POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY – 2016
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FOREWORD

Since its establishment in 2000, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has enjoyed a lively and inspiring cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly across a wide range of subjects and outreach activities, not only in Rose Roth conferences conducted across Partnership for Peace nations, but in Annual Sessions, trainings for new parliamentarians, and the development of knowledge products and documentation on democratic governance and its associated best practices. Sixteen years on from the onset of cooperation, the need for capacity building in the realm of parliamentary oversight of the security sector remains as pertinent as ever.

DCAF and the NATO PA, with the assistance of the Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, are delighted to make this publication of 2016 NATO PA policy recommendations available to a larger public.

Brussels and Geneva, February 2017

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CONTENTS

Introduction NATO, the Enduring Strategic Challenges and the Domestic Political Surprises of 2016 .......................................................... 1
Policy Recommendations Adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2016 ....... 5
  Declaration 428 on a United and Resolute Agenda for NATO at the Warsaw Summit 5
  Resolution 429 on Forging a Concerted Response to Terrorism at Home .......... 10
  Resolution 430 on Maintaining International Support in Afghanistan .............. 13
  Resolution 431 on Supporting NATO’s Post-Warsaw Defence and Deterrence Posture ..................................................................................... 16
  Resolution 432 on Allied Defence Spending ...................................................... 19
  Resolution 433 on Defeating Daesh ................................................................. 21
  Resolution 434 on NATO Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) .................................................................................. 24
Annex 1: The NATO Parliamentary Assembly .................................................. 27
Annex 2: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) .... 35
Introduction
NATO, the Enduring Strategic Challenges and the Domestic Political Surprises of 2016

David Hobbs and Ruxandra Popa

For the NATO community, the Summit of Allied Heads of State and Government due to take place in Warsaw in July was expected to be the milestone event of 2016. It did not disappoint: the Summit indeed provided renewed strategic guidance about the complex security challenges facing Allies and ways NATO needed to adapt to address them.

At the same time, however, three important—and largely unexpected—political events in Allied countries marked 2016, and are likely to have a lasting impact on intra-European and transatlantic relations: the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey, and the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States.

All these events featured prominently on the agenda of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), the interparliamentary body bringing together national legislators from the 28 member states of NATO as well as from a broad range of partner countries.

Much of the Assembly’s work in 2016 naturally revolved around the Warsaw Summit. Through its reports and resolutions in particular, it sought to both shape and analyse the Summit’s outcomes. The Summit was widely seen as a success, delivering a strong message of Allied solidarity and resolve in the face of ongoing threats and continued instability in the Alliance’s neighbourhood.

First, in light of Russia’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its destabilising global agenda and the open threats directed against NATO Allies and partners alike, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed an important strengthening of the Alliance’s deterrence and collective defence. They reaffirmed the centrality of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty—the pledge by Allies to defend each other against attack—and increased NATO’s military presence on the territory of the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. They also directed further work to protect NATO and its members against cyberattacks and the type of subversive non-military destabilisation campaign conducted in the initial phases of Russia’s campaign against Ukraine in 2014.

Second, Allied governments agreed to increase NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism along three main lines of effort: intelligence, surveillance and recon-

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1 David Hobbs is the Secretary General and Ruxandra Popa the Deputy Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
naissance (ISR) support to the counter-ISIL coalition; further capacity-building assistance to Iraq, and other NATO partners on the frontlines of the battle against terrorism such as Afghanistan, Jordan and Libya; and a longer-term and comprehensive effort to prevent crises and support stability in the Alliance’s neighbourhood.

Third, NATO Heads of State and Government acknowledged that these new demands on Allied militaries could only be met by dedicating more resources to defence, and thus reaffirmed their objective to increase defence spending and investment in new capabilities.

Fourth, the Warsaw Summit delivered a historic agreement between NATO and the European Union to increase cooperation on a range of challenges.

Lastly, Allied Heads of State and Government confirmed their invitation for Montenegro to become NATO’s 29th member state, and their ongoing support for other applicants.

The NATO PA advocated many of these measures in the discussions it held in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, and in the reports prepared by its five Committees: the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security; the Defence and Security Committee, the Economics and Security Committee, the Political Committee, and the Science and Technology Committee. The Assembly’s views and priorities for the Summit were formally summarised in Declaration 428 on A United and Resolute Agenda for NATO at the Warsaw Summit adopted exceptionally at the Assembly’s spring session in Tirana, Albania, in May 2016, and reproduced in this booklet.

The Assembly’s President, Hon. Michael R. Turner (United States) presented these priorities in person to Allied Heads of State and Government in Warsaw, addressing the Summit on behalf of the NATO PA. He also separately published two studies—one ahead of the Summit and one immediately following the Summit—on the importance of strengthening NATO’s deterrence.

In addition, throughout 2016, the Assembly monitored and encouraged prompt ratification of Montenegro’s accession to NATO by its 28 member parliaments.

The six other policy recommendations featured in this booklet were adopted during the Assembly’s annual session in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 2016, and many focus on the progress achieved in implementing the Warsaw Summit decisions. They address the following themes:

- Supporting the strengthened deterrence and defence posture agreed by Allied Heads of State and Government in Warsaw (Resolution 431), as well as the commitments made regarding increased defence spending (Resolution 432);

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2 One of the traditional arrangements between NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is that the Assembly’s President is invited to address NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government on behalf of the Assembly, and present the views of the Alliance’s parliamentarians. The NATO PA President usually speaks first in the first closed session of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government.
• Urging the adoption of more robust measures to combat the threat of terrorism abroad and at home (Resolutions 429 and 433);
• Maintaining international support for Afghanistan (Resolution 430);
• Recognising the growing value of airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets for fulfilling NATO’s missions (Resolution 434).

