


**DCAF** a centre for security,  
development and the  
rule of law

The International Security Sector  
Advisory Team (ISSAT)

# SSR IN A NUTSHELL

**MANUAL FOR INTRODUCTORY TRAINING  
ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**







# ABOUT THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES

Established in 2000, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world's leading institutions in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Security Sector Governance (SSG).


DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance to states and international organisations to reinforce and strengthen their efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. Additionally, DCAF develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at both international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research to make recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.

DCAF's partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security services and the military.

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) was established as an integral part of DCAF in 2008. Its current membership includes fourteen countries and five multilateral actors. ISSAT aims to increase the capacity of the international community to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes, to enhance the effectiveness and quality of SSR programming, and to facilitate the coordination and coherence of international assistance for nationally-driven SSR processes. ISSAT supports its members through the provision of four key services: Advisory Field Support, Advocacy and Outreach, Knowledge Services and Training Support.

For more information on DCAF and ISSAT, please visit <http://www.dcaf.ch>, and <http://issat.dcaf.ch>.

Join the ISSAT Community of Practice (CoP) on the ISSAT website to connect to other security and justice reform practitioners from around the world, access resources, and contribute your experience.



<http://issat.dcaf.ch>

# ACRONYMS

<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BCPR</b>	UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>CIF</b>	Capacity and Integrity Framework
<b>CoP</b>	Community of Practice
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
<b>DCAF</b>	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>DFAIT</b>	Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
<b>DFID</b>	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
<b>DPKO</b>	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FBA</b>	Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
<b>GPSF</b>	Global Peace and Security Fund
<b>IDDRS</b>	UN's Integrated DDR Standards
<b>IPMA</b>	Integrated Project Management Approach
<b>ISSAT</b>	DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team
<b>JSR</b>	Justice Sector Reform
<b>LogFrame</b>	Logical Framework Analysis
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PESTLES</b>	Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental and Security Analysis
<b>PMSC</b>	Private Military and Security Company
<b>QIP</b>	Quick Impact Project
<b>RBM</b>	Results-Based Management
<b>SAF</b>	Swedish Armed Forces
<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>Sida</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SNDC</b>	Swedish National Defence College
<b>SNP</b>	Swedish National Police
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>SMART</b>	Smart, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound criteria
<b>START</b>	Canada's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force
<b>TJ</b>	Transitional Justice
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>WGA</b>	Whole-of-Government Approach
<b>WSA</b>	Whole-of-System Approach



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# INTRODUCTION TO THE MANUAL AND HOW TO USE IT

This manual complements ISSAT's Introductory Level 1 Security Sector Reform Training Course. It aims to provide a basic overview of Security Sector Reform (SSR) policy and practice based on collective experience in supporting security and justice reform efforts. The manual is built around four key pillars of SSR:

**Section one: The Concept of SSR.** This section discusses SSR as a concept, explains its evolution and theoretical foundations and provides definitions of key terms. It also highlights some key characteristics of SSR.

**Section two: Key Security and Justice Actors.** This section maps the main security and justice actors at both the national and international level and proceeds to discuss coordination among these actors when engaging in SSR.

**Section three: SSR Programming.** This section elaborates the various stages of the SSR programme cycle, and addresses various challenges—both political and technical—that could arise when engaging in SSR programming.

**Section four: Cross-Cutting Issues.** This section reviews important thematic and practical aspects of SSR that are often overlooked, including gender issues, human rights and programme management. It also discusses issues closely related to SSR, such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control and Transitional Justice (TJ).

This manual provides an overview of the theoretical background and key practical insights needed to engage in SSR programming, setting out the main principles but also highlighting various challenges that could arise when engaging in SSR. For those who have completed the ISSAT Level 1 Introductory Training Course, as well as those getting involved in SSR policy and programming for the first time, this textbook will remain a useful reference.

# SECTION 1

## INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

This section outlines the development and evolution of the policy discourse around Security Sector Reform (SSR), provides definitions of basic SSR terminology and introduces key characteristics of SSR.

### 1.1 HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The concept of ‘security’ has been traditionally viewed in purely state-centric terms, focusing on the protection of states from military threats. Following the end of the Cold War, however, attention gradually shifted towards the people and their well-being. This had a profound impact on the conceptualisation of security and threats to security. As a result, the notion of security came to encompass not only classic military threats, but also the need for states to safeguard and promote the livelihoods of their people—what is widely referred to today as human security.

**“Human security encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human- and therefore national security.”**

**Kofi Annan**  
Former UN Secretary General (2000).



The concept of SSR developed along with this shift towards human security. It explicitly emphasised the linkages between security and development, prompting the development community to redefine its role in the field of security, while also highlighting the importance of security in the establishment of sustainable peace and development. In 1999, in one of the first references to SSR, former UK Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short referred to SSR as a prerequisite for sustainable development (Short 1999, DFID 2000). Since then, the concept has spread rapidly throughout the development and security communities.



Today, SSR is viewed as central to the international community's efforts to help prevent violent conflict and build lasting peace in states as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste.

**“It’s all about making people feel safe... For most people today, a sense of insecurity comes not so much from the traditional security concerns, but from concerns about their survival, self-preservation and well-being in a day-to-day context. Human security is relevant to people everywhere (...). The threats to their security may differ from hunger and disease to drugs and crime.”**

Source: Training participant (2010)



In order to underscore the importance of SSR in their developmental and peacebuilding efforts, many international, regional and bilateral actors have placed SSR on their agenda through the development of various SSR policies and guidelines. The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's Report on Security Sector Reform (2008), for example, testifies to the growing importance of SSR and the need for the international community to address it in an efficient, effective, coherent and coordinated manner. The report offers a comprehensive overview of the UN's policies and approaches to SSR. Both the European Union (EU) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have issued similar policy documents, while the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are currently in the process of developing their own SSR policies. Finally, individual countries such as the France and Guinea Bissau have also developed their national SSR strategies.


## 1.2 BASIC TERMS

In order to define SSR, it is important to first understand the interrelated concepts of ‘security’ and the ‘security sector’. Each of these concepts, as well as the notion of SSR, is discussed below. As SSR is a relatively new and fast evolving concept, discussions continue over the nuances of each of these elements, but there is growing consensus on key characteristics associated with SSR.

### SECURITY

The traditional, state-centric understanding of security has gradually given way in recent years to what is widely referred to as the new security agenda. The new security agenda recognises the wide range of state and non-state actors that can act as security providers—or in some instances, as purveyors of insecurity. It also takes a broad view of security, understanding national security not only in military terms but also in terms of political, social, economic and environmental security. In this context, SSR should be understood as encompassing both the protection of the state and the well-being of its population. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of our understanding of security and the move towards the new security agenda (based on Hänggi, 2003, pp. 4–8).

**FIGURE 1: THE NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY**



## SECURITY SECTOR

Traditionally, the security sector was understood to encompass the collective of security agencies responsible for internal and external security. These institutions, empowered with the legal right to bear arms on behalf of the state, included military forces, police and other law enforcement agencies, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, intelligence and secret services, border guards and customs authorities, among others.


The new definition of security takes a broader view of the security sector. It recognises the interrelated nature of the security and justice sectors and the need to balance increases in effectiveness with greater accountability. The understanding of the security sector therefore encompasses a broader range of state and non-state security and justice actors.

While there is no fixed definition of the security sector, there is, however, consensus on the categories of actors that play a key role in the provision of security and justice services. These include:

1. State security and justice providers;
2. State governance and oversight mechanisms;
3. Non-state security and justice providers; and
4. Non-state governance and oversight mechanisms

Figure 2 provides some examples of the types of actors and institutions that fall under each of these four categories. In section 2, the various actors and their interrelationships will be discussed more in detail.

**FIGURE 2: KEY SECURITY SECTOR ACTORS**





While there are clear differences between security and justice providers—such as their governing principles and procedures, and the types of skills and experiences that inform their management and operations—there is growing recognition that security and justice reform efforts should overlap. As a result, the security sector is also referred to as the security and justice sector.

Irrespective of terminology, there exists a clear link between both sectors, as highlighted through the criminal justice chain. The police, for example, will be unable to effectively fight crime without a functioning judiciary. Similarly, the courts and prosecutors will be unable to carry out their mandates without the criminal investigations conducted by the police. Finally, the efforts of the police and the judiciary will not be successful if the prison system is dysfunctional. It is therefore crucial to bear in mind that the activities of one category of security and justice actors can—and do—affect the activities of other actors.

### Why SSR?

SSR enhances the security and protection of individuals and their property, which is not only an achievement in itself but also promotes their social inclusion and improves the conditions for economic development.

Where the security sector is a source of conflict, SSR helps to transform the sector into an instrument of conflict prevention and management, which contributes to development and paves the way for other development activities.

SSR promotes greater participation of marginalised and disenfranchised people in the decision-making related to the security sector and its reform, enhances their involvement in the oversight of the security sector, and increases access to security and justice.

SSR may also lead to a more effective allocation of resources, and better budgetary management, which could in turn make more resources available for other development activities.

