Enhancing Multilateral Support for Security Sector Reform

A Mapping Study covering the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

DCAF
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About this report

This report has been developed by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) at the request of the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The report presents the findings of a multi-year research project on the approaches of multilateral organizations to supporting nationally-led security sector reform (SSR) processes. The organizations selected for this mapping exercise are the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The study aims at developing an empirically-based understanding of the roles and potential comparative advantages of these organizations in SSR support, as well as avenues for enhanced cooperation. This is intended to contribute to dialogue on ensuring the provision of more effective, coherent, and predictable external support to nationally-driven reform processes. For this purpose, the study examines the following three categories related to the role of multilateral organizations in SSR support: (1) normative frameworks, (2) institutional capacities, and (3) operational practices.

The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not in any way reflect the official views of the organizations involved in this project, or those of their representatives.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	**UNOCI**	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
OSRSG-SVC	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict	**UNODA**	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
		UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office	**UNPF**	United Nations Population Fund
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU)	**UNOPS**	United Nations Office for Project Services
PRISM	Prevention of conflicts, Rule of Law/security sector reform, Integrated approach, Stabilization and Mediation Division (EU)	**UNOWAS**	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
		UNSC	United Nations Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department (AU)	**UNSMIL**	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division (AU)	**UNSOM**	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
RECs	Regional Economic Communities		
RMs	Regional Mechanisms		
RoL	Rule of Law		
RPBA	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment		
SADC	Southern African Development Community		
SCR	Security Council Resolution		
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit (OSCE)		
SSG/R	Security sector governance/reform		
SSR	Security sector reform		
TAM	Technical assessment mission		
ToR	Terms of Reference		
TNT	Department for Transnational Threats		
UN	United Nations		
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq		
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur		
UNDG	United Nations Development Group		
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme		
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund		
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research		
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau		
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo		
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia		
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan		

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Security sector reform (SSR) is a fundamentally national process, and yet many countries draw on support from international actors, which bring to the table financial resources, technical knowledge, and experiences of security sector governance from other reform contexts. In this way, multilateral organizations have played an important role in shaping the SSR agenda through the development of policy and guidance and by engaging in the provision of a wide range of SSR support on the ground.

Despite their significant engagement in this area, there is no predictability in terms of the type of support that multilateral organizations will take on. While policy frameworks concur that international support should be well coordinated, the support provided by these organizations tends to be compartmentalized in practice. As a result, considerable time is often lost while each organization separately assesses a conflict, maps what others are doing, and agrees on a division of labour. In light of the important role that SSR plays in sustaining peace and in sustainable development, and the narrow window of opportunity in which national actors can be engaged in reform efforts, particularly in the immediate aftermath of conflict, harmonization between and among multilateral organizations must be strengthened. In line with United Nations Security Council resolution 2151, which stresses the "importance of coordination (…) between the different actors involved in supporting security sector reforms," **there is a need for greater predictability in multilateral support to SSR**, based on a clear understanding of the normative framework, institutional capacities, and operational practices of each actor.

Mapping study

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) therefore requested that the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) conduct the project, *Supporting Nationally-Led Security Sector Reform: Mapping the Approaches of Multilateral Organizations*, the main objective of which was to develop a first set of data on the approaches to SSR support of selected organizations, and identify avenues for enhanced cooperation. This is intended to underpin an empirically founded understanding on the roles and potential comparative advantages of different organizations in SSR, and generate dialogue on ensuring the provision of more effective, coherent, and predictable international SSR support to national actors. The organizations selected by DPKO for this mapping exercise are the

United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, on Regional Arrangements, is among the guiding documents that calls on multilateral organizations to work together and coordinate to achieve peace and security, thus paving the way for cooperation between the UN and other international and regional organizations.[1] Building on the broad partnership agreements between these organizations, coordination in the area of SSR has been recognized as particularly important given the multiple actors engaged and the need for comprehensive approaches.[2] The organizations under study have identified concrete priorities for cooperation in their SSR policy frameworks, ranging from the sharing of policy and guidance to the sharing of rosters, and the conduct of joint planning, assessments, and monitoring and evaluation. These priorities fall generally into three categories – cooperation in the area of normative frameworks, institutional capacities, and operational practice – which are all addressed in this study. Yet, the findings of this study highlight that significant efforts to strengthen partnerships have had only a limited impact thus far and have mostly contributed to increased information sharing as opposed to tangible results.

Key findings

The main objective of this study was to build an initial comparative set of data on the approaches to SSR of selected organizations, as a first step towards identifying opportunities for **enhancing the predictability of multilateral support to SSR.** Predictability would imply, among other things, that multilateral organizations: provide support on the basis of a clear division of labour, drawing on comparative advantages; have resources available to deliver according to needs on the ground; and address planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation in a coherent and collaborative manner. Yet, this study has uncovered a discrepancy between the strong commitment of these organizations to enhance the effectiveness and predictability of international support to SSR and practices on the ground, whereby much time is lost at the planning stage and support is not always provided in the most effective and impact-oriented manner.

The four organizations under study provide support to national SSR processes under their wider mandates to support peace, security, and development. Yet, they each have different characteristics that shape the delivery of their SSR support. This study has identified some **trends in the potential comparative advantages** of these organizations that deserve further exploration:

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1   See Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 1945, Articles 52–54.

2   UN Security Council resolution 2151, S/RES/2151, April 24, 2014.

- The **UN** appears to be most engaged in sector-wide support and is the only organization that has dedicated sector-wide SSR structures in many of its field offices. This would suggest that it has an important role to play in supporting the identification of strategic priorities for SSR, and in taking the lead in coordination efforts to ensure that a comprehensive approach to reform is supported by the international community. Its plethora of agencies, funds, and programmes also enable it to provide comprehensive support through the perspectives of development, human rights, and gender; still, more needs to be done to build on synergies that can potentially exist within the organization, notably by strengthening the role of the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force.

- The **AU**, due to its role as the main custodian of peace and security on the African continent, may have a stronger political role to play in raising awareness on important but sensitive issues and in coordinating with national counterparts in-country, to the extent that its capacities permit. However, it cannot provide comprehensive support to SSR due to its limited capacities, particularly in the field. Thus, to date, it has focused more on sector-wide support than on systematic engagement in component areas such as the police or judiciary. Nonetheless, by virtue of its close partnership to regional organizations and its deeper understanding of realities on the ground, the AU may play an important role in leading conflict analysis and assessments on the African continent as well as leveraging south-to-south support.

- The **EU** is the organization least engaged in sector-wide initiatives, but it offers some very specialized capacities in component-specific areas as a result of field operations that are dedicated primarily to supporting one or two related security sub-sectors. The EU is also most capable of providing flexible support according to evolving needs, as the only organization to rely systematically on external expertise through its country offices (delegations). Its recent establishment of an EU SSG Facility adds an additional tool for accessing rapid SSR expertise where needed by the international community. And, the adoption of its 2016 comprehensive SSR policy, which is intended to bridge the support of the EEAS and European Commission, provides the potential for the EU to become an even stronger actor in the area of SSR.

- The comprehensive approach of the **OSCE** to security enables it to engage in a range of issues and suggests that, in countries where it has a long-standing field presence and there is no clear UN lead, it may play a key role in coordinating international efforts and supporting strategic assessments of security sector needs. Additionally, by virtue of its experience in supporting a wide range of SSR-related activities, the organization has recognized that it can fill the niches left behind by other actors.[3] This study has also noted that the AU and the OSCE, both regional organizations that operate only within the territory of Members States, can have significant impact in promoting political messages and raising awareness on important but sensitive issues.

This study has also identified several **elements that negatively affect the ability of these organizations to enhance the predictability of their support**:

- While the normative frameworks of these organizations are very rich, they do not provide meaningful information on potential comparative advantages. Also, while these policy frameworks lay out roles in the area of cooperation and coordination, they do not clarify who should be in the lead and, consequently, commitments are not translated into practice.

- The capacities of these four organizations in the area of SSR are generally limited and are insufficient to provide all the expertise required for the delivery of SSR support, which points to the need for partnerships. However, all four organizations have similar broad institutional structures and staffing profiles which hampers the ability to identify comparative advantages for field support.

- Cooperation mechanisms fall short at both the planning and implementation stages and are usually based on information-sharing as opposed to efforts to discuss division of labour. Moreover, the broader challenges that organizations face in integrating SSR into their internal planning processes also affects the ability to provide more predictable support in this field.

- It is not possible to determine in advance the extent to which an organization may be engaged in certain areas of SSR support in-country. While broad mandates allow for flexibility to adapt to changes on the ground, they represent a challenge to strengthening the division of labour and coordination among different actors providing international assistance in the same country.

Recommendations

To strengthen predictability and coordination among international actors, this research has led to the following **recommendations**, which fall into three categories:

- **Increasing the effectiveness of SSR Policy and Guidance:** While the effectiveness of policy and guidance can only be measured by outcomes, multilateral organizations have sometimes developed guidance without further reflection on how to support its dissemination or implementation. A general lack of awareness of existing policy and guidance represents a missed opportunity to support staff on the ground who would benefit from drawing on applicable lessons learned from previous SSR support. Therefore, this study recommends:

  ▶ Strengthening opportunities to disseminate and review existing policy and guidance both within and between organizations;

3   OSCE-SPMU, *Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2005*, November 2006. Available from http://www.osce.org/secretariat/22448.

▶ Providing support to the development of further guidance based on lessons learned, with a particular focus on developing evidence on what does and does not work, drawing on a catalogue of examples from different reform processes; and

▶ Supporting collaboration in the guidance development and implementation processes of these organizations, especially in areas where enhanced interoperability between organizations would be useful.

- **Strengthening Institutional Capacities:** The effective delivery of SSR support hinges on having the necessary capacities to meet mandates. The field of SSR covers a variety of security and oversight actors, addresses many crosscutting issues such as human rights or gender, and requires both political and technical expertise. Given that the number of SSR staff is often limited, it is challenging for multilateral organizations to equip themselves with the capacities and expertise needed to address all national requests for support. To fill the many gaps in SSR institutional structures and expertise, this study encourages:

▶ Supporting efforts to ensure that capacities match needs in terms of dedicated structures and number of staff, including by ensuring that SSR is adequately reflected in planning teams that feed into programme/mission budget development; and

▶ Supporting efforts to better mobilize existing expertise, particularly through the development of flexible mechanisms for support and agreements on how to better leverage the existing expertise of internal and external partners.

- **Improving Operational Practice**: The operational practice of multilateral organizations is largely shaped by their approach to planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Planning and assessment challenges, combined with capacity and funding challenges, have often contributed to short-term approaches that do not fully embrace the long-term governance needs of the security sector. This study recommends:

▶ Ensuring that SSR is integrated into broader assessments and planning efforts, including developing a methodology for linking SSR to conflict analysis;

▶ Promoting alignment among multilateral organizations through joint assessments, and encouraging commitment to the joint interpretation of findings and the adaptation of support;

▶ Enhancing the harmonisation and effectiveness of international support delivery though enhanced coordination at both the technical and political levels;

▶ Balancing the need for long-term institutional capacity-building with short-term approaches and ensuring that efforts are made to enhance capacity-building in areas that strengthen national ownership; and

▶ Increasing monitoring and evaluation efforts, both by the individual organizations themselves but also through increased joint approaches to minimize transaction costs and enable more sector-wide analysis of national progress.

In conclusion, this study has shown that more efforts are needed to ensure the provision of multilateral assistance to national governments in the area of SSR that is coherent and coordinated in order to best support effective, efficient, and sustainable reforms of national security sectors as a key element to sustaining peace and enabling sustainable development.

Introduction and Overview

I

Security sector reform (SSR) is a fundamentally national process, which must be nationally led in order to strengthen the trust of a population in the capacity of a state to provide effective and accountable security and justice. However, in practice, many countries draw on external support from international actors such as donor states, multilateral organizations, and international non-governmental organizations. These external actors may provide financial resources and technical knowledge, along with lessons learned from experiences of security sector governance in their own national contexts and in other reform contexts in which they have participated. Multilateral organizations have played a particularly important role in shaping the global SSR agenda through the development of policy and guidance and are increasingly engaged in the provision of a wide range of SSR support on the ground.

Yet, while multilateral organizations are ever more involved in SSR support on the basis of national requests or formal mandates, the type of support they offer is, to a large extent, unpredictable. Policy frameworks concur that international support should be well coordinated, but the reality is that support provided by these organizations tends to be siloed. As a consequence, time is often lost as each organization seeks to separately assess a conflict, map the activities of other actors, and agree on a division of labour. And in some cases, the interests of individual organizations take primacy over this need for cooperation, contributing to gaps in support or even duplication of efforts. Given the important role that SSR plays in sustaining peace and supporting sustainable development, and the narrow window of opportunity that generally exists in fragile contexts to engage national actors on reform, this situation is untenable. **There is a need for greater predictability in multilateral support to SSR**, based on a clear understanding of the normative framework, institutional capacities, and operational practices of each actor.

This is in line with United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2151 on SSR, which underlines the "importance of coordination (...) between the different actors involved in supporting security sector reforms," while recognizing the priority of national ownership.[4] The UN Group of Friends of SSR has also called for "strengthening partnerships among multilateral organizations in support of enhanced

predictability on the ground."[5] Reform of the UN peace and security pillar is also viewed as having bolstered prospects for "building stronger global and regional partnerships with non-United Nations entities to collectively address contemporary multidimensional peace and security challenges."[6] Finally, the recent Report of the UN Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace underscored the need for strengthened partnerships to meet the ambitious goals set by the sustaining peace resolutions.[7]

Objectives and methodology

Against this background, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has requested that the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) conduct the project, *Supporting Nationally-Led Security Sector Reform: Mapping the Approaches of Multilateral Organizations.* The main **objective of the project** was to establish a baseline data set on the SSR approaches of selected organizations, in order to develop an empirically-based understanding of the roles of these organizations in SSR support and avenues for enhanced cooperation. This is intended as a first step towards identifying openings for improving the predictability of multilateral support to SSR. Predictability would imply, among other things, that multilateral organizations: provide support on the basis of a clear division of labour that draws on comparative advantages; have the resources available to deliver according to needs on the ground; and address planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation in a coherent and collaborative manner. This research is expected to inform future dialogue on ensuring the provision of more effective, coherent, and predictable international SSR support to national actors. The organizations selected by DPKO for this mapping exercise are the UN, the AU, the EU, and the OSCE.

The **methodology** for this study was a mixed qualitative approach that employed a combination of desk research, questionnaires, workshops, and selected interviews. First, an analysis of relevant primary sources (official documents issued by the four organizations) and secondary sources (publications by the expert community) was undertaken. Then, representatives from all four organizations were invited to fill out a questionnaire on thematic areas of engagement. The aim was to provide a broad base of preliminary findings to support the identification of next steps for more detailed research. Insights drawn from questionnaire responses were discussed with representatives of the participating organizations as well as with Member States at the workshop *Mapping of Multilateral Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR),* hosted by the DPKO SSR Unit in June 2015. This workshop provided an opportunity to discuss initial findings and identify further issues for analysis. Moreover, interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Geneva, New York, and Vienna from September 2016 to May 2017 with select representatives

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4   UN Security Council resolution 2151, S/RES/2151, *preamble.*

5   UN, "Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," Outcome document of the High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace, June 5-6, 2017, Bratislava, A/72/513–S/2017/844.

6   UN General Assembly, *Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/72/525, October 13, 2017.

7   UN, *Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/72/707–S/2018/43, January 18, 2018.

of the organizations under study.[8] Finally, a one-day workshop on *Mapping of Multilateral Approaches to SSR: Taking Stock of the Recommendations and Looking Forward* was held in Brussels in March 2018, to review the study and discuss the recommendations. As a result, **this report offers a snapshot of the normative frameworks, institutional capacities, and operational practices of these organizations in the period from 2015 to 2017.**

This study **differentiates between sector-wide and component-specific approaches** to SSR. While component-specific support focuses only on one sub-sector (e.g. defence, law enforcement, justice, corrections, civil emergencies, intelligence, or border management), sector-wide reforms seek to strengthen the strategic, governance, and architectural framework of the security sector as a whole.[9] This distinction is important because much of the criticism of international support to SSR has been related to an excessive focus on training and equipping security sector components, as opposed to seriously addressing the governance dimension by building the foundations for more accountable and effective security sectors.

The methodology used in this study has two main **limitations**. First, this is primarily a desk-based study, complemented by headquarters-level interviews. Field research was considered beyond the scope of this study but may be part of a follow-up effort. As such, the study did not examine, for example, whether support provided to the same institutions in the same country may be complementary or duplicative. Further, the questionnaires that were provided to participant organizations were in most cases filled out by only one focal point in each organization. These focal points made attempts to consult other departments and field offices, but this was not systematized. Additionally, the questionnaire did not ask respondents to distinguish between support at the political or technical levels.[10] Efforts were made to address this by discussing the extent of programmatic support during interviews.

The second limitation of this study is that it compares the SSR approaches of four organizations with different characteristics. Each of these organizations is comprised of various entities that provide support from different institutional perspectives. However, no matter how dissimilar these organizations, they are all engaged in providing SSR support alongside one another, and thus, comparing their approaches and synergies is important. Still, to facilitate this comparative analysis, some generalizations have had to be made that do not do justice to the complexity of each organization and its role in supporting SSR. While this allowed the researchers to identify broad trends as a basis for further discussion, the differences among these organizations must be acknowledged.

Comparative overview of the four participant organizations

It is under a **broad mandate to support peace and security,** and in line with **associated objectives related to development, human rights, and the rule of law**, that the organizations under study are engaged in the provision of SSR support. For instance, the recent twin UN resolutions on sustaining peace have recognized that SSR is critical to consolidating peace and stability.[11] Similarly, the AU's policy framework for SSR is embedded in the broader African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and SSR has been recognized as a pillar of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy under the objective of increasing security, which calls for efforts to promote the consolidation of efficient and accountable defence and security forces under civilian control and oversight.[12] In the EU, the prioritization of SSR can be traced back to the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003.[13] The recent EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016) also appreciates that SSR efforts enable and enhance the capacity of states to deliver security within the rule of law.[14] Finally, SSR is a key element of the OSCE's cross-dimensional approach to security, which addresses the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) is a founding document in this regard as it sets out the basic norms for the democratic control of armed and security forces.

Each of these organizations has also developed more **specialized mandates** in support of peace and security, some of which are directly related to SSR. The UN has a strong mandate to engage in support to sustainable development, for example, which is recognized as inextricably linked to sustaining peace. As such, several UN entities, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), engage in SSR support to contribute to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, among others. Other entities, such as the UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), draw their mandate from UN conventions on organized crime, trafficking, and corruption, and thus provide support to SSR through a broader transnational lens. Many entities also provide support under the umbrella of human rights, such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Ultimately, the mandates of each entity in each organization determine how efforts are invested in SSR.

8   This consisted of 20 interviews with UN representatives, including several members of the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force; 13 interviews with AU representatives; and 10 interviews with EU representatives. For analysis of the OSCE, the study built on over 170 interviews that were conducted by DCAF with representatives of the organization in the context of a 2014 mapping study on the role of the OSCE in SSG/R support. To ensure information was up to date, this data was further supplemented by an interview with the OSCE Assistant Project Officer for SSG/R.

9   UN Security Council resolution 2151, S/RES/2151.

10   This means that an organization reporting engagement in the provision of police reform may only be engaged in a limited or indirect way, for instance through the provision of political support (e.g. facilitation or advocacy), or much more extensively through the provision of technical support (e.g. institutional capacity building support).

11   See UN General Assembly resolution 70/272, A/RES/70/262, May 12, 2016; and UN Security Council resolution 2282, S/RES/2282 (2016), April 27, 2016.

12   African Union, Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, June 2006. Available at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policy-framwowork-eng.pdf

13   European Council, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy," December 12, 2003. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Also in 2003, the Commission issued a Communication on Governance and Development, which noted that SSR is an integral component of good governance and is closely related to development. See European Commission, "Governance and Development," Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM(2003) 615 final, October 20, 2003.

14   EU, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," June 2016, p. 26. Available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

While these organizations feature many similarities, there are **variances in the geographic reach of their support**, **their roles as far as funding, and their presence on the ground.** For one, the OSCE, the EU, and the AU are regional organizations, whereas the UN has universal membership. While the OSCE and the AU operate only within the territory of their Member States,[15] the EU mainly provides support to national SSR processes outside its region. This means that, in addition to providing operational support, the OSCE and the AU have played a bigger role in developing normative commitments for their Member States in the area of SSR; which has not been a key objective of EU support. Another important difference among these organizations relates to funding, with the EU acting not only as an implementer of support but also as a financial donor to other organizations. Thus, in comparison, the other three organizations under study have more limited budgets than the EU.

Table 1 Recipients of SSR support

	Support to Member States	Support to other States
United Nations	x	
European Union	x	x
African Union	x	
OSCE	x	

There are also differences in the type of SSR support mandated and implemented by these organizations (for a comprehensive overview, see annex A). The UN has adopted the most field operations mandates to provide sector-wide support to reforms, and often supports the development and/or implementation of national SSR strategies as well as efforts to strengthen the mainstreaming of human rights and gender into the security sector. On the other hand, the EU is rarely mandated to provide support across the whole security sector in a country, which arguably reflects the component-specific function of many EU field operations. The sector-wide mandates of the OSCE are frequently focused on strengthening capacities to address transnational threats, while the AU rarely defines specific areas of engagement in its mandates. There are however several commonalities. In particular, the majority of component-specific mandates of these organizations are in the areas of law enforcement, justice, and defence. Moreover, mandates for democratic governance of the security sector are the exception rather than the rule. Finally, while mandates may differ, the type of support provided by these organizations across both field operations and non-field operations is very similar in practice (see annex A), highlighting the need to ensure an adequate division of labour on the basis of clear comparative advantages.

The inherent differences between these organizations may positively or negatively affect SSR support and should therefore be factored into conversations about **comparative advantages**. The UN, for instance, recognizes that its political neutrality and global reach represent an important comparative advantage when it comes to facilitating inclusive dialogue processes.[16] Yet, while the AU acknowledges that the universal character and extensive experience of the UN have allowed it to play an important role in identifying basic SSR principles, the AU emphasizes its own "critical role as the main custodian of peace and security on the African continent."[17] The EU notes that "its global reach, wide-ranging external policies, instruments, tools and well established presence and experience" are valuable to SSR efforts.[18] And the OSCE seeks to draw on its comparative advantages in the field of comprehensive security and its strong network of institutions and field presences.[19]

Cooperation among multilateral organizations

To achieve peace and security, multilateral organizations have recognized the need to work together and coordinate efforts. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, on Regional Arrangements, paves the way for cooperation between the UN and other international and regional organizations such as the EU, the AU, and the OSCE.[20] To translate this into practice, **partnership frameworks** have been developed between the UN and the AU,[21] between the UN and the EU,[22] and between the UN and the OSCE.[23] Specific agreements also exist in the area of SSR.[24]

The individual policy and guidance frameworks of these multilateral organizations also acknowledge the need for enhanced cooperation in the area of SSR support. The 2008 Report of the Secretary-General on SSR **stresses the importance of partnerships,** which are considered "vital in providing effective

16   UN, *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform : Report of the Secretary-General*, A/67/970–S/2013/480, August 13, 2013, para. 29.

17   AU Commission, "Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR)," January 2013, para. 78.

18   European Commission, "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform," JOIN(2016) 31 final, July 5, 2016, p. 2.

19   OSCE, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Guidelines for OSCE Staff," 2016, p. 7.

20   See Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, Articles 52–54.

21   See for instance the "Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security," April 2017; and the Framework on Cooperation signed in 2014 between the African Union and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

22   Council of the European Union, "Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015–2018," March 23, 2015.

23   High-level tripartite meetings took place involving the respective Chairpersons and Secretaries-General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and the Director-General of the UN Office in Geneva, as well as annual UN-OSCE staff-level meetings.

24   For instance, see "Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 2015-2018." The EEAS has noted that "cooperation in Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform (SSR), including in the area of Defence Sector Reform (DSR)" is among the priorities of the EU when it cooperates with regional and international organizations. The OSCE and UNODC have also developed a joint action plan that includes a section on cooperation in the area of SSR, which among other things, recommends regular exchanges between the two organizations, awareness raising on guidance tools, support for their implementation, the sharing of results on implementation reviews, and the leveraging of expertise.

15   There may be limited exceptions to this when the OSCE works with partners that are outside the immediate region of its participating States.

support and expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform processes."[25] The AU Policy Framework on SSR highlights that, where national authorities lack the capacity for coordination, the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or the UN may partner with national authorities to facilitate the coordination of SSR assistance. The 2016 EU policy framework for SSR also states that "the security sector should be an inherent part of in-country coordination among international actors/ donors."[26] Finally, the OSCE has noted in its Guidelines on SSG/R that "...all international actors engaged in a country should be contributing to the achievement of the same national long-term priorities."[27]

The SSR-specific policies of the organizations under study set out a number of priorities for cooperation, many of which are shared by more than one organization. These priorities fall broadly into three categories: normative frameworks, institutional capacities, and operational practice. As such, these are the three main areas examined in this mapping study.

Box 1 Priorities for cooperation in the SSR policies of multilateral organizations
• Develop coordination modalities (i.e. planning, deployment) (UN, EU,[28] OSCE[29])
• Develop and/or share policy and guidance (UN, AU, OSCE[30])
• Share information on best practice (UN)
• Undertake joint assessments/context analysis (UN, AU, EU[31])
• Share rosters of experts (UN, AU)
• Engage in joint approaches to training (UN)
• Undertake joint implementation of activities (UN, AU)
• Cooperate in monitoring and evaluation (UN, AU)

Relevance and structure of this mapping study

This research examines the approaches to SSR support taken by the four multilateral organizations under study, as well as the extent to which cooperation occurs between and among them in line with broader policy and cooperation frameworks. While significant efforts have been made to strengthen partnerships among these organizations, the impact of this cooperation remains limited and largely

contributes to increased information sharing as opposed to tangible outcomes.[32] **This study represents a significant step forward** by providing a first set of comparative data on the SSR approaches of these organizations.[33] Moreover, it is the first time these organizations have jointly contributed to an analysis of these approaches. As a result of this joint exercise, a dialogue among the four organizations has already started on how to move forward and implement some of the recommendations raised in this study.

The **structure of this study** is as follows: after this introduction, Section 2 offers an overview of normative frameworks (e.g. policy and guidance) on SSR. Section 3 then examines the institutional capacities for SSR support at the disposal of these organizations, both in terms of institutional structures and types of expertise. Section 4 addresses operational support to SSR in practice, by considering how it is approached during planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Finally, conclusions as well as recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness and predictability of support to SSR by multilateral organizations are presented in Section 5. Annex A outlines the recurring thematic areas of SSR support that are mandated and implemented by multilateral organizations while annexes B, C, and D provide explanatory notes on relevant tables in the study.

25   UN Secretary-General, *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform : Report of the Secretary General*, A/62/659–S/2008/39, January 23, 2008, para. 63.

26   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 10.

27   OSCE, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Guidelines for OSCE Staff," p. 65.

28   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 10.

29   OSCE, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Guidelines for OSCE Staff," p. 65.

30   Ibid., p. 80.

31   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p.13.

32   For instance, see Thierry Tardy and Richard Gowan, "Building EU-UN Coherence in Mission Planning & Mandate Design," Policy Briefing, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), November 2014.