While formally independent from NATO, the Assembly brings together national parliamentarians from all member states of NATO. These policy recommendations thus represent the collective views of over 250 legislators from across the Alliance on the key issues on NATO’s agenda. As part of the regular interactions between NATO and the Assembly, they are communicated to national parliaments, governments and NATO authorities, and the NATO Secretary General replies in writing to each of them.

However, these texts are only one aspect of the Assembly’s multifaceted response to international events. The Assembly meets at regular intervals and in different formats some 40 times a year, and these meetings allow its members to discuss—both formally and informally—any issue that they consider relevant and important for transatlantic and global security.

In 2016, these discussions naturally centred around the main global challenges connected with Russia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, terrorism, refugees, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, among others, and around NATO’s response. However, throughout the year, the NATO PA also offered a valued forum for its members to exchange views with their colleagues from the United Kingdom, Turkey and the United States on the likely impact of the so-called “Brexit,” the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey, and the US presidential elections on the transatlantic relationship.

While “Brexit” is not directly related to NATO, it will force a redefinition of the fundamentals of European integration, including European defence. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it, post-Brexit, 80% of Allied defence spending will come from non-members of the EU. Discussions among Assembly members in 2016 were particularly helpful to better grasp the significance of these developments.

Similarly, the Assembly’s annual session in November 2016 and its final event of the year—the Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum held each December in Washington D.C.—provided valuable opportunities for European and Canadian lawmakers to gauge assessments from their counterparts from the United States Congress on the priorities of the new President and administration for transatlantic defence and for NATO.

However, the coup attempt in Turkey and its aftermath probably offer the best example of the NATO PA’s parliamentary diplomacy in action. The Assembly responded promptly to the coup attempt. Contact was made on 16 July with the Head of the Turkish delegation to express the Assembly’s support for Turkey’s democratic institutions, and the NATO PA President issued a statement calling for an end to violence, a return to constitutional government and respect for the subordination of the military to civilian democratically elected authorities.
Assembly Vice-President Paolo Alli (Italy) was one of the parliamentary leaders to attend the “Democracy and Solidarity Summit” held in Ankara on 1 September. The Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the Summit both unambiguously condemned the coup attempt, and stressed the importance of responding in accordance with Turkey’s laws and constitution and international human rights instruments.

Lastly, the Assembly’s annual session held in Istanbul in November 2016 featured a series of both on and off the record, formal and informal, discussions allowing Assembly members to express their condemnation of the coup attempt, while seeking clarification and reassurance from their Turkish counterparts and Turkey’s top government officials about the emergency measures taken in response and their compatibility with NATO core values.

Records of these public discussions are available on the Assembly’s website and social media sites.

The Assembly thus played its full part in making the parliamentary voice heard in the face of both the internal and external challenges which marked the year 2016. We hope that this collection of the Assembly’s policy recommendations will help readers better understand the added value that parliamentary diplomacy can bring to decision-making in the areas of security and defence. The Assembly’s members are the democratically elected representatives of the people in all member states of the Alliance. Their voice is therefore also that of the Alliance’s citizens. This volume is dedicated to them, and we would like to thank the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces for supporting its production.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
adopted by the
NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
in 2016

DECLARATION 428
on
A UNITED AND RESOLUTE AGENDA FOR NATO
AT THE WARSAW SUMMIT *

Preamble

i On 8 and 9 July 2016, NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Warsaw to review the whole range of challenges facing Allies, and NATO’s role in addressing them.

ii In the past two years, the strategic environment has experienced profound shifts. With its aggression against Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea as well as the continuing illegal occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia), Russia put an abrupt end to 25 years of efforts by Allies to build a genuine strategic partnership. Russia’s recent actions have also included other forms of intimidation targeted at its neighbours, dangerous behaviour and provocations directed against Allies, multiple violations of international norms and an extensive rearmament programme. NATO’s door has remained open for dialogue throughout, and we welcome the recent NATO-Russia Council meeting as far as it demonstrates shared interest in dialogue. However, this dialogue has so far delivered no concrete outcome of a strategic nature. Nevertheless, we welcome further efforts to promote a dialogue, which we consider as the most appropriate path for de-escalating the current tension.

iii At the same time, ongoing conflicts and instability in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood, from Libya to Iraq and Syria, and more generally in the arc of crisis from Pakistan to the Gulf of Guinea, directly threaten the security of our citizens and indeed global security. They have been a breeding ground for Daesh and other terrorist groups, which

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday, 30 May 2016, Tirana, Albania.
have seized control of large swathes of land and whose hateful ideology continues to attract some of our own citizens. They have also caused a humanitarian disaster and the largest mass migration since World War II. NATO needs a comprehensive strategy to support stability in the South.

iv In Afghanistan, NATO continues to assist with development of the framework and institutions which will provide security for the Afghan people while ensuring that Afghanistan no longer exports insecurity.

v In today’s complex security environment, none of these challenges can be addressed in isolation. Neither is NATO necessarily the sole or most appropriate framework. Rather, these challenges form part of a broader range of threats and risks which we must address simultaneously and in cooperation with others, especially the European Union (EU). Among these are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, various forms of trafficking and organised crime, cyber-attacks, and threats to energy security and the environment.

vi Our governments’ and parliaments’ first responsibility is to provide security for our people. This declaration reflects the consensus among the elected representatives of NATO’s 28 member parliaments on how we can ensure that our Alliance continues to serve as the cornerstone of our nations’ security. Building on the important foundations laid down at the 2014 Wales Summit, the Warsaw Summit must make clear that the Alliance is one and indivisible, prepared and able to address the entire range of challenges to our security at 360 degrees.