**Based on Michael Brzoska (2003, pp. 24-27)**



## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The concept of Security Sector Reform is often used to refer to the process through which a country seeks to review and enhance the effectiveness and the accountability of its security and justice providers. While the concept itself continues to evolve and some variations of this definition exist, it is broadly acknowledged that SSR:

- is a nationally-owned process aimed at ensuring that security and justice providers deliver...
- is effective and efficient security and justice services that meet the people's needs, and that security and justice providers are...
- is accountable to the state and its people, operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.

In the UN context, SSR is conceived as:

a process of assessment, review and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (United Nations, 2008a, para. 17).

Another commonly quoted definition comes from the OECD DAC, which describes SSR as a process in which a country seeks to:

increase [its] abilities to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 21).

Taken together, both descriptions illustrate that SSR operates under the assumption that security and development are mutually reinforcing factors (also referred to as the security and development nexus) and that principles of justice, rule of law and governance are key reference points in SSR.

**“The truth is, development without security is not possible; security without development is only temporary.”**

Mr. Hilary Benn,

Former Secretary of State for International Development, UK (Center for Global Development, Washington, 23 June 2004)

### What is in a Name?

The abbreviation “SSR” is used throughout ISSAT documents to refer to the improvement of service delivery by, and oversight of, security and justice institutions/actors (both state and non-state). There are many different terms adopted by national and international actors that encompass these concepts, including and not limited to: “Security Sector Reform (SSR)”, “Security System Reform (SSR)”, “Security Sector Governance (SSG)”, “Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR)”, “Security Sector Development (SSD)”, “Security Sector Transformation (SST)”, “Security Sector Management (SSM)”, and “Security and Justice Sector Development (SJSJ)”. These terms are also used within ISSAT texts and are understood to be synonymous with “SSR”, as defined above.


## 1.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Building on the understandings described above, the following characteristics of SSR can be identified:

- ONE fundamental approach to SSR: local ownership;
- TWO core objectives of SSR: increased effectiveness, balanced with increased accountability; and
- THREE essential dimensions of SSR: political sensitivity, a holistic vision and technical complexity.

These characteristics are illustrated in Figure 3 and elaborated more in detail below.

**FIGURE 3: THE APPROACH, OBJECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS OF SSR**



### ONE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH: LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Local ownership implies that “the reform of security [and justice] policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” (Nathan, 2007, p. 4). However, local ownership is not synonymous with government ownership. Rather, it implies a people-centred approach involving all relevant stakeholders—including the beneficiaries of security and justice services. In this regard, it should aim at civic empowerment through participatory and problem-solving approaches that are gender-sensitive and respect human rights standards.

Taking local ownership into consideration in all aspects of SSR-related activities is crucial to the success of an SSR programme. Local ownership makes SSR sustainable and ensures that SSR activities respond to local needs. It also helps strengthen the legitimacy of security and justice institutions. Reforms that are not shaped and driven by national actors are unlikely to meet the actual needs of the population. In many instances, such reform processes may not be sustainable and could even exacerbate the situation. The success of a reform process is therefore highly dependent on the level of local ownership. Without local ownership, SSR is likely to fail.

On the other hand, SSR processes often take place in contexts in which external support to the process is desirable or even required because of limited local capacity or resources. For numerous reasons, however, external actors are often tempted not just to support, but also to drive SSR processes and to impose their models and programmes on partner countries. They may do this in the belief that their models of governance are universally applicable or because their funding cycles require deliverables within set timeframes. They may also simply underestimate the immense difficulties of development, state building and reconstruction, and become frustrated by the pace of reform and change.





**“One of the key problems that representatives from developed countries face when trying to re-establish the judiciary and law and order mechanisms [in countries emerging from conflict] is that they try to apply their rules and their standards to the local community, which won’t work.”**

**Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar**  
Former Force Commander and Head of Mission, UNPROFOR (2010)

However, experience shows that externally driven processes—especially those that disregard local needs and traditions—can produce resentment, resistance and inertia from national actors. In practice, the principle of local ownership is a complex balancing act for external supporters. For example, while it is important to respect local customs and traditions, external actors also need to ensure that these customs and traditions are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

**“An effective, professional and accountable security sector without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development and is important for conflict prevention”.**

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2151 on Security Sector Reform (2014).

## TWO CORE OBJECTIVES: INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Effectiveness, the first core objective of SSR, refers to improving the provision of security and justice services in order to enhance the overall well-being of the state and its people. This could be achieved through a wide range of activities including skills training for security and justice officials, provision of equipment and infrastructure, undertaking reforms to enhance the organisational and managerial capacity of security and justice institutions, as well as efforts to improve cooperation between security and justice providers.

Accountability, the second core objective of SSR, implies the provision of checks and balances to assess whether security and justice actors adhere to the laws and policies in place and to stipulate sanctions for abusive conduct. Traditionally, however, improving the accountability of security and justice institutions has received less attention in the context of SSR. Still, accountability deficits are often among the key reasons why a security or justice sector does not function as it should. No SSR programme can be successful in the long term if proper accountability and governance structures are disregarded. An effective and well-equipped army could, for example, be an obstacle to long-term



peace and development if it were to use its skills and capacity to oppress citizens or violate their fundamental rights. Ensuring that effective accountability and governance mechanisms are in place could therefore contribute significantly to the success of an SSR programme.

Accountability can be provided both formally and informally. Formal accountability can include internal mechanisms such as codes of conduct, chains of command and disciplinary procedures as well as external mechanisms such as parliamentary oversight, executive oversight, judicial review, independent civilian oversight and ombudspersons. Informal accountability, on the other hand, can be provided by civil society groups, elders and/ or religious groups, research organisations, the media, human rights organisations and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) etc.

**“If one does not address issues of accountability and chains of command and how the security forces are located within the broader apparatus of the state, SSR is just training people to be more efficient at killing others.”**

**Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno**  
Former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (2010)


## Setting up Independent Police Commissioners in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2001-2002, independent Police Commissioners were established at the cantonal level in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to minimise political interference in the work of the police. A Police Commissioner (Head of Police in each Canton) would be politically accountable to the respective minister of interior, and would be solely responsible for the management and operations of the police. A Police Commissioner could not hold political office or represent a political party, and would be appointed by an independent board. The establishment of Police Commissioner posts represented an important step towards creating a professional and accountable police service in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For more information see: [United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/2002/1314 \(2 December 2002\): 1, 4](#)

Effectiveness and accountability need to be regarded as the twin objectives of SSR, and should be pursued simultaneously in order to ensure long-term success of SSR programmes. Their interrelations are emphasised in the Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF), a useful assessment tool that examines the effectiveness and accountability of an organisation across three different levels (see Figure 4).

**FIGURE 4: THE CAPACITY AND INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK**





### THREE ESSENTIAL DIMENSIONS: POLITICAL, HOLISTIC AND TECHNICAL

SSR is a complex process with three dimensions: it is political; highly technical; and requires a holistic approach and understanding of the interconnected nature of security and justice institutions.

First, SSR projects are highly sensitive and political undertakings, if only because they impact on the state's monopoly on the use of force. Additionally, SSR implies decisions relating to the state architecture as well as societal values such as freedom, security and human rights. Almost always, SSR processes affect power relations, income and privileges. Justice reform is equally sensitive because it aims at enhancing the capacity of the judiciary to oversee the executive branch of the government.


Engaging in SSR therefore requires a high level of political understanding and sensitivity, analytical, research and negotiation skills, tact and diplomacy. SSR processes should look for viable entry points, carefully identify stakeholders, minimise the effects of spoilers, be consultative and inclusive, and ensure flexibility in the planning, design and implementation of SSR programmes. Above all, the political nature of SSR calls for time and patience from both national and international actors.

**“For me, one of the limits of SSR is that it has too often been taken as a purely technical exercise while it is, in essence, the capacity to enforce. It is really the visible face of power, so it is the most political exercise that can be.”**

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno

Former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (2010)

**FIGURE 5: THE HOLISTIC NATURE OF SSR**



Second, SSR programming is a holistic process that involves a multiplicity of stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 5. By its very nature, SSR is a process that involves a host of different services provided by different actors, institutions and agencies. Adopting a holistic vision of SSR requires understanding the interconnected nature of the various components of the security and justice sector. As discussed earlier, efforts to reform the police without engaging the justice and corrections sectors will be met with only limited success. Likewise, improving the effectiveness and accountability of the police requires

engaging with a range of other actors such as the military (to delineate roles and responsibilities), the parliament (to improve oversight), the finance ministry (to improve financial accountability), the ministry of interior (to improve governance and the policy framework) as well as civil society (to benefit from research expertise, or to get insight into public issues of concern).

As described in Figure 5, SSR has as its foundation the people and their various security and justice needs, particularly those of the most vulnerable and disenfranchised groups. Ideally, a state would attempt to meet these needs through the development of an overarching policy framework such as a national security or justice strategy or a national SSR strategy. Based on the specific needs in question, and the state's understanding of security and the security sector, these strategies will encompass a wide range of sectoral and institutional reform programmes such as defence reform, police reform and intelligence reform etc. It is also important to consider a number of cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights and programme management simultaneously. These will be addressed more in detail in section 4. In addition, there is a need to understand the links between SSR and other reform processes such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Transitional Justice (TJ), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control, mine action, elections, etc. since these processes can affect and be affected by ongoing SSR programmes.

