

# People-centred Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform

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**LINKING  
POLICY WITH  
PROGRAMMING**

**Stocktaking  
Study Report**

**FEBRUARY 2023**

# About DCAF

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## Cover Photo

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# Executive summary

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The security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) agenda has been influenced by the concept of human security since it was conceived in the 1990s. Putting people's needs at the heart of reform processes has been the underlying premise of international assistance programming. However, over two decades since its conceptual conception, SSG/R programming has shown a disconnect between the 'statebuilding' approach and grassroots-focused peacebuilding efforts. Both types of approaches aimed to tackle the underlying causes of violence, harm, crime, and conflict and build more efficient, effective, legitimate, transparent and accountable mechanisms for providing security and justice services.

In practice, SSG/R programming has mainly focused on the state, under the assumption that the state and its institutions are best placed to safeguard and guarantee peace and security and the best choice to provide stability in transition contexts. Peacebuilding programming has focused primarily on the community, spreading awareness of the peaceful resolution of conflict and aiming to change the existing culture around conflict resolution by involving non-state actors or hybrid actors that benefit from community-level legitimacy. Both SSG/R and peacebuilding programming have worked in the space between the state and non-state systems dealing with issues around community perceptions of state actors and building collaborative relationships and partnerships between the two.

Today, donor-assisted statebuilding efforts are flailing in many contexts: populism and criticism of the state and its role is rising globally. An honest examination of donors' engagement in and legacy of assisting SSG/R is clearly needed. Dwindling financial resources for SSG/R, the global COVID-19 pandemic, and the considerable threats of political unrest and increasing fragility should give the international community the opportunity to strengthen coherence in assisting SSG/R processes. The members of the Governing Board of the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) face a shared challenge in ensuring that its international funding does not lead to a plethora of programming with uncoordinated initiatives and results.

ISSAT's mandate allows its Knowledge and Outreach Team to analyse its governing board members' policies and programming to give an accurate reflection of what has been done in this area. ISSAT's role is then to tap into donors' collective learning on SSG/R and to generate guidance and evidence for reconstructing the model of SSG/R to ensure that donor programming stems from communities' concerns but includes the political, governance and institutional aspects necessary for any reform process.

## The concept of people-centred approaches to security sector governance and reform

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People-centred security requires SSG/R to be redefined as a reform process to improve the effectiveness, efficacy, sustainability, affordability, accountability, legitimacy, inclusivity and relevance of security and justice service providers in whatever way people chose to access security and justice services. SSG/R should aim to create an enabling environment for wider reforms and transformations targeting the state, political systems, governance mechanisms, legal frameworks, and community-level behaviours and practices.

People-centred security is defined in this report as the security and safety of women, men, boys and girls across all socioeconomic and cultural groups. This concept has three dimensions: personal security, community-related security and political security.<sup>1</sup> It aims to address issues related to people's vulnerabilities and insecurities as they relate to economic, social, political, or security and justice deficits. Security and justice sector reform centred on people's security is context specific, politically aware, culturally sensitive and needs based.

People Centred reform comprises a three-pronged programmatic strategy:

1. It **empowers people at the local level** – as well their representatives, spokespersons, advocates and community-based organisations – to express their fears, needs, insecurities and vulnerabilities and to hold accountable all security and justice providers whether they are formal, informal or semi-formal actors;
2. It **aims to correct power imbalances** and improve the inclusivity, accountability and relevance of security and justice services as well as those providing them; and
3. It aims to ensure that all security and justice providers undertake their functions using a **logic of protection** approach to their use of force.

ISSAT recognises that extensive research, targeting policy development, on people-centred approaches has been done by Saferworld, the United Nations Development Programme, Folke Bernadotte Academy and others. The current report seeks to complement previous reflections by providing a programmatic

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<sup>1</sup> UN OCHA, 2009. Human Security in Theory and Practice. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p7. <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf>



framework and programming methodology that put people at the heart of SSG/R programming, rather than seeing them as end users.

## Reimagining security sector governance and reform

Security sector reform and governance has been a normatively loaded term with several assumptions underlying how it has been implemented over the past two decades. It has been considered the cornerstone for three types of interconnected change processes:

- sustainable development
- building stability and peace
- statebuilding and democratic governance

SSG/R programming has been designed, implemented and evaluated as part of social and political transformative processes including – in addition to security and justice actors – rule of law frameworks, social contracts, political processes, socioeconomic dynamics and cultural predispositions. Despite the best efforts and intentions to work towards human security, all four case studies conducted for this report have found that SSG/R programming might have engaged, to varying degrees, with the population and its advocates across, Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan but that it has not succeeded in creating a security and justice system that protects people.

### Somalia

Traditional SSG/R until now has not generally made it possible to build a security system that fully protects citizens from the terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab and ISIL, displacement, communal clan fighting, and the growth of crimes, including rape, and the weakening of social cohesion. (From an interview with a community leader)

### South Sudan

Traditional SSG/R has fallen short of impacting people's lives because key stakeholders are not involved in [the] process of improving people lives and security. Security institutions are established but do not perform their mandate of either maintaining law and order, or protecting people's lives and properties. This is what justifies a social contract. When the government has failed to provide security, citizens have started providing it to themselves, and this is where issues to do with security privatization arise. (From an interview with a community leader)



In **Burkina Faso**, traditional SSG/R, focused on the state, with a predominantly stabilisation agenda anchored in training and equipping activities, has not made it possible to build a security system that is committed to protecting citizens from the growth in crime and terrorist attacks and the weakening of social cohesion. The rise in insecurity due to the exacerbation of violent extremism, transnational organised crime and local conflicts<sup>2</sup> is a reality that plunges areas of the country into a worrying humanitarian situation. This hinders the ambitions of the social cohesion policy, which aims to have communities living together harmoniously, provide equitable access to resources, and promote respect for human rights and a reduction in inequalities.<sup>3</sup> State security actors appear to lack the human and material resources to face the current security challenges, and they are not well perceived by many groups, in particular those in regions affected by armed attacks. The lack of joint efforts between the various security actors (formal and informal)<sup>4</sup> also poses a serious problem, hindering the effective involvement of communities in the fight against insecurity.

Since the events of March 2012, and despite local initiatives for peace, security, development and disarmament taken by communities in **Mali**, both urban and rural areas have remained excluded from the search for a way out of the crisis. Against this backdrop, the women community members of the northern regions have prioritised the search for peace and security, post-recovery, as part of their civic activities. Their mechanisms for safeguarding peace and security included favouring dialogue to consolidate trust-building and justice and as a means of managing disputes. They also aimed to be inclusive, with women, young people, and community and religious leaders participating in this initiative. In Mali, the participation of the population, and particularly women in the northern region, has contributed to establishing security and peace and to reducing poverty in post-conflict situations. Malian young people also informed the process for developing the 'governance, peace and reconciliation' roadmap through dialogue and awareness-raising initiatives with civil society organisations.

The lessons learned from the setbacks to traditional SSR/G in **Somalia** highlight the need to develop a security system anchored in participatory and inclusive processes that respects Somalia's needs and its religious and cultural values.

**South Sudan** has witnessed numerous initiatives<sup>5</sup> to assist with the reform of the South Sudanese security sector since the country gained independence in 2011. Despite the wide-ranging technical and financial assistance provided by donors, multilateral actors and non-governmental organisations, these engagements have been poorly coordinated and have lacked strategic direction and coherence, leading to very limited successes. In fact, few countries have received as much foreign technical assistance

<sup>2</sup> Assanvo, W. et al., 2019. *Violent extremism, organised crime and local conflicts in Liptako-Gourma*. Institute for Security Studies. <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/violent-extremism-organised-crime-and-local-conflicts-in-liptako-gourma>

<sup>3</sup> National definition of social cohesion in Burkina Faso from a workshop to define social cohesion, held by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralisation and Social Cohesion, 2019. [www.matd.gov.bf](http://www.matd.gov.bf)

<sup>4</sup> According to the Security Forum Summary Report, 2017.

<sup>5</sup> South Sudan People's Defence Forces Transformation Strategy, 2012, the revision and amendment of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Act and White Paper on Defence, 2008, and the development of the National Security Strategy, 2012.

and achieved such disastrous results. This case study reflects the importance of political leadership and putting people's needs, capabilities, perceptions, beliefs, habits and behaviours at the heart of SSG/R programming.

Lessons from **Burkina Faso** indicate that the role of organisations such as Koglweogo, Dozo, Wendpanga and Rugga (acknowledging their risks, limitations and failings) is key in the construction of public security policies. The development of national security policies needs to involve all social groups' needs and concerns through a participatory co-construction approach. **Somalia** also offers a central role for non-state actors in the security sphere; these include neighbourhood committees, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, community conversation units and other local security advisory committees.

In **South Sudan**, unless local communities get involved in the process of constructing their security system, a state-centric focus will not yield sustainable results. Local communities already supply community watch services, improve lighting, provide cleaning, secure empty buildings and hire other security services as required. The numerous institutions that oversee security in each area should cooperate with the local community whose representatives can identify local problems more effectively. Such cooperation should inform reforms undertaken at central and local levels, bringing about improvements in people's safety.

## People-centred security sector governance and reform programming

Adopting a people-centred approach in SSG/R programming means revisiting the foundations of SSG/R, and recalibrating the priorities of programming to match what was initially envisaged in a human security framework, looking at the root causes of insecurity rather than only at its symptoms. Furthermore, adopting a people-centred approach would allow the ISSAT Governing Board members to take a different viewpoint and flip from a technical supply-driven to a societal demand-driven approach, in order to increase people's trust in the legitimacy of the security sector's structure and thereby strengthen the social contract between citizens and security and justice providers.

## Report findings

**Statebuilding is still relevant**, but people's rights, needs and vulnerabilities need to be at the heart of it to guarantee the sustainability of reforms. Building the effectiveness of institutions without dedicating much attention to their legitimacy, representativeness, accountability and respect for human rights, as well as their affordability, is leading to the erosion of the international community's long-standing reputation in supporting reforms in the area of security and justice in many fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Donors' political clout and positive contribution to people's security is a cornerstone for building partnerships for reform. The narrow view of the social contract taken by donor programming in the four case studies needs to be expanded to factor in non-state actors that benefit from people's trust and reflect

the relevance of their services to the population. The traditional SSG/R model links the effectiveness and legitimacy of the delivery of state services to a uniform and equal distribution of services to the community, falling short of looking at the state–community relationship and the community’s needs that are not necessarily reflected through mainstream methods of data collection. Only part of legitimacy flows from state power. As the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) points out in a guidance note on non-state justice system programming, ‘the recognition and accommodation of social, historical, religious, and cultural trends and realities are important to, and part of, the rule of law. Overshadowing the importance of local values and cultural relevance would fail to root the international assistance in the local culture, establishing only institutional shells and creating relationships of accountability only between local government and the donor community rather than between the government and its citizens.’<sup>6</sup>

**Managing hybrid systems calls for an acknowledgement of the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms and security delivery systems.** References to non-state security and justice providers in international actors’ policies tend to be mostly descriptive of their attributes and importance. However, none of these policies provide a description of **how** to involve these actors. ISSAT’s programme reviews and evaluations have shown a similar lack of detailed analysis. While donors have funded and supported programming tackling non-state mechanisms across many countries,<sup>7</sup> it is very rare to find programming theories of change that elaborate on existing non-state measures, including how they work and the expected impact of engaging with them. This suggests a recognition by the donor community that non-state mechanisms are important but a lack of understanding of how they operate.<sup>8</sup>

**Political and reputational risks are a priority over legal risks.** The political risks around possible perceptions of circumventing the state and working with the community and non-state actors are high for donors. Security and justice issues are the exclusive remit of the state in many countries, even if in reality 80% of these services are provided by non-state actors. The international community should better understand the needs of women, men, young people and various identity groups, and who is actually providing services, including state and non-state actors. It is equally important to understand who dominates these actors and structures and to aim to correct the power balance at sub-national level through local security and justice advisory councils, working on expanding the reach of these actors to excluded groups through empowerment and protection strategies.

**Dilution of concepts and dwindling resources.** Security and justice are concepts that are expanding to include social, economic, environmental and health-related factors. In parallel, international resources dedicated to overseas reforms are at risk of declining, leading to a strong push towards aligning official development assistance more closely with national security agendas. In a world of extreme polarisation,

<sup>6</sup> For more information on this, see the guidance note: USAID, 2019. *Non-state Justice System Programming: A Practitioners’ Guide*. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Guide-to-NSJS-Jun-19.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Uganda and others.

<sup>8</sup> Brown, A.N., McCollister, F., Cameron, D.B. and Ludwig, J, 2015, *The Current State of Peacebuilding Programming and Evidence*, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. <https://www.3ieimpact.org/evidence-hub/publications/scoping-papers/current-state-peacebuilding-programming-and-evidence>

SSG/R could disintegrate further under multiple agendas ranging from stabilisation to migration, climate change, etc. People-centred reform of security and justice is a policy agenda that could fix the decades-long disconnect between statebuilding and community-level peacebuilding. The growth in violence is not a failure of the SSG/R model as such but rather due to factors related to a lack of respect for human rights, a negative contribution to social cohesion, the erosion of legitimacy, perceptions of impunity and corruption, and a lack of adaptability to emerging security threats. The people-centred model for programming should reflect a more holistic understanding of local values and practices, ensuring donor programming that is better aligned with people's needs and interests.

**Donor policies lack explicit reference to people-centred approaches.** Empowering people to advocate for their needs and giving them the tools to co-construct their security and justice system is a key feature of people-centred approaches. Yet, this requires paying explicit attention to non-state security actors, their role, potential, and limitations and challenges. Working with non-state security actors is a high-risk area for most donors. Questions around accountability, human rights, the informal nature of decision-making and deep entanglement with cultural and religious dynamics are all factors that fuel donors' apprehension. However, today's statebuilding agenda is at its weakest in terms of success stories. The risk involved in working with non-state actors has become a necessity for programming. Four factors determine whether and how donors interact with non-state security actors: political choices, awareness, policy and legal frameworks, and capacity and field presence. A reasonable starting point is mapping studies that build awareness and explore options for policy drafting.

## Report recommendations

**Investing in a joint local context assessment and sharing the findings among the donor community and with the recipient country.** A key element for adopting a people-centred approach is the ability to **understand the local context's dynamics**. The donor community would have to consider the opportunity to jointly mandate local expertise<sup>9</sup> in order to proceed to (i) situational analysis including historical, economic, security, political and sociological; (ii) local conflict and gender analysis including stakeholder mapping and conflict dynamics, which would be linked to sub-nationally and nationally relevant analysis of conflict dynamics. Local context analysis would have to be done by local experts with the relevant knowledge and networks<sup>10</sup> to ensure a proper understanding of conflict drivers, the local social fabric, stakeholders' powers and relationships, and relationships with sub-national and national conflict dynamics. Local context analysis could be done in the framework of an inception project mandated jointly by various donors, allowing them to develop a common understanding of the situation, to collectively identify priorities, and to design complementary programming based on the value added by

<sup>9</sup> This could be done via a local or regional research institute or *bureau d'études* as an example.

<sup>10</sup> The local expert should know the local languages and the existing network among civil society and community-based organisations, political and customary authorities, and security and justice institutions.

and expertise of each donor. This type of engagement could be an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with the host country's stakeholders, paving the way for a wider assessment of people's local security and justice needs and problems. Such engagements should include a strong geographical element, expand beyond the capital and aim to establish synergies at the sub-national and local levels, enabling data to be collected on which to base programming adapted to local areas' realities. Area-based programming fosters geographical complementarity between donors, instead of the cluster approach which leads to a multitude of avoidable gaps and isolated engagements in many countries.

**Identifying tools to understand the security and justice needs, problems, expectations and priorities of the 'hardest to reach people'.** Most traditional SSG/R programming seems mainly donor-driven and supply-oriented. One of the most important challenges of adopting a people-centred approach in SSG/R is the ability to collect data from 'hard-to-reach people'. People-centred SSG/R should involve an in-depth understanding of the security and justice needs, problems, expectations and priorities of the most marginalised people and avoid elite capture in the expression of needs and grievances. **Administratively available data** capture the institutional offering and processes, as well as people's engagement with security and justice services and institutions. These data offer a narrow perspective of the supply side of security and justice providers and fail to capture the experience of those who deal with security and justice needs outside formal state institutions. Assessment tools need to take into consideration the important role of non-state security and justice providers, which are more widely accepted and more easily available and accessible in various conflict-affected settings and remote areas. A useful tool could be one that uses random sampling, which allows programming to go beyond the elite capture. **Community needs assessment surveys** can reveal who experiences security and justice challenges, when and where they arise, their impact and repercussions, and what might work to address them efficiently and effectively.<sup>11</sup> **Victimisation surveys**<sup>12</sup> offer an additional perspective on security and justice needs and improve the understanding of the security and justice experiences of people, regardless of whether or not they engage with state institutions. **User surveys** are also important to complement administrative and population survey data, as they help document the experiences of people using particular institutions or sources of services.<sup>13</sup> **Expert surveys** are another tool that can help to assess the legal frameworks, policies and other inputs that affect service delivery and that typically are not understood through other sources of data.<sup>14</sup> **Perception surveys** assess people's perceptions of the various security and justice stakeholders (both formal and informal) as they refer to them to address their various needs, their reasons for attributing trust and legitimacy, and the issues they face regarding

11 OECD, 2019. *Equal Access to Justice for Inclusive Growth: Putting People at the Centre*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. <https://www.oecd.org/gov/equal-access-to-justice-for-inclusive-growth-597f5b7f-en.htm>

12 UNODC and UNECE, 2005. *Manual on Victimization Surveys*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Manual-on-victim-surveys.html>

13 Praia Group on Governance Statistics, 2020. *Praia Handbook on Governance Statistics*. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, pp115–16. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/prai-handbook-governance-statistics>

14 *Praia Handbook on Governance Statistics*, p116.



accessibility, effectiveness and accountability. Furthermore, a perception survey could be considered an initial (baseline) assessment tool but also an impact or outcome monitoring tool and therefore should be conducted in an iterative manner.