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** that NATO’s core mission is the collective defence of its members in Europe and North America, and that all Allies remain committed to the fundamental principle enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack against one is an attack against all;

2. **Regretting** that Russia’s use of force against its neighbours and attempted intimidation of Allies have left NATO no choice but to consider the prospect of aggressive Russian action against an Alliance member as a potential threat, and to adopt measured, proportionate responses;

3. **Stressing** that these measures are structured to be non-provocative, are in compliance with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, despite Russia’s violations of the provisions of that Act, and leave the door open for dialogue;

4. **Noting** that conflict and state failure in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood, from Libya to Iraq and Syria, directly threaten the security of its citizens by feeding terrorism, human and other forms of trafficking, and mass migration;
5. **Convinced** that, in addition to defending Allies, NATO has a role in addressing the roots and consequences of this instability in partnership with others, as it continues to do in the Western Balkans and in Afghanistan;

6. **Determined** that the security of Allies is indivisible, and that all must contribute to addressing shared challenges, assume their fair share of responsibilities concerning conventional, nuclear and missile defence, and commit the resources necessary;

7. **Emphasising** that NATO’s response to threats is rooted in its commitment to individual freedom, the rights of men, women and children, democracy, and the rule of law;

8. **URGES** the Heads of State and Government of the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting in Warsaw:

   a. to ensure that all 28 Allies continue to provide reassurance to those Allies who feel their security is under threat, focusing on the Eastern and Southern flanks of the Alliance;

   b. to continue NATO’s political, military and institutional adaptation by strengthening conventional and nuclear deterrence, and enhancing a robust, balanced and persistent forward presence on a rotational basis and rapid response arrangements so as to make clear to any potential aggressor that any threat against any Ally would be met with utmost resolve and the Alliance’s collective might;

   c. to heighten NATO’s preparedness by increasing the frequency and size of exercises based on Article 5 scenarios, enhancing its ability to anticipate crises, further improving its response to hybrid warfare, and developing its ability to operate in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments;

   d. to continue to strengthen cooperation with NATO partners Sweden and Finland in order to increase situational awareness of the security situation in the Baltic Sea region and further interoperability;

   e. to reaffirm that the Black Sea remains an important component of Euro-Atlantic security, to continue monitoring and assessing the Black Sea security situation, and to strengthen cooperation with Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on this issue;

   f. to maintain a flexible and responsive posture, allowing NATO to respond to all challenges from wherever they emanate, and to preserve the Alliance’s ability to accomplish its three core tasks;

   g. to bolster arrangements ensuring that all Allies share the burden for defence, and to accelerate efforts to redress inequalities in defence spending among Allies, and meet the defence spending and investment guidelines agreed in Wales ahead of schedule and no later than 2020;

   h. to develop a comprehensive strategy for supporting stability in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood;
i. to step up, if requested, assistance to partners and regional organisations in North Africa and the Middle East to strengthen their capacity to deal with challenges in their neighbourhood and operate side by side with NATO;

j. to seek expanded bilateral and multilateral partnerships, especially with the United Nations, for a comprehensive approach, as well as with regional organisations such as the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League;

k. to consider further measures to support the international anti-Daesh coalition’s efforts;

l. to prepare for a potential request from the Libyan Government of National Accord for appropriate support including security assistance and counterterrorism;

m. to expand further cooperation on the management of migration flows with Frontex, and consider a similar agreement to cover NATO’s maritime activities in the Mediterranean;

n. to enhance the European dimension of the Alliance, including by ensuring the fullest involvement of non-EU Allies in the EU’s relevant efforts, and consequently to build on recent milestones in the cooperation with the EU on cybersecurity, hybrid warfare, intelligence, and migration, and seek further synergies in other areas, such as counterterrorism, strategic communication, resilience, and security assistance, as part of the EU’s future Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy;

o. to maintain their commitment to enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces through operation Resolute Support and other partnership activities;

p. to welcome the signing of Montenegro’s accession protocol, to reaffirm all the elements of the 2008 Bucharest Summit decision that Georgia will become a member of NATO with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process, to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s efforts towards meeting the requirements set in April 2010 so that its first MAP can be activated as soon as possible, and to reiterate NATO’s firm commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN;

q. to continue to denounce Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgian and Ukrainian territories, and assist both countries with much-needed domestic reforms;

r. to continue to explore ways to reduce tensions with Russia and avoid miscalculations and incidents, while addressing Russia’s unacceptable violations of international norms;

** Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Policy Recommendations

s. to continue to support the right of partners to make independent and sovereign choices on their foreign and security policy free from external pressure and coercion;

t. to enhance efforts to promote the transparency and efficient governance of NATO, and citizens’ understanding of the challenges and requirements of our shared security.
RESOLUTION 429
on
FORGING A CONCERTED RESPONSE TO TERRORISM AT HOME *

The Assembly,

1. **Deeply concerned** about the noticeable upward trend in the numbers and deadly nature of terrorist activities in the Euro-Atlantic area in recent years, as manifested in particular by gruesome attacks in Paris (13 November 2015), Brussels (22 March 2016), Orlando (12 June 2016), Istanbul (29 June 2016) and Nice (14 July 2016); and **expressing** its heartfelt sympathies to the families of the victims and its solidarity with the nations stricken by these attacks;

2. **Noting** that the Daesh terrorist organisation is behind many of these attacks, either through direct coordination, training and equipping the perpetrators, or indirectly by inspiring and encouraging “lone wolves,” and **noting also** that some NATO Allies have also witnessed an increase in terrorist violence from other terrorist organisations;

3. **Concerned** that national counter-terrorism agencies are increasingly challenged by the growing complexity of the threat, as terrorist use of new weapons and tactics complements, rather than replaces, the old ones;

