DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

POST-WAR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA



Insoo Kim

About this publication project

This publication is part of a policy research project on Post-War Security Sector Reform, entitled ‘Striking a Balance between Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability within the Defense Sector: Learning lessons from Finland, South Korea, and Taiwan with a view of Ukraine’ undertaken by DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.

This comparative policy research project aims to identify challenges and best practices of post-war Security Sector Reform (SSR). It focuses on external strategies for building defense and security alliances, and internal strategies aimed at enhancing credible deterrence, democratic civil-military relations, and accountability—drawing lessons from Finland, South Korea, and Taiwan with a view to Ukraine. In a similar way as Ukraine, these countries were at war and have experienced a permanent threat of war over decades. Nevertheless, they have succeeded in enforcing their sovereignty despite facing asymmetrical power relations and being on the edge of geopolitical tensions. Moreover, they have managed to become consolidated democracies despite the constant pressure of securitization. What lessons can inspire, and which challenges may provide food-for-thought for Ukraine’s own SSR efforts during and post-war?

This project has been made possible by the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.

ISBN: 978-92-9222-783-8

Cite as: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. Post-War Security Sector Reform in South Korea. Geneva: DCAF, 2026.

Editors: Gabriela Manea, Mariia Kostiv
Copy editing: Alec Crutchley
Design & Layout: Petra Gurtner

Table of contents

	List of tables and figures	4
	List of acronyms and abbreviations	5
	About the author	6
	Abstract	7
CHAPTER 1	**Introduction**	**8**
CHAPTER 2	**Historical context**	**10**
	Korea's independence and division	10
	The Korean War and inter-Korean Cold War (1953–1987)	11
	Inter-Korean reconciliation and détente dilemma (1988–present)	12
CHAPTER 3	**External balancing strategies: international military cooperation and defense diplomacy**	**14**
CHAPTER 4	**Internal balancing strategies (1): establishing the effectiveness of the defense sector**	**17**
	Curtailing militarization	17
CHAPTER 5	**Internal balancing strategies (2): accountability and democratic control of the armed forces**	**20**
	Strengthening accountability and democratic control of the military	20
CHAPTER 6	**Learning lessons with a view of Ukraine's post-war Security Sector Reform**	23
	References	24

List of tables and figures

Table 1	Comparison of policies by periods	13
Table 2	Force structure of the two Koreas	18
Table 3	Change in regional and educational background of defense ministers	22

Figure 1	US Aid to South Korea and South Korea's coast-sharing for the USFK	15
Figure 2	The current ROK-US Combined Forces Command structure	16
Figure 3	Working age of the male population by year	17
Figure 4	Military expenditure and share of GDP by year (1993–2023)	19
Figure 5	Democratic control of the armed forces in South Korea	21

List of acronyms and abbreviations

BAI	Board of Audit and Inspection
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAPA	Defense Acquisition Program Administration
DSC	Defense Security Command
DR 2020	Defense Reform 2020
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMI	Global Militarization Index
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KAMD	Korean Air and Missile Defense
KMPR	Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation
KMA	Korea Military Academy
MDL	Military Demarcation Line
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MRLs	Multiple Rocket Launchers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCMA	National Command and Military Authority
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
OPCON	Operational Control
R&D	Research and Development
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
UNC	United Nations Command
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USFK	United States Forces Korea

About the author

Dr. Insoo Kim is a Colonel in the Republic of Korea Army and a professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the Korea Military Academy. He earned his Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the Korea Military Academy in 1997, a Master's degree in sociology from Yonsei University in 2001, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2008. His research interests include military sociology, national security, and North Korean studies. His articles have been published in journals such as Armed Forces & Society, Res Militaris, and the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis.

Abstract

South Korea's post-war reconstruction has been widely regarded as remarkable due to its successful transformation from the ashes of the Korean War (1950–1953) to one of the world's major economic and military powers. Overall, South Korea's success is attributed to at least three factors. First, South Korea has developed the ROK-US alliance from a unilaterally dependent relationship to a strategic partnership to address common security challenges other than North Korean threats. Second, South Korea has reduced the burden of national defense through defense reforms, which have replaced its troop-intensive structure with a technology-intensive structure and has improved the efficiency of defense operations. Finally, South Korea has established subjective civilian control through which elected government leaders influence military decision-making and operations based on personal preferences. This type of military control could lead to inconsistency and inefficiency in security affairs, but it ensures the vertical accountability of the military to the civilian government. Although the security situation in Ukraine is different from that in South Korea, the South Korean case provides useful lessons on overcoming the challenges that Ukraine will face after the end of the Ukraine-Russia war.

Keywords: Détente, military alliance, subjective civilian control, defense reform, South Korea

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

South Korea is one of the warring countries facing 1.28 million North Korean troops across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) (KOSIS 2023). Panmunjom, where the warring parties signed the armistice agreement to end the Korean War in 1953, is a popular tourist destination that has attracted tourists' attention because they can see South and North Korean soldiers facing each other with loaded guns across the MDL. However, those who want to witness tension between the two Koreas must be disappointed as they feel the same calmness as on the streets in Seoul. In their eyes, the fear of war may not seem to weigh on South Koreans' day-to-day lives. If money can buy peace, this calmness may not be a surprise. South Korea's national military budget is one of the largest in the world. In 2022, South Korea spent US$46.4 billion, greater than the US$44.0 billion that Ukraine spent to carry out an ongoing war against Russia (SIPRI 2023: 2). However, a country that is preoccupied with war preparedness is at greater risk of becoming a garrison state (Lasswell 1941). North Korea, located across the MDL, is a good example of a country whose economy has contracted substantially due to its heavy investment in military buildup. Therefore, the wonder is how South Korea is able to balance accountability and the effectiveness of defense sectors so that militarization does not hinder democracy and economic development.