33   Few studies analyse the approaches of multilateral organizations in a systematic manner. Moreover, none of these have been conducted in cooperation with the organizations under study. See David Law, ed., *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform: DCAF Yearbook* (LIT, 2007).

Normative Framework

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The multilateral organizations under study have all sought to define concepts and approaches for their staff to employ in the area of SSR support. A set of shared definitions, principles, and understandings of SSR support ought to provide a foundation on which dialogue and cooperation among multilateral organizations can be strengthened. Cooperation in developing policy and guidance was therefore identified as a key priority in the normative frameworks of several of these organizations (see box 1 in Introduction). This section demonstrates that while there are many similarities in the normative frameworks of these organizations, there is a potential to increase synergies in order to enhance cooperation.

2.1. Policy development

The four organizations under study each have a policy framework on SSR in place (see Table 2 below). The UN, the AU, and the EU all have dedicated policies on SSR; and though the OSCE lacks a sector-wide SSR policy, the organization's component-area policies contribute to a broader policy framework for SSR.[34] Thus, the OSCE can be said to have a *de facto* policy framework on SSR.[35] As outlined in Table 2 below, the UN has developed an extensive policy framework, on the basis of two reports of the UN Secretary-General and a Security Council resolution. The AU has a dedicated policy document for SSR, and the EU has recently updated its policy framework for SSR.

Table 2 Overview of sector-wide SSR policy frameworks

Year	Organization	Milestone
2016	EU	EU Commission and High Representative, "Joint Communication, Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform"
2016	EU	Council conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR)[36]
2014	UN	Security Council resolution 2151 on security sector reform
2013	UN	Second Report of the UN Secretary-General on "Securing states and societies: Strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform"
2013	AU	African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform
2008	UN	First Report of the UN Secretary-General on "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in support of SSR"
2007	UN	Security Council Presidential Statement on "The maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform"

The policy framework of each organization under study differs according to their broader roles. For instance, the EU policy on SSR is outward looking and seeks to define the role the organization should play in providing SSR support mainly outside European borders. By contrast, the AU policy is aimed primarily at providing a framework for its Member States, while also setting out the approach of the organization to SSR support, and its endorsement by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government provides it strong normative legitimacy. The UN and the OSCE possess policy documents aimed at outlining both the approach of these organizations to SSR support and the normative commitments for their Member/participating States.[37] The approach of the UN to SSR support is mainly spelled out in the UN Secretary-General Reports for SSR, for example, while the UN Security Council resolution on SSR sets out norms that are applicable to the organization and to Member States. In the case of the OSCE, the normative commitments set out for instance in the Code of Conduct for Politico-Military Aspects of Security are intended for participating States, while the Guidelines for SSG/R or the OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities from 2012 (PC Decision No. 1049) are meant for the organization's staff.

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34   For instance, see OSCE, "Border Security and Management Concept: Framework for Co-operation by the OSCE Participating States," MC.DOC/2/05, December 6, 2005; or the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

35   This *de facto* policy is expressed in the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R and the Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R, which draw on the various normative commitments of the organization and envision the approach of the organization in this area. As such, this section on policy draws on these Guidelines to illustrate the organization's *de facto* normative framework for SSR, while acknowledging that these Guidelines are not approved by participating States and not as robust as the SSR policies of the other three organizations.

36   The "EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR," is composed of the EU Commission and High Representative Joint Communication "Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform" (5 July 2016) and the Council Conclusions on the EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR (14 November 2016). These documents replaced the former (pre-Lisbon Treaty) framework, derived from "EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform," 12566/4/05 REV 4, October 13, 2005; and "A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform," Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2006) 253 final, May 24, 2006.

37   For the UN, this refers to UNSC resolution 2151. For the OSCE, these normative commitments are often reflected in component-specific policies or in the broader Code of Conduct on Politico Military Aspects of Security.

Besides organization-wide policies on sector-wide SSR support, the UN and the OSCE have also developed **component-specific policies** that further develop the SSR approach of these organizations. While component-specific policies are not the main focus of this study, it is important to acknowledge these documents as part of a comprehensive normative framework in the area of SSR.[38] Table 3, below, includes documents meant to be implemented at the organization level (e.g. not applicable to only one entity) and focused on components of the security sector.

Table 3 Organization-wide component-specific policies

Year	Organization	Component-specific policy
2017	UN	UNSC resolution 2382 (2017) on UN policing (S/RES/2382)
2014	UN	UNSC resolution 2185 (2014) on UN policing (S/RES/2185)
2012	OSCE	OSCE Strategic Framework for Police Related Activities (PC Decision No. 1049)
2011	UN	United Nations police: Report of the Secretary-General (A/66/615)
2006	OSCE	Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies
2005	OSCE	Border Security and Management Concept

As Table 3 illustrates, there are only a **limited number of organization-wide policies on dedicated components of the security sector**. Moreover, these have been developed only by the UN and the OSCE and are mostly focused on police and border security. It should be noted that a number of **other policy documents directly related to SSR do exist**, but they are not sector-wide nor component-specific. For example, the UN, the OSCE, and the AU have all developed policies on **gender** that seek to promote the equal participation of women in peace and security matters, including SSR.[39] The UN also has a human rights due diligence policy which outlines the risk assessment that the UN must conduct before providing support to non-UN security forces to ensure respect for human rights.[40] The AU has a dedicated Convention on the prevention of terrorism, which among other things calls for effective cooperation between relevant domestic security services.[41] The EU has developed policies in related areas, such as **transitional justice**, which encourage states to couple institutional reforms with vetting procedures and

codes of conduct, when appropriate and in accordance with international human rights standards.[42] Meanwhile, the EU Joint Communication on capacity-building in support of security and development lays out the principles that frame EU support to security sector capacity-building needs, including national ownership and respect for human rights.[43] The OSCE also has a number of policy documents that outline commitments for participating States in areas such as **organized crime, countering terrorism, and combatting trafficking in human beings**. All of these documents specifically set out roles for SSR support, such as the role of police training and monitoring or legislative and judicial reform as effective counter-terrorism measures.[44] Finally, the OSCE was also a pioneer in developing principles for the democratic control of armed forces, which are reflected in its Code of Conduct for Politico-Military Aspects of Security.[45]

Main conceptual elements of SSR

The UN, the AU, and the EU all use the term security sector reform (SSR) in the **title of their policy agenda**, while the OSCE has chosen the term security sector governance and reform (SSG/R). The term SSG/R was selected by the OSCE in order to emphasize the importance of improving security sector governance, which the organization considers more relevant to the needs of a broader category of its participating States.[46] While the OSCE is the only organization to have embraced a different name for its agenda, the other three organizations have recognized that the term 'reform' may carry negative political connotations.[47] In practice, the Member States of these organizations often prefer to use other terms (e.g. 'security sector transformation' or 'security sector management') in their own national documents. Moreover, the point has been raised that in many fragile and post-conflict environments, the term 'reform' may be inadequate; in some contexts, the only activities that can take place involve support to training or the facilitation of political dialogue on the future structure of the security sector.[48]

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38   A host of other component-specific policies are not listed here as they are not considered organization-wide; however, they also set out the roles of specific entities. For instance, see the DPKO Policy on Justice Support in UN Peace Operations, 2016; or the DPKO Policy on Defence Sector Reform, 2011.

39   See UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security (S/RES/1325); the OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality (2004); and the African Union Gender Policy (2009).

40   See UN Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, A/67/775–S/2013/110, General Assembly – Security Council, March 5, 2013.

41   "OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism," July 1, 1999.

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42   "The EU's Policy Framework on support to transitional justice," endorsed by the Council on November 16, 2015. See Council conclusions in document 13576/15. The UN also has a policy related to transitional justice: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the UN Secretary-General (S/2004/616).

43   See "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises," JOIN(2015) 17 final, April 28, 2015, p. 9.

44   See, for instance, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994); OSCE Decision No. 1 on Enhancing the OSCE's Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings (2000); the OSCE Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism (2001); and OSCE Decision No. 5/06 on organized crime (2006).

45   OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, para. 20.

46   Outcome document of the High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace, June 5-6, 2017, Bratislava, A/72/513–S/2017/844.

47   This was raised by interviewees at the UN (New York, September 2016) and the AU (Ababa, November 2016), for instance. The AU's SSR Policy also contains a section on definitions which describes the various terms that can be used to express 'SSR'.

48   Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

No matter the term used, **the conceptual approaches of all four organizations to SSR support are very similar**. Indeed, as defined by the UN and other multilateral organizations, the term SSR is already underpinned by the principle of **good governance**. As such, 'SSR' refers to reform activities undertaken by all countries to improve the governance of the security sector and does not include activities aimed only at strengthening the effectiveness (without the accountability) of the sector.[49]

Table 4 Definitions of SSR in policy frameworks[50]

Actor	Definition of SSR
UN: SSR	"SSR describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of **effective and accountable** security for the **State and its peoples** without discrimination and with full respect for **human rights** and the **rule of law**. [...] SSR underscores that effectiveness, accountability and **democratic governance** are mutually reinforcing elements of security." (UN SG Report 2008)
AU: SSR	"The process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more **effective**, **efficient**, and **responsive** to **democratic control**, and to the **security and justice needs of the people**." (AU SSR Policy, 2013)
EU: SSR	"SSR is the process of transforming a country's security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more **effective and accountable security** in a manner consistent with respect for **human rights, democracy, rule of law and the principles of good governance**. SSR is a **long-term and political process**, as it goes to the heart of power relations in a country," (EU Joint Communication, 2016)
OSCE: SSG/R	Security sector governance (SSG) "implies that the security sector is subject to the same standards of good governance as any other public sector, and that the *security sector is to provide State and human security effectively and accountably, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights.* Activities aimed at improving SSG are defined as "security sector reform," even if not always named as such. Thus, SSG/R concerns all actors involved in security provision, management and oversight, and covers all their roles, responsibilities and actions." (Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R, 2017)

These policy frameworks set out similar understandings of the **objective of security sector reform**. All four organizations recognize that SSR should be aimed at strengthening both the **effectiveness and accountability** of the security sector. Indeed, the UN notes that SSR is understood to support the "enhancement of effective and accountable security;"[51] the AU underlines that SSR is intended to make the security sector "more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people;"[52] and the EU shares a similar objective, to "provide individuals and the state with more

effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, rule of law and the principles of good governance."[53] And despite the fact that it is not addressed in a dedicated policy on SSG/R, OSCE participating States have also acknowledged the importance of "an effective and accountable security sector," which is a cardinal principle in the OSCE's Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.[54] Furthermore, each of these frameworks emphasizes that SSR is based on either "democratic governance," "democratic control," or "good governance."

All four organizations also recognize that **SSR is a reform process that must extend beyond the security needs of the state** to address the security needs of the people as well. The UN refers to enhancing security for "the State and its peoples,"[55] and the AU to the "security and justice needs of the people."[56] Likewise, the EU stresses that its engagement in SSR support must aim to "make states more stable and individuals more secure,"[57] citing "human security" as a main objective.[58] The OSCE has also recognized the importance that security sectors provide both "State and human security."[59]

The organizations under study share a **similar understanding of the institutional scope of SSR** as well. As Table 5 shows, each has included core security institutions in its definition of the security sector. The UN views defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, border management, and customs institutions as part of the sector. But notably, the AU is the only organization to make a distinction between "primary security institutions" and "specialized intelligence and security institutions." All these organizations also include public oversight and management bodies, such as legislatures, ministries, and civil society organizations, in their definition of the sector, and recognize the role of non-state actors. Yet, while all four organizations acknowledge the key role of customary and informal authorities in the security sector, the AU places the most emphasis on this issue in its policy, observing that SSR processes on the African continent may need to engage a broader range of actors than is typical in other contexts and that, given the important role of customary and traditional security and justice providers on the continent, it is important to engage these actors to ensure their conformity with legal norms, the rule of law, and human rights.[60] All four organizations also make specific reference to the inclusion of non-state security actors, such as private security services.

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49   For example, the UN states that SSR "has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law." See Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, para. 17.

50   The OSCE definition is in italics because it is not drawn from formal SSG/R policy, but rather from a Briefing Note for Senior Managers (internal document) on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R (2017), which is part of the OSCE's SSR guidance framework but which has not been approved by participating States.

51   Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659–S/2008/39, para. 17.

52   AU Commission, "Policy Framework on SSR," para. 5-6.

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53   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 2.

54   OSCE Ministerial Council, Joint Statement on support to SSG/R, 2014. The principle of accountability is addressed in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security as well, in Article 25: "*The participating States will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities.*" The OSCE Strategic Police Framework (2012) also refers to police accountability and effective and accountable criminal police justice systems.

55   Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 17.

56   AU Commission, "Policy Framework on SSR," para. 5.

57   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 4.

58   Ibid.

59   OSCE, Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R, 2017, p. 2.

60   AU Commission, "Policy Framework on SSR," para. 16.

Table 5 Comparative overview of institutions comprising the security sector[61]

UN[62]	AU[63]	EU[64]	OSCE[65]
Defence, law enforcement, corrections, border management, and customs institutions	Primary security institutions (e.g. armed forces, police service, border management, customs and immigration authorities, etc.)	Law enforcement institutions (e.g. police, gendarmerie, customs, border guards, etc.) and armed forces	Core security actors (e.g., defence, law enforcement, border management, customs)
Intelligence services	Specialized intelligence and security institutions	Intelligence Services	Intelligence (listed under core security actors)
Management and oversight actors	Public oversight and management bodies	Institutions providing political, financial, and judicial oversight (e.g. line ministries, parliamentary committees, court of auditors, the judiciary, etc.)	Management and oversight actors (e.g., ministries, legislative bodies, ombuds institutions, civil society groups)
Elements of the judicial sector	Justice and Rule of Law institutions	Criminal justice system (e.g. penal courts, prosecutor's office, and corrections)	Relevant judicial actors (e.g., courts, prosecution service, corrections service)
Institutions responsible for civil emergencies	Civil emergency units		Civil emergencies bodies (listed under core security actors)
Other non-state actors (e.g. customary or informal authorities and private security services)	Non-state security bodies	Non-state security actors (customary authorities, traditional courts, guerrillas, liberation armies, private military and security companies)	Non-state actors (e.g. private security services)
Civil society groups	Civil society[66]	Civil society[67]	Civil society groups (listed under management and oversight actors)

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61   The AU, the EU, and the OSCE have all assigned security sector actors to specific categories in their definitions, while the UN has simply listed security sector actors in its policy document.

62   Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 14.

63   AU Commission, "Policy Framework on SSR," para. 4.

64   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 2. The definitions are noted to be in line with the SSR guidelines of the OECD DAC. See OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008).

65   OSCE, Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R.

66   While the AU does not explicitly include civil society within its definition of the security sector, its Policy Framework contains a dedicated section on the role of civil society in SSR.

67   While civil society is not explicitly mentioned in the definition of the security system provided in the EU SSR framework, it is part of the definition of the OECD DAC to which the EU has aligned. Moreover, it is mentioned several times in the EU SSR framework, emphasizing the role of civil society in promoting accountability in the security sector.

While all the organizations under study have a similar understanding of the actors that comprise the security sector, one main difference among them lies in which judicial institutions are considered a part of the sector. While the AU and the OSCE both include justice institutions, the UN only includes "elements of the judicial sector which are responsible for the adjudication of criminal conduct and misuse of force." Similarly, the EU does not include all justice institutions as it specifically refers to the criminal justice system. Still, the EU Joint Communication on SSR specifies that the EU recognizes the interdependence of security and justice, and as such that the "principles it sets out can also be applied to justice actors, where their roles and functions have clear implications for the security sector."[68] The EU is also the only organization that does not explicitly include services responsible for civil emergencies within its definition of the security sector.

Norms and principles of SSR support

The policy frameworks of these organizations also include **a number of similar norms and principles to guide their approaches to SSR support**.[69] While each organization may base its work on additional principles, for comparative purposes this analysis draws only on those set out in the sections of their policy frameworks dedicated to principles for support. The cardinal principle for SSR – national ownership – is specifically listed in the policy frameworks of all four organizations.[70] They all also recognize the principle of gender-sensitive and human rights-based SSR. Further, all four promote understanding of the context-specificity of SSR efforts, which should be tailored to the particular needs of each national context. In addition, the UN, the AU, and the EU emphasize the importance of coordination and/or cooperation in the provision of SSR assistance; and while the OSCE does not list it as a principle per se, it also recognizes coordination as an important element of its support to SSG/R.[71] The necessity that SSR is integrated from the outset of peace processes, and is included in early recovery and development, is highlighted by both the UN and the AU. Lastly, the UN and the EU both include regular monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes as a principle of SSR support. The AU also lists additional principles that are relevant to its own context, meant to promote African solidarity and partnerships and to support regional integration through work with regional mechanisms.

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68   EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 4.

69   The UN, the AU, and the EU set out such principles in dedicated sections of their policies. The OSCE reflects such principles in its Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R. Given the lack of OSCE-wide SSG/R policy, these Guidelines (including the Senior Managers Note) have been used to reflect the *de facto* policy of the OSCE on SSG/R.

70   While not specifically mentioned in OSCE policy, it should be noted that national ownership figures prominently in all four guidelines on SSG/R that have been developed by the OSCE, as well as in the Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R.

71   OSCE, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Guidelines for OSCE Staff," p. 65.

Table 6 Principles for SSR support[72]

Principle	UN[73]	AU[74]	EU[75]	OSCE[76]
National ownership	X	X	X	X
Support to democratic governance	X	X	X	X[77]
Gender sensitivity	X	X	X	X
Human rights-based approaches	X	X	X	X
Context specificity	X	X	X	X
Coordination of SSR assistance	X	X	X	
Integration of SSR from the outset of a peace process	X	X		
Regular M&E	X		X	
SSR based on clearly-defined strategy	X			
African solidarity and African partnerships/ regional integration		X		
Integration of non-state/informal and customary security providers and traditional justice actors		X	X	
Comprehensive/Holistic/Inclusive approach			X	X
Human security			X	
Sustainability			X	

In addition to the principles laid out here, some of these organizations' policies outline a general set of norms that Member States have committed to uphold. In the area of SSR, the OSCE has adopted the broadest range of norms applicable to its participating States; for instance, policies that consider democratic and civilian control and accountability of the security sector indispensable (e.g. the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994, or the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE of 1991). OSCE participating States have also

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72   If principles are not marked, it does not mean that organizations do not embrace them, but simply that they are not listed under a dedicated section on principles in their policy frameworks. For instance, the UN clearly embraces the holistic nature of SSR, but this is not specifically mentioned under principles in its framework.

73   Based on the Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 45.

74   Based on the AU Commission, "Policy Framework on SSR," para. 16.

75   Based on the Council Conclusions on the EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR, November 14, 2016.

76   OSCE, Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R.

77   While not listed as a key principle in the OSCE Briefing Note for Senior Managers, this is a cardinal principle of the OSCE and is reflected in the OSCE Code of Conduct for Political-Military Aspects of Security.

recognized that national security sectors should be guided by good governance practices (e.g. Charter for European Security, 1999), transparency (Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security), the rule of law (e.g. MC Decision No. 7/08 on Further Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Area, 2008), and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and humanitarian law (e.g. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, or the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990). These commitments apply to EU Member States as well, as they are simultaneously participating States of the OSCE. And by signing on to the EU Council Conclusions on the EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR (2016), though these are mainly intended to guide EU support outside its region, Member States have acknowledged that SSR should be tailored through inclusive political and policy dialogue and based on clear and sustained national ownership.

Box 2 Examples of norms and commitments for Member States in the area of SSR

- National ownership (AU, UN, EU)
- Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (OSCE, UN, EU)
- Inclusivity (UN, EU)
- Good governance (OSCE, AU, EU)
- Rule of Law (OSCE, UN, EU)

States have also committed to upholding certain norms and standards through the adoption of UN resolutions, including UNSC resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR, in which States recognized the centrality of national ownership, the need to ensure that SSR is informed by all segments of society, the need to contribute to the rule of law while addressing impunity for human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and the need to ensure women's equal and effective participation in SSR processes. Meanwhile, due to the particular approach taken by the AU SSR policy (i.e. the policy is addressed mainly to its Member States and not directly to the organization itself), all its principles are applicable to both the AU and its Member States. In other words, State members of the AU have also committed to uphold national ownership, the need for context-specific processes, good governance, and gender mainstreaming (*see previous section*).

Review of SSR policy implementation and lessons learning

The four organizations under study have made limited efforts to review the implementation of their SSR policies. This would be difficult for the OSCE, which does not have a formal SSR policy, and given that the EU has only recently adopted a new policy (in 2016) it is too early to assess its impact on the ground.[78] However, the EU has committed to doing so as part of its broader evaluation process of SSR support.

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78   The EU SSR policy states that "*the implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated.*" In addition, it states that, "*The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years' time.*" See EU, Joint Communication, JOIN (2016) 31 final, p. 16.

Starting in 2018, the EU will review its overall engagement in the security sector in at least one country every year, to verify the application of the EU SSR policy and its effectiveness. However, the AU, which adopted its SSR policy framework in 2013, and the UN, which has the first policy document on SSR dating back to 2008, have not yet engaged in such a review. A lack of periodic updates to SSR policies based on practical experiences represents a missed opportunity to address implementation challenges and to learn where potential comparative advantages may lie in each organization. This also represents a missed opportunity to examine the extent to which cooperation is taking place in line with the needs identified in the relevant policy frameworks (see Table 1 in the Introduction).

Cooperation in the area of policy frameworks

The SSR policy frameworks of these multilateral organizations identify the need to develop and share policy and guidance as well as to exchange experience and best practice. Yet, this kind of cooperation has been ad hoc. With the exception of the AU – for which the UN and the EU supported the development of an SSR policy framework under the auspices of the project, "Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform (SSR): A Joint United Nations/ European Union Support Action" – these organizations have not been collaboratively involved in developing **policy frameworks**. Still, despite the fact that the organizations under study have barely cooperated in this area, in practice, their understandings of SSR and its underlying principles are very similar, and as such, the foundation for applying joint approaches at the implementation stage is already in place.

At the same time, the policies of these organizations highlight that all are also engaged in similar areas, suggesting that there is no clarity on their comparative advantages. For instance, all four envision a strong role in sector-wide support to SSR, with the UN, the EU, and the OSCE explicitly outlining the type of support they are to provide to sector-wide reforms. Both the UN and the EU note that their role includes supporting the development of national strategies, national security management, and national coordination mechanisms. The EU and the OSCE also provide specific detail on the type of support to be provided to oversight mechanisms. For the EU, this includes support to independent complaints and civilian oversight mechanisms, ombuds institutions, anti-corruption commissions, independent police complaints commissions, and civil society; and for the OSCE, to ombuds institutions, commissions for combating discrimination, and police disciplinary mechanisms.

In summary, the policy frameworks of these multilateral organizations unambiguously set out the need for cooperation, but they do not provide useful information on how to take this forward. They also do not examine the potential comparative advantages that could inform a division of labour.

2.2. Guidance development

A common practice among multilateral organizations is the development of guidance to complement the broad principles and standards outlined in policy frameworks and to provide a link between policy and

operational implementation. This section examines the extent to which the organizations under study have developed sector-wide SSR guidance, the degree to which this guidance is being effectively implemented, and whether there is potential to build on synergies across guidance development initiatives.

Guidance on a sector-wide approach to SSR

The UN, the AU, and the OSCE have all developed organization-wide guidance pertaining to sector-wide areas of SSR, while the EU is about to undertake a similar process.[79] The OSCE is the only organization that has developed relevant guidance without having a dedicated policy framework in place.[80] Table 7 provides an overview of **sector-wide guidance** developed through consultative processes and applicable to each organization as a whole. It is important to note that each of these organizations possesses a broader array of SSR-related guidance that is not reflected in this overview because it was developed by, or only applies to, specific institutions or entities.[81]

Table 7 Comparative overview of SSR guidance

Organization & Lead Entity	Type	Theme	Year
UN (CASA)	ISACS	Small arms and SSR	Forthcoming
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	Integration of ex-combatants into the security sector	Forthcoming
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	SSR & transnational organized crime	2016
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	UN approach to SSR	2012
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	National security policy and strategy making	2012
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	Peace processes & SSR	2012
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	National ownership of SSR	2012
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	Gender-responsive SSR	2012

79   All these organizations have relied on external expertise in the development of their guidance. The UN and the OSCE, for instance, both requested support from DCAF's Policy and Research Division. Likewise, the AU has worked with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) on its guidance development, as well as with DCAF. There is therefore a growing network of civil society actors and experts who are involved across various processes and who can contribute to enhanced coherence between them.

80   OSCE guidance does not have a specific status, which means it was easier to develop as it did not have to be approved by all 57 participating States. There have been attempts (e.g. during the Spanish Chairmanship in 2007) to codify policy, but as yet, no consensus. For more information, see Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "The Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform," December 20, 2013, p. 21.

81   For example, the European Commission Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the Western Balkans, 2007, and the UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit, 2006.

Organization & Lead Entity	Type	Theme	Year
UN (IASSRTF)	ITGN	Democratic governance of the security sector	2012
UN (IAWG-DDR)	IDDRS	DDR and SSR	2009
AU (Commission/PSD)	Handbook	SSR good practice in Africa	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	Conducting monitoring and evaluation of SSR	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	Harmonization of national security legislation	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	Developing national codes of conduct for African security institutions	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	SSR Assessments	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	Gender & SSR	2018
AU (Commission/PSD)	Operational Guidance Note	Conducting training on SSR	2018
EU	Guidelines	Monitoring and evaluation	Forthcoming
EU	Methodology	Risk management methodology	Forthcoming
EU	Guidance	Security sector analysis	Forthcoming
OSCE (SSG/R Focal Points Network)	Internal Guidelines	Cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R	2016
OSCE (SSG/R Focal Points Network)	Internal Guidelines	Impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R	2016
OSCE (SSG/R Focal Points Network)	Internal Guidelines	Needs assessments for SSG/R	2016
OSCE (SSG/R Focal Points Network)	Internal Guidelines	Strengthening regional approaches to SSG/R	2016
OSCE	Internal Guidelines	Senior management briefing note	2017

In 2009, the UN was the first organization to engage in guidance development in the area of SSR. It currently has a set of seven Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) on SSR. UN guidance covers a range of topics related to its **sector-wide approach to SSR**, including national security policymaking, gender-responsive SSR, and integrating SSR into peace processes. UN inter-agency working groups have also taken the lead, in cooperation with the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, in developing system-wide guidance that addresses the links between their specialty areas and SSR. For instance, the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR) developed a module on DDR and SSR for the UN Integrated

DDR Standards; and the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) developed series 2.20 on small arms and light weapons control in the context of SSR for the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), as well as the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). In 2013, the AU followed suit with its own guidance development process to develop seven operational guidelines. The AU guidelines cover topics such as harmonizing national security legislation, developing national codes of conduct for security institutions, and conducting training on SSR. In 2014, the OSCE began its own guidance development process, resulting in a set of four internal guidelines that were launched in April 2016 and provide advice on how to support a cross-dimensional approach to SSR, how to take an impact-oriented approach to SSR support, as well as on needs assessments and regional cooperation. The EU has not yet developed guidance, but is planning to do so, related to M&E, risk assessments, and analysis of the security sector, in line with its new policy on SSR.

