

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY - 2018



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE DE L'OTAN

DCAF Geneva Centre
for Security Sector
Governance

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**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY – 2018**

Brussels – Geneva 2019

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FOREWORD

The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has worked intensively with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) to promote democratic civilian control and oversight of the security sector. It has provided an in-kind contribution to the Parliamentary Training Programmes, Rose-Roth Seminars and NATO Orientation Programme. DCAF has supported NATO PA–European Parliament seminars and has produced studies to address parliamentary practices and procedures in NATO member states with regards the oversight. In light of this intense cooperation, DCAF publishes NATO PA Resolutions and Recommendations annually and they are widely seen as important indications of the political debate on key topics within the Alliance.

This publication includes 9 resolutions and 1 declaration adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Declaration 444 stresses that Allies are united in their conviction that NATO is and remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security, and that its unique strength lies in Europe and North America's commitment to defend each other's security. The resolutions centre on security and cooperation in the High North, burden sharing and new commitments, hybrid threats, reinforcing NATO's deterrence in the East, opportunities and challenges in space, energy security, safeguarding elections within the Alliance, tackling the challenges from the South, and maintaining the science and technology edge and enhancing Alliance agility.

DCAF and the NATO PA are grateful for the financial support provided by the Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, and are delighted to make this publication of 2018 NATO PA policy recommendations available to a larger public.

Brussels and Geneva, February 2019.

Darko Stančić

DCAF

Assistant Director

Head, Europe and Central Asia, Operations

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Darko Stančić', is positioned below the text. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'D' and a distinct 'Stančić'.

Introduction

Parliaments and NATO's 2018 Brussels Summit: adapting to lasting instability

David Hobbs and Ruxandra Popa¹

Much of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's (NATO PA) work in 2018 revolved around the Summit of Allied Heads of State and Government which took place in Brussels in July.

Through its reports and resolutions, the NATO PA, the inter-parliamentary body bringing together national legislators from the 29 NATO member states, as well as from a broad range of partner countries, seeks to both shape and analyse the Summit's outcomes.

NATO Summits are generally held every other year – or more often if necessary. They serve to provide the highest level of political guidance regarding NATO's priorities and adaptation to evolving security challenges.

Most commentaries ahead of the Summit had focused on profound uncertainties due to anticipated transatlantic tensions. The list of possible irritants included, among others: defence spending – the goal agreed by all NATO countries to commit 2% of GDP to defence spending; trade – with both the United States and the European Union threatening new tariffs on the other; Iran – following the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in May 2018; and energy – due to the support provided by certain European governments to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

The Summit did not pass without incident. Indeed, on the second day of the meeting, the secretary general had to cut short a meeting with the presidents of Ukraine and Georgia to move into an impromptu closed-door meeting of Allied leaders on defence spending.

Yet, the actual outcome of the Summit – and notably the declaration adopted on the first day of the Summit – depicted a strong consensus among all 29 countries on a common vision of both the threat environment and NATO's role.

Five main priorities had been identified ahead of the Summit, and are clearly reflected in the Summit's declaration and related documents:

- Burden sharing;
- Deterrence and collective defence, and NATO-Russia relations;
- Projecting stability and combatting terrorism;
- Modernising the Alliance;
- NATO-EU cooperation.

First, the Summit declaration reaffirmed the three-pronged commitment by Allies to move towards spending 2% of GDP for defence, to dedicate 20% of this to new capabilities, and to enhance the deployability, sustainability and interoperability of Allied forces, a commitment now formally labelled the "Defence Investment Pledge". The Brussels Summit declaration recognised the unprecedented progress achieved on all three dimensions – cash, capabilities and contributions, while noting that more is needed.

¹ David Hobbs is the secretary general and Ruxandra Popa the deputy secretary general of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Second, in light of Russia's ongoing destabilising actions, NATO heads of state and government confirmed that there were no grounds for returning to business as usual with Russia. In 2018, Moscow used a military-grade nerve agent on UK soil, attempted to hack the computer network of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and seized three Ukrainian navy ships in the Kerch Strait. The Summit thus reiterated NATO's dual-track approach to Russia based on strong deterrence and meaningful dialogue. Allies also sought to further strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence posture by enhancing the readiness of NATO's forces and their ability to move efficiently across European borders.

Third, NATO leaders agreed to develop cooperation with partners in its southern neighbourhood. A key channel for enhanced cooperation is NATO's Hub for the South based in Naples, which reached full capability. The Summit also adopted a Package on the South, which included a new non-combat training and capacity-building mission in Iraq.

Fourth, Allied leaders set new objectives to modernise the Alliance, including the creation of two new military commands, a strengthened focus on hybrid and cyber threats, and plans to adopt NATO's first-ever space policy.

Fifth, the Brussels Summit reiterated Allies' commitment to further increase cooperation between NATO and the European Union across a range of areas.

Lastly, following the historic agreement concluded by Athens and Skopje on the name issue in June, Allied heads of state and government confirmed the opening of accession negotiations with the newly re-named Republic of North Macedonia. They also reiterated support for other applicants, and recognised Ukraine's renewed membership aspirations.

The NATO PA advocated many of these measures in its discussions in the run-up to the Brussels Summit, and in the reports prepared by its five committees: the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security; the Defence and Security Committee, the Economics and Security Committee, the Political Committee, and the Science and Technology Committee. The Assembly's views and priorities for the Summit were formally summarised in Declaration 444 on Affirming NATO's Unity and Credibility at the Brussels Summit adopted exceptionally at the Assembly's Spring Session in Warsaw, Poland, in May 2018, and reproduced in this booklet.

The Assembly convened for a special meeting on the eve of the NATO Summit, and its then president, Paolo Alli (Italy) addressed Allied heads of state and government during the Summit, presenting the views of Allied parliamentarians.²

The nine other policy recommendations featured in this booklet were adopted during the Assembly's Annual Session in Halifax, Canada, in November 2018, and many focus on the progress achieved in implementing the Brussels Summit decisions. They address the following themes:

- Supporting the strengthened deterrence and defence posture agreed by Allied heads of state and government in Brussels (Resolution 448), as well as the commitments made regarding increased defence spending (Resolution 447);
- Updating Allies' responses to Russia's hybrid tactics (Resolution 445) and use of energy as a weapon (Resolution 450), and countering Moscow's efforts to interfere in elections in NATO countries (Resolution 452);
- Reinforcing NATO's contribution to tackling challenges in its southern neighbourhood (Resolution 451);

² One of the traditional arrangements between NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is that the Assembly's president is invited to address the NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government on behalf of the Assembly and present the views of the Alliance's parliamentarians. The NATO PA president usually speaks in the first closed session of the North Atlantic Council at the level of heads of state and government. In Brussels for the first time, the NATO PA vice-presidents were invited to accompany the president.

- Maintaining NATO's technological edge (Resolution 453), including in the space arena (Resolution 449);
- Avoiding an increase of tensions in the High North while addressing changing security dynamics in the region (Resolution 446).

