



Human security provisions in ceasefire and peace agreements:

**CASE STUDIES FROM
EASTERN EUROPE, CAUCASUS
AND CENTRAL ASIA**

Keith Krause, Grazvydas Jasutis, Kristina Vezon
and Rebecca Mikova

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Administrative boundary line between Georgia
and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali District)



CONTENTS

Foreword	12
Executive summary	13
Introduction	15
Ceasefires and peace agreements: definitions, similarities and differences	20
HS elements in ceasefire and peace agreements	24
Methodology	28
Case studies from Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia	36
Tajik Civil War	37
Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute	44
Conflict in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali district)	54
Conflict in Abkhazia	59
Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan	64
Prigorodny conflict	70
Conflict in Transnistria	76
Russia-Ukraine War	82
Final Assessments	88
Recommendations	97
Annexes	105

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	HSI indicators
Table 2	Timeline of the Tajik Civil War and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 3	Tajik Civil War escalation curve
Table 4	Tajik Civil War traffic light
Table 5	Timeline of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 6	Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute escalation curve
Table 7	Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute traffic light
Table 8	Timeline of the Chechen wars and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 9	Chechen wars escalation curve
Table 10	Chechen wars traffic light
Table 11	Timeline of the conflict in South Ossetia and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 12	Conflict in South Ossetia escalation curve
Table 13	Conflict in South Ossetia traffic light
Table 14	Timeline of the conflict in Abkhazia and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 15	Conflict in Abkhazia escalation curve
Table 16	Conflict in Abkhazia traffic light
Table 17	Timeline of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 18	Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalation curve
Table 19	Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan traffic light
Table 20	Timeline of the Prigorodny conflict and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 21	Prigorodny conflict escalation curve

Table 22	Prigorodny conflict traffic light
Table 23	Timeline of the conflict in Transnistria and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 24	Conflict in Transnistria escalation curve
Table 25	Conflict in Transnistria traffic light
Table 26	Timeline of the Russia-Ukraine War and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements
Table 27	Russia-Ukraine War escalation curve
Table 28	Russia Ukraine War traffic light
Table 29	Overview of ceasefire and peace agreements based on their categorization
Table 30	Typology of ceasefire and peace agreements in relation to conflict escalation
Table 31	Typology of agreements by conflict and their effects
Table 32	HSI integration by conflict
Table 33	HSI score by conflict
Table 34	Inclusion of HS elements by cluster

LIST OF ANNEXES

Tajik Civil War

Annex 1 Khorog Agreement

Annex 2 Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks

Annex 3 Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country and Joint Communiqué on the results of the third round of Inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation

Annex 4 Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan

Annex 5 Protocol on settlement of the military and political situation in the areas of confrontation, signed in northern Afghanistan on 11 December 1996

Annex 6 Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow on 23 December 1996

Annex 7 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan

Annex 8 Protocol on Political Questions and the Bishkek Memorandum signed at the conclusion of the inter-Tajik talks in Bishkek on 18 May 1997

Annex 9 Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation

Annex 10 Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation; Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation; Joint communiqué, issued at Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran, on 21 February 1997

Annex 11 Joint statement by the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition on the outcome of the round of the inter-Tajik talks held in Moscow from 26 February to 8 March 1997 and the Protocol on Military Issues

Annex 12 Protocol on refugees, signed in Tehran on 13 January 1997

Annex 13 Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed by the delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and of the United Tajik Opposition in Tehran, on 28 May 1997

Chechen Wars

Annex 14	Agreement on the peaceful regulation of the situation in the Chechen Republic (on a set of military issues) signed in Grozny on 30 July 1995
Annex 15	Agreement on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic
Annex 16	Agreement on a Ceasefire, the Cessation of Military Activities, and on Measures for a Settlement of the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Chechen Republic, Moscow, 27 May 1996
Annex 17	Protocol of the Meeting of the Working Groups, formed under the Negotiations Commissions, to locate Missing Persons and to Free Forcibly Detained Persons, Nazran, 10 June 1996
Annex 18	Agreement on Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya
Annex 19	Russian-Chechen truce agreement
Annex 20	Khasav'yourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, Khasav'yourt, Dagestan, 31 August 1996
Annex 21	Agreement on the principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic
Annex 22	Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, Moscow, 12 May 1997

Conflict in South Ossetia

Annex 23	Kazbegi protocol
Annex 24	Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian – Ossetian Conflict, Sochi, 24 June 1992
Annex 25	Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence between the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, Moscow, 16 May 1996
Annex 26	Statement following the meeting of E. D.Kokoity and Z.V. Zhvania, November 2004
Annex 27	Six point agreement (applicable to both South Ossetian and Abkhazian contexts), 12 August 2008
Annex 28	Implementation of the plan 12 August 2008, Communique issued by the presidency of the Republic, Paris, 9 September 2008 (applicable to both South Ossetian and Abkhazian contexts)

Abkhazia

Annex 29	Protocol of Consultations on the Regulation of the Conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, Sochi, 29 August 1992
Annex 30	Moscow agreement
Annex 31	Agreement on a cease-fire in Abkhazia and arrangements to monitor its fulfilment
Annex 32	Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, signed on 4 April 1994
Annex 33	Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, signed on 4 April 1994
Annex 34	Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994
Annex 35	Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commission, signed in Moscow on 11 May 1994
Annex 36	Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations and Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities, Gagra, 25 May 1998

Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Annex 37	Zheleznovodsk Declaration, 23 September 1991
Annex 38	Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran, Tehran, 7 May 1992
Annex 39	Protocol for the Complete Cessation of Hostilities, 18 February 1994
Annex 40	Bishkek protocol, 5 May 1994
Annex 41	Agreement on the Armed Conflict Cessation
Annex 42	Mediator's proposals on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Annex 43	Madrid Principles, 11 April 2016
Annex 44	Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Russian Federation, 2020
Annex 45	Ceasefire agreement on 20 September 2023

Prigorodny conflict

Annex 46 Protocol of Intent, Procedures and Agreements

Conflict in Transnistria

Annex 47 Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine on the situation in the left Dniester districts of the Republic of Moldova Chisinau, 6 April 1992

Annex 48 Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova

Annex 49 Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria

Russia-Ukraine War

Annex 50 Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

Annex 51 Memorandum on the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

Annex 52 Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements

Annex 53 Draft Treaties on (settlement of the situation in Ukraine, its neutrality and) security guarantees of Ukraine and Communique

Annex 54 Categorization of ceasefire and peace agreements

FOREWORD

In an era marked by growing geopolitical fragmentation and recurrent cycles of violence, the pursuit of peace remains both a pressing necessity and a profound challenge. Ceasefire and peace agreements continue to serve as crucial instruments for conflict mitigation, yet their success depends not only on halting hostilities but also on their ability to lay down the foundations for sustainable peace — peace that is inclusive, resilient, and grounded in the everyday realities of those affected by conflict. Furthermore, such agreements play a critical role in laying the groundwork for security sector reform. By establishing initial conditions for stability and trust, these agreements create the political and institutional space necessary for

reconfiguring security institutions, and for redefining the roles and mandates of security actors.

Today's conflicts increasingly blur the boundaries between state and non-state actors, external and internal drivers, and short-term fixes versus long-term solutions. In this environment, traditional security approaches often fall short of addressing the complex human dimensions of insecurity. There is a growing recognition that sustainable peace must go beyond elite bargains and territorial arrangements. Efforts need to embrace a more human-centred understanding of security—one that protects and empowers individuals and communities.



Administrative boundary line between Georgia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali district) in Ergneti

Ceasefire and peace processes are essential tools for conflict resolution and long-term stability across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, regions marked by complex security challenges and protracted disputes. Recent developments signal promising steps toward peace: the signing of a border agreement between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan marks a historic breakthrough, ending the border conflict in Central Asia and setting a positive precedent for regional dialogue and cooperation. In Eastern Europe, the initiation of ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, though still fragile, illustrates the growing recognition that sustained conflict undermines regional and global security. Azerbaijan and Armenia are nearing the conclusion of a peace treaty, marking a potential end to years of conflict and opening a path toward lasting stability in the South Caucasus.

This publication reflects DCAF's long-standing commitment to advancing peace and security through democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. By exploring how ceasefire and peace agreements can be designed to incorporate human security (HS) principles, it contributes to DCAF's broader vision: supporting inclusive and accountable security arrangements that truly serve the people they are meant to protect.

As political, environmental, and societal pressures continue to test the limits of conflict resolution frameworks, the insights offered here serve as a timely and necessary contribution to the ongoing search for peace. This peace must be just, durable, and deeply rooted in the needs of those most affected.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ceasefire and peace agreements play a critical role in conflict resolution and post-conflict stability. While traditionally centred on physical security and political arrangements, such agreements often overlook the HS dimensions that ensure lasting peace for civilian populations. This study explores the integration of HS elements within ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. It examines the extent to which these agreements incorporate the seven HS dimensions, as established in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

A key contribution of this research is the establishment of the Human Security Index (HSI), which provides a structured assessment tool for evaluating the inclusion of HS elements in ceasefire and peace agreements. By applying this index alongside a conflict-stages framework, the study offers a comprehensive methodology for assessing how security needs evolve over time and how said needs should be reflected in agreements. This

methodological approach allows for a more detailed evaluation of the extent to which ceasefire and peace agreements contribute to sustainable security.

The study is broken down into seven sections. There is an examination of the distinction between ceasefire agreements and peace agreements, outlining their respective roles in conflict resolution and the broader security landscape (Section 2). Next a framework is introduced for understanding HS and how it can be integrated into these agreements (Section 3). The methodology section presents the HSI as a tool for evaluating the extent to which ceasefire and peace agreements incorporate HS elements, while also outlining the study's limitations (Section 4). Additionally, the study applies a conflict-stages framework to assess how different phases of conflict shape the role and effectiveness of ceasefire and peace agreements. To ground this analysis, case studies of ceasefire and peace agreements across nine conflicts in the region offer a comparative perspective on HS integration (Section 5). It includes the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the nearly resolved conflicts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well



A city center in Tiraspol

as Armenia and Azerbaijan, the settled wars between Russia and Chechnya, the ended civil war in Tajikistan, the resolved conflict between Ossetians and the Ingush, and the simmering tensions in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The final sections reflect on broader trends, identifying patterns in how HS is addressed and proposing ways to enhance its inclusion in future agreements (Sections 6 and 7).

Findings indicate that many ceasefire agreements focus primarily on halting violence without addressing the broader security needs of civilians. There is significant variation in how HS elements are integrated, with personal, political, and community security receiving more attention, while economic, food, health, and environmental security remain largely overlooked. Comprehensive agreements that cover a wider geographical scope and include diverse security provisions tend to be more effective in contributing to de-escalation. Limited agreements, on the other hand, often fail to sustain peace. Multilateral agreements, particularly those involving international mediation, show a greater degree of HS integration compared to unilateral or bilateral agreements. The study confirms previous literature, that peace agreements are generally more inclusive of HS considerations compared to ceasefires, which tend to emphasize immediate stabilization

rather than long-term well-being. Economic and food security provisions, when present, are typically short-term and primarily linked to humanitarian aid or relief efforts rather than long-term economic recovery. Health security, meanwhile, follows a similar pattern, with provisions often focusing on emergency medical assistance rather than systemic healthcare improvements. Environmental security remains the least integrated aspect. The results indicate that conflicts in the post-conflict stage generally exhibit higher HSI scores, though this alone does not guarantee de-escalation.

Overall, the present study underscores the need for finding a balance between state-centric and human-centred security in conflict resolution efforts. By embedding HS principles into ceasefire and peace agreements, policymakers and negotiators can foster more sustainable and inclusive peace processes. However, this by itself does not ensure conflict de-escalation. The study also offers recommendations on how to better incorporate HS into future agreements, ensuring that peace efforts are comprehensive and durable.

INTRODUCTION

The overall objective of ceasefires and peace agreements is to set the foundations for sustainable peace, in all its dimensions. These agreements are often based on elite bargains and power sharing, and are prone to break down after several years. But the overall objective – especially of outside parties – is to pave the way for the establishment of legitimate and effective governance and institutions. This is also reflected in Sustainable Development Goal 16, which works towards the creation of “peaceful, just and inclusive societies.” Yet there are few credible means for assessing the practical implementation, and implications, of such agreements for the population. One possibility is to use the concept of HS as a lens through which to assess whether or not peace agreements have the potential to provide sustainable security for communities and individuals in a post-conflict setting, and to establish benchmarks through which the implementation of peace agreements can be assessed.

Incorporating HS elements into ceasefire and peace agreements helps to create frameworks that are more ‘humanized’ and attuned to the specific needs of local populations. By emphasizing individual safety, well-being, and dignity, these agreements become more responsive to the immediate concerns of affected communities. They address a key gap in traditional ceasefire frameworks that have historically prioritized state and elite interests. Conventional approaches to ceasefire and peace agreements often assess their success based on whether conflict parties refrain from violence. Said approaches use metrics such as battle-related deaths and compliance with negotiated terms. However, this state-centric perspective overlooks the broader security needs of civilians, who continue to face threats such as displacement, economic instability, and targeted violence even in the absence of large-scale fighting. The HS approach shifts the focus from the cessation of hostilities between armed actors to

the actual lived experiences of individuals, offering a framework that better evaluates how ceasefires contribute to lasting security at the community level.

The HS concept has developed against the backdrop of four major developments: 1) the growing civil wars and interstate conflicts, which far outnumber conventional interstate conflicts and are more likely to cause civilian suffering; 2) the spread of democratization; 3) the advent of humanitarian intervention or the principle of international interventions in case of gross human rights violations; and 4) widespread poverty, unemployment and social dislocations caused by the economic crises of the 1990s¹. Generally speaking, based on the extensive literature on HS, threats to HS can be categorized into two primary dimensions, commonly referred to as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want.’

The objective of this publication is to examine the extent to which HS elements are integrated into ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Researchers have analyzed ceasefire and peace agreements from multiple angles, exploring the complexities and subtleties of these vital components in conflict resolution. They frequently assess the broader societal implications of ceasefires. Areas like governance, economic recovery, and human rights, are prioritized. Then scholars analyze how these agreements affect civilian populations and play a role in post-conflict reconstruction. However, there is a notable lack of research concerning the integration of HS elements within ceasefire and peace agreements.

The literature review encompasses a diverse range of ceasefire and peace agreements, which can be broadly classified into five categories. The first category includes materials related to the determinants influencing ceasefire effectiveness. Page Fortna’s analysis of ceasefire agreements explores why

1 Acharya, A., 2001. *Human security: East versus West*. International Journal, 56(3), pp.442–460.

some agreements endure while others quickly fail². Professor Fortna argues that effective ceasefires can sustain peace by altering the motivations for war. In this way they reduce uncertainty, and help with the management of accidents. Her research examines factors that influence peace durability, like decisive victories or conflicts with deep historical roots. In their 2021 article, Govinda Clayton, Laurie Nathan, and Claudia Wiehler propose a framework for evaluating ceasefire success based on two distinct but interconnected criteria: the immediate objective and the underlying purpose³. The immediate objective, central to any ceasefire, is to halt hostilities, whether temporarily or permanently. However, the underlying purpose — the reason behind establishing the ceasefire — varies significantly. This purpose shapes the scope and duration of the cessation of hostilities. The authors emphasize that researchers assessing ceasefire success should explicitly outline their assumptions and conceptual choices, considering the political context of each ceasefire. The article 'Ceasefire Arrangements' by Robert Forster explores the negotiation process and essential components of ceasefires. It reviews key elements present in 267 ceasefire agreements signed between 1990 and 2015, as documented in the PA-X Peace Agreement Database. The analysis looks at when ceasefires are negotiated and the critical factors that contribute to their structure and effectiveness. The article 'Understanding Ceasefires' by Corinne Bara, Govinda Clayton, and Siri Aas Rustad discusses the growing scholarly interest in ceasefires. Key findings emphasize the diversity of ceasefire agreements and the need to conceptualize various forms, pathways, and outcomes associated with these agreements. The article notes that while ceasefire monitoring is crucial, it remains under-researched, despite indications that civilian monitoring will become more prevalent. Additionally, the relationship between ceasefires and political negotiations is inadequately understood, particularly regarding how factors like ceasefire violations and success affect conflict negotiations. *Ceasefire Monitoring: Developments and Complexities* examines how ceasefire monitoring

aids in transitions from war to peace, though the diversity in ceasefire characteristics and monitoring methods complicates the development of universal best practices. This is not a comprehensive guide. But it does present key insights from these discussions, with the intention of inspiring new perspectives and approaches to enhance support for ceasefire implementation. *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas & Options for Mediators* emphasizes the critical role of ceasefire agreements in the peacemaking process. These agreements can effectively reduce tensions and support the broader political, economic, and social efforts needed to address the root causes of conflict. Successful ceasefires require patience and strategic timing, as mediators must build trust with parties in conflict to gather essential information regarding troop and weapon locations. Security expertise can enhance this trust and facilitate collaborative ceasefire planning, leading to detailed agreements that are more likely to be implemented effectively. Overall, ceasefires serve as important mechanisms for managing violence while paving the way for sustainable peace.

The second category has scholars explore ceasefire agreements within the broader context of peace processes. Malin Åkebo analyses and compares ceasefire agreements as part of peace processes in intrastate armed conflicts⁴. Her research repeatedly underscores the importance of ceasefire agreements in peace processes. She shows though, how, agreements can influence processes in fundamentally different ways. She problematises the common assumption in the literature that ceasefire agreements create momentum in peace processes and pave the way to peace. In doing so she provides a nuanced analysis and understanding based on two empirical cases analysed within a comparative framework. She demonstrates how ceasefires can have negative implications for peace processes. In "Coexistence Ceasefire" in Mindanao' Åkebo (2019) challenges the typical view of ceasefires as mere events or end states of conflict, proposing instead that they should be seen as dynamic processes

2 Fortna, V.A., 2004. *Peace time: Cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

3 Clayton, G., Nathan, L. and Wiehler, C., 2021. *Ceasefire success: A conceptual framework*. *International Peacekeeping*, 28(3), pp.341–365.

4 Åkebo, M., 2016. *Ceasefire agreements and peace processes: A comparative study*. Abingdon: Routledge.

marked by evolving relationships and interactions.⁵ Through a case study of the ceasefire between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, Åkebo introduces the concept of a 'coexistence ceasefire.' This framework considers the unique structure and development of the Mindanao ceasefire, shaped by the conflict's territorial nature and the presence of diverse sources of violence. In so doing Åkebo illustrates how ceasefires can facilitate sustained coexistence amidst ongoing tensions. Jonathan Tonge explores how peace processes have expanded beyond ceasefires to address legacy issues like victim support, truth, and reconciliation⁶. He examines practical conflict resolution methods, focusing first on political strategies such as consociational⁷ power-sharing, partition, federalism, and devolution. Josep Cox argues that conflating ceasefires with peace agreements overlooks the distinct impacts each has on post-conflict environments⁸. Using a dual sovereignty framework, he suggests that peace agreements reduce dual sovereignty by resolving conflict issues, fostering restorative justice measures like amnesties and reparations. In contrast, ceasefires, which leave high dual sovereignty intact, often encourage policymakers to adopt retributive justice to strengthen their position, resulting in political purges. Statistical analysis supports that peace agreements are more likely to lead to amnesties and reparations, while ceasefires tend toward retributive measures, shaping different justice outcomes post-conflict. The study *Peace Agreements in the 1990s – What Are the Outcomes 20 Years Later?* by Anna Jarstad and colleagues examines the long-term effects of peace processes that concluded various protracted conflicts in the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations dramatically increased its peace operations, which became more extensive, while negotiated settlements replaced military victories. This shift sparked optimism that international negotiations and peacebuilding efforts would establish



A crossing point - Inguri bridge, along the administrative boundary line between Georgia and Abkhazia

lasting peace. However, two decades on, the authors find that results vary significantly. Through brief analyses, the paper highlights diverse outcomes regarding the quality of peace in affected countries and presents the 'peace triangle' framework to differentiate types of peace. Experts introduced the Civil Conflict CeaseFire (CF) dataset⁹. CF data covers all ceasefires in civil conflicts between 1989 and 2020, including multilateral, bilateral and unilateral arrangements. These range from verbal arrangements to detailed written agreements. The data feature information on the actors involved in the ceasefire, and the class, purpose, coverage, and end date of the ceasefire. The CF data provide an empirical basis

5 Åkebo, M., 2019. *Coexistence ceasefire in Mindanao*. *Peace & Change*, 44(4), pp.468–496.

6 Tonge, J., 2014. *Comparative peace processes*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

7 Consociationalism – a stable democratic system in deeply divided societies that is based on power sharing between elites from different social groups (Britannica)

8 Cox, J.M., 2020. *Negotiating justice: Ceasefires, peace agreements, and post-conflict justice*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(3), pp.466–481. London: SAGE Publications.

9 Clayton, G., Nygård, H.M., Strand, H., Rustad, S.A., Wiehler, C., Sagård, T., Landsverk, P., Ryland, R., Sticher, V., Wink, E. and Bara, C., 2023. *Introducing the ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 67(7–8), pp.1430–1456.

for assessing the conditions that give rise to ceasefires, how ceasefires affect the dynamics of conflict, and the role of a ceasefire in the peace process. The policy paper *Sequencing Peace Agreements and Constitutions in the Political Settlement Process* by Christine Bell and Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher looks at the interplay between peace agreements and constitutional arrangements within political settlement processes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It challenges the conventional assumption of a linear sequence leading to political settlements: first, a ceasefire or peace agreement, then, transitional arrangements and finally a constitution. The authors argue that in reality, the relationship between peace agreements, constitutional arrangements, and political settlements is more complex. Often, these documents do not accurately reflect a broadly shared political settlement. They require further negotiations to address ongoing conflicts and foster sustainable peace. While peace agreements aim to end hostilities and result from negotiations among conflict parties, they can take various forms, including ceasefires, framework agreements, and implementation agreements. The paper emphasizes how transitional and final constitutional arrangements are frequently intertwined with ceasefire and peace agreements. They result in intricate sequences that diverge from the traditional linear model.

The third category centres on the relationship between security sector reform (SSR) and ceasefire agreements. A 2022 DCAF study was the first to include peace agreements and ceasefires resulting from both intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus¹⁰. The authors employed an innovative security sector reform index, which separates security sector reform provisions into sectorial components, and disaggregates these, in turn, into additional clusters. The study has been able to provide detailed qualitative data on both the extent to which security sector reform provisions have been included in peace agreements and ceasefires, and the exact

nature of such provisions. The thematic brief by Jasper Linke also examined the inclusion of SSR and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in peace agreements by addressing five questions¹¹. Linke first assessed how frequently SSR components appear in these agreements and evaluates the comprehensiveness of such provisions. He then explored at which stages in a peace process SSR elements are typically introduced, emphasizing the importance of timing and strategic planning. He considers the role of justice reform within SSR, analyzing its prevalence and conditions for inclusion. In the final section, he compares the focus on SSR with DDR, broadening the perspective on Security Sector Governance (SSG) to highlight their relative emphasis and implementation in peace processes.

The fourth category encompasses gender considerations in ceasefire and peace agreements. Christine Bell addresses the inclusion of gender dimensions in peace agreements, exploring what 'a gender perspective' might entail, as it is under-examined¹². Her report provides data on specific mentions of women in peace agreements from January 1, 1990, to January 1, 2015, revealing that few agreements show evidence of a comprehensive gender approach. The agreements with the most extensive references to women tend to be highly internationalized, with limited genuine consensus between conflicting parties, leading to frequent implementation failures. In a 2023 study¹³, it is noted that most ceasefire agreements lack gender provisions or references to women and girls. This study includes a new dataset documenting gender provisions across 199 written ceasefire agreements between 1989 and 2018. Findings show that fewer than one in five ceasefires reference gender. The authors further examine these gender provisions, analyzing emerging trends across regions, thematic areas, and time.

The fifth category covers ceasefire dynamics and the contextual factors influencing their implementation. An interesting dimension regarding ceasefires is

10 Jasutis, G., Mikova, R. and Steyne, R., 2022. *Ceasefires and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia: Assessing the inclusion of security-sector reform provisions*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF).

11 Linke, J., 2020. *Provisions on SSR and DDR in peace agreements*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). Available at: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/EN_SSR_DDR_Peace_Agreements_2020.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

12 Bell, C., 2015. *Text and context: Evaluating peace agreements for their 'gender perspective'*. New York: UN Women, October.

13 Obermeier, A.M. and Rustad, S.A., 2023. *Gender provisions in ceasefires*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

explored by Sanja Badanjak and Laura Wise. In their exploration of Christmas ceasefires, they dig into examples from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database to examine these seasonal truces across various regions, from Northern Ireland to the Philippines¹⁴. By analyzing these annual practices, the authors reveal how Christmas ceasefires offer temporary relief in conflict zones. Their work sheds light on how cultural and religious traditions influence peacebuilding efforts and foster brief respites from violence, even amidst prolonged conflict. Monitoring of Social Media Provisions in Peace Agreements highlights the importance of establishing clear definitions and protocols for monitoring social media, as influenced by the broader peacemaking context, goals, and provisions of each agreement. The report suggests that such protocols could guide how social media provisions are crafted, ensuring they contain practical and targeted objectives aligned with peacebuilding efforts. In her article “Not Dead But Sleeping”: Expanding International Law to Better Regulate the Diverse Effects of Ceasefire Agreements’, Marika Sosnowski argues that while ceasefire agreements are currently governed by international humanitarian law, their implications extend beyond violence reduction to questions of governance, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security frameworks. Sosnowski highlights the need for a broader legal framework to address the multifaceted consequences of ceasefires. She explores the potential of categorizing ceasefires as contractual documents or special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, ultimately advocating for an expanded version of *lex pacificatoria*. This approach would introduce more flexible standards to guide the negotiation and conduct of ceasefires, allowing for the better regulation of their diverse effects in conflict situations.

Various authors have analyzed the broader societal impacts of ceasefires, concentrating on aspects such as governance, economic recovery, and human rights, investigating how these agreements influence civilian populations. Nevertheless, there remains a significant gap in research regarding the systemic incorporation of HS elements within

ceasefire and peace agreements. This research will begin by defining the key concepts of ceasefire and peace agreements, highlighting differences and significance in the context of conflict resolution and HS. Furthermore, the authors will analyze the HS approach and its relevance to establishing sustainable peace. This analysis will be based on the formulation of a framework that outlines the essential components of HS, detailing how these elements could or should be incorporated into peace agreements and ceasefire negotiations. To assess the integration of HS elements, a methodological framework will be employed, allowing for analysis of the relevant ceasefire and peace agreements. Finally, the paper will offer recommendations for practitioners in enhancing the effectiveness of ceasefire and peace agreements by incorporating HS considerations. The aim is to promote more resilient and inclusive peace processes.

This work employs a conflict-stages methodology, providing a structured approach for analysing the relationship between conflict intensity and the relevance of ceasefire or peace agreements at different stages of conflict. The framework is designed to test the hypothesis that integrating HS elements within these agreements can contribute to reducing violence or to de-escalating conflict intensity. This hypothesis is grounded on the premise that addressing the well-being of affected populations – through economic stability, political inclusion, and social protections – can alter the incentives of conflict parties, reducing grievances and fostering conditions for sustainable peace. A combination of methods was used to achieve a thorough analysis. Extensive desk research complemented this approach, drawing together diverse sources of information to build a robust understanding of each conflict. The authors also leveraged personal field experience, adding depth and context to the findings and strengthening the overall analysis.

14 Badanjak, S. and Wise, L., 2020. *Peace on Earth? The tradition of Christmas ceasefires across the world*. [online] PeaceRep, 23 December. Available at: <https://peacerep.org/2020/12/23/christmas-ceasefires/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

CEASEFIRES AND PEACE AGREEMENTS: DEFINITIONS, SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Understanding different types of ceasefire and peace agreements, as well as their typologies, is essential for conflict resolution, HS, and for ensuring lasting stability. Ceasefire and peace agreements have distinct functions within the conflict resolution process (conflict stages) and impact HS in different ways. Ceasefires are generally temporary, serving to halt hostilities and create space for dialogue, while peace agreements are more comprehensive, aiming to address the underlying issues of conflict causes and to establish a long-term settlement. Mixing the two can lead to misunderstandings among conflict parties, potentially undermining trust and commitment to agreements.

Different types of ceasefire and peace agreements can include varying terms, such as the presence of monitoring mechanisms, disarmament provisions, or power-sharing arrangements. For practitioners, understanding the typology is critical for crafting agreements that align with the conflict's unique characteristics, HS problems and the needs of the parties involved. Conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia differ widely based on historical, cultural, and geopolitical contexts, making it necessary to adapt agreement frameworks accordingly. For example, a ceasefire in a highly decentralized region such as Chechnya (in the past) might need different HS norms than one in a centralized state in which delivery of social services are better organized. Additionally, certain types of peace agreements might include provisions for transitional justice (for instance in Tajikistan) or autonomy for the conflict-affected region where such is needed. Ceasefires primarily focus on halting violence, while peace agreements aim to create sustainable stability by addressing the root causes of conflict. This is confirmed by various scholars. Nita Yawanarajah and Julian Ouellet define ceasefire agreements as temporary stoppages of armed conflict, designed to suspend aggressive actions without necessarily making concessions. In contrast, peace agreements address the substantive issues in dispute, seeking lasting resolutions and comprehensive settlements¹⁵. Malin Akebo emphasizes that while ceasefires aim to halt hostilities temporarily, they do not inherently resolve the underlying issues of a conflict. She argues that for ceasefires to contribute effectively to a sustainable peace, they must be integrated into broader peace processes that address the root causes of the conflict¹⁶. HS causes are not necessarily linked to the root causes. Therefore, elements such as economic, political, community, environmental and health security might be absent from ceasefire agreements. Being aware of these differences helps conflict resolution practitioners create agreements

that work in cultural and HS terms. These would need to resonate with local actors and enhance the likelihood of sustainable peace. Practitioners may prioritize local ownership of peace processes by engaging community leaders, traditional authorities, marginal groups, and civil society organizations. Alternatively, they might integrate traditional mediation and reconciliation methods alongside formal legal frameworks to foster greater legitimacy

There is no single, universally accepted definition of a **ceasefire**. As part of negotiations, parties agree on what a ceasefire entails in their context¹⁷. Usually, it is an agreement that regulates the cessation of all military activity for a given length of time in a given area¹⁸. UN differentiates ceasefires based on three categories but in practice, a ceasefire may fit into several of these categories¹⁹:

Based on their relationship to the broader peace process:

- **Preliminary ceasefire:** A temporary halt in hostilities that may occur before, during, or after the initiation of a formal peace process. The aim is to reduce violence, address humanitarian needs, and create conditions conducive to negotiations, though a ceasefire is not always required for a peace process to begin (ex. *Agreement by the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 1997*).

15 Yawanarajah, N. and Ouellet, J., 2003. Peace agreements. Beyond Intractability. Available at: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/structuring_peace_agree [Accessed 9 May 2025].

16 Akebo, M., 2016. Ceasefire agreements and peace processes: A comparative study. Abingdon: Routledge.

17 United Nations, 2022. *Ceasefire guidance: Chapter 1*. [online] Peacemaker. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/xyz> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

18 Médecins Sans Frontières, n.d. *The practical guide to humanitarian law*. [online] Available at: <https://guide-humanitarian-law.org> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

19 Ibid

- **Definitive/permanent ceasefire:** A long-term halt to hostilities after a successful political process, addressing security arrangements and often leading to disarmament, while being closely tied to a broader peace agreement (ex. *Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, 2020*)²⁰.

Based on their focus:

- **Humanitarian pauses:** A temporary cessation of hostilities, agreed upon by all relevant parties, solely for humanitarian purposes, typically involving a defined period and specific geographic areas to facilitate aid delivery. The ceasefire is guided by international humanitarian law and best managed by the relevant actors to ensure the focus remains on humanitarian goals rather than political objectives (ex. *Stockholm agreement between the parties to the conflict in Yemen, 2018*)²¹.
- **Geographical ceasefires:** A limited cessation of hostilities confined to a specific area, such as a town or region, aimed at managing conflict in that area, demonstrating goodwill, and testing the feasibility of a broader ceasefire. Ceasefires of this kind require clear provisions and monitoring to prevent redeployment or the resupply of forces outside the ceasefire zone (ex. *Ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta, Syria, 2018*)²².

- **Sectoral ceasefires:** Agreements to halt attacks on specific groups or infrastructure, or to prohibit the use of certain tactics or weapons. Often the aim is to build trust and demonstrate a commitment to peace, and this form of ceasefire can be used alongside other types of ceasefires (ex. *Agreement of cessation of hostilities between the government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/army (in opposition), 2014*)²³.

- **Temporary ceasefires:** Short-term agreements where conflicting parties agree to halt hostilities in a specific area for a set period, often to build trust and facilitate negotiations for a more comprehensive ceasefire (ex. *Temporary ceasefire agreement in Libya, 2024*)²⁴.

Based on the number of parties involved:

- **Unilateral ceasefires:** The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia declared a unilateral ceasefire during peace talks with the Colombian government. It was seen as a confidence-building measure in the run up to the signing of the 2016 peace agreement²⁵.
- **Bilateral ceasefires:** For instance, the ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia was brokered by the European Union during the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The agreement, known as the Six-Point Peace Plan, was mediated by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the EU presidency at the time (the text is available in the annex).

20 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), n.d. Ceasefire agreement between Libyan parties (English). [online] Available at: https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

21 United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), 2018. *Stockholm Agreement*. [online] Available at: https://unmha.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/stockholm_agreement.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

22 Al Jazeera, 2018. *Ceasefire takes effect in Syria's Eastern Ghouta*. [online] Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/27/ceasefire-takes-effect-in-syrias-eastern-ghouta> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

23 United Nations, 2014. *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A (Opposition)*. [online] Available at: <https://www.southsudanpeace.org> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

24 AzerNews, 2022. *Temporary ceasefire agreement reached in Tripoli amid ongoing conflict*. [online] Available at: <https://www.azernews.az> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

25 Brodzinsky, S., 2015. FARC rebels announce unilateral truce in attempt to rescue Colombia peace talks. The Guardian, 8 July. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

- **Multilateral ceasefires:** The Minsk Protocol was signed on 5 September 2014, with the aim of ceasing hostilities, signed by mediator, representatives of Ukraine, Russia and separatists²⁶.

The UN also differentiates informal ceasefires (“handshake agreements”), *de facto* ceasefires and imposed ceasefires all of which may possess the characteristics of other ceasefires listed above²⁷.

Ceasefire agreements can facilitate cooperation in several ways: by making it more costly to attack, by reducing uncertainty about the other side’s actions and intentions, and by preventing misunderstandings and accidents from spiraling back into war²⁸.

Peace agreements or treaties are a legal agreement between two or more hostile parties, which formally ends a state of war between the two parties²⁹. Even though all peace agreements have the same goal – ending the conflict, their content differs. The manner and method by which a conflict is brought to an end also affects the substance of an agreement. Violent conflicts, whether inter – or intra-state, typically end in one of three ways: an agreement on the terms of surrender; a partial agreement; or a full peace agreement³⁰. A conflict may, also, end when one side is completely defeated and no formal peace or surrender agreement is reached.³¹ Sri Lanka’s defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009 – the Tamil Tigers were militarily destroyed, and no formal surrender or negotiated settlement followed³².

Failure to properly distinguish between ceasefire and peace agreements can increase the risk

of conflict re-escalation and negatively affect HS. Ceasefire agreements provide short-term security by stopping violence but they do not resolve conflict drivers. Peace agreements aim for sustainable HS, reducing the risk of future conflicts by addressing deeper economic, social, and political issues. Ceasefires without a clear roadmap towards a peace agreement can sometimes lead to a “conflict freeze” (take the case of Georgia) where unresolved issues continue to simmer. Conversely, a peace agreement that fails to account for the need for interim security arrangements may leave a security vacuum. This can be avoided with phased approaches that move from immediate security measures to longer-term political and social solutions, minimizing the likelihood of a relapse into violence.

However, ceasefire and peace agreements play complementary roles in the broader peace process, each addressing specific needs at different stages of conflict resolution. Their interplay is essential in building a pathway from violence to sustainable peace, making it critical to study and analyze both types of agreements together. Ceasefire agreements often serve as a first step toward peace by temporarily halting hostilities (see the case of Tajikistan), creating an environment where further negotiations can take place. Peace agreements then build upon this foundation, providing long-term resolutions to the underlying causes of the conflict. This sequence (ceasefires create immediate security for conflict affected population) shows the importance of trying to understand the full trajectory from conflict to peace in light of HS.

26 OSCE, 2014. Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/home/123257> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. OSCE, 2014. Memorandum on stabilizing ceasefire another important step towards de-escalation, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office says, 20 September. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/123808> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

27 United Nations Peacemaker, 2022. Ceasefire mediation guidance, Chapter 1. [online] Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/documents/ceasefire-guidance-2022-chapter-1> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

28 Fortna, V.P., n.d. *Peace time: Cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace*. [online] Available at: https://books.google.ws/books?id=7MXPOz95A_IC&pg=PP6&pg=PP6#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 9 May 2025].

29 American Bar Association, n.d. *Understanding peace treaties*. [online] Available at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how-courts-work/understanding-peace-treaties/ [Accessed 9 May 2025].

30 Yawanarajah, N. and Ouellet, J., 2003. *Peace agreements*. In: G. Burgess and H. Burgess, eds. *Beyond Intractability*. [online] Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Available at: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/structuring-peace-agre> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

31 Kreutz, J., 2010. How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP conflict termination dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(2), pp. 231–248.

32 Richards, J., 2014. *An institutional history of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*. Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

HS ELEMENTS IN CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS

The concept of HS has multiple meanings and dimensions – perhaps too many. A generic definition of HS would be: ***‘protecting individuals from existential and pervasive threats to their personal safety and physical well-being.’*** Broadly speaking, and drawing upon the extensive literature on HS, there are two main dimensions on which HS threats (and responses) can be classified, which have been given the labels “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”³³.

33 The first was associated with multilateral initiatives led by a loose coalition of states (including Switzerland, Canada, Norway, *inter alia*) and the *Human Security Reports*; the second with Japan, the UNDP *Human Development Report 2014*, the Human Security Commission, and the UN Human Security Trust Fund. For details see the reference list.

Unlike state-centric security, which primarily focuses on the protection of national borders and sovereignty, HS shifts the focus to the individual as the primary referent. This raises key questions: security for whom, from what threats, and by whom? Freedom from want was defined by the Human Security Commission as *“the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.”* This includes security from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, environmental degradation and political repression (closely following the UN Development Programme’s definition). Freedom from fear was succinctly summarized by the *Human Security Report* as protection from *“violent threats to individuals,”* including the elimination of violent extremism, reductions in conflict – and crime-related violence, protection from state violence, and measures to reduce inter-group or inter-communal tensions. Who, then, is responsible for providing HS? Is it the state, international organizations, or non-state actors — and how do their roles differ from traditional security providers? It also included specific initiatives dealing with issues such as the proliferation and misuse of small arms, anti-personnel landmines and the explosive remnants of war, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of armed actors, and so forth.

It might seem that ceasefire and peace agreements would concentrate primarily on the classic forms of physical insecurity, and that aspects related to addressing “freedom from want” would be delegated to post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. There are, however, three reasons to reject this simplistic division, and to include the broader issues associated with HS. First, from the perspective of the population (groups, communities, individuals), physical security from threats of force and violence are usually not the only – or even the main – concerns. Meeting basic needs (food, shelter, access to basic services and health care) are often primordial once the guns are silenced, and these everyday ‘HS’ elements must be taken into account. Second, the central elements of ceasefires and peace agreements often fix or freeze the parameters of future efforts to build sustainable peace, through such things as the inclusion (or not) of land reform or redistribution initiatives that

are the means to enhance HS. Finally, the cyclical nature of many contemporary conflicts suggests that a failure to address the broader (human) security concerns of groups and the population as a whole can lead to a crisis of legitimacy. All too often there is a return to repression, force and violent conflict over access to scarce resources (among other things).

To this end it is important to consider all HS dimensions outlined in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. These seven components of HS—economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security—represent essential aspects of well-being that extend beyond physical safety and address the fundamental needs of individuals and communities. In conflict settings, these dimensions are crucial as they protect against both immediate and longer-term threats to survival and dignity. The seven dimensions in conflict setting and their ability to contribute to sustainable peace can be understood as follows:

- **Economic security:** Provides support for livelihoods disrupted by conflict, helping individuals who may have lost jobs or resources to regain stability. By restoring economic stability, poverty-driven resentment may in turn be reduced and a foundation can be put down for lasting peace.
- **Food security:** Ensures that populations affected by conflict have reliable access to adequate food, addressing urgent needs in disrupted regions. Stable food supply reduces desperation and strengthens community resilience, making future peacebuilding efforts more sustainable.
- **Health security:** Prioritizes care for those injured in conflict and protects against disease in high-risk, unstable areas, ensuring access to essential healthcare and sanitation. Meeting health needs not only aids immediate recovery, but also supports longer-term community health, reducing one potential driver of post-conflict grievances.

- **Environmental security:** Protects natural resources and prevents attacks on critical infrastructure, such as water sources or dams, to avoid environmental crises that could worsen civilian suffering. By safeguarding resources, it prevents future disputes over scarce resources and promotes sustainable forms of rebuilding.
- **Personal security:** Directly shields civilians from violence, exploitation, and abuse, establishing a foundation of physical safety for non-combatants. This builds trust in peace processes and fosters a sense of security essential for communities to move beyond conflict.
- **Community security:** Strengthens protections for at-risk groups, preventing targeted violence based on identity, ethnicity, or religion, which supports social cohesion in conflict areas. By addressing these group dynamics, it builds tolerance and paves the way for more inclusive governance after conflict.
- **Political security:** Reduces political repression even during the conflict, allowing some degree of civilian representation or voice, pointing the way to future inclusive governance. By addressing political grievances early on, it lowers the risk of opposition to peace agreements and promotes long-term stability.

One can also distinguish between problem-solving and critical approaches to HS. The problem-solving approach takes prevailing social relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as a given and the inevitable framework for actions. The critical approach questions the emergence and maintenance of existing institutions and does not accept the existing policy parameters as a given let alone necessarily legitimate. Traditionally, most HS scholarship has focused on the problem-solving approach, the result of its origins in foreign policy initiatives and among scholars interested in international organizations and development. The critical approach has emerged as an alternative to seek

deeper theoretical inquiry into questions of security and insecurity. Ensuring sustainable security both with respect to freedom from fear and freedom from want requires that structural causes of insecurity are addressed. This means incorporating a critical perspective into the assessment of ceasefire and peace agreements. The 2022 DCAF study has explored this topic by analysing the ways structural causes of insecurity are addressed in ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The study assessed how ceasefire and peace agreements incorporate security sector reform provisions with reference to defence, justice, police and intelligence sectors in six different areas: political; structural and organizational; legislative; budgetary; cross-cutting issues – human rights, good governance; gender and transitional justice; and oversight and monitoring ³⁴. Much as with the aforementioned points, adopting a purely problem-solving approach in developing ceasefire and peace agreements without critically reviewing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the existing social relationships and institutions can result in freezing or fixing the structural elements. This naturally hinders sustainable peace and fails to address broader human-security concerns.

These two approaches are also relevant for understanding the way HS is incorporated into ceasefire and peace agreements. While ceasefires tend to prioritise short-term measures such as civilian protection and access to humanitarians, peace agreements, particularly those addressing governance, justice, and long-term stability, are more likely to integrate structural HS provisions. This distinction shapes both the depth and scope of HS commitments in different types of agreements.

Furthermore, the substance of ceasefire and peace agreements is not only shaped by their intended function but also by the actors involved in their negotiation and implementation. The priorities of conflict parties, external mediators, and affected communities may diverge, influencing which HS elements are included and how they are framed.

34 Jasutis, G., Mikova, R. and Steyne, R., 2022. *Ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia: Assessing the inclusion of security-sector reform provisions*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). Available at: https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Study_Ceasefires_PeaceAgreements_ECA_EN.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

While ceasefires are often driven by immediate security concerns and negotiated primarily by military and political elites, peace agreements may involve a broader range of actors, including international organizations and civil society, which can expand the scope of HS provisions. These dynamics raise important questions about whose interests are reflected in an agreement and whether certain aspects of security are overlooked in this process.

HS elements need to be assessed using a diagnostic tool that can evaluate the effectiveness of ceasefire and peace agreements. This tool should address both 'fear' and 'want' dimensions, as well as examine direct and structural causes of insecurity. The following chapter details how this could be done.



METHODOLOGY

This analysis is grounded in the development of a comprehensive framework that defines and organizes the essential components of HS. This framework will detail how these elements could or should be systematically incorporated into peace agreements and ceasefire negotiations, ensuring that HS concerns are fully addressed within conflict resolution processes. To evaluate the extent of HS integration, this research will apply a Human Security Index (HSI) as a methodological tool, facilitating a focused analysis of how relevant ceasefire and peace agreements reflect these HS dimensions. Through this index, each agreement can be assessed on its inclusion of factors such as: civilian protection; access to basic needs; and safeguarding of fundamental rights. Additionally, the study employs a conflict-stages methodology, enabling a structured analysis of how conflict intensity affects the relevance and design of ceasefire and peace agreements at various phases of conflict. This approach is essential for testing the core hypothesis: that embedding HS elements within these agreements helps reduce violence and lower conflict intensity over time. The combined methodologies provide a nuanced view of how well-integrated HS can potentially shift conflict dynamics toward lasting peace and stability. By analyzing ceasefire and peace agreements through a conflict-stages framework and by employing an HSI, this study assesses the extent to which HS provisions influence conflict de-escalation and long-term stability. The integration of qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews and desk research further allows for a comparative evaluation of how different agreements embed HS elements and the impact they have over time.

HSI

The theoretical framework will follow the seven components of HS identified in the 1994 UNDP Human Development report which are:

- Economic security
- Food security
- Health security
- Environmental security
- Personal security
- Community security
- Political security

Within these categories, only those issues related to the conflict at hand prove relevant. The inclusion of HS components in ceasefire and peace agreements will, therefore, focus on indicators that reflect either the conditions shaping the conflict or sources of insecurity affecting populations, without attempting to pre-define the conflict's root causes. This means that while broad global challenges which affect HS— such as climate change or economic inequality – may not be explicitly addressed, more context-specific issues with a direct impact on the conflict could prove relevant. For example, while climate change might not be included, localized environmental degradation contributing to resource scarcity and tensions between communities would be worth considering. Similarly, while general economic hardship is too broad, the disruption of key trade routes or land disputes might be relevant. This approach thus distinguishes between structural factors that shape the conflict landscape and broader external issues that, while significant, do not require inclusion in the agreement itself.

Furthermore, the categories of indicators will be distinguished depending on which type of insecurity and violence they target – direct or structural. Direct physical violence is typically the primary focus of ceasefire, as well as peace agreements. Some have argued that the focus on this as a key defining criterion of HS makes it easier to devise effective policy responses.³⁵ Nevertheless, factors underlying a conflict are generally tied to more systemic causes. Therefore, considering and addressing structural factors is necessary to ensure sustainable peace. While ceasefire agreements, by their nature, tend to address more direct insecurities, peace agreements focused on sustainable conditions for peace, reconciliation, and peacebuilding must include provisions targeting structural causes of violence. While this distinction will be reflected in the HSI, the methodology will approach them jointly, as provisions often simultaneously address both direct and structural insecurity, making a strict separation difficult in practice.

In light of this, this study develops the HSI for assessing the inclusion of HS in ceasefire and peace agreements (see Table 1). The indicators included in the table below are not exhaustive but attempt to encompass the range of insecurities and violence that ceasefire and peace agreements can address.


35 Lodgaard, S., 2000. *Human security: Concept and operationalizations*. Expert Seminar on Human Rights and Peace, Geneva.

Table 1. HSI indicators

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Direct insecurity	Economic aid and assistance	Provision of humanitarian aid/ access provided to humanitarian organization	Provision of humanitarian aid/ access provided to humanitarian organization	End targeting with potentially dangerous environmental impact	End violent conflict	Reduce inter-communal tensions	Cease state repression and state-sponsored violence
	Restoration of market functionality	Security of resource access	Protection of Healthcare facilities	Protection of affected population	Establish basic security	Creation of community peace structures	Protection from enforced disappearance and ill-treatment
	Protection of foreign investment	Provision of water	Protection of medical supply chains	Explosive remnants of war	Address sexual and gender-based violence and gender equality	Return of refugees and IDPs	Release political prisoners or POWs
	Law enforcement on economic crimes	Protection of agricultural lands	Provision of immediate medical aid		Rejection of violence		Dealing with missing persons
	Immediate reparations for affected populations	Protection of food supply chain and food aid distribution	Provision of mental health services and rehabilitation programs		DDR and SSR		
					Violent extremism		
					Atrocity crimes		
					Refusal of incitement of violence		
					Addressing SALW issues		
	Social guarantees				De-mining		

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Structural insecurity	<p>Addressing economic grievances</p> <p>Fair distribution of land, goods, and services</p>	<p>Intercommunal management of agricultural resources</p>	<p>Access to healthcare</p> <p>Re-establishment of health care services</p>	<p>Restoration of conflict-affected areas</p> <p>Intercommunal management of natural resources</p> <p>Access to natural resources</p> <p>Protection of natural resources and environment</p> <p>Mitigation and adaptation measures for environmentally affected population</p>	<p>SSR</p> <p>DDR</p>	<p>Cross-communal political parties (abolition of sectarian political parties)</p>	<p>Human rights legislation</p> <p>Repeal of discriminatory law</p> <p>Equality under law</p> <p>Free and fair elections</p> <p>Denouncement of martial law</p> <p>Establishment of war crime courts and tribunals</p> <p>Establishment of mixed commissions between conflict parties</p>

The HSI is composed of seven primary clusters, each containing an unequal number of references to HS provisions, with varying values. These seven clusters were selected to assess the degree of integration of HS provisions in ceasefire and peace agreements. The integration degree is categorized as follows:



Each cluster can have a maximum value of 13.5%, and an error margin of 5.5% is considered permissible for the overall integration assessment. The authors acknowledge that the value of each cluster could vary depending on the specific context and situation. Personal, community, and political security are in the context of armed conflict generally considered most relevant, encompass the largest number of indicators and are almost certainly going to be over-represented. Economic, food, health and environmental security may be relevant to a more limited extent or not at all depending on the specific conflict at hand. To consider this, each case study of a conflict will provide a qualitative assessment of the context and reflect on the relevance of various HS components to the conflict and their consideration in the agreement(s). To provide a clearer understanding, a traffic light tool was introduced to describe the value of each cluster:

- **Green light:** Assigned to clusters with direct references to HS provisions, indicating 13.5% of the total value. For instance, the package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements includes definition of modalities of full resumption of socio-economic ties, including social transfers, such as pension, payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine). To this end, Ukraine would reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers being

- established. This fully falls under economic security.
- **Amber light:** Assigned to clusters with tentative or implied HS provisions, indicating 6.75% of the total value. For example, according to the Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence between the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, the sides will continue negotiations with the aim of achieving full scale political settlement. This generally pertains to political security and can be associated with specific indicators under political cluster.
- **Red light:** Assigned to clusters with no references to HS provisions, indicating 0% of the total value.

This traffic light classification complements the mathematical calculations and adjusts the value of each cluster accordingly. The creation of the HSI, which combines quantitative and qualitative analysis, aims to better describe the current conditions and the potential for peaceful conflict resolution. Categories such as 'highly integrated' and 'likely integrated' suggest that the negotiated ceasefire and peace agreements contain sufficient HS provisions to support peaceful resolutions. Additionally, when populating the index, the authors included all ceasefire and peace agreements related to a given conflict. This comprehensive approach allows the agreements to complement each other, providing a more holistic interpretation of the conflict and its resolution poten-

tial. The present chapter will apply the HSI to ten different case studies of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and the 'Final Assessment' will reflect on the broader trends that

can be observed in ceasefire and peace agreements across the region and their inclusion of HS provisions in achieving the conditions for sustainable peace.

Stages of conflict development and intensity

This research adopts a conflict-stages methodology, offering a systematic framework to examine how the intensity of conflict influences the applicability and effectiveness of ceasefire or peace agreements at various stages. There are different approaches towards this issue and authors do not always agree on stages of conflict intensity. Louis Kriesberg's work on conflict escalation and de-escalation includes a stage-based analysis of conflicts, outlining phases such as initiation, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, and resolution³⁶. In *The Structure of International Conflict*, Christopher Mitchell describes conflict as a dynamic process with different stages, including latent conflict, confrontation, crisis, and settlement³⁷. Paul Wehr outlines stages of conflict, including emergence, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, and resolution³⁸. One of the pioneers of peace and conflict studies, Galtung introduced the idea of conflict transformation and analyzed how conflicts evolve through different stages³⁹. Friedrich Glasl's analysis is widely used in mediation and conflict resolution to analyze how conflicts intensify⁴⁰.

Conflict stages highlight the cyclical nature of conflict and underscore the importance of addressing the underlying issues to prevent future escalations. Actual conflicts rarely follow a linear path. Rather, they evolve in fits and starts, with progress and setbacks toward resolution⁴¹.

- 1. Pre-conflict:** This stage is characterized by an underlying tension between two or more parties due to incompatible goals or interests. The potential for conflict exists, but it is often hidden from public view. While one or more parties may recognize the possibility of escalation, the conflict remains latent, and parties might seek to avoid direct confrontation. However, the strained relationships and unease create the foundation for future open conflict.
- 2. Confrontation:** During this phase, the conflict becomes more visible as parties engage in more overt actions. There might be occasional skirmishes, low levels of violence, or verbal confrontations. Relationships between the conflicting parties deteriorate significantly, and the potential for further escalation becomes more evident.
- 3. Crisis:** This is the most intense phase of the conflict, often marked by full-scale violence or war. Tension peaks, and the level of hostility is at its highest. Communication between the parties may completely break down, and casualties are likely on all sides. In larger conflicts, this period involves widespread violence, and efforts to resolve the conflict through dialogue are typically suspended.

36 Kriesberg, L., 1998. *Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

37 Mitchell, C., 1981. *The structure of international conflict*. London: Macmillan.

38 Wehr, P., 2006. *Conflict mapping guide*. [online] Available at: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict_mapping [Accessed 9 May 2025].

39 Galtung, J., 1996. *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. London: SAGE Publications.

40 Glasl, F., 1999. *Confronting conflict: A first-aid kit for handling conflict*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.