One commonality across these efforts is that, while guidance processes have had an operational ambition, in practice they have often been heavily normative. This was due in many cases to a lack of extensive normative guidance at the policy level, which left some organizations needing to collectively define their organizational approaches through guidance development. The outcome is guidance that is hybrid in nature, and some guidance that is more operational than others (e.g. UN guidance on national security policies or OSCE guidance on conducting needs assessments, both of which are framed in 'how to' language).

Review of guidance implementation and lessons learning

The OSCE is the only organization that has formally engaged in review of the implementation of its guidance. The EU has not yet finalized the development of its first set of guidance, while the AU only submitted its guidance for publication in 2018. To date, the UN has not engaged in a **formal review process** to identify whether the guidance it released in 2012 is being used, and if not, what stands in the way of its implementation. This is a missed opportunity to ensure that guidance is being implemented and that staff have at their disposal the necessary tools to provide effective support.

Some lessons on implementing guidance can be drawn from the **OSCE's formal review of its guidance implementation**, which identified a weak commitment on the part of senior management to SSG/R as a main challenge. In response, the OSCE developed a Senior Management Briefing Note that summarizes key messages from the guidelines. Still, staff continue to highlight the challenge they face in ensuring that senior management feel ownership of the SSG/R agenda. Another challenge that emerged from the OSCE review was a lack of awareness among staff of the guidance. For this reason, the OSCE has also developed a train-the-trainers approach to disseminating guidance. Finally, the OSCE review prompted requests that guidance be accompanied by practical examples of SSR from other contexts, and that guidance be developed on how to provide SSG/R support in particularly challenging environments.

While a formal review process has not been undertaken by the **UN**, interviews conducted for this study shed light on some of the challenges faced by the organization in implementing guidance. First, similar to the OSCE, there is often a lack of awareness among staff of existing guidance. This is particularly the case where there is a high turnover of staff who may not have been involved in early guidance development. Moreover, with no dedicated training on guidance, there have been few opportunities to sensitize staff in the field on these tools, with the exception of an ad hoc training for UN staff in Cote d'Ivoire in 2014. Staff at headquarters have also not received training on guidance.

In all three of these organizations (AU, OSCE, UN), staff who were aware of existing guidance issued strong calls for the development of more 'how-to' operational guidance and/or guidance that highlights lessons learned from comparative national experiences. In general, the guidance that has been developed has reflected the need of these organizations to clarify their approach to SSR for internal purposes. While most has been situated at the normative level, what is still missing is operational guidance that provides concrete steps for support and practical examples of how challenges have been tackled in different contexts. Several staff members expressed in interviews that the need now is to move towards developing guidance that offers examples of and comparative lessons from various national experiences that can be presented to national counterparts. It is to be expected that, having developed their normative guidance, these organizations will now focus more on lessons learning.

Each of these organizations are receiving appeals from staff in the field to further support them, either through the development of guidance and/or the identification of lessons. Some of the common **guidance needs** identified through interviews fall under the following themes: strengthening links between SSR and human rights, strengthening links between SSR and transitional justice, strengthening links between SSR and conflict related sexual violence, the sequencing of SSR support in challenging environments, the integration of armed groups into the security sector (including linkages with DDR), supporting SSR at the local level (e.g. setting up local security committees), supporting the political nature of SSR, and establishing international and/or national coordination mechanisms for SSR. There were also more general appeals for examples of how some of these issues have been addressed in different contexts, in order to provide options to national counterparts to select approaches most suited to their needs.

Cooperation in the area of guidance development

All the organizations under study have acknowledged in their policy frameworks (see Box 1 in the Introduction) the need to share guidance and exchange lessons learned. These organizations have often developed or are in the process of developing guidance in similar areas (e.g. gender, needs assessments, M&E), which suggests that they are facing similar challenges on the ground and could benefit from the further exchange of experiences and lessons. Increasing synergies among guidance development processes could be a good basis upon which to develop cooperation mechanisms that would subsequently ensure complementarity of efforts on the ground.

While there has been ongoing cooperation in some guidance development processes, this is not common. Still, the UN provided notable support to the AU leading up to the adoption of its policy framework as part of the joint UN-EU-AU capacity-building programme, which has also provided the vehicle for the development of AU SSR guidance. Cooperation has also occurred to a certain extent between the UN and the OSCE in the context of the OSCE guidance development process, mainly consisting of sharing lessons from the process of guidance development at a high-level joint UN-OSCE workshop in July 2014. Another exception is the development of the Gender and SSR toolkit, in 2008, which resulted from cooperation among ODHIR, the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW), and DCAF. The toolkit is currently being updated by DCAF, ODHIR, and UN women.

It should be noted that the involvement of DCAF in supporting both the UN and the OSCE in their guidance development processes has contributed to some common principles being mainstreamed across both organizations. Yet, what is lacking is clear agreement on the development of minimum standards, common terminology, etc. In particular, these organizations have not yet shared lessons from experiences and have not identified common areas for potential guidance development. Given that there has not been a forum for exchanging lessons on practical challenges to SSR support, which could feed substantive input into guidance development processes, an important entry point would be to invite input from other organizations during review processes, to increase synergies across guidance development and implementation.

To strengthen synergies among the guidance processes of the organizations under study, it is particularly important to aim for complementarity in the methodology and application of those guidance tools which may form a basis for cooperation. This is the case, for instance, with guidance on assessments and M&E, which the policy frameworks of these organizations have directed be conducted jointly. But, as yet, no efforts have been made to identify common denominators in the individual assessment or M&E methodologies of these organizations in order to develop minimum standards for cooperation.

2.3. Key findings

The following are key findings regarding the policy and guidance frameworks of the multilateral organizations examined in this research:

▶ **The policy frameworks of these organizations provide a valuable foundation for cooperation on the basis of shared norms and principles.** The four organizations under study share a similar understanding of SSR, grounded in the principles of democratic governance, human rights, and rule of law. Their definitions of the security sector are also very similar. They appear to converge around a rather broad understanding that incorporates both military and non-military security forces; both security (and justice) providing institutions and management and oversight bodies; and both State

institutions and, to some extent, non-state actors. A few relatively minor differences exist, such as the use of the term 'security sector governance and reform' instead of 'security sector reform' by the OSCE, and the fact that the UN and the EU include only certain elements of the judicial sector in their definition of the security sector.

▶ **Limited efforts have been made to understand whether policies are being adhered to and whether principles are reflected in practice.** No systematic studies of the organization-wide application of policy in the provision of support have been undertaken by these organizations, and only the EU has committed to increase its efforts in this regard.[82] Conversely, the UN and the AU have not engaged in reviews of the implementation of their policies in order to clarify the extent to which those policies are being translated on the ground. Reviewing policy implementation and updating policies every few years, to compare theory to practice, would contribute to learning among these organizations and to a better understanding of where the potential comparative advantages of each organization exist in practice.

▶ **There is recognition of a need for more empirically-based and context-specific guidance.** While the organizations under study have generally focused to date on supporting normative guidance that bridges policy and practice, there were strong calls in interviews for the development of more operational guidance based on comparative examples of different approaches that can be presented to national counterparts. Some of the recurring themes mentioned in relation to future guidance development needs include: addressing human rights in the security sector, linking SSR to transitional justice, and supporting SSR at the local level (e.g. through local security committees).

▶ **There is a lack of awareness among staff of these multilateral organizations of the relevant guidance that exists or is being developed by other organizations.** Interviews conducted for this study highlighted that staff are not aware of, and consequently are not using, guidance from other organizations. While this stems partly from the different nature of each organization and the contexts in which they operate, it nonetheless represents a missed opportunity for staff to access the knowledge and good practice of other organizations. It would be useful to gather all SSR-related guidance of multilateral organizations on a common platform.

▶ **While all these organizations are in the process of guidance development, interactions between them on this issue are limited.** With the exception of the AU, where guidance has been developed through a partnership agreement with the EU and the UN as part of a broader capacity-building project, most guidance development initiatives are siloed. This means that chances are missed to draw on the experience of other organizations in tackling certain issues, as well as to build a common understanding of the challenges to and opportunities for SSR support. While joint guidance

development may be challenging, at a minimum, it would be useful to involve other organizations in a review of draft guidance, carried out in the early stages of development.

▶ **The existence of multiple guidance initiatives raises the risk of lost opportunities to maximize limited resources and enhance interoperability.** Guidance on technical issues, which may be used as a basis for cooperation among these organizations (e.g. assessments, M&E), would benefit from the development of further synergies. While it may be necessary for each organization to independently develop its own guidance on these issues, some common standards could be developed and mainstreamed into the relevant SSR guidance of each organization, to ensure enhanced interoperability when engaging in joint endeavours.

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82   The EU SSR policy states that "*the implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated.*" In addition, it states that "*The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years' time.*" (See EU, Joint Communication, JOIN(2016) 31 final, p. 16).

Institutional Capacities

3

Understanding what SSR expertise exists, and where, are important aspects of predictability. This section reviews the institutional capacities of the multilateral organizations under study, at the headquarters and field levels, to shed light on their ability to implement the SSR approaches outlined in their policies. It reveals that the capacities of these four organizations in the area of SSR are generally limited and are insufficient to provide all the expertise required for the delivery of SSR support, which points to the need for innovative solutions and partnerships.

3.1. Institutional structures

For the purpose of this report, **SSR-related institutional structures are defined as sections, units, or teams that engage in SSR support** (both sector-wide and component-specific). The SSR-related institutional structures of the organizations under study vary significantly across and within organizations, as well as between headquarters and the field. At headquarters, institutional structures are often engaged in policy development but may also be expected to provide strategic and policy guidance along with technical backstopping support to SSR teams on the ground. In the field, institutional structures differ considerably according to needs on the ground; in other words, there are no templates, despite some specificities that pertain to each organization. This section provides an overview of dedicated SSR-related structures at the headquarters and field levels and aims to identify common trends in the size of these structures and their focus.

SSR-related structures at headquarters

All four organizations have multiple **entities engaged in SSR support**. In the case of the UN, fourteen agencies, funds, and programmes provide SSR support, ranging from some that are very active in this area to some that play a limited role. All fourteen are members of the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF).[83] Similarly, the EU has several services that may be engaged in SSR support, from different sections within EEAS to relevant directorates of the Commission. The OSCE also has several entities

engaged in SSR support, including the Secretariat (e.g. CPC, gender unit), its institutions (e.g. ODIHR, HCNM), and the Parliamentary Assembly. The AU is mainly engaged in SSR through the AU Commission, in particular through its Peace and Security Department and its Political Affairs Department. Still, while these entities may engage in SSR support, they are not necessarily *dedicated* SSR-related structures; and in many cases, SSR support is provided through regional desk officers who have broader portfolios than SSR or through thematic units in related areas (e.g. rule of law, gender, human rights).

Table 8 Overview of key SSR-related entities and mechanisms at HQ level

	System-wide focal point	Entities which may engage in SSR Support	Institutional coordination mechanisms
UN	SSR Unit, DPKO	DPA, DPKO, OHCHR, PBSO, UNDP, UN Women, UNODC, UNODA, UNOPS, OSAA, OSRSG-SVC,[84] UNICEF, UNITAR, and UNPF	UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (co-chaired by UNDP and DPKO) and Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections
AU	SSR Team, DSD	Peace and Security Department (including DSD, CMPCRD, and PSOD) and Political Affairs Department	Inter-Departmental Task Force on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (broader than SSR)
EU	PRISM/EEAS, DG NEAR, DG DEVCO	EEAS (PRISM, CMPD, CPCC, EUMS), FPI, and EU Commission (DG NEAR and DG DEVCO)	EU inter-service SSR task force
OSCE	Associate SSG/R Project Officer, CPC, Secretariat	Secretariat, institutions (e.g. ODIHR), and Parliamentary Assembly	OSCE SSG/R focal points network

In order to promote coherence and cooperation among the entities engaged in SSR support, all four organizations have developed **cross-institutional mechanisms**. The UN, for example, established the IASSRTF, which seeks to promote a common and coordinated approach to SSR support from a sector-wide perspective. The IASSRTF may participate in joint planning, implementation, and evaluation, but has thus far been engaged primarily in policy and guidance development. The UN also established the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections – comprising UNDP, DPKO, UN Women, OHCHR, and UNODC – which provides joint operational support to component-specific areas of police, justice, and corrections systems. Similarly, the UN Team of Experts (TOE) on Rule of Law/Sexual Violence in Conflict was established in 2009 and was embedded in the Office of the SRSG-SVC.[85] The TOE may support

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83 The Task Force includes representatives from the DPA, DPKO, OHCHR, PBSO, UNDP, UN Women, UNODC, UNODA, UNOPS, OSAA, OSRSG-SVC, UNICEF, UNITAR, and UNPF.

84 See also UN Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict.

85 The TOE draws from existing DPKO, OHCHR, and UNDP human resources to provide assistance to national governments to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence, with a focus on combating impunity for these crimes.

Table 9 Overview of SSR-related structures per actor at HQ level[86]

Multilateral Organization / SSR-related areas	SSR	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Other
UN	SSR Unit/DPKO (approx. 7 staff)	*OMA/DPKO* *SSRU/DPKO*	Global Focal Point (PD/DPKO and UNDP)	Global Focal Point (JCS/DPKO and UNDP)		*UNODC* *UNDP (in border protection policy)*	UNDP	Global Focal Point (JCS/DPKO and UNDP)	RoL, justice, security and human rights team, UNDP (which falls under the remit of the Global Focal Point)
AU	SSR team, Defense and Security Division (3 staff)					*Border Programme*			CMPCRD Political Affairs Department
EU	SSR team/PRISM/DSG of CSDP (3 staff) Centre of Thematic Expertise (CoTE) on Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform, DG NEAR (3 staff) Global Threats and Security Sector Reform Section, DG DEVCO B5 (2 SSR staff)	*EEAS (e.g. EUMS, CMPD, MPCC)* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	*EEAS (e.g. CMPD CPCC)* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *EUROPOL[87]* *FPI*	DG NEAR DG DEVCO FPI		*EEAS (e.g. CMPD, EUMS CPCC)* *FRONTEX[88]* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	*DG ECHO[89]* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	DG DEVCO (e.g. Global Threats and Security Sector Reform Section) DG NEAR *EUROJUST[90]* *EEAS (e.g. CMPD CPCC)*	
OSCE	SSR Assistant Project Officer (1 staff)	*CPC*	SPMU/TNT	ODIHR		Border team/TNT		ODIHR	

efforts to ensure that SSR initiatives are holistic and fully consider the need to address conflict-related sexual violence.[91] Though the AU does not have a mechanism specifically dedicated to SSR, the broad coordination mechanism of the Inter-Departmental Task Force on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, which considers issues relating to the six pillars of the 2006 PCRD Policy, includes SSR-related matters. This Task Force brings together not only relevant AU Departments, but also liaison offices of RECs and RMs. The EU has recently established an informal inter-service SSR task force of representatives from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services, to promote the application of the EU SSR policy, including through the development of methodological documents and by providing advice and support to EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services, and CSDP missions. Finally, the OSCE has established a network of SSG/R focal points, including representatives from the Secretariat,

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86   The entities in italics reflect those that may be linked to SSR in name, but for which there is no dedicated capacity in place, often because their focus is not on providing support to reform processes under the category examined or because they rely primarily on external consultants to provide support in this area. (e.g. DPKO's Office of Military Affairs or the EU's MPCC is not engaged in the provision of defence sector reform support but deals primarily with the provision of military advice and planning to field operations). A version of this table with detailed footnotes is available in the Annex.

87   EUROPOL supports Member States in their fight against serious and organised crime, however it is not dedicated to supporting reforms of law enforcement agencies.

88   While FRONTEX is the EU agency focused on border management, its main objective is not to support the reform of national border institutions but rather to support search and rescue operations and to fight organized cross-border crime.

89   DG ECHO supports civil emergencies actors with an exclusive humanitarian objective and hence does not take an SSR approach to support.

90   EUROJUST works to improve the effectiveness of prosecutors and other competent authorities in dealing with cross-border crime but does not focus on SSR-related processes.

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91   See for instance, UNDP, DPKO, OHCHR and OSRSG-SVC, *2013 Annual Report of the United Nations Team of Experts on the Rule of Law/ Sexual Violence in Conflict*, 2013.

its institutions, the Parliamentary Assembly, and field operations. The network does not engage in joint programming, but is involved in sharing good practice and contributing to guidance development, and some focal points have been trained to provide training to their colleagues in the area of SSG/R.

Each of these multilateral organizations has at least one entity at headquarters that has emerged as a **focal point for development of the SSR policy agenda** within the organization.[92] At the UN, for instance, DPKO hosts the SSR Unit, led by a Principal SSR Officer (D1) and composed of six professional staff, which serves as the focal point and technical resource capacity on SSR for the UN system and hosts the Secretariat of the IASSRTF (which it co-chairs with UNDP). In the case of the EU, the EEAS hosts a small three-person SSR team within the Prevention of conflict, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilization and Mediation (PRISM) Division. The team is intended to have an organization-wide policy mandate and is jointly responsible with EU Commission Services (notably from DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, and FPI) for providing guidance to field colleagues. The AU also has a three-person SSR team responsible for guidance development, backstopping support, and deployment into the field as needed to supplement capacity. The OSCE system-wide focal point is located within the Secretariat, and consists of only one staff member, who is responsible for coordinating the larger focal points network and supporting outreach and guidance development efforts. Capacities in these sector-wide structures are therefore quite small, ranging from one staff member (OSCE) to a maximum of seven staff members (UN).

These multilateral organizations also have structures dedicated to component-specific elements of SSR support (e.g. police, justice). Their **component-specific capacities** vary significantly and do not cover the whole range of SSR support identified in their policy frameworks, with most component-specific structures focused on law enforcement, corrections, or justice. In some cases, several structures may exist within the same organization to address a single component area. For instance, in the area of judicial reform, both DPKO's Justice and Corrections section and UNDP's rule of law unit may be engaged under the auspices of the Global Focal Point. The OSCE is the only organization to have dedicated capacity at headquarters in the area of border security/customs reform. In questionnaires completed for this study, the UN noted that this is a potential gap in its support capacities, and UNPOL acknowledged border management and customs as areas of development.[93]

While many structures appear by name to be associated with the security sector (e.g. UN Office of Military Affairs, the EU Judicial Cooperation Unit, and the AU Border Programme), they are **not all focused on supporting national reform processes.** For example, while the UN and the EU both have capacities dedicated to military affairs, they generally do not engage specifically in the area of defence sector reform but rather provide military advice, planning, and equipment to field missions.[94]

In sum, while SSR structures with a sector-wide focus exist across all four organizations, they have very limited capacities. This represents a challenge because a strong body of evidence from the field is vital, and headquarters play an important role in ensuring this is collected and disseminated. When it comes to component-specific structures, these organizations often have capacities in the area of law enforcement and justice, but less often have dedicated institutional structures meant to support border management reform, defence sector reform, or civil emergencies reform. The lack of institutional structures in these areas affects the expertise available (see section 3.2); and given the role of headquarters structures to maintain rosters and deploy experts, it should be noted that the absence of institutional structures responsible for the provision of backstopping support in thematic areas results in a diminished ability to identify appropriate experts. As such, **gaps exist** in the ability of headquarters to perform an advisory role in many areas.

SSR-related structures at the field level

There is a clear distinction to be made between structures at the field level working under a mandate of the Security Council or related body (i.e. field operations), and those working on the basis of national requests (e.g. field presences such as UN country teams). A key difference relates to the political leverage that can be applied by organizations, which depends on whether they are engaged in field operations or are operating in non-mission contexts for which the support provided may be limited by the level of national political commitment and financial resources. EU operations are an exception, because all are premised on national requests (even if sometimes endorsed by a UNSC resolution).

The organizations under study have developed different modalities for implementing **field presences that operate on the basis of national requests.** **UN** Country Teams (UNCT) are positioned across the world, encompassing all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery, and transition in programme countries. The **EU** has Delegations and Special Representatives, which are integrated by staff of the EEAS and the European Commission and may engage in SSR support by providing political guidance and expertise to a particular country or CSDP mission. In fact, unlike the UN, most SSR support provided by the EU is channelled through its delegations and not through its civilian and military field missions.[95] EU delegations sometimes include a Security and Development Attaché in charge of managing SSR tasks.[96] In the cases of the **AU** and the **OSCE**, their field presences (e.g. AU Liaison Offices and OSCE Project Co-ordinators) must generally be authorized by their main governing structures – the Peace and Security Council for the AU and the Permanent Council for the OSCE – and thus, are treated in this study as field operations. Both of these organizations may also provide support to the field through headquarters structures. For instance, while OSCE institutions are based in Vienna, Warsaw, and The Hague, they often deploy experts for short-term assignments at the request of national authorities. However, unlike the UN and the EU they do not have dedicated field presences operating on the basis of national requests.

92   At the UN, while DPKO SSRU has emerged as the focal point for the development of SSR policy and norms at headquarters, in non-conflict settings, the regional bureau of UNDP may act as the focal point for SSR support.

93   United Nations, questionnaire for focal points, May 2015.

94   Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

95   Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

96   Ibid.

In **field operations,** which are mandated by the Security Council or a related body, the **UN** distinguishes between peacekeeping missions, managed by DPKO, and special political missions (SPM), managed by DPA.[97] In principle, UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, but they often play an active role in peacemaking efforts and early peacebuilding activities.[98] These operations also include multidimensional stabilization missions that require not only military but also police and civilian instruments.[99] SPMs are engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-conflict peacebuilding, mainly in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. While both types of field operations are headed by special representatives of the Secretary-General, their SSR capacities are often structured in different ways. And, while special political missions tend to involve very few or no uniformed personnel, uniformed personnel represent an important element of the staff deployed in peacekeeping operations.

In its field operations, the **OSCE** distinguishes between a mission, presence, programme office, centre, and project coordinator. Programme offices are more focused on politico-military aspects of security than other types of field presences, and project coordinators (as in Ukraine or Uzbekistan) generally have less capacity, including in the area of SSR. The **AU** has two main types of field operations: Peace Support Operations and Liaison Offices, the latter of which are more post-conflict oriented (though they are located in both post-conflict and stabilization environments).

As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy, the **EU** has civilian missions (planned by CMPD and managed by CPCC), as well as military missions and military operations (both of which are planned by CMPD and managed by MPCC or by Member States). The mandate of civilian and military missions can be broadly clustered into three categories – advisory, training, and monitoring – whereas military operations have an executive mandate with potentially coercive tasks and generally do not provide SSR support.

Across all four organizations, **field operations generally have dedicated SSR capacities (i.e. staff focused only on SSR support) while field presences, which are often smaller, tend to have staff who are expected to cover diverse portfolios and are thus not dedicated to SSR.** For instance, the UNDP's small Rule of Law teams are also frequently expected to handle SSR support. In some cases, a small SSR team may be placed on the ground as part of a broader Rule of Law Programme (e.g. UNDP Iraq), but this tends to be an exception to the rule. In non-mission settings, the UNDP sometimes contracts 2 or 3 advisors, funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), to provide sector-wide strategic advice on SSR (e.g. Burkina-Faso, The Gambia, and Guinea). Similarly, UN Women may assign 1 or 2 people to work with police on ending violence against women in different field contexts, but does not place such personnel within dedicated SSR structures. In EU field presences, some delegations may feature a "security attaché" charged with, among other things, managing SSR projects. The EU had 15 security attachés, seconded by Member States, in 2016; and recently, some delegations have also had a military attaché (e.g. Lebanon). Thus, EU delegations have limited dedicated capacities for SSR, with most SSR support outsourced and implemented by other partners or provided through external consultants. For this reason, EU staff generally concentrate on identifying needs, planning and designing projects, and providing advice, while dedicated expertise is delivered through external actors, including Member States. The AU and the OSCE are less likely to have field presences where they have no mandate for field operations, though they may be called upon to provide ad hoc support.

Comparison of SSR-related structures in field operations

To enable a **comparative analysis** of institutional structures in the field, and given the greater SSR capacities within **field operations**, only the structures of mandated field operations are examined in detail in this section. The organigrams, staffing structures, or websites of field operations were analysed to provide insights into the type of SSR-related structures that are prevalent. For the UN, this study examined the structures of 10 DPKO- and DPA-led operations that are mandated to provide SSR support.[100] For the AU, detailed information on the structures of field presences (e.g. mission or liaison offices) mandated by the Peace and Security Council was not available, but general trends were identified.[101] For the EU, a total of 14 CSDP missions with an SSR-related mandate were considered.[102] And for the OSCE, 14 field

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97   As stated in a 2014 Report of the UN Secretary-General, "Special political missions continue to rely on the support provided by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, especially in areas in which special political missions are often mandated to work, such as the rule of law, judiciary reform and security sector reform. Special political missions also rely on the expertise of the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding the deployment of military advisers and United Nations guard units." See Report of the Secretary-General, "Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council," A/69/363, October 17, 2014, para. 73.

98   UN DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2010, p. 19.

99   Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen, eds., *By all means necessary: Protecting civilians and preventing mass atrocities in Africa* (Pretoria University Law Press, 2017), p. 462.

100 While this study examines 14 UN field operations, information on institutional structures was found for only 10 of those missions, consisting of 9 peacekeeping missions: MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (DRC), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIK (Kosovo), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), and UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire); as well as the special political mission UNSOM (Somalia). Figures are based on 2016 organigrams.

101 The following AU missions and field offices were considered: AU Liaison Office in Burundi, in Central African Republic, in N'Djamena (Chad), in Comoros, in Cote d'Ivoire, in Kinshasa (DRC), in Guinea-Bissau, in Liberia, in Libya, and in South Sudan; the AU/SADC Liaison Office in Madagascar; and MISHAEL (Mali), AMISOM (Somalia), and UNAMID (Darfur). While detailed information for each mission/field office was not available, it was possible to identify the basic structure that is reproduced in most field offices through interviews carried out in 2016. However, AU field missions are structured differently.

102 The following EU missions were examined: EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), EUMAM RCA (Central African Republic), EURSEC RD Congo, EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUTM-Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian territories, EUTM Somalia, EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine, and EUAM Ukraine. Information on structures was based on mission websites, as presented in 2017, as well as the EU Council decisions establishing each mission.

Table 10 Overview of number of field missions with SSR-related structures[103]

Multilateral Organization / SSR-related areas	SSR	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/ Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Comments
UN	7/10	*8/10 have field commander sections, but they are not dedicated to reform*	*10/10 have an office of the police commissioner, but only 3/10 have separate divisions dedicated to police reform*	8/10	0/10	1/10	0/10	8/10	UNSOM also has a Maritime security unit. In addition, most missions have divisions/sections focused on human rights and child protection, which may also cover SSR; however, those are not included in this table.
AU	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Liaison offices often have 1 military advisor,1 political advisor, and 1 PCRD officer who may cover SSR. An exception is the 1-2 dedicated SSR Officers in CAR and Somalia.
EU	1/14	5/14	3/14	1/14	0/14	3/14	0/14	2/14	EU missions often focus on a particular area of SSR, and structures within a field operation are in these cases all dedicated towards a specific area (e.g. police, border reform).
OSCE	0/14	7/14 *(politico-military, which usually do not have a strong DSR component)*	7/14	N/A	0/14	3/14	0/14	4/14	RoL and human rights sections may also cover police reform and judicial reform but are not covered in this table as they are not dedicated specifically to SSR support. Similarly, there are democratization sections that may also cover broader SSR support.

operations engaged in SSG/R support and mandated by the Permanent Council were examined.[104] One key limitation of this analysis is that it compares these structures by name, which does not account for the reality that these names may not match functions. An SSR section may be made up of staff engaged in border reform or defence sector reform, for instance. However, attempts were made to mitigate this limitation through interviews.