Recognising the holistic nature of SSR does not imply doing everything simultaneously. Instead, it promotes planning the next specific activity in full awareness of the complex interdependencies that characterise SSR, fitting it within the broader SSR framework and regarding the activity as one step within the overall SSR process. The holistic nature of SSR also underscores the need for coordination among all key actors including government, civil society, regional and bilateral actors, donors etc. This will be dealt with more in detail in section 2.3.

### **Complex Inter-Relationships that affect Performance**

A police reform programme launched in a post-conflict context and aimed at building both institutional capacity (policies, strategies and procedures) and individual capacity met with initial success. It brought with it a new approach to policing and increased the effectiveness of the police service. The police began to effectively tackle crime and insecurity.

However when the police put those accused of crimes into 'the system' it became apparent that while the police service had been the focus of a reform effort, the prosecution system and courts services were not. This resulted in those on remand being often released due to insufficient resources, or corruption. This in turn demoralised the police, who became reluctant to keep putting those accused of crimes into a system that did not function well, as they inevitably became targets of criminal groups. This made it apparent that the reform of one sector cannot be carried out in a vacuum.

The third dimension of SSR is its technical complexity. Given the political sensitivity associated with SSR programmes and their holistic nature, SSR requires a wide range of skills and the adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach. Among the specific skills required are:

- **Substantive knowledge and experience** in specific reform areas such as policing, defence, intelligence and local government but also in relevant cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights;
- **Technical expertise** in areas such as budgeting, logistics, communication and information technology systems, strategy management and training;
- **Experience in change management** including leadership and communication skills to guide institutional, organisational and managerial reform processes in complex environments; and
- **Programme management skills** such as resource management, planning, reporting and coordination.

One common tendency among SSR practitioners is to excessively focus on substantive knowledge at the expense of more practical types of operational expertise and experience that are also required for SSR programming. An appropriate balance needs to be struck between strategic/political and the more practical operational/technical expertise. A combination of these skills will help develop coherent programmes that can deliver sustainable results.





## SECTION 2

# ACTORS IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

This section presents the main categories of actors generally involved in SSR and explains their different roles and significance. The first part looks at national actors; the second part details the involvement of the international community. Coordination among national and international partners is discussed in section 2.3.

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### 2.1 KEY SECURITY ACTORS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

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As highlighted in section 1.2, national actors are grouped in four categories: state security and justice providers, state governance and oversight mechanisms, non-state security and justice providers and non-state governance and oversight mechanisms.

#### STATE SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROVIDERS



State security providers, also referred to as statutory security providers, are those agencies whose members can legally hold and use arms on behalf of the state. These include the armed forces, police, intelligence and secret services and border and customs officials.

State justice providers such as ministries of justice, penitentiary institutions, criminal investigation units, prosecution services and the judiciary or court system complement the activities of state security actors but also exert a degree of supervision over them.



## STATE GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

The role of state governance and oversight mechanisms is to create the legal framework within which state security and justice providers are supposed to operate, and to ensure that their activities remain within the bounds of the law. The most prominent such body is a country's parliament, but others include judicial councils, ombudspersons and other state watchdogs.

## NON-STATE SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROVIDERS

The most elusive category discussed here is non-state security and justice providers. Also referred to as non-statutory security and justice providers, these are groups that, while not official state institutions, may operate in the vacuum of state authority. In other instances, they may operate in parallel to state institutions, as seen, for example, in regions under the control of insurgent or other non-state forces. In both cases, these providers can have considerable power and influence- positive or negative- and should not to be ignored in SSR programming. Non-state security and justice providers include customary and traditional security and justice systems, special interest groups as well as liberation armies, guerrilla forces and private security companies.





“The population is actually used to live in an environment where state institutions are not functioning. Schools, policing in rural areas are present. However, these services are not provided by state organisations, but by traditional actors. The population manages their lives quite well without state institutions.”

Mr. Bertram Hinze

Advisor for police operations and international cooperation, UNIOGBIS (2010)

## NON-STATE GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

Non-State governance and oversight mechanisms help ensure that the security and justice services provided by relevant authorities are delivered in accordance with the rule of law, and that they advance the well-being of society. Primarily composed of civil society actors such as the media, local NGOs, women's associations and think tanks, they can act as a platform to voice the concerns of the people and to ensure that SSR programmes are representative, inclusive and people-centred.



### Strengthening the Criminal Justice system in Bunia

Since 1999, the conflict in Ituri (Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo) has led to numerous clashes between ethnic groups and mass crimes committed against the population. In 2003, following successive military occupation by Rwanda and Uganda, the region was controlled by ethnic militias and the authority of the Congolese state had completely collapsed. Most of the civil servants, including judicial staff and police, had either joined one of the belligerent's camps or fled the region. In June 2003, a short-term EU-led military force managed to stabilise the security situation in the district capital, Bunia, and strengthen the UN presence in the DRC.

An international NGO working to improve the justice sector in the DRC, was called in by MONUC, the European Union and the Congolese government to support the reestablishment of the criminal justice system in the city of Bunia. The project took a holistic approach of the sector and targeted building the capacities of the police, the prosecution services and the courts, both from the civilian and military justice perspectives. The project included joint trainings, equipment and infrastructures, and improvement of processes that contributed to strengthen the links and collaborations between the stakeholders of the justice sector. It also included the information and empowerment of the local population and civil society (participatory awareness campaigns, "open days" in the courts and police station, legal assistance). This approach allowed to bring the judicial system back on track, and to publicly prosecute and try some of the perpetrators involved in the Ituri conflict. It contributed to restore state authority in one of the regions most severely affected during the DRC conflict.

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## 2.2 EXTERNAL ACTORS

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The various external actors involved in SSR can be put into four distinct categories:

- States that provide bilateral support for SSR programmes;
- International and regional organisations such as the UN, AU and EU;
- NGOs operating at the international level, including research or policy institutes and university departments; and
- Private actors such as companies with technical expertise on SSR, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and individual consultants.



Many of these actors often interact with each other when undertaking SSR projects. In all cases, however, national actors should be prioritised. External actors should play only a supporting role in SSR, while letting national actors lead the implementation of SSR programmes. Given the varying—and at times conflicting—objectives and interests among and between actors, coordination among all stakeholders is a primary requisite.

### UN Policy Framework

The key UN documents that have cemented SSR as an integrative approach in the international system include the Presidential Statement of the UN Security Council (2007), the first Report of the Secretary-General on SSR (2008), the second SSR Report of the Secretary-General (2013) and UN Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014).

Both UN Secretary-General reports establish and elaborate SSR as a process to ensure the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its people without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the Rule of Law. Further, the UN recognises the important role of SSR in the consolidation of peace and security, in preventing countries from relapsing into conflict and in laying the foundations for sustainable peace.

Key highlights of UNSCR 2151 include the central role of local and national ownership, acknowledgement of the need for coordination within the UN system and with regional and national actors as well as emphasis on the need for sector-wide reform.

### AU Policy Framework

The African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform adopted in 2013, represents a major step in addressing the issue of African ownership of current SSR approaches. It builds on the international normative framework established by the UN and is also aligned with other AU instruments, including the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The AU Policy Framework defines SSR as the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people.

Key highlights of the AU policy framework on SSR include the importance of African ownership at regional, national and local levels; the inclusion of non-state and customary actors; as well as the recognition of SSR as part of broader democratisation and reform processes, and as a preventative measure against violent conflict.

## EU Policy Framework

The EU SSR policy is enshrined in two key policy documents, namely: The EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (2005) and A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform (2006). The EU defines SSR as the process of transforming the security system of a state in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. Other strategic documents covering SSR are the 2003 European Security Strategy and the internal 2010 EU Concept for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Justice Missions. In May 2015, the EU initiated a process to create a single EU-wide (including Member States) Strategic Framework for Supporting SSR.

Key highlights of the EU SSR policy include national and regional ownership as a design to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and the respect for human rights; the centrality of accountability and effectiveness as basic principles for SSR; as well as political dialogue as the basis for a framework for addressing diverse security challenges.

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## 2.3 STRENGTHENING COORDINATION AMONG ACTORS

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
**“According to OECD figures released in Accra, donors conducted over 15,000 missions in 54 recipient countries last year. Vietnam played host to an average of three visits each working day. So did Tanzania, whose overstretched civil service produces 2,400 quarterly reports on projects a year. Health workers in several African countries say they are so busy meeting western delegates that they can only do their proper jobs- vaccinations, maternal care- in the evening.”**

Source: A scramble in Africa. The Economist. 4th September 2008.

Coordination refers to regular and systematic initiatives aimed at helping all the stakeholders involved in a plan or activity to work together in an organised manner. In order to be effective, coordination should take place among and between both national and external actors designing, supporting and/or implementing SSR programmes. Coordination among and between various SSR actors is crucial for the greater effectiveness, credibility and sustainability of SSR programmes. Coordinated SSR interventions also help to increase cost-effectiveness, avoid duplication, manage interactions with a variety of SSR stakeholders and help to mainstream cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights throughout SSR programmes. In Figure 6, the complexity of coordination is illustrated.

The Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA) and the Whole-of-System Approach (WSA) are two approaches commonly referred to when coordinating SSR programmes. WGA refers to different ministries and departments within one national government coordinating their activities for improved overall effectiveness of SSR programmes. WSA is often used by international and regional organisations with complex institutional structures and procedures in order to ensure internal coherence through a shared understanding on a specific topic.

