POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY – 2014
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FOREWORD

Since its establishment in 2000, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has enjoyed a lively and inspiring cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly across a wide range of subjects and outreach activities, not only in Rose Roth conferences conducted across Partnership for Peace nations, but in Annual Sessions, trainings for new parliamentarians, and the development of knowledge products and documentation on democratic governance and its associated best practices. Fifteen years on from the onset of cooperation, the need for capacity building in the realm of parliamentary oversight of the security sector remains as pertinent as ever.

DCAF and the NATO PA, with the assistance of the Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, are delighted to make this publication of 2014 NATO PA policy recommendations available to a larger public.

Brussels and Geneva, April 2015

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Introduction
2014: A Year of Profound Changes

David Hobbs and Ruxandra Popa*

The year 2014 witnessed several major political and security upheavals. In the East, Russia responded to the popular revolt against the government of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine by illegally annexing Crimea following a sham referendum and propping up armed separatist movements in the Donbass, while officially denying any form of involvement. Russia continues to this day to support armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine despite the conclusion of several successive ceasefire agreements. With its actions, Russia seeks in effect to redraw the borders of Europe by force, a sad return to an era that Europe thought had been relegated to history.

Twenty fourteen also saw dramatic developments in Europe’s southern and southeastern neighbourhood. The so-called Islamic State or Daesh took advantage of the degradation of the security situation in Iraq and ongoing chaos in Syria to extend its influence and control in the region. This prompted a coalition of mostly Western and Arab governments to launch an air campaign to support the Iraqi security forces in their struggle against Daesh. A parallel campaign by a smaller group of nations is targeting ISIS positions in Syria. Allied governments are also increasingly concerned about the appeal of ISIS’ barbaric ideology among their youth, and the risks connected with the return of those who went to fight alongside ISIS in Syria to their homeland.

Meanwhile, instability spread in Libya as well, where political and security institutions led by different clans and militias competed for influence. The resulting power vacuum raised the spectre that extremist movements would build another stronghold in Libya from where they could seek to destabilise further other already fragile states in North Africa and the Sahel.

It was against the background of these worrying developments that NATO Heads of State and Government convened in Newport in the United Kingdom for a Summit in September 2014. Just a few months earlier, the Summit had been expected to focus primarily on the political and security transition in Afghanistan following the election of Ashraf Ghani to the presidency and the official end of NATO’s combat mission in the country on 31 December 2014. Instead, events in Ukraine and in the Middle East and North Africa dominated the agenda. In light of these challenges, NATO leaders reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to each other’s security and to the values which

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underpin the Alliance. In addition, they adopted a wide-ranging set of measures meant to give the Alliance the necessary tools to respond to new challenges in the East and in the South. Allies are now in the process of implementing this ambitious roadmap which is likely to shape NATO for the years to come.

Naturally, these developments dominated the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s (NATO PA) own agenda throughout 2014. While formally independent from NATO, the Assembly brings together national parliamentarians from the 28 members of NATO as well as their counterparts from a range of NATO partners. The Assembly meets at regular intervals and in different formats some 40 times a year, and adopts reports and policy recommendations which represent the collective views of some 250 parliamentarians from across the Alliance on the key issues on NATO’s agenda.

The policy recommendations featured in this volume provide the thread of the Assembly’s own response to the profound changes in the security environment which took place throughout the past year.

While the NATO PA normally adopts policy recommendations only once a year at its annual session, the Assembly’s leaders felt that international events and the prospect of the NATO Summit warranted a formal expression of the Assembly’s views earlier in the year. The three declarations (408, 409 and 410) exceptionally adopted at the Assembly’s spring session in Vilnius, Lithuania, in May 2014, encapsulate the NATO PA’s firm condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and provide a concise expose of the Assembly’s priorities for the NATO Summit.

The Assembly was in fact asked by the NATO Secretary General to provide input for the preparation of a Summit Declaration on the transatlantic bond. The outcome of the Assembly’s deliberations features in Declaration 408 on Transatlantic Relations which was formally presented to the NATO Secretary General in June 2014 ahead of the Wales Summit.

The other policy recommendations featured in this booklet were adopted during the Assembly’s annual session in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2014, and are based on the reports prepared by the Assembly’s five Committees: the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security; the Defence and Security Committee, the Economics and Security Committee, the Political Committee and the Science and Technology Committee.

These 8 policy recommendations again address international developments as well as the other issues identified by the Assembly as priorities. They include:

- A condemnation of Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine, and reaffirmation of support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and democracy (resolution 411);
- A statement of Alliance resolve and solidarity in the face of Russia’s challenge, as well as a declared readiness to assist those of Russia’s neighbours which also felt threatened (resolution 417);
- A call for further action to help stabilise the security and humanitarian crisis in the Middle East (resolutions 412 and 416);
• A confirmation of Allies’ continued support for Afghanistan beyond the end of NATO’s combat mission (resolution 413);
• A reiteration of the centrality of the transatlantic bond for NATO including in its economic dimension (resolution 415); and
• An affirmation of the need to adapt NATO to current and future challenges, including the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology (resolution 418).

These policy recommendations only tell part of the story however. While they constitute the formal expression of the Assembly’s views, and, as such, are communicated to national parliaments, governments and NATO authorities, they are only one aspect of the Assembly’s multifaceted response to international events.

For instance, throughout 2014, the Assembly conducted several high-profile visits to Ukraine to affirm its solidarity in the face of Russia’s aggression. The NATO PA President issued regular statements on the situation. Leading Ukrainian officials were invited to address the Assembly. Last but certainly not least, the NATO PA took the unprecedented decision to withdraw the Russian Federal Assembly’s associate member status. Members of the NATO PA considered that the Russian Parliament’s decision to authorise the use of force in Crimea and its ratification of the annexation of Crimea made it complicit with the Kremlin’s illegal and unjustifiable assault on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In preparation for the NATO Summit, the Assembly for the first time held a parliamentary conference in the days prior to the meeting to discuss the parliamentary perspective on the issues on the Summit’s agenda with some of the leading national and NATO officials. As has become customary, the Assembly President was also invited to present the NATO PA’s views at the Summit.

Turning to developments in the South, all five Assembly Committees prepared reports on various aspects of the dynamics at play in North Africa and the Middle East, and several visited the region. A large seminar in Italy at the end of the year provided a timely and opportune forum to discuss these dynamics with parliamentarians from all over the region.

The Assembly thus played its full part in making the parliamentary voice heard in the face of the profound changes which affected the security environment in 2014. We hope that this collection of the Assembly’s policy recommendations will help readers better understand the added value that parliamentary diplomacy can bring to decision-making in the areas of security and defence. The Assembly’s members are the democratically elected representatives of the people in all member states of the Alliance. Their voice is therefore also that of the Alliance’s citizens. This volume—as well as the Assembly’s website and social media sites—is dedicated to them, and we would like to thank the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces for supporting its production.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
adopted by the
NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
in 2014

DECLARATION 408
on
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS *

A Common History, a Common Future:
A Renewed Transatlantic Partnership for a Strong Alliance

1. The transatlantic bond is and remains the central and fundamental pillar of the Alliance. The strength of this bond lies in Europe and North America’s common history, in our enduring shared values and common interests. In the face of a constantly evolving and increasingly complex security environment, Europe and North America are confronted with a common set of challenges. NATO provides a unique forum where Europeans and North Americans can consult and coordinate on any and all of these challenges; this extensive, comprehensive, permanent consultation process helps maintain and reinforce our political cohesion. The ultimate expression of the transatlantic bond is the steadfast commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

2. The transatlantic bond, however, predates and transcends NATO. It is rooted in Europe and North America’s historic alliance for a Europe free and at peace, and in our shared commitment to promoting an international order which guarantees the freedom, inalienable rights and economic opportunity of all people.

