Measuring Security Sector Governance -
A Guide to Relevant Indicators

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Abstract

The growing frequency and scope of externally supported security sector reform processes has sparked demand for tools to assess changes in security sector governance in states around the world. This paper takes a first small step towards this goal. By mapping the diverse indicator sets relevant for security sector governance, it provides an overview of currently available data about the quality of security provision and security sector governance among states. In its first part, the paper specifies its understanding of security sector governance and discusses the uses and limits of qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure security sector governance. The paper then provides a comprehensive overview of existing security- and governance-related indexes and assesses their contribution to measuring change in security sector governance over time and across cases. Finally, the paper’s extensive ‘source guide for security sector governance indicators’ provides brief profiles of the discussed indicators and their data sources, and outlines variations in the scope, coverage and methodology of the various indicators.
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1. Introduction*

Security sector reform (SSR) has become a cornerstone of international development, post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building initiatives. Aimed at fostering both effective and legitimate provision of security in states emerging from conflict or undergoing processes of transition, external assistance to SSR processes has rapidly grown in both scope and scale. By seeking to ‘support states and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all’ (United Nations, 2008: 13), international donors have set themselves an ambitious goal. Over the past decade, the stated aims and mandates of externally assisted SSR initiatives have therefore become ever more encompassing. Today’s comprehensive SSR programmes and missions aim at the wholesale transformation of assisted security sectors in line with democratic standards of security sector governance.

Although considerable resources have been committed to international SSR support, so far little systematic knowledge about the results of reform processes has been generated and their effects remain understudied. Since SSR support is a complex and politically contested task taken on under often very challenging domestic conditions, the outcomes of external interventions are less than clear and can even be counterproductive. The growing frequency and scope of international SSR support have therefore sparked demand in both donor and academic communities for tools to assess and evaluate its results. This paper takes a first small step towards this goal. It brings together available data on the quality of security sector governance by mapping the diverse set of global indicators that each measure aspects of security provision and security sector governance among states. While knowledge about the state of security sectors worldwide is widely dispersed among different databases, and although no single index currently measures the ‘security of a state and its citizens’ or the ‘quality of security sector governance’, several indicators cover different aspects of security in the world.

In its mapping exercise, the paper provides an overview of currently available data about the state of security and security sector governance. It further identifies gaps in available indicator sets for measuring the quality of security sector governance. More generally, it discusses the uses and limits of qualitative and quantitative indicators for measuring security sector governance. The paper does not introduce a new methodology for monitoring and evaluating international SSR support, nor

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does it aim to contribute to the direct measurement of successes and failures of externally assisted SSR processes. Changes occurring in the governance of security in a specific state are likely to be influenced by a large number of both domestic and external factors. It is therefore a very difficult undertaking to link causally the effects of an external SSR mission to change on the ground. As only one example, how can we know whether a specific SSR programme is to be credited for a decline in overall organised crime rates in a state, or whether the demand or supply for specific trafficked goods has simply declined? Therefore, instead of attempting to measure the outcome or impact of externally supported SSR processes, the paper’s objective is far simpler: it aims to pave the way towards robust measurements of the quality of security sector governance across the world. To do so, it answers the following questions. First, which existing indicator sets contain information relevant to the security sector? And second, what contribution can these indicators make to the assessment of security sector governance in the world and where are their limits?

In other fields of international assistance, a variety of quantitative and qualitative macro indicators have by now become well established. Unlike the large number of indices that measure and track the global state of larger concepts such as ‘development’1 or ‘governance’2 today, the security field has not generated its own dedicated indicator sets. To make up for this lack of information, the paper draws on available datasets from other policy fields in which the development and use of indicators to measure changes of core policy objectives have already become common practice. The field of international development cooperation has been a forerunner in the trend of using quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure goal attainment of development policies over time. Growing international demand for the ‘effectiveness’ of international aid and development policies culminated in the international Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in 2005 (see e.g. Riddell, 2007; Anderson, 1999). At the same time, the validity of widely used indicators has not gone uncontested. For instance, the ability of the Human Development Index (HDI) to provide valid and reliable measurements of the core concept of ‘human development’ has been harshly criticised on the basis of the HDI’s specific integration of health, income and education indicators into a weighted composite index (see e.g. Sharpe, 2004: 11). Clearly, the construction of an index is not an easy task, and available indicator sets are only as good as the processes of concept specification and operationalisation that went into creating them.

To map available security-relevant indicator sets and discuss their uses and limits in measuring security sector governance, the paper proceeds as follows. The next section clarifies and operationalises the core terminology used in the field of security sector reforms: what is the concept of security underlying SSR, how do we define the security sector and, finally, what do we mean by SSR and security sector governance? In the subsequent methodological section, the paper discusses

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the construction, uses and limits of qualitative and quantitative indicator sets in the field of security. The main parts of the paper – sections 4 and 5 – introduce a wide range of available indicators that each measure aspects of security sector governance among states. In its concluding section, the paper discusses how the introduced indicators sets can be used to measure changes in the governance of security sectors and where their limits lie. The paper’s extensive source guide for security sector governance indicators provides brief profiles of the discussed indicators and their data sources. It outlines variations in the scope, coverage and methodology of the various indicators.

2. Security Sector Governance: Concepts and Definitions

‘Security’, ‘security sector’ and ‘security sector governance’ are all contested concepts that can have different connotations in different contexts and for different audiences. As a first step towards measuring the quality of security provision and security sector governance in states across the world, we need to specify the concepts that form the basis of measurement.

2.1 From Military to People-centred Security

The specification of what we mean by ‘security’ necessarily forms the bedrock of any broader measurement of security sector governance. Answering the general question of ‘who is to be secured from what and by what means’, different concepts of security can focus on diverging referent objects (‘who or what is to be secured’), which can lead to vast differences in policy (‘how is security provided’). During the past two decades, concepts of security have changed and widened dramatically. Throughout the Cold War, ‘security’ primarily referred to the security of a state from external military threats. Its end led to the rapid adaptation of existing security concepts and policies to the realities of a new security environment. In the academic world, by the early 1990s different strands of security research questioned the traditional focus on the state as security provider as well as referent object, and the limitation of the security agenda to measure military security threats objectively. Arguing that ‘security thinking should be for those who are rendered insecure by the prevailing order’ (Bilgin et al., 1998: 28), security became equal to the well-being of individuals in a state (Booth, 1991) or to the security of sub-state communities within the state (‘societal security’ – Wæver et al., 1993). In parallel and as a flipside of this extension of security referent objects, researchers recognised that military force was not the only possible security threat towards a state and its citizens. Against the sometimes fierce criticism of traditional security scholars (see e.g. Baldwin, 1997), ‘critical’ and ‘human’ security studies widened the security agenda to include non-military issues such as human rights violations, environmental degradation, social injustice and economic deprivation (see Booth, 2007; Krause and Williams, 1997; Kaldor, 2007). In a second noticeable shift away from ‘traditional’ security concepts, security referent objects were broadened to include both societal groups and
individual people. Distancing themselves from limited concerns with the preservation of state security through largely military means, new ‘human’ security concepts aim to provide answers to the question of how to meet people’s basic human needs and rights. In the end, the new human security concepts came down to a concern with people, not with states and governments.

During the past decade, broader security concepts have moved from security research to policy. In the field of international development and SSR policies, definitions of security that include the protection of individuals and communities from violence have effectively replaced classical understandings of security in military terms. Beginning with UN Development Programme’s path-breaking Human Development Report in 1994, the international community adopted ‘human security’ concepts that ultimately introduced a ‘concern with human life and dignity’ (UNDP, 1994: 22) into international security debates. As a lowest common denominator, current human security concepts promote people-centred and comprehensive approaches to counter the vulnerabilities of individuals faced with critical threats to their lives and livelihoods. This dual concern is frequently summarised as the goal of promoting both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’.

In the field of international support to SSR processes, human security approaches clearly dominate current thinking about security concepts and policies. International organisations active in supporting SSR processes consensually use comprehensive notions of security as guidelines for their work. In fact, one of the leading actors in the SSR field – the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – has been a forceful promoter of people-centred security concepts. In 2001 the OECD broadly defined security as:

> an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing. (OECD DAC, 2001: 38)

In 2007 the OECD DAC further specified that the promotion of human security is a necessary ingredient of international development policies. Security, in its understanding, is:

> fundamental to people's livelihoods, to reducing poverty and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights. (OECD DAC, 2007a: 13)

Most recently, this new understanding of security has found its way into a UN report on SSR. Outlining its people-centred approach to security, the report specified security in line with the UN Millennium Declaration as a situation in which ‘men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and the fear of violence, oppression or injustice’ (United Nations, 2008: 4).
Drawing on these currently dominant conceptualisations of security in the field of international development policy, this paper starts from a people-centred perspective on security. Instead of using a very broad conception of human security as pertaining to both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, it pragmatically focuses on the latter dimension. Several widely accepted indicator sets in the development field already provide measurements for the ‘freedom from want’ dimension of human security. The UNDP Human Development Index,3 the World Bank World Development Indicators database4 and the WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS)5 serve as examples of the growing number of datasets dealing with the state of ‘freedom from want’ objectives (i.e. hunger, development, environmental degradation). At the same time, knowledge about the state of ‘freedom from fear’ objectives (i.e. crime levels, involvement in international and domestic conflicts, rule of law) is still far more dispersed in a variety of datasets and therefore less readily available.

2.2 Defining Security Sector Governance

Similar to the concept of security more generally, ‘security sector governance’ can mean different things to different people. States have traditionally governed their security sectors in widely diverging ways. As a result, there is no single model of security sector governance that applies to all security sectors worldwide. Since security sector governance – and with it externally assisted SSR processes – differs from case to case, the following definitions are of a necessarily ideal-typical nature. Nevertheless, in order to assess the quality of security sector governance in states around the world, we have to come to a shared understanding of what, in principle, is meant by the term ‘security sector governance’. The following section first specifies its individual components: what is the ‘security sector’, what do we mean by ‘governance’ and, more specifically, by ‘security sector governance’? In a second step, it outlines the underlying normative assumptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of security sector governance.