Table 10 demonstrates that there is **no standard approach to the development of SSR-related institutional structures** in the field operations of multilateral organizations. A key difference among the organizations under study relates to whether **dedicated structures for SSR** (e.g. SSR sections, SSR units, security institutions sections) exist, which are presumed to be engaged in a **sector-wide** approach to SSR support. The UN is the only organization that possesses such a structure in most of its field operations.[105] Among the other three organizations, only the EU has such a dedicated structure – the Operations Depart-ment-Strategic Civilian SSR Component in EUAM Ukraine. This raises an important question as to how many field operations can provide comprehensive support to national SSR processes without a section responsible for promoting a holistic SSR agenda.

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103 While acknowledging the challenges of comparing organizations and field missions, this table provides a broad picture of SSR structures in field missions. Still, it does not account for differences in the number of dedicated staff and the level of expertise in each structure. As such, one SSR unit may have 10 staff, while another may only have one staff member who works on this issue. A version of this table with detailed footnotes is available in the Annex.

104 The following OSCE field missions and offices were examined: OSCE Presence in Albania, OSCE Office in Yerevan (Armenia; this Office discontinued its operations on 31 August 2017), OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE Programme Office in Astana (Kazakhstan), OSCE Mission in Kosovo, OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan; recently deployed after the withdrawal of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek in July 2017), OSCE Mission to Moldova, OSCE Mission to Montenegro, OSCE Mission to Serbia, OSCE Office in Tajikistan (current OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe), OSCE Mission to Skopje, OSCE Centre in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan. This information was based on the Post Table available in Council Decision No. 1197 on the "Approval of the 2016 unified budget," PC.DEC/1197, December 31, 2015.

105 MINUSCA (SSR Unit), UNOCI (SSR Section), MONUSCO (SSR Unit), MINUSMA (SSR and disarmament and reintegration section), UNSOM (SSR), UNMISS (SSR/DDR Team), and UNMIL (with its "rule of law and security institutions support service").

Each organization has a number of structures dedicated to component areas of SSR support (e.g. police, justice, and border management). While the UN and the OSCE tend to possess dedicated sections that cover a wide range of these component areas, EU field operations are generally narrower in scope, focusing on just one or two component-specific areas. Hence, the EU may possess dedicated structures in a wide array of SSR-related areas, but it is rare that they are all located in a single mission. For instance, EULEX Kosovo is mainly focused on criminal justice and thus possesses sections dedicated to this area (i.e. police, border), while the UN and the OSCE in Kosovo cover much broader areas of SSR support through their field operations. Finally, the AU does not have dedicated SSR structures, but individual staff who may be called upon to provide SSR support (see below).

Among the field operations of all four organizations, the UN has the largest number of dedicated structures in the area of justice and corrections reform, while the OSCE has the largest number of structures in the area of law enforcement reform.[106] **Structures in the area of defence sector reform are somewhat limited.** The EU has some dedicated structures providing support in this area, in the context of its EUTMs, yet these missions have traditionally been engaged in the provision of operational training to armed forces, complemented by modules on international humanitarian law and human rights. In recent years, EUTMs have also developed a strategic advisory and mentoring role, but this often remains rather technical, addressing issues such as command and control, logistics, or administration.[107] While the UN has offices of force commanders, these do not typically provide defence sector reform (DSR) support, though DSR teams may sometimes be located under SSR sections (e.g. UNSOM). The OSCE has politico-military sections that may cover DSR support, but in practice, they are usually aimed at raising awareness about the OSCE Code of Conduct or the Vienna Document. The UN and the EU are the only organizations to have dedicated maritime security structures (in Somalia, as part of EUCAP Nestor and UNSOM). As Table 10 shows, there are no dedicated structures in the areas of intelligence reform or civil emergencies reform.

From a comparative perspective, it should be noted that the **human resources of each structure may vary significantly, both within and between multilateral organizations.** In fact, there may be significant disparities within a single organization. For instance, in OSCE missions, there is sometimes a whole department dedicated to a specific topic (e.g. the Police Affairs Department in Serbia, with 19 staff), while in other cases, only one or two people work on a topic (i.e. for border management in Kyrgyzstan, or democratic oversight of the security sector in BiH). In addition, the same departments may have very different capacities in different missions. In 2016, for example, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Department in the Mission to Serbia had 19 staff, while the same department in the OSCE Mission to Montenegro was composed of only 5 staff.

There are also significant variations across the organizations under study, with **the smallest capacities**

in the AU. This is related to the smaller size of AU liaison offices, which are generally made up of 1 military advisor, 1 political advisor, and 1 PCRD officer. Therefore, when SSR activities are required but no funding is available, AU SSR support is usually channeled through the political adviser or the PCRD officer, depending on the nature of the activity. But these staff do not all have SSR-specific expertise, and often have many other tasks in their portfolio. AU field missions have significantly more staff than the liaison offices and sometimes include a military, police, and/or a civilian component. However, AU military and police components are usually geared towards providing 'boots on the ground' rather than addressing SSR.[108] The civilian component could theoretically provide SSR support, but this only happens if HQ-based SSR officers are deployed to provide short term support, such as in CAR and Mali.[109] Even this is uncommon, though, due to the significant capacity limitations of the AU SSR team at headquarters, which is composed of just three staff members.

Overall, missions and other field presences adopt different structures according to their mandates, political priorities, and available resources. The fact that the number of staff can vary significantly across these structures makes it difficult to compare capacity gaps in a meaningful way. However, some broad trends are observable. The UN is the only organization that nearly systematically places a dedicated SSR structure in its field operations, for example, and the UN and the OSCE tend to possess a larger range of component-specific structures in a given country than the EU – which mostly develops the structure of its missions around one focus area (e.g. border reform). Across all organizations, some units and departments that are nominatively associated with a specific issue (e.g. office of military affairs, office of the police commander) do not necessarily concentrate on supporting reform efforts. Finally, in general, field operations lack capacity in the areas of intelligence and civil emergencies, reflecting the lack of dedicated structures in these areas at the headquarters level. Nevertheless, as noted above, names of structures are not always indicative of areas of support and sub-teams dealing with these issues may be included under other sections.

3.2. Institutional expertise

This section provides an overview of key trends in SSR-related internal expertise in the organizations under study, and of their ability to leverage external expertise. SSR-related expertise is seen here as the knowledge and skill sets of those sitting in the institutional structures identified above. It is important to note that areas of expertise are identified primarily based on the stated focus of these structures, which may not always be representative of the various skill sets of staff; an incongruence that was mitigated through interviews.

An **important finding is that the SSR expertise of the organizations under study is rarely adequate to fulfil all mandated tasks.** This lack of specialized expertise translates into time lost while efforts are made

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106 While all 10 UN missions have an office of the police commissioner, only 3/10 have separate divisions dedicated to police reform.

107 See, for instance, the website of EUTM in Somalia, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-somalia/3919/about-military-training-mission-somalia-eutm-somalia_en. Some EUTMs also have an advisory role related to policy, institutional, and legal aspects, as in Mali (where they supported the drafting of the *Loi de Programmation Militaire*).

108 Interview with AU personnel, Addis Ababa, November 2016.

109 Ibid.

to identify and deploy experts. It can also result in missed chances to build confidence with national counterparts and provide relevant and demand-driven support during the short time that windows of opportunity are open. Moreover, there is a missed opportunity to support cooperation across these organizations in identifying and deploying expertise.

The full spectrum of required SSR expertise is not available

This mapping has highlighted gaps in the availability of SSR expertise across the organizations under study. First, as highlighted above, these organizations lack dedicated structures for all areas of SSR support. While exceptions exist, in general, it can be presumed that there is **no expertise in areas of support that do not have a dedicated structure**. For example, despite the UN and the AU identifying civil emergencies as an integral part of the security sector in their respective policy reports, neither organization has dedicated staff with expertise on this issue. This was viewed as a gap in CAR, where national authorities were interested in receiving support in this area and where such engagement may have provided an entry point for building confidence for subsequent discussions on reform.[110] While it is unrealistic to expect multilaterals to cover all areas of reform, it is important to understand that this affects their ability to provide comprehensive support.

Second, there are gaps in expertise within existing structures. Interviewees noted that, at both the sector-wide and component levels, dedicated expertise is particularly lacking in areas such as strategic planning, change management, and M&E. In the area of **sector-wide SSR**, for instance, the profiles of SSR teams from all four organizations are often similar, made up of generalists with experience in political analysis. While it is vital for SSR teams to include staff with broad general knowledge, this staff is often unable to provide the more technical advice required by national counterparts on sector-wide SSR in areas like national security policy making, parliamentary oversight, or human resources management. And indeed, while there is increasing recognition that "police like to talk to police," the same can be said for policy-makers or the staff of parliamentary committees. **A key challenge is therefore that current SSR teams across the organizations under study rarely include experts with experience in their own national reform processes.**

Similarly, while **component-specific capacities** (e.g. police, military, justice) often have the requisite experience to perform specific functions in the area of policing, military, or legal practice, they often **lack experts who can provide strategic and policy advice** or who have expertise and experience in planning and designing complex institutional reforms and change management strategies. A recent review of the UN Police noted that "technical experts are often deployed to post-conflict contexts and expected to automatically become qualified or effective mentors or institution builders."[111] The HIPPO Report

has therefore called for more efforts to integrate civilian expertise in police components.[112] A similar finding was reported in a review of the EU approach to SSR, which highlighted that experts may have considerable operational skills but are often not well versed in advising and mentoring third parties – a critical skill required to build the partnerships with national stakeholders that ensure successful reform.[113] The situation is similar for military personnel. In the UN context, most staff in OMA or in offices of the force commander consist of military secondments who are not hired to provide support for DSR but rather to engage in military planning and force generation.[114] This was also reflected in the HIPPO Report, which noted that "the UN lacks technical capacity to support defence sector reform."[115] In interviews, representatives of the EU and the AU also noted the challenge that exists because their military personnel are generally made up of 'boots on the ground' and not DSR experts.[116]

This lack of SSR expertise creates several obstacles to the SSR support of these multilateral organizations. For instance, as noted in a 2011 report of the Senior Advisory Group to the Secretary-General on civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict, the UN "too often relies on its own personnel to perform all its tasks, particularly in larger Security Council-mandated missions, even when those tasks do not fall within the usual competences of its staff."[117] Interviewees highlighted, too, that UN SSR staff is frequently expected to provide support in a wide range of areas, from political facilitation, design and strategic planning, and M&E, to technical support to reforms. Yet, an absence of technical expertise means that the support provided is often not as in-depth as it could be. Similarly, while the EU, particularly the Commission, relies on outsourcing projects to external experts, it was still found that the organization sometimes lacks the adequate SSR expertise necessary for non-project specific tasks. As a result, staff members have been asked to undertake political engagement with senior government officials when they do not have the experience to do so.[118] Moreover, as was recognized in a recent study of the OSCE approach to SSG/R, "available staff, expertise and financial means often direct the approach."[119] That is to say, if staff do not possess the requisite knowledge to implement requests for SSR support, they are likely to develop activities that match existing skill sets, thus reverting to supply-driven support programmes.

110 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

111 See UN DPKO, "External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division," May 31, 2016, p. vii.

112 UN, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO Report), June 16, 2015, para. 157.

113 ISSAT and FBA, "Country case studies to inform the EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR: Findings from Mali, DRC and Ukraine," 2016, p. 17.

114 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

115 UN, "HIPPO Report," para. 154.

116 Interviews with EU (Brussels, May 2017) and AU personnel (Addis Ababa, November 2016).

117 "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group," A/65/747–S/2011/85, February 22, 2011, p. 14.

118 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017. Also see the ISSAT report on the EU ("Country case studies to inform the EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR," p. 6): "Too often staff members with operational level experience are asked to engage at high level strategic reforms, an area where they feel less comfortable and their experience is limited."

119 DCAF, *OSCE Mapping Study*, December 2013, p. 55.

Challenges to developing internal SSR expertise

The lack of expertise required to meet the comprehensive needs of host countries can be traced to several factors. First, one of the key challenges to leveraging appropriate internal expertise relates to shortcomings in planning, particularly in the context of field operations. **If SSR is not effectively mainstreamed into planning efforts, it is unlikely that necessary institutional structures or staff with appropriate expertise will be accounted for in the budget (see section 5.1).** Second, even if these structures exist, there may be **obstacles to recruiting and deploying staff** with the necessary skill sets.[120] In the area of SSR, these challenges are further compounded by difficulties in identifying and attracting the type of expertise required for SSR support. As noted in the Report of the Secretary-General on policing, "the main challenge is to attract adequate numbers of staff with the requisite police-related expertise in change management, organizational development, finance, and administration."[121] In interviews at the EU, difficulties in attracting good staff in this area was also noted, especially for field operations.[122] The OSCE, which increasingly relies on secondments, reported that programmes are often shaped by the expertise available within countries that support secondments, rather than by the strategic vision of the organization or needs on the ground. At times, the consequence of this is that staff in the Secretariat and in OSCE institutions do not possess the necessary expertise to implement projects or provide support to the field as requested. The AU faces an additional challenge: its most qualified staff often apply for and obtain positions in other multilateral organizations that provide better service conditions.[123]

The use of secondments is seen as a means to accessing a larger pool of candidates, and the EU and the OSCE have both filled many SSR-related positions with secondments from Member States.[124] The advantage is that secondments provide an additional layer of flexibility to staffing arrangements. In the EU, for instance, when needed, a short-term exchange of staff between missions can be organized to provide support or advice on specific issues or to help build up expertise within the other mission. Since most of this staff is seconded by Member States, it is sufficient to have the consent of the two missions involved and of the State that seconded the expert in the first place.[125] However, while this approach allows for more flexibility, it also can lead to a loss of institutional memory. Staff is not usually deployed for more than one year, since they must eventually return to their own post back home, and the **constant rotation of staff** not only affects institutional memory, but hampers attempts to build the trust needed to engage

at the strategic level with national partners.[126] Another challenge of secondments relates to the type of expertise available. Within the OSCE, the lack of relevant expertise among seconded staff was reported as a problem, and it was noted that there can be a tendency among seconded experts to transplant approaches suitable in their country of origin into the context of a host country.[127] Clear organizational policy and guidance can help mitigate this.

Challenges to leveraging external expertise in a timely manner

While multilateral organizations have built up capacities in certain areas of SSR, specialized teams remain small and cannot contain the full breadth of expertise required at all times throughout the SSR process. At the beginning of an intervention, there may be a greater need for planning or policy development expertise, which may turn into a need for more technical expertise later (e.g. on how to design a census of police). Organizations cannot host all the staff required to cover every aspect of SSR support, yet leveraging different types of capacity at different moments in time requires flexible arrangements that are often insufficiently developed.

To a certain degree, this can be alleviated by the development of **rosters of experts**. In the area of SSR, the UN and the AU have developed or are in the process of developing such rosters of experts. On the other hand, the OSCE has no imminent plans to develop one. Still, while rosters of experts are an appropriate path to leveraging external expertise, the approach has been met by significant challenges. Use of the UN Roster of SSR Experts has been negatively impacted by a lack of predictable funding as well as the bureaucratic impediments to rapid deployment; meaning, the Roster exists on paper but has proven next to impossible to operationalize. Indeed, despite a handful of deployments from such rosters, these are the exception and not the rule. In addition, rosters are often a poor solution when multi-profile teams must be formed. There is also a critical shortage of skilled SSR experts to draw from.[128]

There should be a move towards more adaptable approaches to deploying capacities, featuring a small set of general staff in the field that is complemented by temporary staff possessing the specific expertise needed at different times in the SSR process. As yet, this has been a challenge for many organizations.[129] One example of an SSR-related mechanism that has successfully been established to help overcome this is the UN pool of justice and police experts in Brindisi, who are deployed on short notice. Similarly, the EU has created an SSG facility that draws on a consortium of external organizations with expertise in SSR.[130] Without this kind of flexible arrangement, organizations must

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120 See, for instance, the review of the Senior Advisory Group (A/65/747–S/2011/85), which noted that: "the Secretariat finds it enormously difficult to recruit and deploy specialized staff in a timely fashion."

121 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations policing*, S/2016/952, November 10, 2016.

122 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

123 Interview with AU personnel, Addis Ababa, November 2016.

124 For instance, in the case of the EUAM Ukraine team of international advisors, the majority come from EU Member States and have expertise in areas such as police, judiciary, anti-corruption, and public communication. See the mission website, available at http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-us/.

125 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

126 ISSAT and FBA, "Country case studies to inform the EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR," p. 17.

127 DCAF, *OSCE Mapping Study*.

128 Interview with AU personnel, Addis Ababa, November 2016.

129 See, for instance, "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group," A/65/747–S/2011/85, p. 14.

130 For more information see the grant tender announcement for the "Annual Action Programme 2016 for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace – Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness component (Article 4)," available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/tenders/20161028_1_en.htm.

rely on support programmes that often have to be budgeted at least a year before implementation, while needs continue changing on the ground.

Partnerships could play an important role in supporting such modular capacities. All four multilaterals under study have relied extensively on organizations such as DCAF or the African Security Sector Network to develop guidance, conduct assessments, and support programming. These multilateral organizations also often draw on the services of DCAF's international advisory support team (ISSAT) to fill short-term needs in the field. But, so far, the EU is the only organization to have worked systematically with external organizations, through its SSG facility. While the UN can disburse some limited monetary support for such efforts through its programmatic funds, to date, bureaucratic challenges have hampered its ability to use these funds to engage external actors as implementing partners in the area of SSR.

Cooperation in the area of institutional expertise

A key finding of this study is that institutional capacities across the four organizations are insufficient to provide comprehensive SSR support. Thus, **partnerships among these organizations are important to bring together dispersed capacities**, in order to contribute more effectively to national goals. In general, the level of SSR expertise that exists within the multilateral organizations under study is similar, though there are instances when staff in one organization has the experience needed by another. Moving forward, opportunities to build on partnerships between these organizations should be explored, for instance through short-term deployments of staff from one organization to another for targeted tasks, or by sharing rosters of experts or even contributing to a joint roster of experts. A 2014 request by Iraq to the UN for advice on developing a law on the national guard is one example of how this could be valuable in practice. The UN could not immediately identify necessary expertise, but had it known about a 2009–2010 EU effort to support authorities in Guinea Bissau to develop such a law, it could have more readily identified an expert with relevant experience, or engaged in a coordinated effort with the EU to support Iraq on a similar endeavour.

Achieving this will require greater cooperation in sharing institutional expertise, or at least, in sharing information about where such expertise lies. This will necessitate the centralization of information about experts and their areas of expertise, which may be difficult both to develop and to update. Another option for organizations is to identify focal points to whom inquiries of expertise can be sent. In some cases, it may be possible to do this through the development of joint projects. Finally, in line with some of the policy frameworks of these organizations, the sharing of rosters of experts should be implemented, but has not yet been.

More broadly, only **limited examples of good practice** regarding cooperation in the area of institutional expertise were identified. One occurred within the framework of the broader UN-EU support plan on SSR and rule of law in the Central African Republic. Given the agreement that the UN would deploy officers in support to defence sector reform, the UN's OMA identified 8 skill set areas needed to complement

the EU experts already on the ground. A description of possible vacancy announcements was sent by the UN to the EU, which provided comments on whether the posts were already covered by EU experts or not. While this enabled enhanced complementarity between the EU and the UN in line with the mandate in CAR, it was a challenge to the OMA's approach to force generation, which relies on the experts that Member States are willing to send. In this case, it was difficult for the UN to tell Member States that some officers were not needed because they lacked specialized enough skill sets to ensure complementarity on the ground. Still, this highlights that it is possible for these organizations to strive towards enhanced complementarity and the deployment of uniformed personnel with the necessary skills to support reform efforts.

It is also vital that partnerships are encouraged within organizations, to bridge expertise between different communities (e.g. development, human rights, security). For instance, there are often missed opportunities within the organizations under study when it comes to enabling access for security actors to the expertise of development or human rights actors – who may have important expertise to share on development issues related to broader public administration reform or on human rights questions related to the root drivers of conflict, social and political exclusion, human rights violations, and discrimination. For instance, if the DPKO lacks dedicated border reform expertise, advice to UN field components could be provided by UNODC, which has experience in this area. More efforts to connect these actors are necessary to ensure they are working towards a common goal, both within and between organizations. In the UN context, this is likely to require reinvigorating the work of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR to play a stronger convening and facilitation role among UN entities. A similar challenge exists in the OSCE, where there is considerable potential for collaboration between its three dimensions (politico-security, economic and environmental, and human).

In sum, the challenge to these organizations as it relates to capacities is twofold: first, in identifying information on relevant expertise that exists across international actors; and second, in leveraging such expertise. Moreover, a key finding is that many gaps in expertise are in the area of strategic support to reforms, including when it comes to linking SSR to broader institution building and governance initiatives, raising important questions about the effectiveness of support.

3.3. Key Findings

The following are key findings regarding the institutional capacities of the multilateral organizations examined in this research:

▶ **Overall, specialist SSR capacities, both at headquarters and in the field, are small.** Most dedicated SSR-related structures are located in field operations (e.g. UN peacekeeping operations and SPMs, EU civilian and non-executive military CSDP missions), whereas field presences (e.g. UN country teams, EU delegations) often lack these dedicated SSR staff. Still, field presences are frequently able to outsource to implementing partners. The UN and the OSCE possess the broadest spectrum

of SSR-related structures across their field operations. The EU is less likely to take on such a wide scope of support in any given mission, and thus often has several related specialist structures within the same field operation. The AU does not generally have dedicated SSR structures at the field level.

▶ **At the headquarters level, a number of thematic areas of SSR have no corresponding institutional structure, across the organizations under study.** As such, there are gaps in the ability of HQ entities to perform their advisory function in many areas, such as in defence sector reform, intelligence reform, or border management. Given the fundamental nature of the defence sector, it is significant that these organizations mostly do not have dedicated structures with a clear mandate for support of DSR. Moreover, the absence of institutional structures in these areas likely impacts the type of expertise these organizations can deploy, as it is often the role of HQ structures to manage rosters and deploy experts.

▶ **In terms of field operations, the UN is the only organization to possess SSR structures that deal with sector-wide issues in nearly all of its missions.** This suggests that the UN may have a particularly important role to play in identifying strategic priorities for SSR, and in taking the lead in coordinating efforts to ensure that a comprehensive approach to reform is supported by the international community. At the same time, this role hinges on the ability of SSR units to carry out an integrative function within UN missions themselves, as set out in UNSCR 2151. As it currently stands, these units are often placed at the same level as other component-specific units, and are therefore unable to provide strategic direction to field operations. Further, they often lack the capacity to perform their functions effectively.

▶ **There are notable gaps in the expertise needed for these organizations to meet the broad scope of SSR outlined in their policy frameworks.** These gaps are most visible where there are no capacities in place at all (e.g. some organizations lack structures for border management, intelligence, etc.); however, there is also a lack of sufficient expertise within existing structures. For instance, SSR teams rarely possess experience in their own national reform processes. Moreover, there is often a lack of expertise in national security policy and management to meet the mandated needs, including in areas such as public administration reform, internal oversight, vetting, and broader governance issues. Similarly, with some exceptions, experts in defence and police structures often have more technical knowledge than change management skills, which are necessary to effectively support reform processes. Finally, deficient language skills frequently further compound this challenge.

▶ **In field operations, programmes are often shaped by available expertise as opposed to needs on the ground.** Many SSR staff are expected to provide support in a wide range of areas, from political facilitation and process design, to technical support, to conducting M&E, sometimes without possessing necessary skills. This can result in support in the form of awareness-raising workshops or trainings. But the elemental work of institution building which is most needed often falls through

the cracks, because SSR is not usually tackled through broader governance programmes since SSR experts often lack the competence to support this approach.

▶ **While multilateral organizations have built up capacities in certain areas, expert teams remain small and cannot reflect the full breadth of expertise required.** The needs for technical support may vary at different times in the reform process (ranging from planning to M&E), and it is simply impossible for one organization to host all the necessary expertise. Yet, expertise must be accessible nonetheless. The EU has established a standby facility on SSR, but the UN – which does have standby teams in specific component areas (e.g. justice, corrections, and police) – along with the AU and the OSCE lack similar standby arrangements in the area of sector-wide SSR.

▶ **There is a clear need to strengthen partnerships in order to leverage capacities**. While rosters already exist or are in the process of being created, there is a need to ensure mechanisms are also in place to share information across multilateral organizations. There is a need to support more outreach as well, to identify roster candidates with experience in their own national reform processes, so that rosters do not continue to be populated by experts with similar experiences to the staff working in multilateral organizations.

▶ **Potential comparative advantages are difficult to identify based only on a snapshot of existing expertise.** This study has revealed that the broad areas of expertise that exist in these organizations are quite similar (e.g. technical experts on police or justice), as are the gaps (e.g. vetting, public administration reform). There is a need to map this further, in order to better understand nuances of support. Within justice expertise, for instance, perhaps one organization is more focused on prosecution and another on the criminal justice chain. Although, given the sizeable capacity gaps identified by this research, it is unlikely that these organizations have developed such specialized in-depth expertise on these topics.

Operational Practice

4

Specific approaches to planning and assessment, implementation, and M&E are all likely to influence the operational support provided in response to a mandate or request. Each of these are also critical stages during which cooperation between partners should take place to enhance the coherence and predictability of support. This section discusses each stage and makes clear that many of the challenges to SSR support faced by the multilateral organizations under study stem from their approaches to integrating SSR across these phases.

4.1. Planning and assessments

This section offers an overview of some broad approaches to planning and assessment for SSR, and of challenges and opportunities identified by the organizations under study related to the effective delivery of SSR support. While recognizing that planning is a broader task than assessing, this section focuses significantly on the integration of SSR into assessments, because this is often a crucial stage at which SSR is not properly integrated.

Approaches to planning for SSR support

The context within which SSR support takes place, in field operations or non-mission settings, dictates the approach taken to planning. For UN peacekeeping missions, for instance, planning is led by DPKO and the Department for Field Support (DFS), often involving the establishment of an integrated mission task force and drawing on the findings of a technical assessment mission (TAM). The DPKO/DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations (2017) establishes a standard mission planning process to clarify roles and ensure coherence between departments. The policy falls under the framework of the UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013), and covers four phases: (i) assessment in order to launch a mission; (ii) development of plans; (iii) implementation and monitoring; and (iv) review of existing operations or an assessment of the overall UN presence.[131] Planning in non-mission contexts (and some mission contexts), is based on the UN Development Assistance Framework, which highlights the need to reinforce strategic planning and delivery effectiveness on the basis of a common

country analysis as well as mainstreaming, acceleration, and policy support.[132] The UNDAF defines how UN country teams contribute to achieving development results on the basis of an assessment of country needs and UN comparative advantages.[133] A three to five year timeline is aligned with national planning cycles.