**Ensuring various levels of political authorities' ownership of people-centred SSG/R through joint advocacy by the donor community for the host country's stakeholders.** SSG/R should never remain limited to the technical aspects but needs to be anchored in the host country's political process. Adopting a people-centred approach could be seen as a threat to state sovereignty, especially within authoritarian regimes or in conflict-affected settings. The donor community should consider joint advocacy for national stakeholders, underlining the added value of a people-centred approach for the security system architecture's effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability and, by extension, for the state institutions' legitimacy. Evidence-based learning, data and insights, which all donors could contribute to and tap into, are instrumental to enabling such an advocacy role. In various contexts, local structures and governance mechanisms are crucial for the organisation of social, political and economic life and are, in effect, the first representative of the state that people experience. Therefore, addressing dysfunctional power relationships and accountability gaps at the local and sub-national levels is key to ensuring sustainable mechanisms for resolving security and justice issues. By building constructive partnerships between people, security and justice providers, and local authorities, SSG/R programming can improve state–community relationships and increase the state's legitimacy through bottom-up approaches.

**Ensuring long-term, context-specific and adaptive programming.** Adopting a people-centred approach to SSG/R underlines the need to strengthen security and justice providers' effectiveness and accountability. A people-centred approach in SSG/R aims to improve the relationship between, and the behaviours of, communities, authorities and state institutions by providing opportunities for actors to identify their security and justice concerns. It underlines the need to focus not only on institutional and technical capacities but also on the cultural and behavioural change that will be needed if reforms are to take root. People-centred SSG/R programming needs to be better based on the lessons learned from previous SSG/R initiatives and must develop robust monitoring and learning systems. It should also consider behavioural changes in articulating the outcomes, focusing on the security and justice providers' accountability and duty to protect and on local actors' long-term deployment of technical expertise instead of short-term training that has limited impact and sustainability. Strengthening justice and security providers' trust and legitimacy requires long-term and sustainable support. A sudden, even temporary, interruption in support can hamper the expansion of previously successful initiatives. Therefore, it is important to consider bridge-funding to strengthen the sustainability of achievements. Furthermore, programming needs to remain flexible, subject to frequent alterations by country-based teams, so that they may adapt to the context and the changes in people's security and justice concerns. Programme replication is very risky without local context analysis. Each region has its specific challenges and social and political dynamics. Replication should be avoided to ensure that programmes are relevant.

**Ensuring conflict and gender sensitivity and human rights-based programming.** People-centred approaches to SSG/R programming must be conflict and gender sensitive. Strengthening security and justice providers' capacity programming needs to ensure a positive impact on conflict drivers and dynamics. Conflict sensitivity must be ensured through an iterative process of conflict analysis

and not be limited to a snapshot of conflict drivers. Taking advantage of conflict analysis capacity-building opportunities is highly recommended for various stakeholders, including embassy personnel, implementing partners' (international and national) staff, and host recipient authorities.

A people-centred approach in SSG/R has to be able to identify and respond to security and justice gender-specific needs, expectations and priorities. Therefore, gender analysis that takes account of local context and assessment of needs and problems through population and user surveys, coupled with monitoring and learning systems that are also conflict and gender sensitive, would ensure that SSG/R programmes respond to women's and men's different experiences of and needs for security and justice and address the gender-disaggregated root causes of violence and insecurity. A people-centred approach to SSG/R should reduce gender inequality within the security system architecture.

A people-centred approach to SSG/R needs to be grounded in the international norms and standards for human rights and contribute to their fulfilment by strengthening security and justice providers' accountability and duty to protect. It should also be based upon relevant national, regional and sub-regional frameworks. Implementing partners need to focus on human rights-based programming and advocating human rights to the recipient state authorities, in order to foster respect for and promotion of human rights by the various security and justice providers for every segment of the population (especially the most marginalised).

**Transforming SSG/R from a reactive to a preventive approach.** Most recently, SSG/R programming has been prioritising engagements with quick and visible results in conflict-affected settings, focusing on effective and less costly short-term actions (including training and equipping) to the detriment of security sector governance, which requires flexibility and long-term engagement. Capability-focused SSG/R, which focuses primarily on institutions' capacities and state security objectives (counter-insurgency), could be counterproductive if the security and justice sector's accountability and legitimacy has not been sufficiently considered. Adopting a people-centred approach in SSG/R offers the ability to move from a reactive approach that deals only with security and justice problems to a preventive approach that addresses underlying causes and prevents their recurrence. It aims to foster people's inclusivity in designing, implementing and monitoring programmes and therefore addresses their exclusion from access to power and security. **A people-centred approach to SSG/R is a major conflict prevention strategy that fosters inclusive and accountable, and therefore legitimate, security and justice institutions.** People-centred SSG/R must not only be implemented in conflict-affected settings but also considered relevant in fragile environments where exclusion from power and security, weak state capacity or legitimacy, and human rights abuses create fertile ground for transforming group grievances into violence.

**Taking a more comprehensive approach to SSG/R beyond the formal sector.** Evidence from the case studies confirms that 'drivers of political violence are not rooted in poverty, but in experiences of injustice,



discrimination, corruption and abuse by security forces.’<sup>15</sup> People-centred SSG/R programming should aim to establish first which service providers are perceived to be legitimate and accountable, looking at national and local levels, state and non-state security providers. Non-state entities are seen as key security and justice providers by community members, because they are considered more accessible and legitimate, being rooted in local cultures, and more reflective of their normative values. People-centred SSG/R adopts a societal demand-driven approach to security and justice provision and, by extension, strengthens the social contract, underlining the need to consider a comprehensive programming framework that links the adequate and equitable protection of civilians with inclusive governance, social cohesion and peacebuilding.

**Conducting programmatic-relevant analysis on security and justice themes.** Adopting a people-centred approach, with its demand-driven perspective, represents an important paradigmatic shift in SSG/R programming. This underlines the need to foster a wider understanding of security and justice delivery in various contexts, alongside its related opportunities, limits and risks and its impact on state institutions’ legitimacy and citizens’ trust. Therefore, ISSAT Governing Board members could invest in further analysis of people-centred SSG/R to inform the development of future policy and guidance. Mapping the people-centred strategies used by programming is an interesting entry point for establishing the body of evidence needed to begin closing the gap in awareness around non-state security actors’ role, including that of community members, in protecting human rights, social accountability, influencing national security and justice agendas, etc. Other relevant topics include the underlying causes of weak rules of law, weak human rights protection, structural injustice, and security and justice providers’ lack of trust and legitimacy, which inform the global policy agenda through advocacy initiatives and support recipient authorities to improve their reform processes.

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<sup>15</sup> See Mercy Corps, 2015. *Youth & Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence*, February, p2. [https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps\\_YouthConsequencesReport\\_2015.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MercyCorps_YouthConsequencesReport_2015.pdf); International Alert, 2018, *If Victims Become Perpetrators*. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, p5. <https://www.international-alert.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Sahel-Violent-Extremism-Vulnerability-Resilience-EN-2018.pdf>

# Background

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The support of the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) was requested by three of its Governing Board members (Dutch, Swedish and Swiss ministries of foreign affairs) to develop the evidence base and build the case for better operational integration of people-centred approaches and security sector governance and reform (SSG/R).

This study analysed the mandating Governing Board members' SSG/R policies, methodologies and guidance and conducted country-level case studies in Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. These were carried out by national experts, selected for their knowledge of the country and its sociopolitical dynamics and their expertise in the area of security and justice.

The study was implemented between October 2021 and February 2022 and led by ISSAT's Outreach and Knowledge Team. It involved mapping donor-funded programmes focusing on issues related to human security and community-focused SSG/R processes, covering the local (village), provincial (sub-regional, governorate) and national levels.

A total of 91 interviews were conducted during the course of this study with SSG/R and rule of law experts and practitioners with particular knowledge of people-centred approaches, representing agencies from the United Nations, Saferworld, Cordaid and others. At the level of the countries selected for the case studies, the interviews focused on embassy teams and implementation agencies with experience in implementing security-related programmes using people-centred strategies at the local, provincial and national levels. Other context-specific interviewees included members of national security committees, officials from national ministries of defence, ministries of justice, federal supreme courts, university researchers, international organisations and think tanks (International Development Law Organization, IDLO), media consultants, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) focusing on women's rights, legal aid centres and traditional authorities. In South Sudan, interviewees were selected from PAX, Saferworld and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In Somalia, interviewees were selected from Saferworld, the Danish Refugee Council and the UNDP. In Burkina Faso, interviewees were selected from the Danish Refugee Council, Search for Common Ground and the UNDP. In Mali, interviewees were selected from the Danish Refugee Council, International Alert and the UNDP. A detailed list of interviewees per country is set out in Annex D of this study report.

# Approach

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The methodology used in this work revolved around four main phases:

**Phase 1:** Desk review of the policy and practice around people-centred approaches to SSG/R

**Phase 2:** Development of four country case studies

**Phase 3:** Development of the theory of change and the programmatic framework

**Phase 4:** Development of practical guidance and methodologies.

## Phase 1: Desk review of the theory around people-centred approaches

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This desk review of policy looked at the theory available on people-centred SSG/R, including that in ISSAT's Governing Board members' policies, covering relevant concepts such as the protection of civilians, community policing, community security, human security, and local security. The review articulated the gap that exists between policy and programming and identified the reasons why programming remains focused on either the community or the state". Some of the key questions informing this phase include:

- What do people-centred approaches to security sector reform mean?<sup>16</sup>
- How are the concepts related to people-centred security featured in ISSAT Governing Members' policies?
- What are the benefits of people-centred versus institution-centred approaches to reform at different levels: people, state, donor, etc? How do they enable better transparency and legitimacy?
- What are the gaps between stated SSG/R policy objectives and SSG/R programming in practice? And why do they persist? Where is programming struggling to meet policy priorities?

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<sup>16</sup> ISSAT will explore the work done in this area by the United Nations, notably UNDP, and Saferworld.

## Phase 2: Development of four country case studies

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This phase complemented the policy and theoretical review by identifying key examples of countries where people-centred approaches were used and their impact through a comparative analysis of those countries' institutions. Through a series of interviews with field practitioners, desk research and analysis of programme documents, four country experts put together a series of field examples looking at the reform process and programmatic engagement. The choice of case study countries were Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan.

The aim was to identify good practices, as well as bad ones, from existing Dutch-funded programmes, as well as broader ISSAT Governing Board members programmes,<sup>17</sup> establishing how people-centred approaches can contribute to better transparency and legitimacy.

## Phase 3: Development of the theory of change and programmatic framework

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Based on the theoretical and conceptual analysis, the researchers articulated a concise theory of change for people-centred approaches to SSG/R, as well as a programmatic framework, informed by a set of criteria and indicators of success that should inform the upcoming generation of SSG/R programming. This programming should be based on broader assessments, enabling a better understanding of the political landscape and actors, and the nature of the social contract and its key stakeholders and what that entails for the concept of legitimacy, beyond the rule of law, as well as a granular understanding of people-centred security and justice needs, key providers and mechanisms.

## Phase 4: Development of practical guidance

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This phase developed practical guidance and a step-by-step methodology to support ISSAT Governing Board members and their programming teams, as well as other SSG/R practitioners, in taking people-centred approaches to SSG/R. The objective was to help practitioners look at SSG/R programming from a different vantage point, starting with people's needs but still including an institutional analysis of how the state should respond to those needs. The guidance focuses on assessments and covers five main steps:

1. Identify entry points at the political level for dialogue on the requirements for people-centred reform;

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<sup>17</sup> Namely, Denmark, UK, UN missions and UNDP.

2. Map the security needs and what do you need to look for;
3. Identify where the community goes for security services and what the state provides;
4. Analyse the gaps between the needs and what is being supplied; and
5. Provide some entry points and examples of interventions in which donors can start engaging with people-centred SSG/R in practice.

## Limitations

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The current study is a starting point for a paradigm shift in donor support for SSG/R that should be more strongly based on people's protection and empowerment, and that should strive towards rebalancing power towards those who have been excluded or left behind. It addresses perceptions of inequality, exclusion and marginalisation through a context-anchored, culturally sensitive prevention outlook. As one of the key experts on SSG/R and African statebuilding and peacebuilding put it in their interview, 'This generation of SSG/R will be stamped by *a revolution of the context*.' Nevertheless, various issues need to be unpacked after this study, such as identifying the most effective programmatic approach to strengthening security and justice accountability to the people (social accountability), as well as the opportunities, limits and risks of engaging with security non-state actors. The question of the impact of people-centred programming needs deeper analysis by donors, with ISSAT's support. Articulating the change that is needed in a given country has been the easier end of the equation. Who can create this change, the bottlenecks in the change and the most powerful instigators of change remain insufficiently investigated. In theory, community members are expected to benefit from security sector reform; however, in many cases, they are usually not able to instigate systemic change – on the scale of a nation – and sustain it. Those who could instigate systemic change and reform are typically side-lined by a system that taps into a set of values and political practices that aim to reproduce and safeguard its sources of power. A political economy analysis methodology, which looks at instigators of change outside the traditional set-ups and circles of power, could help inform how donors support SSG/R, including their funding mechanisms, their partnerships and the political elites they support. A final limitation of this study is its selection of case study countries, which primarily focuses on conflict-affected settings. People-centred approaches should bring SSG/R back into the conflict prevention context. It is therefore important that the recommendations of this study are not limited to conflict-affected settings but are also applied to fragile and stable environments.

# Policy frameworks for people-centred security sector governance and reform

This section gives an overview of donor policy frameworks relevant to peace and security, with a specific focus on people's needs and priorities. The national policy frameworks of the countries examined through the case studies are also analysed, allowing a greater understanding of how national partners perceive people-centred approaches.

## Donors' policy frameworks

**The Netherlands** has strengthened its explicit use of people-centred approaches in its recent strategies (post 2018). The term most commonly used in Dutch strategies is 'human security', referring to their 'focus on the safety [and] security problems as experienced by the local population and less directly on security institutions'.<sup>18</sup> The policy frameworks also recognise that a people-centred approach must be all-encompassing, in terms of both the targets<sup>19</sup> and the stakeholders<sup>20</sup> but also with regard to pre-programming considerations.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the introduction of the term 'legitimate stability'<sup>22</sup> frames

<sup>18</sup> DCAF, 2018. 'Netherlands, Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Strategy – Summary'. Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Media/GB-Space-Highlights/Netherlands-Highlights/Netherlands-Security-Sector-Governance-and-Reform-SSG-R-Strategy-Summary>

<sup>19</sup> The targets recognised as benefiting from a people-centred approach are the most marginalised groups within a society, which include – but are not limited to – women, children and people with disabilities. See Government of the Netherlands, 2018. *Investing in Global Prospects*. <https://www.government.nl/documents/policy-notes/2018/05/18/investing-in-global-prospects>; Government of the Netherlands, n.d. *Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018–2022*. <https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/nl-international-integrated-security-strategy-2018-2022.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> The stakeholders referred to include – but are not limited to – civil society; national, regional and local authorities; informal, hybrid and state security organisations; multilateral partners; and external experts. See *Investing in Global Prospects*; *Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018–2022*; *the Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Strategy – Summary*; Government of the Netherlands, 2018. *2018 Theory of Change* (translated from the Dutch). <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2018/11/08/theory-of-change-ontwikkelingssamenwerking>

<sup>21</sup> For example, this includes recognising the fact that human security is multidimensional and must therefore be considered from a multidisciplinary perspective: international relations, anthropology, geography, psychology, law and socioeconomic circumstances. See *Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018–2022*.

<sup>22</sup> Legitimate stability is defined as a situation in which the 'citizens feel represented and secure on the basis of inclusive political processes, trust between the state and the population (social contract), and the existence of a horizontal cohesion between groups' (see *2018 Theory of Change*, translated from the Dutch).

many of the conceptual foundations of a people-centred approach in relation to the social contract and its repercussions on security and justice systems. The Dutch policy documents also tackle the importance of **empowering** individuals at the local level, as well as involving civil society because of its ‘expertise, innovation, and capacity to reach the most marginalised groups’, thereby directly affecting the ‘quality and effectiveness of [a] policy’.<sup>23</sup> Dutch strategies highlight the importance of power distribution at the sub-national level and the need to dismantle power asymmetries between the local level and the national level, and therefore they emphasise the need for a sub-national level that bridges this gap between civil society and the government through **dialogue** to ensure inclusive and efficient policies<sup>24</sup> in order to restore trust and reinforce the social contract.<sup>25</sup>

The Netherlands’ policy frameworks also highlight important considerations at the supra-national or international level, where they maintain a strong focus on their role in influencing policy at the European Union and United Nations levels with the intent to include community security as a driving perspective. They argue that the human security focus – which involves working with formal institutions and informal security providers in intervention countries – should be strengthened through synergies between the international community and local, national, bilateral and regional initiatives.

Overall, the Netherlands’ policy frameworks recognise the overarching objective of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 16<sup>26</sup> – pertaining to peace, justice and strong institutions – and the intrinsic link between adopting a people-centred approach in SSG/R programming and the attainment of these global goals.

**Sweden’s** various policy frameworks – specifically the Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid<sup>27</sup> – are also well anchored in the SDGs, focusing primarily on poverty,<sup>28</sup> healthcare,<sup>29</sup> education<sup>30</sup> and climate<sup>31</sup>, all of which are relevant to people’s safety and well-being. Sweden also has, or formerly had, specific development cooperation strategies for all the case study countries presented in this report: Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. While these development

<sup>23</sup> See *Investing in Global Prospects*.

<sup>24</sup> See *Investing in Global Prospects; Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Strategy – Summary; 2018 Theory of Change* (translated from the Dutch).