41 Brahm, E., 2003. *Conflict stages*. *Beyond Intractability*, September. [online] Available at: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

4. **Outcome:** Eventually, the conflict reaches a resolution point. The outcome can take various forms, such as one party achieving victory over the other, or the conflict being paused through a ceasefire. In some cases, the parties may agree to peace talks or negotiations, sometimes with the involvement of mediators. The resolution may be temporary or lead to a more long-term solution depending on how the underlying issues are addressed.
5. **Post-conflict:** In the post-conflict phase, violence subsides, and relations between the parties begin to normalize. Tensions decrease, and efforts to rebuild trust and cooperation may start up. However, if the root causes of

the conflict, such as incompatible goals or grievances, are not thoroughly addressed, there is a risk of reverting to the pre-conflict or confrontation stage. The cycle of conflict will all too easily repeat itself.

This framework facilitates the testing of a key hypothesis: that incorporating HS elements such as economy recovery, provision of basic services, and others within ceasefire or peace agreements can play a role in reducing overall conflict intensity. This hypothesis suggests that a stronger emphasis on HS not only aids in immediate violence reduction, but also supports the long-term de-escalation of hostilities.

Limitations of methodology

Several limitations affect the methodology used in this study, which should be acknowledged:

Exclusion of conflict causes. This analysis does not examine the root causes of the conflict, which limits the ability to fully assess the effectiveness of ceasefire and peace agreements in addressing conflict resolution. Conflicts often arise from a complex mix of factors that may or may not relate to HS, and the omission of these causes reduces the scope of evaluating how these agreements mitigate conflict drivers directly.

Subjectivity in defining HS indicators. There can be overlap and occasional ambiguity between indicators of direct insecurity (immediate threats to physical security) and structural insecurity (underlying conditions that contribute to instability). This distinction is somewhat subjective and relies on authors' judgment, which introduces interpretative variability. While the HS indicator table used in this study serves as an illustrative tool to demonstrate the presence of HS norms, further research could refine these categories and clarify distinctions.

Difficulty to distinguish HSI dimensions. It can be challenging to distinguish political and economic dimensions from conventional ceasefire provisions that also address political and economic aspects.

This is particularly so at the individual and community security levels. An example: if a conflict party seeks to include a future referendum on self-determination in an agreement, viewing it as a stepping stone to independence (e.g. GAM in Aceh) and part of a broader political negotiation or power struggle, this might qualify as the inclusion of an HS.

Number of HS indicators. The set of HS indicators is currently based on an extensive literature review and the foundational principles of the HS concept. While this list offers a solid starting point, there is, of course, potential for expansion. Additional indicators can be identified and incorporated to reflect emerging challenges and diverse dimensions of HS. Regular updates and revisions would ensure that the indicators remain relevant, comprehensive, and aligned with current needs and insights from evolving research and practical applications.

Subjectivity in assessing the integration of HS elements. Calculating HS integration within ceasefire and peace agreements is somewhat subjective. Certain HS elements may be emphasized more strongly in some agreements than in others, reflecting varying degrees of focus on

direct versus structural insecurities. As a result, the overall assessment may not capture the nuanced representation of each HS component consistently.

In addition, this study has a restricted geographical scope as it focuses on ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, building on prior research conducted in the same region. The selection of this regional scope is based on both its empirical relevance and the diversity of conflict dynamics present across different cases. These regions have witnessed a range of protracted and recurrent conflicts, including both inter-state and intra-state disputes, making them particularly relevant for analyzing the integration of HS in ceasefire and peace agreements. The cases selected reflects variation in conflict types, agreement structures, and

post-conflict trajectories, allowing for a comparative perspective on how HS elements are incorporated under different conditions. Examining multiple cases within a shared regional context also enables a more nuanced understanding of common challenges and patterns in conflict resolution efforts, while still accounting for the specificities of different cases.

Finally, the focus of this study is not to evaluate the successful incorporation of HS components across all conflict causes or to comprehensively address each source of human insecurity. Rather, it seeks to highlight the prevalence of HS indicators within each HS category, providing illustrative examples of relevant provisions. This approach offers insights into HS integration in conflict agreements without claiming a comprehensive evaluation of their effectiveness.



Administrative boundary line between Georgia and South Ossetia

CASE STUDIES FROM EASTERN EUROPE, CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

Tajik Civil War

Tajikistan borders four countries: China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Official estimates placed the population at 8,350,000 in 2015. Islam is the most widely-held faith. Sixty-seven per cent of Tajikistanis are Tajik. Other large ethnic groups are: 23% Uzbek; and 3.5% Russians. From 1992 until 1997 there was a civil war in the country. The General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed on 27 June 1997 to end that war.⁴²

Conflict description

The Tajik Civil War (1992–1997) was a devastating conflict that resulted from political, regional, and ideological tensions in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. The phase of confrontation stemmed largely from internal divisions, particularly over the presidential elections in November 1991. Rahmon Nabiev, the former Communist Chief of Tajikistan from Khujand ran against Davlat Khudonazarov, an opposition candidate supported by the Islamic Renaissance Party and by the Democratic Party. Nabiev won by a 35% margin, sparking resentment and claims of electoral fraud from opposition groups who alleged an unfair process⁴³. Nabiev's government was composed mainly of elites from the Leninabad and Kulyab regions, and excluded significant portions of the population, particularly from the Badakhshan and the Gharm region. This exclusion fueled discontent, and by March 1992, the opposition, primarily made up of Pamiris and Gharmis, organized mass protests in Dushanbe. This led to a tense standoff with pro-government demonstrators, who were largely Kulyabi supporters. Both factions took to the streets in rival demonstrations, and tensions were heightened by a televised debate between high-ranking officials that underscored ethnic and regional tensions⁴⁴. In May 1992, Nabiev attempted to disperse the opposition protests by creating a Kulyabi Presidential Guard and distributing

2,000 rifles. Violence erupted on 5 May, marking the beginning as clashes intensified, fighting soon spread beyond Dushanbe, particularly in the south. In Kurgan-Tyube, clashes between pro-government Kulyabis and the opposition, who were now labeled 'Islamists,' became increasingly brutal. By June, entire villages were targeted, and ethnic violence forced around 140,000 people to flee their homes. In July 1992, a temporary ceasefire was reached, yet hostilities resumed as the National Front, a coalition of Kulyabi and Leninabad factions, emerged to counter the opposition⁴⁵. By September, Nabiev was forced to resign, and casualties had reached approximately 15,000–20,000. In December, National Front forces seized control of Dushanbe, and Emomali Rahmonov, a Kulyabi, became Chairman of the Supreme Council. The following year saw ethnic cleansing by pro-government forces in the Gharm and Gissar regions, as well as the involvement of Uzbek air support in some operations⁴⁶. Amid escalating violence, opposition leaders fled to neighboring countries, and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was established in 1993, consolidating several groups, including the Islamic Renaissance Party and the National Movement 'Rastokhez'.

UTO fighters, based in Afghanistan, launched cross-border attacks against Tajik and Russian

42 Jasutis, G. (ed.), Chmykh, E., Dorokhova, E., Loose, H., Sutkaityte, K., Mikova, R., Steyne, R. and Murray, S., 2021. Mapping fragile areas: Case studies from Central Asia. [online] Available at: <https://www.dcaf.ch/mapping-fragile-areas-case-studies-central-asia> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

43 Matveeva, A., 2009. *The perils of emerging statehood: Civil war and state reconstruction in Tajikistan*. Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2, March. [online] Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98292/wp46.2.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Жирохов, М.А., 2011. Семена распада: Войны и конфликты на территории бывшего СССР. Санкт-Петербург: БХВ-Петербург.

44 Matveeva, A., 2009. *The perils of emerging statehood: Civil war and state reconstruction in Tajikistan*. Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2, March. [online] Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/98292/wp46.2.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Жирохов, М.А., 2011. Семена распада: Войны и конфликты на территории бывшего СССР. Санкт-Петербург: БХВ-Петербург.

45 Ibid

46 Ibid



forces, in attacks such as the July 1993 assault on a Russian Border Guard post, highlighting the conflict's regional dimension. To stabilize the situation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan in September 1993, with mandates to assist on the Tajik-Afghan border, facilitate aid delivery, and help refugees return⁴⁷.

Efforts for peace began in earnest in April 1994 under UN auspices, with rounds of talks leading to provisional ceasefires. Despite multiple agreements, violations persisted. Negotiations progressed slowly, with important meetings, such as the 1995 talks in Kabul, offering glimmers of hope for an end to hostilities. In December 1996, the Khusdeh Agreement marked a critical step towards peace, setting the stage for the General Agreement on

the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, signed on 27 June, 1997⁴⁸. The General Agreement outlined a framework for peace and political reform, including the integration of UTO members into government structures, amnesty laws, safe return for refugees, parliamentary elections, and the legalization of previously banned political parties. This accord brought an end to a bloody chapter in Tajikistan's history, paving the way for national reconciliation and rebuilding in the post-Soviet era.

The war was devastating: between 60,000 and 100,000 people were killed; some 600,000 – a little under a tenth of the population – were internally displaced and another 80,000 fled the country. The costs of the war are estimated to have been U.S.\$7 billion.⁴⁹

47 Although the civil war ended at the start of 1993, armed insurgency of the opposition forces, in particular from across the Tajik-Afghani border, continued. To protect the border, the Governments of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation agreed that Russian border forces would continue to be deployed along the Pyanj river, which forms the Tajik-Afghani border. United Nations. 2000. *Tajikistan. UNMOT Background*. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmot/UnmotB.htm>; Sherr J. 1994. *Escalation of the Tajikistan Conflict*. IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin January 1994.

48 United Nations, 1997. *The General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan*. [online] Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9402> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

49 International Crisis Group, 2001. *Tajikistan: An uncertain peace*, 24 December. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/tajikistan-uncertain-peace> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Table 2. Timeline of the Tajik Civil War and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Confrontation-Crisis	March 1992 – September 1992	Tense stand-off in Dushanbe escalated into widespread fighting. Key events included demonstrations at Shahidon Square and Ozodi Square, televised accusations against the Minister of Interior, and clashes in May. In June, intense battles occurred around Kurgan-Tyube airport, with both sides inflicting heavy losses, and Nabiev was forced to resign. In December, coalition forces from Leninabad and Kulyab seized Dushanbe. By October, approximately 20,000 people had been killed, and 140,000 people fled as IDPs.	Khorog Agreement (27 July 1992)
Crisis-Outcome	October 1992 – December 1996	Continued intense fighting with mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and cross-border insurgency as opposition forces fled to Afghanistan. In July 1993, an attack on Russian Border Post No 12 highlighted the growing role of cross-border attacks. CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were deployed in September 1993 to help stabilize the Tajik-Afghani border.	<p>Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts (17 September 1994)</p> <p>Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of the Agreement on provision cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities (4 November 1994)</p> <p>Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan (23 August 1995)</p>

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Outcome	December 1996 – June 1997	Negotiations resumed, leading to various agreements focused on ceasefires, refugee repatriation, and political reconciliation. Key agreements in early 1997 established frameworks for integrating opposition forces and stabilizing security. By June, substantial progress was made in fostering political stability.	Protocol on the settlement of the military and political situation in the areas of confrontation (11 December 1996)
			Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (23 December 1996)
			Protocol on Refugees (13 January 1997)
			Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation; Joint communiqué (21 February 1997)
			Joint statement and Protocol on Military Issues (8 March 1997), Protocol on Political Questions and the Bishkek Memorandum (18 May 1997)
			Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace (28 May 1997)
			General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (27 June 1997)
			Moscow Declaration (27 June 1997)


Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Post-conflict	July 1997 onwards	Implementation of the General Agreement led to reforms such as the integration of the opposition into government, the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission, the disbanding of irregular armed groups, and the legalization of previously banned political parties. Major focuses included parliamentary election preparations, media freedom, and facilitating refugee and IDP repatriation. International aid played a significant role in supporting reconstruction.	

Conflict stage

The civil war in Tajikistan ended, and the country has entered a post-conflict phase. In this stage, active violence has significantly subsided, and efforts have been made to restore normal relations between the previously warring parties. The reduction in tensions has allowed space for rebuilding trust, marking a critical transition toward long-term stability. A key milestone was the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan on 27 June 1997. This agreement played a pivotal role in facilitating the peace process, as it laid the foundations for reconciliation and for the reintegration of opposition forces

into the political life of the country. Through this accord, mechanisms for power-sharing and conflict resolution were established, enabling Tajikistan to move beyond the violence and toward sustainable peace. In the post-conflict phase, Tajikistan has focused on disarmament, political reforms, and rebuilding its institutions. It also initiated processes for addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, helping prevent a relapse into violence. However, challenges remain, as post-conflict recovery often requires ongoing dialogue, economic reconstruction, and the continuous strengthening of political and social institutions to ensure lasting peace.

Table 3. Tajik Civil War escalation curve



Explanatory note: Conflict escalation is illustrated across three phases—pre-conflict, confrontation, and crisis—each value is equal to five. Similarly, de-escalation is structured into three phases—crisis, outcomes, and post-conflict—with each phase value equal to five.

Integration of HS elements

The ceasefire and peace agreements that ended the civil war in Tajikistan effectively integrated most elements of HS. The agreements addressed personal, political, economic, food and community security comprehensively. A significant emphasis was placed on the political aspects of the reconciliation process, along with substantial attention to community security and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.

The political security elements of the agreement were substantial, focusing on creating mechanisms to stabilize governance and to promote political inclusion. This included the establishment of a consultative forum that allowed various political parties and movements, including opposition groups, to participate in the country’s power structures. The deepening of democratization in Tajik society was a priority. Democratization aimed at building trust between different political forces and preventing future conflicts. A reciprocal pardon act was adopted by the President and the Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR), followed, within a month, by an amnesty act. These were seen as critical measures for fostering national unity and healing

political divisions. Additionally, the Central Electoral Commission was formed for a transitional period with 25% opposition members. The Commission was tasked with conducting elections and a referendum to create a new, professional parliament. Another significant political security element was the reform of government structures. Representatives of the United Tajik Opposition were to be incorporated into the executive branch, including ministries, departments, local government bodies, and judicial and law enforcement institutions. This ensured that the opposition had a stake in governance, reducing the likelihood of future political violence. The bans on political parties and movements, particularly those affiliated with the opposition, were lifted. The result was a more pluralistic political environment within the constitutional and legal frameworks of Tajikistan.

Community security was a central focus of the agreement, especially in the context of national reconciliation. The CNR was tasked with addressing issues stemming from the civil war, fostering dialogue among political forces, and promoting an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness. This was a crucial step toward restoring and strength-

ening civil accord in the country. It ensured that all groups, regardless of political or regional affiliation, were included in the nation-building process.

Economic security was also addressed, particularly in terms of recovery and reintegration efforts. The agreement emphasized the importance of preventing blockades of populated areas, national economic infrastructure, and communication systems. Disruption during the conflict had been severe. A donors' conference was planned for securing financial support for reintegrating refugees, displaced persons, and demobilized combatants into society. International aid was also sought to help rebuild the national economy, which had been devastated by years of civil war. Efforts to restore the country's economic stability extended beyond immediate reconstruction. The reintegration of displaced persons and returning refugees into the social and economic life of the country was prioritized. This included providing humanitarian aid, assistance in securing housing and employment, and the restoration of the rights of returning citizens, including the return of property and legal protections against prosecution for their involvement in the civil war. These measures proved vital in ensuring long-term peace and stability by addressing the root causes of economic insecurity that had contributed to the conflict.

Personal security was a key priority in the agreement, particularly in terms of disarmament and ensuring the safety of civilians. One of the earliest actions taken was the cancellation of orders by regional, city, and district executive committees to establish armed groups. This was an essential step in preventing further violence and in stabilizing the security situation. For instance, both parties to the conflict reaffirmed their commitment to the Tehran Agreement, which provided additional security guarantees to civilians in vulnerable areas like the Karategin Valley. The deployment of United Nations military observers and the involvement of international human rights organizations in monitoring the situation were vital components of this

effort. These measures helped to provide security assurances for the civilian population, contributing to a safer environment during the fragile post-conflict period. The DDR process supports personal security. Armed units affiliated with the United Tajik Opposition were disarmed and disbanded as part of the reintegration process. This was a complex operation overseen by the government and the Commission on National Reconciliation in coordination with the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). The systematic reduction of armed groups, helped to prevent future flare-ups of violence and restored state control over security.

Health and food security were integrated into the agreement, with a focus on meeting the basic needs of the population. Special attention was given to the safe and dignified repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, ensuring their access to legal, economic, and social protections. These provisions included legal guarantees, humanitarian aid, and financial assistance to help returning citizens rebuild their lives. In addition, there was a commitment to the exchange of prisoners of war and other detainees, a crucial humanitarian element. UNMOT and the International Committee of the Red Cross were called upon to facilitate these exchanges, ensuring that humanitarian needs were met and that families affected by the war could regain some sense of closure.

In summary, the ceasefire and peace agreement that ended the civil war in Tajikistan showcased a comprehensive approach to HS, integrating political, economic, community, and personal security elements in a cohesive manner. The focus on DDR, the reintegration of displaced persons, political inclusion, and economic recovery demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict and ensuring long-term peace. By emphasizing reconciliation, the agreement aimed to create a unified and democratic Tajikistan, where all citizens, regardless of their political or ethnic backgrounds, could participate in the country's rebuilding process.

Table 4. Tajik Civil War traffic light

HIS	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
Direct							

Clearly expressed provisions Hinted provision No provisions
The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents reflect a 74.25% integration of HS elements, classifying them as ‘likely integrated’ in alignment with HS principles.

Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute

Currently, there are approximately 30 enclaves in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.⁵⁰ Several enclaves have ceased to exist as a result of bilateral deals and quite a few enclaves have been completely depopulated. Many of the most significant tensions come out of local issues such as access to water supplies and the passage of vehicles. As confidence wanes along both parts of the border, any one-sided attempt to build or repair roads or other infrastructure quickly leads to crowds of people from the other country demanding that the work be stopped. Most of the border conflicts are concentrated in the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan triangle, where the issues with Uzbekistan are mainly dealt with in a peaceful manner. During the Soviet period, the Fergana Valley, the most densely populated region was divided between the three then Soviet republics. Now this triangle is the most Islamised and conflict-prone region in Central Asia. In regions with dense rural populations dependent on farming, where arable land and water resources are scarce, frequent conflicts over the distribution of these resources occur.

Conflict description

One key incident occurred in the Tajik-administered enclave of Vorukh, where road construction by Kyrgyzstan aimed to create an alternative route bypassing Vorukh. The project was met with resistance from Tajik authorities and locals, who attacked the construction workers. Local Tajik and Kyrgyz residents began clashing, taking hostages, and destroying property, adding to the tension⁵¹. The 2021 border clashes were some of the most severe, beginning in the Kyrgyz village of Kok-Tash on 28 April. The initial trigger was the

attempted installation of a surveillance camera by Tajik citizens at the Golovnoy water intake, a key infrastructure supplying water to both nations. The ensuing tensions over water management and surveillance erupted into stone-throwing and physical altercations between residents of Kok-Tash and nearby Tajik villages. Violence intensified when security forces from both countries joined in. The fighting led to a rapid spread of violence along the border, involving various villages and leaving Kyrgyz settlements deserted and destroyed⁵².

50 Ng.ru, Панфилова, В., 2018. Киргизия переложила заботу об анклавах на Ташкент, 17 December. [online] Available at: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2018-12-17/5_7464_kyrgyz.html [Accessed 9 May 2025].
51 ТАСС, 2021. Что известно о конфликтах на киргизско-таджикской границе. [online] Available at: <https://tass.ru/info/11275509> [Accessed 9 May 2025].
52 Masalieva, J., 2021. Border incident: Tajikistan starts massive shelling, 24.kg, 29 April. [online] Available at: https://24.kg/english/192151_Border_incident_Tajikistan_starts_massive_shelling/ [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Amid escalating violence, the foreign ministers of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan negotiated a ceasefire on 29 April, 2021. However, despite this diplomatic breakthrough, sporadic clashes continued, prompting further high-level meetings and another ceasefire on 1 May. Negotiations resumed in the Batken region on 2 May, 2021, with both sides exchanging perspectives on resolving the issues. This diplomatic momentum continued, and on 13 March 2025, Kyrgyz and Tajik presidents signed an agreement on delimiting and demarcating the contested border⁵³.

The 2021 clashes had a significant human cost. In Kyrgyzstan, 34 people were killed, and 183 were injured, while Tajikistan reported eight fatalities and at least 90 injured. Thousands of Kyrgyz civilians fled to Batken, the region's administrative center, seeking refuge from the violence. Many villages along the border were left abandoned, with homes, shops, and other infrastructure burned down. The violence not only impacted residents' physical safety but also deepened mistrust and animosity, complicating future reconciliation efforts.

Table 5. Timeline of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Preconflict-Confrontations	1991-2018	Border issues surface post-independence, with land and water resources contested; construction in disputed areas and rising tensions among local residents; periodic skirmishes near enclaves, particularly in the Fergana Valley.	None
Crisis-Outcome	April 2019 – May 2021	Violent incidents erupt over border demarcation and resource access; April 2021 clashes over water rights near Kok-Tash escalate into full conflict with both sides mobilizing military forces; 29 April 2021, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agree to a ceasefire, though sporadic fighting continues until 1 May; ceasefire efforts followed by an agreement on troop withdrawal.	Initial ceasefire on 29 April 2021 Renewed ceasefire and troop withdrawal on 1 May 2021
Outcome-Postconflict	May, 2021-present	Kyrgyz President proposes a peacekeeping commission of elders to prevent future conflicts; both sides completed demarcation talks, agreeing on contested areas.	Ceasefire maintained; demarcation completed


53 Reuters, 2025. *Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan sign deal to end long-running border dispute*, 13 March. [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-sign-deal-end-long-running-border-dispute-2025-03-13/> [Accessed 19 March 2025]. DW, 2021. Киргизстан обновил число пострадавших в конфликте. [online] Available at: <https://www.dw.com/ru/kyrgyzstan-obnovil-chislo-postradavshih-v-konflikte-na-granice-s-tadzhikistanom/a-57407312> [Accessed 19 March 2025]. DW, 2021. Жапаров предложил Таджикистану создать комиссию старейшин. [online] Available at: <https://www.dw.com/ru/zhaparov-predlozhit-tadzhikistanu-sozdat-komissiju-starejshin/a-57406630> [Accessed 19 March 2025]. РИА Новости, 2021. Киргизия и Таджикистан договорились активизировать описание границы. [online] Available at: <https://ria.ru/20210502/granitsa-1730891748.html> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Conflict stage

The active phase of the border conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which escalated in 2021, has subsided. The conflict is considered to be in the 'post-conflict' stage, where a final resolution has been almost achieved. In this stage, conflicts often reach a turning point where hostilities do not exist, and the situation stabilizes. In the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, a ceasefire agreement was reached, halting the active fighting along their shared border. This agreement marked a significant step toward de-escalation, and the underlying issues seem

to have been resolved. On 13 March 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on demarcating their shared frontier. The deal, signed by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rakhmon in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek, also provided for the reopening of road, rail and air transport links between the two: these had been suspended since the battles of September 2022⁵⁴. The long-term success of peace depends on how effectively the countries can implement the agreement and manage tensions in the future.

Table 6. Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

The ceasefire agreements between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not publicly accessible, so any analysis relies primarily on official statements from the government representatives of both nations. The ceasefire addresses elements of personal and community security, but omits aspects related to economic, food, environmental, and health security. While some political considerations are touched upon, they remain limited. In terms of personal security, on 29 April, 2021, a ceasefire

between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was agreed upon, taking effect at 20:00 local time. After multiple negotiations between the foreign ministers of the two countries, both sides committed to halting hostilities and pulling their military forces back to their prior positions. Furthermore, the two nations agreed to hold a separate meeting of law enforcement and security officials to discuss further de-escalation measures. As a result, hostilities ceased, and the withdrawal of troops from the

54 Reuters, 2025. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan sign deal to end long-running border dispute, 13 March. [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-sign-deal-end-long-running-border-dispute-2025-03-13/> [Accessed 19 March 2025].

contested border areas helped alleviate immediate risks to personal security. To prevent future border conflicts and as part of community security, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov proposed the formation of a 'peacekeeping commission' on 2 May 2021. This commission would consist of elders from both Kyrgyz and Tajik communities living in mixed or

neighbouring villages along the border. By involving local leaders with a vested interest in peace, this initiative aims to foster dialogue and build trust between the two communities, minimizing the potential for renewed violence and enhancing long-term communal security in the region.

Table 7. Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute traffic light

<i>HS</i>	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
<i>Direct</i>							

■ Clearly expressed provisions
 ■ Hinted provision
 ■ No provisions
 The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents reflect a 33.5% integration of HS elements, classifying them as 'partly integrated' in alignment with HS principles.

Chechen wars

The Republic of Chechnya shares borders with Russia's Stavropol Krai in the north, the Dagestan Republic in the east, Georgia to the south, and the Republics of North Ossetia-Alania and Ingushetia to the west. Chechnya experienced bloody wars in 1994-1996 and, again, in 1999-2009.

Conflict description

The Chechen people, known as 'Nokhchii,' have historically opposed the Russian presence in the Caucasus. Their modern resistance and confrontation phase began with the 1991 establishment of the Chechen All-National Congress (CNC), led by Dzhokhar Dudaev, who proclaimed Chechen sovereignty. Dudaev's leadership faced conflict with the Chechen parliament, leading to a power struggle in Grozny. Russia intervened militarily in 1994, resulting in a crisis and high casualties, uniting Chechens under the banner of a 'gazavat,' or holy war, led by Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. The conflict saw significant escalations, including Shamil Basaev's hostage crisis in Budennovsk, leading to negotiations mediated by the OSCE. However, ceasefire agreements were frequently violated, culminating in a full-scale Chechen assault on Grozny in 1996 and the signature of the Khasavyurt Accord, which

postponed Chechnya's political status. After the 1996 peace agreements, Chechnya enjoyed de facto independence, adopting a constitution with elements of Sharia law under President Maskhadov. Tensions grew with the rise of Wahhabism, especially as leaders like Basaev sought pan-Caucasian independence with the support of radical Islamist Ibn al-Khattab. By 1999, Chechen incursions into Dagestan reignited hostilities, giving Russia grounds for the Second Chechen War, claimed by Russia to be a counter-terrorism operation.

In 2000, Putin installed Kadyrov as the head of the Chechen administration under Russian oversight. Despite Russia's military presence, separatists persisted in the mountainous regions. Attempts at peace negotiations faltered due to internal Chechen divisions and radical factions opposed



A school in Beslan where school kids and teachers were taken as hostages and many of them were killed during the intervention operation

to compromise. Shamil Basaev's terror attacks in Moscow (2002) and Beslan (2004) intensified Russia's crackdown. Maskhadov declared ceasefires in 2005, but they did not succeed in bringing peace. Chechnya remained under Russian control but there were enduring calls for autonomy. Since March 2006, Ramzan Kadyrov has chaired the government and been the *de facto* ruler in Chechnya. Chechenisation allowed the federal authorities to declare the pro-federal Chechen side 'the legitimate authority', label insurgents as 'terrorists' and 'bandits' and proceed to a political settlement without negotiating with their main antagonists⁵⁵. In April 2009, the counterinsurgency operation in Chechnya was officially terminated. On 5 April 2011 Ramzan Kadyrov became Head of the Chechen Republic.

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Chechen diaspora in Europe convened a congress in Brussels on 24 February, organized by the State Committee for the De-occupation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. This committee is headed by Akhmed Zakayev, who also leads the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile. The gathering decided to form additional Chechen combat units to support Ukraine in resisting Russian aggression⁵⁶. In October 2022, most Ukrainian lawmakers voted to back a resolution that 'recognises the Chechen republic of Ichkeria as territory temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation as a result of armed aggression which contravened the UN's Statute'⁵⁷.

55 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 2004. *The human rights situation in the Chechen Republic*, Report Doc. 10283, 20 September. [online] Available at: <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10644&lang=EN> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

56 Caucasian Knot, 2020. *Chechen Parliament approves peace treaty with Ichkeria government in exile*. [online] Available at: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/373657/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

57 Reuters, 2022. *Ukraine lawmakers brand Chechnya 'Russian-occupied' in dig at Kremlin*, 18 October. [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-lawmakers-brand-chechnya-russian-occupied-dig-kremlin-2022-10-18/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Table 8. Timeline of the Chechen wars and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
<i>Pre-Conflict</i>	Pre-1990	Chechen resistance to Russian control dates back centuries; Soviet-era policies led to forced relocations, significant resentment, and the establishment of Chechen national identity; establishment of the Chechen All-National Congress (CNC) in 1990 under Dzhokhar Dudaev escalates demands for independence.	None
<i>Crisis (First War)-Outcome</i>	December 1994 – August 1996	Russian troops enter Grozny in December 1994; heavy losses on both sides; Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov declares a religious war against Russian forces; Budennovsk hostage crisis in June 1995; escalation until Khasavyurt Agreement in August 1996, which includes truce and postponement of a final status decision for Chechnya.	<p>Agreement on the peaceful regulation of the situation in the Chechen Republic (on a set of military issues) signed in Grozny on 30 July 1995</p> <p>Agreement on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic signed in Moscow on 3 December 1995</p> <p>Agreement on a Ceasefire, the Cessation of Military Activities, and on Measures for a Settlement of the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Chechen Republic was signed in Moscow on 27 May 1996</p> <p>Protocol of the Meeting of the Commissions on the Negotiations Regarding a Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and on Measures to Settle the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Chechen Republic (10 June 1996)</p> <p>Agreement 'On Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya', signed on 22 August 1996</p> <p>Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement signed in Khasavyurt on 25 August 1996</p>


Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
			<p>The Khasavyurt Joint Declaration and a Declaration on the Principles for Determining Mutual Relations signed on 31 August 1996</p> <p>An agreement on the principles of relations between the federal centre and the Chechen Republic signed on 23 November 1996</p> <p>Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic Ichkeria signed on 12 May 1997</p>
Outcome-Post-Conflict	1997 – August 1999	Period of <i>de facto</i> Chechen independence; power struggles between secular and Islamist factions; emergence of Wahhabism under leaders like Shamil Basaev and Ibn al-Khattab; Maskhadov faces challenges controlling the region as Islamization spreads, contributing to instability and tensions with Russia.	None
Crisis (Second War)	September 1999 – April 2009	Basaev and Khattab's incursion into Dagestan sparks the Second Chechen War; Russian forces re-enter Chechnya, on a 'counter-terrorist operation'; intense fighting continues; Maskhadov declares ceasefires, but insurgency persists until Russia consolidates control; Ramzan Kadyrov appointed head in 2006, leading Chechenisation process.	No formal ceasefire; end of counterinsurgency (April 2009)
Post-Conflict-Crisis	April 2009 – Present	Formal end of counterinsurgency operations in April 2009; Ramzan Kadyrov consolidates power, suppressing opposition; Chechnya integrated into Russian Federation with no negotiated peace; issues of unresolved clan rivalries and lack of political inclusivity continue, raising concerns about long-term stability.	Aslan Maskhadov declared several unilateral ceasefires in 2005, however, these were unsuccessful.

Conflict stage

The two wars in Chechnya have ended, and the republic has been fully integrated into the Russian Federation. This period is considered a post-conflict phase, as large-scale violence has decreased significantly. However, unlike typical post-conflict recovery phases where efforts are made to reconcile and rebuild relations between previously opposing parties, such efforts have not been prioritized in Chechnya. Instead, the political and military landscape is dominated by Ramzan Kadyrov's clan, which holds considerable power and influence. Any opposition has either been forced into exile or silenced within the region. A key turning point in the aftermath of the Chechen wars was the appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as President of the Chechen Republic and the official termination of counterterrorism operations in 2009. Since then, no substantial forces have emerged that could challenge the relative stability maintained under Kadyrov's leadership. The current

peace, however, is not the result of a negotiated settlement, as seen in the First Chechen War, which ended with the Khasavyurt Agreement in 1996. Instead, the Second Chechen War was decisively concluded through military force, without any formal peace agreement between the warring parties. This forced resolution leaves unresolved tensions that may affect future stability. Despite the cessation of active conflict, Chechnya still faces significant challenges in its post-conflict recovery. Key issues such as the lack of national dialogue, unresolved clan rivalries, and the absence of efforts toward political reconciliation remain. Furthermore, the consolidation of power under Kadyrov, with little space for opposition, raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of peace. For lasting stability, Chechnya would need to focus on political inclusion, the strengthening of social institutions, and fostering reconciliation to address the deeper divisions that remain from the wars.

Table 9. Chechen wars escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

The analysis of the Russian-Chechen conflict demonstrates that all HS dimensions —personal, political, community, health, food, economic, and environmental—are deeply interwoven. In contrast to other conflict zones where certain aspects of HS may remain less apparent or secondary, the Chechen conflict brings these dimensions —particularly environmental and health security — into sharp relief. The degradation of natural resources, the collapse of public health systems, and the disruption of everyday life due to prolonged violence became central concerns, alongside the traditional issues of physical safety, governance, and state sovereignty. Personal security was a central focus in efforts to end the violence, particularly through ceasefire agreements. The ceasefire initiated on 23 August 1996, marked a critical turning point, aiming to stop hostilities and initiate a process of exchanging prisoners, refugees, and the bodies of the dead. This initiative followed the ‘all for all’ principle, emphasizing that all individuals, regardless of their role or affiliation in the conflict, would be treated equally in the exchange process. This commitment to personal security not only sought to protect individuals from the ongoing violence. It also restored a sense of justice and dignity to those who had been affected by the conflict, including combatants and civilians alike. It demonstrated the personal toll that the conflict had taken on countless individuals and families, as many were left searching for their missing loved ones or were left dealing with the trauma of detention and displacement.

Political security in the Russian-Chechen conflict revolved around ongoing negotiations, particularly concerning the fate of civilians and combatants caught up in the violence. A crucial aspect of these talks included mutual agreements to release and exchange lists of forcibly detained persons, some of whom were held in notorious places across Mozdok, Grozny, and other areas. These places became symbols of the repression and political insecurity suffered by civilians. Individuals were held there without due process, and often subjected to torture or simply disappeared. Both sides committed to the principle of ‘all for all’ in exchanging detainees, reflecting an attempt to

mitigate the humanitarian cost of the conflict. This approach included the exchange of information on missing persons as part of an attempt to resolve the deep sense of political insecurity and mistrust that stemmed from forced disappearances and unlawful detentions. Such measures were not only intended to reduce immediate tensions but also to create a foundation for future political reconciliation by addressing these systemic abuses.

The conflict brought to light the interconnectedness of economic, political, and community security, particularly in the Chechen Republic’s governance framework. Chechnya’s organs of state power were tasked with managing key aspects of regional governance despite the ongoing violence. This included forming their own institutions, collecting taxes, and establishing a budget that reflected the unique needs of the republic. Importantly, the Chechen authorities were responsible for overseeing natural resources and state enterprises, excluding federally-owned assets. This economic autonomy was critical in maintaining the region’s ability to function independently, even amidst conflict, and demonstrated the importance of local governance in providing security to the population. Chechnya also maintained authority over labour relations, advocacy, and education, ensuring that its policies respected the national and historical traditions of its diverse population. Education proved particularly delicate as it was necessary to consider the national and historical traditions of the peoples residing on the Republic’s territory. The defence of individual and minority rights was embedded within governance structures. At the same time, provisions were made to coordinate disaster relief and recover from extreme events such as natural disasters, underlining the importance of community resilience in the face of both man-made and natural crises. These included funds for joint programs, and help with disasters and catastrophes.

Community and economic security extended to vital infrastructure: e.g. energy management, transportation systems (rail, pipelines, air transport), and information networks. The coordination of policies

in these areas underscored the region's attempts to maintain functioning systems that supported economic activity and that ensured the basic security of its population. Employment, migration, social security, and public safety were also prioritized, reflecting a broader understanding of security. The Chechen authorities also took an active role in the preservation of health, education, and cultural integration. They strive to protect the basic rights of citizens and maintain a degree of stability within the community despite the ongoing conflict. Environmental security, a typically overlooked aspect in many conflict zones, was particularly visible in the Chechen context. The management of natural resources, such as oil and minerals, was a critical issue, as these resources not only served as the backbone of the local economy but were also strategically important for both sides in the conflict. The exploitation and destruction of these resources had severe long-term consequences for the population's livelihood, creating an additional layer of insecurity that extended beyond immediate military concerns. Furthermore, there was environmental degradation caused by military operations ranging from the destruction of forests to contamination from weaponry. This posed severe risks to both the immediate and long-term health of the population.

In a war-torn region, health and food security became fundamental concerns. Both the Russian and Chechen authorities agreed to cooperate in ensuring the supply and distribution of essential

foodstuffs and medical aid to the population. With infrastructure destroyed and traditional supply chains severely disrupted, providing basic needs became a monumental challenge. This was compounded by the outbreak of diseases and the collapse of healthcare services. State authorities and relevant organizations took on the responsibility of coordinating these efforts, recognizing the critical importance of addressing hunger and medical crises amidst the broader conflict. Securing these vital resources was essential not only for sustaining the civilian population but also for maintaining a degree of order and preventing further humanitarian catastrophes. This cooperation demonstrated the interconnected nature of HS, where ensuring access to basic needs like food and healthcare became inseparable from broader efforts to restore peace and stability.

The Russian-Chechen conflict speaks to the multifaceted nature of HS, illustrating how different dimensions—whether related to personal safety, political autonomy, economic stability, or environmental sustainability—are deeply interconnected. The conflict not only highlighted traditional concerns such as political governance and military operations, but also revealed the critical role that health, food, and environmental security played in shaping the overall security landscape. The lessons drawn from the Chechen conflict emphasize that a comprehensive approach is needed, addressing not only the immediate violence but also the underlying HS challenges that perpetuate instability.

Table 10. Chechen wars traffic light

HIS	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
Direct							

■ Clearly expressed provisions
 ■ Hinted provision
 ■ No provisions
 The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents reflect a 94.5% integration of HS elements, classifying them as 'highly integrated' in alignment with HS principles.

Conflict in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali district)

The Georgian and South Ossetian (SO) conflict was fast-moving from 1991-2008. There were significant territorial changes and dire humanitarian consequences for the region. The conflict reached critical peaks in 1991-1992, and 2004 and alerted the international community to the fragile situation in the South Caucasus. In August 2008, the Georgian Armed Forces clashed with the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces and SO *de facto* security actors. The five-day war was terminated with the European Union sponsored Six Point ceasefire agreement. This was followed by the immediate deployment of the European Union Monitoring Mission across the country. On 26 August 2008 SO was recognised as an independent country by the RF and several Pacific and Latin American countries, and the Syrian Arab Republic did likewise. The war between Russia and Ukraine has significantly affected the situation on the ground and it remains unclear whether the parties in conflict will move towards signing a peace agreement.

Conflict description

The modern conflict between Georgia and its former Autonomous District of South Ossetia was revived as the Soviet Union was collapsing. The confrontation phase began with the war against laws on the state language, followed by the law banning regional political parties.⁵⁸ South Ossetia declared sovereignty in 1990, and Georgia consequently revoked its autonomy. From January 1991, as Georgian forces moved in, intermittent violence would continue until the 1992 Dagomys Agreement, which also led to joint peacekeeping monitoring. Over 1,000 people died, thousands were displaced, and Georgian and SO areas saw extensive damage⁵⁹. By 2004, tensions flared again as Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili prioritized reunification of breakaway regions, leading to deteriorating relations with SO and its patron Russia. Ceasefires were temporary, and both sides prepared for conflict. The war erupted again in August 2008 and involved troops from the RF. The

war left hundreds dead and forced over 100,000 people from their homes. After the EU-mediated Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement, the EUMM monitored the withdrawal of Russian troops⁶⁰. Despite this, SO gravitated towards Russia, formalizing close ties in 2015 with agreements on military and economic integration, which Georgia and Western nations condemned as steps towards *de facto* annexation. Since 2008, the contentious 'borderization' process has seen Russia and SO construct fences and move borders deeper into Georgian-controlled land, with consequences for communities along the frontier. Incidents of detainment, fatalities, and alleged torture have fueled international criticism. Diplomatic efforts, like the Geneva International Discussions (GID) established under the Six-Point Agreement, have achieved limited progress, focusing on humanitarian issues, ceasefire maintenance, and security. But talks have not resolved the conflict.

58 G. Jasutis, 2013. *Forward-looking solutions to the Georgian and South Ossetian conflict: A path toward reconciliation*. Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol. 6-3. G. Jentzsch, 2009. What are the main causes of conflict in South Ossetia and how can they best be addressed to promote lasting peace? The BSIS Journal of International Studies, Vol. 6.

59 Human Rights Watch, 1992. *Violations of humanitarian law and human rights in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict*, 1 April. [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/1992/04/01/violations-humanitarian-law-and-human-rights-georgia-south-ossetia-conflict> [Accessed 18 May 2018]. Government of the Russian Federation, 1996. *Khasavyurt Accord*. [online] Available at: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902246> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Law Library of Congress, 2008. *Sochi Agreement*, Directorate of Legal Research LL File No. 2008-01419, August. [online] Available at: <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/lglrd/2019669920/2019669920.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

60 Report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009. *Report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, September. [online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iifmgc_report.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Table 11. Timeline of the conflict in South Ossetia and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreement

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Pre-Conflict	1989 – November 1990	Rising nationalism in Georgia under Zviad Gamsakhurdia's leadership; 'Georgia for Georgians' slogan; tensions rise with South Ossetian demands for being separate Soviet entity; November 1989: Gamsakhurdia's march to Tskhinvali met with resistance; SO declares sovereignty on 20 Sept 1990 as a Soviet Socialist Democratic Republic.	None
Confrontation-Crisis	October 1990 – January 1991	Gamsakhurdia elected in Georgia; SO autonomy is abolished on 11 Dec 1990. Georgia sends national guard and volunteers to SO in Jan 1991; rising confrontations and low-level violence.	None
Crisis-Outcome	February 1991 – June 1992	Large-scale violence begins; Tskhinvali experiences three assaults; clashes and hostilities spread; North Ossetia, RF, involved indirectly; severe humanitarian crisis with refugees and civilian losses; major escalation despite ceasefires.	Kazbegi protocol (23 Mar 1991) The Dagomys Agreement (Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian – Ossetian Conflict) signed in Sochi on 24 June 1992
Outcome – Post-Conflict	1992 – 2004	Joint Control Commission established; mixed peacekeeping forces deployed; OSCE Mission established in Tbilisi to monitor the situation. Memorandum on Mutual Confidence (May 1996); economic cooperation agreements in 2000; limited reconciliation efforts; joint efforts for economic and IDP solutions.	Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce Mutual Confidence between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict signed in May 1996

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Confrontation	2004	Georgian President Saakashvili pushes for reintegration; Ergneti market closure and increased Georgian military presence; clashes intensify, leading to civilian casualties; accusations of RF support for SO forces. Meeting between Georgian Prime Minister and SO leader Kokoity in Sochi; demilitarization of conflict zone agreed upon; focus on joint economic projects to foster cooperation.	Unpublished ceasefire agreement signed on 19 August 2004 Agreement on the demilitarisation of the zone of conflict signed on 5 November 2004
Crisis	August 2008	Renewed fighting involving RF, SO, and Georgian forces; severe casualties, displacement, and destruction; significant escalation leads to international involvement.	Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement signed on 12 August 2008 Agreement on Implementing Measures signed on 8 September 2008
Post-Conflict	October 2008 – Present	EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) deployed; 'borderization' by RF and SO along the administrative boundary line; Geneva International Discussions (GID) established; persistent tensions along administrative border line; periodic detentions, ongoing security and humanitarian challenges, lack of full resolution, regular talks in Geneva.	Six-Point Ceasefire remains in effect; 62 rounds of GID as of November 2024

Conflict stage


The conflict between Georgia and SO/ RF, remains in a fluctuating state between the outcome and post-conflict stages. The brief but intense five-day war in 2008 was brought to a halt by the European Union-sponsored Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement on 12 August 2008, followed by the Agreement on Implementing Measures on 8 September 2008. However, these agreements have not fully brought the warring parties (for instance, the Russian Federation did not withdraw their troops to their

previous positions) to a genuine post-conflict phase. One of the major factors preventing full post-conflict transition is the presence of Russian security actors, the ongoing 'borderization' strategy employed by RF and SO forces. This tactic involves the continuous reinforcement of the administrative boundary line (ABL) through the construction of fences, barbed wire, and the movement of border posts, sometimes hundreds of meters into Georgian-controlled territory. This practice has severe consequences

for the local populations on both sides of the ABL. It restricts freedom of movement, reduces access to basic services, and significantly undermines the living standards of affected communities. Regular detentions occur along the ABL, adding to instability in the region. Moreover, there has been no meaningful reconciliation between the parties, a process that would be critical for transitioning

from a state of frozen conflict to long-term peace. The absence of dialogue or efforts to address the underlying causes of the conflict, alongside the continued Russian military presence in SO, creates an environment where tensions persist. Without addressing these issues through genuine peacebuilding efforts, reconciliation, and respect for international norms, the conflict remains unresolved.

Table 12. Conflict in South Ossetia escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

The ceasefire agreements and protocols surrounding the Georgian-SO conflict address various dimensions of security, including community, political, personal, economic, and food security. However, while these HS elements are present, the framework provides only limited attention to health security and makes no mention of environmental security. Importantly, several articles blend HS elements, reflecting the interconnectedness of these issues in the context of conflict resolution.

The community and political security provisions focus on the return of displaced populations to their homes and the restoration of legitimate local authorities. This underscores a broader objective of rebuilding trust within affected communities. The return of refugees is not only a humanitarian necessity but also a key element in stabilizing the region and fostering conditions for sustainable peace. Restoring governance structures plays a pivotal role in re-establishing

law and order, addressing local grievances, and ensuring that the rule of law prevails in these areas. Community security is further strengthened by encouraging collaboration with international organizations, NGOs, and civil society. This includes holding dialogues and round table discussions among Georgian and SO political and social groups, as well as facilitating exchanges between media and cultural representatives. These initiatives are designed to foster understanding, bridge divides, and promote the exchange of objective information. Such efforts are critical in post-conflict environments, where narratives and perceptions can either deepen divisions or pave the way toward peace and reconciliation.

Economically, the agreements call for swift action to restore the conflict-affected regions. By initiating negotiations on economic recovery, the involved parties acknowledge the critical need for rebuilding infrastructure and providing livelihoods for people

who have endured the war’s destructive effects. This commitment is reinforced by pledges to avoid economic sanctions or blockades, which could exacerbate the already fragile situation. Free movement of goods, services, and people is seen as vital to revitalizing local economies and fostering a sense of normalcy. In conjunction with economic recovery, the agreements also emphasize the importance of humanitarian aid to address immediate needs such as food security, further reflecting the necessity of building resilience within communities.

Political, economic, and personal security are closely intertwined within the agreements. Confidence-building measures are highlighted as key steps toward fostering mutual trust and preventing further escalation. These measures include the demilitarization of the conflict zone, security guarantees, and economic initiatives for reducing tensions and for offering tangible benefits to the populations on both sides of the divide. The focus on demilitarization is crucial for ensuring that the peace process moves forward, while the economic programs provide opportunities for cooperation and shared prosperity, which can serve as a basis for deeper political resolution.

Regarding political security, the agreements make a clear distinction between combatants who were involved in the conflict and those who committed war crimes or atrocities against civilians. This approach seeks to balance justice with reconciliation. By pledging only to prosecute individuals who were

involved in war crimes, the agreements attempt to create an atmosphere conducive to reintegration and reconciliation. Simultaneously, the commitment to investigating war crimes ensures accountability, signalling that justice remains a priority, while also opening the way to healing societal divisions through law enforcement mechanisms.

Personal security is explicitly addressed through a firm commitment to cease hostilities and refrain from using force. This core element ensures the physical safety of individuals affected by the conflict and is central to the broader goal of maintaining peace. The cessation of violence not only safeguards lives but also allows for the space needed to engage in dialogue, rebuild infrastructure, and pursue long-term solutions.

In conclusion, the ceasefire agreements and protocols surrounding the Georgian-SO conflict lay out a multifaceted approach to addressing various security needs. However, the lack of attention to environmental security remains a notable gap, particularly in a region where environmental degradation could further complicate recovery efforts. The agreements emphasize community restoration, political resolution, economic recovery, and personal safety, with a focus on ensuring that the affected populations are at the centre of these efforts. Through collaborative measures and confidence-building initiatives, the parties involved can choose to create conditions for lasting peace and stability in the region.

Table 13. Conflict in South Ossetia traffic light

<i>HS</i>	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
<i>Direct</i>							

Clearly expressed provisions Hinted provision No provisions
The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents reflect a 74.25% integration of HS elements, classifying them as ‘likely integrated’ in alignment with HS principles.

Conflict in Abkhazia

Georgia was engaged in the Abkhaz conflict for most of the period 1992-2008⁶¹. The Georgian regular armed forces and Georgian volunteers fought against the Abkhaz from the breakaway territory of Abkhazia and the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus in 1992-1993. This resulted in an Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow, 14 May 1994 (Moscow Agreement). The Moscow Agreement did not prevent further bloodshed and the conflict peaked again in 1998 and 2001. In August 2008, RF forces along with Abkhaz de facto security actors were embroiled in a conflict with Georgian armed forces. Thus, a local war turned into an international armed conflict. In the aftermath of the conflict, over 200 civilian monitors were deployed to Georgia by EU Member States to contribute to the stabilization of the situation on the ground. On 26 August 2008, Abkhazia was recognised as an independent country by the RF, and several Pacific and Latin American countries and Syria followed suit. On 28 August 2008, the Parliament of Georgia passed a unanimous resolution declaring Abkhazia and SO to be RF-occupied territories and defined the Russian peacekeepers as an occupying force.⁶² Currently, there are no credible discussions regarding the peace agreement between conflict parties, save possibly some internal discussions.

Conflict description

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict erupted in full-scale violence during the early 1990s, the result of longstanding tensions, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, in the late 1980s, Abkhaz nationalist movements sought secession from Georgia, culminating in heightened clashes and demands for Abkhazia's status to be upgraded to that of a republic. Tensions escalated into war in 1992 when Georgian forces attempted to assert control over the breakaway region. Although ceasefires were brokered, they were repeatedly violated, with significant violence erupting in 1992, 1993, 1998, and 2001⁶³.

In 1994, the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces attempted to stabilize the region by establishing security zones, with the involvement of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeepers and United Nations (UN) observers⁶⁴.

However, violence continued sporadically, exacerbated by ethnic and political tensions, back-and-forth accusations of ethnic cleansing, and human rights abuses on both sides. The conflict became still more complicated in 2008, when clashes in SO, another separatist region, spiraled into the Russo-Georgian war. This led to an EU-sponsored ceasefire and the deployment of a European Union Monitoring Mission to observe the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory. Following the conflict, Russia recognized Abkhazia and SO as independent states, with a few other countries following suit. Georgia declared both regions as being occupied by Russia.

In recent years, the situation has remained tense, with violence against Georgian citizens by the de facto Abkhaz authorities. In October 2023, Abkhazia signed an agreement with Russia to establish a permanent naval base for the Russian fleet on the

61 Jasutis, G., 2018. *Georgia-Abkhazia: The predominance of irreconcilable positions. War Report.* [online] Available at: <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Georgia-Abkhazia%20The%20Predominance%20of%20Irreconcilable%20Positions.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

62 Jasutis, G., 2018. *Georgia-Abkhazia: The predominance of irreconcilable positions. War Report.* [online] Available at: <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Georgia-Abkhazia%20The%20Predominance%20of%20Irreconcilable%20Positions.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

63 Jasutis, G., 2018. *Georgia-Abkhazia: The predominance of irreconcilable positions. War Report.* [online] Available at: <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Georgia-Abkhazia%20The%20Predominance%20of%20Irreconcilable%20Positions.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

64 United Nations, 1992. *Moscow Agreement*, 3 September. [online] Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unomig/background.html> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Black Sea coast in the Ochamchira district⁶⁵. The agreement was reached following on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and concerns over the status of the Russian navy in the Black Sea. Georgian President Salome Zurbishvili criticized the opening of a Russian Navy base in Abkhazia, calling it a provocation. As of 26 March 2024, 59 rounds of Geneva International Discussion (GID) took place in Geneva, Switzerland⁶⁶. The talks were launched in accordance with the six-point agreement and are co-chaired by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the United Nations, bringing together representatives

of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and SO, as well as the United States. The last round of discussions took place amidst increased tension along the SO administrative boundary, with discussions emphasizing ways to prevent incidents like the fatal shooting of 6 November 2023⁶⁷. GID remains the only platform where the conflict has been addressed over the past 15 years and even there the discussions reached impasse over the last couple of years. In 2024, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed a desire to relocate consultations from Switzerland. Russia stated that the Swiss government ‘has been losing its credibility as an impartial state’⁶⁸.