3. Building on these two fundamental pillars, Europe and North America must redefine a modernised and strengthened transatlantic partnership, which will continue to serve as the fundamental bedrock of NATO for the future. We share a proud common history. Now is the time to define our common future.

4. Below is the vision that we, members of parliament from Europe and North America, elected representatives of the citizens of the Alliance, would like to submit to the consideration of our governments ahead of the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014.

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Friday, 30 May 2014, Vilnius, Lithuania.
1. Build a Citizens’ Alliance Today and Tomorrow

5. However strong, the transatlantic bond should not be taken for granted. We must ensure that new generations—our youth and our future leaders—understand the unique character of the transatlantic link and the value of the Alliance.

6. In all our countries, memories of the extraordinary commitment and sacrifice of our forefathers for peace and liberty in Europe are slowly fading away. In a globalised and interconnected world, our citizens also feel less directly bound together as part of a distinctive transatlantic community. We need active efforts across all fields of culture, education, media, diplomacy and economy to create a renewed transatlantic culture, and dedicate resources to these efforts. As a first step, we should introduce new transatlantic scholarships for future leaders in the fields of foreign policy, defence, economics and science.

7. The goals and missions of our defence have also become more diverse and complex, and thus more difficult for our citizens to understand and to support. Yet, the future strength of the Alliance and of the transatlantic bond depends on public support and trust. Our citizens must feel and take ownership of their own security. For this, we must encourage even greater transparency and involve our publics more in discussions and decisions over our common defence.

8. Greater financial transparency will increase public trust. The Alliance needs to explain the rationale behind its work, and account for the way in which this work is carried out.

9. Working hand in hand with NATO, academic institutions, national chapters of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other civil society organisations, our governments and parliaments must develop annual national action plans to inform the public about the requirements of 21st century defence and promote the values and aims of the transatlantic security partnership. These should include regular public information campaigns on national defence priorities and the benefits and added value of NATO; regular public consultations on defence strategies and priorities; and greater visibility of defence institutions on social media.

10. We should redouble efforts to promote the representation and full participation of women in defence and security institutions.

11. As we build the basis for effective defence and seek to reconcile the need for expediency with the requirement of democratic legitimacy, parliamentary support is essential. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and its members play a fundamental role in promoting the transparency of, and winning public support for, NATO policies, and furthering the transatlantic bond among current and future decision-makers.

2. Reaffirm Transatlantic Cohesion and Solidarity

12. The test for the Alliance is not the absence of differences—these will continue to exist—but the ability to cope with them in ways that pull our respective strengths and perspectives together and point to a common direction. To achieve this, we must ensure that individual or regional interests take into account collective interests, and that economic or other considerations do not jeopardize security interests.
13. Our priority should be to preserve and strengthen transatlantic cohesion and solidarity and demonstrate it in new and visible ways.

14. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provide a historic opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to, and faith in, the political and economic values that form the basis of the transatlantic link, and which we pledged to promote in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty.

3. Strengthen the Transatlantic Energy Security Partnership

15. Ongoing events in Ukraine provide a stark reminder that energy security must be a key mission of the Alliance.

16. Europe and North America should facilitate access to each other’s energy resources in order to reduce their reliance on imports from third countries. We should aim to establish a genuine transatlantic energy community.

17. Europe and North America must continue to work together to create a more competitive, transparent and diversified natural gas marketplace, through initiatives such as US LNG (liquefied natural gas) exports and the Southern Gas Corridor, which will help strengthen the independence of the Alliance.

4. Make Clear that the Alliance Continues to Stand for a Europe Whole and Free, for Universal Values and a Rules-based International System

18. The recent crisis in Ukraine should lead us to reaffirm our shared commitment to a Europe whole and free, to fundamental human and political rights and to a rules-based international system, a commitment which forms the very foundation of the transatlantic partnership.

19. A Europe whole, free and at peace remains a central goal for Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance acts as a symbol of the free, democratic choice of all nations. We should continue to affirm and support the right of nations to choose their foreign policy course, free from outside interference and destabilisation.

20. The Alliance provides a pillar of stability which has continued to attract new members which share the commitment to collective defence and to common values of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. NATO’s door remains open to all European nations which are ready and able to further its values, aims and principles, and in a position to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. The Alliance fully supports the aspirant countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia † and Montenegro, in their quest to become members of NATO.

21. As provided in the Washington Treaty, NATO must also continue to defend effective multilateralism based on the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

5. Reaffirm the Centrality of Article 5

22. Collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is and remains the Alliance’s main purpose and the ultimate expression of the transatlantic bond. There can be no

† Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
doubt about Allies’ determination and ability to exercise their Article 5 obligations. We must continue to take effective and visible measures to demonstrate our resolve and readiness.

6. Provide Common Responses to Common Challenges

23. In a constantly evolving security environment, NATO provides the unique transatlantic framework for Europe and North America to develop common responses to common challenges: terrorism, cyber-threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence is one of the most significant transatlantic undertakings in this field.

24. Food, energy and environmental security, and economic and conflict-driven migration will also pose new challenges in the future. NATO need not be the primary institution for averting, addressing or responding to problems in these areas, but it must be able to act in concert with other bodies.

7. Strengthen the Alliance's Contribution to Crisis Prevention and Management

25. Allies will continue to call on NATO to manage crises, particularly in the Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood.

26. There is no contradiction between the aspiration to prevent and resolve conflicts by diplomatic means and the necessity to maintain strong military capabilities. To reach political solutions, we need a credible defence and credible deterrence and to show our will and readiness to use it.

27. NATO should stand ready to provide military, as well as non-military, assistance in the event of natural, industrial or humanitarian disasters. For this, we must strengthen our capacity to anticipate future crises, particularly in the neighbourhood.

28. NATO should act in these fields in coordination with the European Union, as agreed, and with other international or regional organisations, respecting each organisation's specific area of responsibility and expertise.

29. Allies should consider how they support future UN stabilisation and peacekeeping missions which directly involve collective security interests, in the framework of the Washington Treaty, for instance by designating specific assets or units which could be used together as part of a co-ordinated NATO contribution to UN operations.

30. NATO members face an array of challenges emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) comprised of the protracted war in Syria, the continuing instability of Libya, the stalled transition in Egypt, and governance challenges exacerbated by the disintegration of government control in various countries, which has created ungoverned spaces where terrorist groups and traffickers can thrive. Therefore, the Alliance must be prepared to act in case of regional instability. Weak governance, the absence of the rule of law, and arms trafficking in large parts of the MENA region are a perfect breeding ground for groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are already indications that extremists have coalesced with criminal groups in Mali and Libya.
8. Preserve the Credibility and Strength of Our Transatlantic Defence

31. The threats we face today are increasingly diverse, complex, and unpredictable. To preserve our ability to protect our citizens, we must continue to invest in a strong, credible defence and deterrence.

32. Unfortunately, many capability commitments made in the past have not been fully followed through in practice. Disinvestment in defence has now reached a point where it threatens our ability to respond adequately to today's and tomorrow's threats. We must abide by the commitment embodied in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, to “maintain and develop [our] individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (...) separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.”

33. The current economic context has imposed severe strains on our defence budgets. We must ensure that future decisions about our national and collective defence, while taking into account available resources, are first and foremost policy-driven. Failure to fund adequate defence comes with a high political and security cost. Defence spending cannot be turned on or off at will because of the long lead times needed to recruit, train and exercise personnel, acquire complex and costly defence capabilities, and achieve interoperability of personnel and equipment.