Security Sector

The term ‘security sector’ includes the core executive security actors of a state (i.e. predominantly police, military and intelligence services) as well as the civil authorities responsible for their management and democratic oversight (e.g. ministries of the interior and defence, corresponding parliamentary committees and financial management bodies). Broadening the referent object of security to the levels of individuals and societal groups has led to a parallel widening of security sector definitions. In the United Nation’s (2008: 5–6) report on SSR, the security sector is defined broadly: in addition to the classical core executive and oversight actors, ‘elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force’, ‘civil society groups’ and

3 See footnote 1.
non-state actors such as ‘customary or informal authorities and private security services’ are considered to be part of the sector.

**Governance**

At the most general level, governance denotes the overall setting, application and enforcement of rules that guide the exercise of political authority. It is the process by which political decisions are made and implemented. The World Bank broadly defines the concept as follows:

> Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.6

In the academic debate on the distinctions between government and governance, Mayntz (2004a: 4–5) argued that one main difference between the two concepts lies in their diverging approaches to the solution of collective problems. In contrast to traditional actor-centric theories of government with their focus on hierarchical political intervention and steering, governance approaches focus on the horizontal regulation of collective problems within complex institutional structures on several levels. Héritier (2002: 3) further specifies governance as a mode of policy-making that involves private actors in decision-making and that employs non-hierarchical means of steering in order to provide common goods.

**Security Governance**

Applying the governance concept to security policy-making, the term ‘security governance’ reflects the fragmentation of political authority into hybrid modes of political steering, into multiple levels of decision-making and to a proliferating number of public and private actors (see further Hänggi, 2003). ‘Security governance’ refers generally to the different hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of political steering, decision-making and oversight present in the security field.

**Security Sector Governance**

Security sector governance more specifically refers to ways of governing a state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force in view of the increasing fragmentation of political authority among a plurality of security actors, both state and non-state. In this context, the quality of security sector governance can be distinguished into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ forms. Analogous to conceptions of ‘good governance’ in the field of international development policies, good governance in the security field can be ‘characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc.’7 (see further Hänggi, 2003). In a nutshell, good security sector governance refers to security sectors that are not only effective and efficient

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in providing security to the citizens of a state, but that are at the same time well
governed. Good security sector governance specifically refers to democratic forms
of accountability, transparent decision-making processes and a security apparatus
that is fully subordinated under the control of a civilian authority. In so far as SSR
is a process of change undertaken to improve security sector governance, the UN
report similarly expresses the normative ambitions of SSR as follows:

The goal of the United Nations in security sector reform is to support States and
societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so
as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and
the enjoyment of human rights by all. (United Nations, 2008: 13).

‘Bad’ security sector governance, on the flipside, refers to dysfunctional security
sectors that pose threats to the citizens of a state or community instead of
providing for their security, or to situations in which democratic civilian authority
over the security sector is limited or even completely missing.

3. Methodology: Strengths and Limits of Indicators

International organisations and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) have
developed a large variety of global indicator sets and indexes to measure and track
global trends in different fields. A still growing number of indicator sets measures
the worldwide state of development, governance, education, rule of law, freedom
or other objectives of international assistance. Widely used by both researchers
and practitioners, one prominent example is the World Bank's Worldwide
Governance Indicators Project. It tracks changes in the exercise of political
authority around the world by annually measuring the status of political stability,
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule
of law and the control of corruption. Global indicators such as these fulfil several
purposes. They measure the performance and quality of services of a country in a
given field, track progress of individual countries in a specific policy area over
time and allow for cross-country comparisons of state performance in a specific
area. Often, policy-makers use indicators to aid decisions on the allocation of
assistance, or for early warning and policy forecasting purposes.

At the same time, the added value of global indicators of this type is clearly
limited. The use of indicators cannot substitute for careful causal analyses of
observable changes in variable characteristics, nor can it obviate the need for
monitoring and evaluating individual policy programmes. Indicators that track
general trends in modes of security sector governance do not deliver information
about the causes of change for the better or worse at the same time. In the field of
external support to SSR processes, the strength of indicator sets therefore lies not
in directly measuring the impact of an international reform programme, but

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8 See OECD DAC (2007b) and UNDP (2002) for overviews of monitoring and evaluating international development
assistance and conflict prevention programmes. In contrast to a global indicator set that tracks changes of a
specific phenomenon over time, evaluations are selective exercises aimed at assessing the progress of specific
programmes or initiatives towards their individual objectives.
instead in judging overall progress on the overarching goals of SSR to improve security sector governance. In line with this reasoning, security sector governance indicators primarily play a role in assessing changes in the quality of security sector governance in assisted states over time. For example, according to the Vera Institute of Justice (2003), a pioneer in the development of rule-of-law indicators, performance measurement within the justice system is an important way to assess progress towards the goals of good governance. At the same time, observable changes in the overall quality of the rule of law in a specific country tell us nothing about the specific effects of individual judicial reform programmes on these changes.

3.1 Indicators and Indexes: Core Terminology

Indicators are used in social science research to measure abstract, not directly observable and often multidimensional concepts such as ‘governance’, ‘development’ or ‘innovation’. The OECD defines indicators as a ‘quantitative or a qualitative measure derived from a series of observed facts that can reveal relative positions (e.g., of a country) in a given area’ (Nardo et al., 2005: 8). The selection of specific indicators – or manifest variables – to measure different dimensions of a theoretical concept is no simple task, since the substantive content of broad concepts (e.g. security, governance, crime, corruption, freedom or the rule of law) varies over time and is frequently hotly contested. In the end, the process of concept specification and the subsequent attribution of specific manifest variables to a concept entail difficult choices about political priorities in a policy field. Therefore, indicators for contested concepts need to be chosen in a transparent process based on a clear operationalisation of the concept that a set of indicators is supposed to measure.9

In cases of complex and multidimensional concepts (e.g. ‘good governance’ or ‘rule of law’), single indicators often cannot provide an adequate basis for their measurement. Here, the construction of composite measures in the form of indexes has become a frequently used tool to track progress of more comprehensive international goals and objectives. An index is essentially a composite measure of a variable (e.g. ‘freedom’).10 Indexes are used to integrate several data items into a single score (e.g. ‘free, partly free, not free’).11 Indexes thus combine several indicators, each measuring some aspect of a larger and multidimensional concept. Generally, an index reduces complexity by integrating large amounts of information into an easily understood format (see Freudenberg, 2003: 5). Although composite measures have become a very frequently used tool, the literature remains divided into promoters and adversaries of aggregating single indicators into composite measures (see further Sharpe, 2004: 9). This paper uses the more general term ‘indicator set’ to refer to collections of indicators that are not necessarily integrated into a single index.

9 See generally Nardo et al. (2005); Freudenberg (2003); VERA Institute of Justice (2008) for an example in the rule-of-law area.
11 On index construction see further Babbie (1989: 390f).
Over the years, international organisations have developed a large range of indexes to compare progress on a variety of complex issues across states. Indexes like the HDI or the Economist Index of Democracy are commonly used to identify trends quickly and draw attention to urgent issues (see Nardo et al., 2005: 9). On the downside, the combination of different indicators into a composite score can lead to the oversimplification of complex issues or to measurements in which individual components of a composite score are weighted arbitrarily. As a result, the relationship between individual indicators and the core concept that they supposedly measure can become tenuous.

3.2 Data Sources and Data Quality

Available indicator sets vary considerably in the sources and quality of data they use. Coverage, statistical systems and the specification of particular concepts can differ widely. Index developers, a recent Vera Institute of Justice (2008: 3) report cautioned, therefore face tough challenges in creating comparative indicators able to produce standardised summary measures.

In terms of data sources, quantitative indicators commonly use aggregated macro data, such as demographic or GDP data. Also survey data (i.e. aggregated internal perceptions) and economic data (i.e. defence expenditure, economic growth) are used in quantitative indicators. In contrast, qualitative indicators frequently use system-level (i.e. polity and regime type) or expert panel and survey-based data sources that aggregate individual perceptions. Indexes that compare political institutions, regime types or other difficult-to-quantify concepts normally draw on perception-based qualitative data sources. Examples are Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Global Integrity Index. Data sources vary across indicator sets. In many cases, relevant quantitative data are difficult to obtain. As a result, as researchers producing the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators argue, there is almost no alternative to constructing aggregated indicators on the basis of subjective or perceptions-based measures (see Kaufmann et al., 2002: 19).

Data quality of a specific index entirely depends on the quality of individual indicators included. To assess the quality of a particular data set, Herrera and Kapur (2007: 366) argue that three aspects of the dataset should be given particular attention: concept validity (i.e. the relationship between a concept and empirical indicators), coverage (i.e. the completeness of the dataset) and accuracy (factual correctness). In the case of international indexes, none of these aspects is easy to ensure, since data availability varies widely across countries and factual correctness cannot always be checked. Also concept validity – do we measure what we set out to measure – is difficult to achieve, since many concepts in the field are either contested or undertheorised. In fact, no two indexes will use the same indicators to measure one concept. As a result, comparability across composite indexes is not necessarily given.

As a minimum requirement to ensure data quality, researchers need to be aware of the origin of the dataset they use. Herrera and Kapur (ibid.: 383) propose several questions as a simple 'smell test' of data quality. Who created the data? What incentives and capabilities were they subject to? Were they an independent agency? Were they governed by an external actor with a stake in the data? In principle, indicators should also be robust and reliable and their measurement should be widely supported. Finally, indicators should, if possible, rely on publicly available data, have comprehensive coverage and clearly state their focus and purpose.

3.3 Security Sector Governance: Concept Specification

No dedicated index so far focuses explicitly on tracking changes in modes of global security sector governance. Researchers and policy-makers interested in the status quo of security systems worldwide have had to rely on in-depth studies of single countries or regions, since existing global indexes are only indirectly and partially relevant for the security field. This is surprising, particularly given the fact that the quality of security in a state can have a strong positive or negative influence on a whole range of other social, economic and political indicators. Enhanced knowledge about the condition of the state monopolies on violence would enable us to better understand the effects of dysfunctional security sectors on both the livelihoods of people in an affected state and regional and international security. It would also allow policy-makers to target better the international assistance provided in the context of large-scale external support to security sector reform processes.

The construction of such an international 'security index' lies outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, to proceed with the mapping of existing security-relevant indicators, the paper operationalises the concept of ‘security sector governance’ by disassembling it into different dimensions and assigning multiple indicators to each dimension. In line with the conceptualisations of major international actors in the field of SSR and drawing on the discussion of core concepts above, the paper disaggregates the concept of security sector governance into two overarching dimensions: the quality of security provision in a state (i.e. the delivery of security to the state and its citizens) and the quality of security sector governance (i.e. the quality of governing bodies and mechanisms in the security sector).