The security situation in Ukraine is different from that in South Korea. However, the 70 years of South Korean history from the end of the Korean War gives us a sense of what challenges will come to Ukraine in the post-war years. First, securing a military alliance is critical for Ukraine to enhance its defense capabilities and prepare resources for post-war reconstruction. South Korea could not have effectively saved national resources for post-war reconstruction without a military alliance with the United States. In fact, since the end of the Korean War, military expenditure as a share of South Korea's GDP has averaged only 4.16 % and there is little variation from year to year (standard deviation = 0.015) (World Bank 2023). The United States occasionally deploys strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and advanced missile defense systems in South Korea as a visible show of its commitment to South Korea's defense. However, participating in a military alliance has required South Korea to cede some degree of sovereignty over its military forces to a joint command, weakening the ability of elected leaders to make independent decisions regarding the military. This situation could happen to Ukraine as well.

Second, Ukraine's war against Russia cannot persist without growing military influence over society. The state-of-war confrontation transformed South Korea into a militarized society where two military coups disrupted democratic development. Ukraine is on the same path of militarization as South Korea, as shown by the Global Militarization Index, rising from 42nd in 2014 to 1st in 2022 (BICC 2024). Ukraine may need to consider reducing militarization to accelerate post-war reconstruction. However, the military is likely to resist elected government leaders, arguing that attempts to cut military budgets or reduce troops could compromise security.

Finally, the Ukraine-Russia War will not end the way Ukraine wants it to. South Korea repelled Soviet Russia-backed North Korean forces with the help of the UN forces led by the United States. South Korea wanted to fight until it reclaimed North Korea. However, when the United States tried to end the Korean War with a ceasefire, South Korea had no choice but to accept it. Ukraine will face the same pressure from the international community which aims to reduce tensions with Russia, because Ukraine relies on international support to continue its efforts in countering Russian aggression and maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the context of analyzing civil-military relations in Ukraine's post-war situation, Henry Kissinger's (1982) concept of the détente dilemma, where '[security] policy must embrace both deterrence and coexistence, both containment and an effort to relax tensions,' could be a

relevant theoretical tool for two reasons. First, it may be inevitable for Ukraine to take steps towards reconciliation with Russia while simultaneously managing domestic pressures and expectations, which often advocate for a more aggressive stance. Second, democratic control of the military may become significantly fragile when soft-line governments prioritize coexistence despite a clear sign of Russia's aggressive intentions.

This study provides a clue as to how Ukraine can overcome these three challenges. The following part first historically contextualizes changes in inter-Korean conflict and civil-military relations in South Korea. The next part gives a more detailed look at the mechanisms by which South Korean civilian governments have pursued a balance between military accountability and military capacity to deter North Korean aggression while managing the ROK-US alliance, curtailing militarization, and strengthening democratic control of the military. Finally, a conclusion follows to summarize the findings and present best practices that could be relevant for Ukraine.

CHAPTER 2

Historical context

Korea's independence and division

Until the 19th century, Korea was a feudal agricultural society that had closed its doors to the world. With the onset of colonialism in the mid-19th century, Japan forced Joseon, the last dynastic kingdom of Korea, to sign the Ganghwa Treaty (1876), which paved the way for Japan to intervene in Korean affairs. The Korean Peninsula fell under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. During the Second World War, the Korean people experienced significant hardships because Japan exploited the Korean population for forced labor in various industries, also including conscription into the military. As the war progressed, some Koreans engaged in underground resistance activities and participated in the Korean Liberation Army in China, which was the armed forces of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. The end of the Second World War in 1945 brought about the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. However, it marked the beginning of the division of Korea into North and South.

Soon after Japan surrendered to the Allies, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel, with the Soviets occupying the northern and the Americans occupying the southern parts. Since the two occupying powers had different ideologies, with the United States promoting democracy and the Soviet Union supporting communism, reaching a consensus on unification was increasingly difficult. In February 1948, the United Nations decided to establish an independent government by election, only within the regions where this was possible, as the United States proposed. The Soviet Union thwarted UN activities in the north and sought to establish a communist government led by Kim Il-Sung, a former Soviet army captain. The South held a general election alone in May 1948 and elected Rhee Syng-Man as the first president to form the Republic of Korea in August 1948. One month later, in September 1948, the North declared the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with Kim Il-Sung as its first premier. In December of that year, the United Nations General Assembly approved the South Korean government as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.

The North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung persuaded the Soviet Union and China to unify the Korean Peninsula under communism by force and prepared for war with military support from the two countries. The United States, which had to reduce its troops after the end of the Second World War, could only deploy troops to strategically important areas worldwide. The United States did not consider South Korea strategically important enough to deploy troops (MND 2023b: 300). The United States decided to reinforce South Korea's defense capability by providing military and economic aid rather than stationing its troops there. Despite opposition from the South Korean government, the United States withdrew its troops from South Korea in 1949, leaving only about 500 military advisers. In late 1949, the Intelligence Service of the South Korean Army concluded that North Korea would launch a full-scale attack in the spring of 1950 and reported its judgment to the US Far East Command. South Korea, which had just emerged from colonial rule, could not prepare for war without international aid. However, the United States downplayed South Korea's warning as being intended to obtain more military aid, affirming that 'there is no communist invasion from North Korea' (The Academy of Korean Studies 2024).

In January 1950, the United States delineated the United States defense perimeter in the Asia-Pacific region, indicating that the United States would prioritize the defense of Japan and the Philippines. The Acheson Line, named after then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson, explicitly did not include South Korea, paving the way for North Korea's misperception that the United States would not intervene even if it started a war against the South. At that time, however, Acheson said that the attacked nation could rely on the United Nations to protect its independence from outside aggression, indicating that the United Nations would commit military force in the event of aggression.

The Korean War and inter-Korean Cold War (1953–1987)

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces, with the support of the Soviet Union and China, launched a surprise invasion of the South. The United States feared that the fall of South Korea could trigger the spread of communism to other parts of Asia. In response, the United States quickly convened a UN Security Council meeting. The UN adopted UNSC Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950, calling on North Korea to stop its hostilities against South Korea and calling on UN member states to provide South Korea with the necessary support to restore peace and security. As North Korean forces pushed South Korean troops to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, UN forces led by the United States came to assist South Korea in July 1950, with US General Douglas MacArthur as the commander. In September 1950, the UN forces retook Seoul and successfully advanced to the northern tip of the Korean Peninsula. As the UN forces approached the border with China, Chinese forces launched a massive counteroffensive, pushing UN forces back south of the 38th parallel again. As neither side could achieve a decisive victory, international pressure mounted for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict.