For **AU** peace support operations, strategic planning is undertaken by the Plans and Operations Unit within the Peace Support Operations Division. Once a mandate is issued, a TAM is deployed to identify the core elements of a strategic concept of operations (CONOPS), and to develop the mission implementation plan.[134] It is at the PSOD level that representatives of civilian, police, and military components come together to consider how to implement the CONOPS.[135] Other entities beyond the PSOD are also engaged in planning the everyday activities of liaison offices and HQ-driven activities, such as the Directorate of Programming, Budget, Finance and Accounting, which is in charge of preparing the regular annual AU budget for every financial year, starting 1 January and ending 31 December.[136]

In the context of the **EU**, CSDP missions are identified and planned by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Once plans are made, military missions are managed by MPCC (within EUMS) or by EU Member States, and civilian missions are managed from headquarters by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Notably, while the mandates of civilian missions are two-year, budgets cover only a year at a time. Projects funded by European Commission instruments are typically identified by staff of the DG DEVCO or DG NEAR within EU delegations, in close collaboration with partner countries. The programming of Commission instruments is coordinated by the EEAS with the involvement of relevant Commission services, culminating in the National Indicative Programme implemented by each delegation. Partner countries are closely involved at all stages of programming and implementation, essentially co-managing projects, and there have been growing efforts to support even more integrated planning across the organization. The Commission sets a multiannual financial framework, with maximum annual amounts (ceilings) that the EU may spend in different political fields over several years, set through standard annual budget procedures that must be endorsed by the Parliament and the Council before the start of every year.

The **OSCE** plans its support according to its Unified Budget, which is approved every year by the Permanent Council and outlines allocations for all OSCE institutions and field missions.[137] The OSCE organizes its work into programmes, the objectives and resource requirements of which are laid out in a

131   DPKO/Department of Field Support, *Policy: Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations* (2017).

132   UN Development Operations Coordination Office, *United Nations Development Assistance Framework Guidance* (UNDG, 2017).

133   Ibid., p. 22.

134   Technical assessment missions (TAMs) can be undertaken at different times in a mission's cycle: at start up, mandate review, mid-cycle review, restructure, and/or draw down.

135   Interview with AU personnel, Addis Ababa, November 2016.

136   AU, *African Union Handbook 2017* (2017), p. 180.

137   For instance, see Permanent Council Decision No. 1158: Approval of the 2015 Unified Budget, PC.DEC/1158, December 30, 2014.

Unified Budget Proposal. To identify projects that feed into broader programmes, the OSCE is supposed to undertake needs assessments, but in practice does not do so systematically.

While planning instruments for non-mission support feature longer time frames, **most field operations are planned on shorter timelines, which presents a common challenge for the organizations under study.** One significant consequence of this is that organizations find it difficult to plan for long-term reform since they do not know whether or how that support will be sustained. This is particularly important in the case of SSR support, which must be sustained over time to address fundamental reform needs that cannot be tackled solely through trainings and workshops and require an institution-building approach. In its Guidelines on SSG/R, the OSCE has recognized this challenge, noting that:

> "[...] OSCE staff should recognize that mandates and funding commitments are usually extended. This being the case, it is possible to plan for long-term results, even if it is acknowledged that these may take several years to materialize. In particular, staff should develop multi-year programmes which can be split into a series of shorter-term projects."[138]

Another common challenge relates to the degree to which SSR experts are included in planning processes. If SSR is not effectively integrated into planning, it is unlikely that required institutional structures or job profiles with necessary expertise are accounted for in budget processes (see section 3.2). For instance, in several of the organizations under study, mission planners often have a police or military background. While planners with experience in the police may recognize the wide array of different skill sets required to support police reform (ranging from criminal investigation to community policing to education and mentoring) and may therefore budget for posts that cover these varied expert needs, such a planner may be less aware that there are a similarly wide variety of specialized skills required to support judicial reform. Indeed, interviewees commented that **a lack of full-spectrum SSR expertise among mission planners is one reason sufficient and specialized SSR capacities are often overlooked** in budgeting from the outset, as they do not even make it through the planning stage.[139]

Similarly, in some cases, appropriate internal coordination does not take place. In the case of the AU, for example, the SSR team is not routinely invited to review the concept of operations, which means that SSR cannot be meaningfully integrated from the outset. Even so, both the AU SSR team and representatives of peace support operations entities have recognized how central SSR can be to the design of effective exit strategies. Thus, there is an increasing awareness that SSR expertise must be integrated at the planning stage, to support the development of SSR indicators and benchmarks. Importantly, though, interviewees from the AU noted that even if SSR were to be integrated in a more systematic manner, capacity constraints would severely hamper the ability of SSR experts to provide relevant input to planning efforts. Without staff on the ground, it is difficult to access the up-to-date and context-specific knowledge on SSR that can be relevant for planning purposes.

In the case of the EU, interviews revealed a common perception that SSR is frequently disregarded in planning, particularly for CSDP missions. It was also noted that UN mission concepts are often developed by operational colleagues with insufficient SSR expertise. A lack of understanding of the political nature of SSR, which must be factored at an early stage into the political good offices function, has resulted in operational concepts that frame SSR as an activity to be conducted once conditions permit – i.e., when it is often too late to set the foundations for SSR support.

Approaches to SSR assessments

Across all the organizations under study, planning is frequently based on assessments – which can be either SSR-focused (both sector-wide and component-specific) or more broad, wherein SSR is among many issues assessed.

To date, these organizations have **not systematically conducted sector-wide SSR assessments**, with the exception of the UN, which carried out one SSR assessment each in CAR and in Mali. The OSCE is the only organization to have developed practical guidelines on needs assessments and SSR, but in practice, these are rarely conducted, and not necessarily due to a lack of resources but often to a lack of senior management initiative or national political will. Nonetheless, even if sector-wide assessments are not taking place, these organizations do conduct component-specific assessments (e.g. police, justice, etc.). These are important, but do not alone capture the broader synergies that exist across all elements of SSR, which can only be measured by sector-wide assessments.

While sector-wide assessments are not commonly supported by each organization, there have been several examples of successful **joint needs assessments in the area of SSR**, particularly on the African continent, initially in the context of the AU-UN-EU capacity-building programme for the AU on SSR, for which these three organizations developed a Joint Assessment Guide for SSR.[140] The Guide describes the objectives, expected outputs, and general principles of joint assessments, which have been undertaken in CAR, Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. However, because these assessments were conceptualized as part of a dedicated programme of support for the AU, they have faced some challenges. For instance, despite an agreement on ToR, the strategic objective of joint assessment missions is often not shared across organizations. Some view these assessments as having contributed to the development of a common political message and the clarification of a division of labour; while others, including some EU actors, view them as no more than a capacity-building exercise for the AU.[141] Consequently, these assessments have not always informed the approach of these organizations to SSR support, and interviewees highlighted that even after these assessment missions, planning has typically continued to take place separately, merely incorporating an exchange of follow-up emails and comments that do not facilitate a comprehensive and

138 OSCE, "Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) Guidelines for OSCE Staff."

139 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

140 The Joint Assessment Guide was developed by and for the Steering Committee of "Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform (SSR)," a joint UN/EU Support Action project.

141 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

common approach.[142] Moreover, joint assessment reports have taken a considerable time to draft due to challenges in agreeing on common findings. Beyond the AU-UN-EU capacity-building project, a joint assessment has also been undertaken by the UN, the EU, and ECOWAS in The Gambia.

Overall, though sector-wide SSR assessments have begun to take place – mainly through joint initiatives – they are usually not connected to broader planning and mandate development, because they are not part of the formal assessments used for these purposes. In fact, joint assessments conducted under the auspices of the AU-UN-EU capacity-building project have often been ignored even in individual project planning, as they are perceived as part of a broader capacity-building programme. Given the interest in conducting more joint SSR assessments among these organizations, further reflection on how to link these to broader planning processes is necessary in order to leverage resources and minimize transaction costs for national counterparts.

The integration of SSR into broader assessments

All multilateral organizations may undertake broad assessment missions as part of their larger planning process (e.g. technical assessment missions, strategic assessment missions). This study has found several common challenges faced by these organizations when attempting to integrate SSR. Some are general in nature and are not specifically tied to SSR; for instance, several organizations raised the issue that assessments are frequently rushed to meet urgent planning needs, making it difficult to conduct in-depth analysis and to hold meetings on the ground with anyone beyond government stakeholders. This limits the ability to develop a nuanced understanding of security sector needs, which often vary significantly even within a national context, for example between the capital and the periphery. Moreover, the reality that implementing partners are rarely included on assessment missions has been likened to only hiring an architect to build a house. The importance of including operational partners in the earliest stages of assessment is vital in order to yield a design that can be implemented.

Another common challenge is the trade-off that takes place between inclusivity and depth in assessments. At the UN, broad assessment teams are often very large (including 10 to 15 people or more) and reflect HQ structures – comprised, for instance, of a representative from each major department of the Secretariat and each UN Fund, Programme, and Agency (i.e. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP). As a consequence, these representatives sometimes advocate for their own area of work to be prioritized in an assessment report, resulting in assessment missions that exist in thematic silos rather than being strategically integrated. Indeed, as one interviewee remarked, "including one person per entity in an assessment does not amount to a joint approach."[143] Instead it often contributes to an overly long 'wish list' that does not enable reflection on the prioritization of different support areas. Per UNSC resolution 2151, the UN's SSR Unit is supposed to play an integrative role, but in practice, the Unit is often unable to participate in

these assessment missions due to a lack of human resources or due to larger sections being called upon to represent DPKO. As a result, interviewees noted that SSR issues are often inadequately addressed in strategic reviews of UN peace operations, hampering the ability of the organization to accurately identify priorities for UN-wide engagement in this important area.

The AU SSR team has also not engaged systematically in assessment missions, despite participating in ad hoc missions. Yet, in the context of a recent effort by PCRD to establish an Inter-Departmental Task Force, efforts have been made to increase the inclusivity of PCRD assessments. In 2016, the PCRD adopted a new approach, which is mainstreamed though its assessment missions and aims to bring together the 6 pillars of the 2006 PCRD Policy. In CAR in 2016, for example, the PCRD assessment included 9 people from the AU, including the SSR team, the RECs, and all members of the Inter-Departmental Task Force on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. International partners, civil society (e.g. ASSN, OIF, ACSS, etc.), AU Member States, and the host government are often invited to participate in needs assessment missions as well. Nonetheless, avenues by which SSR can be better integrated from the outset into AU planning and assessments must still be identified.

In the case of the EU, it was highlighted that analysis conducted in the context of assessments often reflects the expertise of assessment team members, who rarely possess SSR knowledge. This limits the ability of these teams to identify staffing needs in the area of SSR and has often resulted in assessments that are "narrow in focus" and based on data collection that is "moulded to endorse preconceived notions of needs, rather than to truly test assumptions."[144] Consequently, SSR support strategies are frequently very similar, at the sacrifice of context specificity. Nevertheless, several recent broader country-level assessments have been recognized as a positive step forward in strengthening balanced analysis while exploring strategic, tactical, and operational aspects.

Most multilateral organizations have emphasized the need to improve capacities for **conflict analysis** in their assessments processes. Several take a broad approach to addressing conflict analysis,[145] but there was a general acknowledgement among interviewees that it is not sufficiently linked to SSR. Some interviewees described conflict analysis, Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments (RPBAs), and EU-WB fragility assessments as failing to provide in-depth political economy analysis of the security sector and the role of security actors in driving conflict and/or preventing an escalation of violence.[146] As such, these were seen as missed opportunities to address root causes of conflict that are related to the security sector. This is critically important with the growing attention on conflict prevention and sustaining peace.

142 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

143 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

144 ISSAT and FBA, "Country case studies to inform the EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR," p. 11.

145 For instance, see EU, "Guidance note on the use of conflict analysis in support of EU external action," October 2013. Also see UNDP, "Conducting a Conflict and Development Analysis," February 2016.

146 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

Cooperation at the planning stage

Despite strong calls for cooperation, few mechanisms have been designed to operationalize partnerships in SSR, particularly at the planning stage. For instance, as recognized in a recent EU evaluation, **coordination rarely takes place during the identification and formulation of SSR interventions and is limited to information sharing during implementation phases**.[147]

There are a few exceptions, notably in CAR and Somalia, where there has been much effort to enhance coordination among international actors. In CAR, the joint support plan on security sector reform and the rule of law – signed in July 2017 by MINUSCA, the EU Delegation, and EUTM RCA – is one of the rare examples of such an institutionalized cooperation arrangement at the country level.[148] Its origins lie in a document of the EU-UN Steering Committee for Crisis Management which stipulated that the UN and the EU develop a joint plan for SSR support in CAR. While this was not implemented at first due to difficulties in agreeing on a division of labour, a decision was later taken to move forward with developing the EU-UN coordination framework for CAR. Currently, its main focus is on setting out general principles for cooperation across different component areas, which is already a significant step forward because it clarifies areas of support and enables more efficient progress. Still, to evolve into an even more effective instrument, it will be necessary to identify common objectives and results and assign specific activities to each actor. Another exception in the area of planning has been the initiative of the EU to organize a five-day workshop in Somalia, to which the UN and other external organizations were invited to participate. The workshop was intended to encourage dialogue among actors on the type of activities being supported; it was also a reflection of a broader commitment to coordination in Somalia, reflected in the Somali Compact (2014–2016).[149]

However, the implementation of such initiatives is met by various challenges, such as the changing nature of conflict, which requires ongoing communication and adaptation. If a mechanism could be found to enable flexibility in the implementation of joint planning documents and to harmonize planning terms across the organizations under study, this may be an effective way to address some obstacles to cooperation.

The conduct of joint assessments is an important starting point to ensure a shared understanding of needs and in the long run could encourage more joint approaches. In practice, as highlighted above, joint assessment missions are rare and have been conducted mostly in the context of a single AU-UN-EU project. This gap contributes to the adoption of disconnected approaches and obstructs the provision of sustained, coherent, and coordinated support to SSR. Moreover, even when joint assessments have been undertaken, any joint interpretation of the findings and their relevance for a division of labour has not been systematic. Further, it was noted during interviews that jointly conducting conflict analysis related to the security sector would require less resources and help foster a comprehensive and coordinated approach among multilateral organizations. In this context, AU representatives acknowledged that the organization may have a comparative advantage when undertaking conflict assessments in Africa, due to its greater awareness of continental sensitivities and its closer connections and access to regional and national actors.[150] However, as a first step, it is likely that guidance would need to be developed on the integration of SSR concerns into conflict analysis.

Assessments are also challenged by the inability of organizations to bring together the necessary developmental, peacebuilding, and political actors. The RPBA (which has replaced the Post Conflict Needs Assessment or PCNA) is a useful resource for improving strategic analysis among multilaterals and is rooted in a 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning in which the EU, the UN, and the World Bank committed to working with national governments to assess and prioritize recovery and peacebuilding needs. The RPBA methodology facilitates joint assessment, planning, and the implementation of international support for recovery, reconstruction, peacebuilding, and development in conflict-affected countries. The RPBA addresses the identification, prioritization, sequencing, financing, and implementation of recovery and peacebuilding needs over the short, medium, and long terms, and is thus a crucial tool for coordinating international SSR support. However, because the UNDP and PBSO generally represent the UN system in these arrangements, there is a risk that assessments do not properly integrate the more political aspects that other UN entities, such as DPKO and DPA, may cover. Also, while other entities have joined some RPBA's, interviewees noted that, at times, these assessments have not effectively integrated SSR concerns in cases where SSR experts were not included, despite the key importance of the security sector to the context at hand.[151] In 2016 in CAR, for example, SSR units were not members of the RBPA team, reportedly resulting in a limited assessment of the security sector which fed into the national plan for recovery and peacebuilding.[152]

In sum, it is clear that SSR has not always been viewed as a priority in the context of broader planning. This is especially a concern for field operations planning, in which assessments are often overly represented by former military or police officials who may not have SSR expertise. At the same time, there are challenges to properly integrating SSR into the planning undertaken by the development community, where more technical approaches may limit the identification of political needs. As a result, these challenges often contribute to a disconnect between multilateral support on the ground and the broader priority needs of national stakeholders.

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147 European Commission, Evaluation of EU support for Security Sector Reform in enlargement and neighborhood countries (2010-2016), Brussels, 2018, p.72.

148 Another example is an MoU signed between the UN-EU-SADC to jointly support SSR under the Peacebuilding Fund (March 2018).

149 The Somali Compact is an agreement between the Government of Somalia and the international community, including the UN and the EU.

150 Interviews with EU (Brussels, May 2017) and AU personnel (Addis Ababa, November 2016).

151 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

152 Interview with UN personnel, New York, September 2016.

4.2. Implementation modalities

This section examines the modalities used by multilateral organizations to support the implementation of SSR support. Approaches to implementing SSR support depend significantly on whether necessary expertise can be accessed internally or externally and on the availability of long-term funding. The findings detailed in this section highlight that these implementation modalities have implications on the ability of the organizations under study to provide SSR support within a broader institution-building framework.

Accessibility of internal versus external capacities

Implementation is affected by **difficulties in accessing and/or deploying expertise** in a responsive and flexible manner (see section 3 for more on expertise). The AU has emphasized, for example, that persistent capacity gaps impact its ability to implement a wider array of support programmes; and similarly, the UN and the OSCE have both struggled to adapt support to evolving needs. There are exceptions, such as in the case of some UN entities like UNDP, which work on the basis of voluntary contributions, enabling them to establish a team around needs. But in general, many parts of these organizations end up providing support on the basis of available capacities, as opposed to needs.

Compared to the other organizations under study, the EU has the most flexible mechanisms by which to deploy experts. It is only through its civilian and military missions that the EU directly implements SSR programmes, and can thus benefit from an exchange of expertise across missions. However, SSR support provided through the funding instruments of the European Commission (e.g. ENI, IcSP, DCI, and EDF) is planned and managed by the EU (e.g. DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, and FPI) but implemented by external partners. The EU relies on a variety of implementing partners, including UN Member States, third states, other multilateral organizations, NGOs, private entities, and more.[153] While outsourcing implementation may facilitate the provision of support, it also requires constant coordination between the EU and the implementing partner, to monitor results and enable the reallocation of funds when necessary. It also means that, in non-mission settings, the EU does not have the capacity to engage in policy dialogues on SSR if there is no dedicated SSR expert posted at the delegation.

Availability of long-term funding

All four organizations have found that a **lack of predictable long-term funding** and inadequate dedicated funding for SSR support more generally pose a significant challenge to implementing comprehensive SSR strategies. The **UN has been both a recipient and a donor** of funding for SSR support, financing activities through, among other sources, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Though, a thematic review of SSR and peacebuilding noted that, to date, PBF funding has only been short-term in nature, and hence

"PBF funding cannot be expected to address all SSR priorities."[154] Still, in recent years, efforts have been made to enhance its catalytic effects by situating individual projects within a larger strategic framework. Similarly, while peacekeeping missions have traditionally relied mostly on mission staff and assets to implement mandates, the need to establish programmes aimed at strengthening mandate delivery in some areas has been recognized, and operational funds for this purpose have been designated in assessed budgets. Programmatic funding can be used for a range of activities, including capacity-building, procurement of material and equipment, temporary consultancies, and technical expertise not available in a mission.[155] These funds remain limited, however, and there have been challenges in disbursing them to implementing partners.

The AU, a major recipient of international financial support, similarly identifies a lack of funding among its main challenges. In June 1993, the AU established the Peace Fund, the principal financing instrument for the peace and security activities of the Organization of African Unity. But ever since then, contributions to the Fund have been irregular and unpredictable due to the fragile economic condition of many African States.[156] As a result, the AU features a high level of donor dependency, which weakens regional ownership.[157] To date, both the UN and the EU have provided active support to the AU (e.g. the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM).[158] In the area of SSR, the majority of AU SSR activities were funded and implemented between 2013 and 2015 under the AU project "Building African Union Capacities in Security Sector Reform (SSR): A Joint United Nations/European Union Support Action." Since January 2016, major SSR activities have been funded under the EU-APSA Support program, but funding has remained a significant challenge with little funding received from Member States.

The EU, a major donor to international assistance, has a significant role to play in supporting financing arrangements.[159] As noted in a 2011 review, "the EU budget's capacity to mobilise a critical mass of funding and to resort to various financing modalities and implementation modalities was a clear added-value which could allow a holistic approach to SSR."[160] While the EU provides SSR support through its CSDP missions, a big share of its overall support is outsourced through its financial instruments (DCI or EDF). Nevertheless, just like any other SSR actor, the EU also faces some challenges related to funding. It has been found, for instance, that CSDP missions sometimes encounter obstacles to accessing funds intended for complementary initiatives, such as military advisory activities or social/community

153   Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

154   UN Peacebuilding Support Office, "Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to Peacebuilding and the role of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund," 2012, p. 6.

155   DPKO/DFS, *Guidelines on Mandated Programmatic Activities funded through Peacekeeping Assessed Budgets* (2017).

156   AU, "Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa," August 2016, para. 17–22.

157   AU, "Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges and mitigation measures in place," press release, January 27, 2017.

158   AU, "Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa," para. 25–26.

159   See European Commission, "EU Official Development Assistance reaches highest level ever," press release, April 11, 2017.

160   EU, "Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders' views," accompanying SWD(2016) 221 final, p. 14.

assistance to military actors in support of reform.[161] Efforts by the EU to enhance flexibility have already been undertaken, with the creation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which has frequently been used as a rapid response instrument to react to specific needs not yet tackled by other programmes. Also, the European Commission has worked to enable more predictability by setting a 7-year Multiannual Financial Framework (2014–2020), with a mid-term review that is designed to be generic and flexible.[162] Still, a Joint Staff Working Document noted in 2016 that, as yet, EU external action financing instruments are not always adaptable enough to be responsive throughout the long SSR process.[163]

The OSCE also faces limited resources and, as acknowledged in an internal mapping study in 2013, the organization sometimes requires funding support from the EU to implement SSR programmes.[164] Thus, the **OSCE has also been a recipient of funding for SSR support**. The core budget of the OSCE is allocated mainly towards fixed costs and salaries, and the majority of projects are funded through extra-budgetary contributions.[165] Thus, projects are often "shaped by the priorities of individual states which contribute extra-budgetary funding and seconded personnel."[166] As with the AU, a dependency on external support runs the risk of undermining regional ownership in approaching the reform of the security sector.

In sum, all four organizations under study cited a lack of long-term and predictable **funding** as one of their main challenges to achieving the implementation of comprehensive SSR strategies. Moreover, annual budget cycles (e.g. OSCE, UN) hamper the ability to plan for longer-term support. And this is compounded by the demands of some donors, who often seek quick results in an area that inherently requires long-term commitment. Indeed, this short-term view clashes with the nature of SSR programming, which must offer long-term support to transformative processes. Thus, furthering the commitment of the donor community to the long-term nature of SSR is essential.

Implications of current implementation modalities

Many of these implementation challenges have contributed to a reality on the ground: **SSR support is often strongly focused on awareness-raising and training activities that are conceived as short-term projects rather than long-term support processes requiring political and technical engagement.** For instance, a recent review of the UN's approach to defence sector reform through its peacekeeping and political missions found that a significant share of its support in this area is provided through trainings that seek to mainstream gender and human rights issues. Likewise, an evaluation of the EU's approach

to SSR support noted that its capacity-building was often only technical in nature and largely focused on "training, advice/mentoring, provision of capital equipment, and infrastructure development," with little emphasis on supporting oversight processes, human resource management, or budgetary management.[167] A review by DCAF of the approach taken by the OSCE to SSR came to a similar conclusion: "Because there is such a high focus on providing training and seminars to accompany reform, processes targeting the institutional systems are often not the main focus of support. While staff of relevant ministries participate in the different activities, reform of the structures within which they work is often neglected."[168] This reflects concerns raised during interviews with UN staff, who also noted that UN support in this area has been insufficiently linked to broader institution-building efforts. This is a significant concern given that support to the governance dimension is vital to the success of transformative processes.

Cooperation in implementation

The policy frameworks of the organizations under study call for the joint implementation of activities and for cooperation in developing coordination mechanisms. A key obstacle to this is that much of the cooperation that occurs among multilateral organizations takes place at the implementation stage, when it is too late to shape mandates. Dedicated international donor coordination mechanisms are often established, especially under the leadership of the UN, when it is mandated to coordinate international support (e.g. Mali, Libya). Sometimes, coordination mechanisms are also established for specific sectors, as the OSCE Mission in Skopje did in the area of police reform. However, a notable weakness of these cooperation and coordination mechanisms is that their activities are generally limited to exchanging information and developing matrices that summarize international assistance. As such, cooperation at the implementation stage is usually technical but not political and is not conducted in order to adapt programmes of support according to a division of labour.

Another challenge is that **national actors are not systematically included in coordination mechanisms**, raising important questions about how national capacity can be built in order to lead reform efforts in line with the core principle of national ownership. As a case in point, the draft Terms of Reference (ToR) for the coordination mechanism in Libya stipulate that, "in time, senior Libyan counterparts will be invited to attend, and ultimately to co-chair and then chair the meetings should they wish."[169] Similarly, a lessons learning exercise pertaining to UNMIL found that the UN had waited too long to build the capacity of national actors in Libya to support coordination efforts. There, it was not until the transition from mission to UN country team that it was realized that a dedicated national coordination mechanism was not in place.[170]

161 Ibid., p. 13.

162 Interview with EU personnel, Brussels, May 2017.

163 EU, "Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders' views," accompanying SWD(2016) 221 final, p. 12.

164 DCAF, *OSCE Mapping Study*, p. 63.

165 Ibid., p. 57.

166 Ibid., p. 23.

167 *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform*, November 2011, p. 33. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1295_vol1_en.pdf

168 DCAF, *OSCE Mapping Study*, p. 48.

169 See International Coordination Meeting on Security Sector Governance, Draft Terms of Reference.

170 UN personnel, Mapping Study Workshop in Brussels, March 2018.

The considerable time lost as actors determine who should lead coordination on the international side, develop terms of reference for the coordination body, and establish a multiplicity of coordination mechanisms in the area of SSR is a further challenge; as is the capacity of organizations to lead coordination efforts at all. For instance, military EU CSDP missions were reported to have difficulties in leading coordination because most of their staff are deployed for only 6 months. Moreover, in non-mission contexts, the EU often relies on implementing partners to manage its SSR projects. It places these partners under strict contracts that outline, in detail, the funds and capacity available for each activity. While this allows the EU to provide SSR support where it does not have dedicated capacities in place, it limits the ability of partners to adapt to evolving circumstances on the ground. This highlights the need to ensure that flexibility is recognized as a guiding principle for planning and programming in the provision of joint support. Linked to this, EU implementing partners rarely participate in UN-led coordination mechanisms, despite instructions from EU delegations to do so.

In sum, there is a need to streamline the multiplicity of coordination mechanisms that exist, and to **distinguish between 'information sharing mechanisms' which exist in many contexts as opposed to proper coordination mechanisms which are generally rare.** A platform that collects the ToR of existing SSR coordination bodies would be useful, as would consideration of the development of a set of minimum standards for these bodies, in order to save time on the ground. Finally, a key lesson is that multilaterals need to more effectively invest in supporting national ownership through strengthening the ability of national actors to lead coordination mechanisms.

4.3. Monitoring and evaluation

M&E is essential in order to adjust operational practice on the basis of evolving needs. It enables the assessment of results, which strengthens evidence-based review. While M&E is recognized in the SSR policy frameworks of the organizations under study as essential, it is nonetheless a key area in which these organizations have lagged. This section provides an overview of approaches to M&E in the context of SSR support.