<sup>25</sup> See *Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Strategy – Summary*.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Sustainable Development Goal 16’. <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/sdg-16>

<sup>27</sup> Regeringens skrivelse, 2016. Policyramverk för svenskt utvecklingssamarbete Skr. och humanitärt bistånd. policyramverk-for-svenskt-utvecklingssamarbete-och-humanitart-bistand.pdf (regeringen.se)

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Sustainable Development Goal 1’. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/>

<sup>29</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Sustainable Development Goal 3’. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/health/>

<sup>30</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Sustainable Development Goal 4’. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/>

<sup>31</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Sustainable Development Goal 13’. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/>



strategies cover a wide range of collaborative areas, the important aspect is that Sweden recognises the intrinsic synergy between development and security.<sup>32</sup>

Although, Sweden does not put forward a clear definition of a people-centred approach across its various policy frameworks, it does recognise its importance. Its strategies are aligned with putting people's security and justice needs at the forefront of SSG/R programming,<sup>33</sup> and its involvement across all the target countries tackles different elements that ultimately constitute a people-centred approach. Sweden places a very strong emphasis on women and young people, not only as categories of people requiring greater attention when adopting a people-centred approach but also are key actors for a successful implementation of this approach in SSG/R programming.<sup>34</sup>

Sweden, like the Netherlands, emphasises the **empowerment** of people at the local level, including recognising the importance of involving women and young people in dialogue and peace processes, thereby increasing their level of participation and influence.<sup>35</sup> This aspect is an important element for people's empowerment, giving visibility to individuals and groups who are discriminated against, excluded and marginalised, thereby highlighting how crucial local ownership is.<sup>36</sup> Sweden strongly advocates the strengthening of civil society's capacity to participate in political processes and promote accountability, as well as openness and a greater respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.<sup>37</sup> At the sub-national level, Swedish strategies call for fostering strategic **dialogue** to ensure complementarity between policies and people's needs, which is one of the primary challenges that taking a people-centred approach would help tackle in a substantial manner. One Swedish policy framework in particular states that 'The chances of success are greatest when change agents at the national and local level are included and strengthened',<sup>38</sup> and the **transformation** angle by establishing a dialogue between the national and local levels, aims to bridge the existing gap and stimulate the harmonious involvement of the most relevant

<sup>32</sup> Government Offices of Sweden, 2016. *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali 2016–2020*. <https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2016/07/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-mali-2016-2020/>; Government Offices of Sweden, 2018. *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Somalia 2018–2022*. <https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2018/10/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-somalia-20182022/>; *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022*. <https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2018/07/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-south-sudan-20182022/>; *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Burkina Faso 2018–2022*. <https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2018/09/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-burkina-faso-20182022>

<sup>33</sup> 'All people, regardless of gender, age, disability, ethnicity, religion or other belief, sexual orientation, or transgender identity or expression', See *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022*; Government Offices of Sweden, 2017. *Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022*. <https://www.government.se/490051/globalassets/government/block/fakta-och-genvagsblock/utrikesdepartementet/sanktioner/strategi-hallbar-fred-eng-slutlig.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> Strategies for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Burkina Faso.

<sup>35</sup> *Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022* (Sweden).

<sup>36</sup> *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022*.

<sup>37</sup> Strategies for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Burkina Faso.

<sup>38</sup> *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022*, p8.

actors in tackling the challenges, needs and circumstances of people and societies.<sup>39</sup> At the national level, Sweden addresses the need for more inclusive peace processes and greater community building and accountability<sup>40</sup>. The focus within its policy framework is to work on strengthening the capacity of national security and justice institutions,<sup>41</sup> so that they can become better equipped to provide basic public services, are more transparent, and promote security and human rights.<sup>42</sup> Sweden's strategy emphasises that this is particularly pertinent in contexts like those in the target countries, where access to justice services remains a prominent issue.<sup>43</sup> Working on further developing national institutions would also directly affect, in a positive manner, the social contract and thus strengthen it.<sup>44</sup> At the supra-national level, Sweden supports stabilisation-focused strategies that are aimed at dealing with the population's resilience against conflict, crises and disasters, which may not be explicitly tackling the people's most urgent security and justice needs<sup>45</sup> – but the people-centred approach is definitively acknowledged at the other intervention levels, which should remain the focal point for successful implementation.

**Switzerland's** policy frameworks have a strong focus on stabilisation.<sup>46</sup> References to peace and security, in Swiss policy frameworks, are mainly in terms of civilian and military peacebuilding; references to terrorism and violent extremism and to humanitarian aid are mainly in the context of migration and disaster preparedness.<sup>47</sup>

39 *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Burkina Faso 2018–2022*.

40 *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022*.

41 Government of Sweden, 2016. *Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid*. [https://www.government.se/49a184/contentassets/43972c7f81c34d51a82e6a7502860895/skr-60-engelsk-version\\_web.pdf](https://www.government.se/49a184/contentassets/43972c7f81c34d51a82e6a7502860895/skr-60-engelsk-version_web.pdf)

42 Strategies for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Burkina Faso.

43 Strategies for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Burkina Faso.

44 *Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid* (Sweden).

45 *Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022* (Sweden).

46 These include prosperity (business and financial sector); sustainability (climate, water and disaster reduction); digitalisation; and multilateralism. See Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020, 'Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–23'. <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/implementing-foreign-policy/aussenpolitischestrategie.html>

47 'Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–23' (Switzerland). See also Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020. 'Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy 2021–24'. [https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/publikationen.html/content/publikationen/en/eda/schweizer-aussenpolitik/Subsahara\\_Afrika\\_Strategie\\_2021-2024](https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/publikationen.html/content/publikationen/en/eda/schweizer-aussenpolitik/Subsahara_Afrika_Strategie_2021-2024)

Most of Switzerland's policy frameworks mention concepts that are strongly associated with a people-centred approach, such as human security,<sup>48</sup> people's security<sup>49</sup> and a human rights-based approach.<sup>50</sup> For example, Switzerland recognises the importance of people-centred development; of the need to foster the collaborative building of inclusive structures at the community, intermediate and national levels; of the importance of trust within civil society; of the crucial need to actively involve the most marginalised and excluded societal groups in political decision-making at all levels; and of the need to stop investing as much in training and equipping security forces.<sup>51</sup> All these elements represent an understanding of how a people-centred approach could be adopted in SSG/R programming. In fact, Switzerland has already developed substantial people-centred strategies for specific country contexts and geographical regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. These include improving governance and strengthening the rule of law, social inclusion, anti-corruption measures and cooperation with local communities.<sup>52</sup>

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**48** 'A concept that focuses on people's needs to live without fear. It complements the traditional understanding of state security – the protection of territorial integrity – with citizens' need for safety and security. The promotion of human security includes mediation, the provision of good offices, conflict transformation, as well as human rights promotion.' See Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2015. *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Strategy for SDC's Work in Fragile and Conflict Contexts*. <https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Conflict-and-Human-Rights/library/PublishingImages/Peacebuilding%20and%20Statebuilding%20Strategy.pdf>

**49** 'With this term SDC [Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation] is focusing on the individual security of people, in accordance with Article 3 of the Universal declaration of the Human Rights "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person". The notion refers to freedom from fear as one part of the concept of Human Security (freedom from want and freedom from fear) which includes Personal Security, Community Security and Political Security' (*Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Strategy for SDC's Work in Fragile and Conflict Contexts*).

**50** 'A human rights-based approach to development empowers citizens and develops government capacities to protect, respect and fulfil human rights' (*Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Strategy for SDC's Work in Fragile and Conflict Contexts*).

**51** *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Strategy for SDC's Work in Fragile and Conflict Contexts*.

**52** Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2021. 'Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24'. <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/fdfa/publikationen.html/content/publikationen/en/deza/diverse-publikationen/broschuere-iza-2021-24>

## INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS

### United Nations (UN)

|                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sustainable Development Goal 5: Gender Equality                                                                                                 | Report of the Secretary-General on 'Human security' (2010)                                                                                                  | UN Community Engagement                                                                                       |
| Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions                                                                           | Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace & Security                                                                                                                  | UN-CMCoord Field Handbook                                                                                     |
| Report of the Secretary-General on 'Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform' (2008) | Report of the Secretary-General on 'Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform' (2013) | Resolution 1325 (and subsequent ones) on Women, Peace & Security<br>Resolution 2151 on Security Sector Reform |
| Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace                                                                                                | UNDP Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach                                                                                        | UNDP Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications                           |

### Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

|                                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance   |
| Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?                                |
| ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace & Security Activities                        |
| OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice |

### European Union (EU)

|                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008)                                                                                                                        |
| Council conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (2016)                                                                              |
| EEAS/Commission services issues paper suggesting parameters for a concept on Stabilisation as part of the EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises (2017) |
| Council conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises (2018)                                                                                   |

### Regional Frameworks

|                                                                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform          |
| ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance |

### Netherlands

|                                                                                                                |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Investing in Global Prospects (2018)                                                                           |
| Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022 |

### Sweden

|                                                                                  |                                                                           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (2016) | Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with South Sudan 2018–2022  |
| Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Mali 2016–2020                | Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Burkina Faso 2018–2022 |
| Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Somalia 2018–2022             | Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022                                  |

### Switzerland

|                                                                                          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–2023                                                        |
| International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24                                               |
| Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Strategy for SDC's work in fragile and conflict contexts |

### Intervention Country Frameworks

|                                                          |                                      |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Constitutional/Legislative Framework on the Use of Force | Peace Agreements                     |
| Laws/National strategies on SSG/R                        | Regional Plans on Security & Justice |

### Implementing Agencies

|                                          |
|------------------------------------------|
| PAX - Human Security Survey              |
| Saferworld - Community Security Handbook |

## National policy frameworks

Through its national policy frameworks, **Somalia** articulates a clear and comprehensive definition of people-centred approaches and their relevance to SSG/R programming.

The **Federal Provisional Constitution**<sup>53</sup> (2012) is one of the key texts that enshrines a people-centred approach, starting from the initial articles that dictate the rights of Somalia's population. The focus of these articles is the implementation of non-discriminatory state programmes and the inclusion of disadvantaged individuals or groups,<sup>54</sup> with a definition of what is considered discrimination in the local context.<sup>55</sup> Special attention is paid to women and children – who are often marginalised – and their needs within the Somali context, such as protection against violence<sup>56</sup> and access to justice<sup>57</sup>. The Constitution also introduces the concept of **human security** and sets out the commissions and committees dedicated to its provision,<sup>58</sup> which have, within their mandates, the provision of oversight<sup>59</sup> and accountability<sup>60</sup> and ensuring the active involvement of civil society representatives.<sup>61</sup>

The **National Stabilisation Strategy** (2018–2020) reiterates many of the key concepts of the Constitution, but also introduces concrete people-centred engagement strategies for the active participation of the local population – many of which align with the propositions of this study. For example, it highlights the importance of **dialogue** and providing the people with the ability to convey their security

<sup>53</sup> Hereafter referred to as the Constitution.

<sup>54</sup> Federal Provisional Constitution, Article 11(4), Equality: 'All State programs, such as laws, or political and administrative actions that are designed to achieve full equality for individuals or groups who are disadvantaged, or who have suffered from discrimination in the past, shall be deemed to be not discriminatory.'

<sup>55</sup> Article 11(3), Equality: 'The State must not discriminate against any person on the basis of age, race, colour, tribe, ethnicity, culture, dialect, gender, birth, disability, religion, political opinion, occupation, or wealth.'

<sup>56</sup> Article 15(2), Liberty and Security of the Person: 'Every person has the right to personal security, and this includes: the prohibition of illegal detention, all forms of violence, including any form of violence against women, torture, or inhumane treatment.' Article 29(6), Children: 'Every child has the right to be protected from armed conflict, and not to be used in armed conflict.'

<sup>57</sup> Article 29(5), Children: 'Every child shall have the right to legal aid paid for by the State if the child might otherwise suffer injustice.'

<sup>58</sup> Article 111H(4)(a), National Security Commission: 'Present proposals to ensure that human security is prioritized and incorporated into the national security framework.'

<sup>59</sup> Article 111H(4)(b), National Security Commission: 'Develop a framework through which the public may provide oversight.'

<sup>60</sup> Article 46(1), The Power of the People: 'The power of self-governance begins and ends with the people, who have the power, where necessary, to hold public institutions and public servants accountable.'

<sup>61</sup> Article 111H(4), National Security Commission: 'The National Security Commission shall establish a Civilian Oversight Sub-Committee comprising security experts, members of the Federal Parliament, academics and civil society representatives from all sectors of Somali society.'

and justice grievances<sup>62</sup> and advocating for their needs vis-à-vis governance structures.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, it focuses on social cohesion<sup>64</sup> and on the need for security and justice efforts to be civilian-led,<sup>65</sup> with the intention that civilians will subsequently undertake joint planning with security and justice actors,<sup>66</sup> focusing on their most pressing needs.

While the National Stabilisation Strategy appeared to represent significant positive progress in the adoption of a people-centred approach to security and justice in Somalia, the **National Development Plan (2020–2024)** failed to propel this agenda further. The document echoes the importance of **human security** – defining it as freedom from fear<sup>67</sup> – and of local ownership<sup>68</sup> with the active participation of civil society in oversight<sup>69</sup> and accountability<sup>70</sup>. However, many of the reflections in this policy framework are geared towards stabilisation and national security threats that present themselves, for example, in the form of cybercrimes and maritime insecurity.<sup>71</sup> Although these aspects can directly affect the local population, the most pressing concerns appear to lie elsewhere: Al-Shabaab, unemployment and inter-clan animosity<sup>72</sup>.

The policy framework from **Burkina Faso**, in contrast to that of Somalia, lacks the theoretical framework but demonstrates an understanding of people centred approaches to SSG/R in more operational strategies, and/or decrees, around practices related to community policing and local security committees.

The **National Security Policy** recognises that security should no longer be the monopoly of the state, emphasising the role of the local population in designing and implementing public policies pertaining to security.<sup>73</sup> The policy states that a more holistic, multidisciplinary, participatory and inclusive process is key to guaranteeing the legitimacy and success of SSG/R in Burkina Faso. However, the extent to which the National Security Policy tackles how such a process could be implemented is limited.

Offering further reflections on what constitutes a people-centred approach, is the **Internal Security**

62 Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation & Federal Member States of Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Puntland and Benadir Regional Administration. *Stabilisation Strategy 2018-2020*. p4. <https://moifar.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/National-Stabilisation-Strategy-v-2.0.pdf>

63 Stabilisation Strategy, p4.

64 Stabilisation Strategy, p6.

65 Stabilisation Strategy, p6.

66 Stabilisation Strategy, p10.

67 As highlighted in the Dutch and Swiss policy frameworks.

68 Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 2019. *Somalia National Development Plan 2020–2024: The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia*, p150. <https://andp.unescwa.org/plans/1245>

69 National Development Plan 2020–2024, p151.

70 National Development Plan 2020–2024, p160.

71 National Development Plan 2020–2024, p149.

72 AMISOM/UNSOM, 2017. *Citizens' Perception Survey of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia: End-Line Survey Report*. Mogadishu: African Union Mission in Somalia.

73 Simporé, A. B., 2020. *Developing a National Security Strategy, Burkina Faso Case Study (Draft)*.



**Strategy.** This framework deals primarily with the general strategic axes of human rights, gender and sustainable development, but it also introduces the concept of **human security**, defined as respect for an individual's well-being and the need to implement policies that cater for the local community.

While these frameworks are not as detailed as they could be on a people-centred approach, the decrees implemented in Burkina Faso represent a more proactive take on the matter. The **Internal Security Act** (2003) was the first legal basis for community policing in Burkina Faso, which is closely linked to the active engagement and participation of the population, whereby people are invited to identify their security and justice needs, search for solutions in collaboration with security forces, and determine how these solutions could be implemented in a satisfactory manner.<sup>74</sup>

The Internal Security Act was complemented by the **Community Police Decree** (2016), which recognises by law the associations and self-defence groups working in the realm of security. This was done to increase the involvement of the population because decision-makers had recognised that security gaps persist in Burkina Faso but that community policing is a viable alternative for filling these gaps and improving the security of the local population.<sup>75</sup>

Another way in which the population has been actively involved is through the **Local Security Committees Decree** (2005), in which these committees are tasked with bridging the gap between security services and the local population,<sup>76</sup> thereby reinforcing the importance of **dialogue**. This advisory body provides a platform through which the people can exert local ownership, by expressing their security needs and holding authorities accountable when their interventions do not directly satisfy citizens' primary concerns.

**Mali's** approach to SSG/R in its policy frameworks and operational strategies remains very state-centric. In practice, however, Mali has shown thus far that it is open to integrating a stronger people-centred approach.

An important policy framework is the **Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions** (2017), which is structured around four pillars: security, governance, socioeconomic development and communication. Although the plan aims to tackle different areas, the focus remains strongly on strengthening the security system in specific regions, in particular against terrorism, and this approach continues to prioritise the state.

However, though mainly in theory, the active involvement of the population constitutes an important part of security management in the country. The state, alongside civil society actors, has undertaken initiatives<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Article 8, Law No. 2003/AN of 14 May 2003 relating to internal security. *Official Journal* No. 31 of 31 July 2003.

<sup>75</sup> Article 3, Decree No. 2016-1052/PRES/PM/MATDSI/MJDHPC/MINEFID/MEEVCC, defining the modalities for the participation of populations in the implementation of community policing. *Official Journal* No. 51 of 22 December 2016.

<sup>76</sup> Article 2, Decree No. 2005-245/PRES/PM/SECU/DEF/MATD/MJ/MFB/MPDH of 12 May 2005 on the creation, composition, powers and operation of local security committees. *Official Journal* No. 10 of 10 March 2005.