4. **Noting** that the science, technology, and material required for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are increasingly accessible and becoming cheaper and easier to employ, **deeply concerned** by the continued use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria, and stressing that the risk of a CBRN terrorist attack is real, significant and growing;

5. **Appreciating** the commitment of the Allies, reiterated at the Warsaw Summit, to enhance terrorism-related information sharing among member states and assistance to partners, as well as new initiatives by the European Union, including the development of EU-wide databases and creation of a European border and coast guard; but,

6. **Noting** that the response to terrorist threats remains predominantly national, whereas terrorist networks are increasingly transnational, and that multinational counter-terrorism information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms are not used to their full potential;

* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
Policy Recommendations

7. **Mindful** of the fact that terrorism cannot be defeated by law enforcement methods alone, and that efforts to curb the spread of radical ideologies and to improve the socio-economic conditions in vulnerable communities within the Euro-Atlantic community and beyond, as well as depriving Daesh of its safe havens in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, are essential to achieving significant and durable reduction of the terrorist threat;

8. **Convinced** that additional security measures should be accompanied by adequate improvement of democratic oversight of security services in order to protect the principles of liberty, democracy, and human rights that underpin the North Atlantic Alliance;

9. **Stressing** the need to improve national implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, in particular Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters as well as Resolutions 2199 and 2253 on financing of terrorism, and **supporting** broader global counter-terrorism initiatives such as the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the 2011 Global Counterterrorism Forum;

10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to ensure that counter-terrorism agencies are adequately funded and have sufficient mandates, personnel and technological capabilities as well as up-to-date security standards across the board, including in public areas, institutions and transportation systems, in order to bolster resilience and to better prevent, deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist activities, taking into account the lessons learned from 2015-2016 terrorist attacks;

   b. to step up multinational counter-terrorism cooperation significantly, including making full use of existing multinational information-sharing platforms, coordinating efforts to combat human and weapons trafficking, and thwarting the financing of terrorism through implementation of the recommendations of the G7 Financial Action Task Force;

   c. to nurture mutual trust among Allies’ security and law enforcement agencies by, inter alia, jointly identifying potential loopholes that could result in information leaks, promoting joint training of counter-terrorism officials, and enhancing democratic oversight mechanisms to prevent the misuse of information received through multinational data-sharing channels;

   d. to support the strengthening of EU-wide border controls, coast guards and asylum systems in order to treat people arriving in Europe swiftly, orderly and with due dignity, and to prevent terrorist organisations from exploiting the refugee crisis to penetrate European societies;

   e. to mainstream the concept of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) which aims: to address the root causes of terrorism and radicalisation by focusing on preventive social and educational projects in vulnerable communities in counter-terrorism strategies; to share expertise and best national practices in areas such as
preventing radicalisation in prisons; to reduce the access of extremist propaganda to our communities by, inter alia, limiting the influence of radical preachers and encouraging the voices of wisdom and reason reaching out to a wider audience; and

f. to send a clear signal that the fundamental values of democracy, human rights and liberties will be protected, and that the competences received by security services will be clearly defined and proportional.
RESOLUTION 430
on
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

The Assembly,

1. **Underscoring** that NATO and its partner countries’ principal strategic goals in Afghanistan are to ensure the country will never again become a wellspring for terrorism, and to assist the Afghan government in building a peaceful, stable, and economically sustainable state for the Afghan people;

2. **Commending** the perseverance of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their efforts to improve security throughout Afghanistan since they took over responsibility in January 2015;

3. **Deeply concerned** by rising casualty rates in the ANDSF and civilians alike, and **regretting** the persistence of capability gaps hindering the forces’ ability to operate more efficiently and effectively;

4. **Recognising** the precarious security situation in Afghanistan, and **stressing** the importance of continued support to the ANDSF through training, advice, and assistance at all levels, particularly in air support, intelligence, logistics, and planning;

5. **Noting** that the continued support of the international community is essential to the future prosperity and stability of Afghanistan;

6. **Applauding** NATO member states and their partners for their continued strong support of Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which is providing an essential security partnership to the ANDSF;

7. **Welcoming** the commitments made at the NATO Warsaw Summit to sustain RSM beyond 2016 and support the ANDSF through training, advice, and assistance, as well as the pledges to continue contribution to the financial well-being of the ANDSF until the end of 2020;

8. **Highlighting** that long-term stability in Afghanistan depends on continued security sector reform as a means of developing effective and accountable ANDSF, which will help foster an environment conducive to political, economic and social development;

* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
9. **Welcoming** the pledges made at the October 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan to provide aid and continued development assistance in Afghanistan;

10. **Supporting** efforts by the Afghan government to implement pledged political, economic, and social reforms, but **highlighting** that much remains to be done;

11. **Concerned** about the persistence of widespread corruption throughout the government, which has a direct impact on ANDSF effectiveness as a stand-alone defence force;

12. **Acknowledging** that local hurdles to electoral reform remain a challenge for the government in Kabul, but **recalling** the necessity to ensure progress on the implementation of electoral reforms and advancing the process of holding credible and transparent elections;

13. **Commending** the Afghan government on its recent peace agreement negotiated with the *Hezb-i-Islami* armed group, marking the first successful peace accord between the National Unity Government and a domestic insurgent force; but, **emphasising** much more needs to be done to negotiate sustainable peaceful agreements between the government in Kabul, the Taliban, as well as other armed groups still participating in the insurgency against the government in Kabul;