While formally independent from NATO, the Assembly brings together national parliamentarians from all NATO member states. These policy recommendations thus represent the collective views of 266 legislators from across the Alliance on the key issues on NATO's agenda. As part of the regular interactions between NATO and the Assembly, they are communicated to national parliaments, governments and NATO authorities, and the NATO secretary general replies in writing to each of them.

While they are the most visible expression of the Assembly's collective views, these texts are only one aspect of the NATO PA's multifaceted response to international events. The Assembly meets at regular intervals and in different formats some 40 times a year, and these meetings allow its members to discuss – both formally and informally – any issue that they consider relevant and important for transatlantic and global security.

In 2018, these meetings naturally centred around the main challenges and priorities described above. However, they also allowed the Assembly to focus on other key issues and regions.

The Western Balkans received sustained attention throughout 2018. A key highlight was the Rose-Roth Seminar, which the Assembly – together with Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance – held days only after the name agreement between Athens and Skopje. North-east Asia is another case in point. Several Assembly activities focused, in particular, on the behaviour of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), China's rise on the international stage, and the Assembly's partnerships with Japan and South Korea. Other priority issues for the Assembly included the impact of climate change, the active participation of women in defence, and initiatives aimed at better informing youth about NATO and defence.

The Assembly thus fully played its part in making the parliamentary voice heard in the face of the key challenges which marked the year 2018. We hope that this collection of the Assembly's policy recommendations will help readers better understand the added value that parliamentary diplomacy can bring to decision-making in the areas of security and defence. The Assembly's members are the democratically elected representatives of the people of the member states of the Alliance. Their voice is therefore also that of the Alliance's citizens. This volume is dedicated to them, and we would like to thank the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance for supporting its production.

The image shows two handwritten signatures in black ink. The signature on the left is 'David Kroll' written in a cursive, slightly slanted style. The signature on the right is more stylized and less legible, possibly reading 'C. P. P.' or similar, also in a cursive script.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

adopted by the

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

in 2018

DECLARATION 444

on

AFFIRMING NATO'S UNITY AND CREDIBILITY

AT THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT³

The Assembly,

1. **Emphasising** that the upcoming Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018 offers an important opportunity to demonstrate NATO's unity and credibility;
2. **Welcoming** the significant progress achieved since 2014 in adapting NATO to a new security environment characterised by Russia's political and military assertiveness, and non-compliance with fundamental principles of the rules-based international order; widespread instability from Libya to Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan which breeds a multifaceted terrorist threat and mass migration; the emergence of hybrid warfare, the spread of cyberattacks and disinformation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile technology;
3. **Stressing** that Allies are united in their conviction that NATO is and remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security, and that its unique strength lies in Europe and North America's commitment to defend each other's security, **and reaffirming** that all Allies are committed to the fundamental principle enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack against one is an attack against all;
4. **Convinced** that, in addition to defending Allies, NATO makes unique and invaluable contributions to responses to today's complex security challenges, including the fight against terrorism, in partnership with other states and organisations;
5. **Applauding** the important steps taken to develop NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and coordination, **and recognising** the strategic potential that could be realised by implementing the agreed common set of proposals;
6. **Acknowledging** the continuing need to modernise NATO's structures and processes to ensure that it adapts to evolving security challenges;

³ Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 28 May 2018, Warsaw, Poland.

7. **Determined** that all Allies must contribute to addressing shared challenges, assume their fair share of responsibilities, and commit the resources necessary;
8. **Reaffirming** its commitment to, and support for, NATO's open door policy;
9. **Highlighting** the importance of explaining and demonstrating to citizens in Europe and North America how the resources invested in defence – including NATO – contribute to their security;
10. **Emphasising** that NATO's response to threats is rooted in its commitment to individual freedom, the rights of men, women and children, democracy, and the rule of law;
11. **URGES** the heads of state and governments of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018:

I. DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE, AND DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

- i. to reaffirm the conventional, nuclear and missile defence pillars of NATO's deterrence and collective defence posture;
- ii. to continue to ensure the sustainability and readiness of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland, Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region, Tailored Assurance Measures for Turkey as well as other assurance measures in force, Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and enhanced NATO Response Force;
- iii. to remove without delay legal and regulatory impediments to the mobility of Allied forces in Europe, and create the conditions for investments in the infrastructure needed to ensure swift troop and materiel reinforcements across Alliance territory;
- iv. to develop Allied forces' ability to operate in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments;
- v. to continue to bolster the Alliance's situational awareness in the Baltic, North, Black and Mediterranean Seas and in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, including through further cooperation, as appropriate, with partners in these regions;
- vi. to maintain NATO's policy towards Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence, and openness to a meaningful dialogue, as stated in the Wales and Warsaw Summit declarations, while addressing and holding Russia accountable for its unacceptable violations of international laws and norms;

II. PROJECTING STABILITY, AND COMBATTING TERRORISM

- i. to pursue full implementation of the Framework for the South which remains an essential integral part of both the Alliance deterrence and defence posture and the Alliance contribution to Projecting Stability;
- ii. to fill manning requirements for the Hub for the South at Joint Forces Command Naples, so it can rapidly reach full capability;
- iii. to prepare, for the Summit, the transformation of NATO's assistance to Iraq into a non-combat training and capacity-building mission;
- iv. to strengthen support for defence capacity-building in the partner countries of the southern shore and the sub-Saharan area so as to enhance their stability by encouraging political dialogue and institutional stabilisation; this process could include Libya - should the conditions for a future government of national unity be in place - by fostering all possible opportunities for engagement in the spirit of the NATO PA's Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group;

- v. to continue to develop political and practical cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council;
- vi. to rapidly fill troop requirements for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan;
- vii. to maintain NATO and Allies' support for the anti-Daesh coalition and continue to share assessments about the possible future evolutions of the terrorist threat;
- viii. to highlight for our citizens NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism, as part of the Alliance's multifaceted response to this threat;
- ix. to continue complementing efforts that deal with the refugee and migrant crisis caused by the instability in the Middle East and North Africa regions, and activities aiming at limiting illegal crossings in the wider Mediterranean region and the Aegean Sea;
- x. to continue working on ways of further assisting Allies in their individual counterterrorism efforts, underscoring that this would contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole;
- xi. to pay tribute to and support the intensified commitment of certain Allies in the fight against terrorism, in particular in the Sahel-Saharan strip;

III. NATO-EU COOPERATION

- i. to continue to encourage the development of NATO-EU cooperation and coordination, and to implement the identified measures to enhance NATO and EU members' response to common challenges and prevent duplication;
- ii. to provide support for a joint statement by the NATO secretary general, the president of the European Council and the president of the European Commission, in which NATO and the EU undertake to continue and to deepen their cooperation, particularly on military mobility in Europe;
- iii. to strengthen the European and transatlantic defence technological and industrial base, and encourage increased defence industrial cooperation;
- iv. to ensure the fullest involvement of non-EU Allied countries in efforts to enhance European security and defence in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of the two organisations;