Table 14. Timeline of the conflict in Abkhazia and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
<i>Pre-Conflicts</i>	1931 – 1989	On 18 March 1989, Abkhaz leaders sign the Lykhny declaration demanding separation from Georgia; protests and demonstrations in April 1989 lead to clashes. Ethnic clashes in Sukhumi (15 July 1989) and Ochamchira (16 July 1989).	None
<i>Confrontation</i>	1991-1992	Abkhazia participates in the Soviet referendum (17 March 1991), supporting staying within the USSR, which Georgia boycotted.	None

65 Caucasian Knot, 2024. Названы возможные сроки открытия российской военной базы в Абхазии [Possible Dates Named for Opening of Russian Military Base in Abkhazia]. [online] Available at: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/374738/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

66 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 2023. *Statement by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on the Geneva International Discussions*. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559941> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

67 Civil Georgia, 2024. *Tbilisi reacts to Russian calls to relocate Geneva talks on South Caucasus*. [online] Available at: <https://civil.ge/archives/572949> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

68 Caucasian Knot, 2024. Россия предлагает перенести женеvские дискуссии по Южному Кавказу в другую страну [Russia Proposes to Relocate Geneva Discussions on the South Caucasus to Another Country]. [online] Available at: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/374739/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Crisis	August 1992 – September 1993	Georgian forces enter Abkhazia; capture Sukhumi and Gagra; RF-mediated ceasefire attempts fail; intense fighting resumes, with Abkhaz forces retaking Gagra in October; July 1993 sees another failed ceasefire; Abkhaz forces retake Sukhumi on 27 September 1993, expelling Georgian forces from Abkhazia amid serious rights abuses and allegations of ethnic cleansing.	<p>Protocol of Consultations on the Regulation of the Conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia signed in Sochi on 29 August 1992</p> <p>Moscow Ceasefire Agreement signed on 3 September 1992</p> <p>Agreement on a ceasefire in Abkhazia and arrangements to monitor its observance signed on 27 July 1993</p>
Outcome	Spring 1994	In the spring of 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia signed four documents laying the groundwork for an 'Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces'; security zones established and CIS peacekeeping force deployment; UNOMIG mission established for oversight.	<p>Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict</p> <p>Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons signed on 4 April 1994</p> <p>Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow, 14 May 1994 (Moscow Agreement)</p> <p>Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commission, signed in Moscow on 11 May 1994</p>
Post-Conflict-Confrontation	1994 – 2001	<p>UNHCR repatriates displaced persons; ongoing international monitoring; May 1998 clashes erupt in Gali between Georgian and ABK forces and CIS peacekeepers, leading to a new ceasefire protocol to prevent further civilian and subversive activities.</p> <p>Renewed fighting in October 2001 as Chechen commander Ruslan Gelayev leads forces into Abkhazia through the Kodori Gorge; operation fails but highlights regional tensions.</p>	<p>Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations, and Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities was signed in Gagra on 25 May 1998.</p>


Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Confrontation	2004 – 2006	Tbilisi takes action against paramilitary groups in Kodori	None
Crisis-Outcome	March – August 2008	RF lifts sanctions on Abkhazia; increased RF peacekeeper presence; confrontation intensifies with skirmishes, drone incident, and explosion in Gali; Russian forces deploy further troops following 7-8 August escalation in South Ossetia; Abkhazia takes Kodori Valley and RF extends conflict zone occupation.	Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement signed on 12 August 2008 Agreement on Implementing Measures signed on 8 September 2008
Post-Conflict	October 2008 – Present	EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) deployed; Abkhazia increasingly asserts independence with RF support, including October 2023 naval base agreement; ongoing detentions and violence in border areas, continued lack of full reconciliation; Geneva International Discussions (GID) facilitate some dialogue but have stalled.	Six-Point Ceasefire remains in effect; 62 rounds of GID as of November 2024

Conflict stages

As in SO, the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia/the RF, is fluctuating between the outcome and post-conflict stages. The five-day war ended in 2008 with the European Union-sponsored Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement on 12 August 2008, followed by the Agreement on Implementing Measures on 8 September 2008. However, these agreements have not fully brought the parties to a genuine post-conflict phase. A key reason is the RF's failure to withdraw its troops to pre-war positions, as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement. One of the major obstacles to achieving a full post-conflict transition is the continued presence of Russian security forces and the ongoing 'borderization' strategy employed by

Russian and Abkhaz forces. This tactic involves the strengthening of the administrative boundary line through the construction of fences, barbed wire, and the closing of crossing control posts. These measures severely affect local populations on both sides of the ABL by restricting freedom of movement, limiting access to basic services, and eroding overall living standards. Furthermore, there has been no meaningful reconciliation process between Georgia and Abkhazia, which is essential for moving from a frozen conflict toward lasting peace. The absence of dialogue, coupled with ongoing Russian military presence in the region, prevents any real progress in addressing the root causes of the conflict.

Table 15. Conflict in Abkhazia escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

The agreements and protocols addressing conflict resolution in the Abkhaz conflict encompass a broad spectrum of security elements. These include political, personal, economic, food, and community security, with additional references to environmental security, while health security is addressed indirectly through provisions aimed at humanitarian support and well-being. The comprehensiveness of the agreements reflects a concerted effort to restore peace and stability in the region by addressing multiple dimensions of human and state security. A key focus of the agreements is political security. One of the immediate priorities is the handover of wounded individuals, hostages, prisoners of war, and the bodies of the deceased, without any preconditions. This step is crucial for building trust between the conflict parties and demonstrates a commitment to humanitarian principles. Moreover, the agreements underscore the importance of upholding international human rights standards, particularly in safeguarding the rights of national minorities. Discrimination based on nationality, language, or religion is explicitly prohibited, and both sides are committed to holding free and democratic elections. These provisions lay the groundwork for political stability and reconciliation by emphasizing inclusivity and adherence to democratic norms.

Economic security is a vital component of the agreements, with a clear commitment to rebuilding and rehabilitating regions affected by the conflict. The parties pledge to initiate negotiations aimed at restoring economic activities in these areas, ensuring free movement of goods, services, and individuals engaged in lawful activities. This is essential for revitalizing the local economy and fostering long-term stability. Furthermore, food security is addressed through the provision of humanitarian aid, including international assistance, to ensure that the basic needs of conflict-affected population are met. These economic provisions are crucial for preventing further suffering and for laying the foundations for sustainable development in the post-conflict period.

Although environmental security is referenced in the agreements, it is a relatively underexplored aspect of the conflict resolution process. Nonetheless, the parties acknowledge the need for joint action in areas such as ecology and the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters. This includes efforts to address the environmental degradation that may have occurred during the conflict. Health security, while not explicitly detailed, is indirectly covered through the humanitarian aid provisions, which include medical assistance for those affected by the conflict. Ensuring access to healthcare and addressing the health needs of displaced populations

is essential for long-term recovery. Community security is one of the most emphasized aspects of the agreements, particularly as to the return of displaced persons. The parties agree to cooperate in creating conditions that allow refugees and internally displaced persons to return safely, securely, and with dignity to their homes. This provision includes special attention to preserving family unity, with mechanisms in place to reunite families when they cannot return together. In addition, unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable individuals are given priority during the repatriation process, with measures in place to provide them with extra care and assistance. The personal security of individuals is also central to the ceasefire agreements. Both sides commit to a strict cessation of hostilities, including refraining from any military actions on land, at sea, or in the air. These provisions are designed to prevent any further escalation of the conflict and to create a stable environment in which the broader political, economic, and community-based agreements can be imple-

mented. The ceasefire is crucial for ensuring the safety of civilians, facilitating the return of refugees, and for allowing humanitarian aid to reach those in need. By committing to demilitarization and the cessation of military activities, the agreements create the foundations for peace and security in the region.

In summary, the agreements and protocols for resolving the Abkhaz conflict reflect a holistic approach to security. By addressing political, economic, personal, and community security, alongside limited references to environmental and health concerns, the framework seeks to promote long-term stability and peace. The emphasis on the safe return of displaced persons, the restoration of economic activities, and the protection of human rights highlights the multi-dimensional nature of post-conflict recovery efforts. However, the lack of a more robust focus on environmental and health security suggests that future initiatives may need to expand these areas to ensure a more comprehensive approach to HS in the region.

Table 16. Conflict in Abkhazia traffic light

<i>HIS</i>	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
<i>Direct</i>							

Clearly expressed provisions
 Hinted provision
 No provisions
 The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents reflect a 87.75% integration of HS elements, classifying them as ‘highly integrated’ in alignment with HS principles.

Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan

The territory of Nagorno Karabakh, internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, became a bone of contention between Azerbaijan (AZE) and Armenia (ARM): there was a full-scale war in 1991-1994 and military confrontations in 2016, 2020 and 2023. The recent ceasefire agreements were reached on 10 November 2020 and 20 September 2023. Currently, the territory is under the full control of Azerbaijan. As of March, 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan have finalized the text of a peace agreement aimed at ending nearly four decades of conflict, particularly over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The treaty has not yet been signed⁶⁹.

69 Reuters, 2025. Armenia says it is ready to sign peace agreement with Azerbaijan. [online] 13 March. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/armenia-says-it-is-ready-sign-peace-agreement-with-azerbaijan-2025-03-13/> [Accessed 13 March 2025].

Conflict description

During Soviet times, the two communities cohabitated with no significant outbreaks of violence. This was largely due to Soviet policy which, in its struggle to integrate segmented societies and satisfy their needs, encouraged, with totalitarian policies, cooperation between communities.⁷⁰ Some rallies and petition campaigns, however, took place in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. Since the mid-1940s, in fact, there had been appeals, projects, and initiatives for the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) to be joined to Armenia.

With the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, full-scale war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to significant violence and civilian casualties. Early ceasefire efforts, such as the 1991 Zheleznovodsk Declaration led by Russian and Kazakh leaders, were ineffective. In 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence following a referendum, though Azerbaijan did not recognize this move. The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France, was formed to mediate the conflict, aiming to maintain neutrality and find a peaceful solution. The conflict saw heavy violence from 1991 to 1994, including the tragic Khojaly events. Despite various ceasefire attempts, violence continued until the 1994 Bishkek Protocol, brokered by Russia, which established a ceasefire. This agreement marked the start of a period of relative stability, though skirmishes occurred periodically, especially around the ceasefire line.

From 1994 until 2020, intermittent violence disrupted the fragile peace, with occasional clashes in 2008 and 2012, and the four-day April War in 2016, which reignited tensions. In July 2020, another escalation occurred in the Tovuz region, with casualties on both sides. Calls for a ceasefire by Russia, the

United States, and the United Nations highlighted the global concern over renewed hostilities, but clashes continued. On 27 September 2020, the conflict resumed on a larger scale, marking the beginning of a six-week war. The fighting ended with a trilateral agreement on 10 November 2020, brokered by Russia. The ceasefire deal mandated that Armenia would relinquish control of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, with Russian peacekeepers stationed along the contact line. This deal also stipulated that displaced people could return and regional transport links would be restored. The Lachin Corridor would connect Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, safeguarded by Russian peacekeepers for an initial five-year period, with automatic extensions unless one party objected⁷¹.

In the years following the 2020 agreement, clashes persisted along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Diplomatic efforts continued under both Western and Russian mediation, with Armenia and Azerbaijan meeting periodically to discuss peace. A major challenge arose in December 2022 when Azerbaijani (allegedly state-supported) activists, blocked the Lachin Corridor under the guise of environmental protests, with severe consequences for Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched an offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, quickly overpowering de facto forces and enforcing a ceasefire agreement, leading to the disarmament of local forces and the withdrawal of Armenia's military. The operation forced the mass exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, marking Azerbaijan's full control over the territory and the effective end of the long-standing territorial dispute⁷².

Since then, Armenia and Azerbaijan have taken steps toward normalization, with discussions focused

70 Jasutis, G. and Hirose, Y., 2014. *Analyzing the upsurge of violence and mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict*. *International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1), p.23.

71 The Moscow Times, 2020. *Russia ready to mediate talks between Armenia, Azerbaijan*, 17 July. [online] Available at: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/07/17/russia-ready-to-mediate-talks-between-armenia-azerbaijan-a70915> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. OC-Media, 2020. *Armenia and Azerbaijan agree peace deal over Nagorno-Karabakh*, 10 November. [online] Available at: <https://oc-media.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-sign-peace-deal-in-nagorno-karabakh/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

72 Reuters, 2023. *Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh agree to disarm*, 20 September. [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenians-nagorno-karabakh-agree-disarm-2023-09-20/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

on border delimitation and the principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty. On 30 November 2023, officials met bilaterally to negotiate a peace treaty, a departure from third-party mediation, and exchanged gestures of goodwill. Azerbaijan proposed five principles as the basis of the treaty: sovereignty; the renunciation of territorial claims; adherence to international laws; border delimitation; and the reopening of transportation links. Armenia has

shown a willingness to formalize these principles in a written peace accord, with negotiations continuing throughout 2024. In 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan completed the text of a peace agreement designed to bring an end to conflict, particularly concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Both countries have signaled their willingness to sign the treaty, though an official signing date has not yet been set⁷³.

Table 17. Timeline of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Confrontation-Crisis	1991 – 1994	The dissolution of the Soviet Union intensified tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with both sides claiming Nagorno-Karabakh. The de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, escalating the situation. Both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engaged in heavy fighting with support from Soviet troops and foreign mercenaries. Indiscriminate attacks, including the Khojaly events on 26 February 1992. Initial attempts at a ceasefire, including the Zheleznovodsk Declaration (mediated by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev) and the Tehran Statement, did not succeed. President Mutallibov of Azerbaijan resigned in the midst of this crisis, which saw an estimated 20,000 casualties and 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs).	Zheleznovodsk Declaration (September 1991) Joint Statement in Tehran (7 May 1992)

73 Reuters, 2025. Armenia says it is ready to sign peace agreement with Azerbaijan. [online] 13 March. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/armenia-says-it-is-ready-sign-peace-agreement-with-azerbaijan-2025-03-13/> [Accessed 13 March 2025].

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Crisis-Outcome	1994	The situation deteriorated further as violence continued with substantial civilian suffering and additional mass displacements. Russia offered the Moscow Protocol on 18 February, which proposed troop withdrawals, the establishment of a mutual security zone, and observer deployment. This was followed by the CIS-mediated Bishkek Protocol on 5 May, formalizing a ceasefire that brought an end to the worst of the conflict but did not fully stabilize the region. Both sides maintained a fragile ceasefire while mutual distrust persisted.	Protocol for Complete Cessation of Hostilities (18 February 1994) Bishkek Protocol (5 May 1994)
Outcome	1995 – 2016	The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the U.S., Russia, and France, led peace talks but achieved only limited success in addressing underlying issues. The Minsk Group's 1995 proposals to reinforce the ceasefire were only partially effective. Significant outbreaks of violence in 2008 and 2012 showed the fragility of peace. The Madrid Principles, introduced in 2007 and updated in 2009, set out a framework that included principles of territorial integrity and proposed self-governance for Nagorno-Karabakh, but these were not accepted by both parties. Tensions remained high, with occasional skirmishes along the line of contact.	Agreement on Armed Conflict Cessation (12 May 1994) Mediator's Proposals on Strengthening the Ceasefire (1995)
Crisis-Outcome	2016-2020	In April 2016, conflict erupted again as both sides engaged in intensive fighting over several days, resulting in more than 100 military and civilian casualties and significant equipment losses. This violence highlighted the failure to resolve long-standing territorial and political disagreements.	Madrid Principles (2007) Statement by the Leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia (9 November 2020)


Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
		<p>Informal ceasefire negotiations in Moscow halted the fighting but left the conflict unresolved. Tensions resurfaced in July 2020, leading to a full-scale war by September. Multiple ceasefire efforts, mediated by Russia, France, and the U.S., were unsuccessful until 10 November 2020, when a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement concluded the fighting. The terms required that Armenia withdraw from key territories, provided for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers along the line of contact, and stipulated the reopening of key transport routes.</p>	
Outcome	2021 – September 2023	<p>Following the 2020 ceasefire, intermittent violence and unresolved issues like border demarcation and movement restrictions on the Lachin corridor continued to strain relations. Diplomatic efforts led by the OSCE, EU, and Russia attempted to stabilize the region. However, periodic escalations, including incursions into Armenian territory, prevented a full transition to stable peace.</p>	
Crisis-Outcome	September 2023 – 2024	<p>On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a swift offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting, in a day, in the surrender of Armenian forces. This ceasefire required disarmament and full withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the exodus of almost the entire Armenian population from the region. Following the offensive, Armenia formally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Bilateral negotiations resumed, focused on mutual sovereignty recognition and border delimitation, with intentions for the finalization of a comprehensive peace treaty.</p>	2023 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, finalized text of peace treaty in 2025

Conflict stage

The active phase of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has ended but the situation remains at the 'outcome' stage. The conflict has reached a significant turning point, with the Armenian side suffering defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, and both parties agreeing to the text of a peace agreement. However, while negotiations seem to have been completed, no formal peace agreement has been signed, leaving many unresolved issues. One critical concern is the status of Armenians who fled from Nagorno-Karabakh. It remains unclear how their situation will be addressed—whether there will be a reconciliation process, and if and how these refugees and those who fled the conflict zone in 1990s will return to their homes. The question of repatriation and the restoration of property and

livelihoods for displaced people will be a key issue in any long-term resolution. In addition to these concerns, there are several parallel discussions that complicate the peace process, such as the fate of border villages and the question of establishing a corridor between Nakhichevan and mainland Azerbaijan. These unresolved matters highlight the complexities of transitioning to a post-conflict phase, as significant political, territorial, and humanitarian challenges still need to be addressed. Therefore, it is premature to classify this conflict as being in the post-conflict phase. The absence of a finalized peace agreement, the uncertainty over key humanitarian issues, and ongoing territorial discussions suggest that while the active fighting has ceased, the conflict has not yet been resolved.

Table 18. Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalation curve



Degree of HS integration

The documents regulating the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan focus primarily on economic, personal, and political aspects. They also touch on community and food security, but conspicuously lack provisions related to environmental and health security, which are critical to long-term stability in the region. In terms of personal security, the agreements prioritize the return of displaced persons to their homes, beginning with fully vacated villages. A

comprehensive ceasefire was established, effectively halting hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone as of 10 November, 2020. Azerbaijan committed to ensuring the safety of citizens, vehicles, and goods moving through the Lachin corridor, a vital route for Nagorno-Karabakh residents, thereby addressing a crucial aspect of personal security and mobility.

Economic security, closely linked to community security, is another key element. The documents call for all parties to restore and normalize railway, air, and communication systems. Mediators will assist in negotiations to facilitate the smooth operation of these critical infrastructure systems, promoting regional connectivity. Inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are entitled to receive foreign aid aimed at fostering human rights, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the reopening of transport and economic links has been prioritized, with Armenia specifically guaranteeing safe transport between Azerbaijan's western regions and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. These measures aim to stimulate economic recovery and to ensure the free flow of goods, people, and services across the region.

As far as political security goes, the agreements address humanitarian concerns through provisions for the exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, and the remains of the deceased. This exchange is intended to build trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan and to pave the way for broader conflict resolution efforts. However, while the documents provide a comprehensive approach to various security challenges, environmental and health security are noticeably absent. The failure to address critical ecological risks, such as land degradation, pollution, and the management of natural resources, represents a gap. These issues, if left unaddressed, could exacerbate tensions and undermine long-term peace efforts. Similarly, the absence of health security measures, especially in light of the humanitarian crisis created by the conflict, leaves vulnerable populations at risk. Integrating environmental and health security into future agreements will be essential for creating a more sustainable and resilient peace in the region.

Table 19. Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan traffic light

<i>HIS</i>	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
<i>Direct</i>							

Clearly expressed provisions Hinted provision No provisions
The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents demonstrate a 54% integration of HS elements, placing them as 'likely integrated' in terms of HS principles.

Prigorodny conflict

Prigorodny district is a five-hundred-and-sixty-square-mile administrative district of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, and part of RF. Prigorodny is located in the east of the Republic. According to the 2010 census the population of the district is 108,665 inhabitants. In 1992 the Ossetian community clashed with Ingush residents, who lived in the Prigorodny District. The active phase of conflict ended with an introduction of the state of emergency and the deployment of federal forces. These were supposed to prevent armed conflict between the opposing sides. While no ceasefire agreement was negotiated, the opposing republics signed documents that contained the elements of a peace agreement. In November 2021, ethnic Ossetians and Ingush skirmished on three separate occasions. No casualties were reported, but in the most violent of these incidents, two Ingush individuals were hospitalized after a shootout⁷⁴. All incidents took place in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia and the eastern end of its capital, the city of Vladikavkaz.

74 Dzutsati, V., 2019. *Ossetian-Ingush tensions escalate into series of clashes*. Jamestown Foundation. [online] Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/ossetian-ingush-tensions-escalate-into-series-of-clashes/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Conflict description

President Gorbachev's perestroika and elements of democracy that were introduced into the old Soviet Union accelerated ethno-political and national renaissance processes. This resulted in the creation of nationalistic movements in Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania and attempts to deal with territorial claims⁷⁵. The situation worsened due to limited governance structures in Ingushetia following its split from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and its decision to remain within the RF. In 1991, violent clashes broke out between Ossetians and Ingush in the village of Kurtat, escalating in other settlements across Prigorodny. Ingush refugees settled in the area, and volunteers from SO reportedly supported Ossetian forces. A fragile political environment, minimal governmental authority, and an accumulation of arms in the region underscored the likelihood of a large-scale conflict.

The most intense violence occurred between 31 October and 6 November 1992, culminating in significant casualties and displacement. The General Prosecution Office of Russia documented the human toll: 583 deaths, 939 injuries, 261 missing persons, and over 1,000 hostages taken during the hostilities. The conflict forced approximately 30,000 to 60,000 residents to flee, with the Russian migration service estimating around 46,000 displaced⁷⁶. On 2 November, 1992, the Russian government imposed a state of emergency in Prigorodny and surrounding regions, deploying federal forces to stabilize the area. This emergency rule, renewed every two months, granted extensive powers to the newly established 'Temporary Administration,' which oversaw both the North Ossetian and Ingush authorities and managed federal forces' activities⁷⁷. However, despite these efforts, the conflict's active phase ended without a formal ceasefire agreement and tensions simmered.

In subsequent years, Moscow initiated several efforts to address the conflict, including the 1993 Kislovodsk, the 1994 Beslan, and the 1995–1996 Vladikavkaz Agreements. These accords, however, did not fully satisfy either side. The Ossetians viewed the conflict as a premeditated attempt by Ingush forces to annex the Prigorodny District, asserting that Ingush criminal groups had orchestrated the violence with the intention of handing over the district to Ingushetia. Ossetian authorities argued that cohabitation with Ingush was not feasible. Conversely, the Ingush saw the events as ethnic cleansing, citing forced deportations and violence against Ingush residents as evidence of genocide in Prigorodny and parts of Vladikavkaz. They demanded justice and acknowledgment of their displacement, accusing the Ossetian authorities of violating their right to return.

Skirmishes persisted through the late 1990s, including violent incidents in 1997 and 1998, despite the presence of federal troops. Moscow's response evolved into a more active peacebuilding approach, involving federal troop deployments and various bilateral agreements. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, efforts to maintain stability yielded some successes, as regional leaders in both North Ossetia and Ingushetia engaged in dialogues that enabled IDPs to gradually return to Prigorodny. A significant milestone was the 2002 Agreement on Development of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations, signed by North Ossetia-Alania's president A. Dzasokhov and Ingushetia's president M. Ziyazikov, which aimed to foster trust and cooperation between the republics.

Further attempts to reconcile the two communities came in the form of policy initiatives. In 2006, Dmitry Kozak, the Russian President's Plenipotentiary Representative in the Southern Federal District, introduced an Action Plan to address the conflict's consequences.

75 Jasutis, G., 2014. *In search of new instruments for resolution of the Ossetian and Ingush conflict*. *International Journal of Conflict & Reconciliation*, 3(1).

76 Ibid.

77 РИА Новости, 2008. Осетино-ингушский конфликт: хроника событий, 7 November. [online] Available at: <http://m.ria.ru/incidents/20081107/154619994.html> [Accessed 29 November 2013].

Human Rights Watch, 2006. *The Ingush-Ossetian conflict in the Prigorodny region*. [online] Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Russia.htm> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Кавказский Узел (Caucasian Knot), 2005. Осетино-ингушский конфликт 1992 г.: истоки и развитие. [online] September. Available at: <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/81949/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

By the late 2000s, intergovernmental dialogue gained momentum, as demonstrated by the 2009 Joint Action Program signed by T. Mamsurov of North Ossetia and Y. Evkurov of Ingushetia. This program emphasized reconciliation, with North Ossetia formally recognizing the right of Ingush IDPs to return to their former residences. Ingushetia, in turn, abandoned its demands for territorial rehabilitation, focusing instead on fostering peaceful coexistence. In 2010, a new Joint Action Program reinforced these goals by enlisting civil society, NGOs, and youth groups to promote mutual

understanding and cooperation. Ingushetia softened its stance, ceasing to press for territorial changes and advocating for reconciliation with Ossetians. While federal interventions, bilateral accords, and gradual peacebuilding initiatives have managed to curb large-scale violence, the underlying issues of territorial rights, ethnic identity, and community integration remain sensitive topics. Occasional skirmishes, such as those in 2021 in the Prigorodny District and Vladikavkaz, underscore the unresolved nature of these issues and the potential for escalation⁷⁸.

Table 20. Timeline of the Prigorodny conflict and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
<i>Pre-Conflict</i>	Pre-1991	Longstanding ethnic tensions between Ossetian and Ingush communities; creation of nationalistic movements in Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania due to perestroika and national renaissance; initial demands for Prigorodny's return to Ingushetia following the USSR's collapse.	None
<i>Confrontation</i>	April 1991 – Summer 1992	Skirmishes between Ossetian and Ingush communities; intense clashes in Kurtat village spread across Prigorodny district; Chechnya declares independence, while Ingushetia remains within the RF; Ingushetia established as a republic in 1992 without formal borders, creating further tensions; state of emergency declared with a military build-up in North Ossetia-Alania and Ingushetia.	None

78 Dzutsati, V., 2019. *Ossetian-Ingush tensions escalate into series of clashes*. Jamestown Foundation. [online] Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/ossetian-ingush-tensions-escalate-into-series-of-clashes/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
<i>Crisis</i>	31 October – 6 November 1992	Intense violence peaks, leading to approximately 583 deaths, 939 injuries, and large-scale displacement (30,000 – 60,000 Ingush); Russian Federation institutes a state of emergency on 2 November 1992, establishing a ‘Temporary Administration’ with full executive powers in the conflict zone; active fighting ends on 6 November without a formal ceasefire.	No formal ceasefire agreement; Russian state of emergency (2 Nov 1992)
<i>Outcome</i>	1993 – 1996	Moscow initiatives bring about agreements at Kislovodsk (1993), Beslan (1994), and Vladikavkaz (1995-1996), although both sides remain dissatisfied; Ossetians view the conflict as an organized aggression against North Ossetian sovereignty, while the Ingush see it as ethnic cleansing; despite agreements, federal forces remain deployed to stabilize matters.	Kislovodsk, Beslan, Vladikavkaz Agreements (1993, 1994, 1995-1996)
<i>Outcome-Post-Conflict</i>	1997 – 2005	Sporadic clashes continue, with federal troops deployed; some progress made as leaders of North Ossetia-Alania and Ingushetia sign the 2002 Agreement on Development of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations; an Action Plan introduced in 2006 aims to eliminate the consequences of conflict, though rejected by Ingushetia.	Agreement on Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations signed on 11 Oct 2002


Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Post-Conflict	2009 – Present	Efforts to rebuild relations see both republics commit to peaceful solutions; in 2009, North Ossetian and Ingush leaders sign the Joint Action Program on good-neighborly relations, acknowledging IDP return rights and abandoning 'territorial rehabilitation' demands; further community initiatives promote cooperation and youth involvement; sporadic skirmishes in 2021 speak to an easily-combustible fragile peace.	Joint Action Program of state authorities, public and political organizations of North Ossetia and Ingushetia on the development of good-neighborly relations for 2010 signed on 17 December 2009

Conflict stage

The conflict between the Ossetian and Ingush communities has moved into a post-conflict phase. In this stage, active violence has largely subsided, and efforts have been made to restore normal relations between the previously warring communities. The de-escalation of tensions has created opportunities for trust-building and fostering cooperation, marking a crucial step toward long-term stability. A significant milestone in this process was the signing of the 'Joint Action Program of State Authorities, Public and Political Organizations of North Ossetia and Ingush-

tia on the Development of Good-Neighborly Relations for 2010' on 17 December 2009. In this agreement, the North Ossetian authorities acknowledged the right of Ingush IDPs to return to their homes. At the same time, the leadership of Ingushetia agreed to drop demands for 'territorial rehabilitation,' which had previously been a source of contention between the two sides. Challenges remain. Occasional skirmishes between the two communities indicate that the situation is still fragile, and there is a need for continued dialogue and conflict prevention measures.

Table 21. Prigorodny conflict escalation curve



Degree of HS Integration

The documents addressing the Ossetian-Ingush conflict incorporate a broad spectrum of HS elements, highlighting the comprehensive approach taken to address the immediate and long-term needs of affected populations. While environmental security is notably absent and food security is only partially covered, personal, health, economic, political, and community security, are meticulously outlined and embedded within the protocols and agreements. Personal security is a central focus, underscored by clear commitments to non-violence and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The inclusion of statements such as the 'unconditional renunciation of any violence in resolving contentious issues' and the 'mutual aspirations to resolve contentious issues by peaceful means, through negotiations' demonstrates a strong emphasis on creating a non-threatening environment for all parties involved. These provisions aim to foster trust, to reduce tensions, and to set a framework for constructive dialogue in resolving the conflict. Health and economic security feature prominently. Provisions for the establishment of mobile medical units ensure that medical care can reach conflict-affected areas and vulnerable populations. This measure addresses the urgent health needs arising from the conflict. The creation of trade outlets and the provision of access to clean water highlight the importance of restoring economic activity and meeting basic human needs. The inclusion of these elements signals an understanding that restoring normalcy through economic activity and essential services is crucial to stabilizing the region. A significant element in the agreement is the tasking of the Interim State Committee of the RF in coordination with the Governments of North Ossetia-Alania and Ingushetia to conduct an inventory of destroyed housing. This provision not only aims at physical reconstruction but also emphasizes social reintegration and the long-term economic security of citizens. The development of a comprehensive program for construction, restoration, and addressing the domestic and social challenges of both those who wish to return to their permanent residences and those opting to remain elsewhere reflects a nuanced understanding of the different needs within displaced and affected populations.

This effort aims to rebuild lives, restore communities, and provide stability for the future. Political security is equally well established. The documents call for the creation of a mixed commission of representatives from the interim administration and the federal authorities of the RF, working on a parity basis. This inclusion ensures that both local and national perspectives are considered, fostering inclusivity in decision-making processes. The parity-based approach promotes fairness and ensures that all parties have an equal voice in the resolution of political disputes, helping to establish legitimacy and broad acceptance of the political solutions proposed.

Community security is another key aspect. The protocols outline the creation of local commissions, which are composed of representatives from local government, members of the public, and distinguished citizens. These commissions play a pivotal role in managing the return and resettlement of IDPs, facilitating inter-family reconciliation, and fostering a peaceful and cooperative atmosphere. By incorporating members of the community in the decision-making process, the protocols acknowledge the importance of grassroots involvement in conflict resolution and the reintegration of displaced populations. These efforts are geared toward ensuring that the reintegration process is not only effective but also community-led, fostering a sense of ownership and participation in rebuilding efforts.

Although the documents fall short in fully addressing environmental and food security, they offer a strong framework for addressing the most critical HS elements in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. By emphasizing personal, health, economic, political, and community security, the protocols lay the groundwork for rebuilding and stabilizing the region. This holistic approach aims to provide both immediate relief and long-term solutions, balancing urgent humanitarian needs with broader socio-political reconciliation efforts. The comprehensive nature of these agreements reflects a clear understanding of the interconnectedness of HS elements and their importance in achieving lasting peace and stability.

Table 22. Prigorodny conflict traffic light

HSI	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
Direct							

Clearly expressed provisions Hinted provision No provisions
The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents achieve a 74.25% integration of HS elements, placing them between ‘highly integrated’ and ‘likely integrated’ in terms of HS principles.

Conflict in Transnistria

Transnistria is a narrow strip of territory on the east bank of the River Dniester of four-thousand one-hundred-and-sixty-three-squared kilometres. Transnistria belongs to Moldova. The conflict between Transnistrian separatists and the Moldovan authorities erupted in 1991-1992. A final ceasefire agreement was signed between Presidents Snegur and Yeltsin in Moscow on 21 July 1992. The Snegur-Yeltsin accord provided for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a demilitarised zone extending 10 km from the Nistru on each side of the river, a zone which included the important town of Bender located on the right bank. Despite intense efforts in multilateral diplomacy, a peace agreement has not been reached.

Conflict description

On 2 September 1990, separatists announced the establishment of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR). The PMR claimed to be the successor of the Autonomous Soviet Moldovan Republic, which had been established in 1924 within the Ukrainian SSR⁷⁹. Clashes erupted in November 1990 between Transnistrian forces and Moldovan police in Dubasari, igniting a cycle of violence that would continue for years. During the late 1990s, paramilitary groups known as ‘worker’s attachments’ were formed on the left bank of the Dniester, becoming the backbone of the Transnistrian Republican Guard, officially established in 1991. The August 1991 coup in Moscow further complicated matters, as Chisinau sought independence from the Soviet Union while Tiraspol expressed support for the coup leaders.

On 1 December 1991, Igor Smirnov was elected the first president of the PMR, and a referendum that day purportedly approved its independence. In the ensuing months, local paramilitary forces, aided by Cossacks from Don and Kuban, began a ‘creeping putsch,’ attacking Moldovan police stations and attempting to overthrow local authorities loyal to Chisinau. The conflict escalated when Moldovan police defended a station in Dubasari on 13 December 1991, marking the start of active hostilities. Further clashes occurred in early 1992, notably on 2 March, with the day of Moldova’s admission to the United Nations. 28 March President Snegur declared a state of emergency. Fighting intensified in April, culminating in the Battle of Bender (Tighina),

79 Jasutis, G., 2017. *Human security dimension across the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space*. [online] Available at: <https://eesri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-08-Human-Security-across-Frozen-Conflicts-in-Post-Soviet-Space-EESRI-PB-ENG.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Eleven International Publishing, n.d. *The Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union: Moving toward a greater understanding*. The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing. Жирохов, М.А., 2011. Семена распада: войны и конфликты на территории бывшего СССР. Санкт-Петербург: БХВ-Петербург. Малышев, Д.В., 2013. Приднестровский конфликт: траектория развития. Международные отношения и мировая политика. Вестник Московского университета, Серия 25.

where Transnistrian forces repelled Moldovan troops with the assistance of the 14th Army⁸⁰. The Soviet 14th Army stationed in Transdniestria played a crucial role during this period. Its officers refused to acknowledge Moldovan jurisdiction, declared loyalty to the Transnistrian leadership⁸¹.

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 21 July 1992, between Presidents Snegur and Yeltsin: after a conflict that had resulted in several hundred to a thousand deaths and over 100,000 IDPs. This agreement established a demilitarized zone around the Dniestr River and created a Joint Control Commission (JCC) to oversee the ceasefire, backed by a peacekeeping force composed of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian troops. The agreement brought a temporary halt to the fighting⁸².

The OSCE established a mission in Moldova in February 1993, shortly after Moldova joined the organization⁸³. By April of that year, the OSCE had joined Russian mediation efforts, with Ukraine participating in 1995. The Moscow Memorandum was signed, reaffirming commitments to peaceful resolution and the non-use of force. Meanwhile, the European Union became involved, launching the European Union Border Assistance Mission

(EUBAM) in 2005 to strengthen border controls and mitigate cross-border illicit activities.

The conflict resolution process evolved through the '5+2' format, which included Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, with the EU and the US acting as observers. Since the Berlin meeting in 2016, the sides agreed on several confidence-building measures, leading to the implementation of five agreements by 2018 concerning issues like vehicle registration, land ownership, and education. Despite these advances, a comprehensive agreement to resolve the conflict remained elusive. Currently, and starting from 2018, the regulatory proceedings regarding Transnistria have been on hold. Political shifts in Chisinau from 2019 to 2021, along with the COVID-19 pandemic, have halted progress toward resolving the Transnistrian issue, limiting it to only partial implementation of the six protocol decisions signed in 2017-2018 under the 'Berlin plus' package⁸⁴. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine any prospects of resuming discussions in that format disappeared entirely. Kyiv asserts that Moscow no longer has the right to take part in the negotiations⁸⁵. Conversely, Russia and Transnistria insist that the 5+2 format remains indispensable, emphasizing the necessity of sustaining dialogue.

80 International Crisis Group, 2003. *Moldova: No quick fix*. [online] 12 August. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/moldova/moldova-no-quick-fix> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Малышев, Д.В., 2013. Приднестровский конфликт: траектория развития. Международные отношения и мировая политика. Вестник Московского университета, Серия 25.

81 International Crisis Group, 2003. *Moldova: No quick fix*. [online] 12 August. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/moldova/moldova-no-quick-fix> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

82 On 23 March 1992, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine met in Helsinki in the margins of the Ninth CSO meeting and adopted a declaration in which they laid down a number of principles for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict. They also agreed to create a mechanism for political consultations to co-ordinate their efforts. At subsequent meetings in April and May in Chisinau, the four Ministers decided to establish a Quadripartite Commission and a group of military observers (five from each country), to monitor the implementation of the terms of an eventual ceasefire. OSCE, 1994. *The Transdniestrian conflict in Moldova: Origins and main issues*. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/moldova/42308> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Vahl, M. and Emerson, M., 2004. *Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict*. JEMIE – Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1, pp.1–29. [online] Available at: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/6196/ssoar-jemie-2004-iss_1-vahl_et_al-moldova_and_the_transnistrian_conflict.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

83 Wolff, S., 2011. *A resolvable frozen conflict? Designing a settlement for Transnistria*. Nationalities Papers, 39, pp.863–890.

84 IDIS "Viitorul", n.d. *Power Politics & Policy No. 16*. IDIS Bulletin. [online] Institute for Development and Social Initiatives. Available at: http://www.viitorul.org/files/IDIS_Bulletin%20Power%20Politics%20Policy%20No%2016%20EN.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

85 NewsMaker, 2024. *Serebrian and Rogovey discussed Transnistrian settlement: Ukraine will not sit at the negotiation table with Russia*, 29 January. [online] Available at: <https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/serebryan-i-rogovey-obsudili-pridnestrovskoe-uregulirovanie-ukraina-ne-syadet-za-stol-peregovorov-s-rossiey/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Table 23. Timeline of the conflict in Transnistria and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Pre-conflict	1989 – 1991	The introduction of the Romanian language with the Latin alphabet in Moldova served as trigger to create tensions, as Transnistria's Russian-speaking population viewed this as a threat to their identity. The separatist PMR was proclaimed on 2 September 1990. Clashes erupted in Dubasari in November 1990 over municipal control, and local paramilitary groups on the left bank of the Dniester began to form. These paramilitaries became the core of the PMR's Republican Guard in 1991.	
Confrontation – Crisis	1991 – 1992	During the 1991 Moscow putsch, Moldova declared independence, opposing the Soviet stance favored by Transnistria. On 1 December 1991, Igor Smirnov was elected president of PMR, and paramilitary forces increased their efforts. Cossack volunteers joined Transnistrian forces, escalating attacks on the Moldovan authorities. Violent clashes erupted on 13 December 1991 in Dubasari, and by 2 March 1992, Moldova's admission to the UN, hostilities intensified. Moldova declared a state of emergency on 28 March, and clashes continued until June. Casualty estimates ranged up to nearly a thousand, with more than 100,000 IDPs.	Statement by Foreign Ministers of Moldova, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine (6 April 1992)
Crisis – Outcome	April – July 1992	Despite several verbal ceasefires, intense battles continued, particularly in the Bender (Tighina) region from 19-21 June, resulting in a decisive confrontation with intervention by the Russian Fourteenth Army, forcing Moldovan forces to withdraw. On 21 July 1992, Presidents Snegur (Moldova) and Yeltsin (Russia) signed a ceasefire in Moscow, establishing a demilitarized zone along the Nistru River and creating the JCC for monitoring compliance. Peacekeeping forces from Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria were deployed under the JCC's command.	Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region (21 July 1992)

Chronology of the conflict		Developments	Ceasefire and Peace agreements concluded
Outcome-Post-conflict	1993 – 2005	Diplomatic initiatives aimed to stabilize the region and monitor the ceasefire. In February 1993, the OSCE Mission to Moldova was established, with Ukraine joining mediation efforts in 1995. The Moscow Memorandum on 8 May 1997 reaffirmed non-use of force and sought to establish normalization principles between Moldova and Transnistria. In 2005, the EU launched the EUBAM to enhance border control and combat illicit cross-border flows in the Transnistrian region, further supporting diplomatic and security cooperation.	Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between Moldova and Transnistria (8 May 1997)
Post-conflict	2006 – present	The 5+2 negotiation format, involving Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, the EU, and the U.S., aimed to implement confidence-building measures under the 'Berlin-plus' package. Agreements were reached on vehicle registration, property rights, Latin-script schools, mutual diploma recognition, and bridge reopening across the Nistru River. These efforts improved daily life but did not resolve core sovereignty issues. Political changes in Moldova and the COVID-19 pandemic stalled negotiations, leaving partial implementation of the Berlin-plus package. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine disrupted diplomatic efforts further, with Moldova rejecting Russia's role in the 5+2 talks. Transnistria and Russia continue to advocate for the format, arguing it remains essential to maintaining dialogue, while Moldova seeks alternative solutions. The Russian military presence in Transnistria remains an obstacle to Moldovan sovereignty.	


Conflict stages

The conflict in Transnistria appears to have largely subsided, with significant efforts underway by the Moldovan authorities, supported by the international community, to bring a lasting resolution and to restore full control over the territory. Citizens currently enjoy freedom of movement, a key indicator of progress toward stabilization. Several important agreements have been implemented, further supporting the transition to a post-conflict phase. These include: measures on vehicle registration and license plates for international traffic; resolving agricultural land ownership issues on the left bank of the Nistru River; ensuring the operation of Latin-script schools in Transnistria; mutual recognition of diplomas; and the reopening of a bridge across the Nistru River. These agreements

demonstrate tangible improvements in cooperation between both sides and a focus on normalizing daily life for citizens affected by the conflict.

However, despite these positive steps, the situation is not fully resolved. The continued presence of Russian troops in Transnistria remains a significant challenge to achieving complete sovereignty and territorial integrity for Moldova. This foreign military presence complicates the peace process and raises concerns about the long-term stability of the region. While the conflict has, in many respects, moved into a post-conflict stage, the unresolved status of Russian military forces indicates that the situation remains delicate.

Table 24. Conflict in Transnistria escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

Almost all aspects of HS are addressed in the documents regulating the Transnistrian conflict, encompassing a broad range of security concerns aimed at stabilizing the region. These documents reflect a multi-faceted approach that integrates environmental, personal, political, economic, food, and community security, each vital for a long-term resolution of the conflict.

While rarely found in other contexts, a focus is placed on environmental security through the protection of critical infrastructure and facilities within the conflict zone, including dams, power plants, and other essential installations. These facilities are indispensable for maintaining daily life and supporting economic activity. The documents highlight the need for special attention to be given to installations that pose potential environmental hazards, ensuring

their protection and the mitigation of any ecological risks to prevent further destabilization. To reduce the immediate risks to life as part of personal security, the documents outline measures aimed at halting all armed conflict between the parties. This includes enforcing a cessation of hostilities to create a peaceful environment. Furthermore, the safe and orderly return of refugees is prioritized, with provisions for humanitarian assistance to be delivered to those affected by the conflict. International involvement is encouraged to ensure the provision of aid and support for affected communities, contributing to the healing and recovery process.

The documents also recognize the importance of political stability. They propose the establishment of a joint commission, involving representatives from four countries, tasked with overseeing the enforcement of ceasefire agreements and ensuring compliance with the disengagement of forces. This commission is essential for restoring trust between the hostile parties, monitoring progress, and maintaining a peaceful political environment that supports long-term stability.

Significant emphasis is placed on economic revitalization and governance. The framework advocates for the introduction of broad local self-administration, empowering local authorities through new legislation that enhances their responsibilities

and rights. In addition, the conflict zone is to be designated a free economic zone. The intention is to stimulate economic development by creating jobs and providing opportunities for recovery. The documents also stress that sanctions and blockades are unacceptable and should be eliminated, ensuring the free flow of goods, services, and people across the region to promote economic stability.

To address food security challenges, the documents emphasize that necessary steps must be taken to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of international humanitarian aid. This means a guarantee of access to essential food supplies and other necessities for those living in conflict-affected areas.

Community security is another crucial element, with the documents calling for immediate negotiations to resolve issues related to the return of displaced persons to their homes. Support for the populations hardest hit by the conflict is prioritized, focusing on rebuilding and recovery efforts that aim to restore normalcy, foster reconciliation, and rebuild trust within communities. This support is key for fostering long-term recovery and social cohesion.

By addressing these diverse aspects of HS, the framework seeks to promote peace, stability, and sustainable development in the region, creating a foundation for a lasting resolution to the conflict.

Table 25. Conflict in Transnistria traffic light

HSI	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
Direct							

■ Clearly expressed provisions
 ■ Hinted provision
 ■ No provisions
 The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents demonstrate an 86.5% integration of HS elements, placing them as 'highly integrated' in terms of HS principles.

Russia-Ukraine War

In 2003, Russia sparked a territorial dispute with Ukraine regarding Tuzla Island by asserting that the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine only applied to the mainland portions of the peninsula, despite the fact that the island had been administratively part of Crimea since 1941⁸⁶. In February-March 2014, Russia occupied and annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. In April 2014 the Ukrainian government launched an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) to restore territorial integrity and ensure law and order in the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, where Russians and separatists had initiated unrest and disorder. This conflict gradually escalated over the years, with intermittent fighting and fragile ceasefires. However, in February 2022, the situation dramatically intensified as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, expanding the war far beyond the eastern territories. The conflict has since evolved into an all-out war that continues to rage across Ukraine and Russia, with no ceasefires or peace agreements in place (a capitulation agreement was offered to Ukraine in March 2022). The only arrangements that have been made involve limited prisoner exchanges and the establishment of a grain corridor to facilitate the export of Ukrainian agricultural products amid the ongoing hostilities. On 18 March 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin engaged in talks focused on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Trump proposed a comprehensive thirty-day ceasefire, but Putin declined to fully commit, agreeing only to a partial halt in attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure and a prisoner exchange arrangement⁸⁷. However, shortly after the announcement, Ukraine accused Russia of violating the truce.

Conflict description

The conflict in Ukraine, which escalated significantly in 2014, has its roots in a coordinated pro-Russian uprising in several eastern cities, including Sloviansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Lugansk, starting on 6 April 2014. This unrest saw local police largely ineffective as activists occupied government buildings and security service headquarters. The situation quickly deteriorated, leading to the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) by separatists the following day. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov responded by launching an ATO against the insurgents, but the situation worsened with the declaration of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) on 28 April 2014. By the end of April, Turchynov

had announced the Ukrainian government's loss of control over Donetsk and Luhansk, leading to military conscription and heightened military readiness⁸⁸. Efforts to de-escalate the violence included the Geneva Initiative on 17 April, which aimed at disarming illegal groups, releasing occupied buildings, and offering amnesty to protestors⁸⁹. However, this initiative failed to quell the violence, which intensified after referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk on 11 May 2014, where residents overwhelmingly voted for independence. Subsequently, the DPR and LPR declared independence and sought incorporation into Russia. The escalating violence culminated in numerous incidents, including the downing of

86 UATV, 2018. *Ukrainian Ministry urges the world not to accept the transfer of Tuzla Island to Russia*, 20 April. [online] Available at: <https://uatv.ua/en/ukrainian-ministry-urges-world-not-accept-transfer-tuzla-island-russia/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

87 AP News, 2025. *Trump and Putin discuss ceasefire proposal amid ongoing Ukraine conflict*, 18 March. [online] Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/trump-putin-call-ceasefire-russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-0d2ca5b69761082979dd9836932ae84f> [Accessed 19 March 2025].

88 Felgenhauer, P., 2014. *Armed Pro-Russian Activists in Lugansk May Trigger a Russian Invasion*, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10 April, Volume: 11 Issue: 68. [online] Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/armed-pro-russian-activists-in-lugansk-may-trigger-a-russian-invasion/> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. BBC, 2014. *Ukraine says Donetsk 'anti-terror operation' under way*, 16 April. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27035196> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. Federalization supporters in Luhansk proclaim people's republic, 2018. TASS, 28 April. [online] Available at: <http://tass.com/world/729768> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. International Criminal Court, 2017. *Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017*. [online] Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

89 United States Mission to the United Nations, 2014. *Text of the Geneva Statement on Ukraine released by the U.S., EU, Ukraine, and Russia*, 18 April. [online] Available at: <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/04/18/text-of-the-geneva-statement-on-ukraine-released-by-the-us-eu-ukraine-and-russia/> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on 17 July, which was attributed to a missile supplied to separatists by Russia⁹⁰. In response to ongoing conflict and rising casualties, the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on Russia. Despite international efforts for peace, fighting continued, with significant battles occurring throughout the summer and fall of 2014. The Minsk Protocol was signed on 5 September 2014, aiming to cease hostilities, initiate monitoring by the OSCE, and decentralize power in Ukraine⁹¹. Yet, the ceasefire was soon violated, leading to a second agreement, known as the Minsk II agreement, on 12 February 2015, which aimed for a more comprehensive peace plan involving heavy weapons withdrawal and local elections⁹². Despite some temporary agreements, such as the 'Easter Ceasefire' and various holiday truces, fighting persisted intermittently in the Donbas region. An assessment by the International Criminal Court noted an increase in military support from Russia to separatist forces, complicating peace efforts. Between 2014 and November 2017, over 35,000 casualties were reported due to the conflict⁹³.

In January 2018, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill classifying the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as 'temporarily occupied' territories, reflecting Ukraine's ongoing struggle for territorial integrity. Throughout 2018, attempts to solidify peace met with limited success, with skirmishes and ceasefire violations remaining common. A notable breakthrough occurred in September 2018 when a prisoner swap took place, signaling a potential thaw in hostilities. Nonetheless, ceasefire agreements, including a New Year truce at the end of December 2018, were often marred by violations, and the conflict continued to

claim lives in 2019. The 'Steinmeier Formula' was introduced in October 2019, proposing elections in separatist-held territories under OSCE supervision as a path to reintegration into Ukraine. In December 2019, leaders from Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France met in Paris, marking a significant diplomatic engagement aimed at resolving the conflict. The discussions yielded agreements on prisoner exchanges and plans for future elections, although ceasefire violations persisted into early 2020.

Despite the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic affecting diplomatic initiatives, efforts continued to stabilize the situation in eastern Ukraine. The Normandy Format meetings aimed to facilitate negotiations between the warring parties but were judged ineffective. In July 2020, the Trilateral Contact Group established a comprehensive ceasefire effective July 27, aimed at paving the way for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. By the end of 2021, satellite imagery and intelligence reports indicated the deployment of approximately 100,000 Russian troops and substantial military hardware positioned at various strategic points near Ukraine's eastern and northern borders, as well as in Crimea, which Russia had annexed in 2014. In February 2022, the U.S. and European intelligence agencies openly stated that an invasion appeared imminent. The pre-war situation culminated in the dramatic escalation on 24 February 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a 'special military operation' in Ukraine. This declaration was immediately followed by the launching of a full-scale invasion from multiple fronts, including direct assaults on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other major cities.

90 Reuters, 2014. *EU and U.S. announce new sanctions on Russia over Ukraine*, 29 July. [online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-east/eu-and-u-s-announce-new-sanctions-on-russia-over-ukraine-idUSKBN0FY0OX20140729> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

91 OSCE, 2014. *Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk*, 5 September. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/home/123257> [Accessed 9 May 2025]. OSCE, 2014. *Memorandum on stabilizing ceasefire another important step towards de-escalation*, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office says, 20 September. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/123808> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

92 OSCE, 2015. *Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements*, 12 February. [online] Available at: <https://www.osce.org/cio/140156> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

93 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017. *On the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15 November 2017*, UN Report. [online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport20th_EN.pdf [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Table 26. Timeline of the Russia-Ukraine War and its linkage with ceasefire and peace agreements

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Confrontation	2003	Russia begins a territorial dispute over Tuzla Island, challenging the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.	None
Confrontation-Crisis	April 2014	Annexation of Crimea; Pro-Russian activists seize buildings in eastern Ukrainian cities; Donetsk and Luhansk proclaim independence; Ukraine initiates ATO; 17 April: Geneva Initiative attempts de-escalation.	Geneva Joint Statement (17 Apr 2014)
Crisis	Summer 2014	DPR and LPR referendums declare independence; Donetsk and Luhansk unify under 'New Russia'; downing of a Dutch civilian airliner (17 July); major battles ensue, including Illovaik; EU and US sanctions on Russia; Russia sends humanitarian convoys into Donbass without Ukrainian consent.	None
Crisis	5 September 2014	Minsk Protocol signed, initiating a ceasefire and addressing decentralization of power, OSCE monitoring, and eventual local elections; however, immediate ceasefire violations ensue.	Minsk Protocol (5 Sep 2014)
Crisis	February 2015	Second Minsk Agreement aims to halt hostilities, withdraw heavy weapons, enable prisoner exchanges, and promote reintegration; nonetheless, fighting resumes with the Battle of Debaltseve.	Minsk II Agreement (11 Feb 2015)
Crisis in certain parts of Ukraine	2015 – 2021	Periodic ceasefires recommitments by TCG (e.g., 'New Year ceasefires,' 'school ceasefires'); continued skirmishes despite ceasefire intentions; DPR's 'Malorossiia' concept in 2017; prisoner swaps in September and December 2018 offer minor relief.	Multiple ceasefire recommitments (various dates 2015-2021); Steinmeier Formula (1 Oct 2019)

Conflict Stage	Timeline	Developments	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements
Crisis	February 2022 – Present	Full-scale Russian invasion expands conflict nationwide; intense, ongoing violence with missile strikes and large-scale combat; limited agreements achieved, such as prisoner exchanges and a grain export corridor for global food supply; otherwise no comprehensive ceasefire or peace agreement. Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place in spring 2022. Three peace agreements were suggested but none of them was adopted.	<p>Limited humanitarian arrangements (prisoner exchanges, grain corridor)</p> <p>Three agreements prepared in spring 2022 but not adopted:</p> <p>Treaty on (settlement of the situation in Ukraine, its neutrality and) security guarantees of Ukraine (draft as of 17 March 2022)</p> <p>Main Provisions of the Treaty on Ukraine's Security Guarantees (on the basis of consultations of 28-30 March 2022)</p> <p>Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees of Ukraine (draft as of 15 April 2022)</p>

Conflict stage


In February 2022, Russia escalated its aggression against Ukraine by launching a full-scale invasion, expanding the war far beyond the previously occupied eastern territories and completely disregarding international law and all existing agreements aimed at peace. This marked a significant and dangerous shift in the conflict, transforming it into a war that now engulfs vast areas of Ukraine and some parts of Russia. There are no ceasefires or comprehensive peace agreements in place. The level of violence and destruction continues to rise, with daily fighting, missile strikes, and intense battles.

The only agreements reached during this period are narrow in scope, focusing on specific humanitarian measures. Limited prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia have been facilitated, but these

efforts remain small-scale and do little to address the broader conflict. Additionally, an agreement was established to create a 'grain corridor,' for facilitating the export of Ukrainian agricultural products—an important lifeline for the global food supply. This arrangement was critical to alleviate food security concerns worldwide but does not address the core issues driving the conflict.

The situation remains highly volatile, with no signs of de-escalation. The war is firmly in the 'crisis' stage, characterized by intense, widespread violence and little prospect of immediate resolution. Diplomatic efforts for peace have been largely ineffective, and the conflict shows no signs of abating, with both sides continuing to engage in heavy combat.