14. **URGES** governments and parliaments of countries contributing to RSM and development efforts in Afghanistan:
   a. to work with the ANDSF and the government in Kabul to fill ANDSF capability gaps, inter alia, air support, logistics, planning, and intelligence gathering, as well as to maintain financial support to the ANDSF so that they may prevail over the insurgent forces currently destabilising the country;
   b. to build upon the Tokyo framework and set clear and achievable benchmarks for the continued improvement of the strength, transparency, and efficacy of all Afghan state institutions, particularly the ANDSF;
   c. to work with the Afghan Government and Parliament to develop efficient institutional oversight mechanisms, particularly of the ANDSF;
   d. to support the government in Kabul to broaden ANDSF cooperation with relevant countries in the region as well as with regional and international organisations to assist in the efforts to counter the spread of extremist networks and their ideologies as well as the drug trafficking criminal networks supporting them;
   e. to commit renewed attention to the security challenges facing the government in Kabul and the ANDSF today, and work together to recommit the whole of the international community, through the auspices of the United Nations, to find new ways to provide the kind of assistance needed to bring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity to the Afghan people;
   f. to encourage the government in Kabul to seize upon the momentum of the recent peace agreement reached with *Hezb-i-Islami* to find ways to resume negoti-
ations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups;

g. to continue to mainstream gender issues in Afghan-wide development projects and to support fully UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in its approach to peacebuilding throughout the country;

15. **URGES** the governments of the states bordering Afghanistan to take action to interdict the movement of fighters from their territory seeking to enter Afghanistan to conduct military or terrorist attacks against the ANDSF, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the Afghanistan civilian population and the Afghan Government;

16. **CALLS UPON** the Government and Parliament of Afghanistan:

a. to continue to address and improve persisting capability gaps of the ANDSF to strengthen their domestic forces’ capacity to fight against the insurgency and to protect Afghan civilians;

b. to continue efforts to increase Afghan contributions to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF, and to redouble efforts for transparent domestic revenue generation and spending to ensure Afghanistan can progressively take responsibility for the financing of its security institutions;

c. to expand efforts to fight persistent institutional corruption, and to ensure the existence and proper functioning of necessary verification and oversight mechanisms;

d. to work diligently towards pursuing and implementing electoral reforms, as well as the organisation of free and fair local and national elections;

e. to continue to seek a sustainable and peaceful resolution of the conflict with insurgents through negotiated settlement;

f. to expand efforts to improve relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, as well as other international actors working to develop a stable, strong, and independent Afghanistan; and

g. to continue efforts empowering Afghan women throughout civil and political life, including taking further steps to increase participation of women within the ANDSF.
RESOLUTION 431
on
SUPPORTING NATO’S POST-WARS AW DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE POSTURE

The Assembly,

1. Recognising the increasingly complex security environment facing the Alliance, particularly to the east and south, and understanding these challenges require an all-of-Alliance response to provide 360-degree security to maintain peace at home and project stability abroad;

2. Continuing to reject Russia’s aggression against Ukraine which resulted in the occupation of the Ukrainian Crimea and a substantial build-up of Russian military forces there, condemning Russia’s military, economic and information aggression against Ukraine, and concerned about the persistent failure to implement the Minsk Agreements due to the almost daily violation of the cease-fire in eastern Ukraine by Russia and its proxies;

3. Condemning the continuous occupation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) regions of Georgia by Russia and the extensive, illegal military build-up in these territories;

4. Deeply concerned about Russia’s deployment of significant A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities around the Baltic States, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arctic and stressing that it will not accept any limits to NATO forces’ freedom of movement within any part of Alliance territory;

5. Unsettled by the continuing instability throughout the Middle East and North Africa which, aggravated by Russia’s intervention in Syria, continues to cause unparalleled levels of conflict, displaced populations, and directly threatens Euro-Atlantic security;

6. Concerned about escalating refugee flows to Europe, resulting in humanitarian crises on its borders, which could pose security risks to Allies and cause division over the appropriate response mechanisms;

7. Encouraged by the strong message of unity expressed during the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, through which Allies sent a clear signal of continued commitment to Article 5 guarantees;

* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
8. **Applauding** the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture and readiness through the NATO Response Force and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);

9. **Commending** the activation of NATO Force Integration Units and the revamping of the Multinational Corps Northeast, which are critical for situational awareness and to support collective defence planning in NATO’s eastern territories;

10. **Welcoming** the decision announced at the Warsaw Summit to establish a multinational Enhanced Forward Presence on a rotational basis in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, thus moving from emergency reassurance measures to credible and persistent defence and deterrence along the eastern flank, and **grateful** to Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States for their commitment to lead these battalions, and to Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia for their contribution;

11. **Appreciating** NATO’s efforts to develop a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region, which will contribute to the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture, situational awareness and peacetime demonstration of NATO’s intent to operate without constraint and will provide a strong signal of support to regional security;

12. **Saluting** the United States’ announced quadrupling of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) demonstrating its enduring commitment to the transatlantic relationship and increasing the flexibility, responsiveness, and capability of the Alliance;

13. **Recognising** the progress Allies have made in reversing the trend of declining defence expenditures, but **underscoring** that all Allies must still invest more in equipment and infrastructure to ensure their forces meet NATO standards and can be deployed and sustained in operations;

14. **Welcoming** the declaration of the initial operational capacity of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system via the Aegis Ashore site in Romania along with the early-warning BMD radar system in Turkey;

15. **Commending** the Alliance’s decision to create a Joint Intelligence and Security Division at its Brussels headquarters, demonstrating a concrete effort to increase intelligence sharing, and thereby enhancing Allied strategic awareness;

16. **Noting** the recognition of cyberspace as an official warfare domain and **cognisant** that Allies have a duty to improve national cyber defences under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;

17. **Supporting** the Alliance’s increased exercise regime, in size and scope, of its air, land, and sea forces;