Approaches to monitoring and evaluating SSR support

All four organizations embrace the need for M&E as part of a broader approach to results-based management.[171] They also all recognize the need to improve their approaches to monitoring and evaluating SSR support. Staff interviewed in the framework of this study acknowledged that monitoring the progress of SSR, particularly beyond outputs, is not carried out systematically. The UN and the OSCE both conduct monitoring as part of their broader results-based management, for instance, but the focus is usually on the achievement of activities or on outputs. And, it should be noted in the case of the OSCE specifically that, despite growing calls from participating States for more attention on accountability

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171 Some UN actors refer to 'results-based budgeting,' while the OSCE uses the term 'performance-based programme budgeting.'

and value for money, the political environment largely inhibits a culture of M&E – because there is a reticence to use any indicators that might allow conclusions to be drawn about the ability of participating States to meet their commitments and not just about overall OSCE support. This means that OSCE evaluations are generally focused on outputs and rarely examine the impact of sector-wide support in a country.[172] The AU also disclosed that its monitoring takes place only on a small scale and that monitoring exercises are mainly output oriented (e.g. questionnaires to training participants). Similarly, a recent evaluation of EU support to SSR noted that reporting had focused on "deliverables/activities" and that "meaningful measurement of reform progress has been limited."[173] This also reflects a broader tendency among multilateral organizations to confuse monitoring with reporting, which has resulted in a lack of effort to regularly collect and analyse data on results beyond outputs.

SSR evaluations appear to be more regularly conducted by UN agencies (e.g. UNODC and UNDP) or by the European Commission than by the entities responsible for field operations. A recent study examined the approaches to evaluations used by international actors in the area of SSR, and while no relevant publicly available evaluations were found for the OSCE and the AU, 9 SSR-related evaluations of EU assistance were identified as well as over 70 evaluations commissioned by different agencies within the UN system, particularly UNODC and UNDP.[174] A key finding was that the vast majority of these evaluations did not analyse progress in the reform of the security sector as a whole but focused primarily on individual components of the sector. In fact, of the evaluations that were examined, the number that framed assistance from a holistic perspective was around just 10 per cent of the total. Most EC and UN evaluations were instead centred on one or several components of the security sector, with the majority focused on reforms related to law enforcement, border management, customs, and criminal justice. While component-specific evaluations are important, they often lack information on how progress may be connected to broader conflict analysis which would require a sector-wide approach. The EU is the only organization that has undertaken comprehensive evaluations of its SSR support in general as well as in specific countries.[175] Moreover, in line with its new SSR policy, it has committed to carrying out at least one comprehensive evaluation of SSR support in one country each year.

All four organizations under study are currently undertaking measures to **improve their approaches to M&E in the area of SSR.** The AU has developed guidance on monitoring and evaluating SSR efforts,

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172 DCAF, *OSCE Mapping Study*.

173 European Commission, Evaluation of EU support for Security Sector Reform in enlargement and neighborhood countries (2010-2016), Brussels, 2018, p. 50.

174 DCAF, *Evaluations in the Area of Security Sector Reform: Comparative Analysis and Policy Recommendations* (forthcoming). For the period under review in the study, 1 January 2001 to 31 July 2015, researchers identified a total of 110 evaluations of international support to national SSR processes. Through a systematic search of publicly available evaluations related to SSR, the study collected a large sample of evaluations covering various and diverse interventions from a range of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, including the European Commission and various UN entities. For the UN, this amounted to 42 assessments of UNODC interventions, 23 reviews of UNDP support, and evaluations of 3 UNICEF interventions, one UN Women assistance project, and one UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) project. In addition, the study included two evaluations of support administered by the UN Development Goal Achievement Fund (MDG-F).

175 The EU is the only organization that has carried out comprehensive evaluations of overall support to SSR, which are publicly available. See, for instance, *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform*.

and the UN has engaged in an initial process of guidance development on the topic. The EU is currently beginning its own guidance process on this issue, while the OSCE has developed a guidance note on impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R support that includes broad guidance for M&E efforts. Although the AU is seeking to deepen its engagement in this area, some interviewees were sceptical about their ability to do so, given their limited capacity.[176] And while they don't face the same capacity restraints as the AU, other organizations also noted that capacity is a potential challenge to strengthening their efforts in M&E.

Cooperation in the area of M&E

M&E has been mentioned as a priority for cooperation in some of the SSR policy frameworks of the organizations under study. Moreover, in line with international cooperation principles, there is an increasing need to jointly measure progress against a common goal. To enhance coordination and identify synergies, the progress of each organization should ideally be measured against the objectives set by national governments, to the extent that these are reflected in national security strategies or PRSPs for instance. Yet, **in the area of M&E, there is typically no cooperation between organizations.** This is a missed opportunity to support efforts that facilitate the alignment of numerous actors towards overall nationally-owned objectives in the security sector, limit the risk of conflicting messages, and support the legitimacy of emerging recommendations. Additionally, such joint efforts limit the transaction costs for host countries and implementing organizations alike, which is of particular importance against the backdrop of capacity constraints these organizations report in the area of M&E.

A review of over 100 SSR-related evaluations revealed that joint evaluations are an exception, not the rule.[177] Just two evaluations in the sample represented a joint effort that brought together different donor agencies – one involving the EU, in Burundi,[178] and the other involving several UN entities (including OHCHR, UNDP, and UN Women), in DRC.[179] These evaluations were not jointly conducted *between* multilateral organizations, but with other donors, yet they still offer some lessons for multilateral organizations moving forward. For example, the joint evaluation on programming in Burundi noted that the absence of a strategic framework encompassing the intervention strategies defined by individual donors was a challenge to evaluators, who had to put forth considerable effort to compare strategies in a way that facilitated their holistic understanding of overall support.[180] This challenge is often related to the lack of joint *assessments*, which would establish common baselines to measure progress. The

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176 Interview with AU personnel, Addis Ababa, November 2016.

177 DCAF, *Evaluations in the Area of Security Sector Reform: Comparative Analysis and Policy Recommendations* (forthcoming).

178 See SARL, "Evaluation conjointe de la cooperation de l'Allemagne, de la Belgique, de la Commission européenne, de la France, des Pays-Bas, du Royaume-Uni et de la Suède avec le Burundi," Vol. I–III, February 2014.

179 Emery Brusset, et al., *Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Synthesis Report* (FPS Foreign Affairs, 2011).

180 See SARL, "Evaluation conjointe de la cooperation de l'Allemagne, de la Belgique, de la Commission européenne, de la France, des Pays-Bas, du Royaume-Uni et de la Suède avec le Burundi," p. 23.

joint evaluation on assistance in the DRC also contained some lessons and good practice, such as the establishment of a steering committee composed of representatives from participating donor agencies and responsible for quality assurance and the maintenance of close dialogue with local consultative groups, including local authorities, civil society, and other major stakeholders, to ensure the relevance of evaluation.[181] If multilateral organizations are going to engage more in joint evaluations, common principles for the conduct of such evaluations must be developed.

One major obstacle to joint approaches to M&E is the fact that the four organizations under study use different M&E language – both between organizations but also within them. For instance, in the UN, there are no organization-wide terms for M&E activities.[182] Through its initial guidance development efforts, the UN attempted to provide coherence to this language by proposing the designation of 'low-level', 'medium-level', and 'high-level' SSR results. This is similar to the approach taken by the OSCE, which employs the terms 'objectives', 'outcomes', and 'outputs', and associates these with 'long-term', 'medium-term', or 'short-term' results. A first step towards coherence among organizations would be to harmonize tools and facilitate the identification of best practice. Crucially, this demands continued dialogue between these organizations during the development of guidance on this topic, to ensure that shared minimum standards are established and a common language is used to the extent possible.

4.4. Key findings

The following are key findings regarding the operational practices of the multilateral organizations examined in this research:

▶ **Assessments that focus on SSR are limited and are not followed up on appropriately.** While organizations often engage in broad assessments, SSR is typically just one among many issues, which are usually examined in siloes and without depth. SSR-specific assessments have been rare and have been undertaken mostly as joint assessments within the AU-UN-EU capacity-building project. While these joint assessments are encouraging, more efforts are needed to ensure a joint interpretation of the findings and that those findings will contribute to planning. Additionally, conflict analysis that links SSR to root drivers is often weak; interviewees raised this as a potential area for future research and guidance.

▶ **SSR has not been effectively mainstreamed into broader planning processes**. Often, sector-wide SSR experts are not included in planning teams (which tend to privilege police or military experts) or lack the capacity to contribute effectively to these teams. As a result, SSR priorities fail to be appropriately assessed in relation to other priorities and their sequencing. Moreover, the different SSR profiles

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181 Brusset, et al., pp. 14 and 33.

182 For instance, the results-based budget of a peacekeeping mission refers to 'output', 'expected accomplishment' (as the medium-order result) and 'Security Council objective' (as the highest-order result); while the frameworks used by UNDAF often refer to 'output', 'country programme outcome' (as the medium-order result), and 'UNDAF outcome' (as the higher-level result).

required for effective SSR support are often not budgeted for as these are likely to be overlooked during the initial planning stage.

▶ **SSR support is often implemented as a series of 'projects' rather than as a long-term process requiring both political and technical engagement.** Consequently, multilateral support has been focused predominantly on awareness-raising and training activities and has not situated SSR within a broader institution-building framework. While this is often the result of pressure from donors for quick results or a lack of national political will to engage in these issues, a significant factor has also been the lack of relevant technical expertise to contribute to these broader governance-driven reforms.

▶ **M&E of SSR support has been a challenge** for all the organizations under study. In general, evaluations are an exception, not the rule, particularly when it comes to assessing sector-wide support. Monitoring is often confused with reporting, offering just the tracking of activities and outputs, without further analysis. Given the significant capacity gaps identified in this area, it would be useful for these organizations to leverage their resources by conducting joint evaluations of SSR support. Among other things, this will require that efforts are undertaken first to harmonize both M&E language and tools used by these organizations.

▶ **While the policy frameworks of these organizations set out key areas for cooperation, these are not being applied in practice.** Each policy framework identifies concrete avenues for cooperation in the area of SSR, including through joint assessments, joint evaluations, and sharing rosters of experts, yet these largely remain borne out only on paper. While cooperation in SSR does take place, it is frequently on the basis of agreements within the framework of specific initiatives, such as the AU-UN-EU capacity-building project. While cooperation does take place on the ground, through national coordination mechanisms for instance, this often occurs too late in the process and amounts to information exchange rather than bringing about a truly harmonized approach to support.

▶ **SSR-specific actors lack established key principles to guide cooperation, such as those that exist in the broader development and humanitarian sectors.** In these sectors, key principles for cooperation are outlined, for instance, in the Paris Declaration and the Busan Agreement, including that donor countries align their support to national objectives, coordinate and share information to avoid duplication, and ensure that development results are measured. It would be valuable for the SSR community to learn from these initiatives and apply these aid effectiveness principles to cooperation in SSR support.

Conclusion and Recommendations

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This mapping study examines the approaches of multilateral organizations to SSR support, as well as the extent to which cooperation takes place between and among them, in line with broader policy and cooperation frameworks. The results highlight that, despite significant efforts to strengthen partnerships among the UN, AU, EU, and OSCE, the impact of cooperation is limited, largely contributing to increased information sharing as opposed to concrete results. This section reviews key findings of the study and puts forth recommendations for multilateral organizations.

5.1. Summary of key findings

The approaches to SSR taken by the multilateral organizations under study were reviewed, to develop empirical data as a first step towards dialogue on comparative advantages. This was also a chance to identify opportunities to enhance cooperation and predictability in multilateral support to SSR. Among other things, predictability implies that organizations: provide support on the basis of a clear division of labour that draws on comparative advantages; have the resources available to deliver according to needs on the ground; and address planning, implementation, and M&E in a coherent and collaborative manner.

Comparative trends in the approaches of multilateral organizations to SSR support

All four organizations under study are both mandated to and engaged in a wide spectrum of SSR support (see annex A). They are all involved, to varying degrees, in providing sector-wide support aimed at establishing the foundations of security sector governance. Most frequently addressed in this support are: reviews of national security policies and strategies, efforts to enhance the fair and equitable representation of women, and the development of national capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence. Common areas of component-specific engagement include support to reforms of police/law enforcement, border management and customs, defence, and justice services. Areas less commonly supported include corrections, civil emergencies, and intelligence services.

This study identified a number of broad trends for further exploration. First, of the four organizations examined, the **UN** is most engaged in sector-wide support to SSR and has issued the most field operations mandates in this area. The UN reports engaging in a wider array of sector-wide activities than the other

organizations and is the only organization to have systematically established dedicated sector-wide SSR structures in its field operations. This suggests that, in mission contexts, the UN has an important role to play in determining strategic priorities for SSR; and when required, in leading coordination efforts to ensure that the international community supports a comprehensive approach to reform. Yet, this role hinges on the ability of SSR units to play an integrative function within UN missions, as set out in UNSCR 2151. The UN also has a rich network of agencies, funds, and programmes in both mission and non-mission contexts that engage in SSR support through the lens of development, human rights, gender, and transnational organized crime. This presents the organization an opportunity to provide comprehensive support and, importantly, to identify entry points for work with national counterparts on topics that may be perceived as less sensitive, while confidence is built to later engage in more delicate areas of SSR. However, this demands that the UN strengthen its internal cooperation mechanisms, notably through the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force.

Conversely, the **EU** is the organization least engaged in sector-wide support. In mission contexts, it has the fewest mandates in this area, usually providing more targeted support to component-specific areas such as defence, law enforcement, or border management. As such, the EU often has a larger array of capacities and expertise in certain component areas from which to draw. The EU is also the only organization that relies routinely on external expertise through its country offices (delegations), which potentially enables more flexible support that can adapt to evolving needs. Then again, the use of external expertise limits the ability of the EU to play a political good offices role, and that often means it cannot provide overarching strategic direction to SSR. This is addressed to some extent in the new comprehensive EU SSR policy, which is intended to bridge the support of the EEAS and the Commission and outlines a role for the EU in sector-wide support and the potential for the EU to become an even stronger SSR actor.

The broad approach of the **OSCE** to security allows it to engage in a wide range of efforts. In countries where it has a long-standing field presence and there is no clear UN lead, the OSCE sometimes plays a vital role in coordinating international efforts. A potential weakness in OSCE support to SSR is that its field operations are often not structured in such a way as to ensure a clear internal lead in defining strategic priorities. Still, the organization recognizes that it can play an important role in filling the niches not occupied by other actors.[183] For instance, regarding its engagement in police reform, which is reflective of its broader approach, the OSCE has acknowledged that it "cannot and should not compete with" the "superior resources and delivery capacity" of other international actors.[184] Like UNODC, the OSCE appears to have a comparative advantage in areas related to addressing transnational threats, including counter-terrorism, organized crime, trafficking, and border management. And due to its regional approach, operating only within the territory of participating States, the OSCE can have a significant impact just by raising awareness on important but sensitive issues.

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183 OSCE, *Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2005*, November 2006.

184 OSCE, *Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2006*, July 2007.

Finally, as the main custodian of peace and security on the African continent, the **AU** has numerous comparative advantages, including its close engagement with RECs and its strong understanding of local context. The organization recognizes that it should play an important part in supporting more effective conflict analysis related to the security sector. Furthermore, by virtue of being invited to provide advisory support to national governments, it has an important political role to play; a role that could be strengthened through support to the AU aimed at increasing its coordinating role with national counterparts in-country. The AU could also work to more actively leverage south-to-south support. However, the ability of the AU to step up to these tasks is limited by its capacities, which make it impossible for the organization to provide comprehensive support to SSR. To date, it has focused on sector-wide support over systematic engagement in component areas such as police or the judiciary.

Challenges and opportunities to enhancing predictability

This study examined the roles played by multilateral organizations and implications for SSR support. It has found that the use of implicit mandates for SSR in field operations makes predictability on this basis unfeasible (for details, see annex A). Indeed, in practice, it is impossible to determine in advance the extent to which an organization may be engaged in certain areas based solely on its mandate. Further, these mandates are often vague, calling generally for support to training or the provision of advice, without clarifying roles and responsibilities. This study also highlighted that the many similarities across areas of support provided by these multilateral organizations makes any discussion regarding a potential division of labour difficult, at least without deeper analysis. Each of these organizations may engage regularly in defence sector reform, for instance, but the study cannot shed light on whether support provided in this area by one organization may focus more on human rights training while another engages primarily in human resource management. More detailed case studies would be useful to identify these nuances.

This study has isolated key findings on the approaches of multilateral organizations to SSR support, in relation to three categories: (1) normative framework, (2) institutional capacities, and (3) operational practice. Several elements that may negatively affect the ability of these organizations to enhance the predictability of their support in these areas were also identified.

(1) Normative framework: Despite the absence of a universal definition of SSR, the international community does nonetheless apply a rather universal normative framework for SSR. Each of the four organizations under study have developed a rich policy framework that sets out definitions and principles that guide support. There is some convergence around a rather broad understanding of what comprises a security sector, incorporating military and non-military security forces, security and justice institutions, management and oversight bodies, and both State institutions and some non-state actors. Moreover, the principles underpinning SSR support are increasingly shared across the international community, especially when it comes to national ownership, good governance, context-specificity, and gender sensitivity. All four organizations are also engaged in developing guidance intended to support their staff in the field.

The findings of this study suggest that many principles and understandings of SSR are common to multiple international actors and should provide the foundations for enhanced cooperation. However, the normative frameworks of these organizations are not instructive regarding potential comparative advantages that could inform a division of labour. Indeed, they often set out similar roles for each organization, both thematically (e.g. focus on sector-wide support) and programmatically (e.g. focus on guidance development, training). On top of that, not one of these organizations has yet engaged in a review of the implementation of their policy framework, to assess whether they in fact have comparative advantages in certain areas over other actors. Also, while these policy frameworks encourage cooperation and coordination, they do not clarify which organization(s) should take the lead in joint efforts, and as a result, commitments are not translated into practice.

(2) Institutional capacities: All four organizations have SSR capacities at headquarters and in the field, but the extent of these capacities varies significantly. The number of staff in dedicated SSR sections at headquarters ranges from approximately seven at the UN, to three at the EU and AU, to one at the OSCE. In the field, staff engaged in SSR support are sometimes in dedicated SSR sections (e.g. UN), while others are dispatched across functional security sector departments (e.g. OSCE). The EU is the only organization to have had missions on the ground entirely focused on a component area of SSR (e.g. EUSEC RD Congo, focused on military reform). The number of staff dedicated to SSR support also varies considerably across contexts, with some field operations featuring only a few staff compared to others that involve several dozen.[185] Given limited capacities, it is common that SSR staff is expected to provide support in a wide range of areas, from political facilitation, to technical support, to M&E. But the extensive mandates laid out in policy frameworks are not always in line with the expertise and resources available in the real world. Thus, many gaps in expertise exist, including in rather important areas such as public administration reform, vetting, and strengthening the management and internal oversight of the security sector.

The broad institutional structures and staffing profiles of all four organizations represent a challenge to enhancing predictability. There is a tendency across these organizations to establish dedicated structures in areas such as police and justice, with only limited structures for border management, and none dedicated to intelligence or civil emergencies. One clear deviation from this is the existence of sector-wide SSR structures in the field, which exist primarily in UN operations. When it comes to expertise, the profiles of staff at these organizations are very similar as well. For instance, staff working in police and defence structures in the field, with few exceptions, are former security officials rather than reform specialists.

(3) Operational practice: There are similarities among the approaches taken by these organizations to planning, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating SSR support. In each case, SSR needs assessments are not systematic and conflict analysis with a specific focus on SSR is rarely conducted.

And while needs assessments are sometimes conducted jointly, they are rarely linked to formal planning mechanisms. Implementation presents many shared challenges as well, with all four organizations experiencing a range of obstacles, from a lack of capacities, to donor pressure for swift results. One of the key findings of this research is that these challenges often result in ad hoc approaches to support that provide trainings and workshops but do not engage in coherent and long-term programming that supports SSR from an institution-building perspective. Finally, these organizations also fail to conduct consistent M&E of their own SSR programmes, beyond outputs, and are thus missing opportunities to learn in real time and facilitate adjustments.

There are significant gaps in cooperation among these organizations, despite the prominence of this principle in their policy frameworks, each of which recognize the fundamental role of cooperation in ensuring the provision of comprehensive support to national reform processes. In practice, effective partnerships depend on the alignment of strategic and political objectives from the early planning stages, and while this study identified one or two exceptions, dialogue on the precise modes of cooperation in SSR generally does not occur until actors are on the ground, when it is too late to realign resources. This lack of a systematic approach to cooperation leads to missed opportunities to address many of the common challenges faced by all of these organizations, including how to better optimize available human and financial resources.

Avenues for further research

This study has mapped the approaches of multilateral organizations to SSR and has identified gaps in knowledge, while also pinpointing areas where further research is required. In particular, there is a need to understand why provisions contained in policy and cooperation frameworks have not been implemented in practice. In-depth research that examines, through case studies, the extent of complementarity or duplication in the field is also needed. Finally, a follow-up study is called for that broadens the mapping begun here to other multilateral organizations, in order to more thoroughly assess approaches to enhancing the coordinated delivery of international support on the ground.

5.2. Recommendations

This study marks a first step towards building an empirical basis from which to draw informed recommendations concerning a range of approaches to enhancing the effective delivery of multilateral support on the ground. These recommendations are structured according to three categories addressed in the study: (1) normative framework, (2) institutional capacities, and (3) operational practice. It is important to note that these recommendations are unlikely to be successfully implemented without a meaningful and continuous dialogue among concerned partners that addresses their feasibility and identifies immediate priorities for action.

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185 This includes staff spread across different sections that provide support in the area of SSR.

1. Increasing the effectiveness of SSR policy and guidance

The proliferation of policy and guidance development among multilateral organizations has generally not been accompanied by efforts to review their implementation. While the effectiveness of policy and guidance can only be measured by its use, multilateral organizations have sometimes failed to reflect on how to support dissemination or implementation. To increase the effectiveness of SSR policy and guidance, it is recommended that multilateral organizations:

1.1. Strengthen opportunities to disseminate and review existing policy and guidance

A general lack of awareness of existing SSR policy and guidance, both within organizations and between them, represents a missed opportunity to support staff on the ground who would benefit from lessons drawn from other SSR support contexts. Further efforts are necessary to raise awareness of the guidance that exists within and outside these organizations, and to identify opportunities to support their implementation in the field.

1.1.1.   **Increase efforts to ensure that senior management is aware of SSR policy and guidance.** Several of the organizations under study noted that a lack of awareness among senior management of SSR policy has been a challenge. Among other things, this may account for an absence of leadership on the use of political good offices to engage with national counterparts on sensitive SSR issues. Approaches to remedying this may include: the development of a note for senior managers summarizing key SSR policy/guidance (as implemented by the OSCE); the inclusion of SSR in the annual retreats of senior management (as implemented by the UN); or a retreat for senior management and Member States on this topic, for instance under the auspices of a Group of Friends of SSR.

1.1.2.   **Establish dedicated training mechanisms to effectively disseminate SSR policy and guidance among both headquarters and field staff.** Multilateral organizations should develop and deliver tailor-made training on SSR to support the implementation of policy and guidance. Further, key messages from policy and guidance should be included in the broader orientation training for staff, as well as in other training opportunities. The development of a train-the-trainers programme may also be appropriate. To date, the OSCE is the only organization that has addressed these needs in a systematic manner, though the EU has begun to deliver a dedicated SSR training curriculum in the context of its new SSR policy. Joint efforts to develop and conduct training could also be considered given the similarities in the definitions and principles of SSR embraced by the organisations.

1.1.3.   **Raise awareness among the staff of multilateral organizations on the existing policy and guidance of other organizations through development of a community of practice and/or an online platform.** An online collaborative platform that links to the official SSR policy and guidance documents of relevant multilateral organizations could be enhanced by the development of online courses, for instance to introduce the policies and guidance of multilateral partners, for which each organization develops/contributes a module.

1.1.4.   **Conduct a review of SSR support in pilot countries to assess the extent to which SSR support aligns with the principles and approaches set out in policy and guidance frameworks.** Efforts should be made to understand the extent to which SSR support implemented in the field aligns with policy and guidance, and whether this contributes to more effective support as well as to enhanced cooperation at headquarters and in the field.

1.2. Support the development of further guidance based on lessons learned

While all four organizations under study have developed or are in the process of developing sector-wide SSR guidance, there is a need to further bridge the policy-practice gap through the development of guidance that is based on lessons learned in national SSR processes.

1.2.1.   **Ensure a balance between normative and operational guidance.** Much of the current guidance of multilateral organizations is intended to develop common intra-organizational understandings of SSR support. As such, it often seeks to provide normative frameworks for engagement rather than specific examples of different approaches to reform. Yet, in order to meet growing calls from both field staff and national stakeholders for examples of lessons learned in other national SSR processes, greater effort should be made to develop operational guidance and tools based on comparative empirical research. This will support an evidence-based approach that considers what has and has not worked in other contexts. Moreover, there is a need to find innovative approaches to tailor lessons collected to the particular circumstances of each context.

1.2.2.   **Identify priority areas for empirically-based research that can feed into future guidance development, and ensure it is conducted using solid methodological approaches.** To develop more lessons-based guidance, multilateral organizations should identify current challenges in SSR that would benefit from analysis (through reviews of policy and guidance implementation and/or through surveys on current challenges). Additionally, it would be valuable to collect, compile, and share good practices from support in these areas and/or initiate an annual conference or forum that brings together expertise. And, beyond research efforts focused on lessons learned from multilateral support to SSR processes, efforts should also be made to identify lessons learned in national contexts that do not draw on international support, to broaden the evidence base. Any such research should be grounded in solid methodological approaches that can move beyond the anecdotal evidence often used to date.

1.2.3.   **Regularly review the operationalization of guidance frameworks to identify challenges to their implementation and to contribute to updating relevant normative frameworks.** Except for the OSCE, which conducted a review of its guidance implementation just a year after its release,

the other organizations under study have not yet conducted a review of sector-wide guidance policies. The EU has only just finalized its new policy, but the UN and the AU should engage in a comprehensive review of implementation of their guidance, to ascertain the degree to which they are translated on the ground. In particular, these reviews should examine how closely this support aligns with key principles and approaches outlined in policy, whether guidance is being used by staff, and what obstacles to implementation exist. This may uncover needs for further support and guidance, and provide insights as to the comparative advantages of each organization.

1.3. Support collaboration in guidance development and implementation processes

The number of SSR policy and guidance products developed by multilateral organizations is steadily growing, yet very little consultation takes place between these organizations in the process of developing these initiatives, apart from guidance developed in the context of the AU-UN-EU capacity-building project. Though the guidance put forth by each organization is often specific to a given region and to institutional requirements, in light of the time and resources expended to develop guidance and the fact that there is still a pressing need for guidance in many areas, multilateral organizations should support synergies wherever possible.

1.3.1. **Open guidance development to include consultation with other multilateral organizations.** Ensuring that staff in other organizations are aware of guidance under development, at an early stage, may contribute to greater compatibility among efforts as well as to minimizing the need for guidance on similar topics. It also provides an opportunity to draw on emerging good practice and lessons from other organizations that have faced similar challenges in SSR support.

1.3.2. **Explore the development of joint guidance to facilitate enhanced cooperation on SSR support delivery.** When developing guidance that is likely to provide the basis for joint support (e.g. on assessments, M&E, conflict analysis, etc.), multilateral organizations should agree on common standards and language. These could then be integrated into the relevant guidance notes of each organization or introduced as a shared addendum to organization-specific guidance. Ideally, a joint guidance note that extracts key steps for cooperation in these areas would also be developed to facilitate cooperation.