IV. MODERNISING THE ALLIANCE

- i. to maintain a flexible and responsive posture, allowing NATO to respond to all challenges from wherever they emanate, and to preserve the Alliance's ability to accomplish its three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security;
- ii. to expedite and improve the quality of political and military decision-making procedures in the Alliance to ensure their democratic nature, political ownership by the countries and rapid decision-making in the event of an imminent threat;
- iii. to complete without delay and implement the design for the adaptation of the NATO Command Structure, including the establishment of new commands and structures, and to fill their manning requirements;
- iv. to continue to refine and exercise the Alliance's response to hybrid and cyber threats as undertaken at the Warsaw Summit;
- v. to continue to assist Allies in building their resilience to disinformation and other attempts at undermining democratic processes;

- vi. to enhance NATO's situational awareness in the Arctic, including through greater information sharing, the creation of an Arctic working group, assistance to the development of Allies' search and rescue capabilities, and exercises;
- vii. to launch discussions on a new Political Guidance and a new NATO Strategic Concept to take stock of the fundamental shifts in the security environment since 2014, and set the future course of NATO's modernisation;
- viii. to encourage further progress in the implementation by NATO and Allies of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women and peace and security, as well as UNSCR 1612 on children and armed conflict;

V. BURDEN SHARING

- i. to recognise that the persistence of a multifaceted and particularly challenging threat environment makes it even more necessary that nations increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows and move towards the guideline of spending 2% of GDP for defence by 2024, increase annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures, and meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and sustainability, as agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits;
- ii. to encourage all Allies, as agreed, to continue to present to the Alliance national plans including data on defence spending, capabilities, and contributions to capacity-building missions and NATO and other operations;

VI. OPEN DOOR POLICY

- i. to reaffirm NATO's open door policy and the right of partners to make independent and sovereign choices on their foreign and security policy free from external pressure and coercion;
- ii. to outline a clear membership perspective for aspiring countries in a forward-looking manner, while preserving the criteria for membership;
- iii. to continue rendering strong political and practical support to Georgia in the process of NATO integration and to advance further the political dimension of Georgia's NATO membership process;
- iv. to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in creating the conditions for activating its first Membership Action Plan without further delay;
- v. to underline NATO's firm commitment to the EuroAtlantic integration of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia⁴ as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the United Nations;
- vi. to reaffirm Allies' condemnation of Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, and ongoing occupation of Georgian and Ukrainian territories, and their unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine in their internationally recognised borders;
- vii. to reiterate support for Ukraine's membership aspiration;
- viii. to continue to encourage all aspirants to enhance both military and political readiness, and to assist them through intensified political exchanges and military cooperation;

⁴ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

VII. CONNECTING NATO WITH ITS CITIZENS

- i. to enhance efforts, working closely with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to promote the transparency and efficient governance of NATO, as well as citizens' understanding of the challenges and requirements of our shared security with a particular focus on the next generation;
- ii. to increase the focus and resources of NATO's public diplomacy to enhance and expand NATO engagement, education and communication through all social media and traditional media platforms with NATO member and partner countries, and with citizens.

RESOLUTION 445
on
UPDATING THE RESPONSES TO RUSSIA'S HYBRID TACTICS⁵

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that the awareness of Russia's use of hybrid tactics against the Euro-Atlantic community has grown considerably in recent years, but **mindful** that these tactics continue to pose a serious challenge to Euro-Atlantic stability, security and unity as well as to our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace;
2. **Alerted** by the clear anti-Western agenda of the Kremlin and the complexity of its hybrid toolbox that ranges from political interference to use of force, targeted assassinations, aggressive espionage, exporting crime and corruption, weaponising information, conducting cyberattacks and applying economic pressure;
3. **Applauding** the adoption – at the 2016 Warsaw Summit – of the NATO strategy to counter hybrid threats and the subsequent decision of the 2018 Brussels Summit to establish counter hybrid support teams as well as the statement that there can be no return to “business as usual” until there is a clear change in Russia's actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations;
4. **Welcoming** the deepening of NATO-EU cooperation in countering hybrid threats as well as important initiatives undertaken by national governments, and traditional and social media outlets as well as civil society actors to counter Russia's disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;
5. **Condemning** in the strongest terms the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom, and praising the unity and support demonstrated by the Allies to the British government;
6. **Denouncing** Russia's meddling in recent elections and referenda in the Euro-Atlantic area, and **deeply concerned** by the similar threat posed to upcoming elections as well as by the Kremlin's support for fringe political movements in the West;
7. **Condemning** the illegal construction of the Kerch bridge by Russia, combined with its policy of selective access denial and arbitrary detaining of Ukrainian and foreign vessels in the Azov Sea, and **deeply concerned** by new security, economic and ecological threats to the region;
8. **Reiterating** its firm support to the investigation conducted by the Dutch authorities on the downing of flight MH17 in Ukraine, and **calling on** the Kremlin to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2166, take responsibility and fully cooperate with all efforts to establish accountability;
9. **Cognisant** of Russia's continued hybrid warfare against Georgia aimed at undermining Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and at discrediting Western values;
10. **Believing strongly** in the resilience of democracy and the ability of open societies to prevail against hybrid threats;
11. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to reflect the new global security realities in the next NATO Strategic Concept and to take the Russian hybrid threat into account;

⁵ Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

- b. to reiterate the position that hybrid attacks can trigger the Allies' right to collective defence;
- c. to consider discussing hybrid threats in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council;
- d. to redouble efforts to build resilience among their civil society against any type of hybrid attack, including by revising education policies in order to promote critical thinking and cyber literacy from an early age;
- e. to continue applying restrictive measures, such as applying fines in cases of hate speech, and encouraging social media companies to increase their capabilities in removing fake news and identifying fake or automated accounts;
- f. to consider introducing targeted sanctions in solidarity with the United Kingdom, and other members recently targeted by Russia's hybrid attacks;
- g. to enhance coherence and coordination between NATO civilian and military assets, as well as between NATO and the EU, in responding to hybrid threats;
- h. to increase strategic awareness by enhancing intelligence sharing and cooperation between domestic agencies and strengthening further NATO's Joint Intelligence and Security Division;
- i. to continue investing in the development of well-trained local Special Forces as the first port of call in scenarios involving the use of mercenaries and armed personnel without military insignia;
- j. to enhance further a coordinated and comprehensive cooperation with aspirant partners in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe on countering Russian hybrid warfare tactics;
- k. to adopt a coherent and pro-active strategy to target the Western assets of corrupt Russian elites;
- l. to design specific government units and support media and civil society initiatives in the field of debunking fake news and identifying hostile propaganda and to provide existing EU and NATO capabilities with additional financial, technological and human support;
- m. to recognise the importance of developing cyber capabilities enabling Allies to impose costs on those who harm them in cyberspace and allowing NATO, where appropriate, to use these cyber capabilities to support its operations;
- n. to identify electoral structures as strategic infrastructure and to offer assistance to political parties and candidates in protecting their data and networks;
- o. to continue efforts to diversify energy imports and promote energy efficiency.