18. **Concerned** about the persistent delays in obtaining authorisations from some member states to move personnel and equipment through their territories; and **understanding** that parliamentary action is part of the solution to this challenge;
19. **Emphasising** that NATO remains committed to the nuclear deterrent element of the Alliance’s broader strategic deterrence posture;

20. **Applauding** the signing of the Accession Protocol for Montenegro and **highlighting** NATO’s commitment to its Open Door Policy as a means to achieve security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

21. **URGES** member state governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   a. to make further efforts to become strong Alliance defence contributors and meet NATO defence spending benchmarks; working towards committing 2\% of their GDP on defence investments, of which at least 20\% on major equipment, and research and development;
   b. to continue to demonstrate the political will and unity seen in Warsaw to uphold their Article 5 commitments;
   c. to remain united against the use of force to alter borders anywhere, and stand in support with partners facing Russia’s aggression and territorial integrity challenges such as Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova;
   d. to further strengthen political and practical support to aspirant countries on their membership paths i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
   e. to remain committed to a strong deterrence posture, while supporting ongoing NATO-Russia dialogue with the aim of respecting the territorial integrity of sovereign states;
   f. to maintain the Alliance’s collective defence posture, while working with NATO partners to address international crises and security challenges; and,
   g. to promulgate cross-Alliance Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the cyber domain.
RESOLUTION 432

on

ALLIED DEFENCE SPENDING *

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that most NATO member countries reduced defence budgets after the end of the Cold War, taking advantage of what was then called “the peace dividend”;

2. **Noting** that other international players, including Russia and China, have been massively investing in defence over the past decade, while Western countries were mired in a serious economic downturn;

3. **Acknowledging** that the security environment has become far less benign, as evidenced in the eastern and southern flanks where Russia has deployed significant A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities;

4. **Underlining** that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty calls upon Allies to separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and **recognising** the unaltered relevance of an adequate level of defence capabilities in an increasingly challenging environment;

5. **Welcoming** the commitments to increase defence outlays that Allied leaders adopted at the Summit meetings in Wales and Warsaw;

6. **Noting** that in 2016 overall Allied defence expenditure rose for the first time since 2009;

7. **Noting** that five Allied countries have achieved the 2% of Gross Domestic Product spending goal;

8. **Recalling** that although the level of defence spending is not an end in itself, it nonetheless represents an important means to purchase advanced equipment while fine-tuning national force structures to maximise capabilities;

9. **Stressing** that there are additional and complementary ways to increase capabilities, for example, through pooling and sharing, specialisation, targeted investment and deeper defence-industrial cooperation;

* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to redouble efforts to dedicate a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product to defence and more than 20% of defence budgets to major equipment, including related Research and Development;

b. to initiate without delay a transparent public dialogue with civil society and key private and public stakeholders on how greater defence outlays and enhanced long-term investments in defence capabilities can increase national and collective security;

c. to ensure that Allied countries work towards a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities for collective defence;

d. to ensure that investments are directed towards meeting new capability priorities and not towards other ends, like employment, which are not expressly defence-related and are thus better achieved by other means;

e. to restructure defence budgets and move ahead with cost-friendly initiatives along the lines of the pooling and sharing of military capabilities, enhanced procurement cooperation and economically sensible trade in defence material; and

f. to ensure that significant funding is also dedicated to addressing the sources of global and regional insecurity.
RESOLUTION 433
on
DEFEATING DAESH *

The Assembly,

1. **Appalled** by the massive loss of civilian lives, continuing violence and the large scale of displacement and destruction resulting from the Syrian conflict;

2. **Concerned** that conflicts in Iraq and Syria undermine regional and global security;

3. **Recognising** that Daesh threatens the stability of the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as the security of Allied and Partner countries;

4. **Appalled** by Daesh’s terror, characterised by filmed executions as well as the killing, sexual slavery, torture, forcible transfer and forced conversion of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the genocide against the Yazidis as concluded by the United Nations;

5. **Noting** that Daesh tends to flourish where state authority has broken down;

6. **Underlining** that only a legitimate government in Syria can effectively fight Daesh;

7. **Recognising** that an ultimate solution to ending the conflict in Syria lies in a genuine political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué and the UNSCR 2254;

8. **Observing** that the Global Coalition Against Daesh has significantly reduced the territory that the terrorist organisation controls;

9. **Emphasising** that defeating Daesh requires military force;

10. **Recognising, however**, that a political solution is ultimately needed to end Syria’s civil war and to foster lasting regional stability;

11. **Lamenting** the lack of unity and coordination among international actors both in the fight against Daesh and in ending the civil war in Syria;

12. **Dismayed** that the regime of Bashar al-Assad continues to perpetrate systematic human rights violations;

13. **Condemning in the strongest terms** Russia and Syria’s bombing campaign, which has targeted innocent civilians and medical facilities;

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
14. **Concerned** that ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq have triggered a devastating humanitarian crisis and generated massive refugee flows while **stressing** the refugees’ need for support and protection, the need for support to host countries in the region, and the need for a common European approach in dealing with the refugee crisis based on shared responsibility;

15. **Recognising** that genuinely defeating Daesh demands a concerted effort to alter the conditions which originally allowed that terrorist organisation to flourish, including poor governance, pervasive corruption, economic and political marginalisation and officially cultivated sectarianism;

16. **Understanding** that the Gulf countries, most of which have established partnership relations with NATO, can make a compelling contribution to the fight against Daesh;

17. **Welcoming** the decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit that will strengthen NATO’s contribution to stability in the South, including: direct NATO AWACS support for the campaign conducted by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, additional in-country assistance to Iraq, NATO support for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean, and Allied willingness to develop a long term-relationship with Libya once it has resolved its internal political conflicts;