However, President Rhee Syng-Man opposed a ceasefire without unification. As the armistice negotiations progressed, he conducted diplomatic negotiations to have a powerful ally ready to defend South Korea in the face of North Korea's invasion. The discussion for a truce was marked by numerous deals over key issues, including prisoner exchange. The UN forces insisted that many prisoners of war should be repatriated according to individual intentions, but the North rejected this, insisting on unconditional forced repatriation. In April 1953, China issued a new proposal to legally resolve the repatriation issue by moving prisoners who did not want to be repatriated to neutral countries, thus moving toward the final phase of negotiations. Accordingly, UN Forces Commander General Clark announced that a ceasefire agreement could be formally signed by June 1953. President Rhee released about 26,000 prisoners who refused to return to North Korea, throwing a dark cloud over the establishment of the ceasefire (Chae 2017). The United States, which wanted an early end to the war, had to appease President Rhee by promising to sign the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and provide economic support in order to obtain a commitment that he would not interfere with the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

At last, the warring parties agreed to end the Korean War with an armistice on July 27, 1953. After a three-year war, the two Koreas came back to square one. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the United States considered South Korea a key ally in containing communism in Asia. This strategic importance led the United States to sign the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, in which the United States pledged to defend South Korea (MND 2023b: 301). Since then, the United States has been deploying US troops in South Korea under the treaty. In the meantime, the United States has provided South Korea with economic and military assistance and, in so doing, the South Korean officer corps has grown into the most modernized group in society. As South Korea was experiencing significant political instability and economic problems in the 1950s, there was a belief that only a military-led government could bring stability and address the nation's problems. Consequently, Major General Park Chung-Hee staged a military coup on May 16, 1961, claiming that the military would root out corruption, revitalize the economy, and restore order and stability (Janowitz 1964: 167).

In the 1960s, North Korea escalated its provocations against South Korea, marking a significant increase in hostile actions compared to the previous decade. The total number of provocations rose from 398 in the 1950s to 1,336 in the 1960s, indicating a substantial uptick in tensions (MND 2023b: 352). Notably, in January 1968, North Korea dispatched commandos with the intention of assassinating President Park Chung-Hee. While infiltrators managed to breach the security perimeter and approach the president's official residence in Seoul, the majority were either killed or captured, leading to a further escalation of tensions

between the two Koreas. This incident instilled a pervasive fear of war within South Korean society, prompting rapid militarization. Against this backdrop, President Park took decisive action by establishing the Reserve Forces in April 1968 (Kim 2023). The Reserve Forces comprised citizens who had completed their active-duty military service and were tasked with maintaining military readiness through regular training exercises and drills. The primary objective behind establishing the Reserve Forces was to counteract North Korea's infiltration attempts into local areas and to bolster South Korea's defense capabilities. Since its inception, South Korea's reserve forces have played a vital role in national defense efforts, performing diverse functions to enhance security and readiness. This includes augmenting frontline units during heightened tension, providing security for critical infrastructure, and supporting civil authorities in response to national emergencies. The Reserve Forces have thus become an integral component of South Korea's defense strategy, contributing to the nation's security and resilience in the face of ongoing threats and challenges from North Korea.

Increasing threats from North Korea helped President Park instill a sense of nationalist identity and loyalty as an ideological means of suppressing opposition and dissent against military rule. President Park portrayed South Korea as the bulwark against communism, framing authoritarian measures, including censorship, suppression of political dissent, and curtailment of civil liberties, as necessary for national security and the defense of South Korea's capitalist and democratic values. In October 1972, he declared martial law to establish a dictatorship in which the president, with all three powers of administration, legislation, and judiciary, could hold power for life. As his coercive rule necessitated military support, he consolidated his grip on the military by favoring a small group of Korea Military Academy (KMA) graduates called the Hana faction (Jun 2001: 128), who controlled intelligence agencies such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Defense Security Command (DSC) (Kim 2013).

President Park's authoritarian rule ended with his assassination on October 26, 1979. Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, the Hana faction leader and the DSC commander, took control of the entire military (Alagappa 2001: 477). Then he staged a military coup on December 12, 1979. The military coup was justified as an inevitable action to prevent the spread of communism by North Korea by maintaining political stability in the South. The military intervention in politics marked the beginning of another military rule in South Korea as General Chun launched a brutal crackdown on democracy protestors in Gwangju in May 1980. After that, he assumed the presidency through an indirect presidential election and curtailed political freedom until he accepted popular demands for a direct presidential election in 1987. In the 1980s, the South Korean military was socially unaccountable because the media and civil society organizations were under government surveillance. In particular, intelligence agencies were notorious for engaging in extensive surveillance of journalists and activists considered to be potential threats to the government (Jun 2001: 129). North Korea served as a justification for military intervention in politics and governance, as the military presented itself as the only force capable of safeguarding the country from the supposed North Korean threat.

Inter-Korean reconciliation and détente dilemma (1988–present)

In the late 1980s, at least three changes fundamentally shook inter-Korean relations. First, the Cold War ended, creating new opportunities for inter-Korean reconciliation, just as the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union promoted inter-Korean dialogue in the 1970s. Second, South Korea began to surpass North Korea economically. South Korea's per capita GDP was only 0.6 times North Korea's in 1970 but increased to 8.9 times by 1990 (KOSIS 2023). Economic prosperity gave South Korean people the confidence to achieve unification through inter-Korean cooperation. Finally, South Korea witnessed a transition to democracy, freely holding a direct presidential

Table 1 Comparison of policies by periods

	Pre-war phase (1948–1950)	Transition phase (1950–1987)	Post-war phase (1988–Present)
Political system	Illiberal Democracy	Authoritarianism	Democracy
Geopolitical context	Cold War	Cold War	Post-Cold War
Foreign policy	Pro-US Diplomacy	Pro-US Diplomacy	Diverse diplomacy
North Korean policy	Deterrence	Deterrence	Deterrence or Coexistence
Troop strength	95,000	592,000	660,000
Defense expenditure (% of GDP)[1]	US$7.7 mil (est.) (38.6 %)	US$1,987 mil. (5.3 %)	US$24,344 mil. (2.8 %)

Data: World Bank (2024); Bank of Korea (2024); KOSIS (2024)

election in 1987. As a result, political parties with security policies that differed greatly depending on their ideology and target voters came to compete for power.