Both dimensions feature prominently in the three major definitions of SSR provided by the United Nations, the OECD DAC and the European Union. In the United Nation’s (2008: 6) widely accepted definition, SSR has ‘as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law’.

In the perspective of the OECD DAC, SSR seeks to ‘increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law’.

13 The EU’s ESDP (European Security and Security and

Defence Policy) concept for SSR echoes and extends this definition by emphasising fostering the dual goals of effective and well-governed security sectors:

Security sector reform will contribute to an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights, which can be a force for peace and stability, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability. (Council of the European Union, 2005: 4)

All three concepts focus not only on enhancing the delivery of security itself, but also on reforming the overall quality of the governing bodies and the institutional framework of the security sectors undergoing reform. In sum, external support to SSR aims to enhance the quality of security sector governance along two dimensions: by enhancing the quality of security provision, and by enhancing the quality of security sector governance institutions.

Indicators for the first dimension focus on the quality of security provision in states across the world. They measure the extent to which a security sector is able to deliver security in an effective and efficient manner. In the broad conception of security that this paper uses, both the security of the state itself and the security of its people are benchmarks for measuring the quality of security provision. In the first classical conceptualisation, indicators for the security of a state are, for instance, its involvement in internal or external violent conflicts and the level of its military build-up. Indicators for the second and broader people-centred understanding of security are, for instance, measures of perceived and actual crime levels as well as indicators that measure the state of fundamental rights in a country. Indicators for the second dimension focus on the quality of security sector governance processes and institutions. They essentially measure the ‘quality of governance’ in the security field. Indicators for this dimension are, for instance, the type of political system, the quality of democratic accountability and oversight procedures in a security sector and the overall state of the rule of law.

The subsequent two sections map the contribution of existing indicator sets to the measurement of security sector governance. The paper first discusses available indicators that contribute measures of the quality of security provided. It then goes on to map indicators relevant to assessing the quality of security sector governance across states.

4. Indicator Set 1 - Quality of Security Provision

The first indicator set introduces existing data sources that provide measures of the quality of security provision in states around the world. In the people-centred understanding of security adopted in this paper, the concept refers to both the security of a state (state as referent object) and the security of the people and societal groups living in it (people and societies as security referent objects). In the first traditional conception, security primarily means the survival and security of a
state in the context of the international system of states. Common indicators for military security are, for instance, the involvement of a state in violent domestic or international conflict and the rate of national military expenditure. In the second broader understanding, the question of how to meet people’s basic human needs and rights takes centre stage. The development of people-centred security can be indicated, for instance, by levels of domestic safety and the quality of the rule of law and human rights in a territory.

Taken together, both perspectives should give us a rounded measure of the quality of security provision, understood as a combination of traditional state-centred and broader people-centred security. Both dimensions are discussed in turn.

4.1 State-centred Security: Indicators for International Peace and Security

In the most limited definition possible, international peace and security are indicated by the mere absence or presence of war or direct violence among states. A broader definition includes the presence or absence of structural or cultural violence (see Galtung, 1996). Indicators for the more limited definition of international security as the absence of inter-state war and violence are more ubiquitous than those measuring the more encompassing concept of peace. In the limited conceptualisation, the security of a state is determined by its level of violence and militarisation and by indicating whether it is currently party to an armed international conflict or not. Several large research projects supply the necessary data to gauge the security of a state in this limited variant. A positive conceptualisation of international peace and security as the absence of not only war but also structural and cultural violence has been rare. So far, only the new Global Peace Index has tackled the challenge of providing an indicator set for a positive concept of international peace. The table on page 12 summarises the best-known publicly available indicator sets relevant to measuring state-centred security. Combined, they draw on a variety of qualitative scores and quantitative datasets and provide indicators for both negative and positive forms of peace and security.

War and Violent Conflict

The first and most intuitive indicator for international peace and security is the lack of involvement of a state in armed internal or external conflict. Several datasets measure the presence of armed conflicts around the world. The earliest and likely the best-known datasets on war originate in the Correlates of War Project measuring inter-, extra- and intra-state war in the 1816–1997 period (see Sarkees, 2000). In the period since 1997, conflict datasets using a variety of definitions of war and conflict have proliferated. The simplest databases construct lists of ongoing conflicts; more complex assessments look at conflict trends in order to better understand the origins of warfare (see discussion in Eck, 2005: 7).

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<td>• Global Peace Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarisation</td>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
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<td>Proliferation of arms</td>
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<td>• Global Peace Index</td>
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<td>Culture of peace</td>
<td>Level of structural and cultural violence</td>
<td>• Global Peace Index</td>
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Currently, the most relevant and annually updated datasets are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland (CIDCM) and the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK). Further, the International Institute for Strategic Studies provides an annual comprehensive overview of non-state armed activity throughout the world in its Chart of Conflict.

For the last 20 years the UCDP has recorded and annually updated information on a variety of aspects of armed violence. Besides being ‘one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts’, its datasets include information on organised crime, the resolution of conflict and human security. The UCDP defines armed conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’. In the German-speaking context, the HIIK records information on military conflicts that have occurred between 1945 and today. Its Conflict Barometer annually counts and qualitatively assesses the occurrence and intensity of intra- and inter-state conflicts. CIDCM’s International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project complements the two datasets with its measurement of foreign policy crisis situations between the years 1918 and 2001.

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Levels of Militarisation

In addition to the incidents of inter-state warfare or intra-state violent conflict, the militarisation of societies and the military build-up in states across the world usefully indicate a state’s potential for military conflict and escalation. As mostly single-issue indicators, several databases directly and from different perspectives quantify the level of ‘militarisation’ in a state. The Bonn International Center for Conversion’s Militarization Index, last updated in May 2005, combines data on military expenditures, average weapon system holdings, armed forces personnel and employment in arms production. It is also known under the name of BIC3D (Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization Index).\(^\text{18}\) The International Institute for Strategic Studies *Military Balance* annually assesses the military capabilities and defence economics of 170 countries worldwide. A sourcebook on military capabilities and hardware as well as military expenditures of states across the globe, the *Military Balance* editions have compiled defence-related data by region since the late 1950s. The military expenditure database produced by SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) covers a similar range of countries and provides an open-source time series of military expenditures since 1988.\(^\text{19}\) Finally, the Small Arms Survey, based at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Switzerland, has provided a quantitative measurement since 1999 of global small-arms and light-weapons issues, including the production, diversion (theft), destruction, transfer and transparency of small-arms and light-weapons stockpiles.\(^\text{20}\) Taken together, a state’s military expenditure, its military capabilities and, if applicable, the proliferation of small arms in a region are here seen as indicators for the role of military force in a state or region.

Culture of Peace

The most encompassing measurement of international peace and security is the new Global Peace Index. A composite index aimed at measuring ‘positive peace’, it includes both more traditional indicators (absence of war, level of militarisation) and indicators for the presence or absence of cultural or structural violence. The index is currently in its second year, with data available for 121 states for the years 2007 and 2008. It comprises 24 indicators in three fields: the level of ongoing domestic and international conflict; the level of militarisation; and the level of safety and security in a society. The index understands ‘internal safety and security’ in a very broad manner and includes indicators that not only assess homicide rates and the state of the rule of law, but also range from the level of distrust in other citizens to the level of respect for human rights. As a composite index, it applies a weight of 60 per cent for the measure of internal peace and 40 per cent for external peace, arguing that ‘a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict’.\(^\text{21}\) The Global Peace Index therefore to some extent overlaps with the subsequent measurement of the state of human safety and security around the world.


\(^{19}\) See project website, http://milexdata.sipri.org/, available February 2010.


In sum, indicators for international peace and security draw on different sets of (mostly qualitative) indicators. While some focus on the absence of war and study battle deaths and the militarisation of society, the Global Peace Index broadens the agenda by focusing on cultural attributes and developing indicators for ‘positive peace’ in a country.

4.2 People-centred Security: Indicators for Individual Safety and Fundamental Rights

Complementing traditional concepts of security as the security of a state in the international system, the second set of indicators focuses on broader notions of domestic and people-centred security. Two dimensions of security are distinguished here. First, the quality of security delivery can be indicated by the actual level of safety and internal security in a territory, i.e. by levels of crime or victimisation. Further, people-centred approaches to security include the presence or absence of threats to individual human rights and the quality of the rule of law in their conceptions. Accordingly, the quality of security delivery is secondly indicated by changes in the application of fundamental human rights in a state.

Safety and Internal Security

As a domestic counterpart to the concept of international security, the notions of ‘safety’ or ‘internal security’ refer to the ability of a state’s citizens to live free from immediate danger to their lives and livelihoods. While international security is concerned with the quality of relations among states, safety and internal security refer to the (perceived) security of the people living in a specific state.

One caveat applies to this distinction: in recent years a rise in domestic civil strife and transnational criminal activities has blurred the boundary between external peace and internal security. Correspondingly, the available indicators and measures for the dimensions of both ‘external peace’ and ‘domestic safety’ increasingly overlap. As one example, the proliferation of small arms will be detrimental both to the state of peace in a country and to the safety of its population. In practice, though, measurements for domestic and international security differ markedly in their choice of security referent objects. International security is measured by indicator sets that focus on the security of the state, and particularly on warfare, weaponry and a country’s involvement in international conflicts. The domestic security of a state’s population, on the other hand, is mostly measured by indicators generated in the fields of law enforcement and criminology. Criminologists traditionally use three major sources of data to measure the status quo of internal security in a state: crime statistics, victimisation surveys and perceptions of safety and crime. Each dimension effectively measures a different aspect of the ‘internal security and safety’ construct and uses different types of data to do so. Taken together, they give us a good idea of the state of internal security and safety in a country.
Crime levels

Crime statistics are recorded by the police and are, at least at first glance, the most authoritative and objective datasets available. If enlisted to measure the safety and internal security of a country, the most commonly used crime statistics indicators for safety are changes in the volume of crime over time and comparisons of criminal incidences across jurisdictions (see Vera Institute of Justice, 2005: 8). Currently, the largest survey measuring crime rates worldwide is the UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).22 Established in 1978, the initially five-yearly and today biannual survey collects data on the incidence of crime worldwide, including counts of recorded crimes for homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, embezzlement, drug trafficking, drug possession, bribery and corruption. Since the survey is completed on a voluntary basis, a less-than-complete picture of crime incidences results. Countries participating in the survey vary. The ninth survey covering the years 2003–2004, for instance, collected information on 75 countries. The survey is based on official data and can be used to measure the safety of a population in terms of its exposure to violent and serious crime. Since 1996 additional data exist for 36 European states: the European Sourcebook of Crime collects a compendium of crime and criminal justice data for Council of Europe member states.23