RESOLUTION 446
on
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE HIGH NORTH⁶

The Assembly,

1. **Alarmed** by the speed of the climate change in the Arctic regions;
2. **Mindful** of the growing geostrategic importance of the Arctic as the changing climate creates new opportunities for shipping, exploitation of mineral resources, fishing and tourism, as well as for military activities;
3. **Concerned** that – while the threat of an armed conflict in the Arctic is still low – it cannot be entirely ruled out that a possible spillover of tension between Russia and NATO Allies, as well as China’s increasing engagement, could lead to more strategic rivalry in the region;
4. **Acknowledging** the scale and scope of Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic, including the re-vamping of the Northern Fleet, the establishment of military infrastructure across the region, the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and dramatic increases in air and submarine activity on the Alliance’s borders;
5. **Recalling** that at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance committed to strengthening its maritime posture in the North Atlantic and to improving the Alliance’s comprehensive situational awareness in the region to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory;
6. **Welcoming** NATO’s decision to establish a new Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia (United States);
7. **Mindful** of the different perspectives among the Allies on the scope of NATO’s presence in the Arctic, yet **persuaded** that NATO can offer added value in the region;
8. **Aware** that the increasing human activity in the region raises serious concerns relating to human security and the protection of critical economic infrastructures, particularly in the context of harsh weather conditions and limited search and rescue (SAR) capabilities;
9. **Convinced** that international cooperation as well as close partnership between the military, public and non-governmental sectors are essential in order to provide adequate civilian protection in the High North;
10. **Highlighting** the role of the Arctic Council as the main vehicle for cooperation in the Arctic;
11. **Emphasising** that interstate relations and Arctic economic development should adhere to international law, both customary and case law, as well as relevant international conventions and rules, including the Polar Code;
12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to steer international efforts towards promoting cooperation in the Arctic in a spirit of responsible stewardship, and preventing tensions and competition in the region from becoming insurmountable;

⁶ Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

- b. to adapt NATO strategic posturing in the High North to the new security realities identified in the Assembly's 2017 report "NATO and Security in the Arctic", including supporting the Allied Arctic littoral states in developing adequate defensive assets and capabilities and organising more joint exercises such as Trident Juncture;
- c. to bolster NATO's enhanced situational awareness through greater expertise in the Arctic region;
- d. to promote and exchange best practices in terms of SAR and contribute to the interoperability of SAR units through joint exercises both among NATO countries and with non-NATO countries;
- e. to maintain and further develop constructive cooperation with Russia in the fields of search and rescue, fisheries and scientific research;
- f. to support the work of multinational frameworks, such as the Arctic Council, and to ensure full compliance with international law, both customary and case law, the implementation of the Polar Code and the further development of higher international safety and environmental standards for the High North;
- g. to ensure that indigenous peoples and communities are adequately consulted and represented throughout decision-making processes concerning the Arctic region;
- h. to strengthen efforts to minimise the impacts of climate change on the Arctic, especially by reducing greenhouse emissions and implementing the Paris Agreement.

RESOLUTION 447
on
BURDEN SHARING: NEW COMMITMENTS IN A NEW ERA⁷

The Assembly,

1. **Concerned** by threats to NATO's territories and populations which could undermine peace and security;
2. **Recognising** that this security challenge demands a determined, unified, and capable Allied response;
3. **Recalling** the new adaptation measures decided upon at the 2014 and 2016 Summits in Wales and Warsaw to address these threats;
4. **Welcoming** the readiness and reinforcement initiatives announced at the 2018 Brussels Summit to ensure more rapid and effective Allied responses to any possible contingency in NATO territory;
5. **Aware** that a dynamic and mobile Allied deterrence posture requires significantly larger investments;
6. **Encouraged** by continued US investment in European security via such initiatives as the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI);
7. **Understanding** that deterrence is a whole-of-Alliance undertaking, requiring investment and sacrifice from all Allies so that NATO is positioned to achieve collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security in the face of any challenge;
8. **Recalling** that Article 3 of the Washington Treaty commits all Allies to do their part to carry the burden of Alliance initiatives, operations, and tasks;
9. **Remembering** the Defence Investment Pledge undertaken at the 2014 Wales Summit which, inter alia, commits Allies to aim to move towards the guideline of spending 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2024 and investing 20% or more of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related research and development, with a view to meeting their NATO capability targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls, and noting that the Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) is not only Cash, but also Capabilities and Commitments, as the so-called "three Cs" accurately reflect the Allies' level of solidarity, which indeed represents the basic pillar of the Alliance's credibility;
10. **Encouraged** by the economic recovery across the Alliance, which has helped underwrite over USD 87 billion in new defence spending by NATO European Members and Canada since 2014;
11. **Noting** that since 2014, the NATO PA has conducted a consequential and positive dialogue on burden sharing that has helped build a political consensus supporting the notion that more must be done to ensure a strong and capable NATO for the future;
12. **Applauding** the fact that five Allies are now spending over 2% of GDP on total defence spending, while 15 Allies have achieved or surpassed the 20% threshold for new investments;
13. **Welcoming** both the 2016 NATO-EU Joint Declaration, which has fostered closer NATO-EU cooperation, and re-energised collective defence efforts in Europe, including rising contributions to the European Defence Fund (EDF) and to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which are helping to deepen defence cooperation among EU member states;

⁷ Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, in Halifax, Canada.

14. **Aware** that the majority of Allies have not yet reached the Defence Investment Pledge guideline, and that Allies have agreed to regularly submit credible national plans for its implementation;
15. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to recognise the challenging and rapidly evolving security environment facing the Alliance, while redoubling national efforts to move towards the 2% guideline for defence spending by 2024 as all Allies agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit;
 - b. to aim to increase their annual investments in new equipment and related research and development to 20% of total defence expenditures focused on obtaining a force structure best suited for not only national defence requirements, but also the most effective contribution to broader Alliance security needs according to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP);
 - c. to submit credible national plans outlining the steps their nations will take to achieve the type and amount of investment in defence necessary to engage a whole-of-Alliance effort to meet the security challenges facing NATO today and in the future;
16. **ASKS** its own members:
 - a. to familiarise themselves with the NDPP as a means of better understanding both the positive impact of their countries' contributions and the strategic and fiscal benefits of deeper coordination and synchronisation in defence planning and procurement;
 - b. to solicit information from their respective defence establishments about how their nations are responding to NATO requirements and streamlining spending to make their current contributions as effective as possible;
 - c. to help lead the debate about defence spending and their nation's contributions to the Alliance.