The Roh Tae-Woo government (1988–1993) took the first step into inter-Korean détente by expanding diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union and China and expressing a willingness to embrace North Korea as part of the nation rather than an object of hostility and competition. North Korea responded positively to South Korea's proposal to pursue common prosperity based on mutual trust. As a result, the two Koreas signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North (also called the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement) in 1991, which defined inter-Korean relations as 'a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification, not as a relationship between states.' Moments of progress in reconciliation were followed by setbacks, as North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, refusing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections regarding suspicions of its nuclear development.

Since then, the various Conservative and Liberal governments have been at odds, insisting on deterrence or coexistence with North Korea according to their ideological orientation, as → Table 1 shows. Conservative governments have adopted more skeptical approaches toward North Korea and have employed a containment strategy, prioritizing a firm stance on North Korea's provocations. Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation were conditional on North Korea's preemptive measures to end military hostility toward the South. They have aligned closely with the United States because they consider the ROK-US military alliance essential for stability in the Korean Peninsula, particularly for North Korea's denuclearization.

By contrast, assuming that North Korea's collapse would not benefit the South, Liberal governments have sought to create a suitable environment for North Korea to come to the path of change on its own through economic support and exchanges. They pushed for a more reconciliatory North Korean policy called the Sunshine Policy, which prioritized inter-Korean reconciliation independent of North Korea's hostility towards the United States policy regarding North Korea's denuclearization and human rights issues. Although the success of the security policy requires active support and cooperation from the military, the appropriate military behavior that the two governments expected differed greatly. The obvious difference in preferred balancing strategies could have caused the two governments to doubt whether the military leadership chosen by the other government would properly implement its balancing strategy. Consequently, the détente dilemma, where the hard-liners and soft-liners give the military contradictory instructions, can potentially challenge accountability and democratic control of the military.

[1] Data for the pre-war period was estimated with related stastistical data. In this period, defense expediture was high because of the fight against commuist rebels who were trying to overthrow the South Korean government.

CHAPTER 3

External balancing strategies: international military cooperation and defense diplomacy

The ROK-US alliance has been critical in thwarting North Korea's aggression since the end of the Korean War. President Rhee Syng-Man was concerned that North Korea would invade the South again when the Korean War ended with a ceasefire on July 27, 1953. In response, he demanded that the United States guarantee South Korea's security. The United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, to formalize its commitment to defending South Korea from communist threats. Since then, US aid to South Korea has provided a material foundation for reconstruction during the post-Korean War period. US support for South Korea has experienced ups and downs due to changes in US policy. In 1954, the United States agreed to provide US$420 million in military assistance and US$280 million in economic assistance to South Korea (MND 2023b: 302). In the 1950s, foreign aid accounted for an average of 38 % of South Korea's defense expenditure (Chung 2007: 308-9). It remained relatively high in the 1960s when the United States affirmed a strong commitment to protecting South Korea because South Korea deployed approximately 48,000 troops to the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1973. In the late 1970s, a significant aid cut followed South Korea's withdrawal from the Vietnam War. The Nixon administration declared a new doctrine in 1969 that the Asian countries should resist and deter security threats by themselves, withdrawing one of two divisions in South Korea in 1971. The Carter administration also withdrew a further 3,400 US troops from South Korea by 1978, announcing a plan to withdraw all ground troops by 1982 (MND 2023b: 303).

The fear of abandonment made South Korea develop an indigenous defense industry to achieve greater self-reliance and autonomy in defense capabilities. In the mid-1970s, President Park Chung-Hee pushed forward the so-called 'Yulgok Plan,' which presented all weapons and equipment that could be produced domestically and established a new defense tax to purchase domestically produced weapons. The development of the government-led defense industry has become the foundation of the South Korean defense industry today. The United States reduced troops again due to economic difficulties in the early 1990s. Since the presence of US troops in South Korea is a critical component of the deterrent against potential aggression from North Korea, South Korea began paying the costs of stationing the USFK (US Forces Korea) on the Korean Peninsula to prevent the withdrawal of US troops from leading to the weakening of the alliance. South Korea's contribution started at 107.3 billion Korean won (US$150 million) in 1991 but increased 11.6 times to 1,247.2 billion Korean won (US$113.4 million) in 2022, as shown in → Figure 1.

Nations entering military alliances face tensions between preserving their operational control, which refers to the authority and responsibility for the operational command of military forces, and adhering to collective defense commitments. South Korea is no exception. South Korea first transferred its operational control (OPCON) to the United Nations Command (UNC) in the early days of the Korean War. In 1978, South Korea and the United States agreed to establish the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), the warfighting headquarters coordinating all military responses in the event of a war in the Korean Peninsula. The CFC was modeled after the Joint Force Command of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), which is responsible for planning and executing military operations to counter aggression against NATO member states at the operational level. No country

Figure 1 **US Aid to South Korea and South Korea's cost-sharing for the USFK**



Data: U.S. Aid to South Korea (US Department of State 2023); South Korea's cost-sharing (KOSIS 2023).

controls the CFC unilaterally due to the principle of binational staffing: 'If the chief of a staff section is Korean, the deputy is American and vice versa' (CFC 2023). The CFC assumed South Korea's OPCON to ensure a coordinated and effective defense against North Korean threats. Since then, the CFC has provided an effective command structure to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles, which are a common threat to South Korea and the United States.

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States has committed to defending South Korea from the North Korean threat of nuclear weapons, using its nuclear arsenal and conventional military capabilities. This extended deterrence umbrella serves as a crucial component of South Korea's national security strategy, allowing it to focus on economic development and regional stability without the need to develop its own nuclear weapons program. The United States and South Korea regularly hold joint military exercises, including field training, command post exercises, maritime exercises, air combat drills, and computer-simulated war games. The primary objectives of these joint exercises are to ensure coordination, communication, and interoperability between the two militaries. Although discussions about the potential development of nuclear weapons in South Korea have occasionally surfaced, particularly during periods of heightened tensions with North Korea, the presence of the CFC underscores its strategic decision to forgo the development of nuclear weapons while ensuring its security through its alliance with the United States.