The uses and abuses of this type of crime data, however, are heavily contested. The first caveat that applies to crime statistics is their reliability. The clandestine nature of criminal activities and the often sensitive nature of crime statistics in the eyes of national governments makes measuring the extent of organised crime very difficult (see van Duyne et al., 2004; van Dijk, 2007a, 2007b). Not all crimes are reported, and of those that are, not all incidents are recorded in official police statistics. We can generally assume, however, that the more serious a crime, the more likely it is to be included in the official statistics. Additionally, we know little about ‘victimless’ crime such as the trafficking of weapons or drugs, where both sellers and buyers usually lack incentives to contact the police. Secondly, crime

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<th>Dimension</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Official crime rates, particularly homicide rates</td>
<td>• UNODC Survey on Crime Trends</td>
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<td>Police investigation statistics</td>
<td>• Political Terror Scale</td>
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<td>• US Annual Trafficking in Persons Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victimisation</td>
<td>Survey of household and personal crimes rates</td>
<td>• International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety perceptions</td>
<td>Survey of safety perceptions</td>
<td>• International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS)</td>
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figures face the question of validity, or whether they measure what they set out to do. Figures on seized drugs and weapons, arrests and convictions of criminals may tell us more about police activity than about actual crime levels (van Dijk, 2007a: 40). A rise in arrests and prosecutions may simply point to more police involvement in specific fields of criminal activities. And a rise in the rates of reported crime may indicate either higher crime rates or simply an increased level of confidence in the law enforcement services (Vera Institute of Justice, 2005: 4). Low rates of crime prosecution may vice versa indicate criminal state capture and police corruption, instead of low crime levels.

Thirdly, data on crime are traditionally collected in national settings and according to national definitions of what constitute licit and illicit activities. The continuing lack of internationally shared crime definitions and methodologies has led to a dearth of datasets that compare criminal activities across countries. The UNODC outlines three reasons why cross-country crime level comparisons are difficult. First, there are different legal definitions for specific crime types in different countries. Second, there are different levels of reporting and traditions of policing and police accessibility across the world. And third, researchers face diverging social, economic and political contexts, a factor that becomes relevant for instance in cases of rape or sexual abuse. As a result of these caveats, the number of homicides recorded in a police statistic may well be the most reliable and valid source of crime data for country comparisons currently available. It follows from this discussion that crime indicators should not be used on their own. To deal with the ambiguity of individual indicators, they should instead be grouped into ‘baskets of indicators’ that relate to the same policy objective and can provide more valid and reliable assessments (see ibid.).

Victimisation levels

Alternative indicators that can usefully complement the UN Survey of Crime Trends are victimisation surveys. Instead of drawing on official crime statistics and police-recorded crime, victimisation surveys collect quantifiable data on victim-recorded crime (see for instance Lynch, 2006) A relevant survey of this type is the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) that became operational in 1989. It aims to provide better comparative criminological data that go beyond officially recorded crime by measuring actual experiences with crime and corruption. To further this aim, the project conducts worldwide standardised surveys on householders’ experience with common crime. Experience with organised and complex crimes lies mostly outside the scope of this survey, since these crimes victimise collective populations rather than the individuals interviewed for the ICVS (see also van Dijk et al., 2008). So far, five surveys in 78 states have been completed. Initiated by a group of criminologists, the survey draws on expertise developed in national contexts to produce comparable estimates of victimisation. A new measure of both volume and nature of crimes in Europe is the European

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Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS). Similar in methodology to the ICVS, it is a survey-based dataset that compares levels of crime across European countries independent of police records.

Safety perceptions

The UN and ICVS datasets collect information on police- and victim-recorded crime, respectively. Combined, they provide a good approximate indicator of the safety of a population from crime, although the outlined caveats (reliability and validity of data) still apply. A third dimension concerns people’s perceptions of safety. Although a population’s perception of crime and safety may not necessarily correlate with actual crime levels in a country, these perceptions are nevertheless ‘at least as important as actual crime rates’ (Vera Institute of Justice, 2005: 7). As one example, the ICVS compares safety perceptions with actual crime levels, and showed for 2004–2005 that perceived safety on the streets was not related to actual levels of street crime (see van Dijk et al., 2008). Yet public perceptions of high crime levels can shape a country’s internal security policies even in the absence of elevated levels of risk.

Currently, very few surveys specifically ask about individual safety perceptions. The ICVS survey, for instance, includes an item ‘fear of crime’. Here, interviewees are asked how likely it is that they will be burgled in the coming year and how safe they feel on the streets. In the future, an initiative to develop an organised crime perceptions index aims to measure the perceived prevalence of organised crime levels in countries worldwide by combining different datasets into a single indicator (see van Dijk, 2007a: 39).

On the whole, the triad of police records, victimisation and public perceptions of safety can be usefully combined to indicate the changing level of safety within a state or territory. At the moment, the outlined approximate and conflicting measures of crime levels are the only option available to researchers interested in assessing the safety and internal security of citizens in states across the world.

Fundamental Rights

The second dimension of a people-centred approach to security includes not only the immediate safety of a society from crime and violence, but also the larger ability of its citizens to live in freedom and in a rights- and rule-based society. The application of fundamental human rights is taken as an indicator for the state of this dimension of people-centred security. More specifically, the ability to exercise political rights freely and the state of civil liberties in a territory provide the main two indicators for the state of fundamental rights in a country. A negative measurement of liberty in a state, the degree of ‘deprivation of liberty’ as expressed in the incarceration rate of citizens, complements the two positive measures of civil liberties and political rights.

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<th>Dimension</th>
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<th>Data Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>State of freedoms of expression and belief</td>
<td>• Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State of free association and assembly rights</td>
<td>• Economist Democracy Index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State of social and economic freedoms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>State of freedom to participate in the political process</td>
<td>• Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State of electoral process</td>
<td>• Economist Index of Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deprivation of liberty</td>
<td>Level of prison population</td>
<td>• World Prison Brief</td>
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<td>• Economist Index of Democracy</td>
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Fundamental Rights: Dimensions, Indicators, Data Sources

Civil liberties and political rights

The term ‘political rights’ refers to the ‘voice’ of a state’s citizens in its political process, i.e. their freedom to participate in selecting their government, as well as their freedom of expression and of political association. Civil liberties, on the other hand, commonly refer to the freedoms of religion, speech and belief, and particularly to personal autonomy and the protection of the individual vis-à-vis the state and its institutions. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators measure political rights in the ‘voice and accountability’ dimension (see most recently Kaufmann et al., 2008). The Economist Index of Democracy also includes civil liberties and political rights into its ‘voice and accountability’ indicator. Perhaps the best-known index that measures the state of both civil liberties and political rights remains Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ report. Freedom House provides numerical ratings (on a scale of 1–7) of the state of political rights and civil liberties around the world. It specifies both concepts by distinguishing them into seven fundamental components. In line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a state’s citizens are free if they:

- participate freely in the political process; vote freely in legitimate elections; have representatives that are accountable to them; can exercise freedoms of expression and belief; are able to freely assemble and associate; have access to an established and equitable system of rule of law; and have social and economic freedoms, including equal access to economic opportunities and the right to hold private property.27

To rate the individual state of ‘freedom’ in each state, Freedom House bases its reports on qualitative data, i.e. on opinions and analyses of regional experts and scholars as well as on a variety of qualitative data sources used by its expert panels. In essence, the – not uncontested – Freedom House ratings of states as ‘free, partly free or not free’ remain the main and best-known indicators developed to

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date for measuring the political and individual freedoms of people across the world.

**Deprivation of liberty**

The World Prison Brief’s index of a state’s prison population complements the above measures of civil liberties and political rights by providing a negative measure of the ‘deprivation of liberty’ in a state. Published by the International Centre for Prison Studies at King’s College, London, the World Prison Brief considers the total prison population of states across the globe, including pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners. The Economist Index of Democracy indicator set provides similar data for this dimension. A caveat applies to the inclusion of this indicator in the measurement of security sector governance: taken on its own, the level of prison population in a country itself does not tell us much about the quality of security sector governance in a state. Instead, while the level of prison population may point to a more repressive internal security architecture of a state, it can also simply signal the presence of higher criminal activity in a society. A further caveat applies to this indicator in so far as prison rates can reflect weaknesses in penal systems as well as differences in public views on law and order rather than abuses of civil liberties and political rights. Thus the US has one of the highest rates of imprisonment while Guinea-Bissau has one of the lowest, but it would not be correct to infer that these rates are an apt reflection of the state of civil liberties and political rights in either case. Although not robust in itself, it can be used to complement existing qualitative measures of civil liberties.

In summary, the introduced indicator sets for the two dimensions of state-centred and people-centred security are expected to provide a robust assessment of the multidimensional concept ‘quality of security provision’. Indicators for state-centred security draw on existing measures of the state of international peace and security (i.e. war, militarisation, culture of peace). Indicators for people-centred security are divided into measures of individual safety and internal security (i.e. crime, victimisation, safety perceptions) and measures of fundamental rights (i.e. civil liberties, political rights, deprivation of liberty).

### 5. Indicator Set 2 - Quality of Security Sector Governance

The second indicator set complements the introduced measures of the quality of security provision in states around the world. It focuses on the quality of security sector governance, i.e. on the quality of the process of security delivery. How are security sectors in states around the world governed and how can we measure the quality of the different types of security sector governance?

First of all, the type of political system in a country plays a crucial role in determining the quality of its form of security sector governance. Following Hänggi’s (2003: 16ff) discussion of democratic security sector governance, ‘good

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governance’ of the security sector is therefore in the first instance indicated by the existence of a democratic constitutional and legal framework that guarantees both the appropriate institutional checks and balances of a political system and the democratic separation of judicial and political powers. Secondly, the quality of security sector governance is indicated by the existence and quality of an overarching set of political and legal institutions that guarantee civilian control of a security sector through a democratically elected government. Accountability procedures, i.e. parliamentary and judicial oversight of the security sector, therefore form an integral part of measuring the quality of security sector governance. Parliamentary control includes – depending on the national regulations in question (Wagner, 2006) – oversight over security-related budgets, the approval of security strategies and troop deployments and the ratification of international treaties. Thirdly, the state of the rule of law influences the quality of security sector governance in a state. Indicators for the institutional integrity of a political system or, on the flipside, of the pervasiveness of corruption provide measurements of this third dimension of the quality of security sector governance in states around the world.