FIGURE 6: IS COORDINATION AN ISSUE?



Source: Steve Kinzett, 2004

Despite various efforts to enhance coordination, the obstacles to SSR coordination remain significant and can occur among national actors implementing SSR and between external actors supporting SSR. Coordination difficulties are not only the result of differences in culture, approach and administrative procedures but can also result from conflicts over project leadership and how differences of opinion are resolved. Moreover, the multiplicity of coordination mechanisms and procedures may create new layers of bureaucracy that can in turn complicate the design of SSR programmes and/or delay their implementation.

## Key Policy Documents

There are eight key policy framework documents that highlight the importance of coordination and have established international coordination norms:

- ✓ Paris Declaration (2005)
- ✓ OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR (Paris, 2007)
- ✓ Accra Agenda for Action (2008)
- ✓ First United Nations Secretary-General's Report on SSR (New York, 2008)
- ✓ Inter-governmental 3C Conference Report (Geneva, 2009)
- ✓ The New Deal (Busan, 2011)
- ✓ Second United Nations Secretary General's Report on SSR (2013)
- ✓ United Nations Security Council Resolution 2151 on SSR (2014)

### Swedish National Contact Group on SSR


In 2007, the Government of Sweden presented a national guidance note on Security Sector Reform. As a way to ensure a Whole-of-Government Approach when implementing the guidelines, an operational National Contact Group on Security Sector Reform was set up. The National Contact Group on Security Sector Reform has permanent representation from five governmental agencies active in areas of international peace and security, including: the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC), the Swedish National Police (SNP) and the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF). The FBA coordinates monthly meetings of the Contact Group, during which information sharing, mission coordination and joint fact-finding and assessment missions are discussed and administered. The policy directions come from a National Steering Group, consisting of representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice.

In 2010, an SSR coordinator was integrated into the Swedish Embassy in Liberia. This was the step towards the implementation of a shared assessment conducted by the National Contact Group, and commissioned by the Steering Group. The SSR coordinator was placed under the National Contact Group. This enabled operations to be set up and implemented through a Whole-of-Government Approach. It also enabled diverse groups with complementing competencies help each other and the government, resulting in a focused and clear engagement.

**Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy (2010)**



## Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)



Within the Government of Canada, Security System Reform (SSR) in fragile and conflict-affected states is a thematic area that falls under the responsibility of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) based within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

The Task Force is divided into four pillars dedicated respectively to policy, programming, civilian deployment and coordination as well as humanitarian affairs and disaster response. The policy division develops and implements Canadian Whole-of-Government foreign policy on peace operations and fragile states, including security system reform. This division also leads an interdepartmental working group on SSR. The programming division manages a fund for field and research activities in peace and security. The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is a 150 million Canadian Dollar financial resource, a large portion of which is dedicated to SSR related activities, in countries and regions around the globe, including Ukraine, Iraq, Colombia, Syria, Burma, Cambodia, Kenya, Laos, Sri Lanka and the Middle East.

Another division is responsible for civilian deployment and coordination issues, many of which directly support GPSF-funded initiatives in SSR. This division includes the corporate planning process and the development, management and direction of Whole-of-Government civilian deployments in response to countries in, or at risk, of crisis. START also chairs the administration of the Canadian Police Arrangement, a partnership of four federal departments and agencies, and the mechanism through which Canada responds to requests from entities such as the UN, EU and individual governments for the deployment of Canadian police personnel. The Task Force itself is supported by a Whole-of-Government advisory board which includes representatives from various other departments and agencies.

**Source:** Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada (2015)



## SECTION 3

# PROGRAMMING IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

This section first describes the various contextual factors that could influence SSR programming, paying special attention to SSR in post-conflict settings. It then proceeds to explain the phases of a typical SSR programme cycle, highlighting the interrelated nature of each of these phases.

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### 3.1 THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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Understanding the broader socio-political and economic context within which SSR programmes are carried out is essential to successful programme design and implementation. Special consideration is needed in post-conflict settings, where many SSR programmes are introduced.

#### THE CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Every country engaged in an SSR process is a unique case. Each reform context is different and every SSR process needs to be adapted to the requirements of a specific context. While the key principles of SSR remain unchanged, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Understanding the local context and adapting one's SSR programmes accordingly will contribute to the success of these programmes. Factors that need to be considered and which determine the nature and outcome of SSR programmes include:

- **Political factors:** The kind of regime (authoritarian, democratic, transitional), power relations and struggles between different political actors, ongoing political processes (elections, peace processes), and the presence of regional or international actors (peacekeeping operations, special political missions and multinational companies);
- **Legal factors:** The constitutional framework and the role of customary law;
- **Economics:** The availability of natural resources, infrastructure, investment conditions and available capital to fund SSR programmes. Low economic development could signal problems of corruption, nepotism and discrimination;
- **Social factors:** Standards of living, demography, the role of women in society, levels of education and literacy and social structures;
- **Technology:** State of communication networks, availability of Internet access; and
- **Environmental factors:** Droughts, floods, earthquakes etc.


While SSR can take place in all countries, the need for SSR tends to be greater in countries emerging from conflict or in fragile states. SSR is most needed in situations where it is critical to prevent the recurrence of conflict. At the same time, several features that characterise post-conflict societies could have a considerable impact on SSR processes.

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Reforming security and justice institutions is often a high priority in societies emerging from conflict, and SSR can be critical to prevent the recurrence of conflict and enhance public safety in these societies. Post-conflict situations often also provide windows of opportunity for SSR because:

- The armed conflict has (largely) come to an end;
- The parties to the conflict may be willing to compromise;
- The need for SSR may have been raised during peace negotiations;
- SSR provisions may have been included in a peace agreement as an element of a larger peacebuilding plan; and
- External actors may be called upon and willing to support SSR activities.

**FIGURE 7: SSR IN POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS**



However, engaging in SSR in post-conflict contexts can also bring with it several challenges that are inherent to such environments (see Figure 7). These include:

- Collapse of state institutions and/or institutional fluidity;
- High political volatility and uncertainty;
- A deep sense of distrust within society towards public authorities;
- A general absence of authority to enforce laws, leading to impunity; and
- Legacies of conflict that need to be managed.

International actors who choose to intervene in such situations have to face additional difficulties. The multiplicity of both national and international actors heightens the risk of duplication and competition. It also makes coordination a required, yet complex, imperative. There may also be significant overlap with other programmes with objectives similar but not identical to SSR, such as DDR and transitional justice activities (see section 4.2). Finally, international actors must resist the temptation to lead SSR programmes. This should be the primary role of national actors. Local ownership is a prerequisite for the long-term success and embedding of SSR programmes in a society.



## 3.2 THE PROGRAMME CYCLE

The programme cycle refers to the course of a programme or a project's lifetime (see Figure 8). This commonly includes the stages of assessment and identification, design and planning, implementation, monitoring and review, evaluation and learning lessons (UN Office of Internal Oversight Systems, n.d.). Each of these phases will be dealt with more in detail in this section. However, for reasons emphasised earlier in this manual (see section 2.3 on coordination), it is important to highlight that, wherever possible, joint activities should be encouraged and initiated throughout all phases of the programme cycle with both national and international partners.

**“Programming needs to result after a due process has come about. You need to have a continuation between the assessment and programming phases and have at least a certain amount of people who are common in both. If not you may have a disjunct between the findings of the assessment and the actual activities of the programme. You may have a good assessment but you may not end up with a good programme. There also needs to be an overlap between those who are programming and those who implement so that there is continuity in the entire project instead of it being done in silos.”**

**Dr. Mallika Joseph**

Deputy Director, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, India (2010)

**FIGURE 8: THE PROGRAMME CYCLE**



The various stages that an SSR programme would undergo do not differ significantly from those of other developmental programmes.

However, the issues at stake and how they are dealt with would differ considerably, given the very nature of SSR.

- SSR challenges existing power relationships and creates winners and losers;
- SSR interventions are often focused on changing behavior and attitudes of key stakeholders and how they interact with each other;
- Given the complexity of SSR programmes, it is difficult to clearly identify the causal relationships between various actors and issues and to isolate the impact of specific SSR-related activities;
- The holistic approach advocated by SSR at a strategic or policy level is often difficult to translate down to a practical level.

## ASSESSMENTS AND IDENTIFICATION

An assessment is a process of data gathering and information analysis carried out in support of a pre-determined purpose. The findings of an assessment will help understand the socio-political and economic context of the country in question, identify key security and justice concerns, possible entry points as well as potential champions and spoilers. The information gathered through an assessment can also inform policy towards a particular sector, grouping or country. Assessments serve as a solid foundation for the design, planning and implementation of an SSR programme and also as a baseline from which to evaluate programme outcomes and impacts.

### Key Assessment Tools

#### ✓ SWOT Analysis

The “SWOT Analysis” is a tool used to analyse a particular situation before designing an intervention. This can be used to facilitate participatory group discussions to identify and compare strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats related to different aspects of the situation being analysed.

#### ✓ Stakeholder Analysis

The stakeholder analysis aims to identify potential stakeholders relating to a security and justice reform programme and determine their interests, influence/power, and whether that influence is positive or negative to the programme. This information can be visually mapped on a grid of low and high influence & interest.