Recently, South Korea's increasing role in its national defense has served as an opportunity to discuss the transfer of OPCON, which can be viewed as a step toward enhancing the accountability of the South Korean military to its elected political leaders. The CFC transferred peacetime OPCON over the ROK armed forces to South Korea in 1994 while still holding wartime OPCON (CFC 2023). In peacetime, the ROK and the US National Command and Military Authority

Figure 2 The current ROK-US Combined Forces Command structure



Source: MND 2023b: 303

(NCMA) command their armed forces through the Chiefs of Staff (JCS), respectively. In wartime, the CFC provides a coordinated defense through its Ground, Air Force, Naval, and Combined Marine Force Component Command, as shown in → Figure 2. In the post-war phase, the position on transferring wartime OPCON has differed depending on whether the government's inclination is liberal or conservative. Liberal governments want to take back wartime OPCON as soon as possible, but Conservative governments want to take it back as late as possible. The Liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government agreed with the US to restore wartime OPCON in 2012. Believing that the transfer of wartime OPCON could weaken the cohesion of the ROK-US alliance, the Conservative Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye governments postponed it indefinitely until South Korea can respond to the North Korean nuclear and long-range missile threats.

CHAPTER 4

Internal balancing strategies (1): establishing the effectiveness of the defense sector

Curtailing militarization

Measuring the effectiveness of a defense sector is a complex and multifaceted task, but in general, it means that the benefits outweigh the costs. In industrial democracy, any attempt to strengthen militarization significantly reduces public support for the government, as people will question the over-allocation of resources to the military at the expense of other critical sectors. Therefore, the civilian government faces the challenge of stepping up war readiness while lowering militarization. The Global Militarization Index (GMI) is useful in examining the changes in militarization. GMI compares the resources a country spends on defense yearly using three indicators: Military spending relative to GDP and health spending, the total number of military personnel relative to the total population and physicians, and the number of heavy weapons relative to the total population (BICC 2023). South Korea's GMI has constantly declined from 318.3 in 1993 to 192 in 2022 without impeding war preparedness against North Korea (BICC 2023). The decline in GMI is attributable to defense reforms, which have targeted cost-effective defense management, troop reduction, and transformation into a technology-intensive military without causing economic hardship to the nation.

First, South Korea has 500,000 troops to deter North Korean threats. Although this number is not great compared to the North Korean troop strength of 1,280,000 active duty personnel and 7,620,000 reserve forces (MND 2023b: 334), South Korea had to reduce active service troops for two reasons. First, the terms of mandatory active service have been getting shorter as political parties have repeatedly made it a presidential election pledge to win votes from the young male population. The term of active service for conscripts, which was 36 months in the 1960s, has decreased to 18 months (MND 2023b: 375). If conscripts leave the military sooner than in the past, the military must draft more people to fill the positions. Second, South Korea has to conscript 200,000 young men yearly to maintain 500,000 troops. However, the male population available for conscription is decreasing rapidly due to the declining birth rate, as → Figure 3 shows.

As it is inevitable that South Korea will face a personnel deficit shortly, South Korea has expanded the number of women and civilians in the military. The Roh Moo-Hyun government enacted Defense Reform 2020 (hereafter DR 2020), establishing the Defense Reform Act, stipulating that the MND should expand female

Figure 3 **Working age male population by year**



Data: KOSIS 2023

officers to 7 percent of officers and 5 percent of non-commissioned officers by 2020 (KLIC 2023). Inheriting its predecessor's DR 2020, the Moon Jai-In government enacted Defense Reform 2.0, which successfully increased the number of female officers to 8.8% of all officers by 2022, and the current Yoon Seok-Yeol government also announced that it would increase the number of female officers to 15 percent of all officers by 2027 (MND 2023b: 287). The number of army civilians is also on the rise, from 4.7 percent of the total strength in 2017 to 11.3 percent in 2023 (MND 2023b: 128). Except for combat-related duties, the budget, supply, and maintenance tasks that active service members carried out in the past are gradually being passed on to civilian workers (MND 2023b: 128).

Second, troop reductions have not provoked the military because a quantity-oriented military structure was transformed into a more quality-oriented one. Instead of increasing the number of conventional heavy weapons, South Korea has achieved a balance of military power by acquiring technologically advanced weapons through defense reform plans. → Table 2 compares the force structure of the two Koreas in 2022. Compared numerically, North Korea appears to have superior military power over South Korea. However, military experts would disagree with this judgment due to the lack of assessment of 'performance level and years-in-service of equipment, level of training, and operational concepts of joint force' (MND 2023b: 334). The South Korean military is smaller but stronger than the North Korean military, ranking 5th next to India in the global firepower index. In contrast, North Korea ranks 36th next to Myanmar (Global Firepower 2024).

Finally, South Korea has continued to increase military expenditure to support the military transformation. South Korea's military expenditure consists of force operation and force reinforcement budgets.[2] These budgets account for, on average, 67.7 percent and 31.3 percent of total defense expenditure, respectively. The force operation budget comprises troop operating costs and equipment and assets operating costs, each of which has a ratio of approximately 40 percent and 30 percent of total military expenditure (MND 2023a). On average, 6.5 percent of total military expenditure (21.4 percent of the force reinforcement budget) is for defense technology R&D (DAPA 2018: 68; DAPA 2022: 61), indicating that South Korea is investing heavily in developing its high-tech weapons, not just importing them.

Despite an increase in the total amount of military expenditure, its share of GDP has decreased since 1993, maintaining an average of 2.58 % of GDP. A relatively lower GDP share than other warring countries indicates that South Korea has successfully maintained a cost-effective defense posture. In 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun government established the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) to centralize defense acquisition-related functions dispersed throughout the

Table 2 Force structure of the two Koreas

	Army		Navy		Air Force	Rotary Wing
	Armor	Artillery	Surface vessel	Submarine	Aircraft	
South Korea	5,300	5,970	1,30	10	720	700
North Korea	6,900	14,400	7,30	70	1,270	290
South/North	76.8 %	41.5 %	17.8 %	14.3 %	56.7 %	241.4 %

Note: 1) Armor = tanks and armed vehicles
2) Artillery = field artillery, MLRS/MRLs/surface to surface guided weapons

Data: MND 2023b: 334.