34. NATO must remain the world leader in military effectiveness. The Alliance must preserve its technological edge, by investing in the capabilities needed for the future. To that end, it should stress research and development, and the importance of a strong industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic.

35. Increased co-operation on capability development through Smart Defence will help us get better value for the money we put into our defence, but will not substitute for inadequate defence expenditure.

36. Enhanced investment in peacetime interoperability will help our troops preserve the habit of working together they have developed in operations over the past 20 years.

9. Define the Terms of a New Compact between European and North American Allies

37. We must define the terms of a new compact between European and North American Allies. The current perception of an imbalance in the sharing of the burden for our security should be redressed.

38. European Allies should contribute more to NATO and to their own security. NATO should not serve as a pretext or vehicle for European Allies to delegate the responsibility for their security to the United States. A stronger Europe in NATO will mean a stronger NATO. In turn, North America should be more open to co-operation with European Allies in research and innovation and to defence industrial partnerships.

39. European Allies should understand and recognise the growing significance of political, economic and security interests in Asia. North American and European Allies will continue to remain each other’s partners of choice, and should work together to develop common approaches in dealing with regional and global security challenges.
40. As a matter of urgency, NATO and the European Union must develop a plan for ensuring that each organisation’s unique strengths and abilities are employed coherently to best address the challenges their member nations face.

10. Engage Partner Countries in Support of Our Shared Security

41. Engagement with partner countries has been one of NATO’s success stories, and contributes to the vitality of the Alliance. Partnerships cannot be a substitute for a strong transatlantic Alliance, but they can complement it. We must continue to work with partners to address common security challenges and build partners’ capacity to deal with their own security challenges.

11. Reassess the NATO-Russia Partnership

42. When partnerships are based on agreed common values and principles in addition to common interests, any violation of these values and principles must have consequences. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, illegal and illegitimate seizure of Crimea and a concerted campaign of violence by pro-Russian separatists, aiming to destabilise Ukraine as a sovereign state, have called into question the basis for our partnership. We must now define the new terms of this relationship. Any further Russian military interference, under any pretext, will only deepen Russia’s international isolation.

43. Russia’s military intervention, first in Georgia and now in Ukraine, represents a historic turning point and demonstrates that the European security environment is both fragile and unpredictable.
DECLARATION 409
on
NATO ENLARGEMENT *

The Assembly,

1. **Underlining** that since its creation by the twelve founding states on 4 April 1949, NATO has been a pillar of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area which has continued to attract new members who share the commitment to collective defence and to common values of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law;

2. **Recalling** that the year 2014 marks the 15th anniversary of NATO membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the 10th anniversary for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the 5th anniversary for Albania and Croatia;

3. **Convinced** that NATO enlargement has been an unambiguous success as a crucial factor for stability and prosperity in Europe as well as a catalyst for consolidating democracy, bolstering the rule of law, promoting tolerance and human rights, and ensuring civilian control of the military;

4. **Stressing** that NATO enlargement poses no threat to any nation but rather enhances the security and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic region;

5. **Highlighting** the positive contribution of new member states of NATO to the Alliance’s defence capabilities;

6. **Recalling** its historic contribution to past NATO enlargements and its continued support for the Open door policy;

7. **CONGRATULATES** the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia on the anniversaries of their countries’ membership in the North Atlantic Alliance;

8. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   a. to reaffirm their strong political commitment to the Open door policy and the Euro Atlantic perspective of the countries aspiring for NATO membership;
   b. to pursue the establishment of policies to promote partnerships and co-operation with partner countries;
   c. to recognise the progress achieved by aspirant countries and to consider taking the next steps in the process of NATO enlargement at the NATO Summit in Wales based on the results of the comprehensive review due to be completed in June 2014; and in particular,
      i. to follow through on the decision taken at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that Georgia will become a member of NATO, and move Georgia closer to membership by granting it a Membership Action Plan;

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Friday, 30 May 2014, Vilnius, Lithuania.
ii. to adopt a renewed set of concrete measures to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in fulfilling the conditions for activating its Membership Action Plan;

iii. to open the way for Montenegro’s membership in the Alliance;

iv. to encourage Skopje and Athens to redouble their efforts to solve the 'name issue', thus opening the way for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s membership in the Alliance;

9. PLEDGES, as it has done in the past, to render aspirant countries all possible assistance in achieving their goal of NATO membership.
DECLARATION 410

on

SUPPORTING UKRAINE

The Assembly,

1. **Expressing** its solidarity with the people of Ukraine defending their national independence and territorial integrity;

2. **Deeply disturbed** by the resolutions of the Russian Duma and Federation Council to authorise the use of military force in Ukraine;

3. **Condemning** Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its military and other actions to destabilise and undermine the sovereignty of other parts of Ukraine, and particularly its south-eastern regions;

4. **Denouncing** Russia’s continuing deployment of unmarked uniformed troops and use of proxies as a tactic to deny involvement in what is a clear and undeniable aggression and occupation;

5. **Deploring** the use of intimidation, torture, and murder in efforts to destabilise Ukraine;

6. **Alarmed** that, following the occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, and now its illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia has established a pattern of using military force against, illegally occupying, and now also illegally annexing, territory of neighbouring states;

7. **Deeply concerned** by Russia’s flagrant violation of international legal commitments and obligations, including the Budapest Memorandum, in which it guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine;

8. **Mourning** the people of Ukraine who have lost their lives in this conflict following Russia’s aggression;

9. **Applauding** the successful conduct of the 25 May 2014 presidential elections, and the large turnout wherever voting took place, despite a very challenging environment and ongoing destabilisation which prevented Ukrainian citizens in Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions from exercising their constitutional right to vote;

10. **Convinced** that these elections are a critical step towards the consolidation of Ukraine’s democracy and a clear signal in favour of national unity;

11. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union:

   a. to increase their political, financial, economic, material and technical support to the government and the people of Ukraine and to Ukraine’s efforts to build a strong, account-

* Presented by Hugh Bayley (United Kingdom), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Friday, 30 May 2014, Vilnius, Lithuania.
able and democratic state which guarantees human rights and the rule of law;
b. to reaffirm that Russia’s illegal territorial occupations will not be recognised, and to apply firmer sanctions against relevant Russian officials and entities until the aggression ends;
c. to increase measures to defend Central and Eastern European Allies and to demonstrate NATO’s unswerving resolve to protect the territorial integrity of all its members;
d. to strengthen their public communication policies to counter Russia’s misleading disinformation and propaganda campaigns;

12. **URGES** the newly elected President, the government and Parliament of Ukraine:

a. to use proportional means to restore fully the Constitutional order and the rule of law on their territory;
b. to take concrete steps to reassure all of their citizens that Ukraine will scrupulously protect civic and human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, to resolutely tackle corruption, oligarchic schemes, and economic inequalities, and to strengthen the independence of the judiciary;

13. **CALLS UPON** the Russian Federation:

a. to end immediately its unacceptable interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs as well as its military build-up along Russia’s Western borders and to publicly urge pro-Russian forces in South-Eastern Ukraine to honour the 17 April 2014 Geneva accords;
b. to engage in a direct and genuine dialogue with the newly elected President of Ukraine and with the government to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and allow Crimea’s return under Ukraine’s control and jurisdiction;
c. to respect the principle that all nations—including Ukraine—are free to exercise their own choices and decisions regarding their international economic and political aspirations and affiliations, in accordance with their national constitutions and laws;
d. to stop the occupation of its neighbours;
e. to respect and uphold the freedoms of expression and the press and to refrain from spreading misinformation aimed at distorting understanding of the situation in Ukraine and the views of majority and minority populations and ethnic groups in the region.
RESOLUTION 411
on
SUPPORTING UKRAINE’S SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY *

The Assembly,

1. **Emphasising** the Euro-Atlantic community’s moral obligation to support Ukraine’s struggle for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as its chosen pathway towards greater Euro-Atlantic integration, and **stressing** that no third party has a right to veto this process;

2. **Supporting** the decisions of the NATO Wales Summit to provide Ukraine with a new package of measures to support its security sector reform and assist with defence capacity building, in order to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself;

3. **Condemning** in the strongest terms Russia’s illegal occupation and ‘annexation’ of Crimea and invasion of Ukrainian sovereign territory, in violation of international law and particularly of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the Helsinki Final Accord, the UN Charter and the spirit of the NATO-Russia Founding Act;

4. **Stressing** that Russia’s direct as well as covert involvement, including the deployment of unmarked uniformed troops in part of Ukraine, is the principal reason for the prolonged armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis in eastern Ukraine;

5. **Welcoming** the Minsk Agreements of 5 and 19 September 2014 and the steps taken by President Poroshenko and the Ukrainian parliament to accommodate the interests of the people of eastern Ukraine; but,

6. **Expressing concern** over the lack of implementation of the Minsk Agreements including the fragile status of the ceasefire, the continued instability in eastern Ukraine, as well as the deterioration of the human rights situation for Crimean Tatars and other minorities under Russian occupation;

7. **Calling** on all relevant parties to provide full assistance to the Dutch Safety Board, conducting the investigation of the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17;

8. **Noting** that the successful conduct and the results of the 26 October 2014 parliamentary elections confirm Ukraine’s strong commitment to democracy and European integration;

9. **Commending** Ukraine for ratifying the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement with the European Union establishing, *inter alia*, a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and **convinced** that, once fully in force, the Agreement will be a crucial tool for transformation and modernisation of Ukraine’s political system, economy and judiciary;

10. **Acknowledging** the significant contributions Ukraine has made as a NATO partner, including to all four active NATO-led operations, as well its participation in the NATO Response Force;

11. **Recalling** the pledge made at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit that Ukraine and Georgia

will receive NATO membership, provided they so wish and once the membership criteria are fulfilled, and welcoming in this context the ever-increasing support of the Ukrainian people for membership of NATO;

12. Noting that the Alliance’s promotion of shared values in Europe and beyond forms the bedrock of the Euro-Atlantic security community;

13. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   a. to ensure full and rapid implementation of pledges made so far in support of Ukraine and to consider additional political, financial, economic, material and technical support measures to assist Ukraine in its efforts to protect its territory and to build a strong, accountable and democratic state which guarantees human rights and the rule of law;
   b. to support diplomatic attempts to peacefully resolve the Russia-backed armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and prevent it from becoming another “frozen conflict,” in particular by reinforcing the International Observation Mission on the Russia-Ukraine border in the conflict zone;
   c. to continue targeted sanctions until Russia shows that it is willing to abide by international rules and norms, to undo illegal and illegitimate territorial gains, and to behave as a responsible and neutral actor advancing the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
   d. to make it unambiguously clear that the illegal “annexation” of Crimea will never be recognised;
   e. to implement measures designed to boost defensibility of the Alliance’s eastern periphery and to demonstrate solidarity and to increase support for those Allies that are mostly affected by Russia’s counter-measures in response to sanctions;
   f. to counter the Russian Federation’s campaign of misinformation;
   g. to encourage greater energy independence of Europe from Russian sources of oil and natural gas;
   h. keep the door open for future enlargements of the Alliance;

14. CALLS UPON the government and Parliament of Ukraine to continue democratic reforms, including the building of an inclusive political system based on respect for the rule of law, minorities, and human rights; and to demonstrate with concrete actions that today’s Ukraine tackles corruption, clientelism and oligarchic influences resolutely and without exceptions;

15. CALLS UPON the Russian Federation:
   a. to stop attempts to destabilise Ukraine;
   b. to publically urge pro-Russian separatists to disarm;
   c. to free immediately all the Ukrainian citizens captured by it since the beginning of the conflict and who are being unlawfully held in Russian territory;
   d. to engage in genuine talks with the Ukrainian government on a political solution to the crisis and the return of Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction;
   e. to put an end to the brutal and massive violations of human rights, including the right to live in the territory of Crimea and the territories in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk temporarily under the control of separatists;
   f. to end the propaganda campaign which fuels aggressively anti-Western and chauvinistic
attitudes among the Russian people;

16. **URGES** therefore the Russian Federation to make every effort to contribute to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.
RESOLUTION 412

on

THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS ON EUROPE’S SOUTHERN BORDERS

The Assembly,

1. Acknowledging that general instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and particularly conflicts in Syria and Iraq, have triggered a devastating humanitarian crisis that has now reached the borders of Europe;

2. Noting that tens of thousands have lost their lives in Syria and Iraq while millions have fled their homes since the start of the war;

3. Lamenting the tragic deaths of thousands of refugees and migrants from the MENA region seeking to cross the Mediterranean Sea;

4. Appreciating the efforts of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and other countries as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international institutions to provide shelter and feed millions of Syrian and Iraqi refugees; but,

5. Noting that the capacity of Lebanon and Jordan is now stretched to the limit and that the arrival of Syrian refugees in recent years has led to overcrowding, soaring prices, water shortage, rising community tensions and growing economic hardship;

6. Understanding that Europe’s southern states have assumed a disproportionate burden in caring for these refugees and migrants, although many do not remain in those countries and move quickly to more northerly states;

7. Applauding the humanitarian intention behind Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation, which also made it possible to arrest a substantial number (765) of traffickers of human beings;

8. Deploring the actions of criminal groups which have led to more migrants losing their lives at sea in the central Mediterranean area;

9. Recognising that women and children have borne a particularly heavy burden as a result of war and instability in the MENA region and have been subject to murder, kidnapping, rape, early marriage, torture and slavery;

10. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to increase support for those frontline states that bear the greatest burden of hosting an expanding number of refugees and migrants;

   b. to create a genuine multilateral programme to dissuade human traffickers and people smugglers from conducting their deadly trade, in order to reduce the number of refugees dying at sea;

c. to deepen co-operation with and to increase assistance to countries of origin and transit in order to find durable solutions for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons;
d. to align national legal standards for prosecuting human traffickers;
e. to revisit reception procedures throughout Europe so that the burden of hosting this huge number of irregular migrants is more equitably shared;
f. to develop comprehensive approaches to the specific problems women and children refugees confront and to work with host countries to implement support systems designed to ameliorate living conditions for these innocent victims of war and terrorism;
g. to pursue the idea of creating humanitarian corridors in war-torn regions so that the basic needs of war traumatised populations can be met in their homes, thereby reducing their incentive to flee;
h. to support vaccination programmes, especially in Syria, and to pressure belligerents not to use denial of health care as a tool of war;
i. to hold those who commit human rights violations and war crimes legally accountable for their crimes;
j. to examine the possibility of the establishment of a no-fly zone and safe zones in Syria for the sheltering and protection of local communities and Internally Displaced Persons.
RESOLUTION 413

on

SUPPORTING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES BEYOND 2014 *

The Assembly,

1. **Commending** the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for taking the lead in all security operations throughout Afghanistan, working diligently to assist with the end of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, and preparing for full autonomy as Afghanistan’s sole security provider, though **expressing concern** about the high casualty rates endured by the ANSF;