1.3.3. **Conduct joint lessons learning exercises.** Strengthening cooperation and effectiveness is linked to the ability to develop a common understanding of what works and what does not. To the extent possible, actors involved in providing SSR support should conduct joint lessons learning exercises that seek to evaluate past experiences and provide shared knowledge on good practices for future similar scenarios. At minimum, multilateral organizations should be encouraged to share their own lessons learned with other multilateral and bilateral partners.

2. Strengthening institutional capacities

Effective SSR support hinges on having the necessary capacities available to deliver on mandates; yet, this research highlights that in the multilateral organizations under study, many gaps exist in both SSR-related institutional structures and expertise. Among all four of these organizations, there are significant differences in their approaches to leveraging capacities, with some entities (such as UNDP and EU delegations) outsourcing SSR support and others (particularly field operations) relying on their own staff. What is needed are efforts to bring together dispersed capacities in order to contribute more effectively to national goals, and this requires two things – ensuring that capacities on the ground align with mandates and developing mechanisms that enable expertise to be leveraged more flexibly. Thus, to strengthen institutional capacities towards enhanced delivery of support, it is recommended that multilateral organizations:

2.1. Support efforts to align capacities with needs in terms of structures and number of staff

A common challenge, particularly for UN and AU field operations and to some extent those of the EU and the OSCE, is that mandates often call for capacities that do not align with structures and staff numbers on the ground. An operation may be mandated to provide support to border management reform, for instance, but may include no dedicated staff assigned to this area. This is particularly challenging when one considers that field operations typically rely on their own staff to provide SSR support, which can result in support that matches the expertise of staff as opposed to meeting needs on the ground.

2.1.1. **Conduct reviews to assess whether a lack of dedicated institutional structures is impacting the delivery of support.** This study has identified numerous areas of SSR (e.g. defence sector reform, border security reform, civil emergencies) for which no dedicated institutional structures exist at headquarters or in the field. While this research did not examine in detail whether this negatively impacts support, preliminary findings suggest that this deficiency does affect the ability of these organizations to provide comprehensive SSR support. If this finding is confirmed, the establishment of more dedicated structures – at least at the headquarters level – should be contemplated by multilateral organizations, in order to provide adequate backstopping support to field operations.

2.1.2. **Raise awareness among Member States of the benefits of a security sector governance approach to support, as well as the challenges related to the provision of support with the available capacities on the ground.** This should be based on empirical research, which should underline discrepancies between mandates and capacities and highlight concrete examples of negative impacts to support. As a first step, a review study could be undertaken to assess whether the lack of dedicated institutional structures in certain areas of SSR is impacting the delivery of support (see recommendation 2.1.1).

2.1.3. **Ensure that SSR experts are included in planning teams so that relevant recommendations on institutional structures feed into programme/mission budgets.** A common challenge for the four organizations under study is that SSR experts are rarely included in broad assessment and planning teams. This has frequently resulted in a failure to appropriately translate SSR needs into programme and mission budgets. Given the strategic importance of SSR in sustaining peace, SSR experts must be included in planning and assessment teams, to advocate for required capacities.

2.2. Support efforts to better leverage existing expertise

The field of SSR comprises a wide variety of security and oversight actors, addresses many cross-cutting issues like human rights and gender, and demands both political and technical expertise. Given that multilateral organizations often have limited SSR-dedicated staff, it is nearly impossible for these organizations to contain the sufficient expertise to tackle all national requests for support. However, when specific expertise is lacking in one organization, it may be available in another; and so, better mechanisms for leveraging such capacities are needed. Thus, it is important to collect and disseminate information on broad and specific areas of expertise and to provide clear channels for leveraging it.

2.2.1. **Develop a balanced skill-set in SSR teams at HQ and in the field.** There are many challenges when it comes to securing expertise, from the fact that technical specialists of component sections (police, military, justice, etc.) often lack policy and management expertise, while general SSR experts often lack technical expertise gained from experience with national institution building. Considering how rare it is that staff can fulfil all SSR functions, SSR teams must be diversified and/or expanded – particularly in the field. This will require a shift in institutional culture, particularly in terms of hiring procedures and terms of reference for vacancy announcements, especially in the case of military and police secondments but also for general SSR specialists.

2.2.2. **Establish mechanisms that enable SSR expertise within organizations to be flexibly leveraged.** It is important to note that the capacities needed at the start of an intervention (e.g. policy/planning expertise) may not be the same as those required during or near the end of an intervention (e.g. technical expertise). Multilateral organizations should seek to develop innovative ways to maintain core staff, keeping institutional memory in place, while at the same time enabling dedicated experts to complement these teams according to needs. Valuable models are, for instance, those standing capacities that exist for the UN in the area of police or justice, or in the EU in the area of SSR.

2.2.3. **Complement rosters with a list of specific SSR expertise available among other organizations and partners and agree on modes for leveraging this expertise at both the headquarters and country levels.** The best way to leverage expertise may be through joint projects, or by consulting with experts in designing relevant programmes before dedicated capacities are brought in. To achieve this, a database with focal points for specific areas of expertise shared among the organizations, and an agreement on the modes for deploying such expertise, should be considered. How to make better

use of existing expertise among other organizations in-country should also be considered. This could potentially be achieved by communicating needs for expertise at international coordination meetings. The UN should also contemplate how to better enable the disbursement of assessed funds, which could facilitate the engagement of external capacity.

2.2.4. **Strengthen partnerships among security, development, and human rights actors to facilitate better sharing of expertise.** Development actors can, for example, contribute expertise in the broader area of public administration reform, and human rights actors can provide knowledge on root drivers of conflict that relate to social and political exclusion, human rights violations, and discrimination. More efforts are required to connect these actors to one another, both within and across organizations, and to ensure they are working towards a common goal.

3. Improving operational practice

The operational practice of multilateral organizations is largely shaped by their approach to planning, implementation, and M&E. The reality is that planning and assessment challenges, combined with the capacity challenges addressed above, often contribute to short-term approaches that fail to fully embrace the long-term governance needs of the security sector. Moreover, limited M&E efforts have hampered learning from and improving operational practice. In order to support enhanced operational practice, it is recommended that multilateral organizations:

3.1. Ensure that SSR is integrated into broader assessments and planning efforts

All four organizations under study identified the fact that SSR is not effectively mainstreamed into broader planning efforts as a challenge, particularly for field operations. This often extends from needs assessments that fail to systematically address SSR concerns, frequently because SSR experts are not integrated into these assessments or because SSR-specific assessments are not undertaken. In addition, findings from relevant assessment missions are often not properly integrated into the strategic planning of SSR-related support.

3.1.1. **Develop and implement a methodology for integrating SSR into conflict analysis or ensure that SSR is appropriately mainstreamed into existing approaches to conflict analysis.** While broad conflict analysis may be undertaken by the organizations under study, a clear methodology for linking SSR to this analysis is lacking. Given the reality that security sectors are often at the heart of conflict dynamics, it is important to develop such a methodology and to ensure that it is appropriately employed by multilateral organizations.

3.1.2. **Commit to including SSR experts and approaches in relevant needs assessments and planning processes.** There has been a tendency to send police or military experts to represent SSR interests on broader assessment and planning teams. When SSR experts cannot be included in assessments,

developing a methodology to ensure that SSR concerns can be appropriately integrated into these broader assessments is necessary, especially because these component experts may lack general SSR expertise that allow them to fully contribute to SSR-related analysis in all relevant assessment missions. There must also be a mechanism to ensure that the findings of SSR-specific assessments can feed into larger planning processes.

3.1.3.   **Ensure connectivity between/among assessments conducted by development, human rights, and security pillars**. Many sector-specific assessments are disconnected from others. For instance, WB-EU-UN recovery and peacebuilding assessments do not always integrate SSR experts from the security pillar, which can lead to a disconnect in the subsequent implementation of support.

3.2. Promote alignment by conducting joint assessments

Effective cooperation is built on a common understanding of the challenges that must be addressed, and these are often determined on the basis of assessments, which inform the planning and development of support programmes. The policy frameworks of many organizations call for joint assessments in SSR, and yet they remain an exception to the rule. One way to facilitate more joint assessments would be to agree on a shared methodology. Still, joint assessments alone are insufficient; they must be met by a commitment to engage in analysis at both the technical and political levels, and to jointly interpret findings and then adapt support accordingly.

3.2.1.   **Prioritize agreement on a shared methodology for joint assessments by multilateral organizations that addresses not only the process but also the analytical framework of SSR assessments**. Such a methodology could draw on existing assessment methodologies developed by the UN (e.g. UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment toolkit), the AU (SSR needs assessments operational guidance note), and the OSCE (Guidelines on needs assessments in the area of SSG/R). Alternatively, these organizations could agree to use methodologies already developed by regional organizations for the regions in which they are engaged. Moreover, to strengthen a shared understanding of the planning and assessment methodology and terminology of each organization, a workshop could be held to bring planners together as a way to improve harmonization and encourage coordination.

3.2.2.   **At the very minimum, invite multilateral organizations engaged on the ground to contribute to or informally join assessments.** Moreover, results of individual assessments should be shared with both national and international partners on the ground.

3.2.3.   **Encourage the joint interpretation of findings from individual assessments, for the purposes of adapting support accordingly or feeding these results into planning**. In cases where joint assessments are not feasible, this can provide the basis for joint political analysis aimed at agreeing on common messaging and objectives.

3.3. Support the harmonization of international support delivery through enhanced coordination

Effective partnerships depend on the alignment of strategic and political objectives, from the early planning stages. Yet, in practice, dialogue on precise modes of cooperation in SSR often takes place only once actors are on the ground, when it is too late to realign resources. This can lead to gaps in support as well as to duplication of efforts. Consultations on the potential for cooperation and coordination should therefore take place at the earliest stages of planning.

3.3.1.   **Agree on a methodology for consultation that incorporates cooperation at both the technical and political levels.** Early dialogue with international partners on the division of labour should be encouraged, to support these higher-level objectives. Building on good practice employed by the EU and the UN, this dialogue could take place in the context of a joint planning workshop or through the development of a joint memorandum of understanding. Ideally, this would result in the defining of common objectives and of the specific activities of each actor.

3.3.2.   **Before planning support, commit to mapping the planned and current support provided by multilateral organizations and other actors on the ground.** In selected pilot countries (for instance, where multiple organizations are operating), a lead organization should be appointed through consultation with other organizations to conduct a thorough mapping of international support to SSR, prior to the development of mandates. The EU could share the coordination matrices it is developing in pilot countries to contribute to this exercise. In cases where early consultation is not possible, at a minimum, each organization should commit to informally map the planned and current support of other multilateral actors engaged on the ground.

3.3.3.   **Reflect on how to improve the effectiveness of SSR coordination mechanisms.** While coordination is a national responsibility, in some cases, it is the international community that initially chairs coordination meetings. Much time can be lost as international actors try to determine the format and tasks of a coordination mechanism for international SSR support. The organizations under study should consider developing a set of principles to guide the development of context-specific ToRs and should highlight the need for mechanisms that focus more on coordination than information-sharing. Additionally, a review of existing coordination mechanisms on the ground could be useful, to identify lessons learned regarding how to strengthen their coordination role and how to transition effectively to nationally-driven coordination mechanisms.

3.3.4.   **Encourage more informal dialogue on country contexts.** Regular exchanges should be organized at the headquarters level by VTC, to enable continued discussion on how to move forward with the implementation of recommendations in the study and of country-specific support more generally. These meetings should also include representatives from field operations in order to encourage greater synergies across headquarters and field.

3.4. Balance the need for long-term institutional capacity-building with short-term approaches

There has been a tendency for multilateral organizations to approach SSR support through short-term projects that do not necessarily account for its long-term and political nature. This has manifested in activities such as trainings and workshops, as opposed to investments in longer-term initiatives that support SSR in a broader institution-building context.

3.4.1. **Approach SSR as an element of broader institution building through dedicated support programmes.** In particular, there must be a shift towards setting long-term programmatic objectives and ensuring that support is provided to achieve them. Efforts must also be undertaken to secure funding for institution building – which requires sustained commitment – as well as to build partnerships between security and development actors. It is important to note that long-term objectives should be incremental and achievable and should gradually generate benefits to the population even in the short term.

3.4.2. **Ensure that adequate attention is given to strengthening the governance dimension.** While the SSR policies of the four organizations under study all acknowledge the relevance of democratic governance, in practice, the mandates of their field missions often fail to call for engagement in governance issues. Additionally, there are still important but neglected areas of SSR in both mission and non-mission contexts, such as when it comes to the development or management of budgets or public expenditure reviews.

3.4.3. **Enhance capacity-building for national actors in areas related to strengthening national ownership, in line with UN Security Council resolution 2151.** None of the organizations under study are frequently involved in strengthening national capacities for M&E or in the development of national security sector budgets, but these are areas that deserve enhanced support from multilaterals. More energy should also be directed at strengthening the capacity of national actors to lead coordination efforts in-country at an early stage in the process and ensuring that capacity-building efforts generate short-term benefits for the population.

3.5. Increase monitoring and evaluation and strengthen the reporting of national progress

None of the four organizations examined here are engaged in systematic, in-depth M&E efforts in the area of SSR. Indeed, evaluations are still an exception, not the rule, especially regarding sector-wide support. To contribute to lessons learning among multilateral organizations, there is a need to strengthen engagement in M&E of SSR.

3.5.1. **Increase efforts to monitor and report on national progress in the area of SSR as well as on how each organization is contributing to overarching nationally-driven objectives.** This demands both improved understandings of how to monitor SSR progress and an investment in developing baselines at an early planning stage. Though UNSCR 2151 calls for enhanced reporting on the progress of SSR, this is not being done systematically or is not based on meaningful analysis.

3.5.2. **Increase numbers of evaluations of SSR support, particularly of sector-wide support, to shed light on synergies and on potential obstacles to progress.** Multilateral organizations should seek to follow the example of the EU in selecting one country per year in which to evaluate SSR support. Alternatively, expanding the evaluation undertaken by the EU to a joint effort may be considered, involving other multilateral organizations as relevant. Given the substantial engagement by these organizations in SSR support, their commitment to more systematic M&E could contribute significantly to building an evidence base on SSR support.

3.6. Promote joint evaluations as appropriate

While joint evaluations are useful tools that provide insight into the impact of multilateral assistance, they are not the rule.[186] The fact that they are not carried out regularly represents a missed opportunity to align various actors towards the aim of measuring overall progress in the security sector, and to support efficiency by limiting the transaction costs for host countries as well as for the organizations themselves.[187] Finally, joint evaluations in the area of SSR may be particularly useful when the issues addressed are considered too sensitive for one organization to tackle alone.[188]

3.6.1. **Identify opportunities to undertake joint evaluations where useful and feasible.** The decision to carry out a joint evaluation should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Multilateral organizations should contemplate the development of criteria to identify useful pilots for joint evaluations and should agree on a modality for joint evaluations with both host governments and international partners. Even when joint evaluations are not ideal, at minimum, it would be good practice for multilateral organizations to have a shared understanding of what data is important to collect and who should collect it. In this context, the progress of organizations should be measured against the objectives set by national governments, ideally based on national security strategies.

3.6.2. **Identify common standards for evaluation that can provide a framework for joint evaluations in SSR.** A common obstacle to joint evaluations is the use by different organizations of inconsistent terminology and non-standard approaches to measuring results. Multilateral organizations should reflect on how to harmonize terminology and agree on minimum standards for evaluations in the area of SSR. One way or another, an agreement on minimum standards should be reached and then reflected in the individual guidance efforts of each organization and/or in a joint note on common methodology.

186 DCAF, *Evaluations in the Area of Security Sector Reform: Comparative Analysis and Policy Recommendations*, forthcoming.

187 OECD, "Managing Joint Evaluations," June 2010.

188 Ibid.

3.6.3. **Ensure that the results of unilateral evaluations are broadly shared and that findings are reflected in support programmes.** Where joint evaluations are not feasible, efforts should nonetheless be made to share the findings of unilateral evaluations undertaken by both national and international partners. Currently, no systematic approach to sharing this information exists, hampering efforts to feed lessons learned into current support and limiting the ability of multilateral organizations to learn from each other.

3.6.4. **Facilitate access to assessment and/or evaluation reports through a shared knowledge repository, to avoid duplication of efforts and foster inter-organizational learning.** For instance, multilateral organisations could contribute their SSR evaluations to an online evaluation database to encourage transparency and enable enhanced access to knowledge in this field.

Annex

A. Areas of SSR support

This annex provides a snapshot of the areas of support that are mandated and implemented by multilateral organizations, highlighting the most common areas. Field operations mandates are an important indicator of what actors are doing, an understanding of which can help facilitate more coherent support. This annex therefore examines the extent to which it is possible to determine in advance a predictable division of labour based on the mandates of field operations. It also reveals similarities in the areas of support mandated and implemented by these organizations which highlights the need for effective approaches to cooperation. To determine the degree to which these organizations provide support to the security sector as a whole, or rather focus on specific components, this section distinguishes between **sector-wide** and **component-specific support**.[189]

Field operations mandates for SSR support

While the largest share of support provided by multilateral organizations to SSR processes is based on requests from national counterparts,[190] for the purpose of this study and to enable comparison in a systematic manner, this section examines the mandates of field operations. Specifically, this section features a comparative analysis of the mandates of 14 UN peace operations, 12 AU peace support operations (including AU liaison offices), 14 EU CSDP missions and operations, and 15 OSCE field operations.[191] These mandates are defined by the governing structures of each organization: the UN Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the European Council, and the Permanent Council of the OSCE.192 In the case of EU operations, mandates are adopted only after a formal request by a national government.

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189 See explanation in the Introduction.

190 This includes much of the support provided by UN country teams, AU institutions, EU delegations, and OSCE institutions.

191 Mandates derived from requests of the governing structures of these organizations typically imply the deployment of a field presence (e.g. a peacekeeping operation, field mission, programme office, etc.) to deliver support. This section examines a sample of 55 mandates. For the AU, liaison offices are included in field operations, as their mandates and the mandates of their field missions are authorized in communiqués issued by the AU Peace and Security Council; but notably, Table 11 analyses only 12 AU mandates, instead of 14, because no mandate could be found for the Burundi and Libya Liaison Offices.

192 This section is based on field operations mandates in force during the period of 2015–2017. As such, this study provides a snapshot of mandates at the time the core research for this Mapping Study was undertaken.

There are several similarities across the SSR mandates of multilateral organizations. For instance, the mandates of field operations often contain **implicit directives for SSR engagement** in a wide range of areas. This is especially the case for the UN, the AU, and the OSCE, which are at times called upon to support institution building (e.g. UN), to strengthen democratic institutions (e.g. AU), or to support participating States in implementing their commitments (e.g. OSCE). In this way, an organization that may not be explicitly tasked with providing support to a specific component of the security sector may still be engaged in this area under a broader mandate to support the strengthening of democratic institutions. This is not the case for the EU, though, for which mandates are generally targeted to specific components of the security sector.

Table 11 Overview of SSR elements reflected in the mandates of field operations[193]

Multilateral Organi- zation/ area of support	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/ Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Sector-Wide Initiatives	Sector Services/ Security Sector	Implicit
UN	7/14	12/14	7/14	0/14	2/14	0/15	12/14	8/14	3/14	3/14
AU	3/12	2/12	0/12	0/12	0/12	0/12	1/12	0/12	6/12	7/12
EU	6/14	6/14	1/14	0/14	5/14	0/14	4/14	3/14	1/14	1/14
OSCE	2/15	5/15	0/15	0/15	3/15	2/15	3/15	5/15	0/15	11/15
TOTAL	18/55	25/55	8/55	0/55	10/55	2/55	20/55	16/55	10/55	22/55

Three of the organizations under study are mandated to provide support to **sector-wide reforms** (UN, EU, and OSCE). This often includes support to the development and implementation of national security policies and/or strategies (e.g. UN and EU) as well as to efforts targeting transnational threats, for instance in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime (e.g. OSCE and UN). Support to mainstreaming human rights in the security sector, particularly through trainings (e.g. UN), has also been a common element of mandates.

The UN has adopted the most mandates to provide support for sector-wide reforms. Eight out of the fourteen UN mandates analysed provided for sector-wide support, while the OSCE only has five mandates in this area, and the EU three. UN mandates for sector-wide support also exhibit the most extensive array of objectives, with a majority aimed at developing and/or implementing national strategies (e.g. MONUSCO), and others focused on mainstreaming human rights and gender through training (e.g. UNOCI) and on strengthening capacities to address transnational threats (e.g. UNOWA). For the OSCE,

mandates in this area are often narrowly focused on strengthening capacities to address transnational threats, including through support to the implementation of relevant strategies. The UN and the EU are the only organizations that are sometimes explicitly mandated to support security services in the area of control and accountability.

Field mandates calling specifically for support to **strengthen the democratic governance of a security sector** are few and far between, totalling only nine instances across 55 mandates; three of which refer to promoting good governance more broadly, not just in the security sector. Some examples include the UN mandate in DRC, which calls for support to the development and implementation of "a national strategy for the establishment of effective, inclusive and accountable security and justice institutions;" the UN mandate in Libya, which specifies assistance in building "transparent and accountable law enforcement and correctional systems;" the EU mandate in CAR to support the objective of a "modernised, effective and accountable FACA;" and the EU mandate of EUAM Ukraine to "reorganise and restructure the security services in a way which permits recovering control and accountability over them." Two mandates also call for support to building an independent judiciary (UN in Libya and UN/ AU in Darfur).

Mandates for sector-wide support are therefore narrow, generally focusing on support for the development or implementation of national security policies and strategies (e.g. MONUSCO, UNOCI, UNMISS, UNIOGBIS, and the OSCE presence in Albania). Other key aspects of sector-wide support, such as gender mainstreaming (e.g. UNOCI) or supporting accountable institutions (e.g. EUAM Ukraine), are very rarely included in mandates. Moreover, these organizations are not specifically mandated to support areas that could strengthen national capacity-building efforts, which are essential for national ownership – such as security sector budget management, public expenditure reviews, or national M&E efforts in SSR.

Most of the mandates examined for this study are in **component-specific** areas of support, particularly in **law enforcement, justice, and defence,** in descending order. Mandates in law enforcement commonly call for support to training and mentoring, and the provision of advice. In UN mandates, a special focus is sometimes placed on training in human rights or support to the vetting and certification of law enforcement personnel (e.g. UNOCI and MINUSTAH), while EU mandates may call for support to coordination between police and prosecution (e.g. EULEX Kosovo). In the area of justice reform, mandates across the organizations under study are often less specific, calling more broadly for the provision of technical assistance, advice, or support (e.g. OSCE Mission to Serbia). In the area of defence reform, the UN has sometimes been mandated to provide support specifically to military justice mechanisms (e.g. UNIOGBIS and UNMISS), while the EU has sometimes been mandated to provide support to the modernization of logistics and human resources (e.g. EUSEC RD Congo) as well as to engage in strengthening respect for human rights in the armed forces (e.g. EUTM-Mali).

193 A version of this table that includes detailed footnotes is available in Annex D.

The UN is the only organization that has regularly mandated its field operations to provide support to corrections reform (seven out of fourteen). The other three organizations have only one mandate (or none at all) in this area. The UN also features the most mandates to provide support to **justice sector reform** (twelve out of fourteen), whereas the EU has only four such mandates, and the OSCE three. The only AU mandate in this area is under the joint AU-UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMID), and therefore does not reflect overall practice in AU mandates.

The majority of **AU field mandates for engagement in SSR support are broad and/or implicit.** That is, several AU mandates call for support to SSR without defining the focus of such support. For example, the AU Liaison Office in the Central African Republic is mandated to "contribute to reform and restructuring of the security sector." In other cases, AU mandates do not specifically mention SSR support but are broad enough to include it, such as in mandates directed at "strengthening democratic institutions" (as in MISAHEL). Only three out of twelve AU mandates include explicit calls for support to component-specific areas (e.g. defence, law enforcement, and justice reform).

Unlike the other organizations under study, the **EU rarely mandates its field operations to provide support across a whole security sector**. EU mandates are usually focused on specific component areas such as defence or law enforcement reform, or on complementary areas, such as criminal justice in the context of law enforcement reform. This reflects the fact that EU peace operations are often conceived as component-specific (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan is aimed primarily at police reform, and EUBAM Libya at border reform). Criticism of EU support has often cited this component specificity, for instance noting that "CSDP missions focused too much on specific parts of the security and justice system and did not link these in a broader strategic manner."[194] This also raises questions as to the extent to which the EU can take a broad strategic coordination role in the area of SSR.

The **OSCE also has several component-specific mandates** in the areas of law enforcement, border, customs, and justice. Further, it is the only organization to have a mandate in the area of civil emergencies, as it is called upon to support disaster risk reduction; however, the mandate does not make clear whether this is actually meant to relate to SSR.[195] OSCE mandates often have a strong focus on supporting efforts to address transnational threats, such as terrorism or anti-trafficking. Yet, the **majority of OSCE field mandates in the area of SSR are implicit.** In other words, support to SSR can be considered part of the mandate of the organization in many countries, to assist and promote the implementation of the OSCE

principles and commitments that participating States have agreed to, across the three dimensions of security. That the OSCE has the highest percentage of implicit mandates is a consequence of the political process, whereby negotiations with host governments in the context of OSCE missions usually take place only after the field mission has been deployed. Thus, OSCE mandates must be broad enough to provide entry points for whatever post-agreements the Head of Mission brokers with the government (e.g. through memoranda of understanding).

Areas of support in practice

While the mandates of multilateral organizations set out the intent of operational support, it is important to examine the degree to which these mandates correspond to thematic areas of support in practice. This section provides an overview of the actual thematic support provided by these organizations and expands the scope beyond field operations. This overview is primarily based on the **frequency** with which the organizations under study reported engagement on the basis of both national requests and mandates in different thematic areas of SSR in response to the questionnaire completed by organizational focal points, complemented by desk research and interviews.[196] While a key limitation to this analysis is that it does not differentiate between political or technical support, nor between long-term institution-building initiatives or ad hoc activities, it nonetheless provides an important snapshot of the type of support in which these organizations report to most frequently engage. The section first examines the engagement of the organizations under study in sector-wide support, followed by an overview of their engagement in component-specific support.

All four organizations are engaged in **sector-wide support** that seeks to strengthen the strategic, governance, and architectural frameworks of entire security sectors. One of the areas most frequently supported by all these organizations is the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in the sector. Indeed, each of these organizations report either always or frequently providing support to efforts to ensure compliance with human rights, to strengthen the fair and equitable representation of women, and to address sexual and gender-based violence. Also reported to receive significant support are efforts to strengthen independent oversight institutions and mechanisms as well as the role and capacity of civil society organizations.

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194 European Commission, "Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders' views," Joint Staff Working Document (accompanying JOIN(2015) 17 final), SWD(2016) 221 final, July 5, 2016.