RESOLUTION 448
on
REINFORCING NATO'S DETERRENCE IN THE EAST⁸

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that NATO's territories and populations face significant conventional and hybrid threats, particularly in the East;
2. **Aware** that NATO-Russia relations are at the lowest point since the end of the Cold War, **cognisant** of Russia's large-scale military aggression against Georgia in 2008, continuous illegal occupation and steps towards factual annexation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, and **mindful** that Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea prompted quid pro quo sanctions, rancorous rhetoric, and high levels of mistrust;
3. **Alarmed** by Russia's increasingly escalatory and reckless pattern of behaviour in the form of cyberattacks, the use of force against its neighbours, the illegal use of chemical nerve agents for attempted murder on Allied territory, as well as its insidious undermining of democratic institutions and principles through its use of election interference and disinformation campaigns;
4. **Cognisant** that Russia's doctrinal shift from 2010 to 2014 has reaffirmed NATO as its de facto competitor and that it views NATO activities in Central and Eastern Europe as direct threats to Russian national interests;
5. **Concerned** by Russia's deployment of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems along NATO's eastern flank, which could impede the Alliance's freedom of movement;
6. **Stressing** the importance of the Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the Baltic States and the Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region as key defence and deterrence measures to secure NATO's eastern flank;
7. **Welcoming** Georgia's engagement in strategic discussion and mutual awareness on Black Sea security and Georgia's contribution to NATO's efforts to enhance Black Sea security;
8. **Recognising** that NATO's eastward enlargement has resulted in the need for strategic enhancements, specifically concerning outdated infrastructure and bureaucratic regulations, which could delay the quick movement of troops and supplies;
9. **Noting** that many of the significant concerns in NATO about infrastructure and regulations impeding military mobility can be found in the Suwałki Corridor, the location of which between Kaliningrad and Belarus makes it a potential choke point between the Baltic States and the rest of the Alliance's eastern members;
10. **Applauding** the EU Transportation Coordinating Committee's EUR 1.9 billion investment in strategic infrastructure in Eastern Europe and other major improvements in necessary infrastructure developments on NATO's eastern flank, and **recognising** that the impetus must now be on NATO and the EU working together to deliver the shared goal of being able to move NATO forces (both EU- and non-EU member states) across Europe as quickly as possible;
11. **Recognising** the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise in Norway offered a crucial opportunity to test the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);

⁸ Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

12. **Commending** the installation of the new NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the US Navy's reactivation of the Second Fleet as necessary for the protection of the North Atlantic;
13. **Supporting** the NATO Readiness Initiative (30-30-30-30 plan) as essential to meeting the demands of NATO's new defence and deterrence posture;
14. **Praising** the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility as a means of improving NATO forces' response time in a potential crisis;
15. **Upholding** NATO's dual track approach towards Russia, based on a combination of deterrence, defence and dialogue;
16. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to continue to ensure the sustainability and readiness of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland, and the Black Sea region, VJTF, and enhanced NATO Response Force;
 - b. to address existing barriers to military mobility at the legal and infrastructure levels in Europe through enhanced NATO-EU cooperation;
 - c. to invest in the improvement of strategic infrastructure as a necessary element of countering hybrid warfare, such as improved roads, bridges, communication infrastructure, ports and airports and to reinforce the security of energy projects;
 - d. to develop an early warning system to detect a possible incursion into the strategically vital Suwalki Corridor, develop infrastructure for quick deployment and sustainment of troops and the necessary manpower to defend the essential territorial link with the Baltic States;
 - e. to deepen dialogue and engage Georgia in the framework of NATO's Tailored Forward Presence (TFP);
 - f. to further the implementation of NATO's Readiness Initiative which is essential to meeting the demands of NATO's new defence and deterrence posture and its reinforcement;
 - g. to demonstrate continued commitment to the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, which is dedicated to improving legislation and procedures, enhancing command and control, and increasing transport capacity;
 - h. to address force deficiencies, develop faster deployment times, and make available the resources necessary to sustain deployed forces;
 - i. to ensure the Alliance has the necessary means to reinforce Allies in an A2/AD environment, potentially through the acquisition of advanced fighter jets, jamming systems, and longer-range precision missile systems;
 - j. to commit to resourcing Alliance contingency plans, including force allocation needs of Graduated Response Plans that address Eastern threats.

RESOLUTION 449
on
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
IN A CHANGING SPACE ARENA⁹

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that space represents a critical arena of both global competition and cooperation, a bastion of the global economy and technological development and a vital scientific frontier;
2. **Understanding** that space has become an important military theatre with space-based satellites playing an essential role for ground, sea and air forces for many national militaries including those of NATO members;
3. **Noting** that the space sector is undergoing fundamental changes due to digitalisation, components miniaturisation, and the growing role of private actors;
4. **Recognising** that the so-called realm of “new space” promises enormous scientific and economic rewards but also poses new risks;
5. **Affirming** that among these risks is the potential presence of bad actors, the development of weapons systems that operate in orbit and from Earth, the vulnerability of communications – from Earth observation and digital space architecture to cyber and even physical attacks – as well as the proliferation of man-made debris in vital orbits;
6. **Concerned** by the increasingly disruptive nature of space warfare programmes in China and Russia, including China’s growing use of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities and Russia’s satellite jamming and spoofing capabilities;
7. **Applauding** international collaboration in space across a range of areas including access to launch vehicles, and shared information on accidents in launch and in space, as well as scientific projects like the International Space Station and the Mars Rover;
8. **Recognising** that NATO operations are highly dependent on national space capabilities in everything from intelligence, ground surveillance, navigation, early warning and radar to disaster management;
9. **Applauding** the overarching Space Policy which NATO agreed to develop at the Brussels Summit in 2018 and the commitment of Allies to promote the non-militarisation of space;
10. **Acknowledging** that there is a need to update international laws governing space operations on matters ranging from the militarisation of space and space mining to debris generation;
11. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to work to ensure that space remains an arena of global cooperation despite its importance to national military and intelligence establishments;

⁹ Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, in Halifax, Canada.

- b. to make a priority of establishing commonly shared rules and norms to provide more effective governance of the global commons in space, particularly as those commons grow more crowded with state and non-state actors;
- c. to strengthen rules and norms that aim to minimise the problem of debris in orbits in which vital satellite systems are operating, including sharp restrictions on testing and deploying antisatellite weapons systems;
- d. to deepen collaboration with private companies to ensure that their satellites are protected from any cyberattack;
- e. to develop more effective forums to engage major players in space with the goal of fostering meaningful dialogue and decision-making on space policy;
- f. to encourage NATO to develop a focused space policy, interoperability and capability sharing across the Alliance, not because space will be the next frontier of conflict, but because NATO capabilities are increasingly dependent upon space-based assets.

RESOLUTION 450
on
ENERGY SECURITY:
A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR THE ALLIANCE¹⁰

The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** that energy security is a major concern for the North Atlantic Alliance as over-reliance on any single supplier of energy for Europe leaves NATO members strategically vulnerable;
2. **Applauding** the European Commission's investigation into the opaque pricing of Russia's gas monopoly and efforts to increase connectivity in energy markets;
3. **Supporting** the efforts made by the European Commission to reform European energy markets by introducing liberalisation measures, building new linkages in energy infrastructure networks, and challenging Russia's monopolistic commodity-pricing practices;
4. **Recognising** the important contributions that new pipeline networks, like the Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan to Southern Europe, and the planned EastMed gas pipeline from the south-east Mediterranean Sea to Europe, can make to collective energy security;
5. **Noting** that advancements in hydrofracking, liquified natural gas (LNG), and renewables offer partial alternatives to energy sourced through unstable regions of the world;
6. **Aware** that Russia's use of natural gas as a tool of political coercion, as it was used against Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, can trigger major supply interruptions for Europe;
7. **Alarmed** by the destabilising effects and undue influence that over-reliance on Russian energy can have on Europe and the Alliance, especially when Russia actively engages in foreign election interference as well as other forms of political subterfuge while continuing to occupy Crimea and support Russian-led military forces in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
8. **Aware** that conventional threats to energy infrastructure from state and non-state actors remains a chief concern of NATO members;
9. **Recognising** that even if energy security is mainly the concern of governments and international institutions like the European Union and the International Energy Agency, there is nonetheless an important role for NATO to play in ensuring energy security across the Alliance;
10. **Welcoming** NATO's efforts both to factor energy security considerations into its strategic vision and to defend critical energy infrastructure from physical and cyberattacks;
11. **Cognisant** that even if individual members have differing perspectives on how to best ensure energy security, the Alliance remains resolutely committed to promoting the secure, affordable, and uninterrupted flow of energy in Europe and North America;
12. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to promote transparency, diversification, and security within European energy markets and throughout the North Atlantic region;

¹⁰ Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018 in Halifax, Canada.