18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO partners:

   a. to apply determined diplomatic pressure on the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its allies, including the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, to bring peace to Syria while protecting Syria’s civilian population;
   
   b. to back the calls for an International Criminal Court probe into war crimes committed in Syria and to consider imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation if its forces continue indiscriminate airstrikes on civilian populations of Syria;
   
   c. to continue the fight against Daesh in Iraq and Syria while deepening cooperation among NATO partner countries, particularly those in the Gulf and in the Mediterranean, in order to ensure a broad unity of purpose in this campaign;
   
   d. to call for investigation of violations of international law by Daesh in Iraq and Syria and to identify the perpetrators and hold them accountable;
   
   e. to increase humanitarian aid to the besieged and displaced people of Syria and Iraq while providing greater support to countries in the region which are receiving refugees of those wars;
   
   f. to continue, and if possible increase, support to the Iraqi Security Forces in order to enhance their capacity to fight and defeat Daesh;
   
   g. to make available additional economic and financial assistance to the countries of the MENA region in order to improve conditions for the broader population and thereby stave off future extremist threats;
Policy Recommendations

h. to encourage the Iraqi government and all relevant parties there to work to foster inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian reconciliation and pursue inclusive policies that allow all segments of that society to participate fully in the political process of the country; and

i. to support the work of governments, NGOs and citizens in the MENA region to build more plural and ultimately more democratic forms of government that enable all citizens to participate actively in shaping governance in their societies and thus defeat extremist ideologies.
RESOLUTION 434
on
NATO AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) *

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the strategic environment in which the Alliance finds itself is characterised by growing uncertainty, instability and risks as well as by a mix of asymmetric and conventional security challenges;

2. **Underlining** that ISR plays a vital role in achieving increased situational awareness and anticipation at all levels of decision making, and **stressing** that airborne ISR is a crucial element in the total ISR enterprise;

3. **Highly valuing** the contribution airborne ISR has made to the success of NATO missions, but also **frustrated** by shortcomings in the employment of airborne ISR in recent missions, especially during Operation Unified Protector in Libya;

4. **Applauding** significant progress in strengthening the Alliance’s airborne ISR capabilities at the national and the NATO level over the last years, but **stressing** that further improving intelligence sharing as well as processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities remain crucial;

5. **Welcoming** the achievement of initial operational capability of NATO’s Joint ISR (JISR) systems in 2016 and the subsequent decision to expand the scope of this initiative;

6. **Endorsing** the NATO decision to begin defining options for a follow-on capability for NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) by 2035, and **resolved** to remain apprised of the matter;

7. **Looking forward** to the arrival of the first Global Hawk at Sigonella Airbase in Italy at the end of 2016 as part of NATO’s Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) system;

8. **Welcoming** the agreement to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO headquarters, led by an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security;

9. **Appreciating** NATO’s support to national and EU efforts to stop illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea; NATO’s readiness to support the EU’s Op-

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2016, Istanbul, Turkey.
eration Sophia in the Central Mediterranean; increased NATO ISR activities along the Turkish-Syrian border; and direct support to the Global Coalition Against Daesh with NATO AWACS;

10. **Supportive** of European unmanned aerial vehicle development projects, notably for a Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System and a Future Combat Air System;

11. **Recalling** the importance of the Wales Defence Investment Pledge in meeting Alliance capability priorities, including ISR, by moving towards spending a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defence and more than 20% of defence budgets on major equipment, including related research and development;

12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to ensure sustained investment in airborne ISR capabilities, not only by acquiring assets, but also through recruitment and training of personnel;

   b. to redouble efforts to increase ISR interoperability and integration among Allies, in particular between US and European systems, including through adapted doctrines and procedures, a viable communication and information systems architecture, and better processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities;

   c. to examine the possibility of a follow-on multinational research and development effort to the Multi-intelligence All-source Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coalition 2 (MAJIIC2), in order to further improve standards for the sharing, searching and dissemination of ISR data;

   d. to overcome security concerns, national procedural hurdles and technological constraints which pose roadblocks for intelligence sharing and to move towards a “need to share” principle on intelligence;

   e. to increase investment in science and technologies relevant to airborne ISR, including the management of big data, connectivity between assets and systems, and technologies to overcome Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies;

   f. to fully fund the NATO AWACS Final Lifetime Extension Programme;

   g. to swiftly define sustainable options for a follow-on capability to NATO AWACS to take the first step towards avoiding a future capability shortfall; and

   h. to continue to take actions that will ensure full operational capability for the AGS system by 2018.
Annex 1:
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The Role of the Assembly

Founded in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) serves as the consultative inter-parliamentary organisation for the North Atlantic Alliance.

Bringing together members of parliaments throughout the Atlantic Alliance, the NATO PA provides an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of its member nations, helping to build parliamentary and public consensus in support of Alliance policies.

At the same time, it facilitates parliamentary awareness and understanding of key security issues and contributes to a greater transparency of NATO policies. Crucially, it helps maintain and strengthen the transatlantic relationship, which underpins the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the end of the Cold War the Assembly has assumed a new role by integrating into its work parliamentarians from those countries in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond who seek a closer association with NATO. This integration has provided both political and practical assistance and has contributed to the strengthening of parliamentary democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, thereby complementing and reinforcing NATO’s own programme of partnership and co-operation.

The headquarters of the Assembly’s 28-strong International Secretariat staff members is located in central Brussels.

How the Assembly Works

The NATO PA consists of 257 delegates from the 28 NATO member countries. Delegates from 13 associate countries; the European Parliament; 4 Regional partner and Mediterranean associate member countries; as well as 8 parliamentary observers and 2 inter-parliamentary assemblies also take part in its activities.