#### ✓ Do No Harm Analysis

The Do No Harm Analysis is designed to help understand the impact that an assistance programme could have on relationships in a fragile state environment. If the analysis shows that assistance will actually make tensions in relationships worse, it then prompts those conducting a Do No Harm analysis to think through alternative assistance programming in order to eliminate these negative influences.

#### ✓ Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF)

The Capacity and Integrity Framework enables practitioners to assess institutional reform needs in post-conflict contexts and to develop realistic programmes. The CIF identifies three fundamental dimensions of public institutions: the individual and the organisational and the external. In parallel, it focuses on two central reform areas of public institutions: capacity and integrity, and helps determine how they impact on the institution’s ability to execute its mandate.

#### ✓ Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental and Security Analysis (PESTLES)

PESTLES is a macro-level assessment tool designed to give a broad contextual understand of the state or region where an SSR activity is planned, through the analysis of a multiplicity of specific but interrelated indicators.

### Key elements that need to be taken into consideration when developing SSR programmes

- ✓ Understand the context and culture
- ✓ Understand risk and flexibility
- ✓ Focus on local ownership
- ✓ Create a balance between effective service delivery and accountability
- ✓ Build national capacity & generate political will
- ✓ Integrate gender issues
- ✓ Plan for sustainability
- ✓ Focus on relationship and partnership building
- ✓ Prioritise building trust and confidence
- ✓ Do not offer advice without an invitation

**Above all, engaging in SSR requires time and flexibility in planning, design and implementation.**

## DESIGN AND PLANNING

Once the relevant data has been analysed and the assessment has produced agreement on what is needed, the relevant actor can proceed to design a suitable SSR programme. When designing and planning SSR programmes, it is crucial to ensure that they are based on the principles of local ownership and sustainability (see section 1.3). In addition, the selected programme should aim at creating a balance between effective service delivery and accountability. Finally, the programme should focus on building relationships and partnerships while also prioritising confidence building among all actors concerned.

One crucial, yet often neglected, aspect of programme design is the development of indicators that will help monitor, review and evaluate the outcomes and impact of a programme. Often considered only upon completion of a programme, monitoring, review and evaluation indicators should in reality be determined during the design and planning phase. This will provide early indicators of progress, ensure that the implementation of a programme is carried out in a manner consistent to the objectives identified and facilitate realignment in case the programme runs into unforeseen difficulties.

**“Time spent on design and planning of SSR programmes is seldom wasted.”**

LGen (ret) Marc Caron  
Deputy Head, ISSAT (2011).

## Key Design and Planning Tools

### ✓ Theory of change (ToC)

The theory of change is the blue print that lays down the building blocks needed to achieve the overall goals and objectives of a specific SSR programme. It explains how the programme intends to achieve the desired change and how the programme will concretely affect the situation in a particular way.

### ✓ Logical Framework Analysis (LogFrame)

The use of indicators, process planning schemas, and means-ends analysis that helps move from the more theoretical to the more practical. It emphasises the need for a people-oriented paradigm that involves efforts to “strengthen the capability of local actors.

### ✓ Results Based Management (RBM)

A broad management strategy aimed at achieving improved performance and demonstrable results. RBM includes elements of design, monitoring and evaluation and contributes to learning, risk management and accountability.

### ✓ Integrated Project Management Approach (IPMA)

The Integrated Project Management Approach refers to the discipline of planning, organising, securing and managing resources to bring about the successful completion of specific project goals and objectives. It is the centralised control of a group of projects which are interdependent in terms of content, organisation and time.

## PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

In essence, SSR implementation is about national capacity building. This is not only about making public institutions work more effectively, but also about helping to create agencies that deliver security and justice services in a way that serves the interests of both the state and the population. While many of the programmes initiated for this purpose primarily focus on a single sub-sector (police, defence, judiciary etc), following the SSR principles implies the adoption of a holistic approach that moves beyond the specific topic to analyse complementarities, linkages and differences with and between other related subsectors. This analysis and integrative approach is key to ensuring the effective implementation of SSR programmes. This in turn has consequences for the modalities of SSR programming since entry points, linkages with other security and justice sector actors and potential challenges will all differ according to the targeted institutions (police, military, judiciary etc.) and the area of activity (capacity building, governance etc.).

## MONITORING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION

**Monitoring** refers to a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing project with early indicators of progress and achievement objectives. **Review** is defined as the assessment of performance on a regular basis in order to improve efficiency, review allocation of resources and foresee any potential difficulties. **Evaluation** describes the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or programme. This includes the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed



project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and final results. (Adopted from: OECD, Quality standards for development evaluation, 2010.)

Taken together, monitoring, review and evaluation—also known as M, R & E activities—are an indispensable part of SSR programming. They should be undertaken on a continuous basis during the implementation phase of a programme and after its formal conclusion in order to assess whether the programme achieved its stated objectives. In order to facilitate the monitoring, review and evaluation of SSR programmes, it is important to make sure that the indicators selected are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (also referred to as the SMART criteria).

### SMART criteria are often used to determine whether an indicator is strong and useful for monitoring purposes:

#### ✓ Specific

Is the indicator specific enough to measure progress towards the results?

#### ✓ Measurable

Are data available at reasonable cost and effort?

#### ✓ Achievable

Are the targets for the indicator realistic?

#### ✓ Relevant

Is the indicator a reliable and clear measure of results?

#### ✓ Time-bound

Does the indicator specify by what date a result must be achieved?

The OECD DAC has also developed a number of useful criteria for evaluating SSR programmes:

- **Relevance:** the extent to which the activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor;
- **Effectiveness:** a measure of the extent to which an activity attains its objectives;
- **Efficiency:** a measure of the outputs—qualitative and quantitative—in relation to the inputs;
- **Impacts:** the positive or negative changes produced by the development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended; and
- **Sustainability:** a measure of whether the benefits are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

Setting up a robust monitoring, review and evaluation mechanism will not only help account for how funds were used, but will also influence future resource allocation decisions and support decision-making on competing and best alternatives. By producing objective data on the success or failure of a specific programme, monitoring, review and evaluation mechanisms can also contribute to learning and help avoid repetition of errors.

## LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

Assessing the prospects for the long-term impact of an SSR programme is not the only reason for undertaking M, R & E activities. As noted above, they can also serve as stocktaking exercises from which lessons can be drawn and good practices identified for subsequent phases of a project or for future endeavours. Since the concept of SSR is relatively new, the number of documented and evaluated programmes is relatively small. Nevertheless, a review of experiences to date conducted by the OECD DAC has produced a number of broad lessons:

- Too often, security and justice sector institutions are targeted individually rather than as part of an interconnected system;
- In many countries there is a lack of human, financial and/or institutional capacities to sustain SSR programmes, and
- Those supporting the implementation of SSR programmes do not always have the technical and political understanding of SSR and, in particular, the role of oversight mechanisms and how to support their enhancement.

The emergence of virtual Communities of Practice that encourage the exchange and documentation of experiences among SSR practitioners has the potential to make significant contributions to the development of a solid compilation of lessons learned and best practices in the field of SSR.

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### 3.3 CHALLENGES IN SSR PROGRAMMING

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The lessons learned and good practices noted above also provide an introduction to identifying some of the common challenges that both national and international actors engaging in SSR can encounter over the course of a project. Some of these challenge areas are discussed below.

#### INTERLOCUTORS

Arguably one of the most challenging issues when engaging in SSR is to ensure that all stakeholders share the same objectives. This is particularly challenging, given the multiplicity of actors involved and because SSR touches on politically sensitive issues that often create winners and losers. While some stakeholders may inevitably have little or no interest in SSR, others may have hidden agendas when engaging in SSR. It is therefore important—especially at the outset—to identify potential champions and spoilers among stakeholders. While it is sometimes suggested that spoilers be ignored or sidelined, for an SSR programme to be sustainable in the long term, they should be encouraged to support the process by continuing to highlight the stakes and the potential benefits of the programme in question.

#### CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Capacity constraints relating to human and financial resources can occur in various forms, affecting both security and justice providers and recipients, as well as those initiating SSR programmes. Among the principal constraints that can arise are:

- Lack of funding;
- Lack of institutional capacity;
- Lack of technical or substantive knowledge;
- Lack of capacity to absorb security and justice sector reforms; and
- Insufficient ability to adapt to changed institutional structures.

## TIMELINES

Timelines can prove challenging because they are typically subject to priorities set by national and international actors engaged in SSR. While these priorities often vary from actor to actor, the priorities of one single actor could also change over time and according to developments in the host country environment. For example, SSR may be declared a priority by a national government during one parliamentary term, but may no longer be a priority in a subsequent term. The political nature of SSR also means that it is highly dependent on developments that occur within the host country. While the signing of a peace agreement could put SSR on the agenda, other events such as coups and insurgencies could stall an SSR process. In order to minimise the effects of uncertainty, it is therefore important to conduct a solid assessment prior to engaging in SSR and to leave room for flexibility when designing and planning SSR programmes.



## SECTION 4

# CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES AND RELATED PROCESSES

While SSR covers a large number of issues ranging from justice reform to private military and security companies, many actors often tend to focus their activities—albeit in a holistic manner—on one single sub-sector. However, certain issues such as gender, DDR, elections, and SALW need to be considered in all activities and across all related sub-sectors. Cross-cutting issues can have a considerable impact on how SSR programmes are designed and implemented. These issues are discussed more in detail below.