2. **Underlining** the importance of continued support to the ANSF through advice, training, and assistance at all levels, with particular attention paid to air support, intelligence, and logistics, and **inviting** NATO Allies that have not yet committed forces to Operation Resolute Support to do so;

3. **Recalling** that NATO and its partner countries’ strategic goals in Afghanistan are to ensure that the Afghan state will never become a safe haven for terrorism again, to assist the newly formed government bring peace and stability to the Afghan people, and to strive to avoid the establishment and spreading of terrorism in this country, particularly by the so-called ISIL;

4. **Confident** that Afghanistan, with the continuing support of the international community, is on the path to achieve these goals as progress continues to be made at all levels on the ground;

5. **Congratulating** the people of Afghanistan with the formation of a government of national unity after the 2014 presidential election, marking the first democratic transition of power in Afghanistan, but **disappointed** by the prevalence of widespread ballot-fraud and the lack of transparency in the run-off elections, which seriously hindered and jeopardised the transition process;

6. **Welcoming** the government’s signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, and the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO, creating the legal framework for international forces to continue to train, advise, and assist the ANSF under Operation Resolute Support after the end of ISAF on 31 December 2014;

7. **Praising** NATO member states and their partners for their contributions to ISAF for over 13 years of security operations to establish peace and stability in Afghanistan, protect the Afghan people and the world from the scourge of terrorism, and helping Afghanistan build the capacity to provide for its own security and its own governance;

8. **Welcoming** the commitment of NATO and its own partner countries to continue their contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF through 2017;

9. **Supporting** the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) in its efforts to reintegrate insurgents who renounce violence and their ties to armed groups and terrorist organisations;

10. **Emphasising** the imperative of renewed negotiations between, on one side, the Afghanistan High Peace Council (HPC), and on the other, designated Taliban representatives and other insurgents operating in the country, and **supporting** President Ghani’s invitation to the Taliban and other insurgent groups to disarm and re-join peace talks;

11. **Concerned** about the persistent budget deficits of the government of Afghanistan and the limited progress on raising domestic revenue, and **underscoring** the increased fiscal constraints the Afghan government will face after the drawdown of international forces and their associated revenues;

12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of countries contributing to ISAF:
   
   a. to commit themselves to Operation Resolute Support and to assist the mission as much as they are able, particularly through a force generation process enabling the mission to reach full operational capacity by 1 January 2015;
   
   b. to continue to support the ANSF by working with the government in Kabul to address enduring capability gaps in, *inter alia*, the state’s air force, intelligence, logistics, as well as to continue to support ANSF financially in order to sustain their operating capacity at the level required to continue to prevail against the insurgency;
   
   c. to support the government in Kabul to broaden ANSF co-operation with relevant regional structures, in particular in the spheres of fighting drug trafficking from Afghanistan, extremism and challenges for regional stability;
   
   d. to remain ready to advise and assist Afghan government institutions in the development and implementation of their border security policies, particularly those addressing illegal migration, drug trafficking and other threats to our societies;
   
   e. to build upon the Tokyo framework and to set clear and achievable benchmarks for the continued improvement of the strength, transparency, and efficacy of all Afghan state institutions, particularly the ANSF;
   
   f. to encourage the government in Kabul to support the Afghanistan High Peace Council to re-start negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgents to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan;
   
   g. to continue to mainstream gender issues in the international community assistance projects and to implement fully UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in its approach, so that there will be no reversal of the progress attained during the last decade;

13. **CALLS UPON** the government and Parliament of Afghanistan:

   a. to continue to strengthen and diversify the ANSF to ensure that they:
      
      i. maintain the balance of power in the fight against the insurgency;
      
      ii. represent the rich ethnic diversity of the country;
      
      iii. continue with their insurgent reintegration programmes;

   b. to work diligently to meet the goals set on Afghan contributions to the financial sustainment of the ANSF, and to redouble its efforts for transparent domestic revenue genera-
tion and spending to ensure that the country can progressively take responsibility for the transparent financing of its security institutions;
c. to follow up on their stated intention to seek a durable and peaceful resolution of the conflict with insurgents through a negotiated settlement;
d. to continue to fight persistent institutional corruption, and to ensure the proper functioning of verification and oversight mechanisms to oversee the appropriate distribution and use of funding to build Afghan state institutions; and,
e. to expand their existing efforts to improve relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, as well as other international actors working to develop a stable, strong, and independent Afghanistan.
RESOLUTION 414
on
SUPPORTING THE WALES SUMMIT CAPABILITY GOALS *

The Assembly,

1. **Expressing** its strong support for the Alliance’s commitment to bolster NATO defence capabilities in order to meet current and future security challenges;

2. **Recognising** that the evolving security environment, and in particular current developments at the eastern and southern borders of the Alliance, constitute a serious threat to Allies and partner states in the region and serve as a test for NATO’s crisis management capabilities;

3. **Noting** the hybrid nature of current security threats and the resulting need for NATO Allies to invest in their national capabilities as well as to strengthen co-ordinated strategic communication;

4. **Convinced** that the equal and balanced distribution of defence costs and responsibilities among all Allies is essential to sustain NATO’s capacity to fulfil its core mission of collective defence as well as its capacity to respond effectively and efficiently to crises;

5. **Pledging** to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets throughout the Alliance and to aim to move toward the NATO defence spending guidelines of 2% GDP on national defence, at least 20% of which should be dedicated to new equipment purchases and related research and development for future combat systems;

6. **Pointing out** that a strong defence industry in Europe is critical for the Alliance to provide essential defence capabilities through a fair and balanced inter-European and transatlantic burden sharing;

7. **Commending** efforts of European Allies to contribute to a balanced provision of defence capabilities particularly through the NATO Framework Nations Concept and the launch of three multinational European projects at the Wales Summit;

8. **Welcoming** efforts to implement the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Initiative, in particular the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance capability;

9. **Commending** efforts to improve the defence capacity of the Alliance via the “NATO Forces 2020” initiative;

10. **Supporting** the Alliance’s new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, which recognises cyber defence as part of NATO’s core mission of collective defence, within the framework of all relevant international law, and **emphasising** the possibility for the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 in the event of a cyber attack, on a case-by-case basis;

11. **Reaffirming** missile defence as an essential component of NATO’s strategy and **welcoming** the work toward full implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach ballistic missile defence programme;

12. **Stressing** that defence capabilities and specific experiences of NATO partner countries are indispensable assets for the successful implementation of the Alliance’s goals and that close interoperability and military integration between forces are essential to pursue a co-ordinated approach to NATO missions;

13. **Noting** that the end of combat operations in Afghanistan should not represent an end to cooperation between NATO and its partners, but rather present a chance to expand the breadth and depth of these relationships;

14. **Welcoming** plans to establish on a permanent basis rotating command and control units and force enablers along the eastern flank of the Alliance;

15. **Commending** efforts to increase interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces and to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity for self-defence;

16. **Noting** the adoption of a substantial NATO-Georgia package aimed at strengthening Georgia’s defence capabilities, which will help NATO aspirant countries to advance in their preparation for membership in the Alliance;

17. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to demonstrate the political will and foresight to invest in their present and future defence forces and thereby strengthen their contributions to NATO’s defence capabilities;

   b. to invest in the preparedness of modern, highly capable and well-equipped ‘NATO Forces 2020’ and to support the implementation of the new Readiness Action Plan (RAP), in particular the creation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);

   c. to reaffirm their commitment to share the burden of the Alliance’s costs and responsibilities, thereby strengthening transatlantic and inter-European bonds of trust;

   d. to continue and increase their efforts to reach a burden-sharing among European Allies through co-operative projects such as the NATO Framework Nations Concept;

   e. to develop national cyber defence capabilities crucial to the defence of the Alliance from attacks, and to continue to devise and enhance strategies of cyber defence co-operation among Allies and with relevant partner nations and organisations;

   f. to continue their efforts to make available through voluntary national contributions and multinational co-operation an operational NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD);

   g. to intensify their efforts to share information and strengthen co-ordination in light of the complex security challenges the Alliance faces in the 21st century;

   h. to increase surveillance of NATO’s southern flank, particularly North Africa and the Sahel, an area of growing insecurity and threatened by the establishment of new forms of terrorism;

   i. to work towards greater defence co-operation and co-ordination with NATO partner countries in order to increase force interoperability, and to support the implementation of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, and the Enhanced Opportunities Programme, as incentives for partner countries to sustain a high standard of preparedness;

   j. to reaffirm their commitment to assist other nations that aim to build up their defence capacities, to be prepared to further extend this commitment, and therefore to implement the demand-driven Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.
RESOLUTION 415
on
NEGOTIATING THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP

The Assembly,

1. Acknowledging that the transatlantic trading and investment relationship has long served as an engine of economic growth both for Europe and North America;

2. Affirming that this vital commercial exchange has reinforced transatlantic ties and is an expression of shared values;

3. Aware that multilateral trade talks under the auspices of the WTO have stalled and that failure to complete the Doha Round would represent a costly setback to global trade liberalisation;

4. Recognising that the lack of significant progress in the Doha Round should not impede efforts to deepen the transatlantic trade relationship;

5. Aware that ambitious efforts to deepen trade relationships through both the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) could help establish a sterling standard for the multilateral trading system;

6. Noting that at a time of economic and strategic uncertainty, deepening trade and investment among Allies will reinforce transatlantic solidarity and economic well-being;

7. Cognisant that there remain significant hurdles to achieving a final TTIP agreement, particularly different regulatory standards and traditions, including those regarding the protection of intellectual property, privacy concerns, varying approaches to financial regulation, political resistance to opening up procurement markets at national, regional and local levels and the critical matter of Presidential Trade Promotion Authority in the United States;

8. Acknowledging that agriculture is a major issue for negotiators, particularly on matters such as labelling requirements and the protection of geographic designations;

9. Understanding that it is feasible to harmonise—not suppress—an array of regulations on both sides of the Atlantic and that insofar as this can be done, it could dramatically lower production costs and thereby trigger a significant increase in productivity;

10. Affirming the need for negotiators to factor in the concerns of labour in order to reach a TTIP deal that benefits workers by creating jobs and generally improving welfare;

11. Recognising that several non-EU countries like Turkey are not participating in the TTIP negotiations and that participating countries should therefore work with these countries to en-

sure that they are not excluded from the gains from trade an eventual deal would foster;

12. **Noting** that governments participating in these negotiations need to strike a balance between the normal discretion that negotiators require in order to find mutually beneficial agreements and their democratic obligations to be as transparent as possible;

13. **Recognising** that the economic gains to be had from the TTIP ultimately hinge on the content and ambitions of the final agreement;

14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the countries engaged in the TTIP talks:
   a. to keep their focus on the long-term strategic objective of achieving greater shared prosperity through trade liberalisation and to recognise that concession-making will be essential to this process;
   b. to ensure that the concerns and interests of workers help shape the final agreement;
   c. to consult closely with non-EU Allies and prepare policies designed to ensure that any final TTIP agreement will not divert trade away from these countries;
   d. to identify ways to open up agricultural trade further, even if total liberalisation seems politically improbable;
   e. to ensure that in the process of minimising regulatory divergences, negotiators do not compromise consumer safety, public health, the protection of fundamental rights, including privacy, the environment, social standards and democratic governance;
   f. to ensure that processes for the settlement of disputes between investors and states fully respect state sovereignty;
   g. to initiate a broad public campaign designed to explain the TTIP.
RESOLUTION 416
on
A RENEWED CALL FOR ALLIED ACTION TO STABILISE THE MIDDLE EAST *

The Assembly,

1. *Greatly concerned* about the deteriorating security situation in Syria and in Iraq, which continues to threaten the security and stability of neighbouring states and the region as a whole;

2. *Condemning* the brutal and indiscriminate use of force as well as the extensive and persistent human rights violations by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the gross, systematic and widespread abuse of human rights by Daesh or the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and by other parties to the conflicts in Syria and in Iraq;

3. *Reminding* the international community that the regime of Bashar al-Assad bears the primary responsibility for the uprising against his brutal regime and the subsequent escalation of the civil war in Syria, resulting in the current catastrophic humanitarian situation and the rise of ISIL and other destabilising armed extremist groups;

4. *Deeply concerned* that the increasingly ideological nature—sectarian extremism—of the conflict is spreading outside Syria and Iraq into the region and beyond, inciting dangerous numbers of foreign fighters to join these conflicts, and thereby raising the prospect of the conflict zones becoming a wellspring for global terrorism;

5. *Alarmed* by the increasingly dire humanitarian situation on the ground and the inability of international assistance to meet, inter alia, the demand for food, housing, and medical supplies;

6. *Commending* Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon for taking in the overwhelming majority of refugees from Syria and recognizing that the millions of Syrian and Iraqi refugees amount to an untenable economic burden, which could threaten regional political stability;

7. *Concerned* with the fact that ISIL has been able to successfully export oil products produced in Iraq and Syria through various channels thus gaining a significant part of its financial resources for its terrorist activities and operations;

8. *Deploring* the failure of the UN Security Council, and more broadly the international community, to take more urgent action in Syria, which has only fuelled the current state of violence, destruction, and suffering;

9. *Welcoming* the intervention of the US-led international coalition which has stalled ISIL’s operational tempo and enabled Iraqi and Kurdish forces to regain their footing; but recognizing that the air strikes and other measures undertaken so far have only gradually affected

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday, 24 November 2014, The Hague, Netherlands.
ISIL’s overall capabilities or its operations in Iraq and Syria;

10. **Recognising** the pivotal role of regional actors in reaching a negotiated settlement to the civil war in Syria and in defeating ISIL in Syria and Iraq;

11. **Affirming** that regional stakeholders, with the international community’s assistance, need to co-operate in good faith to end the ongoing violence in Syria and Iraq and to achieve long-term, sustainable regional stability;

12. **Noting** that the Iraqi central government under Nouri al Maliki failed to pursue inclusive policies, which has alienated many among the Sunni and Kurdish minorities and noting the commitments of the new government of Haider al-Abadi;

13. **Aware** that the defeat of ISIL requires time and close co-operation among regional partners and **reminding** the governments of Iraq and Syria and other governments in the region that exclusionist and sectarian policies prepare the ground for extremist groups;

14. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance, the international community and the governments of the countries in the region:

   a. to encourage and facilitate a Syrian-led and inclusive political process that could lead to a ceasefire, paving the way towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to assist the US-led international coalition efforts to neutralise the extremist groups currently operating in Syria and Iraq;

   b. to increase humanitarian aid for Syria and Iraq and step up efforts, including through resettlement programmes and granting asylum, to ease the burden placed on Syria’s neighbours which are hosting millions of refugees;

   c. to support Iraq in the fight against ISIL and other extremist groups by all necessary military, diplomatic, economic and other means and to encourage the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to pursue an active policy of inclusion and reconciliation, which involves all religious and ethnic minorities of the country;

   d. to refrain from acquiring any oil products from parties involved in terrorist activities;

15. **URGES** NATO, if requested, to consider co-operating actively with the UN in logistical and humanitarian matters, in order to alleviate the situation of refugee camps in neighbouring countries;

16. **CALLS UPON** the Syrian regime and all relevant parties in the country:

   a. to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all actors of the Syrian opposition willing to negotiate in order to achieve a viable political compromise, including the establishment of a transitional government with full executive powers;

   b. to observe strictly the principles of humanitarian law and in particular to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 2139 and 2165 in order to guarantee humanitarian access and delivery;

17. **CALLS UPON** the government and parliament of Iraq and all relevant parties of the country to overcome current divisions, foster inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian reconciliation, curb the influence of extremist groups, and put an end to human rights violations and to the cycle of reprisals.