Table 27. Russia-Ukraine War escalation curve



Integration of HS elements

It is impossible to assess the impact of the HS elements outlined in the Minsk agreements due to the context in which they were developed and subsequent events. These agreements, made in 2014 and 2015, alongside numerous smaller ceasefire arrangements, were overshadowed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This escalation rendered the agreements largely irrelevant, as Russia failed to respect or comply with their provisions, making any assessment of their implementation ineffective. However, despite their failure in practice, the Minsk agreements contained several valuable norms that addressed key HS aspects. Their importance remains notable in terms of the HS framework, even though the agreements themselves were never fully realized due to the breakdown in compliance and the intensification of hostilities. HS dimensions touched upon include personal, community, political, economic, and food security. Indirectly, the agreements touch on health security, though they do not explicitly address environmental security.

For instance, the agreements call for a mutually agreed ceasefire, so as to ensure the safety of individuals in the conflict zones, which speaks to personal security. Political security is very strong and consolidated. From the first day of troop withdrawal, the agreements stipulate the initiation

of dialogue on the modalities for local elections, to be held in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Interim Order of Local Self-Government in Certain Areas of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions.’ Furthermore, within 30 days of signing the treaty, Ukraine’s parliament is required to adopt a resolution defining the specific areas eligible for special status under the same law, based on the demarcation established in the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

The agreements also address the political dimension by ensuring a general pardon and amnesty through legislation that prohibits the prosecution and punishment of individuals involved in the conflict in specific areas of Donetsk and Lugansk. Additionally, they call for the swift release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons on a ‘all-for-all’ basis, with this process to be completed within five days of troop withdrawal.

The agreements emphasize the importance of ensuring safe access to humanitarian aid, including its delivery, storage, and distribution to those in need, based on international mechanisms. This indirectly touches on health security, as access to essential supplies and services helps mitigate health risks in conflict zones.

The agreements outline the need for the resumption of socio-economic ties, including the restoration of pensions, payments, and other income streams. This involves ensuring timely payments for utilities and reinstating the tax system within the legal framework of Ukraine. To achieve this, Ukraine is to regain control of its banking system in conflict-affected

areas, potentially through the establishment of an international mechanism to facilitate said transfers.

While the Minsk agreements provide a comprehensive approach to HS, they do not directly address environmental concerns, leaving a gap in the broader framework of sustainable security.

Table 28. Russia Ukraine War traffic light

HIS	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political
Direct							

Clearly expressed provisions Hinted provision No provisions
The value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0

Overall, the documents demonstrate a 86.5% integration of HS elements, placing them as ‘highly integrated’ in terms of HS principles.



Kyiv, Ukraine

FINAL ASSESSMENTS

This study explored the prevalence of HS components in ceasefire and peace agreements across nine conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia with reference to seven clusters of indicators.

General assessment

A comprehensive review was conducted of ceasefire and peace agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, covering both ceasefire and peace agreements. Most of these agreements addressed the full geographical scope of the conflicts, with only a few limited to specific areas. Similarly, the majority of agreements were designed to be permanent. The agreements were relatively evenly divided between bilateral and multilateral arrangements, with unilateral declarations comprising only a small fraction. In terms of impact, most agreements contributed to de-escalation, while a smaller portion did not facilitate a reduction in conflict intensity.

A total of 55 ceasefire and peace agreements were reviewed, including 34 ceasefire agreements and 21 peace agreements. Most of these agreements (47) applied to the entire geographical area of the conflict, while only eight covered limited areas. Similarly, 50 agreements were permanent in duration, with just

five being temporary. The agreements were fairly evenly split between bilateral (28) and multilateral (24), with unilateral declarations making up only a small portion (three). In terms of impact, 34 contributed to de-escalation, whereas 20 did not promote de-escalation. (see table 29 with respective data).

Table 29. Overview of ceasefire and peace agreements based on their categorization

Category of Agreements	Ceasefire Agreement	Peace Agreement	
	34 (62%)	21 (38%)	
Geographical scope	Full	Limited	
	47 (85,5%)	8 (14,5%)	
Temporal Scope	Permanent	Temporary	
	50 (91%)	5 (9%)	
Parties involved	Unilateral	Bilateral	Multilateral
	3 (5,5%)	28 (51%)	24 (43,5%)
Effect	Escalation	De-escalation	
	20 (62%)	34 (36,4%)	

The data reveals several trends. Broadly, agreements with full geographical coverage tend to be permanent: 85% (40 out of 47) are permanent, with only 15% being temporary. For agreements with limited geographical scope, the split is less pronounced: 62.5% have been permanent (five agreements), while 37.5% were temporary (three agreements). Multilateral agreements are generally more comprehensive, with 92% covering the full geographical scope. This can be attributed to the fact that wider participation usually necessitates addressing the entire conflict rather than isolated issues. While geographically the scope of this study

was restricted, in principle, these findings offer broader insights into the typology of ceasefire and peace agreements, particularly regarding how their scope, permanence, and participation shape their design and application in different conflict contexts.

Effects of agreements on conflict intensity

Agreements with full geographical scope are generally more effective in fostering de-escalation because they address broader security concerns comprehensively, while limited-scope agreements often struggle to sustain peace over the long term. Peace agreements also tend to be more successful in promoting de-escalation compared to ceasefire agreements, which often serve as temporary solutions. This underscores the crucial role of peace agreements in conflict resolution. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral agreements are typically more effective at encouraging de-escalation than unilateral agreements, as shared commitments among parties play a vital role in fostering stability.

Regarding the effects on conflict intensity, several observations emerge (see Table 30 for detailed data). Peace agreements are more likely to result in de-escalation. Of the 21 peace agreements, 81% (17) led to de-escalation, which aligns with their role in the conflict resolution phase. In contrast, the effect of ceasefire agreements is less clear, with only 47% (34 agreements) leading to de-escalation and 53% (18 agreements) associated with escalation. Agreements with full geographical scope are more effective

at promoting de-escalation, with 70% achieving this outcome. In contrast, 87% of limited-scope agreements led to increased conflict intensity, underscoring the limited impact of localized agreements on broader peace processes. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are more likely to support de-escalation (64% and 63%, respectively) compared to unilateral declarations. Although unilateral declarations are fewer, their impact appears minimal.

Table 30. Typology of ceasefire and peace agreements in relation to conflict escalation

	Total	De-escalation	Escalation
Category of Agreements	Ceasefire (34)	18 (53%)	16 (47%)
	Peace (21)	17 (81%)	4 (19%)
Geographical scope	Full (47)	33 (70%)	14 (30%)
	Limited (8)	1 (13%)	7 (87%)
Temporal scope	Permanent (50)	31 (62%)	19 (38%)
	Temporary (5)	3 (60%)	2 (40%)
Parties involved	Unilateral (3)	1 (33%)	2 (67%)
	Bilateral (28)	18 (64%)	10 (36%)
	Multilateral (24)	15 (63%)	9 (37%)

For a more detailed breakdown of characteristics of analyzed agreements by conflict see Table 31 below:

Table 31. Typology of agreements by conflict and their effects

Conflict (number of agreements)	Categories of agreements		Parties involved			Geographical scope		Temporal scope		Effect	
	Ceasefire	Peace agreement	Unilateral	Bilateral	Multilateral	Full	Limited	Permanent	Temporary	Escalation	De-escalation
Tajik Civil War (13)	7 54%	6 46%	1 8%	10 77%	2 15%	12 92%	1 8%	11 85%	2 15%	8 61,5%	5 38,5%
Tajik-Kyrgyz Border Dispute (2)	2 100%	0 –	0 –	2 100%	0 –	0 –	2 100%	2 100%	0 –	1 50%	1 50%
Chechen Wars (9)	5 55,6%	4 44,4%	1 11%	5 56%	3 33%	7 78%	2 22%	8 89%	1 11%	4 44%	5 56%
Conflict in South Ossetia (6)	3 50%	3 50%	0 –	4 67%	2 33%	5 83%	1 17%	5 83%	1 17%	2 33%	4 67%
Conflict in Abkhazia (8)	5 62,5%	3 37,5%	0 –	6 75%	2 25%	7 87,5%	1 13,5%	6 75%	2 25%	2 25%	6 75%
Conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan (9)	5 55,6%	4 44,4%	0 –	7 78%	2 22%	9 100%	0 –	7 78%	2 22%	3 33%	6 67%
Prigorodny Conflict (1)	0 –	1 100%	0 –	1 100%	0 0	1 100%	0 0	1 100%	0 –	0 –	1 100%
Conflict in Transnistria (3)	1 33%	2 67%	0 –	1 33%	2 67%	3 100%	0 –	3 100%	0 –	1 33%	2 67%
Russia-Ukraine War (4)	3 75%	1 25%	1 25%	2 50%	1 25%	2 50%	2 50%	2 50%	2 50%	3 75%	1 25%

Impact of Integration of HS on intensity of the conflict

Conflicts in the post-conflict stage generally exhibit higher HSI scores. Although this trend is apparent, a definitive correlation cannot be confirmed. A notable exception is the Russia-Ukraine war, which demonstrates that even a high level of HS components in ceasefire and peace agreements does not guarantee conflict de-escalation or sustainable peace.

This aligns with previous research indicating that agreements tend to become more comprehensive over time within a conflict trajectory, with peace agreements typically incorporating a broader range of provisions than ceasefire agreements. The Table 32 presents an overview of the integration of HS elements across different ceasefire and peace agreements, categorized by conflict stage. It shows the extent to which various human security provisions

are incorporated into each agreement type, using a traffic light system. Green indicates provisions that are explicitly included (scoring 13.5%), yellow represents provisions that are indirectly mentioned or implied (scoring 6.75%), and red signifies the absence of relevant provisions (scoring 0%). The overall HSI score for each case reflects the cumulative level of HS integration, helping to illustrate patterns across different conflict stages.

Table 32. HSI integration by conflict

	Economic	Food	Health	Environment	Personal	Community	Political	Overall HSI score (%)	Stage of conflict pre-conflict 1; confrontation 2; crisis 3; outcome 4; post-conflict 5
Tajik Civil War								74,25%	5
Tajik-Kyrgyz Border Dispute								33,5%	4
Chechen Wars								94,5%	5
Conflict in South Ossetia								74,25%	4-5 (4,5 or 5)
Conflict in Abkhazia								87,75%	4-5 (4,5 or 5)
Conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan								54%	4
Prigorodny Conflict								74,25%	5
Conflict in Transnistria								86,5%	5
Russia-Ukraine War								86,5%	3

Conflicts with the highest inclusion of HS elements in ceasefire and peace agreements (over 80%) are the Chechen wars, the Abkhazia conflict, the Transnistria conflict, and the Russia-Ukraine war. Conflicts with an intermediate level of HS components (60-80%) include the Tajik Civil War, the SO conflict, and the Prigorodny conflict. The lowest inclusion of HS components is observed in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts and the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute. Table 33 below charts the nine conflicts in descending order with respect to their HSI score and indicates which conflict stage they are currently in (red – crisis; orange – outcome; yellow – between outcome and post-conflict; green – post-conflict). It is notable that conflicts at post-conflict stages (Stage 5) consistently show higher HSI scores and involve full-scope, permanent, and multilateral agreements. The Chechen Wars (HSI 94.5%) and the conflict in Transnistria (HSI 86.5%) are both in Stage 5 and feature high percentages of permanent agreements (89% and 100%, respectively) and multilateral agreements (33% and 67%). The conflict in Abkhazia (HSI 87.75%, Stage 4-5) has 88% full scope, 75% permanent agreements, and 25% multilateral involvement. The Prigorodny conflict, although involving only one agreement, also aligns with this trend (HSI 74.25%, Stage 5), with 100% full scope and permanent agreements. This suggests that conflicts in post-conflict stages benefited from agreements with broader geographical scope and being longer-lasting, often involving multiple parties: multiple parties may contribute to sustained peace and higher HS.

Active conflicts (Stage 3), like the Russia-Ukraine War (HSI 86.5%), exhibit, instead, lower full-scope (50%) and permanent agreements (50%), and are more likely to be of limited scope (50%) with temporary agreements (50%). This pattern implies that during intense conflict, agreements are more likely to be temporary or localized, possibly due to the challenges of achieving broad, lasting consensus on ongoing hostilities. Similarly, the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute (HSI 33.5%, Stage 4) has relied entirely on limited scope and bilateral agreements (100%), which aligns with its lower HSI score, suggesting that localized, short-term agreements may not fully address HS needs. This

suggests that in high-intensity or transitioning conflict stages, limited or temporary agreements may be a common stop-gap measure, but they are less likely to contribute as robustly to HS.

The results also indicate that conflicts with high percentages of full-scope agreements and permanent agreements tend to show higher HSI scores and greater de-escalation. For example, the conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan (Stage 4, HSI 54%) has 100% full-scope agreements and 78% permanent agreements, with a notable commitment to de-escalation (67%). The SO Conflict (Stage 4-5, HSI 74.25%) has 83% full-scope agreements and 83% permanent agreements, also showing a balanced ceasefire/peace ratio (50% each). The Chechen Wars (Stage 5, HSI 94.5%) features 78% full-scope and 89% permanent agreements, with a mix of bilateral and multilateral agreements (56% and 33%). This pattern suggests that full-scope and permanent agreements are crucial in later conflict stages, as they provide a more comprehensive and enduring framework that supports HS and de-escalation.

The assessment further confirms that peace agreements appear more frequently in later stages or post-conflict settings, which align with higher HSI scores. The Prigorodny conflict (Stage 5) and the conflict in Transnistria (Stage 5) have, respectively, 100% and 67% peace agreements, both with HSI scores above 74%. The Chechen Wars (Stage 5, HSI 94.5%) has 44% peace agreements, supporting the positive impact of peace agreements in stabilizing later-stage conflicts. Ceasefire agreements are more common in active or crisis stages, which can be illustrated in the case of the Russia-Ukraine War (Stage 3) with 75% ceasefire agreements, which aligns with a focus on temporary halts in hostilities rather than long-term peace. This indicates that peace agreements are likely to enhance HS and facilitate stabilization in post-conflict stages, while ceasefires are more typical in early, high-intensity stages.


While it can be observed that conflicts with agreements that include HS tend to have lower intensity, a clear correlation cannot be conclusively established (see Table 33). The main outlier in this regard is the Russia-Ukraine war. There a very high level of inclusion of HS components in ceasefire

and peace agreements has not proved enough to ensure conflict de-escalation and sustainable peace. There are several explanations for this:

Firstly, as discussed in the section on limitations, this study does not assess the HSI indicators specific to the causes of conflict and the causes of human insecurity related to the conflict. Rather it focuses on the general integration of these elements in ceasefire and peace agreements. As a result, it does not account for whether the concrete cluster of indicators were relevant in the case of a conflict and as such their inclusion would have been desirable in the first place. This can create biases especially in the case of localized conflicts, such as the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute where only several categories of HS elements may be relevant. Secondly, beyond accounting for the relevance of each cluster to truly understand the inclusion of relevant HS components it would be important to identify all

relevant indicators within each cluster and weigh each respective cluster according to their importance. As regards identification, the analysis in this study only focused on the inclusion of HS indicators in the concluded agreements. It did not account for how they related to the causes of conflict and human insecurity. As a result, categories identified as green, while including HS elements within the respective categories, would not necessarily be comprehensive or comprehensively address the relevant causes of insecurity. While a weighted approach would more precisely determine the inclusion of HS elements it would also introduce its own biases. A weighed approach would be more subjective as it would require detailed analysis of causes of each conflict and the causes of human insecurity at the time of the drafting of the ceasefire and peace agreement. (for simplified procedure for applying HSI to specific conflicts in a weighed manner see section 7.2).

Table 33. HSI score by conflict



Also, as this study focuses on ceasefire and peace agreements it does not account for the protection of HS through other channels such as political and diplomatic agreements. Issues relevant to the conflict including causes of the conflict can be effectively dealt with in an informal manner through back-channel diplomacy due to their sensitive nature and potential fears of public response to them if they were to be included in official agreements. This includes for example the ongoing territorial demarcation efforts between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, ceasefire and peace agreements do not provide a complete picture of the mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution processes and are, on their own, insufficient to establish causal link with the stage of the conflict and achievement of sustainable peace.

Third, due to political realities the enforcement of ceasefire and peace agreements is not guaranteed. Third-party mediators may foster the conclusion of a peace agreement but if the parties themselves are not content with the terms the agreements count for nothing. Domestic political pressure can be a decisive factor in such cases. More authoritarian states or those with lower respect for the rule of law may choose to bypass concluded agreements if the benefits outweigh the costs and they see an advantage in the continuation of the conflict. Alternatively, even when parties to conflict enter the agreements in good faith the realities on the ground may change, pushing the parties to resume the conflict.

From the above it follows that the inclusion of HS elements across all clusters of indicators do not necessarily serve as a final indicator for conflict intensity.

Inclusion of HS elements by cluster

Most agreements emphasize personal, political, and community security elements, aligning with a 'freedom from fear' approach. This focus on civilian protection, community cohesion, and political stability reflects a shared understanding of their importance in reducing violence and fostering peace. Economic and food security elements are moderately represented in ceasefire and peace agreements: they are typically added to address immediate humanitarian needs. However, these provisions rarely extend to long-term economic development, which is crucial for lasting recovery. Health and environmental security components are minimally included, often limited to immediate environmental safeguards or urgent health provisions. This limited focus indicates that the broader, long-term impacts of health and environmental security are frequently overlooked in peacebuilding efforts.

The assessment indicates that the most commonly included HS components are personal, political, and community security, with economic security following closely. Food security is fully integrated in only about one-third of the conflicts analyzed, though indirect references are common. For example, the Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement (1996) provides a rare example of food security being addressed explicitly: 'the Joint Commission shall control the agreed forms of cooperation concerning the supply and distribution of food'. Other ceasefire and peace agreements tend to refer to it indirectly, either as part of humanitarian aid or by securing routes to transfer goods. For example, the Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire


Agreement (2020) provides that 'all economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organizing the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions'; The Tajik Civil War Agreement (1997) provides that the 'Government of the Republic of Tajikistan assumes the obligation to reintegrate returning refugees and displaced persons into the social and economic life of the country, which includes the provision to them of humanitarian and financial aid, assistance in finding employment and housing...';

Health and environmental security are the least represented components. This finding aligns with initial expectations, as ceasefire and peace agreements traditionally focus on elements associated with ‘freedom from fear’ — such as physical security, community protection, and political violence. Interestingly, economic, food, and health security provisions are included more frequently than anticipated: health security provisions are included at least in limited capacity in agreements related to six out of nine conflicts. This may be due to their connection to humanitarian needs arising from conflicts, which are often of concern to negotiating parties – including conflict actors, mediators and international organizations involved in the process. At the same time, such provisions may be more politically feasible to include, as they are framed as neutral humanitarian imperatives rather than contentious reforms requiring deep structural change. Environmental security is the least addressed, typically limited to provisions for immediate threats to infrastructure and facilities that could cause environmental harm, as well as risks to local populations and economies. However, the agreement on the basic principles between the Russian Federation and the

Chechen Republic goes beyond immediate threats, including provisions for establishing comprehensive funds for joint programs and for addressing the aftermath of extreme disasters and catastrophes.

Overall, this pattern of inclusion reflects a prioritization of security concerns that are most directly linked to conflict de-escalation and immediate stabilization. The emphasis on personal, political, and community security aligns with the short-term objectives of ceasefire and peace agreements, which focus on reducing violence and fostering foundations for dialogue. The moderate inclusion of economic security suggests recognition of its role in post-conflict stabilization, though primarily in a humanitarian rather than a developmental capacity. The limited representation of health and environmental security indicated that long-term resilience factors remain secondary considerations in formal agreements. This raises important questions about the extent to which these agreements lay the groundwork for sustainable peace, as unaddressed socio-economic vulnerabilities and environmental risks can undermine stability over the long run.

Table 34. Inclusion of HS elements by cluster



RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for Integrating HS in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements

These recommendations for integrating HS in ceasefire and peace agreements are derived from the case studies and the overall analysis presented in this publication. They reflect lessons learned from past peace processes, highlighting both challenges and best practices in addressing HS concerns. In drafting and negotiating ceasefire and peace agreements, addressing the comprehensive needs of affected communities is essential for building sustainable peace. A HS approach—focusing on economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political dimensions—ensures that agreements go beyond merely ending hostilities to laying down foundations for long-term stability. The following recommendations provide a framework for integrating these critical elements into agreements, emphasizing the importance of inclusive, resilient, and people-centred peace processes that address the root causes and impacts of conflict on individuals and communities alike.

Economic security

1. Agreements should address the economic needs of affected communities by including provisions for reparations, economic aid, and the restoration of essential services.
2. Economic reintegration, particularly through employment support and social guarantees, is crucial in stabilizing post-conflict areas.
3. The agreement could include the provisions on the establishment of a special body that shall be established to oversee the fair distribution of aid and support economic recovery efforts

An example is found in Annex 10 concerning the Tajik civil war: *'The Commission shall have the following functions and powers: ...Implementing measures for the safe and appropriate return of the refugees and their active involvement in the social, political and **economic life of the country**, and **provision of assistance in reconstruction** of the housing and industrial and agricultural facilities destroyed by the war.'*

Food security

1. Agreements should prioritise access to agricultural lands, food supply chains, and humanitarian food aid for affected populations.
2. The agreement should include guaranteed access to food supplies by specifying safe passage for humanitarian aid organizations and local communities.
3. The document should include clear protocols or norms for agricultural resource protection in affected regions.

For example, in Annex 12 on the Tajik civil war: *'**The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan assumes the obligation to reintegrate returning refugees and displaced persons** into the social and economic life of the country, which includes the provision to them of **humanitarian** and financial **aid**, assistance in finding employment and housing and the restoration of all their rights as citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan.'* In the case of the Chechen wars, the parties agreed to monitor the coordinated interaction of the organs of state power and other interested parties in the provision of food and medicines for the population.

Health security

1. Agreements should include protections for (a) healthcare infrastructure; (b) supply chains for medical provisions; and (c) commitments to immediate medical aid for displaced or affected persons in conflict affected zones.
2. The agreement should include clauses for guaranteeing access to medical services (even in disputed territories).
3. The provision of urgent mental health support for trauma-affected individuals remains of importance.

Health security provisions are essential to ensure civilian access to care and maintain stability. For example, as in Annex 15 relating to the Chechen wars: *'The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic will take measures to secure conditions for the return and equipping of refugees, **the creation of centers of medical rehabilitation of the population of the Chechen Republic, of those suffering as a result of military activities.***'

Environmental security

1. Agreements should contain provisions for clearing unexploded ordnance and landmines.
2. Protection of natural resources.
3. In peace agreements, conducting environmental restoration activities in conflict affected areas should be envisioned.
4. Specific environment protection infrastructure should not be targeted.
5. A channel for the exchange of information regarding natural disasters should be established.

By mitigating ecological harm, the agreement can support a safer environment for civilians and help prevent resource-driven tensions. For example, in Annex 32 concerning Abkhazia: *'At this stage, the parties have reached a mutual understanding regarding powers for joint action in the following fields: ... (e) **Ecology and elimination of consequences of natural disasters.***'

Personal security

1. Agreements must include clear personal security norms by explicitly prohibiting violence against civilians, and by ensuring protection from gender-based and other forms of targeted violence.
2. Agreements should establish mechanisms for civilian safety through regular monitoring and reporting.
3. Agreements should respect International Humanitarian Law.
4. Specific references should be made to protect children and marginalized groups, with explicit prohibition of attacks against civilian objects.

For example, in Annex 20 concerning Chechen wars: *'Expressing the will to protect unconditionally human rights and freedoms and those of the citizen, irrespective of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, place of residence or any other distinctions, and to **prevent acts of violence against political opponents.***'

Community security

1. Provisions for community security focus on the safe return of displaced persons and the establishment of intercommunal peace structures. Some scholars argue that repatriation does not always necessarily contribute to peace⁹⁴. But many studies advocate that the return of refugees is a necessary condition for the establishment of sustainable peace after armed conflict.
2. Mechanisms that promote intercommunal dialogue and address tensions are vital for fostering lasting peace.

For example, in Annex 12 concerning Tajik civil war: *'To step up mutual efforts to **ensure the voluntary return, in safety and dignity, of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes**, and to complete this process within 12 to 18 months from the date of signature of this Protocol.'* or Annex 43 relating to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: *'**Inter-communal coexistence** will be prompted by the parties with the support of the international community to **reduce tension and normalize economic, political, and social life** among ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis.'*

Political security

1. Agreements should outline steps towards fair political representation, protecting political freedoms through the electoral process.
2. The establishment of inclusive governance structures with international support to monitor the implementation of democratic reforms.
3. Protection from enforced disappearance and ill-treatment, release political prisoners or POWs and dealing with missing persons remain of great importance.

This can mitigate political grievances that may otherwise trigger future conflicts. For example, in Annex 49 concerning the Russia-Ukraine war: *'**Ensure the holding of early local elections** in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on the interim status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Law on Special Status).'*

94 Sjöström, A. E., Hajdarevic, S., Hörnsten, Å. & Isaksson, U., 2023. Experiences of online COVID-19 information acquisition among persons with type 2 diabetes and varying eHealth literacy. Umeå University. [online] Available at: <https://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:369465/FULLTEXT01.pdf> [Accessed 9 May 2025].

Methodological advice for applying HSI to specific conflicts

The study introduces the HSI as a practical tool for professionals assessing the inclusion of HS in ceasefire and peace agreements. This framework is particularly useful for mediators, policy analysts, and peacebuilding practitioners seeking to evaluate the extent to which agreements address not only immediate security concerns but also broader HS dimensions. By systematically scoring HS provisions, the HSI can help practitioners identify gaps, compare agreements across contexts, and inform the design of more comprehensive and effective peace processes.

While this study applied a general approach to assessing the inclusion of HS elements in agreements from specific conflicts, it did not conduct a case-specific HSI scoring for each agreement. This is because the study's primary aim was to map broader trends in HS integration rather than to conduct a detailed agreement-level assessment. A more targeted HSI application might provide deeper insights into the effectiveness of specific agreements, but it would also require additional data on implementation and outcomes – an aspect beyond the scope of the present research. Nonetheless, the findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of patterns in HS inclusion and can serve as a foundation for future research focused on causality and agreement effectiveness.

The following section will provide for a step-by-step process through which an HSI score for a specific agreement can be determined, allowing practitioners to apply the tool in their own assessments of ceasefire and peace agreements.

Step 1: Identification of causes of conflict and causes of human insecurity

Fill out the table below with causes of conflict and causes of human insecurity. In the case of conflict causes include only structural ones (identification of immediate events leading to the conflict or its intensification is not necessary). In the case of sources of human insecurity focus on those relevant to the conflict parties at the times of the conflict. In some instances, the distinction between direct and structural causes may be unclear – in those instances include the cause if appropriate or replicate it twice with focus on each dimension. It is better to only duplicate causes in limited instances as this could introduce bias in the later assessment.

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Direct insecurity		Shortage of food in area X			Bombing and shelling		
Structural insecurity			Population X has extremely limited access to healthcare				

Step 2: Scoring

In the next step assign scores to each cause of conflict or cause of human insecurity included in the table. First review all items included and determine whether any causes are so similar that they should be merged into one point. As a rule, assign each distinct cause the score of 1, and only if a specific item is especially significant to the conflict or to the level of human insecurity it causes, assign it a score 2 or 3 (only in severe cases).

Assessing the significance of causes of insecurity and the conflict is inherently complex, as the impact of specific causes may vary depending on factors such as ethnicity, gender, class, religion, or geographical location. While this approach provides a structured way to evaluate HS concerns, it does not fully capture intersectional vulnerabilities. Therefore, practitioners should remain mindful of how different communities experience insecurity differently and ensure that diverse perspectives inform the scoring process where possible.

For example, in a conflict where displacement is a major issue, general displacement due to violence might be assigned a score of 1, while the targeted displacement of a specific ethnic or religious group—if it plays a central role in the conflict—could be scored as 2 or even 3 in severe cases. Similarly, economic insecurity will generally be rated 1, but if deliberate economic marginalization of a specific community (e.g., restrictions on land access for a particular ethnic group) is a key driver of instability, it may warrant a higher score.

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Direct insecurity		Shortage of food in area X (1)			Bombing and shelling (2)		
Structural insecurity			Population X has extremely limited access to healthcare (1)				

Step 3: Reformulation of causes into HSI indicators

Once the table is populated with causes of conflict and human insecurity, the next step is to reformulate these elements into identifiable indicators which respond to the individual issues. For potential indicators you can use Table 1 on HIS indicators. It is helpful to have a clear idea of what the indicators include. However, it is not necessary to list them explicitly as the scoring will be done in reference to the first table with causes.

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Direct insecurity		Protection of food supply chain and food			Ceasefire		

Categories of indicators	Economic security	Food security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
Structural insecurity			Reestablishment of healthcare services				

Step 4: Assessment of Ceasefire or Peace agreement

- For the assessment of concrete ceasefires or peace agreements the distinction between direct and structural causes will be temporarily overlooked. In this case, instead of applying the traffic light approach to each cluster, it will be first applied to each cause of conflict or human insecurity.

Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
				Cause 1		
				Cause 2		
				Cause 3		
				Cause 4		

- In the next step, weighed values to the causes of each conflict (see step 2).

Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
				Cause 1 (1)		
				Cause 2 (1)		
				Cause 3 (2)		
				Cause 4 (1)		

- Determine the weighted average value based on the traffic light values: green – clearly expressed provisions; yellow – hinted provisions; and red – no provisions – the value for green sub-cluster – 13.5%, yellow – 6.75%, red – 0. Use the following cut-off values to assign appropriate traffic light for each category: 0-3 = red; 3-9 = yellow; 9-13.5 = green. The calculation is based on the presence of seven clusters, each of which can be scored at a maximum of 13.5%. To account for variability and ensure accuracy, a permissible error margin of 5.5% is applied. This margin helps accommodate potential deviations while maintaining the reliability of the overall assessment.

Example: based on the case-study above the calculation would be as follows:

$$(1 \times 13.5 + 1 \times 6.75 + 2 \times 6.75 + 1 \times 0) / 5 = 6.75$$

Step 5: Overall HSI score

To determine the overall HIS score accounting for the weights of each cluster the first step is to allocate appropriate weight to each cluster. Accounting for a 5% deviation this will be done by dividing 95 by the total number of scores and then multiplying the result by the number of scores corresponding to each cluster.

Example: for the case-study below this would mean: $95 / 18 = 5.28$. This value should be subsequently multiplied by the total score for each cluster.

Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
2 10,5	0	3 15,8	1 10,5	5 26,4	4 21,12	3 15,8

In the next step these values will be adjusted according to the traffic light system. Green values will remain the same, yellow values will be halved and red clusters will be automatically awarded value of 0.

Economic security	Food Security	Health security	Environmental security	Personal security	Community security	Political security
2 10,5	0	3 0	1 10,5	5 13,2	4 10,56	3 7,9

In the final step these values will be added together to show the overall HIS score. In the example above the total HSI score would be 52.66%, reflecting the degree to which HS components are integrated into the respective ceasefire or peace agreement in a weighed manner that accounts for conflict specificities.

Beyond offering a comparative measure, the HSI score serves as a practical tool for policymakers, mediators, and researchers. It can help: identify strengths and weaknesses across agreements, guide negotiations by comparing different drafts of agreements and track the evolution of HS provisions over time. By systematically applying this assessment, practitioners can pinpoint areas where agreements can be strengthened to better address HS needs in conflict-affected settings.

ANNEXES

Annex 1

Khorog Agreement

Nezavisimaya Gazeta

28 July 1992

Monday, No. 142 (313) p. 3

WARRING FORCES LEADERS REACHED AN AGREEMENT

Kulyabers will not lay down their arms

Igor Rotar

Tajikistan

On 26 – 27 July, in the town of Khorog (Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region), a meeting of government officials, representatives of parties and political movements of Tajikistan took place.

It was attended by representatives of Kulyab region, Gharm district, Kurgan-Tyube region, as well as the Islamic Renaissance Party (Coordination Council member Sayid Abdulohi Nuri), the Democratic Party of the Republic (Shodmon Yusuf), and the Rastokhez movement (Chairman Tokhir Abduzhabbor). The leadership of the Republic was represented by acting Chairman of the SS (Supreme Soviet) of Tajikistan Akbarsho Iskandarov.

At the meeting, an Armistice Agreement between the warring parties was drawn up.

1. From 10:00 on 28 July 1992, a ceasefire shall be declared throughout the territory of Tajikistan. The parties concerned shall guarantee its implementation.
2. Within 24 hours after signing the agreement, the armed groups shall be obliged to release the hostages and take them to their places of residence.
3. By 6 p.m. on 28 July, all armed groups must remove all their armed checkpoints on highways, in state institutions, as well as disband headquarters, vacate the occupied buildings and facilities and return motor vehicles to their owners under the control of the MIA (Minister of Internal Affairs) and the National Security Committee.
4. Leaders of political parties and associations of regions, districts, and the executive committee of the city of Dushanbe, as well as leaders of armed groups and kaziats of the Republic, shall guarantee the disbandment of the armed groups loyal to them within three days after the day of signing the agreement and turn in the available weapons.
5. Regional, city and district executive committees, as well as the executive committee of the city of Dushanbe, shall cancel their orders on establishing armed groups after signing this agreement. Control over the implementation of this provision shall rest with prosecution agencies.
6. Individuals who arbitrarily created detachments that have firearms, ammunition and other types of weapons shall be obliged to turn them in to special weapon accepting offices at departments of MIA and National Security Committee by 10:00 on 3 August.
7. Individuals voluntarily turning in their weapons shall be exempt from criminal liability according to the decree of the President of the Republic. Special assets and means shall be deployed to forcefully seize the weapons from those armed groups and individuals who fail to turn in their weapons within this period. These individuals shall be held criminally liable in accordance with the current legislation.

8. The republican commission and special commissions for weapon acceptance made up of representatives of political parties and movements, government authorities and clergy, trade union federation, and youth organisations should be established. Representatives of armed groups may participate in the work of the commissions as observers.
9. To ensure the safety of residents of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab regions from sudden armed attacks, additional checkpoints shall be set up on 30 July 1992 on the following borders: Kulyab – Dushanbe, Kulyab – Kurgan-Tyube, Kurgan-Tyube – Dushanbe. The participation of personnel of the MIA and the National Security Committee shall be ensured to use military equipment.
10. Necessary measures shall be taken to reinforce borders by border forces jointly with government and law enforcement agencies and to interdict weapons importing from outside the Republic. Individuals supplying weapons shall be held criminally liable and shall not be subject to amnesty in accordance with the law.
11. The President of Tajikistan shall be requested to issue a decree on exempting from liability the individuals who crossed the border upon return without weapons.
12. Leaders of political parties and movements, regional, district, and city executive councils shall undertake from now on not to use force to resolve political differences but to be guided by the requirements of democracy and secular society, as well as the Constitution of the Republic.
13. The government and law enforcement agencies of the Republic shall guarantee emergency care to those who were forced to leave their places of residence as a result of a clash of the warring parties, upon their return. Leaders of political parties and movements as well as local government authorities shall guarantee that refugees who have returned to their previous places of residence will not be prosecuted in any way.
14. All these processes shall be covered by the mass media of the Republic.
15. The government of the Republic shall be requested to resolve the issue of buying out weapons at stated prices from the individuals who have purchased them to ensure their safety.
16. Should armed groups and individuals fail to comply with the requirements of this agreement, decisive measures may be applied towards them by law enforcement agencies with the use of service weapons. This agreement became effective on 27 July 1992. However, it gives rise to some doubts. Immediately after it was signed, the leader of Kulyab self-defence groups Sangak Safarov said that his people will not turn in their weapons before the resignation of the illegitimate, in his opinion, coalition government. Tajikistan's Democratic Party leader Shodmon Yusuf said that all foreign formations including border forces must immediately leave the territory of the Republic. This is contrary to paragraph 10 of the agreement. Representatives of the Democratic Party, Rastokhez, and the Islamic Renaissance Party sent a letter to President Rahmon Naiyev, in which they expressed their indignation and bewilderment in connection with his failure to come to Khorog for the warring parties meeting.

Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks

Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks

The delegations of the leaders of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"), in the course of the consultations on national reconciliation held in Tehran from 12 to 17 September 1994 under United Nations auspices, as a major step towards a global political settlement of the conflict, national reconciliation and the solution of the problem of refugees, the constitutional system and the consolidation of the statehood of the independent and sovereign Republic of Tajikistan, have agreed:

1. To halt, on a temporary basis, hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country.

2. The Parties have agreed that the concept of "cessation of hostilities" shall include the following:

(a) The cessation by the Parties of all military activities, including all violations of the Tajik-Afghan border, offensive operations within the country, the shelling of adjacent territories, the conduct of all forms of military training, the redeployment of regular and irregular military formations in Tajikistan, which might result in the breakdown of this Agreement;

Note: The Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian troops in Tajikistan shall carry out their duties in keeping with the principle of neutrality, which is part of their mandate, and shall cooperate with United Nations military observers.

(b) The cessation by the Parties of acts of terrorism and sabotage on the Tajik-Afghan border, within the Republic and in other countries;

(c) The prevention by the Parties of murders, the taking of hostages, unlawful arrest and detention, and acts of pillage against the civilian population and servicemen in the Republic and other countries;

(d) The prevention of blockades of populated areas, national economic and military installations and of all means of communication;

(e) The cessation of the use of all forms of communication and mass media to undermine the process of national reconciliation;

(f) The Parties shall refrain from using religion and the religious feelings of believers, as well as any ideology, for hostile purposes.

3. The Parties have agreed to a temporary cease-fire and the cessation of other hostile acts on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country until the referendum on the draft of the new constitution and the election of the

president of the Republic of Tajikistan, on the understanding that this is only a first step towards the achievement of national harmony and the settlement of all issues included in the agenda of the talks.

4. With a view to building confidence, the Parties have agreed that, within one month following the signing of this Agreement:

(a) The authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan shall release those who have been arrested and sentenced, in conformity with the list annexed hereto;

(b) The Tajik opposition shall release the prisoners of war in conformity with the list annexed hereto.

5. With a view to ensuring the effective implementation of this Agreement, the Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition. The Parties request the Security Council of the United Nations to assist the work of the Commission by providing political mediation services and dispatching United Nations military observers to the areas of conflict.

6. This Agreement was signed at Tehran on 17 September 1994 and shall enter into force as soon as United Nations observers are deployed in Tajikistan.

Head of the delegation
of the Republic of Tajikistan:

A. DOSTIEV

Head of the delegation
of the Tajik opposition:

A. TURAJONZODAH

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations:

R. PÍRIZ-BALLÓN

Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country and Joint Communiqué on the results of the third round of Inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation

UNITED
NATIONS

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4 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The third round of Inter-Tajik peace talks under United Nations auspices was held in Islamabad from 20 October to 1 November 1994. The following documents, the Russian and English texts of which are attached, were signed at the conclusion of these talks:

- (i) Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country.
- (ii) Joint Communiqué on the results of the third round of Inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation.

It would be appreciated if the above two documents are circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of
the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation
of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within
the country

I. Purpose of the Joint Commission

1. The Joint Commission, established in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country for the duration of the talks (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Commission"), shall, by the decision of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition, be the principal body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement.

II. Composition of the Joint Commission

2. The Joint Commission shall be established on the basis of equality and shall be composed of three representatives of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and three representatives of the Tajik opposition. One representative of each Party shall serve as co-chairman of the Joint Commission.

III. Powers of the Joint Commission

3. The Joint Commission shall have the right to interpret the provisions of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country, and also to investigate possible violations of the Agreement by the Parties thereto. In its investigations, the Joint Commission shall have the right to request the submission, at the earliest possible time, of objective, complete and reliable information from any State body or official of the Republic of Tajikistan and also leaders and field commanders of the opposition. In the performance of their duties, the members of the Joint Commission should have free and unimpeded access to all officials of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leaders of the Tajik opposition.

IV. Functions of the Joint Commission

4. The Joint Commission shall monitor the implementation by the Parties of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country; investigate cases of violations of the Agreement on the basis of objective information obtained during the investigation; and submit to the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition, the United Nations and representatives of observers at the

inter-Tajik talks proposals on ways of preventing such violations and of addressing their consequences.

5. In the exercise of its functions, the Joint Commission shall cooperate with the United Nations Mission of Observers, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Tajikistan.

V. Guarantees of security

6. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition shall guarantee the safety and inviolability of the members of the Joint Commission in the performance of their duties. The members of the Joint Commission shall not be subject to detention or arrest and shall not be prosecuted for activities in which they engaged prior to their appointment to the Joint Commission or for acts relating to the performance of their duties as members of the Joint Commission. The Tajik Parties shall guarantee the inviolability of the official premises and living quarters in which the members of the Joint Commission and their families will work and live. The members of the Joint Commission shall have the right to safe and unimpeded travel within the territory of Tajikistan and, with the consent of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, in the territory of Afghanistan, in the areas where camps and bases of the Tajik opposition are situated. They will be accompanied by the United Nations observers. The members of the Joint Commission shall also have the right to maintain without hindrance all forms of communication with the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leaders of the Tajik opposition.

VI. Role of the United Nations in assisting the work of the Joint Commission

7. At the request of the Tajik Parties, which is contained in the Agreement, the United Nations shall, through the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, assist the work of the Joint Commission. In accordance with the principle of independence and impartiality, United Nations observers shall monitor implementation of the Agreement by the Tajik Parties and shall investigate possible violations of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities. They shall assist the Joint Commission in drafting proposals on the prevention of such violations and shall submit such proposals to the Parties on their own initiative.

VII. Location and duration of the mandate of the Joint Commission

8. The Joint Commission shall have its headquarters in Dushanbe. The Joint Commission shall be established for the duration of the validity of the Agreement on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country.

VIII. Logistical support for the Joint Commission activities

9. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan pledges to provide logistical support for the Joint Commission, including providing office space, living quarters and board for the members of the Joint Commission on the territory of the Republic while the opposition provides the same on the territory of Afghanistan. The parties, with United Nations assistance, appeal to the collective peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States stationed on the territory of Tajikistan and to the international community for financial and logistical support for the Joint Commission. A trust fund to support the work of the Commission, established on the basis of voluntary contributions, will be administered by the United Nations mission in Tajikistan.

IX. Amendment and termination of applicability
of provisions of the Protocol

10. The provisions contained in this Protocol and the procedure for their implementation by mutual agreement of the Tajik Parties, as well as the other parties mentioned in this Protocol that are affected by its individual provisions, may be amended or deleted so long as this Protocol remains in force.

Head of the delegation of
the Republic of Tajikistan:

(Signed) A. DOSTIEV

Head of the delegation of
the Tajik opposition:

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations:

(Signed) R. PIRIZ-BALLON

Joint communiqué on the results of the third round
of inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation

1 November 1994

The third round of inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation, held under United Nations auspices with the participation of observers from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, CSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, took place in Islamabad from 20 October to 1 November 1994. The delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan was headed by Mr. Dostiev, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the delegation of the Tajik opposition by Mr. Turajonzodah, First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan. In the course of the negotiations, good offices were provided by Ambassador Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The negotiations were businesslike and open. Both parties demonstrated a will to solve complicated problems pertaining to the situation in Tajikistan in a constructive spirit. They reached agreement on an extension of the Agreement on a temporary cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country until 6 February 1995, and signed the Protocol on the Joint Commission for the implementation of the Agreement.

The parties confirmed their commitment to the spirit of the Tehran Agreement. In this regard, they paid attention to the need to provide additional security guarantees to the civilian population of the Karategin Valley by sending United Nations military observers to that area and by initiating action by international human rights organizations.

In view of the noncompliance with paragraph 4 of the Agreement within the established time-frame, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to release, through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, equal numbers of detainees, prisoners and prisoners of war (27 persons on each side) before midnight on 5 November 1994, in accordance with the lists exchanged at the inter-Tajik consultations in Tehran on 12-17 September 1994. The Agreement will become null and void in the event of the failure by either party to fulfil these obligations before 6 November 1994 (the lists of the persons to be released are contained in annexes 1 and 2). The issue of releasing other supporters of the opposition and prisoners of war of the Republic of Tajikistan will be discussed during subsequent rounds of talks.

The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the settlement of the conflict through political means. In this regard, they agreed, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to hold the next round of talks in early December 1994 in Moscow, where they will continue their efforts to reach national reconciliation and to resolve all the issues listed in the agenda of the talks.

The parties expressed their deep appreciation to the Government of Pakistan for its hospitality, assistance and support in the organization and conduct of the third round of talks in Islamabad.

The parties also expressed their appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to his Special Envoy, Mr. Piriz-Ballon, as well as to the representatives of the observer States, CSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference at the talks for their help and support in conducting the inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation.

(Signed) A. DOSTIEV
Head of the delegation of
the Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of
the Tajik opposition

(Signed) R. PIRIZ-BALLON
Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations

Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/1995/720*
23 August 1995
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ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 21 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the "Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan" signed by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the Tajik opposition, A. Nuri, thanks to the good offices of your Special Envoy Ambassador Ramiro Píriz-Ballón.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rashid ALIMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace
and national accord in Tajikistan

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmonov, and the leader of the Tajik opposition, Abdullo Nuri, strongly determined to ensure observance of the highest interests of the Tajik people, affirm that dialogue and cooperation are the essential ways to achieve stable peace in the country. To this end, the Government undertakes to refrain from carrying out any acts that run counter to the provisions of the protocols being concluded and from adopting such laws or measures which may be incompatible with these protocols. The Tajik opposition, for its part, undertakes to wage a political struggle by exclusively peaceful means in accordance with the laws in force in the Republic of Tajikistan and in conformity with the conditions and guarantees laid down in a general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country.

In this connection, the parties have agreed:

1. To conduct, beginning on 18 September 1995, a continual round of negotiations aimed at concluding, at the earliest possible date, a general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in Tajikistan. The venue for the negotiations shall be agreed upon by the parties through the mediation of the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General.

2. The general agreement referred to shall consist of separate protocols on the following groups of problems:

(a) Political problems, including a consultative forum of the peoples of Tajikistan, the functioning of all political parties and political movements and the participation of their representatives in the power structures, as well as the deepening of the democratization process in Tajik society;

(b) Military problems, including reforms of the governmental power structures, and the disbandment, disarmament and reintegration of the opposition's armed formations into the Government's armed forces or Tajikistan's civilian sector, in accordance with a timetable to be agreed upon at subsequent negotiations;

(c) The voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation and reintegration of refugees, including legal, economic and social guarantees for their protection;

(d) A commission to monitor and verify compliance by the parties with the general agreement;

(e) Guarantees for implementing the general agreement, including a possible role to be played by the United Nations, States and international organizations acting as observers at inter-Tajik negotiations;

(f) A donors' conference for financing the programmes to reintegrate refugees, displaced persons and persons demobilized during the national reconciliation process, and also for providing necessary assistance in restoring the national economy, which has been destroyed by the civil war.

3. The protocols on these groups of problems shall be integral parts of the general agreement, and this document shall be incorporated into it as the first protocol.

4. Acting in the spirit of this Protocol and with a view to creating the necessary conditions for conducting further negotiations, the parties have agreed to extend the period of validity of the Agreement on a Temporary Cease-Fire and the Cessation of Other Hostilities on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the next six months until 26 February 1996.

5. The texts of this Protocol, which were signed by Mr. Rakhmonov, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, and Mr. Nuri, the leader of the Tajik opposition, were exchanged on 17 August 1995, through the intermediary of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Ramiro Píriz-Ballón.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic of
Tajikistan

(Signed) A. NURI
Leader of the Tajik opposition

Annex 5

Protocol on settlement of the military and political situation in the areas of confrontation, signed in northern Afghanistan on 11 December 1996

Protocol on settlement of the military and political situation
in the areas of confrontation, signed in northern Afghanistan
on 11 December 1996

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. Emomali S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Mr. S. Abdullo Nuri, condemn the recent marked deterioration in the military and political situation in the Karategin Valley and Tavildara areas of the Republic on the eve of their Moscow meeting, and have agreed as follows:

1. Before the signing of the Agreement in Moscow, to halt all military action starting at 00 hours on 12 December 1996;
2. The parties shall withdraw their armed units and formations from the Dushanbe-Khorog highway. Towards Tavildara, they shall establish their posts respectively on both sides of the Karanak pass (the government post in sector N1 and the opposition post in the village of Saridasht). They request the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan to assign representatives to these posts as observers. Simultaneously, the armed formations of the United Tajik Opposition shall withdraw from the centre of Tavildara to the village of Dashti-Sher. The government forces shall remain on the summit of the Khaburobot pass and in the Labi-Djar locality;
3. The parties shall remove their armed posts on the Dushanbe-Jirgatal highway. The United Tajik Opposition shall withdraw its armed formations from the regional centres of Komsomolabad, Garm, Tajikabad and Jirgatal. The Ministry of Internal Affairs battalion shall remain at Garm at the location where it was previously stationed;
4. As a confidence-building measure, the United Tajik Opposition shall release the military personnel of the government forces taken prisoner or hostage in the course of the recent events in the Tavildara, Komsomolabad, Garm, Tajikabad and Jirgatal regions. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan and the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be requested to assist in the conduct of this humanitarian action;
5. For purposes of preventing valuables, weapons, narcotic substances and other items prevented by law from being smuggled in and out, a customs control post shall be established on the border between the Jirgatal region and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and also, by the forces of the Government and the United Tajik Opposition, a joint border post;
6. The functioning of the lawful authorities in the territory of Tavildara, Komsomolabad, Garm, Tajikabad and Jirgatal regions shall be restored. In selecting and deploying troops and offices of the organs responsible for internal affairs, preference shall be given to local professionally trained

personnel. The United Tajik Opposition accepts and will not impede the normal functioning of the structures of power;

7. Monitoring of the application of the present Protocol shall be the responsibility of the Joint Commission. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan shall be requested to assist in this respect;

8. The Protocol shall enter into force at the time of its signature.

(Signed) Emomali Sharipovich RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) Said Abdullo NURI
Leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

(Signed) Gerd Dietrich MERREM
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations for Tajikistan

Annex 6

Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow on 23 December 1996

Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan,
E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition,
S. A. Nuri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow on
23 December 1996

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomali Sharipovich Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, understanding the ruinous nature of the military and political confrontation and aware of the high responsibility for the future of the Tajik people and State, having met in Moscow on 23 December 1996, have agreed as follows:

The inter-Tajik talks and the implementation of the agreements reached during them must be completed within 12 to 18 months from the date of signature of the present Agreement;

Bearing in mind that the signature of the present Agreement marks the beginning of a qualitatively new phase in the attainment of peace and national accord, they have taken the policy decision to establish for the above-mentioned transition period a Commission on National Reconciliation. A representative of the Tajik opposition will serve as Chairman of the Commission. The delegations to the talks are instructed to determine in the course of the next round, which is to begin in Tehran on 5 January 1997, the quantitative and personal composition of the Commission and its specific functions and powers;

There is a need to implement a universal amnesty and reciprocal pardoning of persons who took part in the military and political confrontation from 1992 up to the time of adoption of the Amnesty Act;

To conduct within the shortest possible time a full exchange of prisoners of war and other prisoners. They requested the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan and the International Committee of the Red Cross to extend the necessary assistance for the conduct of this humanitarian activity;

From the date of signature of the present Agreement, to proclaim a ceasefire and the cessation of other hostile activities for the entire period of the inter-Tajik talks;

For the purposes of establishing peace in the country, they have given instructions to the delegations to the talks to conclude them by 1 July 1997 through the signature of the documents provided for in the Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995.

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition express their gratitude to the representatives of the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the other observer States at the inter-Tajik talks and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. B. Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative, Mr. G. Merrem, for their hospitality and their cooperation in organizing the meeting in Moscow.

(Signed) Emomali Sharipovich RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic of
Tajikistan

(Signed) Said Abdullo NURI
Leader of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-General
in Tajikistan

Annex 7

General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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2 July 1997
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Item 20 (b) of the preliminary list*
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-second year

Letter dated 1 July 1997 from the Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (annex I), the Moscow Declaration by the President of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, G. D. Merrem, (annex II) and the Protocol of Mutual Understanding between the President of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri (annex III), all signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachments circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 20 (b) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National
Accord in Tajikistan, signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997

For the purposes of achieving peace and national accord in Tajikistan and overcoming the consequences of the civil war, inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation have been conducted from April 1994 up until the present time under the auspices of the United Nations. In the course of eight rounds of talks between delegations of the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, six meetings between the President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, and also three rounds of consultations between the delegations of the Parties, which took place in Almaty, Ashgabat, Bishkek, Islamabad, Kabul, Meshkhed (Islamic Republic of Iran), Moscow, Tehran and Khusdekh (Afghanistan), protocols were agreed and signed which, together with the present document, constitute the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (the General Agreement). It includes the following documents:

- the Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995 (annex I);¹
- the Protocol on political questions of 18 May 1997 (annex II)² and the related Agreement between the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Sharipovich Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow on 23 December 1996 (annex III);³ the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation of 23 December 1996 (annex IV);⁴ the Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation, of 21 February 1997 (annex V);⁵ the Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation, of 21 February 1997 (annex VI);⁶
- the Protocol on military issues (annex VII);⁷
- the Protocol on refugees of 13 January 1997 (annex VIII);⁸
- the Protocol on the guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, of 28 May 1997 (annex IX).⁹

The President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition have agreed that the signing of the present General Agreement marks the beginning of the phase of full and interconnected implementation of the agreements reached, which will put an end once and for all to the fratricidal conflict in Tajikistan, ensure mutual forgiveness and amnesty, return the

* These annexes, containing earlier agreements, have not been included here (see the relevant Security Council documents).

refugees to their homes, and create the conditions for the democratic development of society, the holding of free elections and the restoration of the country's economy destroyed by the many years of conflict. The highest national priorities of the country are peace and the national unity of all nationals of Tajikistan, regardless of their ethnic origin, political orientation, religion or regional affiliation.

The President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition have agreed to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide assistance and cooperation in the comprehensive implementation of the General Agreement. They have also agreed to request the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Governments of the guarantor States to provide cooperation in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the General Agreement.

The President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition have agreed to register the General Agreement with the United Nations Secretariat in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. NURI
Leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Notes

¹ S/1995/720, annex.

² S/1997/385, annex I.

³ S/1996/1070, annex I.

⁴ Ibid., annex II.

⁵ S/1997/169, annex I.

⁶ Ibid, annex II.

⁷ S/1997/209, annex II.

⁸ S/1997/56, annex III.

⁹ S/1997/410, annex.