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### 4.1 SSR AND THE GENDER LENS

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Gender refers to the roles and relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours and values that a society ascribes to men and women, boys and girls (Valasek, 2008, pp. 3–11). ‘Gender’ therefore refers to learned differences between men and women, while ‘sex’ refers to the biological differences between males and females. Gender roles vary widely within and across cultures and can change over time. Given that men and women across all levels of age, ethnicity, etc. are affected differently by the lack/absence of security and justice services, it is important for an SSR programme to take into account the various needs and concerns of these different groups.

The gender lens is an operational tool that can be used to explore information related to the needs, expectations, and participation of men and women across all levels of age, ethnicity, geography, etc. Using a gender lens helps us close the gaps, avoiding that certain groups fall through the cracks of our programming.





EXAMPLES OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	
Women and girls	Men and boys
<b>Domestic violence</b> A 2005 multi-country study by the World Health Organization (WHO) found that in most countries between 29% and 62% of women had experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner.	<b>Gun violence</b> Globally, it is estimated that every year over 1,000,000 people are injured by guns, over 200,000 are gun homicide victims and 50,000 are gun suicide victims. According to WHO, 90% of the casualties attributed to firearms are male.
<b>Human trafficking</b> Annually, 500,000 to 700,000 women and girls are trafficked across international borders.	<b>Child abuse</b> WHO cites international studies that document sexual abuse of boys at a rate of 5-10%.
<b>Sexual violence</b> Increases in sexual violence have been documented before, during and after armed conflicts; for instance in Rwanda where estimates of the number of women and girls raped range from 15,700 – 500,000.	<b>Rape</b> A 2000 survey of inmates in seven US men's prison facilities showed that 21% of the inmates had experienced at least one episode of pressured or forced sexual contact and at least 7% had been raped.
<b>Genital mutilation</b> According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 130 million girls and women have undergone female genital mutilation, and 2 million girls are at risk every year.	<b>Sex-selective massacres</b> The Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, involved the killing of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslim males.
<b>Anti-gay violence</b> A study by the Russian Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual or Transgender Network of over 3,500 gay and lesbian participants revealed that 26.5% of respondents had been victims of physical violence motivated by hatred based on sexual orientation.	

(Kristin Valasek, 'Security Sector Reform and Gender', Gender and SSR Toolkit, Box 2, p.4)

Attention to human security and the gender lens improves SSR by strengthening local ownership; involving relevant groups of the population; enhancing the operational effectiveness of security and justice sectors; and most importantly, helping ensure effective security and justice delivery through representative security institutions.

**“Understanding the role of women is important when building stability in an area... If women are the daily breadwinners and provide food and water for their families, patrolling the areas where women work will increase security and allow them to continue their activities. This is a tactical assessment... Creating conditions for a functioning everyday life is vital from a security perspective. It provides a basis for stability.”**

Brigadier Karl Engelbrektson, Force Commander of the Nordic Battlegroup

An inclusive process targeting men and women across all levels of age, ethnicity, etc. makes the security and justice institutions more representative and participative. A human security responsive SSR process, taking into consideration the gender lens, strengthens service delivery through creating more representative security sector institutions which helps them to be trusted, responsive and effective. It also improves the security sector's prevention of and response to gender-based violence. A gender balanced security and justice sector is also better placed to provide effective oversight and accountability.

**“Searching for weapons was a regular task in Kosovo... This is almost impossible without women in the team. If you suspect that weapons have been hidden in a village, going into houses is much easier in teams of both women and men. The female soldiers can talk to the women in the house because they often have more trust in other women, and this reduces the risk for escalation.”**

Lars Wetterskog, Swedint

### **Gun violence in Brazil**

In Brazil, men and boys are the overwhelming majority of gun violence perpetrators and victims. Research confirms that gender is a key factor, largely due to socio-cultural norms linking guns and masculinity. Carrying a gun can be a way of publicly demonstrating “real manhood” to gain status and respect. Misuse of guns by men and boys is often glorified in popular culture and socially accepted or expected, especially among young, marginalised men.

In Rio de Janeiro, young men are more likely to be killed by guns than all other external causes of death combined. Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with more than 35 000 firearm deaths every year. Brazilians are about four times more likely to die by firearms than the general world population.

**Kristin Valasek, “Security Sector Reform and Gender”, Gender and SSR Toolkit 1, P.9.**

Two complementary strategies can be used to integrate the needs, expectations and participation of men and women across all levels of sex, ethnicity, etc. into SSR: gender mainstreaming, i.e. considering the impact of policies and programmes on men and women and including specific initiatives to address their different security and justice needs; and promoting equal participation of men and women in SSR processes and in security and justice institutions.

Entry points through which gender-related considerations can be integrated include assessment, security policies and protocols, staffing, recruitment, retention, promotion, training, institutional structures, operations, logistics, infrastructure and oversight.

GENDER INITIATIVES WITHIN SSR PROGRAMMES		
	Internal Activities	External Activities
Gender mainstreaming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender awareness training</li> <li>• Sexual harassment training</li> <li>• Codes of conduct</li> <li>• Gender focal points</li> <li>• Resources, such as manuals, on how to integrate gender issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical training on interviewing victims of GBV, preventing human trafficking, responding to sexual assault of men</li> <li>• Capacity building for civil society organisations on gender</li> <li>• Specific initiatives to prevent, respond to and penalise GBV</li> </ul>
Equal participation of women and men	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Measures to increase female recruitment, retention and advancement</li> <li>• Human resources policies and practices that are gender responsive and family friendly</li> <li>• Female staff associations/ women's caucus/unions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaboration with women's and men's organisations for information gathering, referral of victims, drafting security policy, security sector oversight etc</li> <li>• Capacity building of women's organizations on SSR and security issues in general</li> </ul>

(Kristin Valasek, 'Security Sector Reform and Gender', Gender and SSR Toolkit 1, p.16)

## 4.2 SSR AND RELATED PROCESSES

### DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) refers to a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of non-statutory military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods (Source: UN's Integrated DDR Standards, 2006). The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is a pre-requisite for post-conflict stability and recovery. DDR programmes are therefore closely related to SSR and activities in one could have a considerable impact on the other. For example, the continuing presence of armed combatants can have serious impact on the functioning of newly established and fledgling security and justice institutions. Inversely, society has to be prepared to accept ex-combatants in its midst, as newly minted police officers, for example, without feeling threatened by them.



It is often assumed that DDR programmes should precede SSR because DDR is typically short-term and generally occurs immediately after the end of a conflict. In practice, however, both activities need to be pursued together, in a coordinated fashion in order to achieve maximum results.

## SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS CONTROL

Another important issue in post-conflict societies is the continuing presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in communities. The widespread availability of SALW can have a serious impact on SSR programmes if they are used to challenge the authority of law enforcement agencies or to create insecurity where state structures are absent or weak. Long-term SALW control efforts, which typically follow DDR, should be pursued in coordination with SSR programming. This can be challenging because civilians may have strong motivations to retain small arms where the security sector is unable to provide real or perceived security.



## TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Transitional justice mechanisms seek to address accountability for war crimes, human rights violations and other conflict-related grievances in an effort to promote reconciliation between former enemies and establish a firm basis for peace. It is often closely linked to the issues described above and can be considered an integral part of SSR programmes, particularly in post-conflict contexts. The focus on accountability can be essential in helping to foster trust and confidence in state authorities and to ensure their credibility. In this regard, transitional justice can lay a cornerstone for establishing effective and accountable justice and oversight mechanisms that serve the larger purpose of SSR.

## ELECTIONS

Elections can provide opportunities for SSR entry points but could also pose challenges to conducting SSR. In some situations, elections can be an important milestone in a peacebuilding process that includes SSR dimensions. Specific examples include elections as a result of constitutional revisions that bear on aspects of SSR, or elections as an occasion for a public debate on proposed elements of the security and/ or justice sector. In some instances, elections can help to bring these issues on to the agenda of parliamentary committees and infuse them with political urgency.



## MINE ACTION

Mine action refers to activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Key activities that fall under mine action include: mine risk education (MRE), humanitarian demining, victim assistance, destruction of stockpiled landmines, as well as advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines. Through their contribution to the resettlement of displaced persons and the creation of livelihoods, mine action activities can serve as an early and non-threatening entry point for engagement in broader SSR activities. Mine action can also serve as a confidence building measure between former warring parties, through the revelation of information related to stockpiles and minefields, ideally as part of a peace agreement. This could in turn pave the way for future SSR-related activities. Finally, mine action is closely related to DDR (provision of jobs for former combatants through demining activities) and SALW control (destruction of stockpiles) – two processes that could have a considerable impact on SSR programmes.





# SECTION 5

## REFERENCES AND GLOSSARY OF BASIC TERMS

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### 5.1 KEY REFERENCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS MANUAL

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## 5.3 GLOSSARY OF BASIC TERMS

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### **3C Approach**

A policy approach used by the development community that calls for engagements by donors to be coherent, coordinated and complementary. It seeks to consolidate Whole-of Government and Whole-of-System Approaches in trying to achieve a common goal.

### **Access to Justice**

Timely access by people to fair, effective and accountable (in)formal justice systems for the protection of rights, prevention of abuse of power and resolution of disputes.