- b. to accordingly invest in renewable energy and other energy sectors that provide a partial alternative to Russian gas and oil;
- c. to work to bring more oil and gas from the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean to European and world markets and to identify potentially profitable and secure infrastructure to make this possible;
- d. to be prepared for cyberattacks aimed at energy infrastructure;
- e. to counter corruption in the energy sector;
- f. to demonstrate a commitment towards greater solidarity and security by building more inter-connectors and LNG hubs, while working for an even higher level of electrical grid integration;
- g. to ensure that Ukraine is not isolated in energy security terms despite Russian efforts both to build pipelines around that country and to raise the risk of investing in Ukraine's energy industry.

RESOLUTION 451
on
REINFORCING NATO’S CONTRIBUTION TO TACKLING THE CHALLENGES
FROM THE SOUTH¹¹

The Assembly,

1. **Emphasising** that a secure, economically and socially stable Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is of strategic importance for the Alliance;
2. **Acknowledging** that the underlying causes fuelling instability and conflict in the region include a broad range of economic, environmental and social issues as well as ineffective governance;
3. **Recognising** that instability in the area has provoked massive migration flows towards member states at the borders of the region, which have become for those countries a possible cause of instability;
4. **Recognising** that the Alliance as an organisation does not have the necessary instruments to address these underlying causes that fuel radicalisation;
5. **Noting**, however, that NATO does make an important contribution to the stability of the MENA region through its political dialogue and particularly through its assistance to partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI);
6. **Recognising** the essential role of Operation Barkhane for Euro-Atlantic security;
7. **Appalled** by the actions of the regime of Bashar al-Assad against its own population, including the barbaric use of chemical weapons, but **aware** that only a negotiated political solution on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 can produce a lasting solution to the conflict;
8. **Commending** the Iraqi security forces and the government of Iraq for their success against Daesh and for the restoration of sovereign control over all Iraqi territory, but **aware** that Daesh and other terror organisations remain a serious threat unless the underlying causes fuelling radicalisation are addressed;
9. **Stressing** that the war in Syria and the instability in Iraq is a major source of instability far beyond their borders, exacerbating an already volatile security situation in the MENA region and beyond, and adversely affecting transatlantic security in its entirety;
10. **Recognising** that the involvement of foreign actors which pursue competing agendas and support the rival factions is a main factor that has impeded the implementation of the UN Action Plan for Libya;
11. **Recognising** that hybrid strategies are not exclusively used against our countries, and that we must envisage their potential use by different adversaries, some of which might come from the South;
12. **Noting** that the volatile security situation of North Africa is not only affected by developments within the region, but also by spillover effects from other parts of Africa and that we cannot forget that there is a serious terrorist threat with roots in the region, which demands greater attention to the South;

¹¹ Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

13. **Recognising** the efforts made so far by Spain, Italy, Greece and other countries in the face of the migration challenge resulting from insecurity and instability in North Africa, and the need to provide assistance and support to those countries in managing migration flows in a sustainable, inclusive manner;
14. **Welcoming** the decisions taken by Allied heads of state and government at the 2018 Brussels Summit that aim at building a stronger and more dynamic relationship with NATO's southern partners and **highlighting** the importance of NATO's Hub for the South for improving the Alliance's awareness and understanding of the threats coming from the Middle East and Africa;
15. **Noting** that NATO's cooperation with the African Union is an integral part of both NATO's Framework for the South and the Alliance's efforts in projecting stability;
16. **Emphasising** the fact that 22 of the 29 Allies are also members of the European Union which shares the same interests in the MENA region, and **recognising** that the EU is playing an important role in economic development and in the promotion of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights in the Middle East and in Africa as well as the efforts made by the EU in the region, by means of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with missions that are important for the security of our Allies, such as EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA and EUTM Somalia;
17. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to continue assisting NATO partner countries in the MENA region in capacity building and other defence-related activities that help the partners create professional and accountable security institutions, which is central to improving the stability of partner countries and the whole MENA region;
 - b. to provide adequate financial and personnel resources to implement the non-combat NATO training mission in Iraq and encourage the Iraqi government to address the shortfalls in good governance;
 - c. to develop a joint, coordinated, Allied approach towards a political solution to the war in Syria that is acceptable to all main stakeholders and also holds the Assad regime accountable for its human rights violations and the use of chemical weapons;
 - d. to agree on a shared policy towards Libya in the area of defence assistance and security institution building, as well as to use diplomatic leverage to force the actors on the ground to implement the UN Action Plan;
 - e. to expand and deepen collaboration between NATO and the European Union in the MENA region, including by assisting partners in building their capacities and fostering resilience;
 - f. to enable NATO to explore ways to expand and deepen its relations with regional organisations to help them improve their capacities to address security threats in the MENA region and in other parts of Africa;
 - g. to further enhance the operability of the Hub for the South in Naples (NATO Strategic Direction South – Hub);
 - h. to consider how NATO can strengthen military cooperation between Allies to stabilise the G5 Sahel countries.

RESOLUTION 452
on
SAFEGUARDING ELECTIONS IN THE ALLIANCE¹²

The Assembly,

1. **Concerned** that Russia's aggressive actions, including the threat and use of force as well as hybrid operations, are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order;
2. **Recognising** the overall strategic challenge of Russian cyber and information operations to Allied security;
3. **Recalling** NATO's founding principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
4. **Strongly** stressing the need to preserve the institutions that make democracies strong, including freedom of the press, freedom of speech and free and fair elections;
5. **Unequivocally condemning** any foreign attempts to undermine elections and other democratic processes, including referenda;
6. **Denouncing in the strongest terms** Russia's recent targeting of elections and referenda in Allied and partner countries as well as its broader attempts to destabilise democracies in Europe and North America;
7. **Convinced** of the need to deter any foreign interference in elections and in any other type of democratic processes or, failing that, be prepared for and resilient against such interference by developing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches as well as national and international responses at every level, in all forums and through every channel;
8. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to conduct regular risk assessments of election infrastructure and remedy any identified gaps or vulnerabilities;
 - b. to institutionalise pre-election processes against potential election interference;
 - c. to consider mandating postelection security audits;
 - d. to provide adequate funding and assistance to election bodies;
 - e. to explore the possibility of designating election infrastructure as critical infrastructure;
 - f. to outline real and credible consequences in case of foreign interference, for example through legal actions and sanctions;
 - g. to make use of the possibility of holding consultations under NATO's Article 4 when applicable;
 - h. to further develop public-private partnerships and outreach with civil society, private companies and media outlets concerning election interference;
 - i. to encourage non-government institutions and organisations central to the democratic process, such as political parties and campaigns, to adopt increased cybersecurity measures, facilitated by government support if required;

