Spending

The institutionalisation of the management of defence spending comprises:

- Legal arrangements linking managerial decisions on defence expenditures with defence policies and strategies, and with political guidance on defence;

- Legislation regulating the formation of budgets at the general government level (formulation and aggregation of budgetary provisions, parliamentary procedures for debating and approving budgets, reporting on budgetary execution, etc.) and of defence budgets;
- Legal and organisational procedures for the management of finances at the national and defence levels;
- Legal provisions regulating audit activities; and
- Legal and organisational procedures for the transparency of defence budgets.

These arrangements are effective whenever they guide the management of defence spending towards defence goals, objectives and missions and avoid loses, mismanagement and corruption.

a) Assess the effectiveness of any existing regulations and policies developed for the management of defence spending. Aspects to consider:

- Legal provisions for organising the formulation and implementation of departmental policies, including structure, content and relevance of policy and planning documents for the management of defence spending.
- Procedures for parliamentary control and oversight specifically designed for the management of defence spending.
- Arrangements and procedures for the inception of Assess the effectiveness of the existing defence planning system related to the function of adaptability to changing defence requirements and availability of financial resources. Aspects to consider:
- Legal relevance of defence planning documents (legal obligations for issuing and implementing agencies, executive and judicial control and oversight).
- Legal and procedural norms for budgeting defence plans and programmes.
- Levels of transparency of defence planning (availability of information for the general public regarding defence plans and programmes in areas such as personnel, procurement, training and education).

b) Assess the institutional effectiveness of the management of defence spending. Aspects to consider:

- Legal framework for the management of defence spending.

- Managerial structure of financial, planning and resource allocation (decision making, supervision, leadership, auditing, reporting, etc.).
- Procedures for budgetary execution (prioritisation, expenditure authorisation, auditing, reporting, etc.).
- Institutional relevance of defence policies for managerial decisions in the field of defence spending.
- Transparency of budgetary execution and of eventual decisions for adjustments.

Effective International Cooperation

a) Assess the effectiveness of the arrangements made in national legislation to ensure international cooperation on defence and security matters. Aspects to consider:

- Constitutional provisions setting the remit of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government in providing foreign affairs policies, guidance and decisions towards ensuring regional and international security through international cooperation.
- Parliamentarian regulations regarding the mission, responsibilities and procedures of parliamentary committees on foreign affairs, national security and defence.
- Legislation regulating the missions, responsibilities and procedures of the ministries of foreign affairs, defence, security services and other executive agencies involved in international cooperation in defence and security matters.
- Legal procedures for the negotiation, signature, ratification and implementation of treaties, agreements, memoranda of understanding and other politically or legally binding international documents dealing with international cooperation.
- Legal and organisational procedures for intra- and inter-agency cooperation on international relations.

b) Assess the impact of and effectiveness of foreign affairs, security and defence policies in the realm of international cooperation. Aspects to consider:

- Long-term policies such as strategic vision, national security strategy or defence strategy.
- Policy documents promoting dialogue, confidence building, settlement of disputes through peaceful means and with reciprocal respect

such as codes of conduct, best practices and other instruments addressing international cooperation in defence and security matters.

c) Assess the effectiveness of the arrangements for good neighbourly relations between your nation and other nations in the region. Aspects to consider:

- Diplomatic channels at the executive and legislative levels capable of addressing any political, social, economic or cultural issues regionally or bilaterally.
- Arrangements among neighbours capable of providing extensive transparency to their bilateral relations.
- Arrangements and procedures for identification and bilateral recognition of matters of mutual interest in a transparent and constructive manner.
- Procedures for the development of a bilateral or regional agenda at the diplomatic and security sector levels.
- Arrangements for the development of bilateral agencies and/or activities addressing matters of mutual interest.

d) Assess the effectiveness of arrangements for good neighbourly relations in the realm of security and defence at the local and regional levels. Aspects to consider:

- The measures initiated for the development of mutual trust and confidence among the nations in the region.
- National arrangements and procedures for the appliance of internationally accepted confidence measures, such as notification of military activities, on-sight inspections, etc.
- Procedures and practices for bilateral visits and staff talks, bilateral military exercises and/or common participation in multi-national exercises for international cooperation in the field of defence.
- Procedures and practices for the exchange of students and teaching staff in military education institutes.

e) Assess the effectiveness of bilateral assistance on security and defence matters received or offered by your nation. Aspects to consider:

- Assistance agreements and procedures for their implementation.
- Procedures for the exchange of relevant information on matters of concern for donors and recipients.
- Reporting systems.

f) Assess the effectiveness of managerial activities within the defence organisation for international cooperation at the Ministry of Defence and defence staff/ military levels. Aspects to consider:

- Planning procedures for international cooperation.
- Leadership and endorsement/approval procedures.
- Budgetary procedures for financing international cooperation.
- Internal and hierarchical reporting procedures.

Further Information

For further information on the Defence Institution Building Self-Assessment Kit, please contact:

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For further information on the Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building, please see the following website: http://www.dcaf.ch/publications.

About the Author

Col. (ret.) Dr. Hari Bucur-Marcu is the Academic Coordinator of the NATO Studies Center in Bucharest, Romania and a lecturer on NATO issues at the Department of International Relations and European Integration, the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, also in Bucharest, since 2003. Recently, Dr. Bucur-Marcu assumed the task of organising the research unit within the Department of International Relations. He is also a Visiting Professor at the National Defence University and the National Defence College in Bucharest, and a GCSP lecturer for the PSOTC in Sarajevo.

He is a Doctor of Military Science with a thesis on Economics of Defence Planning at the Romanian Defence University, a Master of Arts in English and Romanian Language and Literature at the University of Bucharest and a graduate of the Military Academy, Air Force Branch. He is an ancien of NATO Defence College, in Rome, Italy, and a graduate of the Defence Resource Management Institute in Monterey, California.

His previous assignments during thirty years in the military include: chief, Defence Strategies Service within the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff (J-5); chief, Education and Training Branch, Partnership Co-ordination Cell at NATO; Romanian military representative at NATO, Mons, Belgium; chief, International Military Cooperation Branch; head, PfP Planning and Operations Office; chief, Psychological Training Office of the General Staff. He also served as a staff officer in the Air Force, as a company commander and platoon leader.

During his military assignments, Dr. Bucur-Marcu contributed to democratisation of the Romanian military forces and to the reform and modernisation of the Romanian defence sector, initiated institutional developments in his area of expertise – defence planning and organisational management. He contributed extensively to the success of Romanian armed forces' integration into NATO for almost a decade. While an international officer on NATO staff, he worked closely with Partner nations in significant aspects of education and training policies.

Both as a national and as an international officer, he was deeply involved in the conceptual and practical aspects of democratic control over the armed forces, including security and defence policy development, parliamentarian oversight of defence policies and defence policies implementation within ministries of defence.

For more than five years he contributed to the theoretical, regulatory and practical framework of national defence planning in Romania, working closely with the ministers of defence, chiefs of defence and parliamentarians on issues related to policy, strategy and political guidance formulation and implementation, including budgetary management and transparency.

In the theoretical and academic fields, Dr. Bucur-Marcu developed an understanding of defence policy formulation and defence strategy design for nations in transition to democracy, of financial planning and resource allocation, and of public information policy.

He designed various academic and training courses for officials and for members of the public on security, defence, NATO and crisis management for Romanian and international participants. For three years, the NATO Senior Executive Master Course coordinated by Dr. Bucur-Marcu at the NATO Studies Centre was attended by a significant number of diplomats, officers, civil servants and civilians from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ukraine.

Dr. Bucur-Marcu is teaching at graduate and postgraduate levels and lecturing at national and international institutions and conferences on topics comprising security, defence, economics, crisis management and democratic oversight of the security sector. He also publishes articles on national security and defence, and on NATO issues.

He is fluent in English and French and colloquial in Italian.

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The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform and security sector governance. DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research to make recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.

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