The Moscow Declaration, signed in
Moscow on 27 June 1997

We, the President of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, G. D. Merrem, have signed today in Moscow the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. Thus, after five years of civil confrontation which became one of the most tragic pages in the centuries-long history of our country, the inter-Tajik talks on national reconciliation have been successfully concluded and the long-awaited day of the triumph of reason and hope for a peaceful future has dawned.

The President of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition express their sincere gratitude to the United Nations, under the auspices and with the mediation of which the negotiating process has been proceeding for the past three years. They express their conviction that the United Nations will provide Tajikistan with assistance and cooperation in the implementation of the agreements reached.

We are grateful to the observer countries at the inter-Tajik talks - Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - for their cooperation in moving the talks forward and their all-round assistance during the years of our people's ordeal. Agreement at the international level to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement strengthens our conviction that all the obligations it contains will be implemented in full within the agreed periods.

We greatly value the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the inter-Tajik negotiating process, and express the hope that they too will provide cooperation in the implementation of the agreements reached.

We thank the Government of the Russian Federation and President B. N. Yeltsin personally for their great contribution to the Tajik settlement and their cooperation in the successful conduct of the present meeting in Moscow.

As we enter on the new responsible phase of giving effect to the provisions of the General Agreement, we proclaim once again our desire for the speediest possible attainment of peace and national harmony in Tajikistan.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. NURI
Leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Protocol of Mutual Understanding between the President of Tajikistan,
E. S. Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition,
S. A. Nuri, signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997

The President of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, held a separate meeting in Moscow on 27 June 1997, to discuss issues associated with the strengthening of confidence-building measures between the Parties in the interests of advancing the process of national reconciliation in Tajikistan.

As a result of the meeting, the following agreements were reached:

- (1) To convene in Moscow by 7 July 1997 the first meeting of the Commission on National Reconciliation to discuss and transmit for consideration by the Parliament of Tajikistan the draft of the General Amnesty Act;
- (2) In implementation of the provisions of the Bishkek Memorandum of 18 May 1997 (S/1997/385, annex II) regarding solution of the problems of exchanging prisoners of war and imprisoned persons as an act of goodwill, to exchange by 15 July 1997 50 prisoners of war and 50 imprisoned persons, including all those detained since February 1997;
- (3) Firmly condemning terrorism and confirming that their positions regarding joint action to combat it remain unchanged, the Parties have agreed that they will not use the existing known facts and suspicions to discredit one another politically.

(Signed) E. S. RAKHMONOV
The President of Tajikistan

(Signed) S. A. NURI
The leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

In the presence of:

(Signed) G. D. MERREM
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations for Tajikistan

(Signed) E. M. PRIMAKOV
The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation

(Signed) A. A. VELAYATI
The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

Protocol on Political Questions and the Bishkek Memorandum signed at the conclusion of the inter-Tajik talks in Bishkek on 18 May 1997

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1997/385
20 May 1997
ENGLISH
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LETTER DATED 20 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF KYRGYZSTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Protocol on Political Questions and the Bishkek Memorandum signed at the conclusion of the inter-Tajik talks in Bishkek on 18 May 1997 (see annexes I and II).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Z. ESHMAMBETOVA
Permanent Representative
of the Kyrgyz Republic
to the United Nations

Protocol on Political Questions, signed in Bishkek
on 18 May 1997

In order to achieve peace and national accord in the country and in accordance with the Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan, of 17 August 1995, and the Agreement and Protocol on the Basic Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation, of 23 December 1996, which was signed by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, the delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (hereinafter referred to as "the parties"), in implementation of instructions by the President and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, have drawn up and adopted the Statute on the Commission on National Reconciliation, which is an integral part of this Protocol. The Agreement and Protocol of 23 December 1996, which were signed in Moscow, are also an essential part of it. The parties also reached agreement on the following basic political questions:

1. The President and the Commission on National Reconciliation shall adopt the reciprocal-pardon act as the first political decision to be taken during the initial days of the Commission's work. No later than one month after the adoption of the reciprocal-pardon act, the amnesty act shall be adopted.

2. The Central Electoral Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum shall be established for a transitional period with the inclusion in its membership of 25 per cent of the representatives of the United Tajik Opposition and shall conduct the elections and referendum before the beginning of the work of the new professional Parliament and the establishment of the new Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tajikistan.

3. The reform of the Government shall be carried out by incorporating representatives of the United Tajik Opposition into the structures of the executive branch, including ministries, departments, local government bodies and judicial and law-enforcement bodies on the basis of a quota. The candidates put forward shall be appointed in accordance with a proposal by the United Tajik Opposition following consultations between the President and the Chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation.

4. The bans and restrictions on activities by the political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition and the mass information media shall be lifted by the authorities of Tajikistan after the completion of the second phase of the implementation of the Protocol on Military Questions. The political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition shall function within the framework of the Constitution and the laws in force of the Republic of

Tajikistan and in accordance with the norms and guarantees set forth in the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. NURI
Leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of
the Secretary-General

Bishkek Memorandum, signed in Bishkek on 18 May 1997

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, met from 16 to 18 May 1997 in the capital of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, in order to conduct an in-depth discussion of the issues being considered within the framework of the inter-Tajik talks.

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, who are committed to the highest national interests of the Tajik people, unanimously agreed that the previous negotiation process and the agreements concluded during it constitute a solid basis for bringing the political situation in the Republic to the level of peaceful, creative development. In this context, the next serious step forward was taken in solving the problems on the agenda of the inter-Tajik talks - a protocol on political questions was signed, which includes agreements on such basic issues as the adoption of the reciprocal-pardon act and the amnesty act; the inclusion of 25 per cent of the representatives of the United Tajik Opposition as members of the Central Electoral Commission for a transitional period; reforming the Government by including Opposition representatives in it on the basis of a quota; lifting the bans on activities by the political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition and the mass information media after the completion of the second phase in the implementation of the Protocol on Military Questions. In the context of the provisions of the Protocol on Military Questions, agreement was also reached on deploying in Dushanbe a contingent of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition numbering 460 persons and also 40 persons to protect the members of the Commission on National Reconciliation.

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition agreed in subsequent talks held in Tehran and Moscow to solve the problem of exchanging prisoners of war and imprisoned persons in all its aspects and devise an appropriate mechanism for that purpose.

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition agreed that, as a result of the Bishkek meeting, the obstacles that had arisen recently in the negotiation process had been eliminated and the prerequisites for successfully continuing the talks had been met. They agreed that the Commission on National Reconciliation would begin its work immediately after the signing of the general agreement on peace and national accord in Tajikistan.

The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. Rakhmonov, the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Tajikistan, G. Merrem, expressed their profound appreciation to the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, A. Akaev, and the people

of Kyrgyzstan for their hospitality and cordiality, the outstanding organization of the talks and the active assistance provided for their fruitful completion.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. NURI
Leader of the United
Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of
the Secretary-General

Annex 9

Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation

Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation

In connection with the beginning of a qualitatively new phase in the attainment of peace and national accord in Tajikistan and in accordance with the Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, the parties have taken the decision to establish for the transition period a Commission on National Reconciliation.

The main purposes of the Commission are the attainment of national reconciliation through the implementation of the agreements reached in the course of the inter-Tajik talks, the creation of an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness, and the institution of a broad dialogue among the various political forces in the country in the interests of the restoration and strengthening of civil accord in Tajikistan.

For these purposes, the Commission is assigned the tasks of:

Devising a monitoring mechanism and monitoring compliance by the Parties with the agreements on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country jointly with the other organs established for that purpose;

Implementing measures for the safe and appropriate return of the refugees, their active involvement in the social, political and economic life of the country and the provision of assistance in reconstruction of the housing and industrial and agricultural facilities destroyed by the war;

Developing proposals for amending the legislation on the functioning of political parties and movements and the mass media.

During the transition period the President and the Commission on National Reconciliation will exercise the following functions and powers:

Submission to a nationwide referendum of proposals for amendments and additions to the existing Constitution;

Preparation and submission for approval by Parliament, and if necessary also by a nationwide referendum, of a new law on elections to Parliament and the local representative bodies;

Establishment for the transition period of a Central Commission on Elections and the Conduct of the Referendum;

Reform of the Government - inclusion of representatives of the opposition (the United Tajik Opposition) in the structures of executive authority, including ministries, departments, local authorities, judicial bodies and law enforcement agencies, in proportion to the representation of the parties in the

Commission on National Reconciliation and taking into account the regional principle;

Guidance and monitoring of the disbandment, disarmament and reintegration of the armed units of the opposition, and conduct of activities to reform the authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the agencies of the Office of the Public Prosecutor;

Monitoring of the conduct of a full exchange of prisoners of war, other prisoners and forcibly detained persons;

Adoption of a Reciprocal Pardon Act and drafting of an Amnesty Act to be adopted by Parliament and the Commission on National Reconciliation;

Development of a mechanism for converting the military-political movements into political parties;

Submission for consideration by Parliament of proposals regarding the date for the holding of elections to a new professional Parliament, to be monitored by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the participation of the observer countries at the inter-Tajik talks.

Decisions adopted by the President and the Commission regarding issues of national reconciliation shall be binding on the authorities.

The activities of the Commission on National Reconciliation shall be conducted in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission of Observers and the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan.

The Commission on National Reconciliation shall cease its activities after the convening of the new Parliament and the establishment of its authorities.

The present Protocol forms an integral part of the Agreement signed in Moscow on 23 December 1996 by E. S. Rakhmonov, S. A. Nuri and G. D. Merrem.

(Signed) E. S. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic of
Tajikistan

(Signed) S. A. NURI
Leader of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. D. MERREM
Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-General
in Tajikistan

23 December 1996

Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main
functions and powers of the Commission on
National Reconciliation

In the light of the problems which have arisen in the negotiations, and in order to ensure that the Commission on National Reconciliation starts to function as quickly as possible, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), S. A. Nuri, following their meeting in Mashhad in the Islamic Republic of Iran on 20 and 21 February 1997, have decided as follows:

1. The words "in proportion to the representation of the parties in the Commission on National Reconciliation" shall be omitted from the paragraph dealing with reform of the Government in the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation dated 23 December 1996 (page 2).

2. Thirty per cent of positions in executive structures, including ministries, departments, local authorities, and judicial bodies and law-enforcement agencies, shall be assigned to representatives of UTO, the regional principle being taken into account.

3. The phrase "development of a mechanism for converting the military-political movements into political parties" in the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation dated 23 December 1996 shall be deemed null and void from the date of signing of the Protocol on Military Issues, since this matter will be discussed under the heading of military issues.

Mashhad

21 February 1997

(Signed) E. S. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) S. A. NURI
Leader of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. D. MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation; Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation; Joint communiqué, issued at Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran, on 21 February 1997

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/1997/169*
27 February 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 FEBRUARY 1997 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of three documents signed by H.E. Mr. Imamali Rakhmonov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, and H.E. Mr. Abdollah Nuri, Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran, on 21 February 1997.

It would be appreciated if the text of the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Majid TAKHT-RAVANCHI
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri, guided by the highest interests of the peoples of Tajikistan for the purpose of achieving a stable peace and national accord in the country, have adopted a political decision to establish a Commission on National Reconciliation (hereinafter referred to as the Commission), signing an Agreement and a Protocol in Moscow on 23 December 1996.

2. The purview of the Commission includes the whole range of problems associated with national reconciliation. Its tasks shall be to implement the agreements reached in the course of the inter-Tajik talks, to promote the creation of an atmosphere of trust and mutual forgiveness and to institute a broad dialogue among the various political forces in the country with a view to restoring and strengthening civil accord in Tajikistan.

3. The Commission is a temporary body, established for the transition period. It shall cease its activity after the convening of the new Parliament and the formation of its leadership structures. The Commission on National Reconciliation shall begin its work two weeks after the signing of the Protocols on military and political issues.

II. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ITS ACTIVITY

4. The members of the Commission shall be appointed on a basis of parity by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition. The Commission shall comprise 26 members. It shall be headed by a Chairman, a representative of the United Tajik Opposition, who shall have one deputy, a representative of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (the individual membership of the Commission shall be announced 10 days before the Commission starts work). The leaders and members of the Commission shall work full-time, and may not be removed by the parties, except in circumstances which make it impossible for them to discharge their duties.

5. The Commission shall comprise four subcommissions:

- (a) On political issues;
- (b) On military issues;

(c) On refugee issues;

(d) On legal issues.

The Commission shall have the right where necessary to disband or combine subcommissions or establish new ones. Each subcommission shall elect its chairman, with two subcommissions being headed by representatives of the Government and two by representatives of the United Tajik Opposition. The Commission shall where necessary create working bodies - expert groups, a press service and others. The joint commissions established in the course of the inter-Tajik talks shall become working bodies of the Commission.

6. The quorum for meetings of the Commission shall be two thirds of its membership. Substantive issues shall be decided by consensus. Should this method prove inconclusive after 10 meetings, the procedure for deciding on the substantive issue shall thereafter be taken by the Chairman of the Commission. Procedural issues shall be decided by simple majority. Decisions adopted by the Chairman and the Commission on issues of national reconciliation shall be binding on the authorities.

III. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

7. The Commission shall have the following functions and powers:

Devising a monitoring mechanism and monitoring compliance by the parties with the agreements on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country jointly with the other organs established for that purpose;

Implementing measures for the safe and appropriate return of the refugees and their active involvement in the social, political and economic life of the country, and provision of assistance in reconstruction of the housing and industrial and agricultural facilities destroyed by the war;

Developing proposals for amending the legislation on the functioning of political parties and movements and the mass media.

During the transition period, the President and Commission on National Reconciliation will exercise the following functions and powers:

Submission to a nationwide referendum of proposals for amendments and additions to the existing Constitution;

Preparation and submission for approval by Parliament, and if necessary also by a nationwide referendum, of a new law on elections to Parliament and the local representative bodies;

Establishment for the transition period of a Central Electoral Commission on the Elections and the Conduct of the Referendum;

Reform of the Government - inclusion of representatives of the opposition (UTO) in the structures of executive authority (members of the government),

including ministries, departments, local authorities, judicial bodies and law enforcement agencies, taking the regional principle into account;

Guidance and monitoring of the disbandment, disarming and reintegration of the armed units of the opposition armed forces and conduct of activities to reform the authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the agencies of the Office of the Public Prosecutor;

Monitoring of the conduct of a full exchange of prisoners of war and other prisoners and the release of forcibly detained persons;

Adoption of a Reciprocal Pardon Act and drafting of an Amnesty Act to be adopted by the Parliament and the Commission on National Reconciliation;

Submission for consideration by Parliament of proposals regarding the date for the holding of elections to a new professional Parliament, to be monitored by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the participation of the observer countries at the inter-Tajik talks.

IV. GUARANTEES OF SECURITY

8. The members of the Commission shall possess immunity. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition guarantee the security and immunity of members of the Commission in the discharge of their duties and in their free time. The members of the Commission may not be detained, arrested or tried for actions committed prior to their appointment to the Commission or for actions in connection with the discharge of their duties. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan guarantees the inviolability of the office and residential accommodation in which the members of the Commission and their families will work and live.

In order to ensure the security of members of the Commission and their families, a special unit with a strength of up to 80 personnel comprising representatives of the Government and UTO, on a basis of parity, shall be established by the Government within the Ministry of Security.

V. LOCATION OF THE COMMISSION

9. The Commission shall be located in the capital of the Republic, Dushanbe.

VI. MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR THE WORK
OF THE COMMISSION

10. Expenses associated with the maintenance and work of the Commission (salaries, communications, transportation) shall be financed out of the State budget, special provision being made for this purpose.

VII. PROCEDURE FOR PUBLICIZING THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

11. For purposes of facilitating the process of national reconciliation and creating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding, the press service of the Commission shall conduct press conferences and briefings and issue press releases and bulletins. The mass media of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition shall regularly publicize the work of the Commission.

VIII. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OSCE IN PROMOTING
THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

12. In accordance with the Protocol signed in Moscow on 23 December 1996 by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, the work of the Commission shall be conducted in close cooperation with the United Nations Observer Mission and the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan shall render advisory assistance to the work of the Commission, and also such other assistance as may be provided for in its possible future mandates. Decisions of the Commission on issues related to the activity of the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan shall be taken in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

(Signed) E. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) S. A. NURI
Leader of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the main
functions and powers of the Commission on
National Reconciliation

In the light of the problems which have arisen in the negotiations, and in order to ensure that the Commission on National Reconciliation starts to function as quickly as possible, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), S. A. Nuri, following their meeting in Mashhad in the Islamic Republic of Iran on 20 and 21 February 1997, have decided as follows:

1. The words "in proportion to the representation of the parties in the Commission on National Reconciliation" shall be omitted from the paragraph dealing with reform of the Government in the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation dated 23 December 1996 (page 2).

2. Thirty per cent of positions in executive structures, including ministries, departments, local authorities, and judicial bodies and law-enforcement agencies, shall be assigned to representatives of UTO, the regional principle being taken into account.

3. The phrase "development of a mechanism for converting the military-political movements into political parties" in the Protocol on the main functions and powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation dated 23 December 1996 shall be deemed null and void from the date of signing of the Protocol on Military Issues, since this matter will be discussed under the heading of military issues.

Mashhad

21 February 1997

(Signed) E. S. RAKHMONOV
President of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) S. A. NURI
Leader of the United Tajik
Opposition

(Signed) G. D. MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Joint communiqué, issued at Mashhad, Islamic Republic of
Iran, on 21 February 1997

We, Imamali Rakhmonov, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, and Seyed Abdollah Nuri, Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, met in the city of Mashhad, Islamic Republic of Iran, on 20 and 21 February 1997 and discussed various issues relating to recent incidents in our country, Tajikistan. Following the signing of the Moscow Agreement and the establishment of the Commission on National Reconciliation, we came to realize that the enemies of peace and stability in Tajikistan are striving to impede its implementation. For, regrettably, there still exist individuals whose interests are served more in war than in peace. Taking the representatives of international organizations, government employees, members of the opposition and correspondents hostage as well as acts of terrorism carried out by the Rezvan Sodirov Group are instances of such reprehensible acts which have damaged the credibility of our State, nation and Government. In the light of the fact that no individual or group should violate the inalienable rights of human beings, we condemn such acts.

Today, once again we address ourselves to the world and to our own nation and hereby announce that the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition condemn the hostage taking and terrorism in whatever form it is manifested, and undertake to do our utmost to prevent the recurrence of such acts that may impede the efforts of the Commission on National Reconciliation. We hope that the Commission on National Reconciliation, along with the President and all government officials of Tajikistan, would soon restore the country to the conditions we wish for and that the independent Republic of Tajikistan would gain fame as one of the peace-loving countries. We invite all our dear compatriots, irrespective of their political views, to gain a clear understanding of our efforts in this respect and to assist us wholeheartedly.

Imamali RAKHMONOV
President
Republic of Tajikistan

Seyed Abdollah NURI
Leader
United Tajik Opposition

Annex 11

Joint statement by the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition on the outcome of the round of the inter-Tajik talks held in Moscow from 26 February to 8 March 1997 and the Protocol on Military Issues

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/1997/209
10 March 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 10 MARCH 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

As the representative of the State that arranged the meeting, I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the joint statement by the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition on the outcome of the round of the inter-Tajik talks held in Moscow from 26 February to 8 March 1997 and the Protocol on Military Issues (see annexes).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN AND THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED
TAJIK OPPOSITION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ROUND OF THE
INTER-TAJIK TALKS HELD IN MOSCOW FROM 26 FEBRUARY TO
8 MARCH 1997

The round of the inter-Tajik talks held under the auspices of the United Nations took place from 26 February to 8 March 1997. The delegation of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan was headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Talbak Nazarov, and the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition by the First Deputy Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Hodja Akbar Turajonzodah. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Gerd Dietrich Merrem, served as intermediary during the talks. Observers from the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were present at the talk.

There was a discussion of the military problems related to the reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition as well as the reform of the governmental power structures of the Republic of Tajikistan. The discussion of this group of complicated issues, which are of vital importance for promoting the process of national reconciliation, constituted an important step in enhancing mutual trust. The signing of the Protocol on Military Issues that took place was a further important step on the path towards the successful completion of the inter-Tajik political dialogue.

The sides decided to hold the next round of talks beginning on 9 April 1997 in Tehran, in accordance with the kind invitation by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The sides express their profound gratitude to the Government of the Russian Federation for its hospitality and assistance in organizing and holding the talks in Moscow. They also express their gratitude to the representatives of the observer countries and international organizations for their assistance and support during the talks.

The delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition express their sincere appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the staff of his mission for their efforts in achieving progress at the talks.

(Signed) T. NAZAROV
Head of the delegation of the
Government of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of the
United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) G. MERREM
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

PROTOCOL ON MILITARY ISSUES

In order to achieve peace and national reconciliation and form unified national armed forces and in accordance with the Protocol on the Basic Principles for Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995, the Moscow Agreements and Protocol of 23 December 1996 and the Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation of 21 February 1997, the delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) have agreed on the following fundamental military issues:

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition as well as the reform of the governmental power structures of the Republic of Tajikistan shall be carried out during the transition period by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Commission on National Reconciliation in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and in accordance with the timetable set forth in paragraphs 5, 9 and 11 of this Protocol.
2. The practical implementation of the provisions of this Protocol shall be carried out by a subcommission on military issues of the Commission on National Reconciliation and also by a joint central review board established on the basis of parity.
3. The Government and the United Tajik Opposition shall exchange the necessary information concerning the reintegration of the Opposition's military units and the reform of the power structures of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan.
4. Armed units which are not included in the information provided by the Parties shall be obliged to make themselves known to the subcommission on military issues of the Commission on National Reconciliation and provide it with the necessary information within two months from the date on which the Commission begins work. Armed units which do not cooperate in carrying out the provisions of this Protocol shall be considered illegal and shall be subject to forcible disarmament.

II. THE REINTEGRATION, DISARMAMENT AND DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMED UNITS OF THE UNITED TAJIK OPPOSITION

5. The reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition shall be carried out in stages.

(a) During the first stage, the United Tajik Opposition shall assemble its armed units in the assembly points agreed upon by the Parties in the Vanj, Garm,

Jirgatal, Komsomolabad, Kofaringan, Rushan, Tavildara and Tajikabad districts and the towns of Khorog and Magmurud in the Lenin district, where personnel shall be registered and counted and given medical examinations. At the assembly points, an inventory shall be taken of weapons, military equipment and ammunition, which shall be stored in separate, securely guarded premises. This stage shall be carried out within two months of the date on which the Commission on National Reconciliation begins its work.

(b) During this stage, the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition situated in the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, shall be transferred in stages to the territory of Tajikistan to previously determined assembly points from among those specified above through the Ishkashim and Nizhny Pyanj passage points. The armed units of the United Tajik Opposition shall cross the border without weapons or ammunition. With the consent of the Afghan authorities, the subcommission on military issues of the Commission on National Reconciliation and UNMOT shall travel to the Islamic State of Afghanistan and draw up a register of the weapons and ammunition. The collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) shall, under the supervision of UNMOT, accompany the personnel, weapons and ammunition to the assembly points, where the weapons and ammunition on the register shall be stored in separate, guarded premises. The base camps and training centres of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition situated outside Tajikistan shall be dismantled and closed simultaneously with the transfer of the units referred to to the assembly points in the territory of Tajikistan.

(c) During the second stage, no later than one month after the assembling of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition in the assembly points has been completed, those units shall be made into corresponding units of the regular armed forces of Tajikistan. They shall take the military oath and shall be given new uniforms, be assigned to the corresponding governmental power structures of Tajikistan in separate units and be subordinated to the corresponding chain of command. The relevant laws and military regulations of Tajikistan shall apply to them.

The leadership of the United Tajik Opposition shall publicly announce the disbandment of its armed units.

(d) During the third stage, the Joint Review Board shall certify the personnel of the reintegrated units of the United Tajik Opposition, determining, on an individual basis, fitness for further military service and the nature of such service and shall also make recommendations for appointments to command positions. Persons who do not express the wish to continue service or who are found unfit for service for reasons of health or found to be incompetent and persons having a criminal record prior to May 1992 shall be demobilized and returned to civilian life.

(e) The measures provided for in the first, second and third stages of the reintegration of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition into the power structures of the Government of Tajikistan shall be carried out within six months of the date on which the Commission on National Reconciliation begins its work.

(f) In the fourth stage of reintegration, the former units of the United Tajik Opposition will be completely merged with the governmental power structures. This process must be fully completed by the end of the transition period, i.e. before 1 July 1998.

6. The reintegrated units of the United Tajik Opposition shall be sent to their places of permanent assignment and quartered in separate barracks. A separate unit, the strength of which shall be determined by the President of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, shall be stationed in Dushanbe a week before the Commission on National Reconciliation begins its work.

7. Former members of the governmental power structures who were compelled to quit their posts because of the civil conflict and have expressed the wish to continue their service shall on the recommendation of the Joint Review Board be reinstated into their former or equivalent positions.

8. Persons who were members of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition and have expressed the wish to receive military training shall be afforded equally with other nationals of Tajikistan the possibility of attending the relevant training institutions.

III. REFORM OF THE POWER STRUCTURES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TAJIKISTAN

9. The reform of the power structures of the Government of Tajikistan shall take place on the basis of a re-evaluation of the personnel, including command personnel. This shall be conducted by the Joint Central Review Board within six months from the time when the Commission on National Reconciliation begins its work.

10. The Joint Central Review Board shall take its decisions on assignment to reserve status and reintegration into civilian life on the basis of three criteria: state of health, record of convictions prior to May 1992 and acknowledged professional unfitness.

11. Units formed by local authorities during the civil conflict (as civil defence forces, guard units, unsupervised formations, etc.) shall be disbanded within six months from the time when the Commission on National Reconciliation begins its work, and the formation of new units shall be halted. Persons expressing the wish to continue their service shall be integrated into the power structures of the Government of Tajikistan in accordance with the principles and procedures specified in paragraph 5 of the present Protocol. Members of these units not expressing the desire to continue their service, possessing a record of convictions prior to May 1992 or unfit for service on grounds of health shall be disarmed and reintegrated into civilian life.

IV. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

12. While the measures provided for in the present Protocol are being implemented, the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition shall

comply strictly with the provisions of the Tehran agreement and prevent any attempts to destabilize the situation in Tajikistan. At all stages of the reintegration of the armed formations of the United Tajik Opposition and the reform of the governmental power structures, joint measures shall be taken to combat crime in the country. For purposes of building mutual trust during the first, second and third stages of reintegration, constant contacts shall be established and maintained at the level of unit commanders, contacts among personnel shall be organized and special measures for joint training shall be conducted.

V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

13. In order to ensure the full and effective implementation of the provisions of the present Protocol, the Parties request the United Nations, through its Observer Mission in Tajikistan, to monitor the process of implementation of the agreements indicated above, and to provide expert advisory assistance and good offices at all the stages specified in the present Protocol.

T. Nazarov
Head of the delegation of the
Government of Tajikistan

A. Turajonzodah
Head of the delegation of the
United Tajik Opposition

G. Merrem
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Annex 12

Protocol on refugees, signed in Tehran on 13 January 1997

Protocol on refugees, signed in Tehran on 13 January 1997

With a view to overcoming the consequences of the civil war and achieving peace and national accord in the country, and in accordance with the protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995, the joint statement on the results of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks in Almaty and the appeal by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. Emomali S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Mr. S. Abdullo Nuri, to their fellow countrymen who had been forced to leave the country, adopted in Moscow on 23 December 1996, the delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"), have agreed as follows:

1. To step up mutual efforts to ensure the voluntary return, in safety and dignity, of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and to complete this process within 12 to 18 months from the date of signature of this Protocol. With a view to ensuring their safety, honour and dignity, the Parties also call upon the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide assistance in order to ensure the safety of returning refugees and displaced persons and to establish and expand their presence at places where such persons are living.

2. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan assumes the obligation to reintegrate returning refugees and displaced persons into the social and economic life of the country, which includes the provision to them of humanitarian and financial aid, assistance in finding employment and housing and the restoration of all their rights as citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan (including the return to them of dwellings and property and guaranteed uninterrupted service), and not to institute criminal proceedings against returning refugees or displaced persons for their participation in the political confrontation and the civil war, in accordance with the legislative acts in force in the Republic.

3. The Parties have decided to resume the work of the Joint Commission on problems relating to refugees and, within one month from the date of signature of this Protocol, with the assistance of UNHCR, to draw up a statute of the Commission.

4. The Parties have decided to instruct the Joint Commission, with the participation of representatives of local hukumats (executive committees) and the United Tajik Opposition for the period during which this Protocol is being implemented, to visit on a regular basis, in accordance with a separate timetable, refugee camps in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, places in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where there are concentrations of refugees and districts in the Republic of Tajikistan to which refugees and displaced persons intend to return. Similar visits shall be organized by the Joint Commission to places where displaced persons live in large numbers. The above-mentioned timetable shall be agreed by the Joint Commission within one month from the date of signature of this Protocol.

5. The Parties appeal to the Governments of the CIS States to consider issuing temporary identity documents to refugees from Tajikistan and to assist UNHCR in carrying out additional measures to ensure the safety of refugees and to defend their honour and dignity.

6. The Parties express their sincere gratitude to the United Nations, UNHCR, OSCE, donor countries and the Aga Khan Foundation for their assistance and at the same time make an urgent appeal to them and to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Development Bank, the Islamic Bank and the Aga Khan Foundation to provide additional and substantial financial and material support to refugees and displaced persons and to the Joint Commission on problems relating to refugees, and also for the purpose of rehabilitating the national economy destroyed by the war and improving the well-being of the population.

(Signed) Talbak NAZAROV
Head of the delegation
of the Government of the
Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) Khoja Akbar TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of
the United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) Gerd Dietrich MERREM
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations for Tajikistan

Annex 13

Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed by the delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and of the United Tajik Opposition in Tehran, on 28 May 1997

UNITED
NATIONS

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/410
28 May 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed by the delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and of the United Tajik Opposition in Tehran, on 28 May 1997.

It would be appreciated if this letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Protocol on the guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed at Tehran on 28 May 1997

Pursuant to the Protocol on the Main Principles of Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995 and in order to ensure full and strict implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (hereinafter referred to as the General Agreement), which includes as its integral parts:

- Protocol on the Main Principles of Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan of 17 August 1995;
- Protocol on Political Issues of 18 May 1997;
- Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomali Sharipovich Rakhmonov, and the Leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, based on the results of their meeting in Moscow on 23 December 1996;
- Protocol on the Main Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation of 23 December 1996;
- Charter of the Commission on National Reconciliation of 21 February 1997;
- Additional Protocol to the Protocol on the Main Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation of 21 February 1997;
- Protocol on Military Issues of 8 March 1997;
- Protocol on Refugee-related issues of 13 January 1997,

the delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), in consultations with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Tajikistan and representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan agreed as follows:

1. The good will of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Leadership of the United Tajik Opposition (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) and their commitment to achieving peace and national accord in the country shall be considered as the most important guarantees of strict implementation of the General Agreement. In this context, the material guarantees shall be deemed to be the agreements laid down in the above-mentioned Protocols and Agreements, in particular, to establish the Commission on National

Reconciliation with equal representation of the Parties and headed by a representative of UTO; to reserve for representatives of the Opposition (UTO) thirty (30) per cent of posts in the executive power structures and twenty-five (25) per cent of seats in the Central Electoral Commission; to carry out the reintegration, disarmament and disbanding of the UTO armed units, as well as the reform of the power structures of the Republic of Tajikistan; to ensure the voluntary return, in safety and dignity, of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes; to provide amnesty for persons who took part in the civil conflict and political confrontation, as well as to lift the bans and limitations on the activities of political parties and movements that are part of UTO and on the mass media which shall function within the framework of the Constitution and effective laws of the Republic of Tajikistan, and in accordance with the norms and guarantees established in the General Agreement.

2. The Parties agreed to request the United Nations to provide guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement through possible adoption by the Security Council of the United Nations of a new mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) which would take into account the successful completion of the inter-Tajik talks and might provide for monitoring of the implementation of the General Agreement by the Parties, provision of expertise, consultations and good offices at all stages of its implementation and, possibly, other functions.

3. At the request of the Parties, the Governments of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan agreed to act as political and moral guarantors of comprehensive and strict implementation of the General Agreement by the Parties. In this connection, it may be desirable to have periodic meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the guarantor States in Dushanbe.

4. In order to monitor the implementation of the General Agreement by the Parties and to provide them with expertise, consultations and other good offices, the guarantor States agreed to establish, for the period of the implementation of the General Agreement, a Contact Group which shall be stationed in Dushanbe and shall consist of the ambassadors of the guarantor States accredited there or of specially appointed representatives. The Contact Group shall also include the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Tajikistan, the head of the OSCE mission in Tajikistan and a representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). With the consent of the guarantor States, OSCE and OIC, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Tajikistan shall perform the functions of the Contact Group coordinator. Besides the above-mentioned monitoring and good offices, the Contact Group shall inform the Governments of the guarantor States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his Special Representative for Tajikistan and the decision-making bodies of the OSCE and OIC about any violations of the General Agreement by the Parties and shall forward recommendations on the ways of ensuring compliance. The Contact Group shall begin its work in Dushanbe concurrently with the commencement of the functioning of the Commission on National Reconciliation. Rules of procedure of the Contact Group shall be established by its members within one week following the beginning of its work.

5. OSCE, through its mission in Dushanbe, shall facilitate the implementation of the General Agreement in the areas related to the observance of human rights and the establishment of democratic political and legal institutions and processes in the Republic of Tajikistan.

The present Protocol has been executed in the Russian and English languages, both language versions being equally valid.

(Signed) T. NAZAROV	(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation	Head of the delegation
of the Republic of Tajikistan	of the United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) Gerd MERREM
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
[Signature illegible]

Representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
[Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Republic of Kazakstan [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Russian Federation [Signature illegible]

For the Government of Turkmenistan [Signature illegible]

For the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan [Signature illegible]

Annex 14

Agreement on the peaceful regulation of the situation in the Chechen Republic, (on a set of military issues), signed in Grozny on 30 July 1995

Agreement on the peaceful regulation of the situation in the Chechen Republic (on a set of military issues)

Signed in Grozny on 30 July 1995

The plenipotentiary delegations of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on the peaceful regulation of the situation in the Chechen Republic, guided by the sincere desire to cease military activities and achieve peace, rejecting the use of force or the threat of force in the resolution of disputed issues, and striving to create conditions for the conducting of free democratic elections, came to the following agreement:

a) The cessation of military activities is secured by the following measures:

- the simultaneous issuance of orders to cease fire, signed by the Commander of the Joint group of Russian troops in the Chechen Republic and the Chief of the main staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic;
- the creation of a Special Observation Commission (SNK), upon which is laid the task of the organization of the work and control over the fulfillment of the understandings and agreements on the whole set of military issues. Within the SNK, by mutual agreement, are included the military representatives of the sides, the Committee of national accord, the council of elders, the clergy, and the Territorial Administration of federal organs of executive power in the Chechen Republic. Representatives of the OSCE are invited as observers;
- a mutual exchange of maps of the location and deployment of military formations and maps of minefields, and the handing over of these maps to the SNK.

b) The freeing of forcibly detained people entails the conducting of the following mutually agreed actions:

- a mutual exchange of lists of forcibly detained persons, including the submission of lists of persons confined in filtration points in Mozdok, Grozny and other areas of their confinement;
- a mutual exchange of lists of persons disappearing without a trace;
- a mutual freeing of forcibly detained persons on the principle of "all for all" within a period of a week from the day of the signing of this Agreement;

c) Disarmament and a gradual withdrawal of troops are the most important issues of this set. Under their examination, the sides have agreed that complete disarmament entails the disarmament of illegal armed formations (i.e. formations not covered by the Law "On Defense") and individual citizens illegally possessing arms. Disarmament is conducted in three stages. The first stage involves the disarmament of illegal armed formations, subdivisions and other organizations under the command of field commanders. In the second stage, subject to disarmament are citizens belonging to militias defending villages and populated points. In the third stage, individual persons are disarmed.

The sides have also agreed that:

- disarmament is conducted under the control of the SNK;
- the mechanism of disarmament is agreed in every concrete instance with the council of elders of the village, with the participation of the SNK;
- weapons are handed over to the SNK according to the procedure established by law: by the decision of the council of elders of populated points and with the agreement of the SNK in populated points, detachments of

15 to 25 persons are formed for their defense until the formation of law-enforcement organs. Arms given over to them are registered and stored according to established procedure;

- disarmament in individual cases entails the buyback of weapons;
- during the period of disarmament, there takes place the withdrawal of military formations from the lines of contact to a distance of 2-4 kilometers in order to secure safety and the impermissibility of unprovoked incidents;
- simultaneously with disarmament, there takes place a gradual withdrawal of troops.

The sides have agreed also, that on the territory of the Chechen Republic there will be deployed the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry (MVD) of Russia in numbers up to one brigade. Among the tasks of this brigade will be included the provision of aid to law-enforcement organs in support of social order and the securing of the safety of citizens. From the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation there will be one machine-gun (motostrelkovaya) brigade. The plan of deployment for the aforementioned brigades in the following is agreed with the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic.

d) The cessation of terrorist acts and sabotage entails a declaration of the military command of the sides on the full condemnation and impermissibility of any terrorist acts and sabotage. The delegation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has condemned any terrorist acts and has obligated itself to provide the Russian side with aid in the search and detention of Shamil Basaev and his group, accused of undertaking a terrorist act in the city of Budyennovsk.

For the period of the decision of the set of military issues until the holding of elections there are created the following structures with the exclusive right of control over the implementation of the Agreement that has been reached:

- The plenipotentiary of the Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic;
- A Special Observation Commission, created on an agreed basis with the participation of the OSCE;

The plenipotentiary of the Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, and also the SNK, the co-presidents of which are the Commander of the Unified group of Russian troops in the Chechen Republic and the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic A. Maskhadov, act as the guarantors of the implementation of the present Agreement.

The sides have agreed on the continuation of negotiations on the political and economic sets of issues.

The agreement goes into force from the moment of its signing.

From the government of the Russian Federation:

Mikhailov, V.A.
Volsky, A.N.
Krasnov, M.A.
Kulikov, A.S.
Semenov, I.I.

From the government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria:

Imaev, U.K.
Zakaev, A.Kh.
Idigov, A.D.
Maskhadov, A.A.
Yarikhanov, Kh.A.

Signed in the presence of the OSCE Support Group in the Chechen Republic:

S. Mesarosh
O.M. Pelen

Annex 15

Agreement on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic

Agreement: On the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen

Republic, in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14 December 1995

The plenipotentiary representatives of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic:

- guaranteeing the observance of basic rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, independent of nationality, religion, place of residence and other difference;
- proceeding from the generally recognized right of peoples to self-determination, principles of equal rights, voluntarism and freedom of expression, guaranteeing their observance;
- expressing the striving of peoples to restoration of mutual understanding, trusts, and the preservation and development of their friendly ties;
- guaranteeing the preservation of territorial integrity and the unity of the economic space;
- rejecting the use of force or the threat of force in the resolution of disputed issues;
- guided by the political securing of civil peace, international concord and the security of peoples;
- proceeding from the right of the Chechen Republic to participate in international and foreign economic ties;
- have agreed the following:
- to recognize the necessity of establishing a special status for the Chechen Republic as part of the Russian Federation, the adoption by the Chechen Republic of a Constitution and legislation.

The organs of state power of the Chechen Republic independently realize the authority of state power, including:

- they establish a system of organs of state power of the Chechen Republic, a regime for their organization and activity;
- they form organs of state power of the Chechen Republic;
- they form the republican budget, establish and collect republican taxes;
- they decide issues of the ownership, use and distribution of natural resources, and also state enterprises, organizations and other movable and immovable state property located on the territory of the Chechen Republic, with the exception of objects of federal ownership;
- they decide issues of advocacy and notary publics, family, residential and labor relations;
- they establish the particulars of the organization of education considering the national and historical traditions of the peoples residing on the territory of the Chechen Republic;
- they establish and support relations with other subjects of the Russian Federation, and conclude with them treaties and agreements;
- they realize international and foreign economic ties, and participate in the activity of the corresponding international organizations.

The organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic jointly realize:

- the defense of the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, and the rights of national minorities;
- the defense of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
- coordination of the international and foreign economic ties of the Chechen Republic;
- formation of comprehensive funds for the financing of joint programs, the liquidation of the consequences of extreme disasters and catastrophes;
- the organization of the mobilized preparation of the economy;

- the coordination of the administration of general objects of energy, rail, pipeline, and air transport, ties and the information system;
- the conducting of a common policy in the sphere of employment of the population, migration processes, social security, issues of health preservation, education, science, culture, physical culture and sport, and preparation of national cadres;
- coordination of activity in the battle against crime and the securing of public safety.

The government of the Russian Federation:

- will continue the allocation to the Government of the Chechen Republic financial and material-technical resources for the compensation of the population of the Republic for losses, the restoration of housing, the economy, and objects of the social sphere;
- will confirm a special program of development for the Chechen Republic, including measures to accelerate the development of its mountain districts, to create the necessary jobs for securing employment of the population able to work;
- will establish necessary customs and tax privileges;
- will provide aid to organs of state power of the Chechen Republic for the restoration of museums, architectural landmarks, higher and secondary educational institutions, and for the preparation of national cadres in the scientific and educational institutions of the Russian Federation;
- will create the necessary conditions and provide for the opening of regular international flights from Grozny.

The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic will take measures to secure conditions for the return and equipping of refugees, the creation of centers of medical rehabilitation of the population of the Chechen Republic, of those suffering as a result of military activities, and also the establishment of a special procedure for undertaking alternative civil service on the territory of the Chechen Republic and a special regime of undertaking military service will be secured, including in military construction units, created for the restoration of the economy and the social sphere of the republic.

The delimitation of powers between federal organs of executive power and organs of executive power of the Chechen Republic on issues of their joint sphere of competence can be realized by separate treaties and agreements.

The command of the joint armed forces, executing orders on the disarmament of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic, coordinates its activity with the Government of the Chechen Republic.

Decisions of the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic, adopted within the bounds of its competency, are obligatory for fulfillment on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

Organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the Chechen Republic are obligated to strive for a widening of the zones of peace on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic have plenipotentiary representation, respectively, in Grozny and Moscow.

The Chechen Republic, with the goal of developing cultural, trade and economic ties, can have its own representations in other states.

The present Agreement goes into force from the moment it is signed and is in effect until the conclusion of a Treaty on delimitation of powers between the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic.

Concluded in Moscow, 3 December 1995.

From the Government of the Russian Federation
V.S. Chemomyrdin

From the Government of the Chechen Republic
D.G. Zavgaev

Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic
O.I. Lobov

Annex 16

Agreement on a Ceasefire, the Cessation of Military Activities, and on Measures for a Settlement of the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Chechen Republic, Moscow, 27 May 1996

Agreement on a Ceasefire, the Cessation of Military Activities, and on Measures for a Settlement of the Armed Conflict on the Territory of the Chechen Republic

Moscow, 27 May 1996

We, the Undersigned, vested with appropriate plenipotentiary powers, renouncing the use of force or the threat of force in the resolution of any and all points of contention, have agreed:

1. To assure a full cease-fire and cessation of military activities beginning on 1 June 1996 at 00 hours.
2. Within the course of two weeks from the moment of signature of the present Agreement of the Parties, to provide for the liberation of all persons being retained by force.
3. The commissions for negotiations continue their work.

Established in Moscow on 27 May 1996 in two original copies.

V. Chernomyrdin
Z. Yandarbiev

Established in the presence of the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin
Under the mediation of the OSCE Mission

Protocol of the Meeting of the Working Groups, formed under the Negotiations Commissions, to locate Missing Persons and to Free Forcibly Detained Persons, Nazran, 10 June 1996

Protocol of the Meeting of the Working Groups, Formed under the Negotiations Commissions, to locate Missing Persons and to Free Forcibly Detained Persons

Nazran, 10 June 1996

The working groups, formed under the Negotiations Commissions, to locate missing persons and to free forcibly detained persons, consisting of the following persons:

For the Negotiations Commission formed by order of the Government of the Russian Federation – N. Bezborodov, Working Group Head,

For the Negotiations Commission formed by order of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya* – K. Makhashev, Working Group Head,

In the presence of Mr. Z. Kochoika,

For the purpose of implementing paragraph 2 of the Agreement signed by V.S. Chernomyrdin and Z. Yandarbiev on 27 May 1996 in Moscow,

Have adopted the following decision:

1. By 11 June 1996 a joint working group (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Working Group) shall be established to locate missing persons and to free forcibly detained persons.
2. Six persons from each side shall make up the Joint Working Group.
3. The Joint Working Group shall be quartered in Grozny in specially assigned premises.
4. The Negotiations Commissions shall provide for the material and logistic requirements of the Joint Working Group (transport, office equipment and communications), in addition to ensuring that the members of the Joint Working Group are able to travel around the territory of the Chechen Republic on passes signed by the Commander of the Provisional United Forces, B. Tikhomirov, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya, A. Maskhadov.
5. The competence of the Joint Working Group shall extend to the location of persons who have been missing since 11 December 1994 and to the release of forcibly detained persons seized in the course of the armed conflict.
6. By 11 June 1996 the working groups shall exchange lists of forcibly detained persons.
7. The representatives of the Joint Working Group shall be guaranteed the possibility of visiting places where forcibly detained persons are confined.

8. Questions pertaining to visits to sensitive facilities of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and to other places of confinement of forcibly detained persons shall be resolved in accordance with the established procedure.
9. Arrangements shall be made for the issuance of orders by both sides calling for the cessation of the practice of detaining persons in a manner not provided for by law, including detentions based on lists and other documents of insufficient legal force. At the same time that questions connected with the release of forcibly detained persons are being resolved, screening centres and such other places of confinement of detained persons as are not provided for under the law shall be shut down.
10. Both sides recognize that they regard instances of the abduction of persons with a view to their subsequent sale or use in exchanges as a criminal offense, and they are prepared to prosecute any persons committing such offenses.
11. The prosecution of officials of either side for matters not connected with criminal offenses shall cease.
12. A joint effort shall be undertaken to locate burial sites, to exhume the remains of the dead, and to hand over such remains to their relatives.
13. On 10 June 1996 an exchange shall be conducted involving 27 military personnel of the Interior Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, seized on 31 May 1996, and an equal number of persons detained by the Federal side, on the basis of lists that have been turned over.

This Protocol has been drawn up in three authentic copies.

Working Group Head

N. Bezborodov

Working Group Head

K. Makhashev

With the mediation of the OSCE Mission

T. Guldemann

* The Negotiations Commission formed by order of the Government of the Russian Federation states that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya is not recognized under the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Source: Transitional Justice Peace Agreements Database (University of Ulster, Transitional Justice Institute, Incore)

Agreement on Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya

Agreement “On Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya”

signed by Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov on August 22, 1996.

1. 1. To stop fire and combat operations as of 1200 on 23 August 1996 and to begin an exchange, without any preconditions and based on the “all for all” principle, of prisoners, refugees and bodies of the dead.
2. 1.2. In the event of violation of provisions of this point, the sides can take joint measures to cut short such a violation. In other cases, they are obliged to act in conformity with the requirements of the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.
3. 2. To carry into effect a set of mutually specified and agreed measures on the simultaneous withdrawal of troops to specified areas.
4. 3. The troops shall be withdrawn together with all the arms and ammunition, with the mutual provision of information on the number and strength and arms of formations being withdrawn.
5. 4. To carry out the withdrawal of all warring sides from the city of Grozny and to concurrently set up joint military commandant’s offices organized on the basis of the federal troops commandant offices.
6. 5. The sides shall refrain from any actions or statements hampering implementation of this agreement.
7. 6. The control over the observance of all the points in this agreement shall be carried out by an observer commission in correspondence with instructions of the Russian Federation Security Council secretary.
8. 7. The withdrawal of federal troops from the territory of the Chechen Republic and the unblocking of built-up areas shall be implemented in correspondence with the Nazran agreement.

Annex 19

Russian-Chechen truce agreement

Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement

We, the undersigned, taking into account the progress achieved towards the ending of the warfare, endeavoring to create a mutually acceptable basis for the political solution of the armed conflict, recognizing that it is prohibited to use armed forces or to threaten the use of force as a means towards the resolution of issues under dispute, embarking upon the universally recognized right of nations to self-determination, upon the principles of equality, freedom of choice, free expression of will, strengthening of international accord and security of all nations, exercising the will towards the defense of human and civil rights regardless of his or her nationality, religious affiliation, place of residence and other differences, towards the ending of acts of violence in the relations of political adversaries, while at the same time embarking upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1949 and upon the International Pact on Civil and political Rights of 1966, have jointly worked out the principles for Determining the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic according to which the further peace process shall be developed:

Principles for Determining the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic

1. The treaty regulating the basis fundamentals of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, to be governed by the universally accepted principles and norms of the international law, shall have been reached prior to 31 December, 2001.
2. No later than on 1 October, 1996, a Joint Commission shall have been formed, constituted by the representatives of the state authorities of the Russian Federation and of the Chechen Republic, the duties of which shall be as follows:
 - to assume control over the implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation issued on 25 June, 1996, under No. 985, and to prepare proposals concerning the completion of the withdrawal of the armed forces;
 - to initiate joint undertakings directed towards the combat of crime, terrorism and nationalist and religious prejudices, and to control their implementation;
 - to prepare proposals for the reconstruction of currency, fiscal and budgetary relations;
 - to prepare for the enactment by the Government of the Russian Federation of programmes for the rebuilding of the socio-economic infrastructure of the Chechen Republic
 - to control the agreed forms of cooperation of the state authorities and other relevant organizations concerning the supply and distribution of food and medical aid among the population.
3. The legal system of the Chechen Republic is based upon the respect for human and civil rights, upon the right of nations towards the self-determination, upon the principles of equal rights of nations, of the priority of civil accord, international peace and security for citizens residing on the territory of the Chechen Republic regardless of their nationality, religious identity and other differences.
4. The Joint Commission shall end its work upon the mutual agreement of the parties.

Signed by: A. Lebed, A. Maskhadov, S. Kharlamov, S-Kh. Abumuslimov

Date of signing: 25.08.1996 Place of signing: Khasavyurt, Republic of Dagestan

In the presence of the Head of the Special Task Group of the OSCE for Chechnya, Mr. T. Guldemann

**Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations,
Khasavyourt, Dagestan, 31 August 1996**

**Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual
Relations**

Khasavyourt, Dagestan, 31 August 1996

We, the undersigned,

Taking into account the progress achieved in implementing the agreement on the cessation of military activities,

Striving to create mutually acceptable preconditions for a political resolution of the armed conflict,

Recognising the inadmissibility of using armed force or threatening its usage in the resolution of all issues,

Proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality, voluntary and free expression of will, strengthening interethnic accord and the security of peoples,

Expressing the will to protect unconditionally human rights and freedoms and those of the citizen, irrespective of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, place of residence or any other distinctions, and to prevent acts of violence against political opponents, in doing so proceeding from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Have jointly developed Principles concerning mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, on the basis of which the future negotiation process will be conducted.

(Signed)

A. Lebed A. Maskhadov
B. Khartamov S. Abumuslimov

31 August 1996

In the presence of the Head of the OSCE Assistance Group of the Chechen Republic,

(signed)

T. Guldumann

Principles for Determining the Basis for Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic

1. An Agreement on the basis for mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, to be determined in accordance with universally recognised principles and norms of international law, should be achieved by 31 December 2001.
2. A Joint Commission shall be established by 1 October 1996, composed of representatives of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, the tasks of which shall be:
 - To monitor the implementation of Decree No. 985 of the President of the Russian Federation of 25 June 1995 and to prepare proposals concerning the completion of the withdrawal of troops;
 - To prepare and monitor the fulfilment of agreed measures against crime, terrorism and manifestations of ethnic and religious enmity;
 - To prepare proposals for the restoration of currency, financial and budgetary interrelations;
 - To prepare and submit to the Government of the Russian Federation programmes for the restoration of the socio-economic structure of the Chechen Republic;
 - To monitor the coordinated interaction of the organs of state power and other interested parties in the provision of food and medicines for the population.
3. Legislation of the Chechen Republic shall be based on the observance of human and civil rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality among nationalities, the guaranteeing of civil peace, interethnic accord and the security of those residing on the territory of the Chechen Republic, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religious beliefs or other distinctions.
4. The Joint Commission shall complete its work by mutual agreement

Source: Transitional Justice Peace Agreements Database (University of Ulster, Transitional Justice Institute, Incore)

Agreement on the principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic

Text of Russian-Chechen Agreement

ITAR-TASS World Service, November 23, 1996

By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov

FBIS-SOV-96-228

Daily Report

23 Nov 1996

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 23 Nov (ITAR-TASS) -- An agreement on the principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic was signed today by delegations from both sides led by Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Aslan Maskhadov, Prime Minister of the coalition government of Chechnya. The text of the agreement follows:

On the basis of the necessity of reinforcing the peace process, for the purposes of determining the principles of cooperation until the elections of a new parliament and president of the Chechen Republic, the parties have agreed the following:

1. In the economic sector:

1.1. An agreement is to be concluded on the principles of special economic mutual relations between the parties after the election of a new president and parliament of the Chechen Republic;

1.2. In the sphere of economic mutual relations between the parties in the period up to the conclusion of the above mentioned agreement the legislation of the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation is to be employed;

1.3. The unimpeded movement of citizens, officials, and freight is to be guaranteed, for the purpose of which: The activity of the civil airport in the city of Groznyy, as well as railway and road traffic, are to be resumed by 1 December 1996; - a regulation is to be jointly drawn up and approved by 1 December 1996 on procedures for the customs handling of goods travelling in the Chechen Republic and into the Chchen Republic; -an agreement is to be concluded by 1 December 1996 on the issues of the production, processing, and transportation of oil, refined oil products, and gas on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The Chechen side guarantees the safety of pipeline transportation and of petroleum and gas extraction and processing facilities;

1.4 Social and humanitarian issues will be addressed as a matter of immediacy, for which purpose:

- Measures will be implemented to restore life-supporting facilities in populated areas of the Chechen Republic, after the payment of pensions and wages has been provided for;
- Measures will be implemented to pay compensation to persons who suffered during combat;

2. It will be established that ministries and departments of the Russian Federation and ministries and departments of the Chechen Republic on the territory of the Chechen Republic will be guided by this agreement. [sentence as heard] Separate agreements may be concluded on specific issues arising from the present agreement.

3. It will be recognized as necessary to agree actions in the defense sector, in which respect the parties take upon themselves the obligation not to undertake any actions that threaten their security.