### **Accountability**

An obligation or willingness to take responsibility or to account for one's actions according to principles of transparency.

### **Assessment**

A process of data gathering and information analysis carried out in support of a predetermined purpose. In the context of an SSR project it is normal to undertake an initial assessment during the inception stage to determine the security/ justice needs of a particular group and how these needs are being (not) met.

### **Audit**

A systematic, disciplined approach to assess and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes.

### **Behavioural Change**

Any transformation or modification in the way individuals behave or an organisation performs its missions and functions.

### **Border Guards/Police**

A military or a police force that controls national boundaries.

### **Capacity**

The ability of an individual/ organisation to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual ability), physical capacity (having the right equipment) and institutional capacity (systems and organisational structures in place).

### **Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF)**

A key assessment tool, the CIF enables practitioners to assess institutional reform needs and to develop realistic programming options. The CIF focuses on the capacity and integrity of a public institution, both of which are central to the institution's ability to perform its mandate. It does this at three levels: the individual, the organisational and the external.

### **Capacity-Building**

Programmes and processes that empower and enable the recipients' independent development including technical, professional, and/or personal skills. Capacity- building can apply to both individuals and institutions.

### **Capacity Gap**

A lack/ absence of capacity that prevents an individual/ organisation from functioning effectively.

### **Change Management**

A systematic approach to dealing with any envisaged and concrete change (including the creation of it); change can be managed at a community, society, organisational or individual level.



**Civic Empowerment**

The process of helping citizens to acquire the confidence, skills and power to enable them to shape and influence the political, social, and economic life at the local and national level.

**Civil Society**

Collection of actors, organisations, movements and interest groups that do not fall directly under the control of the State. Civil society can contribute to identifying security needs and defining appropriate strategies. Civil society can also help ensure oversight of public institutions and can at times provide security and justice services to the population. See also **civil society organisations, non-state and non-statutory security and justice providers**.

**Civil Society Organisation (CSO)**

Non state structure(s) composed of volunteers who share the same interests, values and/ or aims such as ethnicity, culture, political /and or religious convictions. Examples of civil society organisations include faith groups, research centres and non-governments organisations. See also **civil society**.

**Coherence**

Close cooperation, consistency and clarity in policy across agencies or organisations working towards a shared goal.

**Community-Based Policing**

A partnership between the police and the community to define crime-related problems, set priorities, determine root causes and implement solutions to reduce or eliminate the problem.

**Complementarity**

The act of supplying mutual needs or offsetting mutual deficits.

**Conflict Cycle**

Term used to collectively describe the “pre-”, “during”, and “post-” stages of a conflict.

**Conflict Mapping**

A technique that helps identify stakeholders and the larger context of a dispute, as well as trying to determine the root causes. It also aims at understanding conflict processes for the purpose of formulating options for conflict management or resolution.

**Constitution**

The basic and fundamental law of a state which describes how the state will be organised, how political power will be distributed among government branches and institutions and setting out the basic values and principles that govern society.

**Coordination**

Regular and systematic initiatives aimed at helping all the stakeholders involved in a plan or activity to work together in an organised manner in order to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity.

**Core Security Actors**

The main security actors, vested with a mandate to use force or to enforce the law, such as the military, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services, border guards, customs, reserves and local security units, civil defence forces, national guards. Also referred to as state or statutory security providers.

**Corruption**

The abuse of entrusted power for private gain.

**Customary Law**

A traditional common rule or practice that has become an intrinsic part of the accepted and expected conduct in a society, which is treated as a legal requirement.

**Dealing with the Past (DWP)**

Recognition of victims' rights and the duty of States to fight impunity when mass violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed. Dealing with the Past includes the implementation of a combination of activities aimed at fulfilling these rights and duties in the following areas: right to know, right to justice, right to reparations and guarantee of non-recurrence.

**Defence Sector Reform (DSR)**

Coordinated series of actions designed to improve the effectiveness and accountability of a state's armed forces.

**Demining**

Activities which lead to the removal of mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazards, including technical surveys, mapping, clearance, marking, post-clearance documentation, community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared land.

**Democracy**

A model of government where the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections.

**Development**

The improvement of economic, social and political structures and living standards as a whole.

**Do No Harm Analysis**

A key assessment tool developed by Dr Mary B Anderson, the Do No Harm Analysis is designed to help understand the impact that an assistance programme could have on the relationships between actors in a fragile state environment. If the analysis shows that assistance could increase tensions between local actors, alternative programming options need to be considered in order to eliminate these negative influences.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**

A three-pronged programme of reducing or abolishing weapons of government and/or opposition forces, reducing or disbanding excess personnel, and integrating former fighters back into normal civilian life.

**Donor**

A country or an organisation that makes a contribution to a third party in cash or kind for the purpose of supporting development initiatives.

**Driver**

Any force, element or parameter (be it an individual or an institution), that can impact or influence (in a positive or negative way) a certain situation.

**Effectiveness**

The extent to which the intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved.

**Entry Point**

Limited programming activities that are feasible and non-threatening but that build confidence and open doors for longer-term involvement.

**Evaluation**

The process of determining the value or significance of an activity, policy or programme as measured against its end objectives. This includes the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and final results.

**Executive**

The branch of a state charged with putting into effect a country's laws and the administering of its functions. It also refers to a person (President or Prime Minister) or group (Government) having administrative or managerial authority in a country.

**Failed State**

A condition of "state collapse" which depicts a state that can no longer provide basic services (e.g. security, safety, health, education) to its population, has no effective control over its territory and borders, and cannot reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

**Focus Group**

A method of group interviewing in which the interaction between the moderator and the group, as well as between group members, serves to elicit information and insights in response to carefully designed questions.

**Gender**

The roles and relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours and values that a society ascribes to men and women, boys and girls.

**Gender Mainstreaming**

Taking into consideration the impact of policies and programmes on men and women, and including specific initiatives to address their different security and justice needs.

**Good Governance**

A form of governance that is legitimate, people-centred, equitable, accountable, transparent, participatory, involves consultation in planning and decision-making, characterised by effective and efficient public sector management, and actively seeking and facilitating the involvement of civil society.

**Holistic**

A view or action that considers the whole of a situation/system including interconnections rather than its component parts.

**Holistic Approach**

Understanding the interconnected nature of the various actors and programmes when developing specific policies and programmes.

**Human Rights**

Those rights that belong to everyone as a member of the human race, regardless of skin colour, nationality, political convictions or religious persuasion, social standing, gender, age or any other distinction.

**Human Security**

A notion of security relating to the freedom from fear and freedom from want. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential.

**Independence**

The autonomy of a particular actor or institution from the actions or policies of a state authority or any other institution.

**Indicator**

A quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple, reliable and verifiable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.

**Integrated Peacekeeping Mission**

A type of mission characterised by a system-wide approach among all UN actors. It implies having certain processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective.

**Integrated Project Management Approach (IPMA)**

The discipline of planning, organising, securing and managing resources to bring about the successful completion of specific project goals and objectives. It is the centralised control of a group of projects which are interdependent in terms of content, organisation and time.

**Intelligence**

Information and data acquired by various covert and overt methods, for the purpose of predicting or understanding the intentions of groups or states.

**Intelligence Sector Reform**

A reform programme concentrating on the intelligence services of a state, seeking- among others things- to ensure a balance between secrecy and transparency, to develop an adequate legal framework ensuring oversight, to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to improve accountability.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

People or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes, in particular as a result of the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

**International Community**

The wider global population, both state and non-state, which in some cases may denote particular groups of international actors linked by a common mission or project.

**International Criminal Law**

A body of laws, norms, and rules governing international crimes and their repression, as well as rules addressing conflict and cooperation between national criminal-law systems.

**Judiciary**

A system of courts that interprets and applies the law in the name of the sovereign or state.

**Justice Sector Reform (JSR)**

The transformation or change of justice institutions to make them more independent, effective and accountable so as to better serve the justice needs of the people.

**Legislative**

A type of deliberative assembly with the power to pass, amend, and repeal laws.

**Legitimacy**

The acceptance of decisions of government leaders and officials by the (local) population based on the fact that their power is acquired and used in line with the accepted procedures and political or moral values of the society in question.

**Lessons Learned**

Generalisations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programmes, or policies. Information gained through lessons learned can contribute to greater effectiveness and efficiency in the design and implementation of future activities.



**Local Ownership**

An approach that recognises that the reform of security and justice policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by national actors rather than external actors.

**Logical Framework Analysis (LogFrame)**

The use of indicators, process planning schemas, and means-ends analysis that helps move from the more theoretical to the more practical. LogFrames emphasise the need for paradigms that involve efforts to strengthen the capacity of national actors.

**Mediation**

The attempt to settle a dispute through the active participation of a third party (mediator) who works to find points of agreement and help the parties to achieve a negotiated settlement.

**Military Justice System**

The primary legal enforcement tool of the armed services whose main purpose is to preserve internal discipline.

**Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**

A set of goals and objectives approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000 and that aim to ensure that human development reaches everyone everywhere by the year 2015. The goals include eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, reduction of child mortality, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, ensuring environmental sustainability, improving maternal health, and promoting global partnership for development. The 8 MDGs break down into 21 quantifiable targets that are measured by 61 indicators.