¹² Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

- j. to develop better information-sharing procedures with the non-government sector on cyber and hybrid threats;
- k. to further develop cyber and hybrid defence and security strategies, policies and institutions at the national level, at NATO, in the EU and beyond;
- l. to develop clear and actionable protocols and action plans as well as lines of authority and coordination at the national, regional and local levels to expedite responses in the event of election interference;
- m. to systematise and institutionalise cooperation on cyber and hybrid threats through the NATO-EU strategic partnership;
- n. to promote civic education and media literacy concerning the threat of foreign interference in democratic processes;
- o. to encourage greater transparency in the social media sector and reasonable access to social media data for independent researchers;
- p. to continue to explore if and how social media activity or companies could be regulated to guard against foreign interference in democratic processes;
- q. to explore how to increase the transparency of political advertising on social media and whether foreign-paid social media political advertising could be banned;
- r. to encourage conversations in the journalistic community about standards of use for material of questionable sourcing as well as about the potential motives behind a source;
- s. to encourage and support independent fact-checking initiatives;
- t. to engage in public information campaigns about the threat of foreign election interference and instances of attempted or successful interference;
- u. to encourage increased research on cyber and information operations and develop effective tools, paying close attention to artificial intelligence, big data analytics and other emerging technologies.

RESOLUTION 453
on
MAINTAINING THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EDGE AND ENHANCING
ALLIANCE AGILITY¹³

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the Alliance finds itself in a new and dynamic strategic reality, marked by growing uncertainty, instability and risks;
2. **Facing** an era of rapid technological change with a shifting science and technology (S&T) landscape and emerging technologies with the potential to disrupt the global strategic balance;
3. **Recalling** NATO's most staunch commitment for Allies to stand united to deter any potential aggression and, if deterrence fails, to collectively defend themselves;
4. **Underlining** the critical importance of cutting-edge capabilities to meet NATO's level of ambition and fulfil its core missions;
5. **Stressing** that NATO's unrivalled S&T edge is the lifeblood of current and future capabilities;
6. **Concerned** that NATO's S&T edge is eroding, resulting in increased risks for Alliance credibility and freedom of action;
7. **Emphasising** that effective defence S&T relies on vigorous sustained investment and continuous organisational adaptation;
8. **Welcoming** recent defence budget increases in the Alliance, but **apprehensive** about continued stagnation in defence S&T and research and development (R&D) budgets;
9. **Noting** that NATO S&T is a critical enabler of maintaining the S&T edge in the Alliance, adding significant value to defence S&T in individual Allied nations, notably in burden sharing, capacity building, interoperability and standardisation;
10. **Highly valuing** the crucial role played by the Science and Technology Organization (STO) and the other members of the NATO S&T community;
11. **Applauding** the significant strides in making NATO S&T more effective, affordable and coherent since the 2012 NATO S&T Reform;
12. **Noting** the highly productive interaction between the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Science and Technology Committee and the NATO S&T community, notably through the Letters of Intent with the Chief Scientist and the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Chairman;
13. **Recognising** the need for increased parliamentary S&T knowledge and expertise;
14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and the NATO S&T community:
 - a. to redouble national efforts to reach the 2% benchmark for defence spending by 2024 as all Allies agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit and allocate at least 20% of their total defence spending towards new equipment purchases and research and development;

¹³ Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 19 November 2018, Halifax, Canada.

- b. to continue adaptation at the national and NATO levels to the changing strategic and S&T realities;
 - c. to unleash the full potential of the NATO S&T community by a) improving NATO S&T's military relevance, coherence, resource exploitation and synergies; b) making the NATO Defence Planning Process a focal point; c) enhancing active, early and systematic engagement with all NATO S&T stakeholders, in particular with the military community and defence industry; and d) increasing parliamentary engagement in national parliaments and through the NATO PA;
 - d. to nurture a more diverse NATO S&T community by a) improving the age and gender balance within the NATO S&T expert network; and b) developing new networks in emerging S&T areas;
 - e. to enhance the agility of NATO S&T by a) developing a more strategic S&T approach; b) making available the highest quality scientists and engineers for NATO S&T; c) fostering an agile, innovative and risk-tolerant mindset through, inter alia, sharing best practices across the NATO S&T community; d) developing new policy tools to exploit emerging technologies; e) exploring financial tools for 'seed money' in support of technology demonstrations and rapid studies; f) developing an improved information management system, including at higher classification levels; and g) fostering communities of interest and boosting activities focused on autonomy, big data and artificial intelligence, and operations in contested urban environments;
 - f. to demonstrate the value of S&T to the military community by a) increasing the quantity and quality of prototyping, demonstrations, tests and experimentation; and b) elaborating better processes and tools to facilitate insertion of S&T into operational settings;
 - g. to improve strategic engagement and communications by a) conveying meaningful, timely and targeted support and advice to NATO entities and national leadership; and b) showcasing the impact and importance of NATO S&T to NATO entities and national leadership;
 - h. to reinforce the Science and Technology Organization by a) conducting a complete review of workload, requirements, manpower and organisation in light of the new strategic and S&T realities and increased demand for NATO S&T activities; and b) conducting a thorough analysis of the organisational and financial model of the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation to make it fit for purpose at a time when NATO must strengthen its maritime capabilities;
 - i. to evaluate NATO S&T on mission delivery by a) building on the 2018 NATO S&T Strategy, priorities, targets of emphasis and the NATO Defence Planning Process; and b) regularly analysing NATO S&T programmes of work to identify gaps and improve programme health;
 - j. to increase transparency on defence S&T and R&D investment trends by a) making these trends more visible among Allies and NATO entities at the classified level; and b) engaging in a serious discussion on publicly publishing statistics on Allied defence S&T and R&D spending.
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Appendix:

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The Assembly's role

Since its creation in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) has brought together members of parliament from all Allied nations. The Assembly serves as a unique parliamentary forum to discuss and influence decisions on Alliance security.

The Assembly – made up of representatives of national parliaments – is institutionally separate from NATO, where decisions are made by representatives of national governments. As such, the Assembly's views are not legally binding for NATO or its member governments. However, the NATO PA serves as an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of its member nations, thus maintaining a constructive and active dialogue, and cooperation, between NATO and its member states.

The NATO PA:

- facilitates parliamentary awareness and understanding of the key issues affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area;
- supports national parliamentary oversight of defence and security;
- helps strengthen the transatlantic relationship;
- promotes the values underpinning the Alliance;
- provides greater transparency of NATO policies;
- fosters better understanding of the Alliance's objectives and missions among legislators and citizens of the Alliance.