4. The present agreement will be valid until the election of a new parliament and president of the Chechen Republic.

Signed by Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Aslan Maskhadov, Prime Minster of the Coalition Government of Chechnya.

Annex 22

Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, Moscow, 12 May 1997

Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic Ichkeria

Moscow, 12 May 1997

The esteemed parties to the agreement, desiring to end their centuries-long antagonism and striving to establish firm, equal and mutually beneficial relations, hereby agree:

1. To reject forever the use of force or threat of force in resolving all matters of dispute.
2. To develop their relations on generally recognised principles and norms of international law. In doing so, the sides shall interact on the basis of specific concrete agreements.
3. This treaty shall serve as the basis for concluding further agreements and accords on the full range of relations.
4. This treaty is written on two copies and both have equal legal power.
5. This treaty is active from the day of signing.

(signed)
President of the Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin

President of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria
A. Maskhadov

Kazbegi Protocol

23 March 1991 Kazbegi protocol text from Nezavisimaya Gazeta

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
26 March 1991
No. 37

Minutes of the meeting and negotiations of the Chairman of the SS (Supreme Soviet) of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and the Chairman of the SS (Supreme Soviet) of Georgia

1. During April 1991, a draft agreement on interstate relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of Georgia shall be ready for signing. For this, a task force shall be formed. As a result of coordination of joint efforts to stabilize the situation in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, the Parties agreed on the following:
2. Within 10 days, the MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) of the RSFSR and the MIA of the Republic of Georgia shall establish a joint commission to study the situation in the specified region and objectively assess the situation by 20 April 1991.
3. By 10 April, the MIA of the RSFSR and the MIA of the Republic of Georgia shall establish a joint police detachment to disarm all illegal groups on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region. The detachment shall be tasked with public order protection in this area to stabilize the situation.
4. To submit a proposal to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR to redeploy SA (Soviet Army) units from the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region.
5. The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, the Republic of Georgia and the North Ossetian SSR shall immediately begin work on creating conditions for the return of refugees to their places of permanent residence and ensure the restoration of legitimate local authorities.
6. The governments of the Republic of Georgia, RSFSR and the North Ossetian SSR shall establish a Commission for the assessment of damage suffered by refugees and provide additional logistical and financial aid to compensate for the damage.
7. Peace restoration in the region shall be deemed the final objective of the commissions and the detachment being established.
8. A permanent group shall be established to monitor the implementation of provisions of these minutes and to address emerging issues.

Chairman of the SS of the RSFSR
B. Yeltsin.

Chairman of the SS of the Republic of Georgia
Z. Gamsakhurdia.

Urban settlement of Kazbegi
Republic of Georgia

23/03/91

(The text is provided by the press centre of the SS of Georgia)

Annex 24

Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict, Sochi, 24 June 1992

Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict

Sochi, 24 June 1992

The Republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation,

Striving for immediate cessation of bloodshed and achieving comprehensive settlement of the conflict between Ossetians and Georgians,

Being guided by the desire to witness speedy restoration of peace and stability in the region,

Reaffirming commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act,

Acting in the spirit of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as rights of ethnic minorities,

Taking into account the agreement reached in Kazbegi on 10 June 1992,

Have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

1. From the very moment of signing this agreement, the opposing parties commit themselves to undertake all necessary measures aimed at termination of hostilities and achievement of comprehensive cease-fire by 28 June 1992.

2. From the moment of termination of hostilities, on 28 June 1992 the opposing parties shall withdraw their armed formation with a view of creation of corridor adjacent to the line of juxtaposition. The withdrawal of armed formations shall be completed within three days. Passage through the line of juxtaposition, corridor and its width shall be determined by the joint group of observers.

Article 2

In order to secure demilitarization of the conflict region and to rule out the possibility of involvement of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in conflict, the Russian Federation shall withdraw the Tskhinvali-district deployed 37th engineer-sapper Regiment and 292 separate fighting helicopter regiment within 20 days from the moment of cease-fire and separation of opposing parties.

Article 3

1. In order to exercise control over the implementation of cease-fire, withdrawal of armed formations, disband of forces of self-defense and to maintain the regime of security in the region, a mixed Control Commission composed of representatives of opposing parties shall be set up and

this Commission shall carry out its functions in close cooperation with the joint group of military observers created in accordance with the agreements reached in Kazbegi.

2. Every Party participating in the work of Commission shall appoint its own representatives. Headquarters of the Control Commission shall be located in the town of Tskhinvali.

3. Until the aforementioned tasks are implemented, joint forces on coordination of activities aimed at establishment of peace and maintenance of order shall be created within the Control Commission. In addition, special mixed groups of observers, attached to the Control Commission, shall be deployed along the security perimeter.

4. The Control Commission and attached to it forces shall start immediate implementation of those tasks assigned by the present agreement.

5. In case of violation of provisions of this Agreement, the Control Commission shall carry out investigation of relevant circumstances and undertake urgent measures aimed at restoration of peace and order and non-admission of similar violations in the future.

6. Financial provision for activities of the Control Commission and forces attached to it shall be provided by the Parties on equal footing.

Article 4

The Parties shall start immediately negotiations on economic restoration of the regions located in the conflict zone and creation of proper conditions for return of refugees.

The Parties deem it inadmissible to apply economic sanctions and blockade, and any other impediments to free movement of commodities, services and people and commit themselves to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected population.

Article 5

The Parties shall seek objective and balanced mass media coverage of the settlement process. To this end, a multilateral press-center shall be established within the Control Commission.

Article 6

This Agreement shall come into force immediately after it is signed.

Sochi, 24 June 1992, in a set of three in Georgian, Russian and Ossetian languages, and each of these three copies are of equal validity.

On behalf of the Republic of Georgia **E. A. Shevardnadze**

On behalf of the Russian Federation **B. N. Yeltsin**

Source: Regional Research Center – Georgia (Website)

Annex 25

Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence between the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, Moscow, 16 May 1996

Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence between the Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict

Moscow, 16 May 1996

The representatives of the Georgian and South Ossetian sides through the mediation of the representatives of the Russian Federation and with participation of the representatives of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held negotiations about the further advance towards full scale political settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and, having the will to remove the consequences of the conflict and restore between them relations of peace and mutual respect;

being convinced in the necessity to put an end to the hard heritage of the last years and stand on the way leading to peace, confidence and agreement;

confirming the adeptness to the regulations of the UNO Charter, basic principles and decisions of OSCE, to internationally recognized norms of international law;

guiding by the principle of territorial integrity of states and right of people for self-determination;

successfully stating that on the basis of the Agreement on the principles of settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and engaging Joint Peacekeeping forces in July 1992 military activities in the conflict zone were ceased;

stating about the readiness to follow the way of conflict resolution in the spirit of mutual respect and only through politic methods;

finding it necessary to make steps which could lead to full scale political settlement of the conflict,

Agreed on the following:

1. The sides in the conflict refuse from using or the threat of using force, from putting political, economic and other forms of pressure to each other.
2. The sides will take all the necessary measures on preventing and suppressing any unlawful activities, infringing the rights of people on their nationality belonging;
3. The sides will carry out real measures to provide worthy settlement of the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, who suffered in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

4. The sides agree that those who took part in the armed conflict but who didn't commit military crimes and also crimes against civil people are not subjected to criminal pursuit. In the near future the sides will create necessary conditions for the work of law-enforcement bodies on the investigation of the mentioned crimes and call to account guilty persons.

5. The sides successfully stress the positive character of practicing regular meetings of the representatives of law-enforcement bodies and will comprehensively assist to their work on recovery of criminal situation in the conflict zone.

6. On the way of full scale settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict the zone will be de-militarized step-by-step on the basis of special agreements. Peacekeeping forces may present in the demilitarized zone.

7. The sides think it expedient to elaborate in frames of the Joint Control Commission a plan of stage-by-stage cutting down of the number of checkpoints of the Peacekeeping forces, lessening their concentration in places of permanent dislocation, organizing their service with consideration of providing the safety of people.

8. The sides express readiness jointly and with assistance of International organizations including NGOs to hold meetings of representatives of the Georgian and Ossetian political and social organizations, scientists with participation of the representatives of the Russian Federation and other countries, "round tables" of the representatives of creative intelligence, also to organize meetings of journalists so as to exchange objective information. The side will take measures for safe movement and staying of the representatives of Mass Media.

9. The side will continue negotiations with the aim to achieve full scale political settlement.

10. The sides successfully stress the readiness of the Russian Federation to be a guarantor, of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania to participate in the implementation of the agreements, achieved in the existing Memorandum and of the OSCE to be an assistant to all this.

11. The given Memorandum comes into force since the moment of its signing.

For the Georgian side :

For the South Ossetian side:

Through the meditation of:

The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (the Russian Federation)

The Russian Federation:

Annex 26

Statement following the meeting of E. D.Kokoity and Z.V. Zhvania, November 2004

Statement Following The Meeting Of E. D. Kokoity And Z. V. Zhvania

2356-06-112004

On 5 November 2004, a meeting of E. D. Kokoity and Z. V. Zhvania took place in Sochi. At the meeting, the Russian Federation was represented by the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation V. V. Loshchinin. The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania was represented by the State Advisor to the President of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania T. E. Kusov. Co-chairs of the Mixed Control Commission (MCC) and the head of OSCE mission in Georgia also participated in the meeting. A representative of the European Commission was invited to discuss economic issues.

During the meeting, which was held constructively, a thorough exchange of views took place on the challenges of resolving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict including further de-escalation of the critical situation, the situation stabilization in the conflict zone, and confidence-building measures. The parties agreed that confidence-building measures, the conflict zone demilitarization, security guarantees, and the implementation of economic programmes would add momentum to further constructive negotiations aiming at a comprehensive political resolution of the conflict.

The meeting participants noted their worries and concerns over the fact that the peaceful conflict resolution process had been dangerously compromised as a result of the recent armed clashes in South Ossetia. They expressed their deep regret over the casualties including those among civilians.

The parties drew attention to the critical role of negotiations within MCC, direct contacts between representatives of the parties, and the actions of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF) aimed at the cessation of the armed confrontation.

The meeting participants reaffirmed their commitment to solely peaceful methods of stabilising relations between the conflicting parties and condemned any form of violence, including discrimination on ethnic grounds, as a means to achieve political goals. The parties also declared their commitment to the fundamental documents signed to resolve the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, which are also a solid basis for negotiations on a comprehensive political resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

In this context, they specifically agreed on the following:

- to strictly comply with the reached agreements on the ceasefire;
- for a phased demilitarization of the conflict zone, as the first step – to fully implement the decisions of the MCC and complete the withdrawal from the conflict zone of all remaining armed groups, except for the JPF and law enforcement agencies, by 20 November of this year;
- by the same date, to submit agreements on the strength of militia / police units required for law enforcement specifying their locations for consideration to the MCC;
- in the future, not to deploy armed groups and checkpoints in the conflict zone without coordinating it with the MCC;
- to organise interaction between security agencies of the parties and take steps to resume the work of the Joint Coordination Center (JCC);
- to guarantee uninterrupted and safe transit along the Transcaucasian Highway and other roads connecting communities in the conflict zone to ensure unhindered movement of people and goods;

- the parties expressed intention to expand contacts at various levels including at a high political level, as well as meetings between parliamentarians and intellectuals;
- at one of the forthcoming MCC meetings, to consider specific economic projects, the implementation of which is of mutual interest, and submit agreed proposals, including for consideration by the OSCE and the EU;
- to hold an extraordinary MCC meeting to monitor the progress of the implementation of the made decisions within ten days.

The meeting participants appreciated the contribution the OSCE is making to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and the EU – to the economic rehabilitation of the region.

The parties noted the importance of the mediating role of the Russian Federation in facilitating an early peaceful resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

Executed in Sochi on 5 November 2004

Annex 27

Six Point Agreement (applicable to both South Ossetian and Abkhazian contexts), 12 August 2008

Six Point Agreement, 12 August 2008

Protocol of Agreement

1. Do not resort to force.
2. Definitively cease hostilities.
3. Provide free access for humanitarian aid.
4. Georgian military forces shall return to their normal quarters.
5. Russian military forces shall return to their positions prior to the start of hostilities. While awaiting international protection, Russian security forces shall implement additional security measures.
6. International discussions shall begin on security and stability measures to be taken in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

For the European Union
The French President Nicolas Sarkozy

For the Republic of Georgia
The Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili

Implementation of the plan 12 August 2008, Communiqué issued by the presidency of the Republic

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN OF 12 AUGUST 2008 COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

Paris, 9 September 2008

Reaffirmation of the commitment of all the parties to implement in full all the provisions of the Medvedev-Sarkozy six-point plan of 12 August 2008.

1. Withdrawal of forces

- Withdrawal of all Russian peace-keeping forces from the five observation posts on the line between Poti and Senaki, within a maximum of seven days, taking into account the signing on 8 September of legally binding documents guaranteeing the non-use of force against Abkhazia.
- Complete withdrawal of the Russian peace-keeping forces from the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This withdrawal will take place within 10 days after the deployment in these areas of the international mechanisms, including at least 200 European Union observers, which must take place no later than 1 October 2008, in view of the existence of legally binding documents guaranteeing the non-use of force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- Completion of the return of the Georgian armed forces to their bases by 1 October 2008.

2. International observation mechanisms

- The UNOMIG international observers will continue to carry out their mandate in their areas of responsibility with the same number of personnel and deployment blueprint as at 7 August 2008, subject to future adjustments decided by the UN Security Council.
- The OSCE international observers will continue to carry out their mandate in their areas of responsibility with the same number of personnel and deployment blueprint as at 7 August 2008, subject to future adjustments decided by the OSCE Permanent Council.
- The preparations will be speeded up to allow the deployment of additional observers in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in sufficient numbers to replace the Russian peacekeeping forces by 1 October 2008, including at least 200 European Union observers.

- The European Union as guarantor of the principle of non-use of force is actively preparing the deployment of an observation mission to complement the existing observation mechanisms.

3. International discussions

- The international discussions provided for in point six of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan of 12 August 2008 will begin on 15 October 2008 in Geneva. The preparatory talks will begin in September.

These will focus, inter alia, on:

- the arrangements to ensure security and stability in the region;
- the issue of refugees and displaced persons on the basis of the internationally recognised principles and post-conflict settlement practice;
- any other subject, by mutual agreement of the parties.

Source: French Embassy in Moscow (Official Website)

Protocol of Consultations on the Regulation of the Conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, Sochi, 29 August 1992

Protocol of Consultations on the Regulation of the Conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia

Sochi, 29 August 1992

Due to the developments in Abkhazia the concern and alarm are constantly raising. Every day of military confrontation brings new suffering to the civilians and serious damage to the economy.

The situation has become complicated in the south of Russia. The republics of region, adjacent to the conflict zone are concerned at the established situation.

Participants of the consultations:

from the Georgian Side - T. Kitovani

from the Russian Side - S. Shoigu, A. Vorobev, A. Safronov, V. Lisenko, A. Klevtsov, B. Pastukhov

from the Abkhaz Side - V. Ardzinba, K. Ozgan

stated about their position on the ways aimed at overcoming the existing situation.

The sides agreed upon the following:

- 1) a firm commitment to stop bloodshed and secure conflict regulation through peaceful means;
- 2) suspension of military confrontation and movement of armed formations from 31 August of 1992;
- 3) establishment of permanent communication between the sides in order to exchange the information and respond to the changes of situation;
- 4) securing of regular and safe functioning of air and maritime transport; fulfillment of reconciled time-table of transportation of civil population in the conflict zone and on adjacent territories.

The sides commit themselves to take responsibility on prevention of possible incidents and provocations posing a threat to the people and delivery of cargo.

- 5) The conflicting sides expeditiously will hand over the wounded persons, hostages, war prisoners and dead bodies without any prior conditions.
- 6) The Russian Federation will render humanitarian assistance to the population affected by the conflict. The Red Cross Organizations of three Sides will determine the procedure and distribution of humanitarian aid.

The representatives of Russian federation reaffirmed their readiness to carry out the role of mediator in the conflict settlement.

The participants of consultations consider that forthcoming meeting in Moscow on 3 September 1992 is an event of special importance. Immediate cease-fire, normalization of the situation, unconditional protection of rights and freedoms of individuals will establish necessary preconditions for successful meeting.

Signed by: **T. Kitovani, S. Shoigu, V. Ardzinba**

Source: As translated by The Union - The Regionalism Research Center from the Chronicle of the Undeclared War, Part I, 14 August-14 September, Moscow, 1992, authors: G. Amkuab, T. Illarionova, p. 167-168

Moscow Agreement

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24523

8 September 1992

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the final document of the meeting in Moscow between the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. B. N. Yeltsin, and the President of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. E. A. Shevardnadze, on 3 September 1992.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. A. V. Kozyrev, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. A. D. Chikvaïdze, I should like to ask that you have this text circulated as an official document of the Security Council, bearing in mind that article 12 contains an appeal by the parties to the United Nations for support for the principles of settlement set out in the final document and for assistance in their implementation, including the dispatching of fact-finding missions and observers.

(Signed) Valentin V. LOZINSKIY
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of the
Russian Federation to the United Nations

The President of the Russian Federation and the President of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia,

Having considered, with the participation of the leaders of Abkhazia and the North Caucasian republics, territories and regions of the Russian Federation, the situation in Abkhazia,

Seeking an immediate cease-fire, a solution to the crisis and the creation of conditions for a comprehensive political settlement in Abkhazia, which has become an area of military conflict,

Reaffirming their commitment to the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Paris Charter for a New Europe and the Helsinki Declaration of 1992,

Considering inadmissible any infringement of the universally recognized principles of the territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of borders,

Respecting human rights and freedoms as well as the rights of national minorities,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia shall be ensured.

All armed formations taking part in the conflict shall cease their fire and all use of force against each other as of 5 September 1992 at noon. Prior to the entry into force of the cease-fire, the parties to the conflict shall undertake to refrain from any offensive actions.

A Monitoring and Inspection Commission, composed of representatives to be appointed by the authorities of Georgia, including Abkhazia, and Russia, shall be established immediately. The Commission shall ensure compliance with the cease-fire and with other provisions of this agreement, in accordance with the procedures to be elaborated by it.

In order for the Commission to function, members shall assign to it appropriate units to carry out disarmament, disbanding and withdrawal from Abkhazia and to prevent illegal armed formations and groups from entering Abkhazia, in order to maintain the entire conflict zone perimeter under strict control.

Once the cease-fire is in force and troops have been deployed, the Commission shall ensure that the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia present in the conflict zone do not exceed the agreed level required for the purposes of this agreement (protection of the railway and certain other installations).

Recommendations by the Commission shall be given immediate consideration by the authorities at all levels.

Article 2

Until 10 September 1992, exchanges of detainees, hostages, prisoners and others shall take place in accordance with the principle "all for all".

Article 3

The Parties shall prohibit and prevent all terrorist acts or the taking of hostages and shall take effective steps to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Article 4

Measures shall be taken promptly to remove any impediment to the free movement of goods and services and of persons engaging in lawful activities. The smooth and uninterrupted operation of land, air and sea communications and the protection of borders shall be ensured accordingly. Particular emphasis shall be placed on guaranteeing the security of relevant segments of the Transcaucasian railway through the establishment of a joint mechanism.

The Monitoring and Inspection Commission shall submit the requisite recommendations on this subject.

Article 5

Conditions shall be created for the return of refugees to their permanent homes. Refugees will be provided with the necessary relief and assistance.

Steps will be taken to search for persons who have disappeared and to evacuate those wishing to leave Abkhazia.

Article 6

Effective measures shall be taken within the conflict zone to halt and prevent acts of violence and looting and to bring perpetrators to justice.

Article 7

The Parties shall take steps to rehabilitate affected regions and to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including international assistance, is made available to the population affected by the conflict. The Red Cross, in consultation with the Monitoring and Inspection Commission, shall identify the procedure for the delivery and distribution of relief.

Article 8

The Parties reaffirm the need to respect international standards in the area of human rights and national minorities, to prevent discrimination based on nationality, language or religion and to hold free democratic elections.

Article 9

The armed forces of the Russian Federation which are temporarily located in the territory of the Republic of Georgia, including Abkhazia, shall remain strictly neutral and shall not take part in internal disputes.

All authorities and administrative entities in the Republic of Georgia, including Abkhazia, agree to respect the neutrality of the Russian armed forces deployed in the territory and to halt immediately all unlawful acts committed by soldiers, members of their families and military property.

Article 10

The Parties shall assist the legitimate authorities in Abkhazia to resume their normal functions by 15 September 1992.

Article 11

The authorities and administrative entities of the North Caucasian republics, regions and territories which form part of the Russian Federation shall take effective measures to halt and prevent all acts waged from their territory that are in violation of the provisions of this agreement. They shall promote respect for this agreement and the restoration of peace in the region. They shall take all necessary steps to explain the provisions of this agreement to the population.

Article 12

The Parties appeal to the United Nations and to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to support the principles of settlement set out above and to promote respect for them, particularly by sending fact-finding missions and observers.

Moscow, 3 September 1992

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

Have agreed

G. S. Khizha
A. V. Kozyrev
P. S. Grachev
A. M. Mirzabekov
M. M. Magomedov
B. M. Kokov
K. M. Karmokov
V. N. Saveliev
V. I. Khubiev
S. V. Khetagurov
A. K. Galazov
A. A. Dzharimov

V. G. Ardzinba
V. I. Zarandia
T. Nadareishvili

T. I. Sigua
T. K. Kitovani
A. D. Chikvaidze

A. K. Tleuzh
V. N. Diakonov
E. S. Kuznetsov
V. F. Choub

Annex 31

Agreement on a cease-fire in Abkhazia and arrangements to monitor its fulfilment

AGREEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE IN ABKHAZIA AND ARRANGEMENTS TO MONITOR ITS OBSERVANCE

The representatives of the parties to the conflict have, with the mediation of the Russian Federation, agreed as follows:

1. With effect from 1200 hours on 28 July 1993, the parties to the conflict shall resume strict observance of the regime established on 20 May 1993 for a cease-fire and the non-use of force against each other in the conflict zone.

The combat use of aircraft, artillery, vessels and any military equipment and weapons shall be prohibited.

No additional troops or other armed formations shall be brought into the conflict zone (into the territory of Abkhazia) and there shall be no mobilization, unapproved movement of troops and other formations, deliveries of arms and ammunition or construction of military infrastructure.

2. With effect from 29 July 1993, the trilateral Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian interim monitoring groups (comprising three to nine persons each) shall begin to function; their membership shall be decided by agreement between the parties.

The interim monitoring groups shall supervise the observance of the cease-fire regime. They shall be stationed in Sukhumi, Gulripsh, Ochamchira, Gudauta, Novy Afon, Tkvarcheli, Gagra and Gali. If the need arises, the groups shall, by agreement of the parties, be stationed in other places as well. The monitoring groups shall have the right of access to any part of the conflict zone of interest to them, after they have notified the parties accordingly. The parties to the conflict shall ensure the safety of the monitoring groups and shall provide them with accommodation and means of transport.

The monitoring groups may consider appeals from members of the population on various issues.

When the international observers arrive, the interim monitoring groups shall establish close liaison with them.

3. Each of the parties to the conflict undertakes to adopt immediate and effective measures to put a stop to any action by its formations deemed by the monitoring groups to be in breach of the cease-fire regime and to respond efficiently to the recommendations and proposals of the monitoring groups.

The United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) shall be notified of violations of the commitments which the parties to the conflict have entered into under this Agreement.

4. A Joint Commission on the settlement in Abkhazia shall be established by 5 August 1993. Its statute shall be approved by the parties. Representatives and observers from the United Nations and CSCE shall be invited to participate in the work of the Commission.

5. The parties consider it essential to invite international observers and peace-keeping forces to be deployed in the conflict zone. This shall be on the understanding that the size and composition of the international peace-keeping forces shall be determined in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council and subject to the agreement of the parties.

6. The phased demilitarization of the conflict zone shall commence. International observers shall immediately be brought into the conflict zone and the armed formations of the Republic of Georgia shall be withdrawn from the territory of Abkhazia over a period of 10 to 15 days from the date of the cease-fire.

During this same period, the armed formations, groups and persons located in the conflict zone shall be demobilized and withdrawn from Abkhazia.

For the purposes of protecting main roads and important facilities, in accordance with the final document of the Moscow meeting of 3 September 1992, a subunit of internal troops shall be formed from the local population on the Georgian side and placed on stand-by. Subsequently this subunit, together with the regiment of internal troops referred to below, shall form part of the multinational internal troops of Abkhazia.

The armed formations on the Abkhaz side shall be amalgamated into a regiment of internal troops, which shall be placed on stand-by and, until a comprehensive settlement is reached, shall perform functions appropriate to internal troops (guarding main roads and important facilities).

All the above activities shall be conducted under the supervision of the Joint Commission.

International observers shall be deployed along the Gumista, Psou and Inguri rivers.

Immediately after the cease-fire, a multinational police force shall be established in the conflict zone for the purposes of maintaining public order. Its composition and size shall be determined by the parties.

International peace-keeping forces and, subject to consultation with the United Nations, the Russian military contingent temporarily deployed in the conflict zone shall participate in efforts to uphold the cease-fire regime and maintain law and order.

The parties to the conflict shall guarantee the rights of the multi-ethnic population.

Measures shall be taken to return refugees to their homes and to render assistance to them. The Joint Commission shall set up a special group to ensure that refugee problems are attended to efficiently.

7. The Russian troops temporarily located in the territory of Abkhazia shall observe strict neutrality.

The temporary deployment status, modus operandi and withdrawal timetable and procedure applicable to the military formations and frontier troops of the Russian Federation shall be determined by separate treaty documents.

The parties shall ensure the safety of Russian servicemen and their families.

8. In accordance with the final document of the Moscow meeting of 3 September 1992, the parties shall create conditions for the legitimate authorities in Abkhazia to resume their normal functions.

9. The parties to the conflict, acting under the auspices of the United Nations and with the facilitation of the Russian Federation, shall immediately resume negotiations on the preparation of an agreement on the comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.

The agreement shall reflect basic issues relating to the maintenance of peace, the demilitarization of the conflict zone, the deployment of international peace-keeping forces, the revival of economic life, the maintenance of law and order, the criminal prosecution of persons who have committed offences against the civilian population, the return of refugees to their homes, the observance of human rights and the rights of national minorities and guarantees to uphold the political status and state system of Abkhazia.

10. The participants in this agreement undertake not to use its provisions or the cease-fire regime for any actions which could be prejudicial to the interests of any one of them.

Sochi, 27 July 1993

For the Georgian side:

For the Abkhaz side:


For the Russian Federation:

[Signed]

[Signed]

[Signed]

MAP OF GEORGIA

MAP NO. 3780 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
AUGUST 1993

Annex 32

Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, signed on 4 April 1994

**UNITED
NATIONS**

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/397
5 April 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 APRIL 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict and the text of the quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annexes were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter P. CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

Declaration on measures for a political settlement of
the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict signed on 4 April 1994

1. The third round of negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict took place from 22 to 25 February 1994 in Geneva, from 7 to 9 March 1994 in New York and from 29 to 31 March in Moscow under the aegis of the United Nations with the facilitation of the Russian Federation and with the participation of representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
2. The negotiations were held in accordance with Security Council resolutions 849 (1993) of 9 July 1993, 854 (1993) of 6 August 1993, 858 (1993) of 24 August 1993, 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993, 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993, 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993, 896 (1994) of 31 January 1994, 901 (1994) of 4 March 1994 and 906 (1994) of 25 March 1994.
3. By signing this declaration, the parties hereby commit themselves to a strict formal cease-fire from this date and also reaffirm their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other as expressed in their communiqué of 13 January 1994 (see S/1994/32, annex).
4. The parties have agreed to and signed a quadripartite agreement, a copy of which is attached to the present declaration, on the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. The agreement provides for the return of refugees/displaced persons in accordance with existing international practice, including the practice of UNHCR. A special commission on refugees/displaced persons, which shall include representatives of the parties, UNHCR, the Russian Federation, and CSCE in an observer capacity, shall begin its work in Sochi in mid-April 1994. The implementation of the agreement will begin upon the deployment of a peace-keeping force.
5. The parties reaffirm their request for the early deployment of a peace-keeping operation and for the participation of a Russian military contingent in the United Nations peace-keeping force, as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding of 1 December 1993 (S/26875, annex) and the communiqué of 13 January 1994. The plan for carrying out the peace-keeping operation will be agreed upon with the parties to the conflict. The realization of the peace-keeping operation should also promote the safe return of refugees/displaced persons. The parties again appeal to the United Nations Security Council to expand the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).
6. Abkhazia shall have its own Constitution and legislation and appropriate State symbols, such as anthem, emblem and flag.
7. The parties held discussions on distribution of powers on the understanding that any agreement on this issue is part of a comprehensive settlement and will

be reached only once a final solution to the conflict has been found. At this stage, the parties have reached a mutual understanding regarding powers for joint action in the following fields:

- (a) Foreign policy and foreign economic ties;
- (b) Border guard arrangements;
- (c) Customs;
- (d) Energy, transport and communications;
- (e) Ecology and elimination of consequences of natural disasters;
- (f) Ensuring human and civic rights and freedoms and the rights of national minorities.

8. The parties agree to continue energetic efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement. The Parties will set up an appropriate committee, which will work on a standing basis, taking into account the decisions of the Security Council under the chairmanship of the United Nations, with participation of representatives of CSCE and the Russian Federation and with the involvement of international experts. This body will meet alternatively in Moscow and Geneva. Its first meeting will be held in Geneva on 19 April 1994. A phased action programme will be worked out and proposals on the re-establishment of State and legal relations will be elaborated.

9. The parties decided to take additional measures in connection with the search for missing persons and the reburial of the dead.

10. The parties, based on the fact that there is no statute of limitations applicable to war crimes, agreed to intensify efforts to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious criminal offences as defined by international and national law and bring the perpetrators to justice. Inevitable punishment shall also be inflicted on persons who try or will try to undermine the peace process in Abkhazia by resorting to arms.

For the Georgian side:

(Signed) A. KAVSADZE

For the Abkhaz side:

(Signed) S. JINJOLIA

In the presence of:

From the United Nations:

(Signed) E. BRUNNER

From the Russian Federation:

(Signed) B. PASTUKHOV

From the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

(Signed) V. MANNO

Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons signed on 4 April 1994

Quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons signed on 4 April 1994

The Abkhaz and Georgian sides, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 849 (1993) of 9 July 1993, 854 (1993) of 6 August 1993, 858 (1993) of 24 August 1993, 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993, 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993, 896 (1994) of 31 January 1994, 901 (1994) of 4 March 1994 and 906 (1994) of 25 March 1994,

Recognizing that the right of all citizens to live in and to return to their country of origin is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Noting conclusions 18 (XXXI) and 40 (XXXVI) of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which constitute internationally agreed principles governing the repatriation of refugees,

Acting in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Parties on 1 December 1993 and especially paragraph 4, under which Parties expressed their willingness to create conditions for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of displaced persons to their permanent places of residence in all regions of Abkhazia,

Recalling that resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, by which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ascribes to the High Commissioner the function of providing international protection to refugees and of seeking permanent solutions for the problems of refugees, inter alia, by promoting and facilitating their voluntary repatriation,

Given the responsibility entrusted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to act, under the Secretary-General's authority, as the international lead agency for the repatriation of displaced persons to Abkhazia,

Noting the desire of the Parties to cooperate with each other to achieve full observance of the principles and safeguards governing voluntary repatriation,

Considering the need, therefore, to establish a framework to define modalities of such cooperation for implementation of the repatriation,

Noting that the Parties agree that a repatriation operation to Abkhazia will imply, prior to its implementation, that the security and living conditions in the areas of return are guaranteed.

HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:

1. The Parties agree to cooperate and to interact in planning and conducting the activities aimed to safeguard and guarantee the safe, secure and dignified return of people who have fled from areas of the conflict zone to the areas of their previous permanent residence.

2. For the purpose of the present agreement, the parties will guarantee the safety of refugees and displaced persons in the course of the voluntary repatriation and rehabilitation operations to be organized.

3. In implementing this voluntary repatriation programme, the Parties undertake to respect the following principles:

(a) Displaced persons/refugees have the right to return voluntarily to their places of origin or residence irrespective of their ethnic, social or political affiliation under conditions of complete safety, freedom and dignity;

(b) The voluntary character of the repatriation shall be ascertained and respected through appropriate arrangements;

(c) Displaced persons/refugees shall have the right to return peacefully without risk of arrest, detention, imprisonment or legal criminal proceedings.

Such immunity shall not apply to persons where there are serious evidences that they have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in international instruments and international practice as well as serious non-political crimes committed in the context of the conflict. Such immunity shall also not apply to persons who have previously taken part in the hostilities and are currently serving in armed formations, preparing to fight in Abkhazia.

Persons falling into these categories should be informed through appropriate channels of the possible consequences they may face upon return;

(d) The Parties shall ensure that returnees, upon return, will enjoy freedom of movement and establishment including the right to return to the areas where they lived prior to leaving the conflict zone or to the area of their choice;

(e) The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons, upon return, will get their expired documents (propiska, passport) extended and validated for their previous place of residence or the elected place of return;

(f) The Parties shall ensure that repatriants, upon return, will be protected from harassment, including unauthorized charges or fees and threat to life or property;

(g) Returnees shall, upon return, get back movable and immovable properties they left behind and should be helped to do so, or to receive whenever possible an appropriate compensation for their lost properties if return of property appears not feasible

The Commission mentioned in paragraph 5 below will establish a mechanism for such claims. Such compensation should be worked out in the framework of the reconstruction/rehabilitation programmes to be established with a financial assistance through the United Nations Voluntary Fund;

(h) Displaced persons/refugees who choose not to return to Abkhazia shall continue to be assisted and protected until acceptable alternative solutions are found for such cases;

(i) In accordance with the fundamental principle of preserving family unity, where it is not possible for families to repatriate as units, a mechanism shall be established for their reunification in Abkhazia. Measures shall also be taken for the identification and extra care/assistance for unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable persons during the repatriation process;

(j) The Parties agree that refugees and displaced persons will be guaranteed unimpeded access to all available information on the situation in the areas where repatriation will take place. Such an information should be provided in the framework of a campaign to be launched by the Commission as mentioned in paragraph 9 (b) below.

4. For the purpose of the implementation of voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to Abkhazia, a quadripartite Commission is hereby established.

5. The principal tasks of the Commission shall be to formulate, discuss and approve plans to implement programmes for the safe, orderly and voluntary repatriation of the refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia from Georgia, the Russian Federation and within Abkhazia and for their successful reintegration. Such plans should include registration, transport, basic material assistance for a period of up to six months and rehabilitation assistance.

In order to create the conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons, the Commission will establish a working group of experts to undertake an assessment of the level of damage to the economic and social infrastructure in Abkhazia, the availability of housing and the extent of damage to houses in the areas of return as well as the projected needs in rehabilitation/reconstruction, with financial implications. This survey should be undertaken region by region according to the plan of return to be worked out and accepted by the Parties, bearing in mind that the Parties have agreed to start the repatriation operation with the Gali region.

6. The Commission shall be composed of four members, one being designated by each of the Parties and two representing the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In addition, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will designate a representative to attend the Commission's meetings in an observer capacity. If circumstances do not allow the designated CSCE representative to attend such meetings, the Commission will keep the CSCE mission in Georgia informed on a regular basis on the progress of the Commission's work.

7. Any member of the Commission may, when attending any meeting of the Commission, be accompanied by such advisers as the Party designating that member may deem necessary. Where a member of the Commission is unable to attend any meeting of the Commission, the Party concerned may designate a substitute.

8. The Commission shall meet as often as required, but no less frequently than once every month. Meetings of the Commission may be convened at the request of any of the members and shall be held on the territory of the Russian Federation, except as the members of the Commission may otherwise agree. The Parties agree to guarantee the personal security of the members of the Commission and personnel involved in the activities agreed.

The first meeting of the Commission shall be scheduled as soon as possible and no later than one week after the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution on a mechanism ensuring the security conditions in the areas of return.

9. During its first meeting, the Commission will set out the modalities of the assessment mentioned in paragraph 5 above and will establish a plan concerning:

(a) The areas where repatriation will be primarily conducted according to the level of guaranteed security and preparedness;

(b) The implementation of an information campaign among the displaced person/refugee population to encourage voluntary return;

(c) The registration process of persons expressing their willingness to return;

(d) The activities needed to safeguard the safety of returnees based on the principles set out in paragraph 3 (a) to (j) above;

(e) The needs for financial, transport and basic material assistance to displaced persons/refugees as well as projected needs for rehabilitation/reconstruction of the areas of return as mentioned in paragraph 5 above.

10. The Parties agree that representatives of refugees and displaced persons shall be provided with facilities to visit the areas of return and to see for themselves arrangements made for their return.

11. In the event of disagreement within the Commission regarding the application and interpretation of this Agreement, where such disagreement cannot amicably be settled among the members of the Commission, the Commission shall refer such disagreements to the Parties and to the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

THE PARTIES, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES FURTHER AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

(a) UNHCR shall have direct and unhindered access to all displaced persons/refugees from Abkhazia in order to undertake activities essential to the discharge of its mandate and operational and monitoring responsibilities;

(b) Travel shall be facilitated between and within all areas where refugees and displaced persons are located and areas of return for the personnel of the United Nations and other relevant international and non-governmental agencies cooperating with the United Nations in repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation programmes. It shall include the free use of airspace and authorized airstrips and airports for relief flights and the exemption from taxes and duties of all goods imported for use in the voluntary repatriation programme of displaced persons/refugees from Abkhazia and for the provision of relief integration and rehabilitation assistance to the Abkhazian region by the United Nations and cooperating agencies, as well as the expeditious clearance and handling of such goods;

(c) The Russian Federation will guarantee unimpeded transit of humanitarian supplies through its territory for the purposes of the present Agreement;

(d) UNHCR shall establish local offices, as deemed appropriate, at locations to be approved by the Parties concerned, to facilitate voluntary repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation;

(e) The security of the staff and property of the United Nations and the cooperating agencies shall be guaranteed;

(f) The allocation and continued use by the Parties, the United Nations and the cooperating agencies of particularly designated radio frequencies for radio communications between their offices, vehicles, and staff, in areas where refugees and displaced persons are located and in areas of return, shall be provided.

This agreement shall enter into force with immediate effect and shall remain in force for the period required for the effective voluntary return of the displaced persons/refugees.

In witness whereof, the authorized representatives of the Abkhaz and Georgian sides, the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, have signed the present agreement.

Done at Moscow, this fourth day of April 1994 in four originals, three in the Russian language, and one in the English language, the four texts being equally authentic but the English text being authoritative for interpretation purposes.

For the Abkhaz side

(Signed) S. JINJOLIA

For the Georgian side

(Signed) A. KAVSADZE

For the Russian Federation

(Signed) B. PASTUKHOV

For the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees

(Signed) J. AMUNATEGUL

Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994

In the Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, annex I), the Parties committed themselves to strict compliance with a formal cease-fire from that date, and once again reaffirmed their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other, as expressed in their communiqué of 13 January 1994. That commitment remains valid. This Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces formalizes that commitment.

1. The parties shall scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, at sea and in the air and shall refrain from all military actions against each other.

2. The armed forces of the parties shall be separated in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The area between lines B and D on the attached map (see appendix) shall constitute a security zone. There shall be no armed forces or heavy military equipment within this zone. The territory between lines A and B and lines D and E shall constitute a restricted-weapons zone. There shall be no heavy military equipment within this zone. The local civil authorities shall function in the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone. The police/militia employed for this purpose may carry personal arms;

Heavy military equipment includes:

- (i) All artillery and mortars of a calibre exceeding 18 mm;
- (ii) All tanks;
- (iii) All armoured transport vehicles;

(b) The peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the military observers, in accordance with the Protocol to this Agreement, shall be deployed in the security zone to monitor compliance with this Agreement;

(c) The heavy military equipment to be withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone shall be stored in designated areas to be determined by the parties and shall be monitored by United Nations military observers;

(d) Under the supervision of representatives of the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and United Nations observers, with the participation of representatives of the parties from the Kodori valley, the troops of the Republic of Georgia shall be withdrawn to their places of deployment beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia;

A regular patrol of the peace-keeping force and international observers shall be organized concurrently in the Kodori valley;

(e) All volunteer formations made up of persons from beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia shall be disbanded and withdrawn;

(f) The movement of units and subunits of the peace-keeping force and of the international observers outside the security zone in the relevant areas shall be subject to agreement with the parties;

(g) United Nations military observers shall also monitor the coastal waters and airspace between lines A and D;

(h) In the event of an attack or a direct military threat against the peace-keeping force, it shall take appropriate measures for its safety and self-defence.

3. The precise demarcation on a detailed map and a plan for the separation of forces in the initial phase of the deployment of the peace-keeping force shall be worked out by the command of the peace-keeping force with the participation of the parties in the context of a step-by-step, comprehensive settlement, with a continuation of the return of refugees and displaced persons and in compliance with this Agreement, in a working group, which shall begin its work to this end in Moscow within five days after the signing of this Agreement. It shall complete this task within five days. Disengagement shall commence five days after the working group has completed its task. The process of disengagement shall be completed no later than 10 days after it has commenced.

4. A map indicating the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone is contained in the appendix.

Protocol. The Protocol concerning the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States is as follows:

"The parties agree that:

"The function of the peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall be to exert its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. Further, its presence should promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to the Gali district. It shall supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the Protocol thereto with regard to the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone. In carrying out its mission, the force shall comply with local laws and regulations and shall not impede the functioning of the local civil administration. It shall enjoy freedom of movement in the security zone and the restricted-weapons zone and freedom of communications, and other facilities needed to fulfil its mission.

"The peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall operate under the Interim Unified Command and the Commander of the Peace-keeping Force."

5. The process of achieving a comprehensive political settlement shall be pursued.

6. The parties appeal to the United Nations Security Council to expand the mandate of the United Nations military observers in order to provide for their participation in the operations indicated above.

7. On the basis of the statement by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 15 April 1994 (S/1994/476, annex), the parties appeal to the Council to take a decision on the use of a collective peace-keeping force within the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

For the Georgian side:


For the Abkhaz side:

(Signed) J. IOSELIANI

(Signed) S. JINJOLIA

APPENDIX

RUSSIAN FEDERATION



Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commission, signed in Moscow on 11 May 1994

Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commission,
signed in Moscow on 11 May 1994

[Original: English/Russian]

1. Both parties to the conflict agree to establish a Coordinating Commission to discuss practical matters of mutual interest (energy, transport, communications, ecology and so on). The Commission will be established for the transitional period until the conflict has been resolved.
2. The Coordinating Commission will work in the town of Sochi. At its first meeting, which will take place on 1 June 1994, the Commission will be chaired by a representative of the Russian Federation. Further meetings will be chaired alternately by representatives of both parties, unless agreed otherwise.
3. Both parties to the conflict will each designate four representatives of their choice to the Coordinating Commission. Both parties invite representatives of the United Nations, the Russian Federation and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to participate as observers in the work of the Commission. In discussion of matters affecting both the interests of the parties and territory of the Russian Federation, the representatives of the latter will take part in the work of the Commission with the rights of a delegation.
4. By the first meeting of the Coordinating Commission the parties to the conflict will prepare proposals for the programme of work of the Coordinating Commission, including those to be discussed at its first meeting. Both parties welcome the readiness of the observers to present their proposals for the programme of work of the Commission.
5. Proposals for the work of the Coordinating Commission will be prepared taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides of 1 December 1993 (S/26875, appendix).
6. The Commission will act without prejudice to the work of the standing committee agreed on in the Moscow declaration of 4 April 1994 (S/1994/397, annex I).
7. Both parties agree to take all decisions by consensus of delegations.
8. Participation in the Coordinating Commission will not prejudice the legal positions of both parties with regard to the future status of Abkhazia.

For the Georgian side:

(Signed) J. IOSELIANI

For the Abkhaz side:

(Signed) S. JINJOLIA

In the presence of:

From the
United Nations:

(Signed)
E. BRUNNER

From the Russian
Federation

(Signed)
B. PASTUKHOV

From the Conference on
Security and Cooperation
in Europe

(Signed)
V. MANNO

Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations and Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities, Gagra, 25 May 1998

**Protocol on Ceasefire, Separation of Armed Formations and
Guarantees on Inadmissibility of Forcible Activities**

Gagra, 25 May 1998

1. The Sides commit themselves to cease fire from 6 am of 26 May 1998.

2. From the moment the cease-fire regime comes into effect the Sides commit themselves to start separating of opposing military formations.

The Abkhaz Side commits itself, from 9 am till 01 pm of 26 May 1998, to withdraw from Gali region additional contingent detached there beyond limits of the militia personnel.

The Georgian Side commits itself to withdraw all armed formations from Gali region from 9am till 01pm of 26 May 1998.

3. In order to exercise control on the implementation of commitments pledged by the Sides, the special groups will be set up composing of representatives from the UNOMIG and Collective Peacekeeping Force starting their operation since the moment of cease-fire in compliance of the elaborated scheme that will establish conditions for return of the peaceful population of Gali region fled the region due to the military operations.

4. The Abkhaz Side commits itself to refrain from unlawful forcible acts against the peaceful population of Gali region.

The Georgian Side commits itself to take effective measures aimed at preventing from penetration of terrorist and subversive groups, armed formations and individuals to the territory of Abkhazia.

With this regard and pursuant to the Decisions of the Coordinating Council, the Sides shall establish necessary mechanisms with participation of the Sides, UNOMIG and CPKF of the CIS.

For the Abkhaz Side **S. Shamba, A. Kchach**

For the Georgian Side **I. Menagarishvili, K. Targamadze**

From the CPKF the Commander of the CPKF of the CIS **S. Korobko**

From the UN: Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General **L. Bota**

Annex 37

Zheleznovodsk Declaration, 23 September 1991

Zheleznovodsk Declaration

Zheleznovodsk, 23 September 1991

Joint Communiqué on the Results of the Mediating Mission of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan

[Unofficial translation, Moscow TASS, 24 Sep 1991]

The intense conflict in the region of Nagorno Karabakh has gone on unabated for four years, claiming the lives of numerous people of different nationalities - civilians and services personnel of regular Army units and interior troops.

The central authorities of the USSR have been unable to work out and implement effective measures to normalize the situation in the region. Gross errors were made resulting in the worsening of confrontation between the sides and the increase of distrust in federal bodies.

In the obtaining [as received] situation, the need arose for mediating efforts aimed at creating conditions to start the negotiating process capable of gradually laying the foundation for the normalization of the situation in the region.

Upon agreement with the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, the leaders of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan took upon themselves the role of mediators.

On September 20-23, 1991, the mediating mission, led by President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, visited Baku, Gyandzha, Stepanakert and Yerevan.

The sides seeking settlement of the conflict are guided by the principles of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states and the undeviating observance of civil rights of citizens, irrespective of their nationality and in accordance with international legal norms.

Through mediation some problems of the gradual settlement of the conflict were discussed.

The main results of discussion are as follows:

The sides believe that the necessary and binding conditions for settlement of the conflict are a ceasefire, the repeal, before January 1 1992, of all unconstitutional

Azerbaijani and Armenian enactments concerning Nagorno Karabakh, the recognition of authority of legitimate bodies of power, the withdrawal from the conflict zone of all armed forces, except units of Soviet Interior Ministry and Soviet Defence Ministry troops.

When this period has expired, the presence of all armed forces and their activities will be considered illegal by all sides and will be suppressed by the Soviet Interior Ministry troops, and members of armed forces are liable under [word indistinct].

A working group of observers is hereby entrusted with working out measures to safeguard the ceasefire, neutralize all armed forces defined as illegitimate, create guarantees of safety for all citizens residing in the conflict zone.

2. For purposes of taking coordinated measures to normalize the situation in the conflict zone a provisional working group is set up, including authorized representatives of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. The working group begins activities from 1 October.

3. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia ensure the eventual return of deported people to their homes, beginning with the fully vacated villages.

The sides guarantee safety in places of permanent residence. Talks on this problem must begin from October 1991.

4. The sides involved in the conflict begin an immediate release of hostages. This process must be completed within a period of two weeks, upon the expiry of which persons involved in holding hostages may be prosecuted under the law.

Control over compliance with this provision is exercised by authorized representatives of the mediating sides.

5. Together with federal bodies, the sides guarantee to normalize all railway, air traffic and communications systems within two weeks.

All sides, with the cooperation of mediators, will start negotiations to ensure the free and mutually beneficial functioning of all highways.

6. During the talks the sides arrived at a unanimous decision to guarantee the flow of impartial information into the conflict zone.

It was decided to set up an information group, consisting of representatives of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan authorized to prepare official information about developments in the conflict zone.

7. The supreme bodies of the state authority of Azerbaijan and Armenia will approve authorized delegations, which will immediately begin bilateral negotiations on a permanent basis.

8. The sides believe the negotiation process will begin once bilateral treaties have been prepared and signed between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijani Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and the Republic of Armenia.

9. The working group of observers is entrusted with preparing, within a month, proposals for the subsequent stages of settling the conflict.

10. The working group of observers will regularly inform the top leaders of the four republics on progress on realizing the measures envisaged by this communiqué.

The provisions contained in this communiqué cannot be viewed as the right of the mediators to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states - the Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia.

The communiqué is signed by:

For the Russian Federation:

Boris Yeltsin

For the Azerbaijani Republic:

Ayaz Mutalibov

For Kazakhstan:

Nursultan Nazarbayev

For the Republic of Armenia:

Levon Ter-Petrosian

Taking part in the discussion of the communiqué were:

Ye. Shaposhnikov

V. Barannikov

S. Voskanyan

M. Gezalov

V. Dzhafarov

R. Kocharian

L Petrosian

M. Radayev

September 23, 1991

Zheleznovodsk

Source: As Published by Accord – Conciliation Resources

Annex 38

Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran, Tehran, 7 May 1992

Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran

Tehran, 7 May, 1992

Upon the invitation of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mr. Yakub Mamedov, Acting President of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Mr. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, President of the Republic of Armenia, arrived in Tehran to hold bilateral negotiations and discuss regional problems. Using this opportunity, upon the initiative and at the suggestion of the Iranian side, within the framework of diplomatic efforts on the normalisation of the situation in Nagorno Karabakh and at the Azerbaijani-Armenian border and bringing the viewpoints closer together with the purpose of reliving tensions in the region, the leaders of the two states met and conducted negotiations on May 7, 1992.

The sides started with expressing their gratitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran, international and regional organizations as well as other countries for their efforts directed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region and expressed hope that peaceful wishes and goodwill would promote peace and stability.

With a view to develop bilateral relations and provide security in the region, the sides agreed to organise meetings of representatives of the both countries at a top level and periodically of the leaders of regions and responsible military representatives.

The sides expressed a desire for solving all issues connected with the normalisation of bilateral relations at different levels by peaceful means on the basis of principles of the CSCE and international law.

Taking international legal norms and the UN Charter as a basis, the sides emphasised the necessity of ensuring peace and stability on the borders, in Nagorno Karabakh, pointing out that it is advantageous both for the two states and for the region.

Respecting human rights and the rights of minorities, the sides drew each other's attention to the questions of solving problems of Armenian and Azeri refugees.

The sides agreed that within a week after the arrival of the special representative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. M. Vaezi in the region (Baku, Yerevan, Nagorno Karabakh), after conducting negotiations with the concerned sides and with the support of the heads of state of Azerbaijan and Armenia, ceasefire is established and simultaneously all communication roads are open with the purpose of meeting all economic needs.

In case of consent for the implementation of the reached agreement, besides the observers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, observers of the CSCE and others will be involved.

Positively assessing the work of the summit in Tehran, the sides agreed that all questions connected with bilateral relations should be solved by means of meetings and consultations of responsible persons at different levels and through negotiations.

The leaders of the two states, highly appreciating the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, expressed hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its efforts until the ultimate peace and stability were established in the region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

Akbar HASHEMI RAFSANJANI

The Azerbaijan Republic

Ya. MAMEDOV

The Republic of Armenia

L. TER-PETROSYAN

Source: ABASOV, A., KHACHATRIAN H. (2005), “The Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality”, Published by Areat, Noyan Tapan, Appendix 3.

Annex 39

Protocol for the Complete Cessation of Hostilities, 18 February 1994

Protocol for the Complete Cessation of Hostilities

February 18, 1994

Moscow

The Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan and the Minister of Defense of Armenia with the participation of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Armed Forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, hereinafter referred to as the parties:

guided by the fundamental interests of the people involved in the armed conflict,

showed its determination in supporting the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions No. 882, 853, 874, 884 and its readiness to contribute to the comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Conference

with the mediation of the Russian Defense Minister, they agreed:

1. The use of the term “Parties” does not imply recognition of any political or legal status other than that specified in this Protocol.
2. The parties agreed to ensure a complete cessation of hostilities on March 1st, 1994 at 00:00, and the withdrawal of the troops on March 1, 1994 at 10:00.

On the ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, the relevant orders will be given to the commanders (chiefs) of the military formations responsible for their implementation in February 28, 1994 at no later than 15:00.

3. To implement the withdrawal of the troops within three days in the agreed lines of the separation of the troops of the parties, considering the liberation of the occupied territories as soon as possible with the full confidence in each other.
4. Create a mutual security zone - 20-30 km in width (at the same time, withdrawal and concentration of at least 20 km from the contact line of troops at a distance for heavy weapons) - Northern, central and southern directions, in which it will be prohibited any military action of forces, including move auxiliary forces, military and military equipment, as well as and armed units of the transport ship supplier vehicles for combat aircraft and combat helicopters, and other flying flights of devices that can be used for military purposes, including intelligence flights to the settlements and military installations blockade.
5. Establish a security (control) zone to monitor the implementation of the agreements reached, and deploy observation posts of a mixed staff consisting of the representatives of the parties and the Russian Ministry of Defense. Establish a joint headquarters to oversee the implementation of the agreements reached, headed by a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Deploy groups in the security (control) zones by the Joint Staff, which is also headed by representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The beginning of the work of the Joint Staff is on March 1st, 1994 at 12:00. Determine the composition, powers, deployment points of the Joint Staff, the necessary transport for its protection, including helicopters, the specific composition of the observation posts, the locations and the order of their provision, as well as the coordinated areas of the withdrawal of troops, determine the working areas to the expert groups of the parties until March 1, 1994 in the accordance with the current norms of international law.