**Monitoring**

A continuing function that uses the systematic collection of data to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing project with early indicators of progress and achievement objectives.

**National Security Strategy/Policy**

A formal strategy that involves all decisions and activities about the security sector which affect the state's and society's external and internal security. It includes both policy statements and the measures to implement those policy statements.

**New Security Agenda**

A term that recognises the wide range of state and non-state actors that can act as security providers—or in some instances, as purveyors of insecurity. It also takes a broad view of security, understanding national security not only in military terms but also in terms of political, social, economic and environmental security.

**Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)**

An organisation that is autonomous, voluntary and non-profit based, and which is not associated with national or local governments.

**Non-State Security Providers**

Organised groups or forces with military or policing capability, but which do not belong to the official, legitimate domain of the security forces of the state. These may include paramilitary forces or more informal groups such as religious organisations or neighbourhood watch groups. Also referred to as non-statutory security providers.

**Non- State Justice Providers**

Informal or organised groups or individuals such as customary actors, religious organisations and special interest groups that have not been established by the state- though in some instances

recognised by it- but that ensure the provision of justice services to segments of the population. Also referred to as non-statutory justice providers.

### **Non- Statutory Security and Justice Providers**

Non-state actors that may provide security and justice services. They have the capacity- but not a formal mandate- to use force or dispense justice. Also referred to as non-state security and justice providers.

### **Official Development Assistance (ODA)**

Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions.

### **Ombudsman**

An official appointed to receive and investigate complaints made by individuals against abuses or capricious acts of public officials.

### **Oversight**

The supervision of actions and behaviours of state institutions by accountability mechanisms such as parliament and civil society actors including media or watchdog groups.

### **Paramilitary Forces**

Organised forces with military capability, which are modelled upon a military format, but which do not belong to the official, legitimate domain of the security forces of the state.

### **Parliament**

A national representative body having supreme legislative powers within the state.

### **Peace Building**

A process that seeks to reduce the risk of a renewal of hostilities by trying to strengthen national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. In taking a variety of economic, political, security and humanitarian measures into account, peacebuilding seeks to enhance the capacity of the state to carry out its core functions in an effective and accountable manner.

### **Peacekeeping**

A technique based on the principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions and allows for negotiated solutions in a conflict situation, usually in the context of a peace agreement.

### **Peace Process**

Negotiations held with the purpose of brokering peace between warring states or factions.

### **Peace Support Operations (PSOs)**

Organised international assistance initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict.

### **Penal Reform**

A set of measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of the corrective institutions of a state. Also known as penitentiary or corrections reform. .

### **Police (Sector) Reform**

A process of enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of policing institutions.

**Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal, Environmental and Security analysis (PESTLES)**

A macro-level assessment tool designed to give a broad contextual understanding of the state or region where an SSR activity is planned, through the analysis of a multiplicity of specific but interrelated indicators.

**Private Military and Security Company (PMSC)**

Legally established national or international firms offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic manner and by military or paramilitary means.

**Programming**

A general term for a set of activities designed to achieve a specific objective. In order to ensure that a programme's results, outputs and overall outcome are reached, activities are often framed by a strategy, key principles and identified targets. Together, these indicate how the activities will be structured and implemented.

**Programme/Project Cycle**

The course of a programme or a project's lifetime. This commonly includes the stages of assessment and identification, design and planning, implementation, monitoring and review, evaluation and learning lessons.

**Quick Impact Project (QIP)**

A short-term, small-scale initiative designed to have an immediate impact contributing to post-conflict stabilisation or recovery. It can be used as a confidence-building measure between stakeholders and show that real improvements in the short term are feasible. It may also have an impact- positive or negative- on longer-term development, and this should be taken into account in the planning stages.

**Reconciliation**

The social and sometimes legalised process that enables society to address war crimes or repressive acts committed previously by a regime, authority or social group. The aim is to deal with legacies of the past and construct a future together. See also **Dealing with the Past**.

**Reconstruction**

The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.

**Refugee**

A person who is outside his or her country of origin and has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

**Results-Based Management (RBM)**

A broad management strategy aimed at achieving improved performance and demonstrable results. RBM includes elements of design, monitoring and evaluation and contributes to learning, risk management and accountability.

**Results Chain**

A process that illustrates the causal sequence for an intervention. It begins with inputs and activities and moves through processes, outputs, outcomes and impacts.

**Review**

The assessment of performance on a regular basis in order to improve efficiency, review allocation of resources and foresee any potential difficulties.

**Rule of Law (RoL)**

A situation whereby security and justice providers as well as other public institutions contribute to preserving the law, abide by it and promote respect for it.

**Security and Development Nexus**

An understanding that security and development are mutually reinforcing factors and the recognition that they are intrinsically linked.

**Security**

The absence of real or perceived threats to a person, group of persons and/ or acquired values. Peace of mind and reassurance that an individual and/ or State is free from physical and/ or psychological threat.

**Security Sector**

A broad range of state and non-state security and justice providers as well as oversight bodies and mechanisms.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

A nationally-owned process aimed at ensuring that security and justice providers deliver effective and efficient security and justice services that meet the people's needs, and where security and justice providers are accountable to the state and its people, operating within a framework of good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. Also referred to as: Security and Justice Sector Reform, Security Sector Transformation or Development or Reconstruction or Stabilisation or Governance.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

All lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried by an individual combatant (SA) or a light vehicle (LW) that does not require substantial logistic and maintenance capability. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW.

**SMART Criteria**

Criteria that are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound. SMART criteria are often used to determine whether an indicator is strong and useful for monitoring purposes.

**Spoiler**

An individual or party who believes that the particular policy or activity could threaten their power and interests and who will therefore work to undermine it.

**Stability**

A context where the political and security context, as well as the actors, rules, cultures and institutions related to it contribute to the establishment and/ or maintenance of a minimal level of order. The stability of a country or region is characterised by the absence of violence and/ or the absence of political, socio-economic and/ or military threats.

**Stakeholder**

A broad term used to denote all local, national and international actors, including the state, civil society and business, which have an interest in the outcome of a particular activity or process.

**Stakeholder Analysis**

A key assessment tool, the stakeholder analysis aims to identify potential stakeholders of security and justice reform programmes and determine their interests, influence/power, and whether that influence is positive or negative to the programme. This information can be visually mapped on a grid of low and high influence & interest.

**State Security Providers**

Organised forces that belong to the official domain of the security forces of the state, such as the military; civilian police; presidential guards; intelligence services; border guards; reserve or local security units; civil defence units; national guards and government militias. Also referred to as core security actors or statutory security providers.

**Statutory Security Providers**

A group of state actors/ institutions which provide security and have the capacity & formal mandate to use force. Also referred to as core security actors or state security providers.

**Survey**

A detailed study aimed to gather data on a particular topic/ situation by polling a cross-section of the population.

**Sustainability**

A characteristic or a condition where the needs of today's generation can be met without leading to declines in the future well-being of generations or populations.

**SWOT Analysis**

A strategic planning method used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats involved in a policy or project.

**Terms of Reference (ToR)**

A document that describes the purpose and structure of a project as well as the parties, their roles and responsibilities in accomplishing a shared goal.

**Transitional Justice**

The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with legacies of large-scale abuses in the past, in order to achieve reconciliation and to ensure the effective and accountable future provision of justice services.

**Transparency**

Free and open access to information which enables civil society to perform its regulatory function, ensuring that stakeholders are accurately informed about the decision-making process and have the ability to influence it.

**Theory of Change**

A blue print that lays down the building blocks needed to achieve the overall goals and objectives of a specific SSR programme. It explains how the programme intends to achieve the desired change and how the programme will concretely affect the situation in a particular way.

**Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)**

Explosive weapons such as bombs, grenades and landmines that did not explode when they were employed but that still pose a risk of detonation.

**Vetting**

A process of examination and evaluation, generally referring to performing a background check on someone before offering him or her employment, or conferring an award.

**Vulnerable Groups**

Groups with a high probability of being exposed to risks and/or threats and who have little or no means to overcome them. Their vulnerability can be a result of exposure to risk factors, and/ or a result of underlying socio-economic processes.

**Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA)**

An approach that refers to different ministries and departments within one national government coordinating their activities for improved overall effectiveness of SSR programmes.

**Whole-of-System Approach (WSA)**

An approach adopted by international and regional organisations with complex institutional structures and procedures in order to ensure internal coherence through a shared understanding on a specific topic.










# ISSAT COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE ONLINE

**Register online with ISSAT's Community of Practice (CoP) – a platform for security and justice practitioners to Learn and Share good practice in SSR. The ISSAT CoP welcomes all individuals who have a demonstrated practical and/or research interest in the implementation of security and justice reform programmes.**



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Registration on the ISSAT CoP allows practitioners to:

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- Create a profile detailing experience in security and justice reform;
- Find other security and justice reform practitioners from around the world;
- Ask for expert advice and receive help from peers on planning and conducting security and justice programmes via the ISSAT Forum;
- Share topical experiences, lessons identified, and good practices from security and justice reform missions via the ISSAT Blog posts;
- Access a growing number of free e-learning on SSR, advising, policing and justice.

The ISSAT Community of Practice will help you to stay connected, access experts and resources, and contribute to enhancing the knowledge and practice of security and justice reform.





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
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