<sup>77</sup> For example, a civil society forum on security was organised in 2009.



aimed at improving the institutional, legislative and operational framework in the realm of defence and security. Perhaps the difficulty in successfully implementing a people-centred approach derives from the specificity of the Malian context, in which there is a plethora of armed actors (violent extremist groups, militias, vigilante groups), which have become security and justice providers, and therefore coordinating these actors to provide for the needs to the local population may be more challenging.

Nonetheless, the aim is to make the SSG/R process in Mali more inclusive, and plan is to develop training for local leaders on mediation and negotiation for more marginalised groups, such as women and young people. The developments in Mali ought to be studied further to properly assess how a genuinely successful people-centred approach could be implemented in the country and how SSG/R could be rethought in that specific context so that it becomes less state-centric.

**South Sudan's** strategic frameworks remain very state-centric. The country is still struggling to reconcile the legacies of the old regime with the need for a stronger focus on people and their empowerment and protection.<sup>78</sup>

Nonetheless, there are some policy frameworks that indicate that a people-centred approach could be achieved in the long term. One of these is the **Comprehensive Peace Agreement** (2005), which started to incorporate the foundation of a people-centred approach to security. This accord defined the role of the national-level security and justice institutions as **protecting** their citizens, by enshrining the need for the National Security Service to be representative of its population<sup>79</sup> and by ensuring that this inclusivity extends to meeting the safety and security needs of all the people under its purview.<sup>80</sup>

The issue of reintegrating ex-combatants in South Sudan takes the front of the SSG/R stage. Hence the DDR<sup>81</sup> programme has been particularly important. One of the main objectives of the DDR process has been to create an environment that encourages the adoption of a human security approach, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement delineates some guiding principles that could be considered people-centred, such as the provision of assistance to ex-combatants that is fair, transparent, equitable and meets their needs; the inclusion of a gender-sensitive lens; and the increased participation of communities and civil society organisations involved in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

The **South Sudan Development Plan** (2011–2013) reiterated some of the notions expressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement more explicitly, focusing on the need to integrate a people-centred approach to attain sustainable peace and security in the long-term by highlighting the population's

<sup>78</sup> Kuol, L.B.D., 2020. *Reforming the Security Sector in Sudan: The Need for a Framework*. Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

<sup>79</sup> The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of The Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 2005, para. 2.7.2.2 (p26). <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1369>

<sup>80</sup> The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, para. 22.1.2 (p116).

<sup>81</sup> Demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration and reconciliation.

insecurity.<sup>82</sup> Among the most positive developments of the plan were the 2009/2010 consultations that asked men, women and young people to come up with solutions for meeting their security and justice needs,<sup>83</sup> thereby emphasising the importance of having citizens at the heart of the decision-making process in these realms.<sup>84</sup>

Despite some initiatives focusing on people's security, such as community policing, South Sudan is still at an early stage in the statebuilding process, inhibiting its focus on the community as a stakeholder in the process of reform. The community is highly politicised and divided among various factions and allegiances. Therefore, fighting elite capture is a key challenge in this country.



Credit: UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran.

82 Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011. *South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013: Realising Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for All*, pxiii. [http://mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS\\_SSDP.pdf](http://mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS_SSDP.pdf)

83 South Sudan Development Plan, p108.

84 South Sudan Development Plan, p106.

# What insecurities are we talking about?

Tackling state security and national defence issues has become almost straightforward. Some argue that the security of the state is synonymous with the security of its community members. The question that most practitioners ask is whether the insecurities that SSG/R programming tends to address would fundamentally change if data were collected through community surveys unconnected with the state's national defence and security priorities.

Communities' security and justice needs, as assessed through community-based means, can be grouped into four categories. **Security needs caused by other community members** include cases of robbery in certain areas, assaults on women during field work, extortion by merchants at the market and attacks on minority groups by other community members. **Communal conflicts** include disputes over property and land, clashes over natural resources and disagreements over religious practices. **Abuse inflicted by security actors** includes ill treatment in police custody, illegal searches at roadblocks set up by armed groups and illegal detention by customary justice actors. **Inadequate services from security providers** include discrimination by the police, undue delays in court proceedings, prison overcrowding and taking bribes for the services provided.

An approach to reform that starts with an institutional needs assessment and focuses only on institutional service providers is likely to fail to identify many of these needs, resulting in a reform process that is dislocated from the population's realities and needs.

In fact, **physical insecurity and armed conflict** is still one of the primary concerns for people in the countries studied in this report. In Burkina Faso, recent surveys by Afrobarometer and the Centre for Democratic Governance show that Burkinabés' feelings of insecurity are increasing.<sup>85</sup> Similarly Mali has been experiencing a wave of violence and armed conflict since January 2012, when it was triggered by an armed rebellion in the north of the country and the occupation of the Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu regions by various armed groups. Similar cycles of insecurity, violent extremism and armed struggle over power affect Somalia. South Sudan's insecurity landscape is dominated by intra and inter-tribal conflict, some of the most serious armed struggles over power-sharing. Deeply entrenched triggers of violent conflict affect not only a country's stability but also the bodies, minds, lives and livelihoods of its people.

As the report *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* states, sometimes an aggrieved group perceives the state as acting in self-interest and failing to protect the group's interests, aggravating them or, worse still, creating them. As a result, the group mobilises against the

<sup>85</sup> Afrobarometer and Centre for Democratic Governance, 26 June 2020. 'The feeling of insecurity of Burkinabè is increasing'.

state, questioning the social contract. Two thirds of armed conflicts in Africa are caused by non-state armed groups; almost one third of those have occurred in Somalia.<sup>86</sup> Today's type of protracted conflict, which involves identity-related tensions and intergroup tensions, in which the state could be perceived as a stakeholder, has made people (civilians) one of its primary targets. Internally displaced people and children are most vulnerable to this type of insecurity.

### **Burkina Faso**

According to an Afrobarometer and Centre for Democratic Governance Bulletin dated 26 June 2020: 'Large and growing proportions of Burkinabé do not feel safe in their neighbourhoods and fear a criminal attack in their own homes.' This situation is linked to the fragile and volatile security context, marked by an upsurge in terrorist attacks, in particular in the eastern, centre–south, Sahel and northern regions. Burkinabés consider that since 2020 insecurity is the most crucial problem that the government must address as a priority:

- » 6 out of 10 Burkinabés say that they do not feel safe in their own neighbourhoods in the last 12 months
- » 55% of respondents say that they or a family member have feared being the victim of crime in their own home at least once in the past 12 months.

### **Mali**

A perception survey, conducted by International Alert in central Mali in 2016, shows the great contrast in the perception of security in the Ségou region between urban and rural dwellers. Ninety per cent of the people surveyed in the city of Ségou feel that their security is assured and 80% have a feeling of confidence in the security forces, including 75% of women and young people. In Niono and Macina, on the other hand, more than 80% consider themselves insecure. They attribute their perceptions of insecurity to the insufficient presence, numbers and resources of the security forces. As one respondent, living in the peripheral localities of the region, put it: 'We live in [a state of] psychosis and this has caused distrust between the population and the police, between the population and foreigners, and within the population itself.'

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<sup>86</sup> United Nations and World Bank, 2018. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. Washington, DC: World Bank, p55.



The role of the state in inter-community tensions, struggles for power or armed uprisings has been very contested across Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. In Mali, frustrations around the weakness of the state are mixed with social, political and religious considerations. Some people believe that the presence of the state is at the root of conflict and insecurity, while others perceive the actions of security forces, such as those of officers at checkpoints, as abuses. While some complain about the absence of the state or its weakness, others no longer want the state present in their locality. Where most Malians agree is around the weak resourcing of the Malian Security Forces. As one interviewee explained: 'People need to be confident that the security forces are alert and capable of responding. I usually pass checkpoints where one of the officers is sleeping and the others are not even armed.' Somalia is another case in point where the fighting between state forces, the Somali National Army units and non-state armed actors raises serious questions about people's security and their ability to live in dignity.

The second most widespread insecurity is the phenomenon of **internally displaced people**, and the abuse that they undergo without adequate protection measures is a challenge that is reflected strongly in Somalia and South Sudan. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that at least 520,000 people were forced to flee from their homes between January and October 2021 in Somalia.<sup>87</sup> These displaced people struggle mostly with access to land and security, and they tend to face recurrent evictions, even when residing on public land. According to Refugee International, in 2019, about 108,000 internally displaced people in Mogadishu were evicted from their land and shelters. The majority of the victims of these evictions are women and children. Displaced people also face exploitation and abuse by camp 'gatekeepers', extremely overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, poor shelters, limited access to basic services, increased risk of gender-based violence, frequent unlawful evictions and significant tension with the host community.

**Violence against women** and their systemic exclusion from decision-making mechanisms around their own safety and security is a worrying cross-cutting trend across the four countries. An Oxfam briefing note, published in May 2020, indicates that women in some areas of Burkina Faso live with a permanent sense of insecurity and are at a high risk of aggression.<sup>88</sup> Sexual and gender-based violence was referred to as one of the worst insecurities faced by women and children in Somalia. A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) advocacy brief noted that 2020 had been witness to an increase in gender-based violence against women and girls due to the restrictions imposed by the government during the COVID-19 pandemic – in addition to the persistent communal conflicts, armed conflicts and natural disasters, including droughts and floods. Isolation, loss of livelihood due to the closure of their businesses, disruptions in school calendars, and limitations on movement are associated with an increase in sexual violence, intimate partner violence and female genital mutilation among children, adolescent girls and

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<sup>87</sup> UN OCHA, 2021. Somalia Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2021. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-humanitarian-bulletin-november-2021>

<sup>88</sup> OXFAM, 2020. *Survivors and Heroines: Women in the Crisis in Burkina Faso*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/survivors-and-heroines-women-crisis-burkina-faso>

women.<sup>89</sup> Across the four case study countries, women suffer abuses by security providers (formal and informal) and violence from armed terrorist groups, have less access to resources and are at higher risk of abuse by a system that has not fully factored their needs into the construction of the security offer. These factors stem from stereotypes and a certain historical and cultural heritage.

**Community-level insecurities, including common criminality**, are the third most prevalent type of people-centred insecurities across the four countries studied. The results of human security surveys have shown that the main sources of insecurity in these countries are mostly community-based in nature. These include theft, assault, robbery, and land-, water- and cattle-related disputes, which might have some inter-community or inter-tribal dimensions. As an example, in South Sudan, the Murle, Nuer and Dinka sustain a culture of paying 50–1,000 cows as dowry for the marriage of a girl. This practice encourages young men to raid cattle so that they can get married. This practice also brings praise to those who have raided cattle, generating a feeling of pride among the young men.


**Unemployment, lack of access to education and healthcare, and food insecurity** is the fourth most important cluster of people insecurities reflected by the case studies. Young people constitute the largest demographic numerically in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite their numbers, they are a social category somewhat excluded from the political and economic system. Unequal access to services and the lack of strong socioeconomic inclusion policies are factors that crystallise a sense of frustration and rejection of the state among young people. These frustrations are key factors in their involvement in violence.<sup>90</sup> In Burkina Faso, since the Security Forum,<sup>91</sup> the National Youth Council has been involved in all security policy reform processes. For example, it was represented in the commission responsible for drawing up the National Security Policy in 2020. The council, which brings together youth associations, remains largely dominated by young men to the detriment of young women. As for women's organisations that are also consulted in the reforms, they are generally dominated by adult women to the detriment of young women. As a result, young women experience double discrimination.

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<sup>89</sup> UNFPA, 2021. *Overview of Gender-based Violence in Somalia*. United Nations Population Fund. <https://somalia.unfpa.org/en/resources/overview-gender-based-violence-somalia-advocacy-brief-2021>

<sup>90</sup> Arnaud, C., Ray, O., Tehio, V. and Grunewald, F., 2016. *Sahelian Youth: Dynamics of Exclusion, Means of Integration*. Agence Française de Développement. <https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/sahelian-youth-dynamics-exclusion-means-integration>

<sup>91</sup> UNFPA, 2021. *Overview of Gender-based Violence in Somalia*. United Nations Population Fund. <https://somalia.unfpa.org/en/resources/overview-gender-based-violence-somalia-advocacy-brief-2021>



State security actors are designed and have been trained and resourced to provide static security (eg guard posts or checkpoints) or to strengthen armed response elements (eg police intervention units), and are commonly ineffective in addressing the abovementioned issues. The nature of the threats and insecurities identified by this study would suggest that a more proactive and community-oriented approach to service delivery, as well as socioeconomic solutions to tackle emerging threats, is a better fit for the needs of the people (eg employment opportunities, social dialogue). This should include a greater exploration of security actors' role in routine community engagement and presence, which would enable them to become more effective in addressing community-based issues such as land disputes, domestic violence and theft, which appear to be the security issues that communities are most concerned with.



# Where do people go to get access to security?

The four case study countries have common features in terms of where people go to access security services. Community consensus is the cornerstone of decision-making processes in the informal sector. A set of guiding values informs the choice of the people who perform the role of a judge or a security provider. Those values provide the necessary legitimacy, credibility and enforceability of the decisions. Whether people access the formal or the informal sector is a question of individual, family or clan-based choice, preference and convenience. The fluidity between the formal and informal systems is accepted as the status quo by the people, the state and informal actors. All four countries are undergoing severe political and social unrest leading to the people questioning the social contract and whether the state and its institutions are legitimate in terms of providing security and justice services. Across all four countries, the state lacks monopoly over the use of power and the provision of security and justice services. An underlying system of patronage, corruption and nepotism informs where people seek security, relying on factors such as the extent to which they believe they can have an impact on the system, or the system understands their needs, interests and expectations.

Rural populations across the four countries tend to prefer informal security and justice providers. They often perceive the mechanisms of 'modern justice' as being out of step with their endogenous values, which promote, for example, consensus through mediation, consultation and forgiveness, while they see modern justice as often favouring punishment and correction. For those people, the procedures of the state seem long, abstract and not sufficiently anchored in local habits and customs. Added to these factors is the distance and cost involved in accessing State services.

## Burkina Faso

At the community level, people prefer to go to customary chiefs, religious notables, village development committees and, increasingly, to self-defence organisations to settle disputes: 'Chiefs are the guarantors of the cultural tradition of peoples. Even in urban areas, the cultural life of societies is often organised around chiefdoms. Customary laws are very important in the management of human relations. Considered the legitimate spokespersons of the local populations, the chiefs serve as intermediaries between their local communities and the central government.'

Bado, A. B., 2015/4 April. 'La démocratie au Burkina Faso aux prises avec les systèmes traditionnels de gouvernance'. *Études*, p. 19-30

However, the past few years have seen an expansion in self-defence mechanisms or vigilante groups, which benefit from the state's loss of credibility. The absence of the state has led to the expansion of alternative conflict resolution or governance mechanisms that have developed over time, with various levels of state involvement depending on the level of presence of security forces and/or local administration. These groups, which initially gave themselves the mandate to defend their villages and

prevent imminent attacks, now see themselves as real armies of war. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, individuals have armed themselves to protect their villages and property, increasing the risk of militarising the community within the framework of a weak rule of law and accountability measures.

In South Sudan, communities are the main providers of security. The state is expected only to coordinate security. Therefore, youth groups in villages, and in some bigger towns, protect themselves and their families against the threat posed by other tribes or clans or from people within the same clan. Cattle keepers in a certain village protect their livestock against theft by another community, tribe or clan. The state is less involved in security – it has almost ‘privatised’ the security of citizens to citizens throughout the country.<sup>92</sup> Grassroots community security and justice mechanisms encompass all activities that are locally led. Security measures are based on a process of community dialogue involving local stakeholders, marginalised groups and community members. In fact, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) White Paper on Defence sets out the notion of having a ‘people-centred army’, but this role has been neglected since independence because of the state’s preoccupation with quenching rebellion throughout the country.<sup>93</sup>

The table below shows the organisation of security services available to the Somali people. It gives a detailed picture of where members of the community go for security services and why.

| Security provider                                                         | Who?                                                                      | Why?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Police, including the Criminal Investigation Department and various units | Educated people, such as NGO staff, educated diaspora, and businesspeople | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understanding of the complexities and bureaucracy associated with security</li> <li>• Personal connections with the police</li> <li>• Potential for bribery</li> <li>• Easy access</li> </ul>                        |
|                                                                           | Internally displaced people<br><br>City-based women                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of clan association for displaced people</li> <li>• Women feel less stigma about taking their cases to court away from their home communities, and possibly away from the offender’s home community.</li> </ul> |


<sup>92</sup> In a face-to-face interview with a civil society representative, the respondent stated that, whenever there is an attack against the community, it is very rare for the government to respond to any security threat. The police and the army are not committed to protecting people and their assets.

<sup>93</sup> SPLA White Paper on Defence, 2008, piv.

| Security provider                              | Who?                                                                                                                                              | Why?                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Traditional elders and clan-based armed groups | <p>Nomadic and rural women, men, boys and girls</p> <p>People in urban areas where police and/or private security companies' presence is weak</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understanding of the system</li> <li>• Legitimacy, credibility, relevance, familiarity</li> <li>• Easy access and good responsiveness</li> </ul> |
| Private security companies                     | NGOs, international NGOs, private businesses                                                                                                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust (Al-Shabaab cannot infiltrate them)</li> <li>• Effective operational capacity</li> </ul>                                                   |
| Special protection units                       | Ministries, Members of Parliament, high-profile businesspeople                                                                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loyalty and trust (represent the clan of the people protected or selected from the police or the military)</li> </ul>                            |
| Gatekeepers                                    | Internally displaced women, men, girls and boys                                                                                                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide protection from outside attackers</li> <li>• Provide access to NGOs for relief and humanitarian support</li> </ul>                       |

# Security sector governance and reform needs a new roadmap

Recognising that people's security needs and how they seek services do not always involve the state or its actors, noting that the state and its institutions do not always protect the community or represent its needs and priorities, and finally admitting that in many contexts the social contract between the state and its people has become a challenge to governance, SSG/R programming needs a new roadmap for change. It should allow programming to better understand the complexity of the security sector and the multiplicity of actors and adapt to locally fostered opportunities for change. It would include a reconfigured theory of change, a framework for programming that puts SSG/R back at the heart of conflict prevention, and a set of indicators capable of measuring changes in people's safety and security. As the report *Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*<sup>94</sup> reiterates, institutional transformation is still necessary but to serve goals that revolve around 'people, planet, prosperity, and peace'. The theory of change shown in the diagram below articulates how the people, security and justice actors, state and international community could jointly make a new commitment to protection, empowerment and transformative change.