The Assembly’s governing body is the Standing Committee, which is composed of the Head of each member delegation, the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer and the Secretary General.

The International Secretariat under its Secretary General, is responsible for all administration and the bulk of research and analysis that supports the Assembly’s Committees, Sub-Committees and other groups.
The five Committees are: Civil Dimension of Security; Defence and Security; Economics and Security; Political; Science and Technology. They are charged with examining all major contemporary issues in their fields. Other Assembly bodies include the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group to enhance parliamentary dialogue and understanding with countries of the Middle East and the North African region, the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council and the Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council. The NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee was discontinued in April 2014.

The Committees and Sub-Committees produce reports, which are discussed in draft form at the Assembly’s Spring Session. The reports are then revised and updated for discussion, amendment and adoption at the Assembly’s Annual Session in the Autumn.

At the Annual Session, the Committees also produce policy recommendations – which are voted on by the full Assembly and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council. As well as meetings during Sessions, the Committees and Sub Committees meet several times a year in member and non-member nations where they receive briefings from leading government and parliamentary representatives, as well as senior academics and experts.

Financial

The Assembly is directly funded by member parliaments and governments, and is financially and administratively separate from NATO itself.

The Rose-Roth Programme

A central part of the Assembly’s work is the Rose-Roth Programme of partnership and co-operation – initially with Central and Eastern European countries but subsequently throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. This programme seeks to assist partner countries, mainly in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, through a challenging transition process, which involves the implementation of difficult political and economic reforms.

The Rose-Roth Programme involves a series of seminars focused on regional and topical security issues and training programmes for parliamentary staff and members of Parliament. The aim is to enhance parliamentary awareness, build contacts and provide experience and expertise. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principle of the democratic control of armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military.

The NATO Orientation Programme

The NATO Orientation Programme is focused primarily on young or newly elected members of parliament from NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations, as well as those newly assigned to security or foreign affairs responsibilities. The programme aims at providing an in-depth overview of the functioning and policies of NATO and SHAPE as well as of the Alliance’s evolving relationships with its many partners. The Programme was launched in 2000 and is held annually in Brussels.
The Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum

In 2001, growing concern about the apparent drift in transatlantic attitudes, perceptions and policies, prompted the Assembly’s Standing Committee to instigate a “Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum” to help identify the precise nature of the divergence in transatlantic thinking and to explore ways in which these differences could be redressed. The programme includes discussions with senior US administration figures and academic experts.

The Forum is held annually in Washington DC in co-operation with the National Defence University and the Atlantic Council of the United States.

The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group *

In the context of its outreach activities, the Assembly created in 1995 a Mediterranean Special Group with the aim of opening a political dialogue with legislators from countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The programme gradually expanded and received new impetus following the Arab uprisings. The Assembly has established relations with the Parliaments of six countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, as well as with the Palestinian National Council. Preliminary contacts have been established with Libya as well as with some countries of the Gulf and of the Sahel.

The yearly activities of the Group include a visit to the region, and two seminars, one of which is held in co-operation with the Italian Parliament. These meetings seek to enhance parliamentary awareness of the problems of the region, promote a political dialogue between parliamentarians, and ultimately provide experience and expertise to legislators from Maghreb and Middle East countries.

Sessions

Two sessions are held each year—in the Spring and Autumn (“Annual”)—in different countries.

* Formerly referred to as the Mediterranean Special Group.
## Membership of the Assembly

### Member Delegations

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### Associate Delegations

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* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Inter-parliamentary Assembly Delegations

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Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups

Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS)
Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG)

Defence and Security Committee (DSC)
Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation (DSCTC)

Economics and Security Committee (ESC)
Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTD)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations (ESCTER)

Political Committee (PC)
Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships (PCNP)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR)

Science and Technology Committee (STC)
Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS)

Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM)

Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (UNIC)

Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (GNIC)

NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee (NRPC)
(Discontinued as of April 2014)

Members of the Bureau of the Assembly

President
Paolo Alli (Italy)

Vice-Presidents
Metin Lütfi BAYDAR (Turkey)
Joseph DAY (Canada)
Rasa JUKNEVICIENE (Lithuania)
Tchetin KAZAK (Bulgaria)
Sverre MYRLI (Norway)
**Treasurer**
Marc ANGEL (Luxembourg)

**Secretary General**
David HOBBS (United Kingdom)
Annex 2:
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

DCAF at a Glance

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world's leading centres in the area of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). The Centre was founded in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government.

DCAF’s membership includes 63 member states and six permanent observers.

DCAF’s core services include:

- Advisory support and practical assistance in the development and implementation of policies in the area of SSG and SSR;
- Assessment, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SSG/R projects;
- Capacity-development and training;
- Development of knowledge products, services, and tools for policy-makers and SSR practitioners.

DCAF is based at the Maison de la Paix in Geneva with permanent offices in Beirut, Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah, Tripoli, and Tunis. DCAF has five operational divisions (Southeast Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa & Gender and SSR, Public-Private Partnerships, and the International Security Sector Advisory Team), as well as a research division. DCAF employs some 160 staff from almost 40 countries.

In 2015, DCAF’s overall budget reached 34.6 million Swiss francs – of which Switzerland financed 58 per cent and other member states and international organizations 42 per cent. All funding to DCAF is eligible as Official Development Assistance.

For detailed information about DCAF, visit www.dcaf.ch
Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform is the political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management, and oversight more effective and accountable, within a framework of civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights. The goal of SSR is to apply the principles of good governance to security institutions. SSR is recognized as an essential peacebuilding tool and a means to help prevent conflict, strengthen rule of law, and establish a conducive environment for political, social, and economic development.