195 This includes the mandates of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana (PC.DEC/1153/Corr.1, December 18, 2014) and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek (PC.DEC/1250, April 27, 2017). However, it is important to acknowledge that when the OSCE mandates its offices to support civil emergencies (e.g. natural disaster risk reduction), it may not necessarily be from an SSR perspective. Activities in this area can vary from restoring ecosystems to mitigate floods, to strengthening national and regional capacities for wildfire management. See the OSCE webpage on "Disaster Risk Reduction and Security" available at http://www.osce.org/secretariat/disaster-risk-reduction-and-security. While this study has not examined the extent to which the tasks implemented in practice respond to SSR-related concerns, the OSCE recognizes that disaster risk reduction should be part of a comprehensive approach to security.

196 The questionnaires were completed by focal points in all four organizations. Where possible, they asked other entities within the organization to complete the questionnaire as well. For instance, all UN IASSRTF members were provided the questionnaire. As such, this section reflects thematic areas of support provided by both field operations and field presences.

Table 12 Frequency of sector-wide support   A = Always | B = Frequently | C = Sometimes | D = Never

Sector-wide initiative	UN	AU	EU	OSCE
National security dialogues	A	B	C	B
Security sector reviews, assessments, or mappings	A	B	C	B[197]
Development of national security policies	A	C	C	B
Development of national constitutional and legal frameworks	B	C	C	C
Development/implementation of national security plans	B	C	C	B
Review of national security polices	B	B	C	C[198]
Independent oversight institutions and mechanisms	B	C	B	B
Management systems	B	B	B	C
Executive coordination	B	A	B	C
Role/capacity of civil society	B	C	B	B
National monitoring and evaluation of SSR	C	C	C	C
Development or management of security sector national budgets	C	C	C	D[199]
Public expenditure reviews	C	C	D	C[200]
Community-level initiatives and mechanisms	C	C	C	C
Regional SSR mechanisms	C	A	B	C
Efforts to ensure compliance with human rights	B	A	B	A
Strengthening the fair and equitable representation of women	B	A	B	B
Sexual and gender-based violence	B	A	B	B
Transnational threats	B	A	B	A

The UN reports that its key areas of engagement include support for national security dialogues, security sector reviews or assessments, and national security policy development. In fact, it reports always providing support in these areas, while the AU and the OSCE report frequent support to these initiatives, and the EU reports only sometimes providing such support. The UN, the EU, and especially the AU have also supported executive coordination mechanisms; an area less frequently supported by

the OSCE. The UN is the only organization frequently supporting the development of national, constitutional, and legal frameworks. Both the AU and the OSCE reported that supporting sector-wide initiatives to address transnational threats is a key element of their engagement, and for the OSCE in particular this likely reflects the existence of dedicated institutional structures to address transnational threats. Out of all four organizations, the AU is most frequently engaged in supporting regional SSR mechanisms, by virtue of its strong partnerships with regional economic communities.

While there is increasing recognition of the importance of supporting national capacity-building efforts that can enhance national ownership of reform processes, this does not appear to be a common area of support. The organizations under study are only sometimes engaged in this area, building capacity for national M&E endeavours for example. Similarly, these organizations are only sometimes engaged in strengthening national capacities to manage security sector budgets or in conducting public expenditure reviews. The UN is most engaged in this area, through its partnership with the World Bank; whereas, the EU reports never having engaged in support to public expenditure reviews and the OSCE reports never having engaged in support to the development and management of security sector budgets.

Overall, the four multilateral actors under study are committed to strengthening a comprehensive approach to the security sector, through engagement with several types of sector-wide initiatives. Particularly, significant effort is being put forth to ensure compliance with human rights and gender equality; to counter conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and transnational threats; to support independent oversight institutions and mechanisms, national security dialogues, and security sector reviews; and to improve the role of civil society in the security sector. Nevertheless, there are still important areas essential to strengthening national capacities to lead reform efforts – such as national security sector budget development or management, public expenditure reviews, and M&E – that are not regularly addressed by the support of these organizations. Moreover, it is not clear from the data whether support provided to strengthening oversight and accountability mechanisms are being conducted through institution-building initiatives or rather supported through ad hoc trainings and workshops.

The four organizations under study are also engaged in supporting individual components of the security sector. **Law enforcement is the component that receives the most support from all four organizations.** This includes, for instance, assisting the police and other law enforcement agencies to engage with local communities and build trust, or providing capacity-building training to better control small arms and light weapons.[201]

197 The answers provided by OSCE focal points were 50% 'sometimes' and 50% 'frequently'.

198 The answers provided by OSCE focal points were 50% 'sometimes' and 50% 'frequently'.

199 The answers provided by OSCE focal points were 50% 'never' and 50% 'sometimes'.

200 The answers provided by OSCE focal points were 50% 'never' and 50% 'sometimes'.

201 United Nations, questionnaire for focal points, May 2015. While weapons and ammunition management (WAM) and physical security/stockpile management (PSSM) support to law enforcement and security agencies is not often addressed in SSR programmes, there are some notable exceptions, such is the PBF-funded SSR process in Madagascar which recognizes that unless weapons and ammunition management in the security sector is improved, the problems of diversion and illicit arms will persist. The UN provides support to Member States, including to security sector actors, to apply relevant standards and guidelines on this topic (e.g. International Small Arms Control Standards, International Ammunition Technical Guidelines).

Table 13 Frequency of support to each security sector component

A = Always B = Frequently
C = Sometimes D = Never

Security sector component	UN	AU	EU	OSCE	UN	AU	EU	OSCE	UN	AU	EU	OSCE
	Effectiveness				Internal Accountability				External Accountability			
Defence	B	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	B	B	C	B
Police /Law Enforcement	A	B	B	B	A	B	B	B	C	B	B	B
Corrections	B	C	C	C	C	B	C	C	C	C	C	C
Intelligence	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Border Management / Customs	B	B	C	B	B	B	C	B	B	B	C	B
Civil Emergencies	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
Justice	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C	B	C

The other areas most supported by the UN, the AU, and the OSCE are border management/customs and defence reform. The EU reports only sometimes engaging in these areas. In the area of defence, concerns have been raised that efforts by the military and police components of field mission operations are overly focused on training.[202] For instance, a recent study on the UN approach to DSR support highlighted that, while defence services are also often addressed, this support frequently prioritizes training related to ensuring compliance with human rights and humanitarian law.[203] Similarly, the EU has focused its efforts on specific components of the security sector through support provided at the operational and tactical levels of the reform process, mainly through train-and-equip activities. More efforts must be made at the political level to improve governance and oversight of all components of the security sector.

All four organizations under study only sometimes provide support to intelligence services and civil emergencies. Corrections services are also sometimes addressed; with the UN frequently engaged in support to improve the effectiveness of the corrections systems and the AU more often focused on improving internal accountability mechanisms. The OSCE is mostly engaged in law enforcement and border management reform, and less in reforms to corrections, justice, and civil emergencies. Generally, the UN and the EU are more frequently engaged in judicial reform than the AU and the OSCE. In fact, assistance to police reform, border management, and justice reform comprises 2/3 of SSR contracts funded by the European Commission.[204]

In sum, a review of the areas of support that are mandated by multilateral organizations reveals that **field operations with explicit mandates to support democratic governance of the security sector are the exception rather than the rule.** Given the criticism that international actors often focus too much on training and equipping and too little on governance issues, if this is not addressed in mandates, it will be a missed opportunity. Moreover, t**he use of implicit mandates for SSR in field operations makes predictability on this basis less feasible.** It is not possible to determine in advance the extent to which an organization may be engaged in certain areas solely on the basis of its mandate. Moreover, these mandates are often quite vague, calling for support to training or the provision of advice without specifying the thematic areas requiring support within each component (e.g. human resource management, vetting, etc.).

In terms of recurring areas of support, all four organizations under study are engaged to some degree in sector-wide support in practice, with particular attention given to mainstreaming cross-cutting issues in the security sector. The EU appears to be less engaged in sector-wide support than the other three organizations, particularly when it comes to supporting the development of national security policies, strategies, reviews, and legal frameworks. However, all these organizations report either always or frequently providing support aimed at ensuring compliance with human rights, strengthening the fair and equitable representation of women, and addressing sexual and gender-based violence. Despite the recognition of customary and non-state actors in policy frameworks, engagement with these actors is rare. There is also little effort made to support community-level initiatives. Most importantly, **while there is increasing acknowledgement of the importance of strengthening national capacity-building efforts that can contribute to national ownership, in practice, the UN, the EU**, and the OSCE are rarely engaged in this area**. Supporting national M&E efforts or budget management is not common. Moreover, the practice of public expenditure reviews is also often disregarded, except by the UN, which has developed a partnership with the World Bank on this issue. To date, the EU has rarely engaged in these areas, but is expected to do so increasingly as a result of its new EU SSR policy framework, which emphasizes the need to ensure the fiscal sustainability of reforms.

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202 Interviews with EU (Brussels, May 2017) and UN personnel (New York, September 2016).

203 DCAF, "Review of the implementation of Defence Sector Reform Mandates by UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions from 2006–2016" (*forthcoming*).

204 European Commission, *Evaluation of EU support for Security Sector Reform in enlargement and neighborhood countries (2010-2016)*, Brussels, 2018. This evaluation also determined that most support by the European Commission has focused on state security actors and has been delivered by non-state contracted implementers.

B. Explanatory notes on Table 9

This annex provides detailed information on SSR-related structures, per actors at headquarters level, as well as explanatory notes on how to interpret the table.

Table 9 Overview of SSR-related structures per actor at HQ level[205]

Multilateral Organization / SSR-related areas	SSR	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Other
UN	SSR Unit/DPKO (approx. 7 staff)	*OMA/DPKO[206]* *SSRU/DPKO[207]*	Global Focal Point (PD/DPKO and UNDP)	Global Focal Point (JCS/DPKO and UNDP)		*UNODC* *UNDP (in border protection policy)[208]*	UNDP[209]	Global Focal Point (JCS/DPKO and UNDP)	RoL, justice, security and human rights team, UNDP (which falls under the remit of the Global Focal Point)
AU	SSR team, Defense and Security Division (3 staff)					*Border Programme[210]*			CMPCRD Political Affairs Department
EU	SSR team/PRISM/DSG of CSDP (3 staff) Centre of Thematic Expertise (CoTE) on Crisis Reaction and Security Sector Reform, DG NEAR (3 staff) Global Threats and Security Sector Reform Section, DG DEVCO B5 (2 SSR staff)	*EEAS (e.g. EUMS,[211] CMPD, MPCC)* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	*EEAS (e.g. CMPD CPCC)* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *EUROPOL[212]* *FPI*	*DG NEAR* *DG DEVCO* *FPI*		*EEAS (e.g. CMPD, EUMS CPCC)* *FRONTEX[213]* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	*DG ECHO[214]* *DG DEVCO* *DG NEAR* *FPI*	DG DEVCO (e.g. Global Threats and Security Sector Reform Section) DG NEAR *EUROJUST[215]* *EEAS (e.g. CMPD CPCC)*	
OSCE	SSR Assistant Project Officer (1 staff)	*CPC[216]*	SPMU/TNT	ODIHR		Border team/TNT		ODIHR	

205 The entities in italics reflect those that may be linked to SSR in name, but for which there is no dedicated capacity in place, often because their focus is not on providing support to reform processes under the category examined or because they rely primarily on external consultants to provide support in this area. (e.g. DPKO's Office of Military Affairs or the EU's MPCC is not engaged in the provision of defence sector reform support but deals primarily with the provision of military advice and planning to field operations).

206 OMA is not DSR focused, but rather aimed at supporting the deployment of military officials in field operations.

207 SSRU only has one seconded staff member dedicated entirely to DSR support.

208 UNDP's engagement in this area has been more on the policy level.

209 For instance, UNDP has been engaged in supporting the development of early warning systems.

210 While the AU has a Border Programme, it is mainly aimed at supporting efforts to demarcate borders.

211 EUMS is primarily engaged in coordinating the military missions and instruments of the EU, although it can also provide advice to Member States on defence issues.

212 EUROPOL is not focused on supporting reform processes, but on supporting law enforcement authorities throughout the EU in crime fighting activities in areas such as terrorism, money laundering and asset tracing, facilitated illegal immigration, and trafficking in human beings. This support may be provided through efforts to enhance the capacity of police officers, but is not necessarily linked to support for a broader reform process.

213 While FRONTEX is the EU agency specifically focused on border management, its main objective is not to support the reform of national border institutions. Though it can provide training to national institutions, it is primarily concerned with supporting search and rescue operations, deploying coast guard teams, and fighting organized cross-border crime and terrorism.

214 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) support civil emergencies actors with an exclusive humanitarian objective. Therefore, it does not take an SSR approach to support.

215 While EUROJUST works to improve the effectiveness of prosecutors and other competent authorities in dealing with cross-border crime, the agency does not focus on SSR-related processes.

216 In the area of defence, the CPC is primarily responsible for activities relating to the Code of Conduct and the Vienna document. These activities are related to DSR but do not involve staff engaging in primary support to reform processes.

C. Explanatory notes on Table 10

This annex provides detailed information on the numbers of field missions with SSR-related structures, as well as explanatory notes on how to interpret the table.

Table 10 Overview of number of field missions with SSR-related structures[217]

Multilateral Organization / SSR-related areas	SSR	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/ Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Comments
UN	7/10[218]	8/10[219] have field commander sections, but they are not dedicated to reform	10/10 have an office of the police commissioner, but only 3/10 have separate divisions dedicated to police reform[220]	8/10[221]	0/10	1/10[222]	0/10	8/10[223]	UNSOM also has a Maritime security unit. In addition, most missions have divisions/sections focused on human rights and child protection, which may also cover SSR; however, those are not included in this table.
AU	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Liaison offices often have 1 military advisor, 1 political advisor, and 1 PCRD officer who may cover SSR. An exception is the 1-2 dedicated SSR Officers in CAR and Somalia.
EU	1/14[224]	5/14[225]	3/14[226]	1/14[227]	0/14	3/14[228]	0/14	2/14[229]	EU missions often focus on a particular area of SSR, and structures within a field operation are in these cases all dedicated towards a specific area (e.g. police, border reform).
OSCE	0/14[230]	7/14 (politico-military, which usually do not have a strong DSR component)[231]	7/14[232]	N/A	0/14	3/14[233]	0/14	4/14[234]	RoL and human rights sections may also cover police reform and judicial reform but are not covered in this table as they are not dedicated specifically to SSR support. Similarly, there are democratization sections that may also cover broader SSR support.

217 While acknowledging the challenge of comparing among organizations and field missions, this table provides a broad view of SSR structures in field missions. Still, it does not account for differences in the number of dedicated staff and the level of expertise located in each structure. As such, one SSR unit may have 10 staff, while another may only have one.

218 MINUSCA (SSR Unit), UNOCI (SSR Section), MONUSCO (SSR Unit), MINUSMA (SSR and disarmament and reintegration section), UNSOM (SSR), and UNMISS (SSR/DDR Team). This also includes UNMIL with its "rule of law and security institutions support service."

219 MINUSCA (Office of the Force Commander), UNOCI (Force Commander), MONUSCO (Office of the Force Commander), MINUSTAH (Office of the Force Commander), UNMIL (Office of the Force Commander), MINUSMA (Office of the Force Commander), UNAMID (Office of the Force Commander), and UNMISS (Force Commander).

220 Only 3 missions have a division dedicated to police reform: UNSOM (Police Section), UNAMID (Police Division), and UNMISS (United Nations Police). However, all 10 missions have an Office of the Police Commissioner. In stabilization missions, i.e. MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSMA, the Office of the Police Commissioner may also contain police development or police reform support teams.

221 Out of 8 missions, 6 include corrections under justice: MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNMIK, MINUSMA, and UNSOM through their Justice and Corrections sections, and UNAMID through its Rule of Law, Judicial System, and Prison and Advisory Section. The other 2 missions have units or teams exclusively dedicated to corrections – a Model Corrections Unit in MINUSTAH and a Corrections Team in UNMISS.

222 This includes the Border Management Unit of MINUSTAH.

223 MINUSCA (Justice and Corrections Section), MONUSCO (Justice and Corrections Section), MINUSTAH (Model Jurisdictions Section), UNMIK (Justice and Corrections Section), MINUSMA (Justice and Corrections Systems), UNSOM (Joint Justice and Corrections), UNAMID (Rule of Law, Judicial System, and Prison and Advisory Section), and UNMISS (Justice Advisory Team).

224 EUAM Ukraine (Operations Department, Strategic Civilian SSR Component).

225 EUTM Mali (Advisory Task Force and Education and Training Task Force), EUTM Somalia, EUFOR ALTHEA/BIH, EUMAM RCA, and EUSEC RD Congo.

226 EUPOL COPPs (Police Advisory Section), EUPOL Afghanistan, and EULEX Kosovo (Advisory Unit on Police and Border Matters).

227 EULEX Kosovo (Correctional Unit).

228 EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (Border Management Department), EULEX Kosovo (Advisory Unit on Police and Border Matters), and EUBAM Rafah.

229 EUPOL COPPS (Rule of Law Section) and EULEX Kosovo (Advisory Unit on Justice).

230 The OSCE Presence in Albania has a Security Co-operation Unit, which includes a position on Security Sector Development. However, its ToR focus heavily on organized crime, and SSG/R is only a small component.

231 These structures do not usually focus specifically on DSR support, but may touch on related issues such as arms control. The OSCE Office in Yerevan (Armenia, discontinued), the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana (Kazakhstan), and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan, currently transformed into the Programme Office in Bishkek) do so through their sections on Politico-Military Activities; the OSCE Mission to Moldova through its section on Conflict Prevention/Resolution, which includes one military and one politico-military officer; the OSCE Mission to Montenegro through its Security Cooperation Section, which includes one national politico-military officer; and the former OSCE Office in Tajikistan through its section on Politico and Military Aspects of Security.

232 The OSCE Presence in Albania (Security Cooperation Unit), the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Security and Public Safety), the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (Politico-Military Activities, which includes one expert on police affairs), the OSCE Mission to Montenegro (Security Co-operation), the OSCE Mission to Serbia (Police Affairs), the former OSCE Office in Tajikistan (Politico and Military Aspects of Security, which includes one national police assistance officer), and the OSCE Mission to Skopje (Public Safety and Community).

233 The OSCE Presence in Albania (Security Cooperation Unit, which involves one expert on border management), the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe (Politico and Military Aspects of Security, which includes one expert on border management), and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (Politico-Military Activities, which includes one expert on border issues).

234 The OSCE Presence in Albania (Rule of Law and Human Rights), the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Human Rights and Communities), the OSCE Mission to Serbia (Rule of Law and Human Rights), and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (Rule of Law and Human Rights).

D. Explanatory notes on Table 11

This annex provides detailed information on the mandates of field operations that were examined to develop this table, as well as explanatory notes on which mandates were considered to include SSR elements.

Table 11 Overview of SSR elements reflected in the mandates of field operations

Multilateral Organization/ area of support	Defence	Law Enforcement	Corrections	Intelligence	Border/ Customs	Civil Emergencies	Justice	Sector-Wide Initiatives	Sector Services/ Security Sector	Implicit
UN[235]	7/14[236]	12/14[237]	7/14[238]	0/14	2/14[239]	0/15	12/14[240]	8/14[241]	3/14[242]	3/14[243]
AU[244]	3/12[245]	2/12[246]	0/12	0/12	0/12	0/12	1/12[247]	0/12	6/12[248]	7/12[249]
EU[250]	6/14[251]	6/14[252]	1/14[253]	0/14	5/14[254]	0/14	4/14[255]	3/14[256]	1/14[257]	1/14[258]
OSCE[259]	2/15[260]	5/15[261]	0/15	0/15	3/15[262]	2/15[263]	3/15[264]	5/15[265]	0/15	11/15[266]
TOTAL	18/55	25/55	8/55	0/55	10/55	2/55	20/55	16/55	10/55	22/55

235 This table includes the mandates of MINUSCA, S/RES/2301(2016); UNOCI, S/RES/2226(2015), which was completed in June 2017; MONUSCO, S/RES/2348(2017); UNIOGBIS, S/RES/2343(2017); MINUSTAH, S/RES/2350(2017); UNAMI, S/RES/2367(2017); UNMIK, S/RES/1244(1999); UNAMID, S/RES/2363(2017); UNMIL, S/RES/2333(2016), the mandate for which was substantially reduced at the end of 2016 in anticipation of the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian UNMIL components by April 30, 2018; UNSMIL, S/RES/2376(2017); MINUSMA, S/RES/2364(2017); UNSOM, S/RES/2346(2017); and UNMISS, S/RES/2327(2016). It also includes the mandate of UNOWAS, S/2013/759, for which it should be noted that, lacking a new mandate, the field office has been operating under the last mandate (See UN, "Letter dated 23 December 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General," S/2013/759, December 23, 2013; and UN, "Letter dated 28 January 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General," S/2016/89, January 28, 2016).

236 MINUSCA, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNIOGBIS, UNSMIL, and MINUSMA. In addition, UNAMID is mandated to assist in implementing the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which calls for the "need for reform and development of military institutions in Darfur in order to improve their capacity, effectiveness and professionalism and to strengthen the rule of law in accordance with accepted standards." (Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, 2011, para. 463).

237 MINUSCA, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNIOGBIS, MINUSTAH, UNMIK, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNSMIL (through its mandate to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, signed in December 2017), MINUSMA, UNSOM, and UNMISS.

238 MINUSCA, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNIOGBIS, MINUSTAH, UNSMIL (through its mandate to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement), and UNSOM.

239 UNOCI and UNAMI.

240 MINUSCA, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNIOGBIS, MINUSTAH, UNAMI, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNSMIL (through its mandate to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement) MINUSMA, UNSOM, and UNMISS.

241 MINUSCA, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNOWAS, UNIOGBIS, UNMIL, UNSMIL (through its mandate to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement), and UNMISS.

242 UNOWAS, MINUSMA, and UNSOM.

243 MINUSTAH, UNAMID, and UNSMIL.

244 This table includes the mandates of the AU liaison offices in CAR (Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXXV), July 19, 2013); in N'Djamena (Chad); in Comoros (Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1 (DXLV), 545th Meeting, September 21, 2015); in Cote d'Ivoire; in Kinshasa (Plan of Action, SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/PLAN(I), August 31, 2009); in Guinea Bissau (Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXII), 222nd Meeting, March 29, 2010); in Liberia; and in South Sudan; as well as the AU/SADC Liaison Office Madagascar (Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1 (DXLV), 545th Meeting, September 21, 2015); MISAHEL (in charge of implementing the African Union Strategy For The Sahel Region); AMISOM (per UNSCR 2372 (2017)); and UNAMID (per UNSCR 2363 (2017)).

245 The AU Liaison Office CAR, AMISOM, and UNAMID (through its mandate to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement).

246 AMISOM and UNAMID.

247 UNAMID.

248 The AU liaison offices in CAR, in Cote d'Ivoire, in Kinshasa, in Guinea Bissau, and in Liberia, as well as MISAHEL.

249 The AU liaison offices in N'Djamena, in Comoros, and in South Sudan, as well as the AU/SADC Liaison Office Madagascar, MISAHEL, AMISOM, and UNAMID.

250 This table includes the mandates of EUPOL Afghanistan (Council Decision 2013/240/CFSP, May 27, 2013, mission closed in January 2017); EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH (Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP, November 25, 2004); EUTM RCA (Council Decision 2016/610/CFSP, April 19, 2016); EUSEC RD Congo (Council Decision 2014/674/CFSP, September 25, 2014, mission closed in December 2016); EULEX Kosovo (Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, February 4, 2008); EUBAM Libya (Council Decision 2016/207/CFSP, February 15, 2016); EUCAP Sahel Mali (Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP, April 15, 2014); EUTM-Mali (Council Decision 2016/446/CFSP, March 23, 2016); EUCAP Sahel Niger (Council Decision 2016/1172/CFSP, July 18, 2016); EUBAM Rafah (Council Decision 2016/1107/CFSP, July 7, 2016); EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories (Council Decision 2017/1194/CFSP, July 4, 2017); EUTM Somalia (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, February 15, 2010); EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission, the Government of the Republic of Moldova, and the Government of Ukraine, signed October 7, 2005); and EUAM Ukraine (Council Decision 2016/2083/CFSP, November 28, 2016).

251 EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH, EUTM RCA, EUSEC RD Congo, EUTM-Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, and EUTM Somalia.

252 EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories, and EUAM Ukraine.

253 EULEX Kosovo.

254 EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Rafah, and EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine.

255 EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories.

256 EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger, and EUAM Ukraine.

257 EUAM Ukraine.

258 EULEX Kosovo.

259 This table includes the mandates of the OSCE Presence in Albania (PC.DEC/588, December 18, 2003); the OSCE Office in Yerevan (PC.DEC/314, July 22, 1999, operations discontinued on 31 August 2017); the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Baku (PC.DEC/1092, July 26, 2013, for which the mandate expired on 31 December 2015); the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Budapest Ministerial Council Decision MC (5), DOC.MC/1/95, December 8, 1995); the OSCE Programme Office in Astana (PC.DEC/1153/Corr.1, December 18, 2014); the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (PC.DEC/305, July 1, 1999); the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek (PC.DEC/1250, April 27, 2017, recently deployed after the withdrawal of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek in July 2017, which only had an implicit mandate on SSR per PC.DEC/245, July 23, 1998); the OSCE Mission to Moldova (Committee of Senior Officials, CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No.3, February 4, 1993, Annex 3); the OSCE Mission to Montenegro (PC.DEC/732, June 29, 2006); the OSCE Mission to Serbia (PC.DEC/401, January 11, 2001); the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe (PC.DEC/1251, June 1, 2017, resulting from the transformation of the previous OSCE Office in Tajikistan); the OSCE Mission to Skopje (as concluded in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, singed August 13, 2001); the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat (PC.DEC/244, July 23, 1998); the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (as agreed in the Memorandum of understanding between the OSCE and the Government of Ukraine concerning the creation of a new form of cooperation, July 1999); and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan.

260 OSCE Programme Office in Astana and OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

261 OSCE Presence in Albania; OSCE Missions in Kosovo, Serbia and Skopje; and OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

262 OSCE Presence in Albania, and OSCE Programme Offices in Astana and Bishkek. Notably, in Astana and Bishkek, support to border/customs is approached from an economic and environmental dimension.

263 OSCE Programme Offices in Astana and Bishkek. It is important to acknowledge that when the OSCE mandates its offices to support civil emergencies (e.g. natural disaster risk reduction), it is always from the economic and environmental perspective. Hence, this support may not necessarily address SSR-related issues, like strengthening national capacities to combat wildfires.

264 OSCE Presence in Albania, OSCE Missions in Kosovo and Serbia.

265 OSCE Presence in Albania; OSCE Programme Offices in Astana, Bishkek, and Dushanbe; and OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan.

266 OSCE Office in Yerevan; OSCE Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Skopje; OSCE Centre in Ashgabat; OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe; and OSCE Project Co-ordinators in Baku and Ukraine.

Enhancing Multilateral Support for Security Sector Reform

This report has been developed by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) at the request of the Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The report presents the findings of a multi-year research project on the approaches of multilateral organizations to supporting nationally-led security sector reform (SSR) processes. The organizations selected for this mapping exercise are the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The study aims at developing an empirically-based understanding of the roles and potential comparative advantages of these organizations in SSR support, as well as avenues for enhanced cooperation. This is intended to contribute to dialogue on ensuring the provision of more effective, coherent, and predictable external support to nationally-driven reform processes. For this purpose, the study examines the following three categories related to the role of multilateral organizations in SSR support: (1) normative frameworks, (2) institutional capacities, and (3) operational practices.