Figure 4 Military expenditure and share of GDP by year (1993–2023)



Data: Military expenditure 1993–2000 (MND 2001, 64); Military expenditure 2001–2023 (MND 2023b, 333); Share of GDP (World Bank 2023).

MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each service branch, and the Defense Procurement Agency. Since then, the MND has planned and executed the budget for force operation, and DAPA has done so for the budget for force reinforcement. DAPA has been critical in improving defense acquisition's transparency, efficiency, and specialization.

However, the direction of military transformation has been staggered according to the strategic priority given by the civilian government. Liberal governments have tried not to provoke North Korea with military buildup, but Conservative governments have tried to show off their military power to North Korea. The Liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government's Defense Reform 2020 plan aimed to modernize and restructure the South Korean military to better address security challenges in Northeast Asia independently of the USFK. This plan included procuring advanced weapons, platforms, and systems to bolster South Korea's military capabilities (Defense Reform Commission 2005: 10–14). However, the army was very dissatisfied with Defense Reform 2020, arguing that it focused on strengthening the navy and air force while significantly reducing the number of army troops.

Going back to the old ways of relying on the USFK for air and naval power, the Conservative governments of President Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye revised Defense Reform 2020 to prioritize strengthening ground forces. Conservative governments also sought to establish the three-axis system—Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)[3]—which aimed at countering the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The Liberal Moon Jai-In government actively adopted science and technology as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to overcome resource constraints and adapt to the future battlefield while abolishing the three-axis system because its aggressive nature could provoke North Korea militarily. The current Conservative Yoon Seok-Yeol government is not an exception, as it has announced the Defense Innovation 4.0 plan, which aims to solve problems caused by a lack of military service resources and minimize loss of life by fostering AI science and technology. However, President Yoon reversed his predecessor's policy by reinstating the three-axis system.

[2] The force operation budget covers the day-to-day operational costs of the military, including expenses related to training, maintenance of equipment, personnel salaries, and other routine activities. The force enforcement budget is associated with costs of improving weapons systems through the purchase, improvement, and R&D of weapons systems.

[3] Kill chain refers to South Korea's preemtive strike system designed to detect, track, and eliminate North Korean missile threats before they can launch. KAMD is a multilayered defense system designed to protect South Korea's airspace from various types of aerial threats. KMPR is to discourage North Korea's aggression by showcasing South Korea's readiness and capability to respond with significant force.

CHAPTER 5

Internal balancing strategies (2): accountability and democratic control of the armed forces

Strengthening accountability and democratic control of the military

Civil-military relations align with the principal-agent problem: 'The civilian-principal seeks ways to assure appropriate behavior from his military agent' (Feaver 1998: 409). Feaver (1998: 421) argues that a crisis in civilian control is most likely when the civilian government decides to monitor the military intrusively and the military decides not to be submissive to the civilian government. From this view, democratic military control is stable if the civilian government detects military shirking behavior without paying the monitoring cost. The monitoring cost is adversely proportional to intra-military cohesion. If the military is internally not cohesive, the civilian government can easily detect military shirking behaviors, and the military leadership has no reason not to support the government that prefers them over others. Huntington names this way of taking advantage of intra-military division 'subjective civilian control' (1957).

Before transitioning to civilian rule in the early 1990s, Hana faction members dominated the military, with close ties to various presidents and former generals. The rate of promotion to the rank of general for Hana faction members was 90.4 %, whereas for other KMA graduates it was 20.9 %. The respective rates of assignment to a command position were 54.8 % and 7.7 %, respectively (Kim 2013: 702). Accordingly, solidarity between presidents and the military leadership was substantially strong, but internal military cohesion weakened. President Kim Young-Sam (1993–1998) exploited antagonism against Hana faction members to ensure his military control. He purged Hana faction members soon after his inauguration in 1993 to consolidate democracy, replacing military leadership with non-Hana faction KMA graduates who vowed loyalty to him (Jun 2001: 131). KMA graduates could have perceived his purge against their classmates as an intangible threat to the military. However, most officers welcomed his purge, which would accelerate their upward mobility within the military ranks, so the military had a clear reason to support the stable handover of power to the civilian government (Kim 2013).

For two reasons, Korean culture provides favorable conditions for civilian presidents to apply this form of civilian control. First, Korea is a low-trust society in which inter-personal trust is confined to those connected through social ties, particularly regional ones (Fukuyama 1995). In politics, region of origin decides which party people support (Cho 1998). For example, the Liberal Party has a strong base in President Kim Dae Jung's region of origin, the Jeolla region. The Conservative Party traditionally finds support in President Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam's region of origin, the Gyeongsang region. Second, interservice rivalry is intense due to the army-centered military structure (Kim & Kuehn 2022). In South Korea, where KMA graduates (Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, and Roh Tae-Woo) have played a significant role in politics, the Ministry of National Defense has often been called the Ministry of Army Defense.[4] This social structure enables civilian presidents to create a patron-client relationship with military leaders from their originating regions.

→ Figure 5 delineates the mechanisms of democratic control of the armed forces within the context of South Korea. In their capacity as commander-in-chief, the president holds the reins of vertical military control. Concurrently, the National Assembly and the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) serve as pivotal actors in the vertical oversight of the military apparatus. Primarily, the National Assembly assumes a multifaceted role in this regard. Initially, it exercises its legislative prerogative by promulgating laws that delineate the parameters and protocols governing military activities. Subsequently, the National Assembly leverages its authority during budgetary deliberations to meticulously scrutinize defense expenditure, military operations, and the structural organization of the armed forces.

[4] South Korea has military academies that serve different branches of its armed forces. Korea Military Academy is the primary officer training institution for the South Korean Army.