<sup>94</sup> United Nations and World Bank, 2018. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337>

## New theory of change for security sector governance and reform

Moving away from the previous roadmap for change, which most SSG/R programmes adopted and which revolved around institutional reform, the theory and diagram set out below puts people at the centre of transformation, along with their advocates from civil society.

|                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| If                 | People, including women, men, boys, girls, the elderly, and especially the excluded, the marginalised and those furthest behind, are empowered to take action collectively and supported by non-state security and justice actors to articulate their needs, advocate for their demands and hold security and justice actors accountable in accordance with human rights principles and commitments;                                                                     |
| And If             | Hybrid and state security and justice stakeholders have the legitimacy, political will, strategies, resources and capacities to respond relevantly, effectively, efficiently, and in a sustainable, accountable and transparent manner, to the justice and security needs and demands of men, women, boys, girls, the elderly, and especially the excluded, the marginalised and those furthest behind;                                                                  |
| And If             | Internal and independent oversight mechanisms can effectively challenge, question and address shortcomings in access, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, transparency, sustainability and human rights commitments to influence security and justice policies, practices and behaviours with and on behalf of community members;                                                                                                                      |
| And if as a result | Security and justice actors, institutions and mechanisms form a dispute resolution and security system that is effective, efficient, accessible, inclusive, accountable and responsive to people's needs, and which strives to earn people's trust and confidence, based on human rights principles and commitments;                                                                                                                                                     |
| If                 | The international community supports the national and sub-national processes in a context-sensitive, politically astute, people-centred manner, ensuring that no harm is done by fuelling opportunities for corruption, leading by example through empowering people, recognising the potential role of the state, creating opportunities for rebalancing power relations towards the most excluded, finding synergies, forging partnerships, and bringing about reform; |
| Then               | SSG/R reduces the potential for violence <b>because</b> the feelings of exclusion and victimisation, as well as the perceptions of corruption and predatory behaviour by hybrid and state security and justice actors, are likely to decrease, and the power relations are likely to be fairer, more inclusive, sustainable and legitimate.                                                                                                                              |



## People-centred approach from policy to programming

The operationalisation of the above theory of change requires a framework of potential outcomes, outputs and indicators that SSG/R programming can use to inform its design or monitoring processes. The programmatic framework developed as part of this report was based on the mapping of 12 programmes across the four case study countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan.

The objective of the programme mapping was to examine the mixed records of people-centred approaches. The programmes were selected to cover the national, sub-national and local levels. Interviews were conducted with the implementing agencies to establish how people-centred strategies have been used throughout the cycle of the project, what outcomes were observed, and what were prerequisites for the success of the approach.



## Prerequisites for people-centred SSG/R

Across all the case studies, common patterns were identified in terms of the minimal enabling factors that would allow a people-centred approach to SSG/R to take root and grow into a sustainable process for reform. In South Sudan, where many of the factors below are not present, part of the international partners' contribution could be to start working towards creating these conditions on the short or medium term. Without the majority of the factors below in place, a people-centred approach to security sector reform could be a very risky endeavour, if undertaken without the state's backing and authorisation. In Mali, it is equally challenging to try to implement SSG/R reform in a county currently 'at war' (with jihadist groups). In this country, SSG/R is primarily found in the 2015 Peace Agreement, predominantly focused on institutional reform, despite the inclusive dialogue with civil society organisations. Therefore, the conditions set out below are necessary for a people-centred approach to SSG/R programming.

**Minimal level of stability.** In countries such as South Sudan, the main challenge is to transform mindsets from having a stake in war-making to becoming part of peacemaking. The widespread proliferation of weapons and light arms, combined with limited opportunities for economic and financial activity, encourages South Sudanese young people to find violence attractive. People-centred approaches are relevant to transition contexts when people have chosen peace and not war as a feature of their joint future. People-centred approaches to security in South Sudan should give the people, the state and non-state actors the means to start imagining and building peace. This starts with disarming, demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants, including a commitment to prevent the proliferation of small arms and light weapons non-proliferation, coupled with economic development and employment opportunities for ex-combatants.

**Minimal level of awareness of and capability in SSG/R.** Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan all reflect a need for people to know what SSG/R is, how it can change how they live, and how their future prospects could improve if they played a role in self-empowerment. Lessons from South Sudan show that good results can be achieved from mass information campaigns, through churches, social media, radio and road shows, explaining the role of the security sector and how people could influence the security conditions they live under. Most programmes examined in this study have prioritised state and non-state actors that have minimal capability in terms of security and justice provision or oversight.

**Minimal level of trust between security actors and the people.** Understanding the quality of the relationship between the people and their 'suppliers' in terms of security and justice services is necessary for the conceptual phase of the programme. This involvement presupposes that there will be consultation with a view to identifying problems and taking local dynamics into account in the proposed solutions. Analysis of the operating context and the relationship between security and justice actors and communities is an important prerequisite, within the framework of a people-centred approach to SSG/R programming.

**Programme co-design.** While most of the programmes studied at the sub-national and local levels prioritised community-based organisations for their partnership-building, national-level programming

focused on state institutions. The engagement strategies varied from consultations to occasional workshops, meetings, etc. With the intention of jointly designing programming that responds to people's needs and allows for reform, a mix of approaches has been used that does not clearly result in a real partnership or only a form of 'buy-in'. Across all programmes, there are certain key actors and indispensable stakeholders, including:

- institutional actors (ministries, governorates, prefectures, elected officials, etc)
- security actors (police and gendarmerie especially)
- justice actors
- the different social categories of local communities (including traditional and religious leaders, women, young people).

**Political will.** Political will is an indispensable condition. The tension between elite capture and political will for reform needs to be studied more closely in each of the selected countries. Emerging findings have converged around the importance of ensuring that people-centred approaches are designed in such a way that they are anchored in national commitments to human security, people's security and community protection. These anchors exist in both local cultures and national strategies. Without political will, local authorities might not be cooperative and perceptions of circumventing the state could have a negative reputational impact on the international partner. While these can be perceived as dichotomous concepts or approaches, current human security challenges linked to disasters, pandemics, economic strain, civic engagement for social change, and the downwards trend in the perception of public institutions' reputations are all pointing to a need for better community–state partnerships. A people-centred approach will ensure that an SSG/R assessment will start with the needs of the population, which will help frame state–community partnerships and improve the impact of reforms on human security. It will then focus on analysing service delivery, which will have a direct impact on the perceptions of insecurity or injustice and on the perceptions of the state's effectiveness and legitimacy. It will ensure that resources are used optimally and that reforms are meaningful and impactful.

## A people-centred approach to SSG/R programming: three entry points and three strategies

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In addition to the minimal enabling conditions or prerequisites for people-centred SSG/R, programming through a people-centred lens requires three complementary entry points and three complementary strategies.

The entry points for programming need to be created at three levels – the local level, the sub-national level and the national level – through top-down strategies revolving around **protection** and bottom-up strategies focused on **empowerment**.




### Top Down

Build the trust, awareness, strategies, processes and capabilities to provide protection to people



### Bottom Up

Empower the community and its advocates to articulate its needs and hold security and justice actors accountable to human rights commitments and principles



These three entry-points are what set the people-centred approach apart from community-based programming. While the latter seeks to reform the state, while including the community, the former adopts a simultaneous bottom-up (empowerment) and top-down (protection) approach, while changing the power dynamics at the sub-national level. SSG/R programming should not be complicit with power dynamics that reinforce the exclusion of certain social groups according to cultural, gender or socioeconomic identities. The sub-national level provides opportunities to influence power dynamics and include the views and needs of people who are often left behind or excluded from mainstream assessments and programming. Furthermore, the sub-national level aims to address the current disjunction between the local and national levels and provide a way of bridging this gap by fostering synergies and coordination among the various actors involved in peacebuilding and governance reform processes.

This is an approach that is complex for any programme. It requires a three-pronged programmatic strategy involving empowering the community at the local level so that it can better articulate its needs and hold security actors to account; correcting power balances at the sub-national level through councils that mirror the community and contribute to setting public policy on to security issues; and providing the necessary support at the national level to transform security institutions into forces for protecting and serving the population.

### Empower at the local level

Integrating a people-centred approach at the local level involves focusing heavily on the **empowerment** of people – comprising individuals and community-based and civil society organisations – which gives them,

especially those excluded, marginalised and furthest behind,<sup>95</sup> the knowledge and capacity to articulate their security and justice needs, to use the systems available to advance their demands, and to take collective action, through social accountability mechanisms, should these needs not be fulfilled, in line with human rights commitments and standards.

People-centred SSG/R programming puts people's empowerment at the centre of its objectives and strategies. It builds the awareness and capabilities necessary for people and their advocates to use the systems in place to articulate their needs, expectations, interests and vulnerabilities, and to hold those responsible accountable for any shortcomings or harm caused by their behaviours or actions. It allows people to interact constructively with the systems in place and not resort to violence. This transformative process is gradual because it requires an overturning of the status quo; however, it will significantly contribute to sustainable development, stability and security in the long term.

The process of empowerment revolves around two key elements: **capacity-building** and **social accountability**.<sup>96</sup> The local people need to be given the means to increase their capacity to engage in dialogue with the authorities – supplemented by the assistance of community-based and non-state stakeholders that act as their advocates and ensure that this avenue for discussion with the authorities is consolidated. This dialogue is of an informative nature, meaning that the local population has to first and foremost be informed about their rights, which allows them to subsequently be able to articulate and advocate for their security, justice and human rights needs.

Social accountability is enhanced through donors supporting community members' awareness of their human rights and the standards to which they can hold security and justice actors accountable. The involvement of civil society in SSG/R programming should be one of the cornerstones of successfully integrating a people-centred approach, as it provides knowledge and expertise of external oversight of the policies and practices of security and justice institutions.<sup>97</sup> Social accountability is also enabled by giving people greater access to complaint and oversight mechanisms for their security and justice providers. This gives them the means to effectively challenge, question and address major shortcomings in **access**,<sup>98</sup>

**95** 'People can be excluded, marginalised or left behind due to multiple, sometimes intersecting, factors such as sexual orientation, gender, geography, ethnicity, religion, displacement, conflict or disability. Individuals or groups may include, but not be limited to, women, youth, racial or ethnic minorities, migrants, refugees and the displaced, disabled persons, the poor, LGBTQI persons.' See UNDP, 2022. *Theory of Change*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

**96** 'Accountability ensures that the security sector and the security actors act in the population's best interest by taking the responsibility to hold security actors liable for deviant behaviour that threatens the security of the people.' See Kool, D. and Sweijs, T., 2020. *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Framework to Assess Security Sectors' Potential Contribution to Stability*. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. The 2009 report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly on legal empowerment states that 'Legal empowerment promotes a participatory approach to development and recognizes the importance of engaging civil society and community-based organizations to ensure that the poor and the marginalized have identity and voice.' It is 'a process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their rights and interests as citizens'. The report also illuminates the links between legal empowerment and social accountability – that is, the ability of society and its citizens to hold government accountable for service delivery and other functions.


**97** Sedra, M., 2010. *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

**98** Accessibility refers to the ability of the local population to have equal and universal access to security and justice services across all socioeconomic, gender and cultural groups.

**relevance, effectiveness,<sup>99</sup> efficiency, accountability, transparency,<sup>100</sup> sustainability** and human rights commitments.

The concept of **local ownership** needs to be expanded from what current practice has limited it to. If SSG/R programming priorities are to be genuinely locally owned, they should be the prerogative not only of domestic stakeholders but also of non-state actors and individuals, in particular those typically left behind, allowing the notion of local ownership to encompass more than just the elites.<sup>101</sup>

The key objective for SSG/R at the local level is equal access to security and justice services to address local security and justice concerns and threats, peacefully resolving conflict and thus promoting social cohesion. The issue of social cohesion arises even more strongly in countries where multiple, diverse identity groups have to share a geographical space,<sup>102</sup> and the sentiments of exclusion and victimisation are exacerbated in a conflict setting. Previous efforts to approach social cohesion in a top-down manner involving the elite in conflict-affected environments have not shown significant progress,<sup>103</sup> which is why SSG/R programming should ensure in future that social cohesion is consolidated via a bottom-up approach. Local and traditional security and justice mechanisms are key in areas where the state is not typically present. Considering that most conflict drivers are rooted in community-level insecurities,<sup>104</sup> a people-centred approach to SSG/R is about curbing these drivers by focusing on empowering people and their relationships – an investment that **is** a foundational element of security sector reform.<sup>105</sup> This requires the integration of tailor-made initiatives and solutions that focus on addressing the security and justice demands and priorities of the local populations.



<sup>99</sup> 'Institutions fulfill their respective roles and responsibilities to high professional standards.' (Kool and Sweijts, 2020, p10).

<sup>100</sup> 'Information on decision-making and implementation of policies is freely available and accessible to those that will be affected by these policies and the outcomes that result.' (Kool and Sweijts, 2020, p. 10).

<sup>101</sup> Sedra, 2010, p7.

<sup>102</sup> UNDP and Search for Common Ground, 2027. *Social Cohesion Framework: Social Cohesion for Stronger Communities*. United Nations Development Programme, p4. [https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SC2-Participant-Guide\\_English.pdf](https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SC2-Participant-Guide_English.pdf)

<sup>103</sup> Liaga, E.A. and Wielenga, C. 2020. 'Social cohesion from the top-down or bottom-up? The cases of South Sudan and Burundi'. *Peace Change*, 45: 395.

<sup>104</sup> Conflict drivers include inequalities, perceptions of exclusion, youth frustration, intercommunal cohesion, illegitimate or untrusted public institutions, security threats at national and regional levels and uncertain democratic transitions.

<sup>105</sup> Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Academic Foundation, 2018. *Strategy, Jointness, Capacity: Institutional Requirements for Supporting Security Sector Reform*. Bonn, Germany.

## Transform at the sub-national level

Implementing a people-centred approach within SSG/R programming requires the introduction of a sub-national level that aims to address the disjunction between the national and local levels, focusing on **building trust**. In concrete terms, the social contract is best constructed, deconstructed, challenged and updated at the sub-national level, where the state and its institutions and the people and community advocates and stakeholders are connected through proximity, necessary for building confidence and trust. Trust is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as ‘a person’s belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectations of positive behaviour’;<sup>106</sup> therefore, it is a subjective phenomenon. Trust in the government represents the confidence of citizens in the actions of a ‘government to do what is right and perceived fair’.<sup>107</sup> It depends on the congruence between citizens’ preferences – their interpretation of what is right and fair and what is unfair – and their perception of the government’s actual functioning.<sup>108</sup> Core levels of trust in the state and its representatives, in general, are necessary for the fair and effective functioning of the security and justice system, including the rule of law and independent judiciary, key drivers of trust in the government.<sup>109</sup> The OECD<sup>110</sup> has identified the following public governance drivers in government institutions:

- **Reliability:** the ability of governments to minimise uncertainty in their citizens’ economic, social and political environments and to act in a consistent and predictable manner;
- **Responsiveness:** the provision of accessible, efficient and citizen-oriented public services that effectively address the needs and expectations of the public;
- **Openness and inclusiveness:** a systemic, comprehensive approach to institutionalising a two-way communication with stakeholders, in which relevant, usable information is provided and interaction is fostered as a means of improving transparency, accountability and engagement;
- **Integrity:** the alignment of government and public institutions with broader principles and standards of conduct that contribute to safeguarding the public interest while preventing corruption;
- **Fairness:** in a procedural sense, the consistent treatment of citizens (and businesses) in the policymaking and policy implementation processes;

<sup>106</sup> OECD, 2017. *OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust*. Paris: OECD Publishing, p42.

<sup>107</sup> Easton, D., 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley.

<sup>108</sup> Bouckaert, G. and Van de Walle, S., 2003. ‘Comparing measures of citizen trust and user satisfaction as indicators of “good governance”: difficulties in linking trust and satisfaction indicators’. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 69: 329–344.

<sup>109</sup> Knack, S. and Zak, P.J., 2003. ‘Building trust: public policy, interpersonal trust, and economic development’. *Supreme Court Economic Review*, 10: 91–107; Johnston, W., Krahn, H. and Harrison, T., 2006. ‘Democracy, political institutions, and trust: the limits of current electoral reform proposals’. *Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 31(2): 165–182; Blind, P.K. 2007. ‘Building trust in government in the twenty-first century: review of literature and emerging issues’. *Proceedings of the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government – Building Trust in Government*, pp26–29.

<sup>110</sup> OECD, 2013. *Government at a Glance, 2013*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, p 31. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov\\_glance-2013-en](http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-en)



- **Political participation:** the perception of having a say in politics – and ability to do so – and potential cynicism about or distrust of systems;
- **Satisfaction:** experience of public services; and
- **Evaluation:** assessment of government action on long-term and global challenges.

Trust is not a unidimensional concept, and the legitimacy of security and justice actors is not isolated from other sets of attitudes to public institutions. It is, however, a crucial concept for supporting people-centred SSG/R processes. Trust is best fostered at the sub-national level, where it is possible to have dialogue and consultations between security and justice stakeholders and the community on issues of direct relevance to its security and justice.