For the purposes of this paper, indicators for the quality of security sector governance are differentiated into three dimensions: the general state of the democratic constitutional and legal framework in place to govern security institutions (‘state and stability of democratic institutions’), the democratic civilian control of the security sector (‘civilian control’ and ‘judicial and parliamentary accountability mechanisms’) and the overall quality of the ‘rule of law’ in a state. The different available indicator sets that measure aspects of each dimension are summarised in the table on page 21.

5.1 State and Stability of Democratic Institutions

The most basic indicator for the quality of security sector governance is the form of government of a state. By measuring the qualitative characteristics of political authority in a state, the Polity IV dataset provides a good basis for differentiating between democratic and autocratic qualities of political systems. To do so, the current Polity IV dataset examines the concomitant qualities of institutionalised democratic and autocratic authority, and models the institutional characteristics of political regimes between 1800 and 2007. Polity IV measures a state’s process of executive recruitment, the nature of constraints on executive authority and the possibility of political competition in a state. In contrast to fully institutionalised democracies, autocracies will restrict political participation, executive recruitment will be limited to the political elite and executive powers will be largely unconstrained.

In addition to this quantitative dataset, at least two qualitative composite indexes are relevant for measuring the state of democratic government around the world.

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<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<td>Characteristics of political authority</td>
<td>Polity IV dataset</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Level of institutional and political stability</td>
<td>Economist Democracy Index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Competitiveness of political participation</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Transformation Index</td>
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<td>Constraints on executive power</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
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<td>Process of executive recruitment</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
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<td>Civilian control and accountability</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
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<td>Judicial and parliamentary oversight institutions and accountability</td>
<td>‘voice and accountability’)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State of civil society and public access to information</td>
<td>Global Integrity Report</td>
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<td>Role of state monopoly on violence in politics</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
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<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Open Budget Index</td>
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<td>Institutional integrity</td>
<td>Civil Society Index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Existence of anti-corruption mechanisms</td>
<td>Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
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<td>Perceived corruption levels</td>
<td>Global Integrity Report</td>
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<td>Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index</td>
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The broadest of these, the Economist Democracy Index, assesses the state of democracy by measuring performance in five key areas: elections, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation and political culture. More extensive in its conceptualisation of democracy than Polity IV, the Worldwide Governance Indicators or the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, it assumes free and fair elections and civil liberties to be necessary conditions for any ‘full democracies’, and includes a supportive democratic political culture, adequate political participation and a minimally effective government as sufficient conditions. Finally, the Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index assesses the status of both democracy and market economy in states across the globe. The status of the ongoing political transformation towards democracy is indicated by a combination of ratings for the level of political participation, rule of law, ‘stateness’ (i.e. the functioning and territorial extension of state institutions), stability of democratic institutions and the level of political and social integration.

Further to the overall state of democracy, the stability of political institutions in a state also affects the quality and sustainability of democratic forms of security sector governance. Reliably low levels of political instability and violence lie at the heart of the ability of a state’s citizens to live free from immediate danger to their
lives and livelihoods. Complementing the introduced measures of the democratic quality of political systems, a second set of indicators therefore focuses on the institutional stability of political institutions.

One of the better-known composite indexes measuring the risk of instability in states is the Failed States Index. It uses a set of 12 indicators to assess the risk of state failure around the world. Among others, the FSI includes levels of delegitimation, criminalisation and deterioration of a state’s institutions, laws and services in its indicator set. Another measure is the ‘political stability and absence of violence’ component of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. This indicator primarily measures perceptions of instability (i.e. ‘the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means’). It also measures changes in the absence or presence of violence in a society by integrating items for, among others, internal conflict, civil unrest, extremism and terrorism. Finally, the University of Maryland’s Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger assesses the risk of instability in a state over time and according to a range of economic, social and political indicators. For the specific case of the stability of the state monopoly on violence, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2008: 16) gauges the quality and extension of a state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force over its territory.

Related to the outlined stability measures is the new Political Terror Scale that focuses on the level of political violence in a state. Originally developed by Freedom House, it maps levels of political violence and terror that a state experiences. It bases its assessment on the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US State Department country reports on human rights practices. Its indicators measure whether terror and political violence are localised or have expanded to the whole population, and it assesses the extent of civil and political rights violations and imprisonments.

5.2 Civilian Control and Accountability Mechanisms

More specifically geared towards assessing the quality of democratic governance in the security sector itself are indicator sets that measure the quality of political and judicial control and accountability regimes in place to oversee a state’s security sector. Encompassing both political and judicial oversight of the state monopoly on violence, democratic accountability measures in the security field refer to the obligation of security actors to report on their activities to the political and judicial institutions of the state. In broader terms, institutionalised accountability relationships exist if a group or individual can demand reports on an agent’s activities, and if that group or individual has the ability to impose costs on the agent (Keohane, 2003). In brief, democratic accountability in a constitutional

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system generally characterises a relationship in which power-wielders are accountable to a broader public (ibid.).

Unfortunately, there are no specific indexes that measure the accountability regimes and civilian control of security sectors around the world. Instead, several indicator sets assess the existence and quality of accountability regimes more generally. For instance the Worldwide Governance Indicators include the dimension of ‘accountability’. This particular index, however, conflates ‘accountability’ and ‘voice’ into a single dimension, thus the World Bank’s specification of accountability in terms of participation, elections and access to information overlaps quite substantially with indicators for civil liberties and political rights. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (commercial) Country Risk Service further usefully distinguishes between the ‘accountability of public officials’ and the existence of ‘vested interests’ in a state. The Global Integrity Index, a relatively new index with as yet limited coverage, includes government accountability (i.e. executive, legislative, judicial and budget accountability) as one of its six ‘integrity indicators’. Its four sets of questions enquire, inter alia, into the process of appointing judges, accountability laws for the chief executive and legislature, and the transparency of the budget process. Finally, the Open Budget Index provides a comprehensive measure of a state’s accountability mechanisms in the establishment of its budget. It is an interesting addition to existing datasets, since it not only evaluates the formal existence of specific legal and institutional accountability measures, but also asks about ‘what occurs in practice’.

Indicators that assess the civilian control mechanisms in place for overseeing the security sector of a state only exist as negative measures of ‘military involvement in domestic politics’. The role of the security apparatus within a state is for instance measured by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) Militarization Index. One of BICC’s indicators asks whether the ‘security apparatus operates as a “state within a state”’, as indicated by the emergence of elite guards who operate with impunity, state-supported private militias, public security forces that serve the interest of single factions and rival militias or guerrilla forces that challenge the security forces of the state. Within its monthly country risk guide, the Political Risk Services ‘military in politics’ indicator focuses on the direct or indirect participation of the military in politics and the potentially inefficient changes in policy and reductions of accountability that such an involvement can yield. The Worldwide Governance Indicators have integrated the Political Risk Services ‘military in politics’ indicator into their measurement of ‘voice and accountability’. Additionally, the Civil Society Index provides annual measures of the state of global civil society as indicated by its internal structure, environment, values and impact. Civilian control can be exerted through the public sphere constituted by civilian experts, the media and NGO representatives that enable informed public debates about security issues. A functioning civil society can therefore play a positive role in providing public civilian oversight of the activities of a security sector.

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34 The full set of integrity indicators can be found at http://report.globalintegrity.org/, available February 2010.
5.3 Rule of Law

Since the 1990s, international assistance to judicial systems has grown significantly, particularly in the context of larger democracy promotion programmes (Carothers, 1999: 164). Judicial reforms have also become part and parcel of many SSR initiatives. Yet the concept of ‘rule of law’ means a variety of things in different national and legal contexts. At its most general, ‘rule of law’ refers to a situation in which ‘the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone’ (Carothers, 1998: 96). These laws specifically enshrine the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-century. For the development of its rule-of-law indicator set, the Vera Institute of Justice’s (2008: 3) definition generally emphasises the ‘supremacy of the law’ over all other spheres of political and social life, and specifically mentions the relevance of ‘equity, accountability and avoidance of arbitrariness’.

Measures for this item have to cope with large variation in the quality of rule of law throughout the world. At one extreme of the spectrum lie cases where the public has lost confidence, and where state institutions themselves are delegitimised or non-existent. Here, indicators of weak or limited statehood such as the Failed States Index can be helpful. On the other hand, measures also have to provide analyses of differences in the rule of law within the OECD world. In this case, more fine-grained composite indexes of the integrity and ‘lawfulness’ of a state will be useful, referring to both the quality of formal institutions upholding the rule of law and the normative orientations of the public (see van Dijk, 2006). Currently, several large indexes provide comprehensive measures of the ‘rule of law’ across the world. The Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Economist Democracy Index all focus on the rule of law as one of their core indicators for governance and democracy. The specific indicators chosen to measure the quality of rule of law ask whether legal proceedings are executed in a fair, speedy, competent and impartial manner, and enquire into the level of confidence a population has in the rules and laws of the state. The Worldwide Governance Indicators, for instance, measure perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, court systems and the likelihood of crime and violence.

More specific measurements of the integrity of a political, legal and economic system complement general ‘rule-of-law’ indicators. The integrity of a political system is normally measured through its counterpart: corruption. Several different ways have been developed to indicate corruption levels (see Kaufmann et al., 2006 for a discussion). Integrity indicators can assess how relevant stakeholders or the general public perceive corruption in a state or region. Transparency International’s well-known Corruption Perceptions Index37 (CPI) draws on expert opinions, while its Global Corruption Barometer presents polling data on perceptions of the general public. The composite CPI defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, and its questionnaire broadly asks about perceptions of bribery and embezzlement of public funds and the actual strength

and effectiveness of a state’s anti-corruption efforts (see Graf Lambsdorff, 2008). The Worldwide Governance Indicators offer a similar measure of perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, and additionally measure the extent of ‘state capture’ (Hellman et al., 2003). The latter is the degree to which firms and other private interests influence policy and legal environments in a state. A final type of index, the Global Integrity Index, focuses on the institutional features of anti-corruption measures in a country, i.e. on the ‘existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key anti-corruption mechanisms’. It excludes measurements of corruption perceptions or corruption levels as such. Instead, it focuses on formal measures to safeguard the integrity of a political system, regardless of whether they actually function in an ideal-typical fashion or not.