Figure 5 **Democratic control of the armed forces in South Korea**



Furthermore, the confirmation hearings convened by the National Assembly for nominees to key military positions, such as the Defense Minister and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serve as a vital mechanism for oversight. This rigorous process allows the National Assembly to assess the suitability of appointees, thereby ensuring the reasonable exercise of the executive's authority in military appointments. The National Assembly also convenes the National Defense Committee, an expert panel dedicated to defense-related affairs. Charged with oversight responsibilities, this committee conducts exhaustive inquiries, hearings, and investigations into defense policies, military preparedness, and arms procurement practices.

Simultaneously, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) undertakes audits to verify compliance with extant laws and regulations within the military sphere. These audits serve a dual purpose: ensuring adherence to legal strictures and evaluating the efficacy of defense strategies vis-à-vis their stated objectives. By identifying areas for enhancement or reform, the BAI contributes to continuously refining military governance and operational efficiency. Finally, the media and civil society organizations (CSOs) wield influence through horizontal control mechanisms over the military. Through investigative journalism, public advocacy, and civic engagement, these entities bolster transparency, foster accountability, and safeguard the integrity of democratic norms within the military domain.

→ Table 3 shows a clear difference in preferences for defense ministers between Conservative and Liberal governments. In South Korea, a military leadership appointment is the president's sole authority as the commander-in-chief. The president can appoint them ex officio even if the National Assembly does not agree. While Conservative governments prefer KMA graduates from outside Jeolla province, Liberal governments appoint non-KMA trained officers from Jeolla province. This form of subjective military control could help civilian presidents consolidate vertical control, preventing a particular group of officers from amassing much power in the military and becoming entrenched in defense policy.

President Kim Dae-Jung was the first president from the Jeolla province since 1961. Accordingly, President Kim Dae-Jung filled influential military positions with Jeolla natives (Jun 2001: 132; Lee 2003). Inheriting

Table 3 Change in regional and educational background of defense ministers

	Regional Origin of Birth				KMA graduates
	Gyeongsang	Jeolla	Others	Total	
Kim Young-Sam (1993–1998) (C)	3 (75 %)	0 (0 %)	1 (25 %)	4 (100 %)	75 %
Kim Dae-Jung (1998–2003) (L)	0 (50 %)	2 (50 %)	2 (50 %)	4	100 %
Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008) (L)	1 (33 %)	2 (66 %)	0 (0 %)	3	33 %
Lee Myung-Bak (2008–2013) (C)	0 (0 %)	0 (0 %)	2 (100 %)	2	100 %
Park Geun-Hye (2013–2017) (C)	0 (0 %)	0 (0 %)	2 (100 %)	2	100 %
Moon Jai-In (2017–2022) (L)	1 (33 %)	1 (33 %)	1 (33 %)	3	33 %
Yoon Seok-Yeol (2022–Present) (C)	2 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	0 (0 %)	2	100 %

Note: (C) = Conservative government; (L) Liberal government

Data: List of Defense Ministers, MND 2023b.

President Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy, presidents Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008) and Moon Jai-In (2017–2022), themselves from the Gyeongsang region, harnessed antipathy toward elitism among non-KMA-trained officers, appointing non-KMA-trained officers to the position of defense minister. President Roh Moo-Hyun appointed a non-KMA army general as defense minister for the first time. President Moon Jai-In followed his predecessor's military control by appointing an ROTC-trained general as army chief of staff for the first time. The selection of military leadership based on region of origin is a persistent trend. The same has been true during Yoon Suk-Yeol's presidency. Soon after the current Yoon Seok-Yeol government announced a round of promotions to four-star general, the Liberal Party criticized that it excluded Jeolla natives, arguing that of 69 of those promoted to positions higher than two-star general, only three were Jeolla natives (Kwak 2023).

Consequently, no matter the direction in which security policy changes, the South Korean military remains submissive to the government's guidelines. A typical example is a political controversy over the term archenemy in the Defense White Paper, an official document published by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (hereafter MND) to outline defense policies, strategies, and security environment assessment. In the early 1990s, suspicions of North Korea's fledgling nuclear development emerged, raising public concerns about the security policy of getting North Korea to give up its nuclear program. The Conservative Kim Young-Sam government (1993–1998) first branded North Korea as South Korea's archenemy in the document in 1995. What made the situation worse was a clear sign of North Korea's expansionism at sea. However, the MND deleted the expression identifying North Korea as an archenemy from the 2004 Defense White Paper, supporting the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. The MND revived the expression of archenemy again under the Conservative Lee Myung-Bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-Hye governments (2013–2017), as they accused the Sunshine Policy of undermining war preparedness against North Korean threats. The MND deleted it again from the 2018 Defense White Paper under the following Liberal Moon Jai-In government (2017–2022). Then, the MND again stated that the North Korean regime and its military are 'an enemy of the Republic of Korea' (MND 2023b: 39), publishing the 2020 Defense White Paper under the current Conservative Yoon Seok-Yeol government (2022–2027).

CHAPTER 6

Learning lessons with a view of Ukraine's post-war Security Sector Reform

South Korea is an exemplary case of post-war reconstruction. Ukraine can take the same path as South Korea. Ukraine's ability to address challenges will be attributable to three things: 1) defense capabilities as a deterrent to Russia's potential aggression, 2) the effectiveness of the defense sectors in strengthening military power at a minimum cost that does not impede socio-economic development, and 3) a military leadership committed to implementing the civilian government's security policy regardless of whether it promotes deterrence or coexistence with Russia.

First, South Korea had to reinforce its deterrence capability without raising its militarization level. It solved this problem through international military cooperation with the United States based on the ROK-US military alliance. It is hard to form an alliance, but it is harder to keep it stable because an alliance poses the fear of abandonment and entrapment. South Korea sent its troops to Vietnam, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan whenever the United States fought a war, paying the cost of stationing the USFK. South Korea also ceded the US military jurisdiction over US military crimes in Korea and wartime OPCON to the United States. Although South Korean civil society insists on taking them back, there are voices concerned that this will weaken the alliance. Ukraine must seek social consensus on what it can cede to form and maintain a military alliance.