The level of confidence that the local population has in these stakeholders indicates a certain level of trust in them; however, this ought to be consolidated, particularly with regard to the integrity and professionalism of these security and justice stakeholders, to the extent that the population is then willing to provide feedback and cooperate on improving the delivery of these services. Participation and inclusion are key to the success of SSG/R and its contribution to conflict prevention. The World Bank reinforces that ‘providing a platform for inclusion, participation, and voice to citizens and involving them directly in the provision of services can significantly improve citizens’ perceptions of the State. The presence of grievance mechanisms and possibilities of civil participation strongly influence perceptions of government, which suggests that public services can act as a channel through which citizens and public authorities interact. Indeed, direct involvement matters more than the mere presence of services.<sup>111</sup> Thus, taking a people-centred approach to SSG/R programming ought to involve the sub-national or provincial level, so that the population may participate more, thereby improving the overall effectiveness and relevance of the security and justice services provided to them.



<sup>111</sup> United Nations and World Bank, 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank, p160.

## Protect at the national level

The focus of people-centred SSG/R at the national level should be to enhance the **protection** of civilians – with a particular emphasis on those most excluded – and that should constitute the primary role and duty of security and justice actors.

The United Nations Member States pledged in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ensure that ‘no one will be left behind’ and to ‘endeavour to reach the furthest behind first’.<sup>112</sup> The 2030 Agenda underlines the link between sustainable development, peace and security and the need to adopt holistic context analysis and understanding and the related comprehensive programming.

Leaving no one behind appears to be a crucial objective in adopting a people-centred approach to SSG/R in order to fulfil the security and justice needs of communities and individuals, especially the most marginalised.

SDG 16 emphasises the need to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. It provides various targets relevant to building trust between civilians and state institutions. The first two targets (16.1 and 16.2) underline the right of everyone to be free from violence and abuse, emphasising the need to pay attention to the protection of the most marginalised (especially women and children). Targets 16.3 and 16.5, promoting the rule of law at both international and national levels, underline the importance of the fight against arbitrariness and the abuse of power and the need to reduce corruption and bribery. Targets 16.6 and 16.7 underline the importance of accountability and transparency and the importance of inclusivity and a participatory decision-making process, respectively. Target 16.10 calls for ensuring public access to information and protecting the fundamental freedoms at the heart of the people-centred approach to SSG/R, as well as enforcing non-discriminatory laws and policies (16.10b) to strengthen public trust and the legitimacy of the security sector.

People-centred SSG/R should ensure that security and justice providers have a protection mandate and provide necessary services within a framework that delineates and regulates the use of force and the powers of the security and justice institutions, which should be aligned with respect for human rights, leading to less violence and a more sustainable peace.

Balancing immediate and effective service delivery and longer-term institution-building is the main difficulty that donors, supporting security sector reform, have faced in the context of conflict prevention.

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<sup>112</sup> United Nations, n.d. ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>

In most cases this challenge is compounded by a degraded **social contract**<sup>113</sup> and decreasing trust between the state and civil society, in particular given the inequitable nature of delivering security and justice services. However, the adoption of a people-centred approach, in which the voice of the most marginalised at the local level is taken into consideration, at a national level, ensuring the protection of individuals, should help to reinforce the social contract and increase civil society's confidence and trust in the state, thereby contributing to more sustainable development, stability and security.



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**113** According to the UNDP and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre 'the social contract refers to processes by which everyone in a political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to state authority, thereby limiting some of her or his freedoms, in exchange for the state's protection of their rights and security and for the adequate provision of public goods and services. This agreement calls for individuals to comply with the state's laws, rules, and practices in pursuit of broader common goals, such as security or protection, and basic services. The validity and legitimacy of a social contract may be gauged by the extent to which it creates and maintains an equilibrium between society's expectations and obligations and those of state authorities and institutions, all amidst a context of constant flux.' See UNDP and NOREF 2016. *Engaged Societies, Responsive States: The Social Contract in Situations of Conflict and Fragility*. New York: United Nations Development Programme, p9.

# How do we do it?

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Most SSG/R programmes are developed on the basis of country, institutional or sectoral assessments that overemphasise the institutional deficits of the security sector. These assessments tend to take stock of why institutions are falling short of delivering services and goods but fail to address the central question of what these institutions should be doing in line with the community's needs and the context-specific challenges it faces. Programming on this basis helps institutions to do things right but not necessarily to do the right things. It intends to improve the community perceptions of state institutions without looking at the quality of the social contract, the nature of sociopolitical power balances, and the extent of the legitimacy and relevance of these institutions for the community.

While state institutions remain a significant part of a country's security sector, a people-centred security assessment starts by identifying communities' needs, then asking what actors (state institutions, hybrid actors and non-state actors) should do to respond to these needs, and finally looking for the challenges and shortcomings that explain why those services are not being used in an impactful manner.

## Step 1: Context analysis

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The first step in a people-centred assessment is ensuring that the donor team fully understands the contextual complexity, including **history, political economy, anthropology, social contract, conflict analysis** and **gender analysis**. Although there are some similarities, fragile and conflict-affected states rarely resemble Western concepts and the understandings of the 'state'. This exercise should unpack Western assumptions of monopoly control over coercive and judicial powers, the extension of sovereignty throughout the territory of the state and the security of borders. This step should not be a superficial exercise: genuine analysis of the context and its drivers is essential for the sustainability of SSG/R programming. Contextual analysis should ideally be done in a joint exercise by the international community, including local actors and partners. This not only ensures the efficiency of financial and human resources but also achieves a shared understanding among donors and international actors of contextual factors that could undermine or reinforce drivers for reform. Gaining a true understanding of local cultures can take years of embedded research, which external assessment teams will rarely have the opportunity to conduct. Ideally, these types of analyses should remain with donors at headquarter level or embassy level as a central repository of knowledge and context-specific insights that should inform all future programming. They should also be updated on a periodic basis. Each donor has a different framework for contextual analysis; however, the main building blocks for such an assessment are shown and explained below.

## Context analysis

-  Geographical and historical context
-  Anthropology and social Contract
-  Political economy analysis
-  Gender analysis
-  Conflict analysis

## Geographical and historical context

In order to understand the complexity of citizen, community and state partnerships, it seems crucial to understand the geographical and historical factors covering global, regional and national dynamics that affect the country's politics and security and community safety. Geographical analysis should focus on state services' proximity to the communities they serve and non-state actors' geographical distribution, while historical analysis provides insights on national and regional political tensions informing the performance of governance mechanisms and the evolution of the normative framework, as well as the state's legitimacy for the various segments of the population.

## Anthropology and social contract

A people-centred approach to SSG/R requires a focus on the relationship between the state and the people, namely the social contract. It must be based on previous and current people's experiences, expectations and priorities. It is important to proceed with an analysis of the social contract's strengths and weaknesses, which should take into consideration that state mechanisms could be incomplete or ineffective and therefore could be substituted with alternative governance mechanisms (non-state, such as customary, or even from armed opposition groups<sup>114</sup>). Such an exercise would provide an understanding of security and justice system actors' place in the overall framework of the social contract.

**114** Armed opposition groups can propose sub-national hybrid governance mechanisms that challenge customary and central state governance mechanisms and the monopoly of coercive power in order to occupy part of the national territories as is observed in certain parts of central Mali.

## Conflict analysis

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Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the type, causes and dynamics of conflict and of the participants. It helps to gain a better understanding of the context in which intervention is considered by (i) understanding the background and history of conflict; (ii) identifying all the relevant groups involved; (iii) understanding the perspectives of these groups and how they relate to each other; and (iv) identifying the causes of conflict.<sup>115</sup> The key questions in conflict analysis are related to political, economic, social cultural and environmental factors and triggers. Conflict analysis should be informed by a stakeholder analysis to understand the various actors' interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships, as well as an analysis of whether people from different groups have equal access to security and justice, why or why not, and the people's major security and justice concerns and whether they are being met by the current security provision.<sup>116</sup>

Conflict analysis is a prerequisite for doing no harm and ensuring that programmes are conflict sensitive. Understanding the underlying conflict drivers and dynamics can identify their positive and negative impacts on programmes and should avoid exacerbating existing tensions. Moreover, it should help to understand whether a specific kind of programming is relevant or not in a targeted local context.

Conflict analysis is an iterative process because conflict dynamics and drivers can evolve quickly. It must be conducted at every stage of project cycle management, from assessment to monitoring, and in the evaluation and learning phases. Regular local conflict analysis contributes to donors' and implementing agencies' understanding of the relevance of a people-centred approach to SSG/R, and the impact on people's experiences of security and justice, and whether certain programming elements or sudden threats can exacerbate underlying conflict dynamics and require appropriate adaptations.

## Gender analysis

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Providing security and equal access to justice, including for historically marginalised or disadvantaged populations, is at the core of the security and justice sector's duty to protect people within a framework of good governance. Gender is one of the most important factors that defines inequality in societies. It places people in different positions of power, risk, security and insecurity, with varying potential to access the services of security and justice providers.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012. *How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity*. <https://www.international-alert.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Conflict-Sensitivity-How-To-Guide-EN-2012.pdf>

<sup>116</sup> Saferworld, 2014. *Community Security Handbook*. London: Saferworld, p13.

<sup>117</sup> DCAF, OSCE/ODIRHR and UN Women, 2019. *Tool 1: Security Sector Governance, Security Sector Reform and Gender*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, p5.



A gender analysis is a ‘critical examination of how differences in gender roles, activities, needs, opportunities, and rights/entitlements affect women, men, girls and boys, and other gender identities in a given policy area, situation, or context’.<sup>118</sup>

A gender analysis examines the relationships between women and men, their access to and control of resources, and the relative constraints they face. With regard to the security and justice sector, a gender analysis might focus on women’s, men’s, girls’, boys’ and other gender identities’ different types of insecurity and barriers to accessing justice, and the quality of their representation and participation in the security and justice sector.<sup>119</sup>

The purpose of a gender analysis can be understood on two levels. On one level, a gender analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of the power relations and dynamics that affect security and justice actors, the institutions and bodies they represent and the people who access their services. On another level, a gender analysis is necessary to ensure that the proposed project does not exacerbate gender-based injustices and inequalities and that, where possible, the project promotes greater equality.<sup>120</sup>

Gender analysis is a prerequisite for adopting gender-sensitive programming and seems central to adopting a people-centred approach to SSG/R. It allows different gendered needs and experiences of insecurity and injustices to be identified. Consequently, the design of people-centred programmes is based on gender-specific needs and should ensure that security and justice interventions (including those by non-state providers) themselves do not exacerbate gender inequalities.

Gendered roles and norms are so deeply entrenched that programmes to improve gender-sensitive security can themselves create tensions, and therefore they must be implemented sensitively taking a long-term perspective. It could be relevant to create safe spaces where men and women can constructively reflect on how gender dynamics shape violence, insecurity and injustice and can jointly come up with proposals to address this.<sup>121</sup>

## Assessing risk and unpacking assumptions

The ability of donors to influence the social contract in a country is limited. This is subject to the country’s history, conflict dynamics, power balances, sociocultural landscape, political system and governance mechanisms. Even when donors sufficiently understand the national actors’ interests, agendas and stakes, there may be very little that a donor can do to sway an actor’s motivation and behaviour. At the

<sup>118</sup> European Institute for Gender Equality, 2019. ‘Gender analysis’. <https://eige.europa.eu/thesaurus/terms/1143>

<sup>119</sup> DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women, 2019. Tool 15: Integrating Gender in Project Design and Monitoring for the Security and Justice Sector. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, p10.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p10.

<sup>121</sup> Saferworld, 2021. A People-centred Approach to Security and Justice: Recommendations for Policy and Programming. London: Saferworld, p7.

same time, any type of donor activity will affect the system itself (whether desired or unintended) by modifying the rule of law framework and the national capability for providing and overseeing security and justice services, and by increasing awareness of donors' support on security and justice issues, creating a civic space that is empowered enough to create, foster, and drive change.

Understanding the relationship between the state and the individuals, and between the state and the non-state and hybrid sectors, is key to determining the environment in which support will be provided. In reality, this means accepting the narrow range of donors' influence, and ensuring that all SSG/R programming is conducted in line with a risk management approach.

**A do no harm analysis** is a useful tool that provides a good basis for international assistance risk analysis.

### Do No Harm Analysis

The Do No Harm analysis is designed to help understand what impact an assistance programme can have on relationships in a fragile state environment. If the analysis shows that assistance will actually make tensions in relationships worse, it then prompts those conducting a Do No Harm analysis to think through alternative assistance programming in order to eliminate these negative influences. A Do No Harm analysis can be conducted in seven steps:

- **Step 1:** *Understanding the context*
- **Step 2:** *Analyse dividers and sources of tension*
- **Step 3:** *Analyse connectors and local capacities for peace*
- **Step 4:** *Analysing the assistance programme*
- **Step 5:** *Analysing the assistance programme's impact on dividers and connectors through resource transfers and implicit ethical messages*
- **Step 6:** *Generate programming options*
- **Step 7:** *Test options and redesign programme*

Visit [www.cdainc.com](http://www.cdainc.com) for more details, or the DCAF website for related resources at [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

Example: In preparing to support a reform of the justice and security sector in Zimbabwe, a group of national and international experts, with the support of a donor group, decided to undertake a thorough Do No Harm analysis. Zimbabwe had experienced severe and recurrent political crises and the justice and security sector had played a central role. However, the newly created coalition Government had been identified as a window of opportunity for sector transformation. Little was known about the current state of affairs and an assessment seemed a natural first step.

A Do No Harm analysis revealed several political risks associated with an overarching justice and security assessment, highlighting the importance of getting initial buy-in from key stakeholders. As a result it was decided to initiate a series of studies on sub-sectors in a sequence that the national parties could agree to, with the aim of identifying policy options. This in turn exposed the need for a participatory and consensus-based mechanism where the national parties could directly influence the justice and security programme.

## Step 2: Strategic analysis of the country's SSG/R process and international assistance mapping

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This approach is designed to answer the basic question 'How should we support security sector reform in a given country?'.

The strategic analysis draws largely on a mapping of international support, a political and legal analysis and stocktaking of what reform has accomplished so far. It can also include other elements, such as looking into the medium-term future (foresight assessments).

'Opportunity' is defined as the combination of the reforms that are (i) yet to be done, (ii) not yet supported sufficiently by international support and (iii) politically possible.

The strength of a strategic analysis of opportunities for security sector reform is that it gives high-level guidance to what can be done, drawing on several different approaches. The central challenge is to bringing together the different approaches in a harmonious and effective way. The components below are typically what make up such an analysis:

- **Legal system:** when considering security and justice support, donors should have an understanding of the local legal systems. It is important that the focus is not only on the state-sanctioned legal system but also on non-state and informal traditional systems, many of which may not be written down;
- **Progress of the reform process to date:** major accomplishments, enabling factors and actors, how the institutional reform fits into the overall picture of national SSG/R, including challenges and lessons;
- **Donor activity mapping:** a snapshot of what donors are supporting across which regions and in partnership with which national actors, including an in-depth appreciation of coordination mechanisms, focus areas, achievements, and gaps and opportunities;
- **Findings from baseline assessments:** data and qualitative findings around institutional capability, institutional gaps, internal and independent accountability and community safety;
- **Foresight analysis:** key drivers and opportunities for reform, main challenges and upcoming priorities;
- **Impact harvesting:** what the community felt was the impact of the various reform processes; and how some donors have ensured the sustainability of results.

### Step 3: People-centred needs assessment

A community is not a homogeneous whole but consists of various communities and groups that are characterised by ethnicity, location, religion, social class, gender and other factors. For instance, women, children and elderly people are likely to face different forms of security threats; or certain communities may be marginalised in a society and may be subject to harassment by security providers. A people-centred needs assessment should reach out to the various communities and groups within a society and capture their security needs. Marginalised groups should receive particular attention on account of their vulnerable status.

The security needs of communities can be grouped into four categories. Of these, two categories arise from community members, while the other two categories are directly caused by security actors. The first two are **Individual security Needs** instigated by other community members (such as cases of robbery in certain areas, assaults on women during field work, extortion by merchants at a market or attacks on minority groups by other community members) and **communal conflicts** (such as disputes over property and land, clashes over natural resources or disagreements over religious practices). The latter two categories of needs are **abuses** inflicted by security actors (such as ill treatment in police custody, illegal searches at roadblocks set up by armed groups or illegal detention by customary justice actors) and **inadequate services** provided by security actors (such as discriminatory practices by the police, undue delays in court proceedings, prison overcrowding or taking bribes for services provided).



## How to map the needs

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The identification of people's security needs must be based on a mapping process that uses a variety of data-gathering methods. The combination of different methods, the composition of the sample of respondents and the triangulation of findings are critical factors for successful people-centred approaches. These methods fall into five categories: **document review, key individual interviews, focus group interviews, perception surveys or small-scale surveys** and **observations**.

### Document review

A review of relevant documents will provide an initial overview of the people's security needs. Of particular use will be the reports of human rights organisations (national and international), which will help to determine the most common and most serious human rights violations. Medical reports can provide information on injuries and hence on security incidents. Reports on minority groups and other vulnerable groups are useful for determining their specific needs. Public sources can include information about security trends and major types of community insecurities. Relevant academic articles and think tank reports can also provide useful information.

### Semi-structured Interviews with key informants

Semi-structured interviews use an interview guide with predetermined questions that help steer but do not constrain the conversation with the respondent. Although the interview questions are prepared, they are open-ended, allowing the respondent to express their views in a conversation. The interview guide serves as a checklist and ensures that similar information is obtained from all respondents without restricting the conversation. The interviewer can probe topics as they arise and can pursue certain questions in more depth.

Frequently, semi-structured interviews are conducted with key informants. A key informant is a person with in-depth knowledge about the security needs in the community. Representatives of key civil society organisations (such as women's organisations, youth groups, human rights groups and religious communities) will often be important key informants. Organisations that provide services to vulnerable groups and to victims of violence, such as medical, legal welfare, or psychological services, usually also have good insights on what is happening to their client groups. In addition, journalists, especially those who cover security issues, can be a useful source of information and contacts.