Taken together, the three dimensions of the state and stability of democratic institutions, the quality of accountability and civilian control mechanisms, and the general state of the rule of law give us a good overall assessment of the quality of a state’s democratic security sector governance. Currently, the ability to measure specifically the quality of modes of security sector governance remains incomplete, as the lack of specific indicators for the civilian control of the security sector indicates. Moreover, most available indicators remain limited to the general political and legal institutions of states and do not focus specifically on the security sector.

6. Conclusions

The paper answers a growing demand in the donor and academic communities to create tools for the assessment of externally assisted SSR as an instrument for improving security sector governance. As a first small step towards this objective, it discussed the strengths and limits of existing indicator sets for the measurement of security sector governance. This mapping exercise provided an overview of currently available data about the quality of security provision and security sector governance around the world.

To specify the concept ‘security sector governance’, the paper disaggregated it into two dimensions. The first dimension focused on the quality of security provision, from both a state-centred and a people-centred perspective. The second dimension assessed the quality of security sector governance, considering the robustness of democratic institutions, democratic civilian control and accountability, and the rule of law. For both dimensions, the paper summarised and discussed the contribution of existing indicators to measure not only the quality of security provision but also the governance of security institutions. What did the selected indicator sets contribute to the assessment of security sector governance around the world, and where were their limits? Although some indicators are relatively new (e.g. the Global Peace Index and the Open Budget Index) or do not provide comprehensive coverage (e.g. the Global Integrity Index).

Report and the International Crime Victims Survey), the paper finds that several of the more established indexes allow us to measure aspects of security sector governance. As only some examples, the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Economist Democracy Index, the International Crime Victims Survey, the Failed States Index and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index all contribute substantively to the objective of tracking changes in the quality of security sector governance around the world. The main added value of these indicator sets lies in their ability to track the progress or decline of specific aspects of security sector governance over time and across cases.

Most indicators in the field of security primarily draw on qualitative data sources, specifically on data generated by external experts (e.g. Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index). In composite indicators, quantitative data sources sometimes complement and round off qualitative expert advice (e.g. the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Global Peace Index). A further series of indicators is based primarily on quantifiable measurements such as economic or defence-related data (e.g. the International Country Risk Guide, the SIPRI databank on military expenditure and the IISS Military Balance). Finally, surveys and opinion polls like the Survey on Crime Trends and the International Crime Victims Survey focus on the perceptions of individuals.

The limitations of using available indicators to measure security sector governance are, nevertheless, quite substantial. Wide variations in data sources and geographical coverage of the discussed indexes complicate the integration of different indicators into more comprehensive measures of security sector governance. At the same time, the validity and reliability of the different indicator sets also vary. In some cases the existence of a clear political agenda behind the creation of a particular index can lead to biased measures. As the OECD (2008: 13) warns, indicators can easily be misused to support desired policies. Also, poorly constructed indicators invite simplistic policy conclusions.

Gaps in the substantive coverage of available security-relevant indicator sets exacerbate the challenge of coming to valid conclusions about the state of security governance around the world. Above all, specific data on civilian control and accountability mechanisms in the security field are still hard to come by. Several indicators measure the quality of accountability and oversight mechanisms of a political system, or assess the general state of civil society in a state. None of these, however, focuses on specific oversight mechanisms for the security sector. Beyond the UNODC Survey on Crime Trends and the International Crime Victims Survey, data for the ‘safety and internal security’ dimension were similarly difficult to find.

One final major caveat concerns the state-centric nature of many of the reviewed indexes. None of the available indicator sets sufficiently takes the role of non-state actors in security sector governance into account. The rising influence of armed non-state security actors such as militias, rebels, clan chiefs or warlords in areas of limited statehood strongly influences both security delivery and the quality of
security sector governance (see further Schneckener, 2007). Also the increased use of private security contractors in conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq has repercussions for the governance of security institutions. Since available indicators focus primarily on the characteristics of state institutions and actors, however, the impact of private security actors on security sector governance remains inadequately reflected in available datasets. Therefore, although this paper attempted to go beyond traditional state-centred security concepts by including a people-centred perspective, it was unable to extend its scope to the wide range of non-state security actors that have become increasingly relevant for the governance of security sectors worldwide. As a result of these limitations, the use of available indicators to measure security sector governance still has to be approached with some caution.
Appendix: Source Guide for Security Sector Governance Indicators

Organisation of Appendix

The appendix provides an extensive guide to available indicators for measuring security sector governance. It gives an overview of the discussed indexes and data sources that can be utilised to measure the quality and performance of security governance systems. Variations in the scope, coverage and methodology of the outlined indicator sets are very large. Some are based on quantitative data sources and provide large, but rather general, datasets that cover many states over a long period of time. Other qualitative indicators have a more specific focus and cover fewer years or countries. The following pages provide a compendium of the most relevant available indicators for the quality of security sector governance worldwide. The appendix does not aim to cover all available datasets on issues of security, but focuses on those that have the largest scope and coverage and are freely accessible to the public. Criteria for inclusion in this compendium were substantive relevance, accessibility of primary data, worldwide geographical coverage, availability of information on the internet and transparency of methodology used in the construction of the index in question. This source guide for security sector governance indicators aims to complement other existing valuable source guides that focus, for instance, on governance, conflict or development indicators (see Arndt and Oman, 2006; UNDP, 2003, 2004; Eck, 2005; Sharpe, 2004).

The appendix systematically describes each index according to a standard format: it first briefly introduces the background of the institution or project providing the dataset, and then summarises the main aims, scope and topics covered by the index according to each project’s self-description. Further, each summary briefly provides a snapshot of both methodology and data sources of the index and indicates the frequency of measurements and its geographical coverage. Which countries are covered over what period of time? Is it a qualitative or quantitative index, what are the data sources used, and how is the index constructed? The summaries also indicate the accessibility of the main findings: are they freely available and in what formats are the findings presented? Finally, the dataset’s website and major publications concerning its findings are named.

List of Indexes Covered in the Source Guide

The following major indexes and indicator sets are presented in the appendix. They are listed in alphabetical order according to the name of the index or to the research institutions providing the index, depending on how the index is primarily known.

- Bertelsmann Transformation Index
- CIDCM International Crisis Behavior
- Civil Society Index CIVICUS
- Economist Democracy Index
- Failed States Index
- Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ Report
- Global Integrity Report
- Global Peace Index
- HIIK Conflict Barometer
- IISS Military Balance
- International Crime Victims Survey
- Open Budget Index
- Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger
- Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide
- Political Terror Scale
- Polity IV Project
- SIPRI Data on Military Expenditure
- Small Arms Survey
- Survey on Crime Trends
- Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
- UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and Battle Death Data
- US Annual Trafficking in Persons Report
- Worldwide Governance Indicators
- World Prison Brief
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<th><strong>Bertelsmann Transformation Index</strong></th>
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**CIDCM International Crisis Behavior**

| **Background** | The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland, College Park, US, has hosted the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) since 1975. Following the assumption that knowledge can facilitate the effective management of inter-state crises, its primary aim is to accumulate and disseminate knowledge about inter-state conflicts and protracted crises in the world. |
| **Subject** | The ICB assesses the ‘sources, processes and outcomes of all military-security crises since the end of World War I’. Its database includes all military crises across the world in the contemporary era. It provides qualitative and coded crisis overviews that include comparative information on crisis triggers, characteristics, geography, great-power and international organisations’ involvement, mediation and outcomes. |
| **Relevance for security sector governance** | The ICB Project provides measures for the dimension of ‘international peace and security’, particularly for the measurement of the ‘war’ dimension (i.e. foreign policy and military crises). |
| **Methodology** | The project uses qualitative and quantitative methods in its analyses and draws on both in-depth studies of single states and their decisions and cross-case studies that cover all crises under analysis in the project. |
| **Coverage** | The project covers all military interstate crises between 1918 and 2006. The most currently released data set (version 9.0, 1/2009) contains information on 452 international crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 994 involved crisis actors. |
| **Access** | The ICB data viewer (www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/) provides free access to the collected crisis data. The data collections and codebooks can be downloaded, both in the full-text version and as SPSS file. |
| **Website** | www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/ |
**Civil Society Index**

**Background**
The CIVICUS Civil Society Index aims to create ‘a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening initiatives’. Initiated by civil society institutions during the 1990s, the index was created both to strengthen civil societies and to enhance their contribution to positive social change. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS is located in Johannesburg, South Africa.

**Subject**
The CSI measures the state of civil societies in their national contexts along four dimensions: the structure of civil society, the external environment of civil society, values practised and promoted in the civil society arena and the impact of activities pursued by civil society actors.

**Relevance for security sector governance**
The CSI provides measures for the dimension of civilian control and accountability, specifically an indicator measuring the state of civil society in providing civilian control of the security sector.

**Methodology**
The project uses 74 indicators to measure the state of civil society. Grouped into 25 sub-dimensions, they focus on the structure, environment, values and impact of civil society. Main output of the index is the graphical representation of indicator scores as a ‘Civil Society Diamond’. Data sources are qualitative, with the index drawing on regional stakeholder consultations and community and media surveys as well as fact-finding case studies. To summarise findings into index scores from 0 to 3, a national advisory group scores indicators using a ‘citizen jury approach’ that emphasises public deliberation.

**Coverage**

**Access**
The results have been published as CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society (Vols I –II). The project’s indicator database is available online (www.civicus.org/csi-phase1/index.php).