6. Eliminate the activities of all armed groups in the security (control) zones of the areas controlled by the parties, to prevent the violations of the ceasefire regime.
7. The Parties reserve for the mediator the right in the security (control) zones to cease hostilities violation of the agreements reached in the event of the application of all necessary measures and means, up to military, to the armed forces violating the terms of the protocol to the entities:

The participants of the meeting express confidence that the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol will favorably create conditions for a political conflict among all interested parties for a meeting of leaders:

Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan - Mamedrafi Mamedov,
Armenian Defense Minister - Serzh Sargsyan,
Armed formations of Nagorno-Karabakh
Plenipotentiary Representative: Bako Sahakyan,
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Minister: Pavel Grachev

Source: Tatul Hakobyan, Green about sei. Artsakh Diary, third edition, 2011, pp. 482-483
<http://www.aniarc.am/2020/02/18/serzh-sargsyan-bakosahakyan-1994-february-18/>

Annex 40

Bishkek Protocol, 5 May 1994

The Bishkek Protocol

5 May 1994

Participants of the meeting held in May 4-5 in Bishkek on the initiative of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Parliament of Kyrgyz Republic, Federal Congress and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:

express determination to assist in all possible ways to the cessation of armed conflict in and around Nagorno Karabakh, which does not only cause irretrievable losses to Azerbaijani and Armenian people, but also significantly affects the interests of other countries in the region and seriously complicates the international situation; supporting the April 15, 1994 Statement by the CIS Council of heads of states, express readiness to fully support the efforts by heads and representatives of executive power on cessation of the armed conflict and liquidation of its consequences by reaching an appropriate agreement as soon as possible; advocate a naturally active role of the Commonwealth and Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in cessation of the conflict, in realization of thereupon principles, goals and the UN and OSCE certain decisions (first of all the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884);

call upon the conflicting sides to come to common senses: cease to fire at the midnight of May 8 to 9, guided by the February 18, 1994 Protocol (including the part on allocating observers), and work intensively to confirm this as soon as possible by signing a reliable, legally binding agreement envisaging a mechanism, ensuring the non-resumption of military and hostile activities, withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and restoration of communication, return of refugees;

agree to suggest Parliaments of the CIS member-states to discuss the initiative by Chairman of Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly V. Shumeyko and Head of the Assembly's Peacemaking Group on Nagorno Karabakh M. Sherimkulov on creating a CIS peacemaking force;

consider appropriate to continue such meetings for peaceful resolution of the armed conflict; express gratitude to the people and leadership of Kyrgyzstan for creating excellent working conditions, cordiality and hospitality.

[Signatories]

Agreement on the Armed Conflict Cessation

To: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation P. S. Grachov MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of the Russian Federation A. V. Kozyrev V. N. Kazimirov

Responding to the call for a ceasefire set forth in the Bishkek Protocol of 5 May 1994 and relying on the Protocol of 18 February 1994, the warring parties agreed on the following:

1. To ensure a complete ceasefire and cessation of hostilities from 00 hours 01 minute on 12 May 1994.

The corresponding ceasefire orders will be issued and communicated to commanders of military units responsible for their execution, no later than 11 May 1994.

On 12 May by 23:00, the Parties will exchange the texts of their ceasefire orders to be able to make their mutual update and subsequently unify main provisions of similar documents.

2. To request the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation to convene in Moscow no later than 12 May of this year an urgent meeting of Ministers of Defence of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh to agree on the boundaries of forces separation, other urgent military and technical matters, and to prepare for the deployment of the forward group of international observers.
3. This agreement will be used to complete the negotiations within the upcoming 10 days and to enter, no later than 22 May of this year, into an Agreement on the Armed Conflict Cessation.
4. This agreement will come into effect immediately after the Mediator notifies on the receipt from the opposing forces of completely identical documents signed by authorized representatives.

Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan
Minister of Defence of Armenia
Commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh

May 1994

Note: the text is signed correspondingly by M. I. Mamedov in Baku on 9 May, S. A. Sarkisian in Yerevan on 10 May, S. Babayan in Stepanakert on 11 May 1994.

Annex 42

Mediator's proposals on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

To: President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Mr Heydar ALIYEV

Highly honoured Heydar Aliyevich,

According to the exchange of opinions held in Baku on strengthening the ceasefire regime, I am sending you, as agreed, the proposals of the Minsk Conference Co-chairmanship.

Mediator's proposals on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

On behalf of the Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference (hereinafter - the Mediator), to strengthen the ceasefire regime established in the area of the conflict since 12 May 1994 and to create more favourable conditions for furthering the peace process we jointly invite the warring parties (hereinafter – the Parties) to assume the following obligations:

1. In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, notify immediately the other Party (with the Mediator in copy) thereof in writing by fax or via PM line with the exact indication of the incident location, time, nature and its consequences.

The other Party shall be advised that measures are being taken to prevent retaliation that could lead to an escalation of the incident; the other Party is expected therefore to take immediate appropriate action. If possible, proposals shall also be made for immediate measures to be taken to overcome this incident and restore the status quo ante.
2. Upon receipt of such notification from the other Party, immediately conduct a fact-check and provide a written response within 6 hours (with the Mediator in copy).
3. The Parties agree that official sources will report the incident to mass media only upon receipt of a response from the other Party, and if the receipt of such a response is delayed then no earlier than 7 hours after the initial notification of the other Party on this issue. It is understood that the Parties will fairly report the response of the other Party to the media and inform that the communication on this issue is ongoing.
4. To establish reliable direct emergency communication, each Party shall allocate two PM line sets and maintain a 24-hour presence of responsible officials at both sets. The respective numbers of the PM line sets should be communicated via the Mediator no later than 6 February 1995.

Should it be impossible to use fax for transmission by the Parties of emergency messages to one another or the Mediator, these texts shall be dictated via the PM line.

5. The Parties agree that the Mediator will accept for consideration only those appeals of the Parties in which it is confirmed that this issue has already been raised before the other Party.
6. In special cases, the Parties may request the Mediator to hold an urgent meeting with their representatives to address the incident and the situation at hand.
7. As necessary, upon request of either Party and with the consent of the other Party, a mixed group of inspectors including representatives of the Mediator, should the Parties so request, may be sent to study the situation on the ground.

8. Without waiting for the completion of the incident investigation, the Parties undertake to put in place measures to prevent escalation in order to restore status quo ante while taking into consideration possible recommendations of the Mediator as much as practical.
9. The situation depending on its severity may be proposed by the Mediator for consideration at the meeting of OSCE Minsk Group or in the OSCE Permanent Council.
10. The Parties undertake to refrain from public statements that may result in an escalation of the conflict.

Please formally confirm at the highest military authority level no later than 4 February 1995 your willingness to assume the above obligations in full so that upon receipt of the respective responses from the Parties these obligations may be deemed effective on 6 February 1995.



Vladimir Kazimirov
on behalf of the Co-chairmanship
of OSCE Minsk Conference
3 February 1995

Appendix: response wording proposal.

To: Co-chairmanship of OSCE Minsk Conference

Ambassador V. N. Kazimirov Ambassador A. Biorner

Herewith I confirm the consent of Azerbaijan to assume in full the obligations outlined in your proposal dated 3 February 1995.

Should we receive from you a confirmation of the unanimous consent to undertake these obligations, we will deem this agreement effective on 6 February 1995.



M. Mamedov
Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan
4 February 1995

Note: on the same day, 3 February 1995, similar letters were sent to the President of the Republic of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosian and the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh R. Kocharian.

On the same day, 4 February 1995, responses were received (identical to the above) from the Minister of Defence of Armenia S. Sarkisian and the Commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh S. Babayan.

Annex 43

Madrid Principles, 11 April 2016

Madrid Principles – Full Text

April 11, 2016

NOTE- The Armenian Research Center ANI publishes the Madrid Document (full text) for the first time.

Basic principles for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, transmitted at the OSCE Ministerial Council (Madrid, 29 November 2007) as an official proposal of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, for consideration by the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan

We, the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, agree that the stability, security, and prosperity of the region require the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict.

We refer to the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between CSCE/OSCE Participating States of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (1975), in particular to Article II related to refraining from the threat or use of force, to Article IV related to the territorial integrity of States, and to Article VIII related to the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

In accordance with these provisions, we hereby instruct our Foreign Ministers, in cooperation with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to draft¹ a comprehensive agreement on the peaceful resolution of the conflict (hereinafter, the "Peace Agreement"), based on the principles below:

1) The final legal status of NK will be determined through a plebiscite allowing the free and genuine expression of the will² of the population of NK. The modalities and timing of this plebiscite will be agreed by the parties through future

negotiations as described in (9). The population of NK is understood as the population of all ethnicities living in NK in 1988, in the same ethnic proportions as before the outbreak of the conflict³. The formulation of the question or questions to be asked in the plebiscite should not be limited, and could cover the full range of status options.

2) During the interim period until the determination of the final legal status of NK, its inhabitants will enjoy certain rights and previliges⁴ to be specified in the Peace Agreement, in accordance with the guidelines below:

The inhabitants of NK will have the right to protect and control their political and economic viability and security within a democratic society committed to the rule of law. Their human rights and fundamental freedoms will be respected.

The inhabitants of NK will have the right to elect officials to govern NK during the interim period. These officials will exercise legislative and executive power over the internal affairs of NK, as well as provide for the establishment and maintenance of courts of law to administer justice. These officials will also be able to engage in external relations in those areas specified in the Peace Agreement.

The interim authorities of NK will be allowed observer status in the OSCE for those sessions in which issues directly related to NK are discussed. They will also have the right to seek membership in international organizations for which statehood is not a precondition.

The inhabitants of NK will be entitled to receive aid from foreign counties and international donor organizations provided that such aid intended to promote human rights, peaceful economic and democratic development, cultural and commercial ties or to meet basic humanitarian needs. They will also be able to seek foreign direct investment and access to international markets.

3) All the Azerbaijani territories around NK under Armenian control will be returned to Azerbaijan's control in stages in accordance with the guidelines below, with detailed modalities to be agreed between the parties in Peace Agreement:

The territories situated east and south of NK, as far as the southern limit of the corridor stipulated in (4), will be retuned when the Peace Agreement enters into force, international peacekeeping forces (PKF) have been deployed and are operational, and international security assurances are in place (including those of the UN Security Council).

Armenian settlers shall depart from the areas indicated above, with assistance of the international community (IC). Azerbaijani civil authorities shall reenter these areas after the deployment of the PKF and redeployment of the Armenian forces.

Armenian troops shall redeploy from Kelbajar district, with the exception of a remaining limited contingent stationed in an agreed area stipulated in the Peace Agreement.

Kelbajar district shall be placed under transitional international monitoring by an OSCE commission that will include Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives. During the transitional international monitoring of Kelbajar district, Armenian settlers shall be encouraged, with the assistance of the IC, to depart from Kelbajar district.

Azerbaijani IDPs will be allowed to return to Kelbajar district five years after entry into force of the Peace Agreement. (This period can either be extended or reduced by the joint commission described in (11), depending on the efficacy of the security assurances.

4) A corridor of an agreed width will link NK to Armenia. Until the determination of the final legal status of NK, this corridor will be maintained by the NK interim authorities under the conditions of the status quo prevailing when the Peace Agreement enters into force. After the determination of the final legal status of NK, the functioning of the corridor will be regulated taking into account NK's final status.

5) All internally displaced persons and refugees from the conflict-affected areas will have a right to return on a voluntary basis, as soon as the Office of the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees has determined that conditions are appropriate, in the places of their former residence according to provisions to be specified in the Peace Agreement. All persons who have returned to their places of former residence will enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination of any kind. Inter-communal coexistence will be prompted by the parties with the support of the international community to reduce tension and normalize economic, political, and social life among ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

6) All international peacekeeping operations will be deployed immediately after entry into force of the Peace Agreement to monitor the Armenian redeployment and the demilitarization of evacuated areas. PKF units shall be drawn from nations that volunteer troops. The selection of troops for the PKF shall be done by the parties by mutual consent. Each party has the right to veto the other's choice.

Azerbaijan will commit not to send military personnel or equipment beyond the current line of contact, with the exception of police units (in equivalent proportion with civilian population as pertains to police units currently deployed in other Azerbaijani provinces) and with the exception of border detachments and associated equipment along the Azerbaijan-Iran border (at a level equivalent to those currently maintained per kilometer along the eastern Azerbaijan-Iran border).

The sides will pledge non-use of force against each other, including in NK and around NK. The Co-Chair countries will consult with Armenia and Azerbaijan on developing bilateral as well as collective security guarantees and assurances to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement and overall security in the South Caucasus.

7) Open and unimpeded transport and communication links between the parties will be prompted throughout the region, including, in particular, direct and immediate land access for Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and reopening of all borders and communications.

8) An International Donors' Conference convened by the International Financial Institutions, in cooperation with the Co-Chair countries, will develop a fund for demining and reconstruction of infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications in the conflict-affected areas around and inside NK.

9) Four separate working committees will be created by the parties, in cooperation with the Co-Chair countries. These committees will work on the basis of consensus and will:

Addressed the detailed modalities and the timing of a plebiscite to determine the final legal status of NK.

Work out the technicalities of the corridor on the basis of the concept described in (4).

Elaborate the modalities in Kelbajar District of the transition from the international OSCE monitoring commission to Azerbaijan's resumption of full administrative control.

Assess all remaining questions not yet dealt with in these basic principles.

10) Five years after the entry into force of the Peace Agreement, a review conference will be convened by the Co-Chair countries to assess the progress of the working committees and the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement.

11) A joint supervisory commission led by the Co-Chair countries, with members to be agreed by the parties, will settle all issues related to the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

12) The Minsk Group Co-Chair countries will be requested by the parties to witness the Peace Agreement and to affirm their intention their intention to monitor closely the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to take appropriate measures to promote compliance with the Peace Agreement.

13) The UN Security Council will be asked by the parties, with the support of the Co-Chair countries, to adopt a resolution endorsing the Peace Agreement as guarantor of its implementation and of the rights of the population of NK during the interim period until the determination of NK's final status.

14) The OSCE and UN will be asked by the parties, after consultation with the Co-Chair countries, to adopt measures in accordance with the OSCE Declaration on Principles and the UN Charter, should the need arise.

1. The parties will start work on drafting the Peace Agreement **immediately after the two Presidents' endorsement of the basic principles, witnessed by the Co-Chair s, and will conduct drafting negotiations in good faith to conclude the Agreement within 6 months.**
 2. Per the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice for West Sahara, 16 October 1975.
 3. The references to be used will be the results of the last census organized in the Soviet Union before the outbreak of the conflict.
 4. **The rights and privileges of the inhabitants of NK during the interim period will be finalized by the parties with the participation (in a form to be agreed) of NK representatives.**
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Annex 44

Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Russian Federation, 2020

“Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Russian Federation

10.11.2020

We, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin state the following:

1. We hereby declare that a complete ceasefire shall be established and all hostilities shall be stopped in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone as of 00:00 Moscow time on November 10, 2020.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, shall remain at their current positions.

2. Aghdam region shall be returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan until November 20, 2020.
3. Peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation shall be deployed along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor, including 1,960 servicemen with firearms, 90 armored personnel carriers, 380 units of motor vehicles and special equipment.
4. The peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation are being deployed in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces. The peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation shall stay there for a period of 5 years, with automatic extension for the next 5-year periods, if none of the Parties declares of its intention to terminate the application of this provision 6 months before the expiration of the preceding period.
5. A peacekeeping center shall be deployed to monitor the ceasefire with a view to increasing the effectiveness of control over the implementation of the agreements reached by the Parties to the conflict.
6. The Republic of Armenia shall return the Kelbajar region to the Republic of Azerbaijan by November 15, 2020, and the Lachin region by December 1, 2020. The Lachin corridor (5 km wide), which will provide for communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia and at the same time will not affect the city of Shushi, shall remain under the control of the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation.

The Parties have agreed that a plan for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor shall be determined within the next three years, providing communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent redeployment of Russian peacekeeping troops to protect this route.

The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee traffic safety for citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions along the Lachin corridor.

7. Internally displaced persons and refugees shall return to Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the control of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
8. An exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons and bodies of the dead is to be carried out.

9. All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with a view to organizing the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions. Control over transport communication is exercised by the Border Guard Service bodies of the FSS of Russia.

The Parties agree that the construction of new transport communications linking the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan shall be provided.”

Annex 45

Ceasefire agreement on 20 September 2023

Cease-fire agreement reached on 20 September 2023

Through the mediation of the command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, an agreement was reached on the complete cessation of hostilities from 13:00 (12:00) on September 20, 2023.

An agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the remaining units and servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia from the deployment zone of the Russian peacekeeping contingent and the disbandment and complete disarmament of the armed formations of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army and the withdrawal of heavy equipment and weapons from the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh for their early disposal.

The issues raised by the Azerbaijani side on the reintegration, ensuring the rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the issues of ensuring the livelihood of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh within the framework of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, according to the agreement reached, will be discussed at the meeting between representatives of the local Armenian population and representatives of the central authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan to be held in the city of Yevlakh on September 21, 2023 and during subsequent meetings.

Sources: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/921685>

Protocol of Intent, Procedures and Agreements

Protocol of Intent

The delegations of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR through the mediation of the delegations of the Republic of Daghestan and Stavropol Krai agree to be guided in their negotiations by the following:

- the parties' commitment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, laws of the Russian Federation, decisions of the Congresses of Peoples' Deputies of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation;
- mutual respect for the sovereignty of the parties and non-interference into each other's internal affairs;
- unconditional renunciation of any violence in resolving contentious issues;
- mutual aspirations to resolve contentious issues by peaceful means, through negotiations;
- the necessity of unconditional release of hostages and search of missing persons;
- the necessity of disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups;
- compensation of damage to legal entities and individuals;
- comprehensive addressing of the refugee issue.

The Ingush and North Ossetian parties advocate for the establishment of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations between the two republics, condemn any manifestation of national enmity and violence against the peoples of the republics.

The Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR being equitable constituent entities of the Russian Federation herewith declare their intent to make every effort to ensure peace and national stability in Russia.

on behalf of the Ingush Republic
M. A. BARKINKHOYEV

on behalf of the North Ossetian SSR
Yu. G. BIRAGOV

on behalf of the Republic of Daghestan
B. G. AKHMEDOV

on behalf of Stavropol Krai
A.V. KULAKOVSKII

Kislovodsk,
24 January 1993

Agreement

*of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR on the procedure for considering
para. 2 of the negotiations agenda*

The official delegations of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”, herewith reaffirm their commitment to the unconditional implementation of resolution 7 of the Congresses of Peoples’ Deputies of the RF and taking into account the information of the Head of the Interim Administration on this issue agreed on the following:

1. To ensure weapon seizure from the population, disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups of the Parties.
2. Via the Interim Administration, by 16 February 1993: to exchange information on the presence on the territory of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR of illegal groups, illegally held firearms, ammunition, and armoured vehicles of various types.
3. At the next plenary meeting, to present proposals on the practical arrangement of the disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups and the weapon seizure from the population.
4. To request the Interim Administration to monitor the implementation of this Agreement with the involvement of representatives of the Parties.

on behalf of the Ingush Republic
M. A. BARKINKHOYEV

on behalf of the Republic of Daghestan
Sh. RAMAZANOV

on behalf of the North Ossetian SSR
Yu. G. BIRAGOV

on behalf of Stavropol Krai
A.V. KULAKOVSKII

Kislovodsk,
4 February 1993

Agreement

*On measures to comprehensively address the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons
on the territories of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR*

20 March 1993

Kislovodsk

The official delegations of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”, reaffirming their commitment to the principles of upholding human and civil rights, under Resolution VII of the Congresses of Peoples’ Deputies of the Russian Federation, assume obligations to comprehensively address the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons from both republics:

1. Based on Resolution VII of the Congresses of Peoples’ Deputies of the Russian Federation as applicable to the return of refugees to their places of permanent residence, at the first stage the Parties shall proceed with addressing comprehensively the refugee issue including ensuring their safety by returning and resettling them in the agreed localities of compact settlement.

To agree that citizens of the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR holding official duly documented registration of residence as of 31 October 1992 and not involved in committing crimes shall be entitled to the return at the first stage.

The return of refugees and internally displaced persons shall be addressed in strict compliance with the principle of voluntariness.

The Parties shall define the principles and time frames for the next stages in the course of further negotiations.

2. The Parties shall create conditions for settling of non-returning refugees and internally displaced persons in new localities.
3. The Parties shall provide returning refugees and internally displaced persons with social guarantees as required by the legislation of the Russian Federation.
4. The Parties shall establish a mixed commission on a parity basis with the participation in its activities of representatives of the Interim Administration and federal authorities of the Russian Federation and entrust it with the following responsibilities:
 - compilation and approval of lists of refugees and internally displaced persons from the Ingush Republic and the North Ossetian SSR;
 - consideration of citizens’ documented right to return;
 - development of proposals and mechanism of damage compensation for refugees and internally displaced persons based on the legislation of the Russian Federation;
 - identifying sources of funding approved by federal authorities of the Russian Federation.
5. The Parties shall request the Interim Administration for assistance in matters of funding, delivery and distribution of materials and resources, and addressing social issues.

on behalf of the Ingush Republic
R. AUSHEV

on behalf of the North Ossetian SSR
A. GALAZOV

on behalf of the Republic of Daghestan
B. AKHMEDOV

on behalf of Stavropol Krai
A.V. KULAKOVSKI

Procedure

for the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons in their previous localities of compact residence in the settlements of Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoe, Kurtat of Prigorodnyi District of the Republic of North Ossetia

26 June 1994
Beslan

Pursuant to Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation dated 13 December 1993 No. 2131 and dated 30 May 1994 No. 1112, and Kislovodsk Agreement dated 20 March 1993, the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia, with the direct involvement of the Interim Administration, guided by the principles of mutual respect, international peace and harmony, territorial integrity of the republics, respect for human rights, and law compliance, shall create conditions to comprehensively address problems of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Preliminary stage:

- ensuring public safety in the settlements by forces attached to the Interim Administration, internal affairs agencies of the Republic of North Ossetia according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and current legislation;
- via the migration authorities and the MIA of both republics under the control of the Interim Administration, updating the lists of refugees and internally displaced persons who are ready to return to their previous places of residence;
- the return shall be carried out in strict compliance with the principle of voluntariness at the first stage subject to the documented registration of residence as of 31 October 1992 and other legal grounds;
- individuals accused of crimes may be returned solely upon a decision of law enforcement agencies;
- groups shall be formed and returned to their places of residence with due account of recommendations provided by the conciliation commissions based on the conciliation procedure;
- establishing mobile medical units, setting up trade outlets, provision of water;
- clarifying needs for construction materials and labour force, cost estimation;
- restoration of the utility system, preschool and school facilities, enterprises of the social and cultural sphere, and consumer service facilities from 1 July 1994 subject to solving the issues of financing and allocation of material resources.

Subsequent stage:

- return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their undestroyed homes; installing temporary housing for those returning to their destroyed and partially destroyed homes; necessary infrastructure rehabilitation;
- the scope of work for each restorable object shall be clarified by the customer represented by the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Destroyed homes shall be restored with the involvement of homeowners;
- the Interim Administration shall clarify passenger and freight traffics, the needs for transport, and determine the procedure for the transport allocation;
- the transportation of families to their places of residence shall be provided by the Interim Administration with the assistance of both republics' governments with the involvement of observers from federal authorities and entities of the North Caucasian region.

Final provisions:

1. The efforts on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons shall be coordinated by the Interim Administration, within which a special department shall be created for the return, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and provision of necessary facilities to them.
2. The parties agreed that the government commissions of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia jointly with the Interim Administration shall work out and approve by 5 July of this year, actions and a time frame for the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons.

3. Therewith, the leadership of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Interim Administration shall progress on the basis that citizens both residing in the four settlements and returning undertake to comply with the laws of the Russian Federation and the Republic of North Ossetia, acknowledge the territorial integrity of the Republic of North Ossetia within the current administrative and territorial boundaries, abide by decisions of the legitimate regulatory and administrative authorities, and not to incite ethnic discord.
4. This Procedure proposes the implementation of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 13 December 1993 No. 2131 confirming the status of Prigorodnyi District as an integral part of the territory of the Republic of North Ossetia, other decrees of the President of the Russian Federation and resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation creating conditions for the continuation of negotiations aimed at the normalization and development of good-neighbourly relations between the Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic of North Ossetia.

President of the Republic of North Ossetia
A. GALAZOV

President of the Republic of Ingushetia
R. AUSHEV

Head of the Interim Administration
V. LOZOVoi

Agreement

between the Republic of North Ossetia – Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia on the implementation of decrees of the President of the Russian Federation on the relief of consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict

Vladikavkaz
11 July 1995

The state delegation of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the state delegation of the Republic of Ingushetia, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”, agreed on the following:

1. The Parties reaffirm their aspirations to implement decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation, and agreements on the relief of consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
2. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and renounce their territorial ambitions towards each other.

The Parties shall entrust the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia with updating, within two weeks, of the current procedure for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their previous places of permanent residence on the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia in the light of the changed situation.

3. The Parties note the poor progress of the construction and recovery efforts in the settlements of Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoe, and Kurtat due to serious shortcomings in the works organisation and funding gaps.

The Parties request the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation to expedite the transfer of functions of the public contracting authority as regards the construction and recovery works in the conflict zone to the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation, and to provide full and timely funding for these works.

4. The Parties deem it necessary to adopt, within a month, a Programme of Joint Efforts of the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia to improve the morale in the republics with the active involvement of social activists, academia, cultural workers, mass media, and clergy, and with that in mind, they withdraw mutual accusations and one-sided judgment of the current events, refrain from all kinds of statements and communication that complicate the process of normalising the relations between the republics.
5. The Parties condemn terrorism and other crime manifestations, whatever their origin, and deem it necessary to join efforts of law enforcement agencies of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia to ensure the protection of rights, freedoms, and security of citizens; entrust heads of law enforcement agencies of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia with the development and adoption, within ten days, of a joint action plan to strengthen crime control and counter-terrorism measures.
6. To deal with the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and normalize the relations between the republics, the Parties deem it necessary to draft and sign in 1995 a Treaty on Economic and Cultural Cooperation between the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia.
7. To draft a Treaty, working commissions shall be established made up of the following members:

On behalf of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania:

Dzhygkaev G. A., State Advisor to the President

Bezhaev O. G., Minister of Finance

Doev K. M., Minister of Economy

Zangiev Ch. M., Chairman of the Parliament Committee

Kusov T. E., Chairman of the Committee on Ethnicities

Kirilkin Yu. G., Head of the Office of the President and the Government

On behalf of the Republic of Ingushetia:

Uzhakhov M. Z., Deputy Chairman of the Government

Goigov A. A., Head of the Office of the President

Dzagiev M-G. O., Minister of Justice

Pliev R. S., Member of Parliament, member of the commission of the People's Assembly-Parliament

Tatriev M. T., Deputy Chairman of the Government

Yandiev Kh. I., Head of Department of the Office of the President

On behalf of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
A. GALAZOV

On behalf of the Republic of Ingushetia
R. AUSHEV

Procedure

for the return of internally replaced persons to their previous places of permanent residence on the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia

20 April 1996
Vladikavkaz

In pursuance of the Agreement between the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia “On Implementation of Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation on the Relief of Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict” signed on 11 July 1995 in Vladikavkaz, the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia, reaffirming their commitment to the implementation of decrees of the President of the Russian Federation and resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation on the relief of consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, with the direct involvement of the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation, shall create necessary conditions for the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons in their previous places of residence on the basis of adherence to the principles of mutual respect, territorial integrity, inter-ethnic concord, peace and human rights observance.

1. State authorities of the republics, on the territories of which internally displaced persons are returning, jointly with the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation shall arrange for the return of the internally displaced persons and their resettlement and ensure their safety.
2. The utility system, preschool and school facilities, enterprises of the social and cultural sphere, and consumer service facilities shall be restored as a matter of priority.

The return of internally displaced persons shall be carried out in strict compliance with the principle of voluntariness and subject to the documented registration of residence or actual residence at their places of return as of 31 October 1992:

- a) to their undestroyed homes;
- b) upon the availability of temporary housing;
- c) to restored households.

Contentious questions related to the registration of residence shall be handled by government commissions on a case by case basis.

Persons accused of committing crimes may return only after a respective decision has been made by law enforcement agencies under the current legislation.

3. An application of an internally displaced person shall be submitted to the Government of the republic, to the territory of which the internally displaced person is returning, via the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation, and registered with the administration of the settlement and local police department.

Applications of persons holding the registration of their residence or permanently residing in this settlement as of 31 October 1992 shall be subject to the registration except for applications of citizens, the involvement of whom in the commitment of grievous crimes has been proven in accordance with the established procedure.

An application of an internally displaced person shall be handled after it is submitted to and registered at the administration of the settlement according to the law, after which the return of the internally displaced person to their place of permanent residence shall be arranged.

In the event an application remains unhandled within the established period, the responsible official shall be held liable according to the legislation.

In settlements, commissions made up of representatives of local government authorities, members of the public, distinguished citizens shall be established to support the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons in their places of permanent residence, inter-family reconciliation, the creation of the friendly atmosphere.

The commission shall regularly inform citizens of the settlements on the progress of the registration and return of internally displaced persons.

4. To ensure the registration of returning internally displaced persons, in each settlement a database shall be established containing data on residence registration, places of residence, concluded residential property transactions, and other data according to current legislation.
5. Transportation of families to their previous places of residence shall be planned by territorial authorities of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation and both republics jointly with local government authorities with the involvement of the ISC (Interim State Committee) of the RF under provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Procedure. At the first stage – to the following settlements of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: Chermen, Dongaron, Dachnoe, Kurtat, Kartsa, Oktiabrskoe, Kambileievskoe, Tarskoe and to all settlements of the Republic of Ingushetia.

The timeframes for the return to the rest of the settlements of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania shall be determined in coordination with the Government Commissions of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia with the involvement of the ISC of the RF.

6. The Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia shall create conditions, and the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation shall provide funding, for the housing construction at new places for internally displaced persons not willing to return to their previous places of residence, within the amount of the estimated cost of the construction and restoration works as related to the homes they owned previously.
7. The Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation jointly with the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia shall make an inventory of the destroyed housing stock as necessary, develop and defend a programme of construction and restoration works and activities on the comprehensive solution of social and domestic problems of citizens not willing to return and those returning to their places of permanent residence.
8. The Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia in cooperation with the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation shall create conditions for organising the search of options for the exchange of apartments, households and provide state assistance in their registration.
9. Social, medical, and commercial support of the returning internally displaced persons shall be provided in the same manner and according to the same procedure as for all other citizens residing in the settlements.
10. The returning citizens shall be employed subject to the labour market. The destroyed homes shall be restored with the involvement of the homeowners and household members of working age.
11. The Government Commissions of both republics shall take prompt actions or conduct additional consultations on the issues not covered in this document.

Chairman of the Interim State Committee of the Russian Federation for the relief of consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992 in the rank of the Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
V. LOZOVoi

Chairman of the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
Yu. BIRAGOV

Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia
M. DIDIGOV

Annex 47

Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine on the situation in the left Dniester districts of the Republic of Moldova Chisinau, 6 April 1992

Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine on the situation in the left Dniester districts of the Republic Of Moldova

Chisinau, 6 April 1992

I. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Romania, and Ukraine, according to the judgment which they adopted in Helsinki on 23 March 1992 related to the coordination of efforts for the settlement of the conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, and the processes around it, and the creation of a mechanism for political consultations, including at ministerial level, gathered in Chisinau on 6 April. The ministers reviewed the developments in the conflict zone and examined the recommendations made by the group of experts from the four countries with a view to regulating the conflict exclusively through political means, respecting human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, preventing the escalation of the conflict and not allowing citizens of other states to participate in the conflict, as well as building confidence in the area.

The Ministers have expressed once again serious concern in connection with the aggravation of the situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, and the continuation of the acts of violence that resulted in the loss of human life, as well as the risk these developments pose to the democratic processes. Highlighting the special importance of the Kyiv Declaration of March 20 adopted by the Heads of states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as their Helsinki Declaration of 23 March, which contained the basic elements of the political settlement of the crisis, the Ministers reaffirmed the obligation of the participating countries to take urgent and effective measures in this direction.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Romania, and the Ukraine, appreciate the position and the efforts of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova, in terms of the peaceful settlement of the conflict, as confirmed by the Parliament on March 31, 1992, and shall be addressed to the parties involved in the conflict to do it in such a way that the representatives of the legitimate, elected representatives of the population of the districts of the left bank, to take part in the work of the Parliament, in order to create more favorable conditions for finding a political settlement to the conflict.

The participants of the meeting draw attention to the inadmissibility of the involvement of the 14th Army in the conflict and in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic Of Moldova and the Russian Federation declared themselves ready to initiate treaties with the aim of establishing the legal status of this Army.

II. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs reaffirm the principles, that in a view of their governments, must be laid at the basis of the conflict regulations, namely:

1. unconditional respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova.
2. combining efforts by all parties to reach a resolution of the conflict exclusively by political means.

3. the right of the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Moldova to act in accordance with the legislation of the country to maintain the order of law within the norms of international law and its obligations under the CSCE documents.
4. non-acceptance of military intervention and non-interference in the conflict by foreign forces.

III. In order to prevent the escalation of the conflict, the ministers decide to take the following measures as a matter of urgency:

1. immediate and complete cease-fire, starting with April 7, 1992, at 15.00 and the subsequent disengagement of the armed formations involved in the conflict.
2. ensuring by the commands of the 14th Army and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova conditions that exclude the access of the parties involved in the conflict, as well as the civilian population, to arsenals and any warehouses of arms, combat equipment and ammunition.
3. non-acceptance by the states participating in the meeting of the use of their territories for the transit, by any means, to the conflict zone, of armed formations, as well as weapons, combat equipment and ammunition.
4. joint commitment of the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine to refrain from any actions that could be qualified as direct interference in the conflict.
5. ensuring effective security of installations and facilities in the conflict zone necessary for normal life and development of activity in this territory and which could present an increased ecological danger (dams, dams, power plants etc.).
6. establishing a control period for the return to the places of permanent residence of foreign citizens, who participate in any form, in the conflict, with the provision by the Republic of Moldova of their security in the process of their withdrawal from its territory.
7. the participating states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the financing, from any sources, of armed persons and formations involved in the conflict.
8. creating the necessary conditions for the return of refugees and the provision of humanitarian aid, with international participation, to people who have suffered as a result of the conflict.

IV. In order to increase mutual trust in the conflict zone, foreign ministers consider the following measures necessary:

1. creation of a joint commission with the participation of representatives of the four countries for the implementation of control over compliance with decisions by ceasefire and disengagement of the parties.
2. establishment of a mission of good offices and mediation, with the participation of the representatives of the four countries, in order to dialogue with the representatives of the population of the left Dniester.
3. creation of a group of rapporteurs, specialists in human rights issues, representing the four countries, in order to develop recommendations that take into account the principles of the UN Charter, the norms of international law and the corresponding provisions of the CSCE documents.
4. facilitating the participation of legally elected deputies from the districts on the Left Bank of the Dniester in the work of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, as well as in the work of other constitutional bodies, in order to create conditions for the political settlement of the conflict.
5. establishing a mechanism for mutual operative information between the governments of the four countries on the situation in the conflict zone; taking measures to ensure objective information of public opinion, including by presenting in the media of the participating countries official views on the evolution of events. Ministers assume that this will avoid incitement and maintain the climate of tension and suspicion caused by the absence of objective information on developments in the area.

6. promotion of actions likely to contribute to the principled solution of the following problems:

- continuation of the work of the Conciliation Commission, in which representatives of the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine could participate as observers;
- establishment of local self-administration in a broad sense, adopting new legislation to ensure the increase of responsibilities and rights of local bodies of power and state administration throughout the Republic and granting this area the status of a free economic zone.

V. The Ministers decided to coordinate their efforts for the peaceful settlement of the Left Bank of the Dniester within the various political consultation mechanisms. At the same time, they agreed to maintain regular contact, to decide, in the light of events reconvene the group of experts, to designate representatives to participate in the work of the joint committee, with the mission of good offices and mediation, the work of the group of rapporteurs, as well as by the observers of the commission of the peace, to carry out the agreement, and any other action of a nature to contribute to the achievement of progress in re-establishing stability in the conflict zone.

VI. They will continue to consult on a number of the most pressing issues for the protection of human rights, including the rights of national minorities, in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and deals with international human rights throughout the territory of the Republic of Moldova, including in the districts of themselves in the left side of the Nistru, as well as any other warranties that may be imposed by the evolution of the situation.

VII. The participants of the meeting calls on the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the Office of the CSCE, on the activities undertaken by the member states for the purpose of settlement of the conflict exclusively through political means, and in terms of respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and to refer them to their Statement, calling, at the same time, the CSCE, and in all the countries participating in the CSCE, to support these efforts.

VIII. The ministers agreed to continue the meeting. The date and place of its resumption will be determined by mutual agreement along the way.

Recommendations of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine

17 April 1992

Examining the first results of the work of the Joint Committee, set up in April 1992, Ministers consider it necessary:

1. Further measures, to ensure strict compliance with the ceasefire regime and exercise control over their implementation by those commands, should be adopted as a matter of urgency, with a view to the firm fulfilment of the agreed understanding - conditions without which the other planned measures cannot be carried out.
2. To take measures for the untimely disengagement and withdrawal of subunits of armed formations, on the basis of agreements to which the Conciliation Commission will agree. The withdrawal will be complete and final.
3. Establish an institution of observers from the four countries in order to ensure the guaranteed disengagement of armed subunits and formations.
4. Efforts shall be made to establish, where necessary, peacekeeping forces to be placed in the disengagement zone of the opposing parties.
5. The parties should be called upon to establish effective mutual control, together with observers, over all types of armed formations and individuals, so as not to admit violations of the ceasefire agreement and diversionary acts. In order to strengthen confidence-building measures, the parties will refrain from concentrating forces and means in the conflict zone.
6. To organize the departure from Moldova of foreign citizens who participated in the conflict, ensuring the necessary conditions for their safe movement to their places of residence.
7. To dissolve the subunits of volunteers and people's militia, to ensure the organized return of their members to their places of residence and work, under the conditions of granting an amnesty and guarantees that they will not subsequently be prosecuted. Civilian persons to be disarmed by police and local militia sub-units, ensuring the preservation of seized weapons.
8. To propose to the parties the emergency taking of the necessary measures to guarantee the safe operation of the Dubasari hydroelectric power plant complex, as well as the execution of urgent repair and maintenance works, in order to ensure the security of the dam and the normal operation of the plant.
9. Ensure permanent and direct telephone and radio liaison between the commands and commanders of subunits and armed formations of the opposing forces in conflict areas in order to avoid excesses that may be caused by accidental factors.
10. To refer to the prosecutor's office for an untimely investigation of crimes committed in the conflict zone.
11. All minefields shall be urgently demined to ensure the normal use of these territories.
12. To create without delay a mission of good offices and mediation, with the participation of the representatives of the four countries, and to ensure the conduct of its activity.
13. To send as soon as possible to the conflict zone experts-rapporteurs from the four countries on human rights issues, with the possible participation of specialists in the field from other countries of the CSCE, for the formulation of recommendations in the field of human rights. The parties to the conflict to create the conditions for their effective and secure activity.
14. To ensure conditions for the return of all refugees to their places of life.
15. To ensure, in the future, the neutrality of the 14th Army and its non-interference in the conflict. The Ministers expressed the hope that the Republic Of Moldova and the Russian Federation will initiate negotiations without delay to establish the status of the 14th Army.

The Ministers mention that the peaceful settlement of the conflict is the only way to ensure the political, mutually acceptable and secure regulation of the conflict, as well as to create the prerequisites to guarantee the peaceful, safe life of citizens throughout the Republic of Moldova.

Annex 48

Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24369*
6 August 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

NOTE VERBALE DATED 31 JULY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF MOLDOVA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to forward herewith the letter addressed to him by H.E. Mr. Mircea Snegur, President of the Republic of Moldova, and the accompanying letter of the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Moldova.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova would be extremely grateful if necessary arrangements would be made to circulate as urgently as possible the above-mentioned documents to the members of the Security Council as a document of the Security Council.

Letter dated 31 July 1992 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Moldova addressed to the Secretary-General

I convey to you herewith the letter of the President of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicolae TIU
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Letter dated 31 July 1992 from the President of the Republic
of Moldova addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that on 21 July 1992 I signed, with the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. B. Yeltsin, the Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova. The present Agreement, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, aims at an urgent cease-fire and a political solution of the conflict in full accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

After the cease-fire and disengagement of the parties involved in the conflict, the mechanism elaborated by the decision of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will be put in force. The mechanism stipulates the introduction of military observers, use of a report mission on human rights problems and a mission of good will and mediation.

The leadership of the Republic of Moldova considers it vitally necessary to inform you about these measures which, we believe, will contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the norms of international law.

Unfortunately, our attempts to settle the crisis through political means have been blocked by the destructive forces that continue to commit serious violations of the cease-fire agreement, violations resulting in the loss of human lives, mostly in the city of Bender (Tighina). These circumstances are of great concern to us and make us doubt the sincerity of the opponent side's desire for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

I should be grateful if you would consider the possibility of sending to the Republic of Moldova a United Nations observer mission to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, as well as the process of re-establishing peace in the eastern region of Moldova.

I should like to request that you circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

I take this opportunity to assure you of the firm intention of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova to cooperate fully with the United Nations with a view to maintaining peace and international security.

(Signed) Mircea SNEGUR

Appendix

Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova

[Original: Russian]

The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation,

Desiring a speedy and total cease-fire and a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Dniester region,

Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Welcoming the mutual understanding in principle of 3 July 1992 between the President of the Republic of Moldova and the President of the Russian Federation,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. From the moment of the signing of this Agreement, the parties to the conflict pledge to take all the necessary measures to ensure a total cease-fire and to halt all armed actions against each other.

2. Once a cease-fire has been declared, the parties to the conflict shall proceed to withdraw units of their armed forces and other formations, and military equipment and arms; they shall complete this process within seven days. The aim of this disengagement is to create a security zone between the parties to the conflict. The exact coordinates of the zone will be established in a special protocol between the sides taking part in the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 2

1. In order to ensure the implementation of the measures stipulated in article 1 and to guarantee security in the aforementioned zone, a joint Control Committee consisting of representatives of the three sides taking part in the settlement, shall be established. In its work, the Committee shall make use of the military observer groups established under all the previous agreements, including the quadripartite agreements. The Control Committee shall proceed to carry out its tasks as stipulated in this Agreement within seven days after the signing of the Agreement.

2. Each side taking part in the work of the Committee shall appoint its representatives to it. The Control Committee shall be based in the city of Bendery.

3. In order to carry out the aforementioned measures, the Control Committee shall have under its authority military contingents which shall be formed on a voluntary basis and shall represent the sides taking part in the implementation of this Agreement. The deployment of these contingents and their use in guaranteeing the cease-fire and security in the zone of conflict shall be in accordance with the decisions of the Control Committee, which shall be taken on the basis of consensus. The numerical strength and status of the military contingents, and the conditions for their deployment in the zone of conflict and their withdrawal from it, shall be established in a separate protocol.

4. If the provisions of this Agreement are violated, the Control Committee shall investigate the circumstances of the violation and shall take urgent and appropriate measures to restore peace and law and order and prevent the recurrence of such violations.

5. The financing of the activities of the Control Committee and of the forces under its authority shall be shared by all the sides.

Article 3

The city of Bendery, as the headquarters of the Control Committee, and in the light of the particular complexity of the situation, shall be declared a zone of heightened security, which will be guaranteed by the military contingents of the sides taking part in the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4

The units of the 14th Army of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, stationed in the Republic of Moldova, shall observe strict neutrality. The two parties to the conflict pledge to respect that neutrality and to refrain from any unlawful acts involving the military property and servicemen of that Army, and members of their families.

Matters relating to the status of the Army and the procedure and schedule for its gradual withdrawal shall be settled through negotiations between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation.

Article 5

1. The parties to the conflict consider the application of any sanctions or blockades unacceptable. In this context, obstacles to the provision of goods and services and the movement of individuals shall be eliminated immediately, and appropriate steps shall be taken to lift the state of emergency in the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

2. The parties to the conflict shall immediately begin negotiations to settle matters relating to the return of refugees to their homes, assistance

to the populations of regions that have suffered from the conflict and the reconstruction of economic units and housing. The Russian Federation shall provide the necessary assistance in this endeavour.

3. The parties to the conflict shall take all the necessary measures to ensure the free flow of international humanitarian aid to the area covered by the settlement.

Article 6

In order to disseminate objective information about the situation in the area covered by the settlement, the parties shall establish a joint press centre which will be under the authority of the Control Committee.

Article 7

The parties consider that the measures contained in this Agreement are an important component in the settlement of the conflict through peaceful political means.

Article 8

This Agreement shall enter into force at the time of its signature.

The Agreement shall be terminated by mutual consent or when one of the Contracting Parties renounces it, which would result in the cessation of the activities of the Control Committee and the military contingents under its authority.

DONE at Moscow on 21 July 1992, in duplicate in the Moldavian and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Republic of Moldova

For the Russian Federation

Annex 49

Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria

The Moscow Memorandum
8 May 1997

MEMORANDUM On the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria

The leadership of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, hereinafter referred to as the Parties;

Proceeding from the necessity for the fastest and full solution of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria exclusively through peaceful political means;

Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of the UN, OSCE, and generally recognized norms of international law, and also to the agreements reached previously between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria;

Recognizing the responsibility for securing civil peace, international concord, the strengthening of stability and security in this area of Europe;

According prime importance to the realization of basic human rights and freedoms of the individual, notwithstanding ethnic origin, religious belief, political tenets, place of residence and other differences;

Considering that uniting of their spiritual and material resources will speed the decision of common economic and social problems and will open the possibility for constructing a modern flourishing society through joint efforts;

Through the mediation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE Mission,

Have agreed to the following:

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force in their mutual relations. Any differences shall be resolved exclusively by peaceful means, through negotiations and consultations with the assistance and mediation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as guarantor States for the fulfillment of agreements achieved; of the OSCE and the assistance of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].
2. The Parties shall continue the establishment between them of state-legal relations. The Document, defining these relations, the status of Transdniestria, shall be based on the principles of mutually agreed decisions, including the division and delegation of competencies, and mutually assured guarantees. The Parties will proceed to the elaboration of this document immediately after the signing of this Memorandum, giving consideration to all previously achieved principled agreements, including those achieved on 17 June 1996.
3. Transdniestria shall participate in the conduct of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova - a subject of international law - on questions touching its interests. Decision of such questions shall be taken by agreement of the Parties. Transdniestria has the right to unilaterally establish and maintain international contacts in the economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres, and in other spheres by agreement of the Parties.
4. The Parties direct a request to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the OSCE to continue their mediating efforts for the achievement of a lasting and comprehensive normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria.
5. The Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria will act as mutual guarantors of the full and unconditional fulfillment of the agreements on relations between them.

6. The Parties welcome the declaration of the Russian Federation and Ukraine about their readiness to act as Guarantor States for the observance of the provisions set forth in the respective documents about the status of Transdniestria and the agreements set forth in the present Memorandum.

7. The Parties direct a request to the OSCE to continue its assistance for the compliance of the agreements between them.

8. The Parties declare the necessity to elaborate a mechanism of guarantees by all the participants in the negotiating process.

9. The Parties reaffirm that activities for maintaining peace, carried out by the Joint Peace-keeping forces in the Security Zone in accordance with the agreement between the presidents of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation dated 21 July 1992 "On the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova" shall be continued.

10. In the event of a violation of these agreements, the Parties have the right to address themselves to the Guarantors for the carrying out of consultations with the goal of taking measures for normalizing the situation.

11. The Parties shall build their relations in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as of January of the year 1990.

For the Republic of Moldova
(signed)
P. Lucinschi

For Transdniestria
(signed)
I. Smirnov

For the Russian Federation
(signed)
B. Yeltsin

For the Guarantor States

For Ukraine
(signed)
L. Kuchma

In the presence of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE
(signed)
N. Helveg Petersen

**Joint Statement
of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Connection with the Signing of the
Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and
Transdnistria**

The Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as heads of mediator-States in the political process for the peaceful settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict, with the participation of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Welcome the signing of the Memorandum on the Bases for normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria as an important step toward the just and comprehensive settlement of the Transdnistrian problem and the strengthening of mutual trust, stability, and security in the whole region,

Declare that the provisions of the Memorandum cannot contradict the generally accepted norms of international law, and also will not be interpreted or acted upon in contradiction with existing international agreements, decisions of the OSCE, the Joint Declaration of 19 January 1996 of the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova, which recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova,

Note their intention together with the OSCE to intensify their mediation efforts and call upon the parties to immediately initiate negotiations in order to complete in the near future an accord on a comprehensive document on the final settlement of the conflict and also a mechanism of appropriate guarantees,

Affirm the readiness of their countries, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with the assistance of the OSCE, to act as guarantors for the compliance with the provisions set forth by the corresponding documents on the status of Transdnistria as a component part of a united and territorially whole Republic of Moldova.

(signed)

B. Yeltsin

(signed)

L. Kuchma

(signed)

With the Participation of the Chairman-in-Office
of the OSCE. Helveg Petersen

City of Moscow
8 May 1997

Treaty on (settlement of the situation in Ukraine, its neutrality and) security guarantees of Ukraine

Annex I to the letter dated 24 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Russian]

Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

Upon consideration and discussion of the proposals put forward by the participants of the consultations in Minsk on 1 September 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group, consisting of representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), reached an understanding with respect to the need to implement the following steps:

1. Ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.
2. Ensure monitoring and verification by OSCE of the regime of non-use of weapons.
3. Implement decentralization of power, including by enacting the Law of Ukraine on the interim status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Law on Special Status).
4. Ensure permanent monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian State border and verification by OSCE, along with the establishment of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
5. Immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons.
6. Enact a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
7. Continue an inclusive national dialogue.
8. Adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbass.
9. Ensure the holding of early local elections in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on the interim status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Law on Special Status).
10. Remove unlawful military formations and military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries, from the territory of Ukraine.
11. Adopt a programme for the economic revival of Donbass and the resumption of vital activity in the region.

12. Provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:

(Signed) Heidi **Tagliavini**,
Ambassador

(Signed) L. D. **Kuchma**,
Second President of Ukraine

(Signed) M. Y. **Zurabov**,
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine

(Signed) A. W. **Zakharchenko**

(Signed) I. W. **Plotnitski**

Memorandum on the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

Annex II to the letter dated 24 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Russian]

Memorandum on the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin

To carry out item 1 of the Protocol on the outcome of the consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, (Minsk, Republic of Belarus, 5 September 2014), the participants of the Trilateral Contact Group, consisting of representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, have reached an understanding with respect to the following measures to strengthen the bilateral ceasefire agreement.

1. The ceasefire shall be considered mutual.
2. Both sides' units and armed formations shall halt at their line of contact as at 19 September 2014.
3. The use of all types of weapons and offensive action shall be banned.
4. Within 24 hours after the approval of this Memorandum, all lethal weapons of more than 100 millimetre calibre shall be moved back from the line of contact on each side by at least 15 kilometres (with the exception of those indicated below), including from residential areas, to allow the establishment of a ceasefire zone of no less than 30 kilometres in width (the security zone).

At the same time, artillery systems of more than 100 millimetre calibre shall be moved back from the line of contact to a distance equal to the length of their maximum range, specifically:

- 100 mm canons MT12, by 9 kilometres; 120 mm mortars, by 8 kilometres; 122 mm howitzers D30 (2C1 Gvozdika), by 16 kilometres; 152 mm 2C5 Giatsynt-S (2C3 Akatsia, 2C19 Msta-S, 2A65 Msta-B), by 33 kilometres; multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) 9K51 Grad, by 21 kilometres; 9K57 Uragan, by 36 kilometres; 9K58 Smerch, by 70 kilometres; MLRS Tornado-G, by 40 kilometres; MLRS Tornado-U, by 70 kilometres; MLRS Tornado-C, by 120 kilometres.
- Tactical rocket systems, by 120 kilometres.

5. Deployment of heavy weapons and military equipment shall be banned in the district delimited by the towns of Komsomolsk, Kumacheve, Novoazovsk and Sakhanka, with OSCE monitoring.

6. Installation of new mines and explosive barriers within the limits of the security zone shall be banned.

Mines and explosive engineering barriers installed previously within the security zone shall be dismantled.

7. As soon as this Memorandum is approved, flights by military aircraft and foreign unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), with the exception of UAV used by the OSCE monitoring mission, shall be banned along the line of contact in the ceasefire zone no less than 30 kilometres in width.

8. An OSCE monitoring mission consisting of OSCE observers shall be deployed in the ceasefire zone within 24 hours of the approval of this Memorandum. The above-mentioned zone should be divided into sectors, the number and limits of which shall be agreed upon as part of the preparations for the work of the OSCE monitoring mission.

9. All foreign military formations and military equipment, as well as militants and mercenaries, are to exit the territory of Ukraine under OSCE monitoring.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:

(Signed) Heidi **Tagliavini**,
Ambassador

(Signed) L. D. **Kuchma**,
Second President of Ukraine

(Signed) M. Y. **Zurabov**,
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine

(Signed) A. W. **Zakharchenko**

(Signed) I. W. **Plotnitski**

Minsk, 19 September 2014

Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements

Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation starting from 00.00 AM (Kiev time) on the 15th of February, 2015.
2. Withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides on equal distances in order to create a security zone at least 50 km wide from each other for the artillery systems with caliber greater than 100mm and more, a security zone of 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for MLRS "Tornado-C", "Uragan", "Smerch" and Tactical missile systems "Tochka" ("Tochka U"):
 - for the Ukrainian troops: from the *de facto* line of contact;
 - for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblast of Ukraine from the line of contact according to the Minsk memorandum of September 19, 2014.

The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and to be completed within 14 days.

The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from the day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.
4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions" as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this Law.

Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of the document a resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying the special regime, under the Law of Ukraine On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions", based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.
6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle "all for all". This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.
7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.
8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socio-economic ties, including social transfers, such as pension, payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).