Second, Ukraine was ranked first in the GMI in 2022 (BICC 2024), indicating that most national resources are being mobilized for war. The resulting lack of resources for education and social welfare will raise public concern about alleged corruption in defense spending. South Korea established DAPA by separating the functions related to developing and acquiring weapon systems from the Ministry of National Defense. The rapid increase in South Korea's defense industry products confirms that DAPA has conducted fair and transparent practices, promoting the effectiveness of defense acquisition programs. It is also worth noting that the GMI index was highly correlated with the number of non-combat deaths in South Korea.

Widespread militaristic beliefs had the consequence of putting military purposes ahead of the human rights of individual soldiers. In the past, when military values and practices prevailed in South Korean society, the military could cover up many non-combat deaths in barracks, punishing those responsible lukewarmly. The number of non-combat deaths in the military has declined significantly as oversight agencies in government branches and civil society have called for more transparency. Ukraine must implement defense reforms to strengthen accountability in the defense sector while curbing militarization.

Finally, the collapse of the Cold War in the late 1980s pushed South Korea into the détente dilemma, where the civilian government pursued either deterrence or coexistence with North Korea. After the end of the Ukraine-Russian War, Ukrainian politics will be divided into hard-liners and soft-liners on Russian policy. The Ukrainian military may not accept the soft-liner policy of acquiescing to Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory. However, policy-making is up to civilian leaders and it is up to military leaders to follow it. Subjective civilian control was useful in the South Korean context. Still, the military may degenerate into a coercive force in politics unless civilian leaders 'have clearly defined duties and performance standards, which would enable their behavior to be assessed transparently and objectively' (UNESCO 2023). In South Korea, the media and civil society organizations have acted as watchdogs over military actions and decisions. Ukraine must significantly promote media freedom and civic participation over the issues of security policy, human rights violations, and the rule of law.

References

Alagappa, M. (2001). Asian Civil-Military Relations: Key Developments, Explanations, and Trajectories. In M. Alagappa (ed.), *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (pp. 433–497). CA: Stanford University Press.
DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804779234**

BICC (Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies). (2024). Global Militarization Index. Retrieved on February 3, 2004, from **https://gmi.bicc.de/#rank@2021**

Chae, Grace. (2017). Complacency or Complicity?: Reconsidering the UN Command's Role in Syngman Rhee's Release of North Korea POWs. *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 24*(2/3), 128–159

Cho, K. (1998). Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratization: An Empirical Analysis. *Asian Perspective, 22*(1), 135–156

CFC (Combined Forces Command). (2023). About. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.usfk.mil/About/CFC/**

Chung, Y. (2007). South Korea in the Fast Lane: Economic Development and Capital Formation. New York: Oxford University Press.
DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325454.001.0001**

DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration). (2018). 2018 Defense Acquisition Program Statistics (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **http://kidet.or.kr/**

DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration). (2022). 2022 Defense Acquisition Program Statistics (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **http://kidet.or.kr/**

DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration). (2023). About DAPA. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.dapa.go.kr/dapa_en/sub.do?menuId=412**

Defense Reform Commission. (2005). How We Promote Defense Reform (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **http://archives.knowhow.or.kr/**

Feaver, P. D. (1998). Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations. *Armed Forces & Society, 24*(3), 407–434.
DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9802400**

Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. NY: Free Press

Global Firepower. (2024). 2024 Global Firepower. Retrieved on February 5, 2024, from **https://www.globalfirepower.com/**

Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations. MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

Janowitz, M. (1964). Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Jun, J. (2001). South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control. In M. Alagappa (ed.), *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (pp. 121–142). CA: Stanford University Press. DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804779234**

Kim, I. (2013). Intra-Military Divisions and Democratization in South Korea. *Armed Forces & Society, 39*(4), 695–710. DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12454533**

Kim, I. (2021). South Korea: A Media-Driven Amplification of Threats. In D. Kuehn and Y. Levy. *Mobilizing Force: Linking Security Threats, Militarization, and Civilian Control* (pp. 55–76). CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. DOI: **https:// doi.org/10.1515/9781626379435**

Kim, I. (2023). Militarism and Self-portrait of Reservists as Second-rate Soldiers in South Korea. In E. Ben-Ary and V. Connelly. *Contemporary Military Reserves: Between the Civilian and Military World* (pp. 183–99). NY: Routledge. DOI: **https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003306399**

Kim, I. & Kuehn, D. (2022). The Ministry of National Defense in South Korea: Military Dominance despite Civilian Supremacy? *Journal of Strategic Studies, 45*(6–7), 865–892. DOI: **https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2127092**

Kissinger, H. (1982, March 15). The Détente Dilemma. Time. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,925328,00.html**

KLIC (Korean Law Information Center). (2023). Current Laws and Regulations. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **https://www.law.go.kr/**

KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service). (2023). National Statistics (Korean). Retrieved November 7, 2023, from the database, **https://kosis.kr/index/index.do**

Kwak, J. (2003, November 1). Blowing Up Seven Generals All at Once. Pressian (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.pressian.com/pages/articles/2023110118244432029**

Lasswell, Harold D. (1941). The Garrison State. *American Journal of Sociology,* 46(4), 455–468. **http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769918**

Lee, D. (2003, October 29). The Disorder of Military Personnel Management. Dong-A Ilbo (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2003, **from https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20031029/7996253/1**

MND (Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense). (2001). 2001 National Defense Information Collection (Korean). Retrieved on November 9, 2023, from the database, **https://www.mnd.go.kr**

MND (Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense). (2023a). 2020 National Defense Statistics (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **https://www.mnd.go.kr**

MND (Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense). (2023b). 2022 Defense White Paper (Korean). Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from the database, **https://www.mnd.go.kr**

SIPRI. (2023). Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2002. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf**

The Academy of Korean Studies (2024). Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, Retrieved on March 30, 2024, from **https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0042143**

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). (2003). Accountability. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/dcf_account1.shtm**

US Department of State. (2023). Foreign Assistance. Retrieved on November 7, 2023, from **https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data#tab-data-download**

World Bank. (2023). Military Expenditure (% of GDP) – Republic of Korea. Retrieved on November 8, 2023, from **https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=KR**

About DCAF

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and gender equality. Since its founding in 2000, DCAF has contributed to making peace and development more sustainable by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders.

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
Maison de la Paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

www.dcaf.ch

DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

Maison de la Paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

www.dcaf.ch