### Focus group interviews

Generally, a focus group consists of 4–12 people who have certain factors in common and is led by a neutral moderator. Organising a focus group can help to collect information on security needs from a small group in a structured format. The advantage of using focus groups over individual interviews is that they allow participants to benefit from others' comments, which can prompt their own thinking about the subject in hand, generating views and insights that might not otherwise have been obtained. The role of the

moderator is to guide the discussions. These should normally be framed around a single clear question. The moderator ensures that everyone's views are heard and should try to identify areas of consensus among the participants.

### Community perception surveys

Perception surveys add particular depth to needs assessment exercises. While they are time-consuming to carry out – and invariably politically sensitive if seen to be circumventing the state – there are an increasing number carried out by national actors and available through other organisations.

Small-scale surveys with simple questionnaires can complement interviews and direct observations. The questionnaires could be used with respondents that have been interviewed, for example in a focus group process or with a respondent sample that cannot be interviewed. Questionnaires can be designed in different ways. For example, they can include open questions ('What are your greatest needs in terms of security?') or closed questions ('How many cases of cattle theft occurred in your community during the last four weeks? Please tick as appropriate: 0, 1–10, 11–20, 21–30'). The respondents can be asked to rank their security needs ('Of the following ten threats, which are the three greatest threats to you?'). The respondents can also be asked to score their security needs ('On a scale of 1–5, what score would you give the following ten threats?').

Depending on the context and the circumstances of the programme, other survey methods can be used to map a community's security needs. Community members could be invited to provide written comments and drop them in a comment box in the municipality. A telephone survey with a sample of community members could be carried out. Community members could be invited to participate in an SMS or online survey.

### Direct observation and transect walks

Direct observation is a way to collect spatial information about the security needs of the community and helps assessments teams cross-check the findings from interviews. Generally, direct observation should be carried out with key informants. Direct observation can be carried out in any location of interest such as a local market, a police station or a prison.

Transect walks are a specific form of direct observation. During a walk with key informants along a defined route through the community, the assessment team discusses anything noticed, facilitates exchanges by asking questions and making observations, and informally interviews any people met during the walk to get their views on the security threats, conflicts, abuses and deficits in service delivery in the community. Transect walks introduce the assessment team to the community and its inhabitants.

### Determining respondent sample

Individual interviews, group interviews, small-scale surveys and transect walks all imply making decisions about the sample of respondents. Generally, the larger the size of the sample, the better. But



financial, time and human resource constraints usually limit the number of people that can be reached in the course of a programme. Hence, the key is to aim for greater representativeness rather than a straightforward increase in the number of respondents. For instance, at least one sample community from each geographical region should be included; the sample should be drawn from all ethnic groups; minority and vulnerable groups should be included in the sample; not only heads of households but also other household members should be interviewed; and when choosing a sample of respondents from a community or social group, they should be of different ages, genders and social status.

### Triangulating data

Whatever data gathering methods are used, the information obtained should be triangulated to ensure its trustworthiness. Triangulation can be achieved using multiple sources, multiple methods and multiple assessors. Using **multiple sources** refers to multiple representatives of one type of source (e.g. interviews with several merchants at the main market) or to different sources of the same information (e.g. interviews with women, men and children about the same topic). Using **multiple methods** refers to comparing results obtained with different methods. Using **multiple assessors** refers to having an assessment team with a diversity of social and professional backgrounds, enhancing the range of perspectives in the assessment.<sup>122</sup>

### Developing a security needs data sheet

The data compiled during the needs mapping process has to be organised. For each security need, a data sheet should be completed, including a detailed description of the need, the people or groups affected by it, and the people or groups from whom it arises. The information in the data sheet should always be clearly sourced. Important data gaps should be clearly marked in the need data sheet.

## Step 4: Who are the trusted service providers?

This step involves the mapping of all security actors to determine whether or not they meet the communities' needs and, if not, why not? The mapping of actors should not cover only the state or formal institutions but rather aim to establish a complete inventory of security actors.

### Activities rather than names

The mapping should cover all actors that are **actually** involved in security activities, irrespective of what they are called. For instance, the mapping covers not just institutions that are called 'police' but all actors

<sup>122</sup> Jules N. Pretty and Simplice D. Vodouhê, "Using Rapid or Participatory Rural Appraisal" in: Burton E. Swanson, Robert P. Bentz and Andrew J. Sofranko (eds), *Improving Agricultural Extension. A Reference Manual* (Rome, FAO: 1997).

that actually carry out internal security functions. This could involve having an actor called ‘intelligence service’ or ‘neighbourhood watch’. For instance, defence forces often assume law enforcement functions in post-conflict contexts and the division of labour between those forces and the police and neighbourhood watches is frequently a highly debated issue.

### **Not just state but also non-state**

Non-state actors often play important roles in the provision of security services. The mapping should include non-state actors providing security functions such as armed militias, customary justice mechanisms and private security companies.

### **Not just providers but also management and oversight functions**

Management and oversight functions are core security services. Ministries provide management support functions. Formal oversight actors include parliamentary committees, human rights commissions and independent review boards. Civil society actors (such as human rights organisations and media outlets) often engage in oversight of security providers such as the police and the defence forces. These management and oversight functions should be included in the mapping.

## **Data gathering**

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Information on security actors is also collected during the mapping of people-centred security needs. In addition, further documents should be reviewed, other key informants should be interviewed, and different sites may be visited to map the security actors.

### **Additional documents**

Of particular use for the mapping of security actors will be a review of a peace agreement and related accords, the national constitution, relevant domestic laws and statutes, and relevant government policies and strategies. Reports by national and international think tanks and academic institutions may also include useful information.

### **Additional key informants**

Additional key informants for the mapping of actors include representatives of security institutions; members of government, members of parliament, political party representatives and representatives of former warring factions; and representatives of international organisations, members of national and international NGOs, academics, researchers and journalists.

### **Additional observations**

Visits to offices and other locations where security actors are based will provide additional information on these actors.

### **Triangulating findings**

Again, the information obtained should be triangulated to ensure its trustworthiness. At a minimum, two knowledgeable sources should be consulted on each security actor: one representative of the actor and an external source.

### **Documenting information on actors**

The data compiled in the course of mapping the actors have to be processed. A profile should be established for each security actor identified and all security actors should be classified to establish gaps and overlaps in their mandates.

## **Profiling actors**

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For each actor identified, a brief profile should be established that summarises essential information on the actor including contact details, history, functions, leadership, personnel, organisation, infrastructure and budget. The profile pays particular attention to the actor's mandate, its actual activities, the services it should deliver and service delivery deficits. For state institutions, it is important to distinguish between what is legally mandated and what is actually the case: the actual set-up of a state institution can differ considerably from its legal framework, and the actual activities of the institution can vary significantly from its mandated responsibilities.

The information in the profile should always be clearly sourced. Important data gaps should be clearly marked in the actor profile.

## **Classifying actors**

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All security actors identified should be classified according to locations, functions, size, representation and other criteria in order to establish service delivery gaps and overlaps.

## **Step 5: Link the needs to the actors**

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Step 5 of people-centred SSG/R assessments consists of identifying which security actor(s) is/are responsible, in principle, for delivering services to meet the communities' needs, or which actor(s) directly

cause(s) the need. Again, the needs of the communities are the starting point. For every need identified, answers to some of the following questions will help to identify the responsible actors:

- Does the need occur at the national, regional or local level? In what jurisdiction or area of responsibility?
- Who are all the actors and the services that are available to meet the need in question?
- Which actors (one or several, state or non-state, at national, regional or local level) should be but are not, or only inadequately, delivering services to meet the need?
- Are there any other actors (formal and informal) that could respond to the same need or that may be responsible for delivering the same or a comparable service? (identify overlaps)
- If no responsible actor is identified, which actors should be supplying the service? (identify gaps)
- Is the need caused directly by acts of omission on the part of one or several actors?

After this step of the methodology, the factors below should now become clear to the programming team.

|          |                                                                                               |          |                                                                                  |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1</b> | The types and number of people-centred insecurity needs                                       | <b>4</b> | The needs sorted according to impact on local peace (seriousness and prevalence) |
| <b>2</b> | The types and number of actors (formal and informal) who are responsible for service delivery | <b>5</b> | The needs sorted according to geographical area of occurrence                    |
| <b>3</b> | The needs sorted according to group or community affected                                     | <b>6</b> | A list of the gaps and overlaps in service provision                             |

## Step 6: Identify where the programme should focus

The last stage of this methodology consists in determining the factors that account for why the responsible actors directly cause the needs in question, or why they do not meet the needs arising from others. The answers to these questions highlight the areas where donor programming should focus.

The best way to do this is to sketch out the security system in the relevant country or locality. It is very useful to draw a chart of all the security actors, indicating whether they are formal, informal or semi-formal and identifying where the security needs are emerging, the key points in this system where people access security services, and how a request for services flows from one actor to the other, including the key decision points and the weakest links in this system.

Deficits in this system result in lingering insecurities, frustration about the status quo, feelings of exclusion, and inadequacy, pushing people to resort to violence.

Typically, deficits in the people-centred security system are associated with political factors, cultural and social behavioural factors, capacity issues and/or gaps in accountability. The Political, Cultural, Capacity and Integrity Framework (PCCIF), designed by ISSAT, is one tool to help identify these factors (see below). The PCCIF distinguishes between two contextual categories (political and cultural) and two security and justice actor-related categories (capacity and integrity).

The two contextual categories are:

1. **Political:** the political commitments, agendas and stakes, whether explicit or implicit, that influence how security actors provide security (or insecurity) and interact among themselves and with the population;
2. **Cultural:** the gender roles and community-level dynamics that predetermine how the various cultural and gender groups access security actors, their perceptions thereof and the subsequent relations between security actors and the people.

The two categories related to the security actors are:

3. **Capacity:** the existing resources, structures and procedures:
  - a. Internal capacity refers to the actor itself, and its internal qualities such as its mandate, the number of staff or members, their training, experience and competence, other resources (budget, infrastructure, equipment), structure, procedures and information systems; and
  - b. External capacity refers to the actor's cooperation and interactions with other actors and also to national strategies, guidance, management and other support provided to the actor by ministries and other institutions.

#### 4. **Integrity**: respect for basic norms and values when carrying out their activities:

- c. Internal integrity relates to the members' respect for basic norms and values (human rights, professional conduct, financial propriety) and to the procedures and mechanisms in place to monitor and enforce respect for basic norms and values, including disciplinary and complaint procedures, codes of conduct, budgetary accountability procedures, gender representation and representation of minorities; and
- d. External integrity relates to various means of formal and informal external oversight (parliamentary, political, independent, media) to monitor the institution's respect for basic norms and values and the safeguards in place to prevent political interference and ensure independence.

For every responsible actor identified in step 4 of the methodology, each of these four categories should be analysed to determine all the institutional factors that account for why one or more actors directly cause(s) the need in question or why they do not meet the need arising from others.

### Political, Cultural, Capacity and Integrity Framework

| Political                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Capacity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Internal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | External                                                                                                         |
| <b>National security strategies</b> and explicit analysis of the security system's role and potential<br><br><b>Political stakeholders' agendas</b> and implicit perceptions of the security system, its role and potential<br><br><b>Political process</b> in place to renew social contract (such as elections) and the role of the security actors in it<br><br><b>Political affiliation</b> of the security actors and the role of the ministries, ministers, senior officials and civilian management<br><br><b>The political influence over mandates</b> and roles of security actors determining what they actually do versus what their mandates require them to do | <b>Normative framework</b><br><br><b>Mandate of the actor</b><br><br><b>Human resources</b><br><br><b>Budgetary</b><br><br><b>Equipment</b><br><br><b>Infrastructure</b><br><br><b>Security of members, their associated assets and information</b><br><br><b>Rules, procedures and management</b> | <b>Cooperation procedures</b><br><br><b>Actual cooperation</b><br><br><b>External or hierarchical management</b> |



| Cultural                                                                                                                                                                                            | Integrity                                                      |                                                                           |                                                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                     | External                                                       |                                                                           | Internal                                                                |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Formal                                                         | Informal                                                                  |                                                                         |
| <b>Gender roles</b><br><b>Community-specific perceptions</b><br>Other factors that determine the relations in terms of trust, legitimacy and credibility between the people and the security actors | <b>Parliamentary oversight</b><br><b>Independent oversight</b> | <b>Social accountability</b><br><b>Civil society organisations, media</b> | <b>Conduct</b><br><b>Respect for human Rights</b><br><b>Inclusivity</b> |

The following factors correspond to the four categories of the PCCIF and help to identify shortcomings of and gaps in the security system, where future SSG/R programming needs to focus.

## 1. Political agendas

- 1.1. lack of commitment or competence of the civilian or political leadership
- 1.2. political agendas that affect how actors are resourced and supported to deliver services
- 1.3. political tensions that affect cooperation between various actors and agencies
- 1.4. human rights violations involving security and/or other government officials, and whether they are prosecuted or followed up
- 1.5. political acknowledgement of non-state actors active in the area of security, and how they are perceived by political authority
- 1.6. political or other interference: categorise the type and source of interference and, for every category, try to assess the frequency and the consequences of these interferences:
  - hierarchy
  - peers
  - other actors

## 2. Cultural practices and behaviours

- 2.1. conflict between formal rules and cultural norms
- 2.2. lack of adequate representation of one or several communities or groups, specifying:
  - gender

- ethnicity
- religion
- regions, etc

### 3. Internal capacity deficits

#### 3.1. shortcomings in the normative framework of the actor:

- conflicting norms
- gaps in norms

#### 3.2. shortcomings in the mandate of the actor:

- responsibility for delivering the service at issue
- services that should be in place to satisfy needs that are not included in the mandate
- services actually delivered versus services not delivered

#### 3.3. shortcomings in terms of human resources:

- inadequate membership or staffing levels – examine levels for every relevant staff category
- inadequate balance of substantive versus administrative support staff
- inadequate staffing pyramid (junior–management–leadership)
- inadequate recruitment procedures – examine procedures for every relevant staff category
- shortcomings in terms of skills and/or a lack of training – examine related training needs for every job category
- inadequate incentives in terms of salaries and career prospects, compared with average cost of living

#### 3.4. budgetary constraints or shortcomings:

- inadequate budget to cover the operational costs of service delivery
- inadequate budget for development processes
- inadequate budget to cover real expenses
- inadequate budget to cover running costs

#### 3.5. shortcomings in equipment:

- list of equipment available, providing numbers and indicating where repairs are needed:
  - o insufficient equipment

- inadequate equipment
- equipment in need of repair
- maintenance problems

3.6. shortcomings in infrastructure:

- prepare inventory and indicate where repairs or improvements are needed

3.7. lack of security:

- lack of security for staff, members, victims, witnesses or perpetrators
- insufficient protection of forensic evidence
- procedures, equipment, infrastructure and human resources are managed in ways that ensure security

3.8. organisational shortcomings:

- overly complicated rules and procedures that slow down operations or limit access to services
- ineffective or inefficient internal management systems (management structure, information systems, resource management, decision-making processes, performance management, etc)
- suboptimal distribution of resources and workloads (think of work units and the geographical and functional distribution of human resources and equipment)

## 4. External capacity deficits

4.1. inadequate cooperation procedures between the actor and other actors in the security system:

- lack of clarity about responsibilities
- overlap of or gaps in responsibilities
- overly complicated cooperation procedures
- cumbersome data management and communication systems

4.2. lack of collaboration between the actor and other actors in the security system

- leadership and priorities may not be clearly defined and agreed to and actors may not be aware of them.
- Systems to track needs, and their degree of adequacy, applicability and credibility.
- Collaboration practices

4.3. ineffective or inefficient external guidance, management or other support provided by relevant government actors:

- information systems

- decision processes
- external resource management such as budgetary or recruitment processes

## 5. Internal integrity deficits

### 5.1. Lack of respect for basic norms and values by security actors:

- inadequate conduct
- inadequate knowledge of relevant human rights standards
- involvement in human rights violations in the past (identify allegations)

### 5.2. inadequate rules and procedures to ensure that these norms and values are respected:

- recruitment and appointment procedures may not be fair or based on criteria such as competence, integrity and merit.
- codes of conduct and clear and specific norms and values.
- disciplinary and complaint procedures, their perceived fairness and effectiveness for protection of citizens.
- vetting processes, their effectiveness and compliance with basic due process standards.
- rules and procedures, their degree of transparency, including public access to trials, public reports on misconduct, public reports on budgets and expenditures, accessibility of procedures (fees, rights and obligations), etc

### 5.3. structures and mechanisms to protect the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups (eg child-friendly policies).