**Website**
www.civicus.org/csi
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<th><strong>Economist Democracy Index</strong></th>
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<td>Failed States Index</td>
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<td><strong>Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Global Peace Index</strong></td>
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## HIIK Conflict Barometer

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<th><strong>Background</strong></th>
<th>The annual Conflict Barometer is published by the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK), part of the Department of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, financed by the EU. Now in its seventeenth year, the HIIK is dedicated to studying and documenting intra- and inter-state political conflicts.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>The HIIK’s database Cosimo 2/CONIS records information on political conflicts between 1945 and today. It defines conflicts as the ‘clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals’. Drawing on the Cosimo 2/CONIS database, the Conflict Barometer annually counts and qualitatively assesses the occurrence and intensity of intra- and inter-state conflicts in the world. Depending on their level of violence, conflicts are classified into five levels of intensity: latent conflict, manifest conflict, crisis, severe crisis and war.</td>
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<td><strong>Relevance for security sector governance</strong></td>
<td>The Conflict Barometer measures the absence or presence of violent conflict in a state and therefore provides indicators for the dimension of ‘war’.</td>
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<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>The HIIK has adapted its methodology to the changing characteristics of conflict over the past decades. Starting out with an emphasis on inter-state conflicts, the barometer today focuses on assessing the occurrence of intra-state conflicts. The Cosimo 2/CONIS database contains information on all types of intra- and inter-state political conflicts since 1945. In contrast to other measurements of war and violent conflict, the HIIK bases its measurement on the conflict intensity observed, not only on the number of fatalities that a conflict has generated.</td>
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<td><strong>Coverage</strong></td>
<td>The Conflict Barometer is published annually and covers all inter- and intra-state conflicts since 1945. The most recent edition counted 345 conflicts in 2008, of which 30 were fought with the use of a massive amount of violence, 95 were conducted with sporadic use of violence and 211 were non-violent. The Conflict Barometers of the years 1992–1996 and 1998–2001 are available in German only.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Access</strong></td>
<td>Access to both reports and the underlying raw data (until 1998) is available on the HIIK’s website free of charge. Currently the CONIS database has not yet been released to the public.</td>
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**IISS Military Balance**

| **Background** | The Military Balance is published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, UK. It is produced by the IISS’s Defence Analysis Department to give a comprehensive overview and assessment of military capabilities and defence economics in 170 countries. |
| **Subject** | The Military Balance is the probably most authoritative and publicly available assessment of military forces and defence expenditures across the world. Its annual publication provides region-by-region assessments of military capabilities and defence data in a standard format. Its most recent assessment (2010) includes assessments of both traditional state actors and non-state activities. Entries on each of the 170 countries covered include demographic, economic and military data. The assessments of military forces consist of information on manpower, conscript services, organisation, number of formations and inventory of major equipment of each armed service of each state. |
| **Relevance for security sector governance** | The Military Balance provides indicators for the 'militarisation' dimension (i.e. military expenditure, weapons systems in use). |
| **Methodology** | The IISS uses both qualitative and quantitative data sources in its assessment of personnel strength and equipment holdings of each state. Assessments are based on 'the most accurate data available' or 'the best estimate that can be made'. |
| **Coverage** | Updated every year, the Military Balance has been published since 1959. |
| **Access** | The Military Balance is a commercial publication that is not available free. It includes a chart of conflict and a comprehensive overview of all armed activities and conflicts throughout the world. |
### Background

Coordinated by the Criminal Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in Turin, Italy, in conjunction with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, Austria, the International Crime Victims Survey was initiated in the late 1980s. Since then it has evolved into the primary standardised survey of citizens' experience with common crime. Its major aim is to advance criminological research by producing estimates of national victimisation rates that can be used for international comparisons.

### Subject

The ICVS provides an assessment of the extent to which the general public of a state is exposed to common crimes. As statistics on police-recorded crime cannot be easily compared across countries since crime definitions vary, the ICVS measures victimisation rates by standardised surveys of the population’s experience with crime. It does not cover complex crimes such as large-scale corruption or organised crime, but focuses exclusively on measuring experience with conventional crimes (vehicle crimes, burglary, attempted burglary, theft of personal property) and contact crimes (robbery, assault and sexual offences).

### Relevance for security sector governance

This index measures victimisation rates as part of the safety and internal security dimension (i.e. actual rates of household and personal crimes), and provides measures for the perception of public safety and crime levels in covered states.

### Methodology

The ICVS is a quantitative, longitudinal and standardised household survey. Its full methodology is downloadable from the ICVS website. Currently in its fifth round, it uses random sampling of between 1,000 and 2,000 households per round and collects data both by telephone-assisted and face-to-face interviews.

### Coverage

In 1989 the first report was published with coverage of 14 industrialised countries. The following surveys took place in 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004/05. By the end of 2005 over 140 surveys had been finalised in over 78 different countries (in 37 countries nationwide). Over 320,000 citizens have been interviewed in the course of the ICVS so far, and the present database covers 325,454 individual respondents. The current report focuses on 30 countries.

### Access

The ICVS publications are available online and the raw datasets can also be downloaded from its website.

### Websites

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<th><strong>Open Budget Index</strong></th>
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## Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger

### Background
The University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) in College Park, MD, US, publishes the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, a ranking of states at risk of instability, to identify those states most at risk of instability and violent conflict.

### Subject
The 2010 ledger ranks 162 countries in terms of their risk of future state instability within a time-span of three years. It is basically a composite index that measures the concept of ‘instability’ through five main indicators: the institutional consistency of a regime; its economic openness – the extent to which it is integrated in the global economy; its infant mortality rates as a measurement of overall economic development; its level of militarisation; and the presence of armed conflict in its neighbourhood. From these five factors, the ledger calculates a single score that captures the overall risk of future instability.

### Relevance for security sector governance
The ledger assesses the risk of political instability, and thereby contributes to measuring the ‘state and stability of democratic institutions’ dimension.

### Methodology
The ledger calculates its ranking with a statistical model that takes into account episodes of political instability over the past six decades. It presents each country’s likelihood to succumb to political instability and violent conflict as a ‘risk ration’ that indicates the relative risk compared to the average likelihood of instability in OECD member countries. Finally, in a bid for transparency of its measurements, the ledger indicates the level of statistical confidence in each country’s risk estimate.

### Coverage

### Access
Summaries of the major findings of the Conflict and Instability Ledger and its methodology are freely available online.

### Website
[www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/)
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<th><strong>Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide</strong></th>
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## Political Terror Scale

### Background
Developed in 1976, the Political Terror Scale measures the level of political violence and terror in countries worldwide. The PTS is published by Mark Gibney and Linda Cornett, both University of North Carolina at Asheville, and Reed Wood, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, US.

### Subject
The PTS understands ‘terror’ as the violation of physical integrity rights worldwide and thus differs in its definition from current conceptualisations of terrorism. Specifically, it measures the rate of state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment undertaken by states. While not completely disregarding non-state actors, the PTS focuses explicitly on state-sanctioned political violence. A country’s individual PTS score expresses the political violence and terror a country experiences in a specific year in numerical terms. On a scale from 1 to 5, a country remains fully under the rule of law (1), experiences a limited amount of political violence (2), has extensive political imprisonment, executions and unlimited detentions (3), a large part of a country's citizens experience civil and political rights violations (4), and finally, terror has expanded to the whole of the population (5).

### Relevance for security sector governance
The Political Terror Scale measures the level of political violence and terror in a state, and contributes to measuring the ‘state and stability of democratic political institutions’ dimension as well as to the ‘crime’ dimension.

### Methodology
The PTS is based on data provided in Amnesty International's and the US State Department’s human rights reports. Coding is done manually by subjective assessment according to each of the two data sources; the individual scores for a country are then compared.

### Coverage
In its first instalment, the PTS covered 59 countries for the years 1976–1983. Its current edition has extended its coverage to more than 180 countries. The PTS is published annually.

### Access
The PTS dataset is downloadable freely from the PTS website.

### Website
www.politicalterrorscale.org/
## Polity IV Project

### Background

The Polity IV Project provides one of the most widely used databases on regime change. Building on its predecessors, Polity I–III under the direction of Ted Gurr, the main idea remains to code the authority characteristics of states in the world systems ‘for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis’. Part of the Center for Systemic Peace, it is currently directed by Monty G. Marshall at George Mason University in Washington, DC, US.

### Subject

Polity IV assesses the degree of democracy and autocracy in the political structures of states by examining the concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in government. Its output is summarised in ‘polity scores’ that characterise the spectrum of political authority, ranging from ‘fully institutionalised autocracies’ to mixed or incoherent authority regimes (‘anocracies’) to ‘fully institutionalised democracies’.

### Relevance to security sector governance

Polity IV measures the ‘characteristics of political authority’ in the ‘state and stability of democratic institutions’ dimension.

### Methodology

Polity IV is a quantitative database that captures differences in regime authorities by measuring key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition. It provides a 21-point policy scale that distinguishes the three major regime categories (autocracy, democracy, anocracy) into different regime type values. Its main output is the Polity Index that combines democracy and autocracy scores into a single indicator. Polity data only include information on institutions of the central government and political groups active within it. Coding is done by experts based on a subjective interpretation of historical monographs and other source materials.

### Coverage

The project provides annual records of regime characteristics in all independent states (greater than 500,000 total population) between 1800 and 2008. It currently covers 163 countries.

### Access

The Polity IV dataset is freely available for download.

### Website

[www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)
### SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

| **Background** | The Military Expenditure Database is one of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s flagship publications. Established in 1966, SIPRI is a Swedish independent research institution with a traditionally strong focus on issues of arms control and disarmament, among others. |
| **Subject** | The database provides information on military expenditure worldwide, with the aim of providing a single measure of the ‘scale of resources absorbed by the military’ across states. Military expenditure is all costs incurred by the armed forces, defence ministries and other government bodies engaged in defence projects, paramilitary forces and military space activities. SIPRI provides data in three formats: in local currency and at local prices, in constant US$ and as a share of gross domestic product. |
| **Relevance to security sector governance** | By quantifying and comparing military expenditures worldwide, the MED contributes to the measurement of the ‘militarisation’ dimension. |
| **Methodology** | The database is a straightforward collection of available quantitative data on military expenditure. Unless there is convincing information to the contrary, SIPRI draws on official government data and takes these national data to be accurate. The database uses two different types of data: primary sources, e.g. official data provided by national governments in their publications or in responses to questionnaires, and secondary sources, e.g. international reports and measurements provided by international organisations like NATO. The database exclusively relies on open-source data, including answers to an annual SIPRI questionnaire on military expenditure. |
| **Coverage** | The database currently covers military spending in 172 countries for the period 1988–2008. |
| **Access** | The data are freely available for download from the SIPRI online database. They are also published in SIPRI’s yearbooks. |
| **Website** | [www.sipri.org/databases/milex](http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex) |
| **Background** | The Small Arms Survey is produced by the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established by the Swiss government in 1999 as an independent research project, the survey aims to be the ‘principal source of impartial public information on all aspects of small arms and light weapons’. Built on the conviction that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons represents a grave threat to human security, it further aims to act as an international resource, forum and clearing-house for all matters related to small arms and light weapons. |
| **Subject** | The Small Arms Survey is primarily known through the annual publication of the same name. As an annual review of global small-arms issues (e.g. ‘production, stockpiles, brokering, legal and illicit arms transfers, the effects of small arms, and national, bilateral, and multilateral measures to deal with the problems associated with small arms’), the survey processes and presents a wide variety of data on small arms. |
| **Relevance to security sector governance** | The SAS contributes to our understanding of the ‘militarisation’ dimension by measuring the proliferation of arms transfers in the world. |
| **Methodology** | The SAS compares data sources and individual data points on small-arms transfers and other small-arms matters. It integrates data taken from several sources into numbers of military firearms, pistols, revolvers, sporting and hunting rifles and shotguns transferred each year. Predominantly the data are taken from national arms exports records, the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register) and the reports on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Some data are provided by country experts. |
| **Coverage** | The survey does not cover the proliferation of small arms in states across the world. Instead, its assessment of small-arms transfers focuses solely on the world’s largest importers and exporters of small arms. The 2009 survey includes data on 53 countries. Each year, thematic sections of the survey cover different aspects of the small-arms challenge. |
| **Access** | Since 2001 the survey’s findings have been published in the annual *Small Arms Survey*. Available in hard copy, most recent reports are also freely available online. |
| **Website** | www.smallarmssurvey.org/ |
## Survey on Crime Trends

### Background

The UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS) was begun with the aim of conducting a long-term assessment of crime trends worldwide. Conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, Austria, its main aim is to improve international knowledge about crime incidences and the workings of criminal justice systems worldwide. In providing this overview, the survey aims to improve the analysis of crime trends and assist policy-makers in making informed decisions about criminal justice issues worldwide.