The Assembly consists of 266 members of parliament from the 29 NATO member nations. Delegation size is proportionate to a country's population, and each delegation must reflect the political composition of its own parliament. The Assembly's membership, therefore, represents a broad spectrum of political opinion within the Alliance.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly continuously responds to the changing security environment. Partnerships with lawmakers from countries seeking a closer association with NATO are therefore essential. Even before the Cold War ended, the Assembly reached out to members of parliaments from the Warsaw Pact countries, and today, the Assembly's partnerships are wide and deep. The NATO PA welcomes delegates from 12 associate countries and 4 Mediterranean associate countries. Observers from 8 other countries take part in its activities. Thus, the Assembly complements and reinforces NATO's own programme of partnership and cooperation.

Partnerships with international institutions are of paramount importance as well. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament are therefore also represented.

Other parliamentary delegations are invited on an ad hoc basis. In the past, these have notably included delegations from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean.

The Assembly's structure

The Assembly's governing body is the Standing Committee. It performs a wide range of political, administrative and financial tasks, and coordinates the overall work of the Assembly. It is composed of the head of each member delegation; the president, five vice-presidents, the treasurer and the secretary general as well as the chairs of all the committees.¹⁴

The president is elected by his/her peers to represent the Assembly and act as its leading political officer. The president, vice-presidents, and the treasurer collectively form the Assembly's Bureau. The Bureau's main function is to provide overall guidance and ensure coherence of the Assembly's policies and activities in the intervals between meetings of the Standing Committee; it also acts as the "first responder" when internal or external events require a decision or statement by the Assembly.

Five committees (including their eight sub-committees) are charged with examining the security and policy challenges confronting Allied countries and are responsible for most of the Assembly's substantive work:

- Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security
- Defence and Security Committee
- Economics and Security Committee
- Political Committee
- Science and Technology Committee

Other Assembly bodies include:

- Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group
- Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council
- Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary Council

The NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee was discontinued in April 2014 following Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and its decision to annex the Ukrainian province of Crimea in March 2014.

The International Secretariat, under its secretary general, is responsible for the bulk of research and analysis that supports the Assembly's committees, sub-committees and other groups, as well as all the practical and administrative arrangements for its activities and meetings.

¹⁴ This includes the chair of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group.

How the Assembly works

The Assembly organises some 40 activities every year, bringing together between 10 and 350 members of parliament in various formats.

The committees and sub-committees meet several times during the year and organise visits to both NATO and non-NATO countries. In these meetings, they receive briefings from leading government and parliamentary representatives as well as senior academics and experts.

Two particularly large-scale meetings are organised each year: the Spring and Annual Sessions. During the Spring Session, elected committee and sub-committee rapporteurs present draft reports for a first discussion. The reports are then revised and updated for further discussion, amendment and adoption at the Annual Session in the autumn.

At the Annual Session, the committees also produce policy recommendations. Once adopted in the plenary sitting, these are forwarded to the NATO secretary general, and to national governments and parliaments. Although these policy recommendations are not binding, NATO's secretary general provides a written reaction to them, and they are widely seen as important indications of political sentiment on key topics within the Alliance.

Financing

The Assembly is directly funded by member parliaments and governments, and is financially and administratively separate from NATO itself.

The Rose-Roth Programme

A central part of the Assembly's work is the Rose-Roth Programme of partnership and cooperation – initially with Central and Eastern European countries but subsequently throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. This programme seeks to assist partner countries, mainly in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, through a challenging transition process, which involves the implementation of difficult political and economic reforms.

The Rose-Roth Programme involves a series of seminars focused on regional and topical security issues and training programmes for parliamentary staff and members of parliament. The aim is to enhance parliamentary awareness, build contacts and provide experience and expertise. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principle of the democratic control of the armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military.

The NATO Orientation Programme

The NATO Orientation Programme is focused primarily on young or newly elected members of parliament from NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations, as well as those newly assigned to security or foreign affairs responsibilities. The programme aims at providing an in-depth overview of the functioning and policies of NATO and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) as well as of the Alliance's evolving relationships with its many partners. The programme was launched in 2000 and is held annually in Brussels.

The Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum

In 2001, growing concern about the apparent drift in transatlantic attitudes, perceptions and policies, prompted the Assembly's Standing Committee to instigate a Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum to help identify the precise nature of the divergence in transatlantic thinking and to explore ways in which any differences could be redressed. The programme includes discussions with senior US administration figures and academic experts.

The Forum is held annually in Washington DC in cooperation with the National Defense University (NDU) and the Atlantic Council.

The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group

In the context of its outreach activities, the Assembly created in 1995 the Mediterranean Special Group with the aim of opening a political dialogue with legislators from countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The programme gradually expanded and received new impetus following the turmoil and changes in parts of the MENA region that began in 2010. The Assembly has established relations with the parliaments of six countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, as well as with the Palestinian National Council. Preliminary contacts have been established with Libya as well as with some countries of the Gulf and of the Sahel.

The yearly activities of the Group include a visit to the region, and two seminars, one of which is held in cooperation with the Italian parliament. These meetings seek to enhance parliamentary awareness of problems within the region, promote a political dialogue between parliamentarians, and ultimately provide experience and expertise to legislators from Maghreb and Middle East countries.

Membership of the Assembly

Member Delegations

Member states	Delegates
United States	36
France	18
Germany	18
Italy	18
United Kingdom	18
Turkey	18
Canada	12
Poland	12
Spain	12
Romania	10
Belgium	7
Czech Republic	7
Greece	7
Hungary	7
Netherlands	7
Portugal	7
Bulgaria	6
Denmark	5
Norway	5
Slovakia	5
Croatia	5
Lithuania	4
Albania	4
Estonia	3
Iceland	3
Latvia	3
Luxembourg	3
Montenegro	3
Slovenia	3
29	266

Associate Delegations

Ukraine	8
Austria	5
Azerbaijan	5
Serbia	5
Sweden	5
Switzerland	5
Finland	4
Georgia	4
Armenia	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Republic of Moldova	3
Republic of North Macedonia	3
12	53

European Parliament Delegation

	10
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Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations

Algeria	3
Morocco	3
Israel	3
Jordan	3
4	12

Parliamentary Observer Delegations

Assembly of Kosovo	2
Australia	2
Egypt	2
Japan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Palestinian National Council	2
Tunisia	2
Republic of Korea	2
8	16

Inter-parliamentary Assembly Delegations

OSCE PA	2
PACE	2
2	4

Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups

Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS)

Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG)

Defence and Security Committee (DSC)

Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC)

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC)

Economics and Security Committee (ESC)

Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTD)

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations (ESCTER)

Political Committee (PC)

Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships (PCNP)

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR)

Science and Technology Committee (STC)

Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS)

Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM)

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC)

Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary Council (GNIC)

NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee (NRPC)

(Discontinued as of April 2014)

Members of the Bureau of the Assembly¹⁵

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Vice-Presidents

Franklin van KAPPEN (Netherlands)

Vitalino CANAS (Portugal)

Osman Askin BAK (Turkey)

The Rt Hon. Richard BENYON (United Kingdom)

Hon. Michael R. TURNER (United States)

¹⁵ As elected during the Assembly's 64th Annual Session in Halifax, Canada, on 19 November 2018.

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