## 6. External integrity deficits

### 6.1. ineffective or inefficient external accountability and oversight procedures (parliamentary, political, independent, informal):

- budgetary accountability
- formal procedures to independently investigate instances of alleged misconduct
- procedures to hold actors politically accountable
- potential for citizens to initiate an investigation into alleged misconduct
- independent oversight mechanisms such as independent oversight boards, judicial commissions, independent human rights commissions and ombudsperson offices
- external vetting processes
- oversight by media and civil society organisations

### 6.2. lack of capacity and/or integrity on the part of external oversight bodies

6.3. external interference in the functioning of actors – identify and categorise the source of interference, and describe the type (bribery, threats, political benefits, etc), frequency and consequences of interference:

- political actors
- security forces
- social/religious/ethnic groups

# Annexes

## Annex A: List of programmes mapped per case study

|              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mali         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Programme to Support the Stabilisation of Mali</b> by Strengthening the Rule of Law (PROSMED), United Nations Development Programme</li> <li>• <b>Strengthening security governance in Mali</b>, International Alert</li> <li>• <b>Border Security and Management Programme</b>, Danish Demining Group</li> </ul>                                                                              |
| Burkina Faso | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Various projects in the SSG/R sector from 2007 to 2020</b>, United Nations Development Programme</li> <li>• <b>Cross-border project to improve communication between the security and defence forces and the communities in the Liptako-Gourma</b>, Search for Common Ground</li> <li>• <b>The Oumtâaba Project: Improving and Strengthening Security</b>, Search For Common Ground</li> </ul> |
| Somalia      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Justice Programme</b>, United Nations Development Programme</li> <li>• <b>The Time is Now: Strengthening Police Accountability and Access to Justice in Somalia</b>, Danish Demining Group</li> <li>• <b>Restoring Stable Communities</b>, Saferworld</li> </ul>                                                                                                                               |
| South Sudan  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening</b>, United Nations Development Programme</li> <li>• <b>South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) Action Plan for Peace Accompaniment Programme (APP)</b>, PAX</li> <li>• <b>Community Security and Peacebuilding Programme</b>, Saferworld</li> </ul>                                                                                 |

## Annex B: Sources and information on security needs and actors

- reports of national and international human rights organisations
- reports of independent national bodies such as human rights commissions, anti-corruption bodies or audit offices
- medical sources such as hospital records, experiences of medical staff and medical insurers (if records exist) for information about injuries and hence about possible victims
- reports by national and international think tanks and academic institutions
- reports of women's organisations and other relevant NGOs
- media reports
- statistics and databases of security and justice institutions
- United Nations reports:
  - reports of the United Nations Secretary-General and United Nations Security Council resolutions (Security Council online)
  - consolidated appeals processes (OCHA online)
  - reports and strategic frameworks of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC online)
  - reports of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, reports by special mechanisms of the Human Rights Council and concluding observations of human rights treaty bodies (OHCHR online)
  - United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF), common country assessments (CCA) and post-conflict needs assessments (UNDG online)
- poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) (World Bank online and IMF online)

### Additional sources for security actors

In addition to the above, the following sources may provide useful information on security actors:

- ceasefire and peace agreements
- national constitution and relevant domestic laws and statutes
- personnel files and registries of security and justice institutions
- relevant government policies and strategies



## Annex C: List of interviewees

### General expertise

| Name                         | Organisation                                                                       | Function                                                                                                                                    |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Niagalé BAGAYOKO             | African Security Sector Network                                                    | Chair of African Security Sector Network                                                                                                    |
| Mark SEDRA                   | Centre for Security Governance                                                     | Executive Director                                                                                                                          |
| Iris HARTEVELT               | Cordaid                                                                            | Sahel representative                                                                                                                        |
| Annick VAN LOOKEREN CAMPAGNE | Cordaid                                                                            | Senior Adviser, Security and Justice                                                                                                        |
| Jolie-Ruth MORAND            | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance                                | Sahel SSG/R Adviser                                                                                                                         |
| Benoit LOT                   | European Commission, Directorate-General for International Partnerships, EuropeAid | Policy Officer, Unit G5 – Resilience, Peace and Security                                                                                    |
| Hanna BERTELMAN              | Folke Bernadotte Academy                                                           | Senior Security Sector Reform Officer                                                                                                       |
| Ornella MODERAN              | International Security Studies                                                     | Head of Sahel Programme                                                                                                                     |
| Shelagh DALEY                | Saferworld                                                                         | Advocacy Adviser for International Programmes                                                                                               |
| Abigail WATSON               | Saferworld                                                                         | Conflict and Security Policy Coordinator                                                                                                    |
| Charlotte WATSON             | Saferworld                                                                         | Conflict and Security Adviser                                                                                                               |
| Lawali Garba SAHIROU         | Search For Common Ground                                                           | Project Coordinator, Niger                                                                                                                  |
| Sebastien RINELLI            | Stabilisation Platform                                                             | Civil Adviser                                                                                                                               |
| Virginie BAUDAIS             | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute                                   | Deputy Director, Sahel/West Africa Programme                                                                                                |
| Mpako FOALENG                | United Nations, Department of Peace Operations (DPO)                               | Chief Security Sector Reform Standing Capacity                                                                                              |
| Sofiène BACHA                | United Nations Development Programme                                               | Crisis Bureau, Global Policy Network – Policy Specialist, Rule of Law; Security and Human Rights Team for Sustainable Peace and Development |
| Lara DERAMAIX                | United Nations Development Programme                                               | Crisis Bureau, Global Policy Network – Policy and Programme Specialist, Rule of Law, Justice and Human Rights                               |

| Name                         | Organisation                                                             | Function                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Yulia MINAEVA                | United Nations Development Programme                                     | Crisis Bureau, Global Policy Network – People-centred Security Specialist                                                            |
| Mayen MUORWEL                | United Nations Development Programme                                     | Social Cohesion Officer                                                                                                              |
| Karin GRIMM                  | United Nations Women (UN Women)                                          | Women, Peace, Security and Policy Specialist                                                                                         |
| Brigadier General Saleh BALA | Whiteink Institute for Strategy Education and Research/White Ink Consult | President and Founder of the Whiteink Institute for Strategy Education and Research and Chief Executive Officer of White Ink Consult |
| Emilie JOURDAN               | World Bank, Fragility, Conflict and Violence                             | Senior Fragility and Conflict Specialist                                                                                             |

## Burkina Faso

| Name             | Organisation                                              | Function                                                                                           |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Silvère KIENTÉGA | Armed Forces, Burkina Faso                                | Technical Adviser, Directorate of Social Action of the Affairs of the Armed Forces                 |
|                  | Centre for Security Governance                            | Executive Director                                                                                 |
| Ruth JORGE       | Danish Refugee Council                                    | Regional Coordinator (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), Border Security and Management Project           |
|                  | Cordaid                                                   | Senior Adviser, Security and Justice                                                               |
| Valentin WAGEE   | DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance       | Burkina Faso Programme Manager                                                                     |
| Sampala BALIMA   | National Security Policy Drafting Committee, Burkina Faso | Policy Officer, Unit G5 – Resilience, Peace and Security                                           |
|                  | Lecturer-researcher at Thomas Sankara University          | Senior Security Sector Reform Officer                                                              |
| Thomas OUÉDRAOGO | National Security Policy Drafting Committee, Burkina Faso | Lecturer-researcher at Thomas Sankara University, Director of the Centre for Democratic Governance |

| Name                     | Organisation                         | Function                                                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Wiesje ELFFERICH         | Netherlands Embassy, Burkina Faso    | Senior Security and Rule of Law Expert                      |
| Beatrice Odountan ABOUYA | Search For Common Ground             | Country Director, Niger and Burkina Faso                    |
| Chloé DESESQUELLES       | Search For Common Ground             | Programme Associate Burkina Faso                            |
| Susanne ALLDÉN           | Swedish Embassy, Burkina Faso        | Head of Development Cooperation                             |
| Losséni CISSÉ            | United Nations Development Programme | Governance Specialist, Burkina Faso                         |
| Dieudonné KINI           | United Nations Development Programme | Analyst on the Political Governance Programme, Burkina Faso |
| Marino OUÉDRAOGO         |                                      | PhD Student, Security Researcher, Burkina Faso              |
| Mahamadou SAWADOGO       |                                      | Security Consultant, Burkina Faso Specialist                |
| Anselme SOMDA            |                                      | Security Expert, Burkina Faso                               |

## Mali

| Name                       | Organisation                                      | Function                                                                                 |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| General Moussa Bemba KEITA | Armed Forces, Mali                                | Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (2017–2019), Minister of Security (2020)              |
| Ruth JORGE                 | Danish Refugee Council                            | Regional Coordinator (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), Border Security and Management Project |
| Francesco SARACENO         | European Union, Capacity Building Mission in Mali | Political Adviser                                                                        |
| François FLAMANT           | European Union, Delegation to Mali                | Energy Infrastructure Programme Manager                                                  |
| Philippe LAFOSSE           | European Union, Delegation to Mali                | Political Adviser                                                                        |
| Nana Aïcha CISSÉ           | G5 Sahel Women's Platform, Mali                   | Regional Coordinator                                                                     |
| Oumar ARBY                 | International Alert                               | Mali Programme Manager                                                                   |
| Issiaka DIAKONO            | International Alert                               | Monitoring and Evaluation Officer                                                        |

| Name                      | Organisation                                                              | Function                                                                                      |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Moussa Doudou HAIDARA     | Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, Mali                            | General Coordinator of the National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission  |
| Bakoun KANTÉ              | Ministry of Security, Mali                                                | Former Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Security                                             |
| Colonel Major Nema SAGARA | National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Mali | Former Coordinator of the National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| Moussa BAKHAGA            | National Transitional Council, Mali                                       | Special Adviser                                                                               |
| Chelsey BUURMAN           | Netherlands Embassy, Mali                                                 | First Secretary, Security and Stability                                                       |
| Willemijn VAN LELYVELD    | Netherlands Embassy, Mali                                                 | First Secretary, Rule of Law                                                                  |
| Minna NAUCLÉR             | Swedish Embassy, Mali                                                     | First Secretary, Peace and Security                                                           |
| Thierry MARTIN            | United Nations, Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali | United Nations Police, Head of Development Pillar                                             |
| Samba TALL                | United Nations, Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali | Chief of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration/Security Sector Reform                 |
| Filippo DI CARPEGNA       | United Nations Development Programme                                      | Rule of Law Senior Adviser, Mali                                                              |
| Mohamed Ahmad AL ANSARI   |                                                                           | Deputy Political Adviser, Mali                                                                |
| Abass DEMBÉLÉ             |                                                                           | Governor of the Mopti Region, Mali                                                            |
| Ibrahim DIALLO            |                                                                           | Former Commissioner for Security Sector Reform, Mali                                          |
| Kissima GAKOU             |                                                                           | EMA Special Council, Mali                                                                     |
| Yves Kesse GÉRARD         |                                                                           | Former Danish Demining Group Programme Manager, Mali                                          |

## Somalia

| Name                    | Organisation                               | Function                                                                         |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Yusuf Haji HUSEIN       | Federal Ministry of Justice, Somalia       | Senior Technical Adviser, Focal Point for United Nations Joint Justice Programme |
| Salah DHIBLAWE          | Federal Supreme Court, Somalia             | Judge                                                                            |
| Guled Ahmed HASSAN      | Federal Supreme Court, Somalia             | Technical Adviser                                                                |
| Abdullahi Yusuf MOHAMED | International Development Law Organization | Field Programme Manager of the Joint Justice Programme                           |
| Ismail Haji ABDI        | Ministry of Justice, Puntland, Somalia     | Puntland State Director-General                                                  |
| Mohamed Jelle DUBAW     | Ministry of Justice, Puntland, Somalia     | Technical Adviser                                                                |
| Dahir Ali ARAB          | National Bar Association, Somalia          | Secretary-General                                                                |
| Stephen KINYANJUI       | Netherlands Embassy, Kenya                 | Senior Policy Officer for Development Cooperation, Somalia Unit                  |
| Faiza Farah ILMI        | Puntland Legal Aid Center, Somalia         | Lawyer                                                                           |
| Ali Ahmed HERSI         | Saferworld                                 | Somalia Country Director                                                         |
| Abdurahman Adam MADAR   | Somali Women Development Centre            | Legal Aid Coordinator                                                            |
| Halima Farah GODANE     | Somali Women Solidarity Organisation       | Former Executive Director (2017–2020), Board Member                              |
| Peter NORDSTROM         | United Nations                             | Senior Trust Fund Manager, Somalia Joint Justice Programme                       |
| Doel MUKERJEE           | United Nations Development Programme       | Portfolio Manager, Rule of Law, Somalia                                          |
| Abdullahi Muhammed ADAM |                                            | Secretary-General of the Jubbaland State Judiciary Service Commission, Somalia   |
| Abdullahi SHAFI'I       |                                            | PAC Chairperson in Kismayo, Somalia                                              |
| Zahra Muse SI'AD        |                                            | Galmudug State Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Somalia               |

## South Sudan

| Name                  | Organisation                             | Function                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Garang Abraham MALAK  | BBC Media Action                         | Training Officer, South Sudan                                                                                    |
| Sam LONY              | Clip Poverty                             | Executive Director, South Sudan                                                                                  |
| Joseph Ajang ATEM     | Episcopal University, South Sudan        | Assistant Academic Registrar                                                                                     |
| Colonel Dut Bol AYUEL | Ministry of Defence, South Sudan         | Director                                                                                                         |
| Rob SIJSTERMANS       | Netherlands Embassy, South Sudan         | Security and Rule of Law Expert, South Sudan                                                                     |
| Emmanuel IRA          | PAX                                      | Country Director, South Sudan                                                                                    |
| John MALITH           | PAX                                      | Human Security Survey Project Coordinator South Sudan                                                            |
| Anton QUIST           | PAX                                      | Project Lead, Human Security Survey, South Sudan                                                                 |
| Mauro TADIWE          | Saferworld                               | Country Director, South Sudan                                                                                    |
| Petter MEIRIK         | Swedish International Development Agency | Head of Unit for South Sudan                                                                                     |
| Mako Madut GARANG     | TOCH South Sudan                         | Executive Director                                                                                               |
| Evelyn EDROMA         | United Nations Development Programme     | Chief Technical Adviser/Programme Manager, Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening Programmes |
| Peruth KARUNGI        | United Nations Development Programme     | Security Specialist, South Sudan                                                                                 |
| Manyok AJAK           |                                          | Paramount Chief, Jonglei State, South Sudan                                                                      |
| Manyuon David MAYEN   |                                          | Media Consultant, South Sudan                                                                                    |

# People-centred Justice and Security Reform Programmatic Framework

## Impact

To contribute to sustainable development, stability and security through the improved accessibility, responsiveness and accountability of security and justice providers

## Sustainable Development Goals



**5 GENDER EQUALITY**  
Inclusive peace, stability and effective governance are prerequisites for reducing fragility and people's vulnerability and for sustainable development



**16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS**  
Key to peace and effective governance are improving access to good-quality and inclusive security and justice services and ensuring inclusiveness and the meaningful participation of marginalised groups (especially women and young people) in governance

## Cross-cutting issues

1. Local context analysis through historical, economic, security, political, sociological and anthropological analysis of governance mechanisms
2. Local conflict analysis through mapping of stakeholders and conflict dynamics and gender analysis
3. Designing security sector governance and reform programmes to solve human rights-based and other stakeholder (local and national) problems
4. Learning and adaptive-based programming based on lessons learned, previous programming results and perception surveys to inform future behavioural qualitative performance monitoring

## Results

### Local level

**Empowering people**, especially those left behind, and community-based and civil society organisations to articulate and advocate for their justice and security needs, advancing their interests and holding security and justice actors accountable against human rights commitments and standards

### Sub-national/provincial level

Strengthening **inclusive governance** mechanism, **accountability** and trust between civilians, justice and security stakeholders and authorities

### National level

**Enhancing people's feeling of safety** in pursuit of their lives and livelihoods, so they feel that their interests are protected by the security and justice system

## Outcomes

Communities and civil society and community-based organisations demonstrate increased capacity to engage in dialogue with and hold authorities to account on justice and security provision and conflict prevention


Communities and civil society and community-based organisations peacefully resolve conflict, promote social cohesion and address local security and justice concerns

Security and justice actors are more trusted, responsive and accountable to people, especially those marginalised and left furthest behind

Security and justice actors' leadership, strategies, doctrine and standard operating procedures enshrine the role of protecting the community, especially those marginalised and left furthest behind



## Outputs



## Outcome indicators

Number of local security and justice priority needs identified and raised by the community to the dialogue platform in the last 12 months

Number of joint dialogues involving authorities, civilians' representatives and security and justice stakeholders in the last 12 months

Percentage of population that expresses feeling safe and having confidence in security actors (disaggregated by sex, age, religion and ethnicity)

Number of initiatives implemented by security and justice stakeholders on concerns expressed by civilians' representatives in the last 12 months

Number of cases of intimidation/human rights violation reported by civil society organisations monitoring the activities of security and justice stakeholders in the last 12 months

## Output indicators

Number of people (disaggregated by sex and age) with increased awareness of their rights and greater access to complaints mechanisms

Percentages of civilians and of marginalised group members (women, young people, minority ethnic groups) participating in governance structures and mechanisms

Number of security and justice providers trained to improve competence in and skills and/or knowledge of their duties and response protocols (disaggregated by sex)

Number of complaint cases reported by community members

Percentages of civilians and of marginalised group members (women, young, minority ethnic groups) participating in security and justice dialogue platforms

Number of complaint cases received and investigated by internal inspection/audit services within individual security institutions

Number of awareness tools (leaflets, radio spots) designed and disseminated

Number and type of responses implemented by security and justice stakeholders based on requests from civilian representatives

Percentage of complaints investigated by an internal disciplinary unit accepted by prosecution services

Number of awareness campaigns implemented

Number of people (disaggregated by sex and age) trained on leadership, dialogue and advocacy skills

Number of complaint cases received by governance structure and mechanisms and reported to relevant inspection body

Percentage of citizens who report that they were a victim of or witness to a human rights violation/crime but say that they did not report it to the security and justice state institution (disaggregated by sex and age)

Number of people (disaggregated by sex and age) trained in conflict analysis and resolution

Percentage of population that trusts security and justice stakeholders (disaggregated by sex, age, and formal and informal provider)

Percentage of citizens who believe that security sector institutions serve their interests (disaggregated by sex, religion, ethnicity and income – or a proxy such as neighbourhood of residence)

Number of cases peacefully managed by local and traditional mechanisms

Number of recommendations on security and justice delivery made by civilians and implemented by security and justice stakeholders

Number of initiatives to address security and justice demands implemented

Number of human rights training sessions and tools provided by security and justice state institutions to informal security and justice providers

Number of cases of disputes referred from informal security and justice providers to security and justice state institutions

Percentage of staff trained on human rights and on the proper and proportionate use of coercive power



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