18. **ENCOURAGES** the governments and parliaments of the region:
a. to co-operate closely with the international community in cutting off weapon, oil and funding streams to ISIL and other religious extremist groups and in blocking the flow of foreign fighters to the region;

b. to make every effort to stem the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorism and to continue protecting human rights, including those of women;

c. to engage in a meaningful, sustained dialogue in order to reach solutions for the ongoing crises in the region.
RESOLUTION 417
on
NATO REASSURANCE AND SUPPORT TO PARTNERS *

The Assembly,

1. **Strongly deploring** Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and its continued efforts to destabilise Ukraine, as well as the continuous illegal occupation and unlawful recognition of the territories of Georgia, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are a blatant violation of international law and run counter to the principles and commitments in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Basic Document, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 12 August 2008 ceasefire accord, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, and the Rome Declaration;

2. **Deeply concerned** that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its continued intimidation as well as the ongoing occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia and steps taken by Russia towards the de facto annexation of Abkhazia pose a serious threat to European peace and security;

3. **Noting** that Moscow’s pledge to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking minorities living outside the Russian Federation is so broad and vague that it could be misused as a pretext for a military intervention in any country with a Russian minority;

4. **Stressing** the right of all sovereign countries to chart their own foreign policy course in line with their rights and obligations under the UN Charter, without outside interference;

5. **Recognising** that the security and stability of NATO’s East European partners impacts Euro-Atlantic stability as a whole;

6. **Noting** that the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia and welcoming that NATO continues to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia based on common security concerns and interests;

7. **Emphasising** that the Alliance cannot and will not compromise on its principles which underpin security in Europe and North America and noting that the future relationship with Russia will be contingent on a clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions which demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities;

8. **Welcoming** the reassurance measures confirmed at the Wales Summit as a clear and unambiguous signal that the Alliance will protect and defend any member state against an aggression;

9. **Recognising** that the continuing security environment and the reassurance measures for NATO’s East European member states require increased defence investment if NATO is to maintain its present capabilities and develop new ones to counter the current and future secu-

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday, 24 November 2014, The Hague, Netherlands.
10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   a. to take the necessary political, military, and financial measures to implement the decisions taken in Wales in order to increase Allied military capabilities and interoperability;
   b. to urgently take the relevant measures to ensure energy sufficiency for allied countries and avoid their current dependency on Russia;
   c. to continue reassurance measures to NATO’s East European member states as long as necessary, and expand them if the situation so requires;
   d. to consider the possibility of additional NATO bases in member countries that are threatened by continued or escalated Russian aggression;
   e. to assist Ukraine and Georgia in countering the military and economic tools of coercion that Russia employs, as well as its campaign of misinformation, and to support bilateral assistance from NATO member states to increase Ukraine’s and Georgia’s defence capabilities;
   f. to continue diplomatic efforts to encourage Russia to implement concrete steps to de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine and to consider tightening sanctions if further acts of aggression are committed;
   g. to assist NATO partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic region to choose their own path and help them to resist undue pressure from Russia;
   h. to monitor developments in Moldova as well as in the South Caucasus closely and to support the countries in the region by helping them to build capacity and resist any possible pressure from Russia;
   i. to remain committed in their support for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all NATO partner countries;
   j. to support current aspirant countries—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro—on their path to NATO membership;

11. **CALLS UPON** the government and parliament of the Russian Federation:
   a. to reverse the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and recognition of Georgia’s occupied regions, to fulfil its international obligations and to abide by international law;
   b. to refrain from any further interference and aggressive actions in Ukraine and Georgia or in any other state of the region;
   c. to take active steps to de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine, including to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the government in Kyiv;
   d. to revoke the proposed treaty on “alliance and integration” with the occupied region of Abkhazia.
RESOLUTION 418
on
NATO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE *

The Assembly,

1. **Emphasising** that the collective defence of the population, territory and forces of the North Atlantic Alliance remains a core task;

2. **Concerned** about the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially among potentially hostile states such as Iran and North Korea;

3. **Convinced** that diplomacy, as well as arms control, disarmament and non proliferation remain the principal means to reduce the global threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

4. **Affirming** the complementary value of missile defence in NATO’s defence and deterrence posture;

5. **Fully supporting** the 2010 NATO decision to develop a ballistic missile defence capability to protect all NATO European population, territory and forces;

6. **Satisfied** with the progress on Allied missile defence, including the achievement of an Interim Capability in 2012;

7. **Welcoming** the voluntary national contributions, including contributions in kind, by Allies thus far, and in particular **recognising** the commitment of the United States through its European Phased Adaptive Approach;

8. **Supporting** NATO’s suspension of all practical civilian and military co-operation with Russia, including co-operation on missile defence, following Russia’s illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea and a concerted campaign of violence by Russia and Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine;

9. **Strongly reaffirming** that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities, as NATO has repeated at every junction;

10. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
    a. to continue to support the prompt completion of NATO’s ballistic missile defence capability;
    b. to provide further voluntary national contributions, including contributions in kind, to NATO missile defence, in particular by European Allies in order to create a more equitable sharing of risks and burdens;
    c. to ensure compatibility and interoperability of new missile defence systems with existing

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday, 24 November 2014, The Hague, Netherlands.
Allied systems;

d. to explore increased co-operation on missile defence, especially through further Smart Defence projects, potentially including joint acquisition of systems;

e. to conduct regular national and NATO assessments of the missile threat and adapt NATO missile defence accordingly;

f. to continue to demonstrate that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities through an active policy of unilateral transparency and confidence-building measures as well as bilateral efforts if NATO’s co-operation with Russia were reinstated;

g. to examine further engagement on missile defence with key NATO partner countries, in order to increase transparency, build confidence and explore opportunities for co-operation;

h. to continue to closely monitor the implementation of NATO missile defence and to deepen political oversight and transparency involving inter alia national parliaments and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

i. to continue to support all relevant international diplomatic efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Annex 1:
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The Role of the Assembly

Founded in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) serves as the consultative inter parliamentary organisation for the North Atlantic Alliance.

Bringing together members of parliaments throughout the Atlantic Alliance, the NATO PA provides an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of its member nations, helping to build parliamentary and public consensus in support of Alliance policies.

At the same time, it facilitates parliamentary awareness and understanding of key security issues and contributes to a greater transparency of NATO policies. Crucially, it helps maintain and strengthen the transatlantic relationship, which underpins the Atlantic Alliance.

Since the end of the Cold War the Assembly has assumed a new role by integrating into its work parliamentarians from those countries in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond who seek a closer association with NATO. This integration has provided both political and practical assistance and has contributed to the strengthening of parliamentary democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, thereby complementing and reinforcing NATO’s own programme of partnership and co-operation.

The headquarters of the Assembly’s 28-strong International Secretariat staff members is located in central Brussels.

How the Assembly Works

The NATO PA consists of 257 delegates from the 28 NATO member countries. Delegates from 13 associate countries; the European Parliament; 4 Regional partner and Mediterranean associate member countries; as well as 8 parliamentary observers and 2 inter-parliamentary assemblies also take part in its activities.