### Subject

The survey first and foremost provides an assessment of crime trends and of the operation of the criminal justice frameworks in participating states over the last two decades. It collects data according to a standard questionnaire that covers information on the main components of the criminal justice system (police, prosecution, courts and prisons) and the numbers of crimes committed and prosecuted in a state. Questions include information on crimes recorded, persons convicted in criminal courts, the number of people incarcerated and personnel levels in the different parts of criminal justice systems.

### Relevance to security sector governance

The survey provides indicators for official crime rates and the operation of the criminal justice service, and thereby provides indicators for the ‘crime’ dimension.

### Methodology

The CTS is based on a mostly statistical questionnaire sent out to participating states. In the tenth wave, the core questionnaire included a standard set of crime and criminal justice system questions. The modular part of the questionnaire deals with selected crime issues. The methodology of the questionnaire is straightforward, because the UNODC confines itself to reproducing the figures ‘as received in the questionnaire’. The collected data, however, have their limitations: they cannot differentiate between variations in definitions of offences across countries, nor can they take into account variations in counting criminal incidences. The comparison of data among countries therefore remains a challenge.

### Coverage


### Access

Full responses to the CTS are freely available online (after free user registration).

### Website

# Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index

## Background
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is Transparency International’s flagship publication. Transparency International was founded in 1993 as a ‘global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption’. The mission of the German Berlin-based NGO is to ‘create change towards a world free of corruption’. Published since 1995, the CPI is used as a tool to put corruption and its negative effects on the international policy agenda.

## Subject
The CPI provides a qualitative measurement of perceived levels of public sector corruption. It uses both expert assessments and opinion surveys to rank countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, on a scale between 0 (highly clean) and 10 (highly corrupt). The CPI defines corruption as the ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’. Since robust and direct quantitative data on levels of corruption are hard to obtain, the index limits itself to measuring the perceptions of those groups that are affected by corruption. It measures the perceived levels of abuse of power by asking about bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds and the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.

## Relevance to security sector governance
The CPI provides measures of ‘perceived corruption levels’ and the ‘perceived institutional integrity’ of political systems in the dimension ‘rule of law’.

## Methodology
The CPI is a composite index that draws on data from 13 polls and expert and business surveys carried out by 11 institutions (poll-of-polls system). It is based on the concept that combining different data sources into a single index enhances the reliability of data. To ensure validity, different data sources used in the index are standardised before the mean values of a country are determined.

## Coverage
The 2009 CPI covers 180 states.

## Access
All data are freely available for download.

## Website
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
**UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and Battle Death Data**

**Background**
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and the Norwegian Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), collaborate to produce two quantitative datasets on the prevalence of armed conflict and battle deaths in the world. The two datasets primarily serve an academic audience and have been widely used in statistical research on the incidence and effects of internal and external armed conflict in the world.

**Subject**
The two datasets provide quantitative measures of armed conflict and battle deaths in the world. Main units of analysis are armed conflicts, defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’. Battle deaths are defined as deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted by the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat.

**Relevance to security sector governance**
The datasets provide quantitative indicators for measuring the incidence of ‘war’.

**Methodology**
The armed conflict dataset selects conflicts for inclusion according to its chosen definition of armed conflict. Each conflict is listed and given a unique ID code. Time is not a factor incorporated in the database: i.e. two conflict episodes over the same incompatibility are assigned the same ID, regardless of time differences.

**Coverage**
The two datasets each cover the years 1946–2008 (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2009).

**Access**
1946–2008 armed conflict data and the 1946–2008 battle deaths dataset are available for free download online. Both datasets are compatible.

**Website**
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/
| **Background** | The US Annual Trafficking in Persons Report is the result of the US Department of State’s obligation to submit an annual report to the US Congress on ‘foreign governments’ efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons’. Now in its ninth edition, the report aims to increase awareness of the human trafficking phenomenon and is guided by the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000 (amended in 2008). It is primarily a diplomatic tool for the US to strengthen anti-trafficking policies abroad and engage other governments in cooperative anti-trafficking efforts. |
| **Subject** | The TIP is the most comprehensive report on worldwide human trafficking and smuggling currently available. It covers ‘severe forms of trafficking in persons’, defined as sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion, or the forced, fraudulent or coerced trafficking of a person for labour or services. The report includes data on countries of origin, transit and destination for trafficking victims. It also focuses on governments’ direct and concrete action to fight trafficking. This includes prosecutions, convictions and prison sentences for traffickers as well as victim protection measures and prevention efforts. |
| **Relevance to security sector governance** | The TIP report contributes to the measurement of transnational crime in the safety and internal security dimension. |
| **Methodology** | The US Department of State uses a variety of sources to compile the annual report. It draws on information provided by US embassies, foreign government officials, non-governmental and international organisations, published reports, research trips to every region and information submitted directly to the US Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. The report provides country narratives that describe the scope and nature of the trafficking problem, the government’s efforts to combat it and its compliance with major anti-trafficking standards and rules. Each country is ranked in Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List or Tier 3. The omission of a country from the report may indicate the lack of adequate information on trafficking related to it. |
| **Coverage** | The report is now in its ninth edition and has been released in the years 2001–2009. Until 2008 it covered all states with a ‘significant number’ of trafficking victims, defined to be 100 or more. Since 2008 this requirement has been eliminated, thereby expanding the scope of countries included in the report. |
| **Access** | The reports themselves are freely available for download. Datasets used in the compilation of the reports are not online. |
| **Website** | [www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm) |
### Background
Good governance and anti-corruption measures are part of the World Bank’s poverty-alleviation mission. Good governance provides the fundamental basis for economic development. The release of the Worldwide Governance Indicators is part of the World Bank Institute’s approach to support countries in improving governance and controlling corruption. The indicators serve the purpose of ‘providing individual countries with a set of monitorable indicators of governance they can use to benchmark themselves against other countries and over time’. However, the WGI have no official status in the Washington, DC-based World Bank and are only one of several tools available to monitor governance.

### Subject
The WGI are one of the most widely used indicator sets that assess cross-country differences and changes in country performance over time on key dimensions of governance. Governance is broadly understood as the ‘traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’, and is divided into six main dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, i.e. the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media; political stability and absence of violence, i.e. the likelihood that the government will be destabilised by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism; government effectiveness, i.e. the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressures and the quality of policy formulation; regulatory quality, i.e. the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector development; rule of law, i.e. the extent to which agents confide in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; and control of corruption, i.e. the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.

### Relevance to security sector governance
The WGI are of central importance for the measurement of the ‘rule of law’, ‘state and stability of democratic institutions’, ‘militarisation’ and ‘civilian control and accountability’ dimensions.

### Methodology
The WGI organise and synthesise data from a wide variety of sources drawn from enterprise, citizen and expert surveys as well as from experts from NGOs, public sector agencies and providers of commercial business information. The latest version of the WGI is based on 35 data sources from 33 organisations around the world. Primary data are aggregated into six governance indicators that correspond to the WGI’s six dimensions of governance. As such, the WGI are based exclusively on perceptions and subjective data sources. The aggregation methodology follows an unobserved component model (UCM). It assumes that the ‘true’ level of governance in each country is unobserved, and that each available source provides noisy ‘signals’ of the level of governance. The UCM constructs a weighted average of the sources for each country as best estimates of governance in it. Weights are proportional to the reliability of each source. The reports include margins of error that accompany each country estimate.

### Coverage
The WGI six dimensions of governance for 212 countries and territories over the period 1996–2008 are available. Indicators were updated biannually between 1996 and 2002 and are now updated on a yearly basis.

### Access
Datasets and main reports of the World Bank Governance Indicators Project are freely available for download. As of 2006, all sources used to aggregate indicators have also been made public.

### Website
www.govindicators.org
# World Prison Brief

## Background

Since 2000 the World Prison Brief has been compiled by the International Centre for Prison Studies at King’s College, London, UK. Its aim is to provide better information on prison systems worldwide, with a view to enhancing the development of policies on prisons and the use of imprisonment in states around the world in line with international human rights standards.

## Subject

The WPB provides quantitative information on prison populations and population rates (per 100,000 of the national population), the use of imprisonment for women and juveniles, and the extent of pre-trial imprisonment and prison overcrowding.

## Relevance to security sector governance

The WPB contributes to the measurement of the ‘deprivation of liberty’ dimension by measuring incarceration rates in states around the world.

## Methodology

The brief uses a variety of sources, but is primarily based on the national prison administrations’ own data. Data are presented in the form of lists and as a series of maps. To make data more easily comparable, it uses median rates of numbers of persons held prisoner.

## Coverage

The WPB has been released since 2000 and is now in its eighth edition. It provides information on the global prison population and the incarceration rate per 100,000 of the national population (the prison population rate) in 218 countries and territories.

## Access

The world prison population lists for 2005, 2007 and 2009 are available for free download.

## Website

www.prisonstudies.org
Bibliography


Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform and security sector governance. DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.