To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.
11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new Constitution entering into force by the end of 2015, providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015ⁱ.
12. Based on the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions”, questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.
13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:

Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini

Second President of Ukraine, L.D. Kuchma

Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, M.Y. Zurabov

A.V. Zakharchenko

I.V. Plotnitskiy

Minsk, 12 February 2015

ⁱ Such measures are, according to the Law on the special order for local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions:

- Exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination for persons involved in the events that have taken place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- Right to linguistic self-determination;
- Participation of organs of local self-government in the appointment of heads of public prosecution offices and courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- Possibility for certain governmental authorities to initiate agreements with organs of local self-government regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- State supports the social and economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;
- Support by central government authorities of cross-border cooperation in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions with districts of the Russian Federation;
- Creation of the people's police units by decision of local councils for the maintenance of public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions;

The powers of deputies of local councils and officials, elected at early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the law, cannot be early terminated.

Draft Treaties on (settlement of the situation in Ukraine, its neutrality and) security guaranties of Ukraine and Communiqué

Draft as of 17.03.2022. (22:00)

Reconciled text received from the Ukrainian side, with amendments from the
Russian side
(during consultations on 16.03.2022, 15:00-16:30, and on 17.03 2022)

[Proposals by Ukraine]

(Proposals by the RF)

(EXPLANATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN SIDE REGARDING THE
UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE UKRAINIAN WORDINGS)

[EXPLANATIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE REGARDING THE
UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE RUSSIAN WORDINGS]

Treaty on (settlement of the situation in Ukraine, its neutrality and) security
guarantees of Ukraine

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United States, France, being the
guarantors of the permanent neutrality of Ukraine (Guarantor States), and Ukraine,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

referring to the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine dated 16 July
1990 and, in particular, the fact that in the Declaration Ukraine solemnly proclaimed
its intention of becoming in future a permanently neutral state that does not
take part in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept,
to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons,

being convinced that enshrining the permanent neutrality of Ukraine at the
international legal level is an integral part of the long-term goal of maintaining
[universal] peace and [international] security [,including] in the European region,

referring to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other
principles and norms of international law, recognizing realizing the need for strict
and unconditional observance thereof, as well as adhering to the obligations assumed
within the OSCE, [as well as enshrined in the Memorandum on Security
Guarantees in connection with the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) of 05
December 1994,]

(UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCE TO THE
BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM, WHICH CONTAINS THE RECOGNITION OF
THE BORDERS OF UKRAINE AS OF 1994.)

[THIS PROVISION IS PRINCIPAL FOR UKRAINE, BECAUSE THE BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM IS A CONDITION FOR UKRAINE'S RATIFICATION OF THE NPT (LAW OF UKRAINE NO. 248/94 DATED 11/16/1994), AND FOR UKRAINE MENTIONING NPT WITHOUT MENTIONING THE BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM IS UNACCEPTABLE. NEITHER UKRAINE, NOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS DENOUNCED THE BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM. IN ADDITION, A SOLUTION ON THE ISSUE OF BORDERS WILL BE FOUND BEFORE THE EXECUTION OF THIS TREATY]

[recognizing that the acceptance by Ukraine of the status of permanent neutrality does not affect the fulfillment of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and will not be contrary to the achievement of the aims the United Nations]

(WE OPPOSE THE WESTERN TERMS "WORLD ORDER" AND "WORLD ORDER BASED ON RULES". THE WORDING IS NOT LEGALLY PRECISE)

[THE PROPOSED TEXT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE TERM "WORLD ORDER" AND IS BASED ON A SIMILAR PROVISION OF THE UN GA RESOLUTION DATED 12.12.1995 ON THE PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF TURKMENISTAN]

realizing their exclusive historical responsibility to present and future generations,
in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. [Subject to due observance by the Guarantor States of the obligations they assumed under this Treaty,] (NEUTRAL STATUS MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL) [RELATED TO THE RUSSIAN WORDING UNDER ARTICLE 4, PARA 5, OF THE RF'S PROPOSAL DATED 14.03.2022 (UNDER ARTICLE 4-1 IN THIS DRAFT). THE APPROACH SHOULD BE SIMILAR IN BOTH CASES] Ukraine undertakes to support its permanent neutrality declared and enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine.

[2. The guarantor states recognize, respect and guarantee the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, and undertake to ensure that this status is observed at the international level.]

(REFERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS OF UKRAINE IS UNACCEPTABLE, SINCE THE BORDERS CHANGED AFTER THE CRIMEA MERGED IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE DPR AND LPR DECLARED THEIR INDEPENDENCE)

[TO THE BEST OF OUR UNDERSTANDING, THE ISSUE OF BORDERS WILL BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE EXECUTION OF THIS TREATY]

3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1, Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state, undertakes:

a) not to engage in activities that would be contrary to the international legal status of permanent neutrality;

b) to terminate treaties and agreements incompatible with permanent neutrality;

c) not to participate in military conflicts on the side of any guarantor state and/or any third state;

d) not to join any military alliances and not to enter into any other military agreements with any states;

e) not to allow entry into Ukraine or deployment in any form on its territory, including temporarily, of foreign armed forces and formations, including military personnel,

[except in the following cases: (i) in the exercise of the right to self-defense in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (in this case, the deployment shall be carried out in response to an official request from Ukraine and on the basis thereof) and/or (ii) in the event of a serious threat to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity or neutrality of Ukraine (in this case, the deployment shall be carried out in response to an official request from Ukraine and on the basis thereof) and/or (iii) when providing assistance to Ukraine, in response to an official request from Ukraine and on the basis thereof, by a reasonable number of foreign military personnel for civilian works and activities of a non-military nature, in particular, to assist in the elimination of the consequences of emergencies caused by natural or technogenic disasters;]

[Alternative proposal by Ukraine: except in cases where such entry or deployment is permitted by this Treaty and/or does not contradict the international legal status of permanent neutrality;]

(CONDITIONING OF NEUTRAL STATUS, CREATING CONDITIONS FOR ITS VIOLATIONS IS UNACCEPTABLE)

[THIS PROVISION IS IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE REGARDING PERMANENT NEUTRALITY. FOR INSTANCE, ALL OF THE PROPOSED EXCEPTIONS ARE PRESENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF MALTA AS A NEUTRAL STATE. THE RF HAS NOT MADE A REPRESENTATION ABOUT THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF SUCH EXCEPTIONS WITH MALTA'S NEUTRALITY STATUS]

f) to prevent creation or preservation of foreign military bases and other military infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine,

g) not to allow any foreign states, military alliances and coalitions to use military and civilian infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine, including airports and ports, for any military purposes;

h) **[without the consent of the Guarantor States]** not to conduct military exercises with the participation of foreign armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, in its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone;

i) to prohibit the recruitment of citizens of foreign states and stateless persons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and other law enforcement agencies;

j) to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

k) to refrain from using its own territory or the territories of other states to harm the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of other states;

l) to strictly comply with the obligations of Ukraine as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons; not to accept transfers from anyone of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control of such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nor seek or accept any assistance in manufacturing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

m) to strictly comply with the obligations of Ukraine under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)

and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, not to Provide its territory for the carrying out [illegal] activities, (*detrimental to*) [in the field of] biosecurity.

[GIVEN THAT THE RUSSIAN SIDE UNDERSTANDS THE WORD "ILLEGAL" AS PERTAINING TO DOMESTIC (NATIONAL) LAW AND AT THE SAME TIME UNDERSCORES THAT THE SAID ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT VIOLATE THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, THE UKRAINIAN SIDE PROPOSES AN ALTERNATIVE OPTION:

"m) strictly comply with the obligations of Ukraine under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, not to provide its territory for activities that violate the provisions of these Conventions (*and that can cause damage to chemical and biosecurity*)"]

(4. To ensure the ability to maintain order and exercise the right to self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter; there is established the maximum permissible number of military forces and assets in accordance with Annex No. 1)

[BEING DISCUSSED WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE]

(Article 2

Without prejudice to the NPT observance review and verification regime, the verification and control of Ukraine's compliance with Article 1 of this Treaty shall be carried out by a joint commission composed of (the Russian Federation, one more guarantor state) [all Guarantor States] and Ukraine and, if necessary, - Secretary General of the United Nations.)

Article 3

Pursuant to Article 1, the Guarantor States and other States that are Parties to this Treaty undertake:

[a) to respect, observe and guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders;

b) to refrain from economic and/or political pressure aimed at subordinating the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty to their own interests, and thus obtaining any advantages;

c) to seek immediate action from the UN Security Council in order to provide Ukraine with all necessary assistance, if Ukraine becomes a victim of

an act of aggression, armed attack, any military operation or an object of a threat of aggression, armed attack or any military operation;]

(REFERENCES TO THE BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM, AS WELL AS MENTIONING OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS AND POSITIONING OF RUSSIA AS AN AGGRESSOR STATE ARE UNACCEPTABLE)

[WE UNDERSTAND THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS -A-, -B-, -C- WILL BE ACCEPTABLE ONCE THE ISSUE BORDERS IS SETTLED BEFORE THE EXECUTION OF BEFORE THIS TREATY]

d) not to enter into any military alliances and not to enter into any other military agreements with Ukraine;

e) **[not to carry out activities contrary to Ukraine's international legal status of permanent neutrality;]**

[THIS OBLIGATION OF THE GUARANTOR STATES AND OTHER STATES CORRESPONDS TO UKRAINE'S OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 1, PARAGRAPH 3(A) AND IS RELATED THERETO]

f) to refrain from direct or indirect interference in any form in the internal affairs of Ukraine;

g) to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine **[, its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine, except in self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter];**

h) to refrain from using their territories or the territories of other states to damage the permanent neutrality of Ukraine **[,its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity];**

(IN PARAGRAPHS C AND D THE RECOGNITION OF THE BORDERS OF UKRAINE WITH CRIMEA AND DONBASS IS UNACCEPTABLE)

i) not to bring onto the territory of Ukraine or deploy in any form on the territory of Ukraine **[any] armed forces and formations, including military personnel, [in any quantity, for any purpose, for any time and under any pretext (including humanitarian intervention) except (i) in cases expressly provided for by this Treaty and/or (ii) by a decision of the UN Security Council, which must be supported by all permanent members of the UN Security Council. Violation or threat of violation of this provision will mean committing an act of aggression or a threat of aggression against Ukraine with the consequences provided for by this Treaty;]**

(RUSSIA DOES NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERFERENCE IN THE COMPETENCE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. CONDITIONING OF THE NEUTRAL STATUS, CREATING CONDITIONS FOR ITS VIOLATIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE.)

j) not to allow the creation or preservation of their military bases and other military infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine, as well as the deployment of weapons;

The Parties reserve the right to add to this subparagraph a prohibition on any type of weapon that may be developed as a result of scientific research.

k) not to conduct military exercises on the territory of Ukraine and, to prevent occurrence of incidents, in a zone [] wide from the border line of Ukraine, in its airspace, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone,

l) not to use infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine for any military purposes, including air, sea and river ports,

m) to abandon any military activity on the territory of Ukraine (*without prejudice to Article 10, Paragraph 3, hereof*);

n) terminate treaties and agreements that are incompatible with the permanent neutrality of Ukraine;

o) strictly observe Ukraine's rights **[and their obligations]** under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (*as a non-nuclear-weapon state*);

(REFERENCE TO GUARANTOR STATES THAT ARE NUCLEAR POWERS IS UNACCEPTABLE)

p) not to use the territory of Ukraine for the purpose of carrying out **[illegal]** activities (*detrimental to*) **[in the field of]** biological security, not to encourage, not to induce Ukraine to produce and acquire chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons.

[q) to strictly observe their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, not to provide or use their territory for illegal activities in the field of biological security.]

(THE WORDING IS NOT LEGALLY PRECISE)

[TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMENTS TO SUB-PARAGRAPH (R) OF ARTICLE 1, PARAGRAPH 3, THE UKRAINIAN SIDE PROPOSES A LEGALLY PRECISE ALTERNATIVE TEXT TO

**REPLACE SUR-PARAGRAPHS (P) AND (Q) ABOVE С УЧЕТОМ
КОММЕНТАРИЕВ К ПОДПУНКТУ (R) ПУНКТА 3:**

"p) to strictly observe their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, not to use their territory and/or the territory of Ukraine to carry out activities that violate the provisions of these Conventions, not to encourage or induce Ukraine to produce and acquire chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons"]

2. The Parties to this Treaty mutually undertake:

a) in relations with each other, to be guided by the principle of equal and indivisible security and not to strengthen their own security at the expense of each other's security;

b) in relations with each other, to peacefully resolve all international disputes, as well as to refrain from any use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the aims and the Charter of the United Nations;

c) not to create conditions or situations that could pose threat or be perceived as a threat to each other's national security;

d) to exercise restraint in military planning and when conducting exercises to reduce the risks of eventual dangerous situations, in accordance with their obligations under international law;

e) to comply with the fundamental norms and principles of international law, as well as to encourage observance of the international humanitarian law.

3. Ukraine and each of the countries that are parties hereto do not consider each other as adversaries.

4. Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall maintain dialogue and interact on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas.

5. The Parties hereto share the understanding that the status of a permanently neutral state is compatible [**, without any limitations,**] (*without Ukraine's participation in the military component of the European Union and without its Joining any statements, decisions or actions of the European Union directed against Russia and its national interests*) with the membership of a permanently neutral state in the European Union, as well as with the participation of Ukraine in peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE [**, or the EU**].

[NEUTRAL EU MEMBER STATES ARE AUSTRIA, FINLAND, SWEDEN, IRELAND AND MALTA, THESE STATES PARTAKE IN THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (SCDP/CSFP). THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION HAS NOT MADE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT

THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE NEUTRALITY OF THE SAID STATES WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN SCDP/CSFP, OR IN ANY EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS, THE AGREEMENT ON THE ACCESSION OF MALTA TO THE EU EXPRESSLY STATES THAT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE SCDP/CSFP DOES NOT DAMAGE ITS NEUTRALITY, THE RF DID NOT OBJECT. IN ADDITION, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE'S OBLIGATIONS TO "NOT CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY" (PARAGRAPH 3(A) OF ARTICLE 1)]

Article 4

1. In order to address issues and resolve problematic situations, Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral and multilateral consultations.

2. Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, key provisions of their military doctrines. In order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities, all available mechanisms and instruments of confidence-building measures shall be used.

3. To maintain emergency contacts between Ukraine and each of the guarantor states, telephone "hotlines" shall be established.

4. In the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty **[independence, territorial integrity or]** *(and)* neutrality of Ukraine and any other obligations contained in this Treaty, the Guarantor States, on their own initiative and/or at the official request of Ukraine, *(shall take)* **[undertake to immediately take]** all possible steps to eliminate such violation or threat of violation by peaceful means.

[Article 4-1]

(Should, after the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, Ukraine become the object of aggression, the Guarantor States, in response to the official request of Ukraine, shall take the following actions:

- hold immediate consultations to assess the situation, ascertain acts of aggression and agree on the necessary measures to stop them; inform the UN Security Council about the decision taken;

- on the basis of the decisions agreed by all Guarantor States, provide all necessary military assistance to Ukraine).

[THE UKRAINIAN SIDE NOTES THAT DURING THE CONSULTATIONS ON 15.03.2022, THE UKRAINIAN SIDE PROPOSED TO REMOVE THE WORDS "AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT" FROM THE TEXT OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH (SO THAT SAFETY GUARANTEES WERE NOT CONDITIONAL) AND THAT THE HEADS OF BOTH DELEGATIONS CAME TO UNDERSTANDING THAT:

(I) AFTER THE WORD "AGGRESSION", THE WORDS "ANY ARMED ATTACK ON UKRAINE OR ANY MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST UKRAINE" MAY BE ADDED;

(II) IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH THE WORD "ALL" MAY BE REPLACED WITH "FOUR" (POSITION OF THE RF) OR "THREE" (POSITION OF UKRAINE)]

[The Guarantor States and Ukraine agree that in the event of any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States, after urgent and immediate consultations (which shall be held within no more than three days) among them, in the exercise the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will provide (in response to and on the basis of an official request from Ukraine) assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack, by immediately taking such individual or joint action as may be necessary, including closing airspace over Ukraine, providing necessary weapons, using armed forces in order to restore and subsequently maintain the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state.

Any such armed attack (any military operation) and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. Such measures will cease when the Security Council takes the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.]

[Possible compromise wording:

1. Should (*after the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty*) Ukraine become the object of aggression, any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine, the Guarantor States, in response to the official request of Ukraine, shall take the following actions:

1) hold immediate consultations [, **which shall be held within no more than three calendar days and with the obligatory participation of Ukraine,**] to assess the situation, (*ascertain acts of aggression, an armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine*) and agree on the necessary measures to thwart (*them*) [aggression, any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine]; [immediately after the expiry of the aforesaid three-day term]

inform the UN Security Council [**and Ukraine**] of the (*adopted*) [**agreed**] decision [**or lack of an agreed decision**];

2) on the basis of the (*decisions*) [**decision**] (*agreed*) [**agreed**] by (*all*) Guarantor States will [**and in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Guarantor States that do not object to an agreed decision, will immediately**] provide all necessary military assistance to Ukraine [, **including closing the airspace over Ukraine, providing necessary weapons, using armed forces, deploying units of their armed forces on the territory of Ukraine in order to restore and subsequently preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Ukraine. At that, the Guarantor States objecting the agreed decision, or all Guarantor States in the absence of an agreed decision, within the said 3-day term shall:**

a) refrain from any decisions and/or actions that may damage the permanent neutrality of Ukraine, its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity or the subject matter of this Treaty or deprive this Treaty of its object and purpose;

b) not provide any assistance and/or support to the state or any territorial entity that has committed an act of aggression, any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine.

For the purposes of this paragraph, the decision of the Guarantor States shall be considered agreed in the absence of express objections from more than two Guarantor States.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to the right of each of the Guarantor States (even in the absence of an agreed decision in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article) or any other state to provide assistance to Ukraine under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations by taking such individual or joint action which will be necessary for the restoration and subsequent preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Ukraine.]

[**COMMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE: ARTICLES 5-11 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIAN SIDE AS OF 20:40 11/03/2022 — HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS DRAFT. THE POSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN SIDE IS THAT THE ISSUES REGULATED BY THE REMOVED ARTICLES 5-11 DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SUBJECT OF THIS AGREEMENT ON NEUTRALITY AND SECURITY GUARANTEES OF UKRAINE, AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT]**

(WE INSIST ON THE RESTORATION IN THE TEXT OF ALL PROVISIONS ON CRIMEA, DPR AND LPR, SANCTIONS, DENAZIFICATION AND THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE)

(Article 5

1. Ukraine shall cancel and henceforth not impose, and also shall publicly call on all states and international organizations to cancel and henceforth not impose, any and all sanctions and restrictive measures imposed since 2014 against the Russian Federation, its officials, legal entities and individuals, as well as sanction, prohibitions and restrictions regarding economic, financial and other activities with the Russian Federation and its economic operators.

2. The guarantor states and other states who are parties to this Treaty undertake to cancel and henceforth not impose the sanctions, restrictive measures, prohibitions and restrictions referred to in this Article of this Treaty.

3. After the complete cancellation of the sanctions, restrictive measures, prohibitions and restrictions referred to in this Article and the previous Paragraph of this Article, the Russian Federation shall cancel the retaliatory restrictive measures it has introduced in connection therewith.

[1. Within a reasonable time Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall create an intergovernmental commission that will consider the issues of mutual lifting of sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by each of these states, starting from 2014, against another of these states, its officials, legal entities and individuals, and also in relation economic, financial activities with another state and its economic operators.]

[IN GENERAL, THE UKRAINIAN SIDE PROPOSES NOT TO INCLUDE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 5 TO THE TEXT OF THIS TREATY, BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PROVISIONS REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ONLY TWO PARTIES AND, MOREOVER, NOT RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TREATY (PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF UKRAINE)]

(Article 5-1

Ukraine undertakes:

a) to withdraw all interstate claims and applications for initiation of judicial and arbitration proceedings filed by Ukraine against the Russian Federation since 2014 to the International Court of Justice, the ECHR and arbitration under the 1982

[NOTE: A PORTION OF THIS PAGE IS NOT LEGIBLE IN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT]

b) to release the Russian Federation from any liability, claims, including investment and property claims of individuals and legal entities, that have been and are being considered starting from 2014 by the courts of Ukraine and foreign states, international judicial and arbitration instances, for direct or indirect damage, to take on settlement of any resulting claims;

c) to withdraw the submitted declarations and henceforth not to submit declarations on recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in relation to alleged crimes committed on the territory of Ukraine since 2013, to abandon and non to commence domestic procedures for accession to the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court.)

[Within a reasonable time Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall create an intergovernmental commission that will consider the possibility of settling interstate disputes, as well as investment and property disputes initiated by individuals and legal entities controlled by or acting in the interests of the state.]

[THE UKRAINIAN SIDE STANDS STRONGLY AGAINST INCLUSION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN THE TEXT OF THIS TREATY. A MULTILATERAL TREATY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PROVISIONS REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES ONLY, AND, MOREOVER, UNRELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE TREATY (PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF UKRAINE)]

(Article 6

1. Ukraine recognizes the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as an integral part (subjects) of the Russian Federation and, in this regard, shall make comprehensive changes to the national legislation.

2. Ukraine shall ensure the safe and unhindered movement of persons and goods through its territory to and from the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

3. *Ukraine guarantees unhindered, uninterrupted supply of fresh water to the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol through the North Crimean Canal and the safety of all hydraulic structures.)*

(Article 7

1. *Ukraine recognizes the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic within the administrative boundaries of the former Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine and, in this regard, shall introduce comprehensive changes to the national legislation.*

2. *Ukraine assumes obligations to restore the infrastructure of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic destroyed from 2014 to 2022 inclusive.*

3. *Efforts will be made to settle the issues related to the business interests of Ukrainian entrepreneurs in the territories of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.)*

(Article 8

1. *Free movement of citizens between Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall be resumed.*

2. *Transport, including rail, water and air communication between Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall be resumed.)*

[1. **Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall ensure free movement of citizens across their borders. This rule shall not limit the right of each of the states to apply measures of customs and border control, epidemiological security, as well as restrict the entry or departure of certain individuals due to such individuals having committed offences.**

2. **Ukraine and the Russian Federation shall ensure the possibility of transport, including rail, sea and air communication]**

[THE UKRAINIAN SIDE STANDS STRONGLY AGAINST INCLUSION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN THE TEXT OF THIS TREATY. A MULTILATERAL TREATY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PROVISIONS REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES ONLY, AND, MOREOVER, UNRELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE TREATY (PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF UKRAINE)]

(Article 9

Ukraine shall ensure respect for and observance of human rights and Fundamental freedoms and for these purposes shall:

a) guarantee the status of an official language to the Russian language throughout Ukraine, lift and henceforth not introduce any restrictions on its use in any areas, first of all, repeal or revise existing laws in accordance with Annex 2, cancel language quota on radio and television discriminating against the use of the Russian language compared to Ukrainian, henceforth not adopt comparable legal acts;

b) ban, with the introduction of criminal liability, the glorification and propaganda in any form of Nazism and neo-Nazism, the Nazi movement and organizations associated therewith, including holding public demonstrations and processions, construction of monuments and memorials and naming toponyms, in particular, streets, settlements and other geographical objects, and also ban the announcement of members of such organizations (including the OUN and the UNA-UNSO) and those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition as participants in the national liberation movement;

c) cancel and henceforth not impose any prohibitions of symbols associated in states with the victory over Nazism;

d) repeal all legal acts that open the possibility for the practice of glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism in accordance with Annex 3;

e) ban the activities of ultra-right organizations and parties that preach the ideology of Nazism, neo-Nazism, racial and linguistic superiority;

f) guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, cancel and prevent restrictions and discrimination against the canonical Orthodox Church (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), restore all its rights, including property rights;

g) lift all restrictions on the Russian language media, activities of journalists, as well as the Internet and social networks.

[The parties, being guided by the generally recognized principles and norms of international law in the field of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, shall enter into an agreement on mutual respect for the ethnic, cultural, educational and linguistic identity of the national minorities of Ukraine and neighboring states, whereunder the national minorities living on the territory of the parties will be guaranteed the following rights on a reciprocal basis:

- a) non-discrimination,
- b) prohibition of incitement to racial, ethnic or religious hatred and discord,
- c) the right to revive, use, support and develop their history, language, traditions, writing, literature and cultural heritage; freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- d) protection from any act of persecution, coercion or violence,
- e) protection from any manifestations of fascism, Nazism (neo-Nazism) and anti-Semitism; (prohibition of extremist organizations and movements preaching the ideology of Nazism (neo-Nazism) and racial superiority;) a ban on the production, distribution, public use of Nazi symbols with the application, and in necessary cases — strengthening of criminal liability for the crimes related to the violation of these prohibitions;
- f) protection of their cultural, educational, linguistic and informational rights;
- g) protection and preservation of monuments (military graves) of the World War II.

[THE UKRAINIAN SIDE PROPOSES NOT TO INCLUDE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 9 TO THE TEXT OF THIS TREATY, BASED ON THE FACT THAT THESE PROVISIONS ARE NOT RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TREATY (PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF UKRAINE). MOREOVER, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PROVISIONS REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PARTIES ONLY]

Article 10

(1. Starting from provisional application of this Treaty:

a) a ceasefire may be established and measures of the cessation of hostilities may be carried out. All forces shall immediately disengage and refrain from all hostilities and from all deployments, movements and actions that would lead to the expansion of the territory under their control or could cause resumption of hostilities;

b) Ukraine shall withdraw (return) all units, arms and military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the troops of the National Guard to the places of permanent deployment or to places agreed with the Russian Federation; ships and

vessels of the Naval Forces of Ukraine shall return to their bases;

c) all external military and military-technical assistance to Ukraine shall cease immediately.

2. Ceasefire, inventory of weapons and equipment shall be controlled by a joint commission consisting of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and, if necessary — the UN Secretary General.

3. Until the Russian Federation and Ukraine fulfil all their obligations under this Treaty, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation shall be located on the territory of Ukraine, where they were located at the time of execution of this Treaty.

4. The exchange of bodies of the deceased, the release of all prisoners of war and interned civilians, shall be carried out as soon as possible with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the assistance, when necessary, of other relevant international humanitarian organizations.)

[THE UKRAINIAN SIDE NOTES IT KEEPS WORKING ON THE DRAFT OF THIS TREATY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INCESSANT HOSTILITIES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE, PERMANENT ARTILLERY, BOMBING AND MISSILE STRIKES BY THE RF, INCLUDING ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND CIVILIANS IN UKRAINE, INCLUDING DESTRUCTION OF ENTIRE UKRAINIAN CITIES AND VILLAGES (SUCH BEHAVIOR IS AGAINST BOTH THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE DECISION (ORDER ON INTERIM MEASURES) OF THE UN INTERNATIONAL COURT 1602.2). THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS IGNORED UKRAINE'S NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR CEASEFIRE.]

Article 11

Any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Treaty not settled by consultation or negotiation **[between Ukraine and the Guarantor States]** (shall be referred to a commission composed of one representative from each of the disputing parties, who shall take decisions by consensus. In the absence of consensus, the parties, upon the consent of each of them, may agree on a different method of settlement.) **[shall be submitted for consideration and final decision by the International Court of Justice. Ukraine and the Guarantor States undertake to immediately, unfailingly and in good faith execute all decisions of**

the International Court of Justice, including decisions on provisional and/or interim measures.]

[Possible compromise wording:

1. The parties to this Treaty shall act in such a way as to prevent the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations in their relations, in particular, by fulfilling in good faith their obligations arising from this Treaty and the international law.

2. Any dispute between Ukraine and the Guarantor States (one or more of them) regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be referred to a commission consisting of one representative from each of the disputing parties, the decisions of which are taken by consensus within 30 (thirty) calendar days from the date of occurrence of the dispute.

In the absence of consensus, the disputing parties shall agree as soon as possible on a different settlement method.

3. The disputing parties and their representatives on the commission referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article shall take all reasonable and good faith measures to settle the dispute by peaceful means as soon as possible.

4. In the event of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation hereof, the Parties hereto shall refrain from any decisions and/or actions that may damage the permanent neutrality of Ukraine, its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity or the subject matter of this Treaty or defeat the object and purpose of this Treaty.

5. Should the dispute remain unsettled within 30 (thirty) calendar days from the date of its occurrence, the Guarantor States shall take, on their own initiative and/or at the request of Ukraine, all measures necessary to obtain an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal matter regarding the dispute.]

Article 12

The Parties to this Treaty call upon the Security Council of the United Nations to approve this Treaty and decide, with reference to Article 25 of the UN Charter, that its provisions shall be fully implemented by all Member States of the UN.

Article 13

Reservations to this Treaty by Ukraine, the Guarantor States (*and other States*

that are Parties to this Treaty) are not allowed.

[Article 13-1

This Treaty is subject to ratification by Ukraine and the Guarantor States.

Other States that are parties to this Treaty shall independently determine and implement their own domestic procedures necessary for execution of and/or acceding to this Treaty.]

Article 14

1. This Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution by Ukraine **[and all Guarantor States]** *(and by one of the Guarantor States. For each Guarantor State that executes this Treaty after the commencement of its provisional application, the Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution).*

2. This Treaty shall enter into force **[after the approval of the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state in the course of an all-Ukrainian referendum and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine]** from the date of deposit with the depositary of **[the last of the documents on ratification of this Treaty by Ukraine and each of the Guarantor States.]** *(the document on ratification of this Treaty by Ukraine and a document of consent to be bound by this Treaty, including, where necessary, ratification, by one of the Guarantor States. For guarantor states that express consent to be bound by this Treaty after this Treaty has entered into force, including, where necessary, ratify it, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit with the depositary of the relevant document).*

This Treaty, after its entry into force, shall be open for accession by any state. For the acceding state, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit with the depositary of the instrument of accession.

Article 15

This Treaty shall be executed in seven original copies in *(Ukrainian, Russian and) English languages*, having equal legal force, one copy for Ukraine and one each of the Guarantor States. In addition, another original copy of this Treaty shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, *(who shall be the depositary thereof)* **[who shall act as the depositary of this Treaty.**

The Depositary shall immediately notify all signatory and acceding States of the date of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the

date of entry into force of this Treaty, and of any other notifications it has received.

**Done in the city of Kyiv on __ March 2022 in seven original copies in
(Ukrainian, Russian and) English.]**

**The maximum number of military forces and equipment of Ukraine
to maintain order and exercise the right to self-defense**

**According to the Swedish model, the strength of the armed forces of Ukraine
shall not exceed 250 thousand people;**

**The strength of the National Guard according to the Swedish model shall not
exceed 60 thousand people;**

**The strength of the border service according to the Swedish model shall not
exceed 53 thousand people;**

tanks	— 800 pcs;
AFV	— 2400 pcs;
guns, MLRS, mortars and antitank cannons	— 1300 pcs;
wherefrom mortars	— 216 pcs;
ATGM	— 1255 pcs;
ADMS (maximum range up to 120 km)	— 200 pcs;
combat (auxiliary) aircrafts	— 160 pcs, including:
combat	— 74 pcs,
auxiliary	— 88 pcs;
combat (auxiliary) helicopters	— 144 pcs, including:
combat	— 60 pcs.,
auxiliary	— 84 pcs.;
warships with a displacement below 3200 tons	— 8 pcs.;
auxiliary vessels	— 94 pcs.;
gunboats	— 30 pcs.

**(UNACCEPTABLE, AS THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
CURRENTLY EXISTING AUSTRIAN, SWEDISH AND FINNISH MODELS
OF NEUTRALITY. DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION IN ARMED
FORCES AND WEAPONS)**

(Annex No.1

*The maximum number of military forces and equipment of Ukraine
to maintain order and exercise the right to self-defense*

The Strength of armed forces of Ukraine shall not exceed 50 thousand people;

Strength of the National Guard — below 25 thousand people;

Strength of the Border Service — below 25 thousand people;

tanks — 280 pcs;

AFV — 741 pcs;

guns, MLRS, mortars and antitank cannons — 442 pcs;

ATGM — 255 pcs.;

ADMS (maximum range up to 120 km) — 188 pcs;

combat (auxiliary) aircrafts — 100 pcs, в том числе:

combat — 74 pcs,

auxiliary — 26 pcs;

combat (auxiliary) helicopters — 79 pcs, including:

combat — 31 pcs,

auxiliary — 48 pcs;

warships with a displacement below 3200 tons — 4 pcs;

auxiliary vessels — 12 pcs;

gunboats — 20 pcs.)

List of the Laws of Ukraine regarding the language

Constitution of Ukraine

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1996, No. 30, Art. 141)

Article 10, Article 11, Article 12.

*On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language
(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2019, No. 21
Art.81)*

On Education

*(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2017, No. 38-39
Art. 380)*

Article 7. Language of Education

On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2021, No. 38, Art. 319)

On State Service

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2016, No. 4, Art. 43)

Article 2. Definitions

On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2016, No. 31, Art. 545)

Article 12. Language of legal proceedings and paperwork in courts

On television and Radio Broadcasting

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1994, No. 10, Art. 43)

Article 9. Protection of interests and national television and radio broadcasting

Article 10. Language of audiovisual (digital) mass media

*On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Language of
Audiovisual (Electronic) Mass Media*

On complete secondary education

Article 5. Language of education in institutions of general secondary education

On the Professional Pre-higher Education

*(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2019, No. 30,
Art. 119)*

Article 46. Language of the educational process

Про культуру

*(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2011, No. 24,
Art. 168)*

Article 5. Language in the sphere of culture)

List of laws of Ukraine on Nazification and glorification of Nazism

*On Purification of Power (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2014, No. 44, Art.2041)
Article 1 part 7, Article 4 part 2.*

On the condemnation of the communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the ban of propaganda of their symbols (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 26, Art. 219)

On the perpetuation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945 (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 25, Art. 191)

On the rehabilitation of victims of repression of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991

*On the legal status and honoring the memory of fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the XX century (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 25, Art. 190)
Article 1, part 1 of Article 2.*

*On the status of war veterans, guarantees of their social protection (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1993, No. 45, Art. 425)
Para 2 (second passage), para 16 of Article 5.)*

COMMUNIQUE

following consultations on March 28-30, 2022

Main Provisions of the Treaty on Ukraine's Security Guarantees

The agreement assumes:

1. The declaration of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state under international legal guarantees in order to implement a non-aligned and nuclear-free status.
2. Possible guarantor states: Great Britain, China, Russia, the United States, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, Israel. The free accession of other states to the treaty is proposed, in particular the Russian Federation proposes Belarus.
3. International security guarantees for Ukraine under the agreement do not apply to Crimea, Sevastopol and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. (The agreement will include an interpretation of how we understand the borders of the certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and how the Russian Federation understands them separately).
4. Ukraine does not join any military alliances, does not deploy foreign military bases and contingents, and conducts international military exercises only with the consent of the guarantor states. For their part, the guarantor states confirm their intention to promote Ukraine's membership in the European Union.
5. The guarantor states and Ukraine agree that in the event of aggression, any armed attack on Ukraine or any military operation against Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States, after urgent and immediate consultations between them (which shall be held within no more than three days), in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will provide (in response to and on the basis of an official request from Ukraine) assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack, by immediately taking such individual or joint action as may be necessary, including closing airspace over Ukraine, providing necessary weapons, using armed force in order to restore and subsequently maintain the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state.

Any such armed attack (any military operation) and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall cease when the Security Council takes the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The mechanism for implementing security guarantees for Ukraine, based on the results of additional consultations between Ukraine and the Guarantor States, will be regulated in the Treaty, taking into account protection from possible provocations.

6. The Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution by Ukraine and all (option: the majority of) the Guarantor States.

7. The Treaty shall enter into force after the approval of the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state in the course of an all-Ukrainian referendum and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine and ratification in the parliaments of Ukraine and the Guarantor States.

8. The agreement proposes to stipulate the desire of the parties to resolve issues related to Crimea and Sevastopol through bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation within 10 (option - 15) years.

9. It is also proposed to stipulate that Ukraine and the Russian Federation will not resolve the issues of Crimea and Sevastopol by military means, but will continue political and diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue.

10. The parties will continue consultations (with the involvement of other guarantor states) to prepare and agree on the provisions of the Treaty on Security Guarantees for Ukraine, modalities for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and other paramilitary forces, opening and ensuring the safe functioning of humanitarian corridors on an ongoing basis, as well as the exchange of bodies of the deceased and the release of prisoners of war and interned civilians.

11. The parties consider it possible to hold a meeting on 2022 between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia with the aim of signing an agreement and/or making political decisions regarding the remaining unresolved issues.

Annex 54

Categorization of ceasefire and peace agreements

Draft as of 4/15/2022 (12.15)

Sent to the President of the Russian Federation on April 15, 2022.

Position of the Russian Federation, not agreed upon by the Ukrainian Side

Position of the Ukrainian Side, not agreed upon by the Russian Federation

Issues that the Ukrainian Side refuses to discuss, citing their absence from the "Istanbul Communiqué"

Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees for Ukraine

Great Britain, China, the Russian Federation, the United States, the French Republic, (*Republic of Belarus*, **Republic of Turkey**), being the guarantors of the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state (Guarantor States), and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

referring to the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine dated 16 July 1990 and, in particular, the fact that in this Declaration Ukraine solemnly proclaimed its intention of becoming in future a permanently neutral state that does not take part in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons,

being convinced that enshrining the permanent neutrality of Ukraine at the international legal level is an integral part of the long-term goal of maintaining international peace and security, including at the regional level,
agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. Ukraine undertakes to support its permanent neutrality, which is declared and enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine.

2. The guarantor states recognize, respect and guarantee the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state, and undertake to ensure that this status is observed at the international level.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state, undertakes:

- a) not to engage in activities that would be contrary to the international legal status of permanent neutrality;
- b) to terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with permanent neutrality;
- c) not to participate in military conflicts on the side of any Guarantor State and/or any third state;

d) not to join any military alliances; not to conclude military agreements, the implementation of which would contradict Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harm the security of other Parties;

e) not to allow entry into the territory of Ukraine or deployment in any form on its territory, including temporarily, of foreign weapons, including missile weapons of any type, armed forces and formations; not to allow foreign military personnel to remain on the territory of Ukraine if this contradicts Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harms the security of other Parties.

It is allowed to provide assistance to Ukraine on the basis of an official request from Ukraine for foreign military personnel (without weapons) to carry out civilian work and non-military activities, in particular to provide assistance in eliminating the consequences of emergencies caused by natural or man-made disasters;

f) to prevent the creation and presence of foreign military bases and other military infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine; refuse to provide foreign states with their territory for conducting any military activities, without prejudice to subparagraph h) of this paragraph;

g) not allow any foreign states, military alliances and coalitions to use for military purposes any infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine, including air, sea and river ports, without prejudice to subparagraph b) of this paragraph;

h) without the consent of *all* Guarantor States, not to conduct military exercises with the participation of foreign armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, in its territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and in the airspace above them;

i) not to recruit citizens of foreign states and stateless persons into the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and other law enforcement agencies;

j) to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty and independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

k) to refrain from using its own territory or the territories of other states to harm the sovereignty, independence and integrity of other states;

l) to strictly comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), prevent the training of its military personnel in the use of nuclear weapons, the deployment on its territory of nuclear weapons of foreign states and their means of delivery, as well as the creation of infrastructure for the deployment or maintenance of nuclear weapons foreign states and means of its delivery;

m) ensure chemical, biological, nuclear and physical nuclear safety on its territory in accordance with that set out in Annex 4, and not carry out activities directed against the interests of other states and that could pose a threat to them in these areas.

4. Pursuant to this Article, a maximum number of personnel, weapons and military equipment of Ukraine is established in accordance with Annex 1.

Article 2

1. Pursuant to Article 1, the Guarantor States and other States that are Parties to this Treaty undertake:

- a) to respect and observe the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine;
- b) to terminate international treaties and agreements that are incompatible with the permanent neutrality of Ukraine;
- c) not to enter into military alliances with Ukraine; not to enter into military agreements with it, the implementation of which would contradict Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harm the security of other Parties;
- d) not to carry out activities contrary to Ukraine's international legal status of permanent neutrality;
- e) to refrain from direct or indirect interference in any form in the internal affairs of Ukraine;
- f) to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine, its sovereignty and independence, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- g) to refrain from using their territories or the territories of other states to damage the international legal status of permanent neutrality of Ukraine;
- h) not to bring into the territory of Ukraine or deploy in any form on the territory of Ukraine, including temporarily, any armed forces and formations and any weapons, including missile weapons of any type; not to send military personnel to the territory of Ukraine if this contradicts Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty and/or harms the security of other Parties;
- i) not to allow the creation and location of their military bases and other military infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine;
- j) not to conduct military exercises on the territory of Ukraine and, to prevent the occurrence of incidents, in a strip 50 (fifty) kilometers wide from the line of territories indicated on *the map* in Annex 6, without prejudice to subparagraph h) of paragraph 3 of Article 1.
- k) not to use any infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine for military purposes, including air, sea and river ports, without prejudice to subparagraph h) of paragraph 3 of Article 1;
- l) to abandon any military activity on the territory of Ukraine, without prejudice to subparagraph h) of paragraph 3 of Article 1;
- m) not take actions that undermine Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT; not to train Ukrainian military personnel in the handling of nuclear weapons, not to use the territory of Ukraine for the deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, as well as the creation of infrastructure for the deployment or maintenance of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; not to use the territory of

Ukraine, its territorial waters and airspace for the transit of nuclear weapons or their delivery vehicles.

n) in accordance with what is set out in Annex 4 of this Treaty, not to take actions leading to a violation of chemical, biological, nuclear and nuclear security on the territory of Ukraine, and not to carry out activities there that are directed against the interests of other states and may pose a threat to them in the indicated areas.

2. Ukraine and each of the States that are Parties to this Treaty do not consider each other as adversaries.

3. All parties to this Treaty mutually undertake to resolve all international disputes and territorial questions peacefully between themselves, and to refrain from any use or threat of use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and Charter of the United Nations.

4. Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall maintain dialogue and interact on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas.

Article 3

The Parties to this Treaty share the understanding that Ukraine's status as a permanently neutral state is, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, compatible with Ukraine's possible membership in the European Union, as well as its participation in UN, OSCE or EU peacekeeping missions.

Article 4

1. In order to address issues and resolve problematic situations, Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral and multilateral consultations.

2. Ukraine and the Guarantor States shall regularly voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers and key provisions of their military doctrines. In order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities, all available mechanisms and instruments of confidence-building measures shall be used.

3. To maintain emergency contacts between Ukraine and each of the Guarantor States, telephone "hotlines" shall be established.

4. In the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of Ukraine and any other obligations contained in this Treaty, the Guarantor States, on their own initiative and/or at the official request of Ukraine, undertake to take all possible steps to eliminate such a violation or threats of violation by peaceful means.

Article 5

The Guarantor States and Ukraine agree that in the event of an armed attack on Ukraine, each of the Guarantor States, after holding urgent and immediate consultations (which shall be held within no more than three days) among them, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, *on the basis of a decision agreed upon by all Guarantor States*, will provide (in response to and on the basis of an official request from Ukraine) assistance to Ukraine, as a permanently neutral state under attack, by immediately taking such individual or joint action as may be necessary, including **closing the airspace over Ukraine, the provision of the necessary weapons**, using armed force in order to restore and subsequently maintain the security of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state.

Such use of force can only be defensive in nature and is limited to the territory indicated on *the map* in Annex 6.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the UN Security Council. Such measures will cease when the UN Security Council takes the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

The Russian Federation and Ukraine shall cancel all mutual sanctions, prohibitions and/or restrictive measures, including retaliatory measures introduced since 2014 against each other, legal entities, officials and individuals, as well as sanctions, prohibitions and/or restrictive measures in relation to with each other and between economic and other operators of economic, financial and other activities;

The lifting of sanctions, prohibitions and/or restrictive measures, in accordance with this Article, shall be carried out regardless of the position and actions of other states and their associations.

Article 7

1. International judicial and arbitration proceedings on interstate claims and applications filed by the Russian Federation and Ukraine against each other, starting from 2014 (in particular, in the International Court of Justice, the ECHR and arbitrations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982), shall be terminated;

The Russian Federation and Ukraine shall notify the judicial and arbitration authorities about this jointly or separately; in the case of separate notification, the second party to the proceedings shall not object to its termination;

The Russian Federation and Ukraine shall not initiate repeated or new proceedings arising from the same events.

2. Within a reasonable time, an intergovernmental commission facilitating the settlement of investment and property claims against the Russian Federation by Ukrainian individuals and legal entities, as well as Russian individuals and legal entities against Ukraine, shall be created.

3. Ukraine shall withdraw the submitted ones and shall not submit, on the same grounds, applications for recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and shall not carry out domestic procedures for accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court within five years after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article 8

Paragraph 1 of Article 2 and Articles 4, 5 and 11 of this Treaty shall not apply to Crimea and Sevastopol.

Article 9

Paragraphs 1 of Article 2 and Articles 4, 5 and 11 of this Treaty **shall not** apply to the territories indicated on *the map* in Annex 6.

Article 10

Without prejudice to the NPT regime and taking into account what is set out in Annex 4 to this Treaty, verification and control of Ukraine's fulfillment of obligations under Article 1 of this Treaty shall be carried out by a joint commission consisting of representatives of all interested Guarantor States and Ukraine, as well as, if necessary, the UN Secretary-General and/or representatives of the IAEA.

Article 11

The timing and procedure for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and exchange of prisoners of war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine from the beginning of the provisional application of this Treaty are determined by Annex 5.

Article 12

Ukraine shall guarantee that the Russian language is an official one and functions on an equal basis with the Ukrainian state language in all legislative, executive and judicial institutions and institutions of Ukraine. Ukraine, within 30 (thirty) days after signing this Treaty, shall remove all restrictions on the use of the Russian language in any area in accordance with Annex 2.

Article 13

Ukraine shall condemn and ban all propaganda and all organizations based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of a certain skin color or ethnic or national origin, including the ideas of fascism, Nazism, neo-Nazism and aggressive nationalism, and for these purposes within 30 (thirty) days after the signing of this Treaty shall cancel all regulations in accordance with Annex 3 and toughen criminal liability for committing crimes related to violation of these bans.

Article 14

1. The parties to this Treaty must act in such a way as to prevent the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations in their relations, in particular, by conscientiously fulfilling their obligations arising from this Treaty and international law.

2. Any dispute between Ukraine and the Guarantor States (one or more of them) regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Treaty must be referred to a commission consisting of one representative from each of the disputing parties, the decisions of which are made by consensus within 30 (thirty) calendar days from the date the dispute arose.

In the absence of consensus and agreement on a different method of settlement, each of the disputing parties shall ask one of the Guarantor States of its choice to appoint one additional representative to the commission. The dispute is transferred to such a commission, which independently establishes the procedure for its work.

3. The disputing parties and the members of the commission specified in paragraph 2 of this Article must take all reasonable and good faith measures to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible by peaceful means.

4. In the event of any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Treaty, the Parties to this Treaty are obliged to refrain from any decisions and/or actions that may harm the permanent neutrality of Ukraine, its sovereignty, and independence or the subject matter of this Treaty, or defeat the object and purpose of this Treaty.

Article 15

Reservations to this Treaty by Ukraine, the Guarantor States and other States that are Parties to this Treaty are not allowed.

Article 16

1. This Treaty is subject to ratification by Ukraine and the Guarantor States. Other States that are Parties to this Treaty independently determine and carry out their own internal procedures necessary for signing and/or accession to this Treaty.

2. This Treaty is subject to registration with the UN Secretariat in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter.

Article 17

1. This Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution by Ukraine and the majority of the Guarantor States, including Russia.

For each Guarantor State that executes this Treaty after the commencement of its provisional application, the Treaty shall be provisionally applied from the date of its execution.

2. Within three days from the date of the commencement of the provisional application of this Treaty, the signatory States that have executed it shall submit to the UN Security Council a draft resolution approving this Treaty and containing a clause stating that its provisions are subject to full implementation in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter by all UN member states.

3. From the date of delivery to the depositary of documents on the ratification of this Treaty by Ukraine (after approval of the status of Ukraine as a permanently neutral state during an all-Ukrainian referendum and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine) and the majority of the Guarantor States (*including Russia*), this Treaty comes into force for Ukraine and such Guarantor States.

For the Guarantor States that consent to be bound by this Treaty, after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the relevant instrument of ratification with the depositary.

4. This Treaty, after its entry into force, shall be open for accession by any state. For the acceding state, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit with the depositary of the instrument of accession.

Article 18

This Treaty shall be executed in seven original copies in Ukrainian, Russian and English, having equal legal force, one copy for Ukraine and each of the Guarantor States. In addition, another original copy of this Treaty shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall serve as the depositary of this Treaty.

The Depositary shall immediately notify all signatory and acceding States of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and of any other notifications it has received.

Done in the city of _____ < > April 2022 in seven original copies in Ukrainian, Russian and English.

Annex 1
(Russia's position)
[Ukraine's position]

The maximum number of personnel, weapons and military equipment that are in the combat composition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in peacetime

Number of Armed Forces of Ukraine [**does not exceed 250 thousand people**]
(up to 85 thousand people);

(National Guard strength¹ — up to 15 thousand people;)

Tanks	- [800] (342) units;
armored combat vehicle	- [2400] (1029) units;
Guns (²)	- [1900] (519) units;
MLRS (²)	- [600] (96) units;
anti-tank gun	- [380] (96) units;
Mortars	- [1080] (147 units;)
Anti-tank missile systems	- [2000] (333) units;
(control point (combat vehicle) of an anti-aircraft missile system [Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine])	
(maximum engagement range up to (75) km)	- [200] (190) units;
(anti-aircraft guns	- 119 units;)
(MANPADS	- 608 units;)
Combat (auxiliary) aircraft including:	- [160] (102) units,
combat	- [74] (50) units,
auxiliary	- [86] (52) units;
Combat (auxiliary) helicopters	- [144] (35) ed.,

including:

combat	- [60] (10) units,
auxiliary	- [84] (25) units;

(UAV (Aileron type aircraft for reconnaissance purposes)	- 138 units;)
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Warships with a displacement of up to 3200 tons	- [8] (2) units;
Combat boats	- [30] (10)
Auxiliary vessels(<i>and boats</i>)	- [40] (10) units;

Notes:

[1. The maximum firing range of MLRS and missile weapons of all types is no more than 280 km.

Ukraine undertakes not to develop, produce, acquire or deploy on its territory any type of missile weapons with a firing range of more than 280 km;]

(1. National Guard troops are not allowed to have heavy weapons with the exception of armored fighting vehicles.

*2. The maximum firing range of MLRS and missile weapons of all types is no more than **40** km.*

At the same time, it is allowed to develop and produce such weapons for export within the framework of the implementation of military-technical cooperation agreements that do not contradict the provisions of this Treaty, with a range of over 40 km but not more than 280 km.

Ukraine will not accumulate the weapons mentioned in paragraph two of this paragraph in quantities excessive for the implementation of the above-mentioned agreements on military-technical cooperation.)

List of the laws of Ukraine regarding the language

Constitution of Ukraine

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1996, No. 30, Art. 141)

Article 10, Article 11, Article 12

On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2019, No. 21 Art.81)

On Education

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2017, No. 38-39 Art. 380)

Article 7. Language of education

On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2021, No. 38, Art. 319)

On State Service

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2016, No. 4, Art. 43)

Article 2. Definition of terms

On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2016, No. 31, Art. 545)

Article 12. Language of legal proceedings and paperwork in courts

On Television and Radio Broadcasting

(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1994, No. 10, Art.

43)

Article 9. Protection of interests and national television and radio broadcasting

Article 10. Language of audiovisual (digital) mass media

*On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Language of
Audiovisual (Electronic) Mass Media*

On Complete Secondary Education

Article 5. Language of education in institutions of general secondary education

On Professional Pre-higher Education

*(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2019, No. 30,
Art.119)*

Article 46. Language of the educational process

On Culture

*(The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2011, No. 24,
Art.168)*

Article 5. Language in the field of culture

List of laws of Ukraine on Nazification and glorification of Nazism

- *On Purification of Power (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2014, No. 44, Art. 2041) Article 1 part 7, article 4 part 2.*
- *On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Ban of Propaganda of their Symbols (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 26, Art. 219)*
- *On the Commemoration of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945 (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 25, Art. 191). Article 7.*
- *On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repression of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991*
- *On the Legal status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 2015, No. 25, Art. 190)*
- *Article 1, part 1 of Article 2.*
- *On the Status of War Veterans, Guarantees of their Social Protection (The Official Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1993, No. 45, Art. 425)*
 - *Para 2 (second passage), para 16 of Article 5.)*

Annex 4

Being worked through with the Ukrainian Side
at the expert level

**Clarifications to the obligations of the parties
in the field of chemical and biological safety**

1. Ukraine undertakes:

a) to strictly comply with its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 (BTWC), not to carry out biological activities on its territory with the participation of representatives of military departments and related organizations;

b) to ensure that interested Guarantor States carry out verification activities on an annual basis in a bilateral format with Ukraine in relation to what is set out in subparagraph (p) of paragraph 3 of Article 1 of this Treaty in terms of biological safety, and in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph and with the provision of full access to biological objects on its territory, as well as any relevant documentation;

c) to strictly comply with its obligations under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), not to take actions on its territory in relation to toxic chemicals, as well as facilities for their production, processing, storage and transportation, causing damage to human safety and the environment; ensure the physical, technological, environmental and other safety of chemical facilities on its territory.

2. The guarantor states and other states parties to this Treaty undertake to:

a) not take actions that undermine Ukraine's compliance with its obligations under the BTWC and the CWC;

b) not to carry out biological activities on the territory of Ukraine with the participation of representatives of military departments and related organizations;

c) not take actions on the territory of Ukraine aimed at undermining its chemical and biological safety.

Annex 5

Starting from the provisional application of this Treaty:

1. The Russian Federation and Ukraine take measures to separate the parties and do not carry out actions that could lead to the expansion of the territory controlled by them or cause a resumption of hostilities;

2. Ukraine carries out the withdrawal (return) of units of its armed forces, other armed formations, weapons and military equipment to places of permanent deployment or to places agreed upon with the Russian Federation;

3. The procedure and timing for the withdrawal (return) by the Russian Federation of units of its armed forces, other armed formations of weapons and military equipment outside the territory indicated on the map in Annex 6, are defined in accordance with a schedule, in order to prepare which the Russian Federation and Ukraine will hold consultations;

4. Monitoring the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Annex and Annex 1 to this Treaty is carried out by a joint commission of representatives of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as representatives of the UN Secretary-General, if necessary;

5. The exchange of bodies of the dead and the release of all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall be carried out as soon as possible with the participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the assistance, when necessary, of other relevant international humanitarian organizations.



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