The Assembly’s governing body is the Standing Committee, which is composed of the Head of each member delegation, the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer and the Secretary General.

The International Secretariat under its Secretary General, is responsible for all administration and the bulk of research and analysis that supports the Assembly’s Committees, Sub-Committees and other groups.

The five Committees are: Civil Dimension of Security; Defence and Security; Economics and Security; Political; Science and Technology. They are charged with examining all major contemporary issues in their fields. Other Assembly bodies include the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group to enhance parliamentary dialogue and understanding with
countries of the Middle East and the North African region, the Ukraine-NATO Inter parliamentary Council and the Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council. The NATO Russia Parliamentary Committee was discontinued in April 2014.

The Committees and Sub-Committees produce reports, which are discussed in draft form at the Assembly’s Spring Session. The reports are then revised and updated for discussion, amendment and adoption at the Assembly’s Annual Session in the Autumn.

At the Annual Session, the Committees also produce policy recommendations – which are voted on by the full Assembly and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council. As well as meetings during Sessions, the Committees and Sub Committees meet several times a year in member and associate nations where they receive briefings from leading government and parliamentary representatives, as well as senior academics and experts.

**Financing**

The Assembly is directly funded by member parliaments and governments, and is financially and administratively separate from NATO itself.

**The Rose-Roth Programme**

A central part of the Assembly’s work is the Rose-Roth Programme of partnership and co-operation – initially with Central and Eastern European countries but subsequently throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. This programme seeks to assist partner countries, mainly in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, through a challenging transition process, which involves the implementation of difficult political and economic reforms.

The Rose-Roth Programme involves a series of seminars focused on regional and topical security issues and training programmes for parliamentary staff and members of Parliament. The aim is to enhance parliamentary awareness, build contacts and provide experience and expertise. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principle of the democratic control of armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military.

**The NATO Orientation Programme**

The NATO Orientation Programme is focused primarily on young or newly elected members of parliament from NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations, as well as those newly assigned to security or foreign affairs responsibilities. The programme aims at providing an in-depth overview of the functioning and policies of NATO and SHAPE as well as of the Alliance’s evolving relationships with its many partners. The Programme was launched in 2000 and is held annually in Brussels.

**The Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum**

In 2001, growing concern about the apparent drift in transatlantic attitudes, perceptions and policies, prompted the Assembly’s Standing Committee to instigate a “Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum” to help identify the precise nature of the divergence in transatlantic thinking
and to explore ways in which these differences could be redressed. The programme includes discussions with senior US administration figures and academic experts.

The Forum is held annually in Washington DC in co-operation with the National Defense University and the Atlantic Council of the United States.

**The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group** *

In the context of its outreach activities, the Assembly created in 1995 a Mediterranean Special Group with the aim of opening a political dialogue with legislators from countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The programme gradually expanded and received new impetus following the “Arab Awakening.” The Assembly has established relations with the Parliaments of six countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, as well as with the Palestinian National Council. Preliminary contacts have been established with Libya as well as with some countries of the Gulf and of the Sahel.

The yearly activities of the Group include a visit to the region, and two seminars, one of which is held in co-operation with the Italian Parliament. These meetings seek to enhance parliamentary awareness of the problems of the region, promote a political dialogue between parliamentarians, and ultimately provide experience and expertise to legislators from Maghreb and Middle East countries.

**Sessions**

Two sessions are held each year—in the Spring and Autumn ("Annual")—in different countries.

**2014**

Spring Session: Vilnius, Lithuania, 30 May – 2 June
Annual Session: The Hague, Netherlands, 21–24 November

**2015**

Spring Session: Budapest, Hungary, 15–18 May
Annual Session: Stavanger, Norway, 9–12 October

* Formerly referred to as the Mediterranean Special Group.
Membership of the Assembly

Member Delegations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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28 257
Associate Delegations

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<tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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European Parliament Delegation

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Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations

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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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Parliamentary Observer Delegations

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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Palestinian National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
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* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Inter-parliamentary Assembly Delegations

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
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Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups

Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS)
Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG)

Defence and Security Committee (DSC)
Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC)

Economics and Security Committee (ESC)
Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTD)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations (ESCTER)

Political Committee (PC)
Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships (PCNP)
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR)

Science and Technology Committee (STC)
Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security (STCEES)

Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM)

Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (UNIC)

Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (GNIC)

NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee (NRPC)
(Discontinued as of April 2014)

Members of the Bureau of the Assembly

President
Hon. Michael TURNER (United States)

Vice-Presidents
Paolo ALLI (Italy)
Angelien EIJNSINK (Netherlands)
Gabriel VLASE (Romania)
Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom)
Thomas MARINO (United States)
Treasurer
Marc ANGEL (Luxembourg)

Secretary General
David HOBBS (United Kingdom)
Annex 2:
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

What is DCAF?
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government. DCAF’s primary fields of activity include security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). The Centre’s work to support effective, efficient security sectors, which are accountable to the state and its citizens, is underpinned by the acknowledgement that security, development, and the rule of law are essential preconditions for sustainable peace.

DCAF is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, gender sensitivity, and local ownership as the basis for supporting legitimate, sustainable reform processes.

Good governance of the security sector

*Effective governance and civilian oversight of the security sector are essential ... for peace and development.*

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 2008

*The security sector ... should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other public service.*

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 1999

DCAF is based in Geneva with permanent offices in Beirut, Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah, Tripoli, and Tunis. The DCAF Foundation currently comprises 62 Member States and 6 permanent observers from across the globe. The Centre has over 130 staff from more than 30 countries.

Where does DCAF work?
DCAF conducts wide-ranging multi-stakeholder programmes and training activities globally, with a particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Southeast Asia. DCAF’s outreach projects also cover the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Latin America.

DCAF’s core services:
- Strategic advice to governments and international organisations on the development of SSR and SSG policies
- Assessments
- Programme design and implementation
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Capacity-building and training
- Development of instructive resources for SSR practitioners
- Knowledge services and publications

DCAF combines conceptual, analytical, and operational capabilities in order to support a holistic SSR agenda. The Centre provides advisory field support and in-country assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate SSR norms and standards at national and international levels, offers project-specific SSR policy guidance, and conducts policy-relevant research into SSR and SSG as well as related fields.

DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) reinforces the capacity of the international community to support SSR processes, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states.

**DCAF’s areas of thematic expertise**

- Border management
- Defence reform
- Gender and SSR
- Intelligence governance
- Justice sector reform
- Ombuds-institutions for the armed forces
- Parliamentary oversight of the security sector
- Police reform
- Private security governance
- Public-private partnerships and security governance

**Who does DCAF work with?**

DCAF applies a broad understanding of the security sector that incorporates core security actors, management / oversight bodies, and private security actors.

The Centre places particular emphasis on supporting security sector governance institutions and actors. These include:

- Executive authorities
- Parliaments and interparliamentary bodies
- Judicial authorities
- Security sector actors
- Ombuds-institutions
DCAF partners include a wide range of governments, parliaments, international organisations, and non-governmental and private actors.

DCAF works directly with *national SSR stakeholders* in different national and regional settings.

DCAF contributes to the efforts of *bilateral donors* in supporting SSR by promoting coherence, coordination, and complementarity in line with the whole-of-government / whole-of-institution and 3Cs agenda.

DCAF works with *multilateral institutions*—in particular the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE, the African Union, and others—in enhancing their engagement in the field of SSR.

DCAF actively fosters partnerships with regional and global SSR-related *expert networks*.

DCAF facilitates or otherwise supports innovative *multi-stakeholder processes* of policy development and implementation in security sector governance.