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


**RAZUMKOV CENTRE**



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
Netherlands

# CITIZENS OF UKRAINE ON SECURITY: PERSONAL, NATIONAL, AND ITS ELEMENTS



Results of the second national-wide public opinion poll



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Results of the second national-wide public opinion poll

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This publication presents the results of the second national-wide public opinion poll performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service within the framework of the project “Monitoring Ukraine’s Security Governance Challenges”. The project is implemented by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) jointly with Razumkov Centre, with financial support from the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The survey was performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on April 21-26, 2017, in all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 2,018 respondents aged above 18 years were polled. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.

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All photo materials in this publication were taken from publicly available sources.

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## FOREWORD

More than three years ago, a new tragic stage began in Ukraine's modern history. Tough confrontation between the authorities and society at the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014, unlawful annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation and the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine changed the security situation in the country fundamentally. Threats of foreign aggression and subversive activities in the format of a “hybrid war” that until recently had seemed notional, became an everyday reality for Ukrainian society. Hostilities on the country's soil and a permanent threat of a large-scale aggression of the Russian Federation exert serious influence on the overall security and stability in the country. The uneasy security situation is further complicated by economic problems and post-revolutionary radicalisation of social processes.

The purpose of the public opinion poll was to find out the thoughts of citizens on a wide range of problems, concerning:

- external and internal threats;
- personal safety and factors that influence the perception of safety;
- the rate of corruption, the progress of fighting it, and the readiness of citizens to counter acts of corruption;
- problems of human rights protection, including guarantee of gender equality;
- assessments of the activity of the authorities and other actors in the security sector;
- formulation and implementation of security policy;
- activity and separate aspects of reformation of law-enforcement bodies;
- civilian democratic control of the security sector;
- assessments of the progress, priorities and prospects of reforms in the security sector, the role of national actors and international partners promoting reforms in Ukraine.

The authors believe that the obtained results are important for the formulation and implementation of the state policy, identification of challenges for security sector governance and reforms, prioritisation and planning of the following steps for reform implementation, and establishment of strategic communication between the state and society for the most critical societal issues.

# SUMMARY RESULTS AND KEY CONCLUSIONS

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## Assessment of internal and external threats to the national security

The second public opinion poll results has proved the majority of findings made on the basis of the previous poll in May 2016.\* The main threats to Ukraine's national security are largely of an internal nature and related, first of all, with inefficiency of governance, corruption, insufficient capability of the state to secure protection of citizens. Economic crisis, unemployment, income drop, corruption, stranglehold of oligarchs are the problems that concern Ukrainians most of all. Even in the rating of external threats, threats of military aggression and "hybrid war", despite their real urgency, yield to financial problems, which are seen by Ukrainians as the most serious danger for the state.

Some changes in assessments and the rating of urgency of threats in the course of time are insufficient for conclusions about the loss of their urgency and give no grounds to ignore the seriousness of each of them. Even the lowest score of public perception of the seriousness of separate threats remain in the "red" sector of the scale.

## Personal safety, factors of feeling safe and secure

Ukrainian citizens feel safer in their customary environment: in their own apartment, entrance lobby and courtyard, in their neighbourhood. Men in most cases report a higher feeling of safety than women. There is also a clear trend towards a decrease in the feeling of safety with the growth of the respondents' age. Meanwhile, the overall trend of changes over the past years is not too optimistic, given the higher percentage of citizens who feel less secure and a decrease in the number of those who reported greater security.

Feeling safe is greatly influenced by two key factors: assessment of the urgency of each threat for their personal security, and citizens' perceptions of the reliability of protection provided by the state. For instance, citizens feel the least protected from theft and robbery and unlawful acts by the Ukrainian authorities. The capabilities of self-defence from thieves and robbers are limited, actions of the state are seen as a threat rather than protection.

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\* For more detail see: Citizens of Ukraine on security: personal, national, and its elements. – Results of a nationwide sociological survey conducted by Razumkov Centre, Kyiv, 2017, <http://ukrainesecuritysector.com/publication/citizens-ukraine-security-personal-national-elements>.

Negative trends in the perception of safety by those polled over the past year are recorded in nearly all aspects. In some cases there are significant regional, gender and age differences in assessments of the perception of safety that deserve deeper analysis and consideration in the process of the formulation and implementation of the state policy, as well as international and civic initiatives.

The perception of personal safety by those polled is most of all affected by the armed conflict, economic crisis and criminal situation. Although said factors dominated in May 2016, the degree of their influence substantially changed, compared to the previous year: the effect of the two former somewhat decreased, while the importance of the criminal situation as a factor influencing the feeling of safety increased. Those polled in 2017 paid much more attention to events beyond Ukraine (armed conflicts, migration crisis, terrorist acts) as factors that influence their safety.

Results of security reforms influence the feeling of personal safety much less than results of economic, political and social reforms. Analysis of answers to questions about the assessment of threats and the progress of reforms in Ukraine prompts some suggestions concerning the nature of influence of reforms (negative or positive).

Regional, age and gender distribution of answers proves rather a concurrence of opinions of those polled, irrespective of their place of residence, age and sex.

## Human rights

Regretfully, Ukrainians pay too little attention to the state of observance of fundamental rights and freedoms as a key prerequisite of security and development in their assessments. At that, regional, age and gender differences are not statistically significant.

According to those polled, the main violators of human rights in Ukraine are the President, the Government, and criminal structures. East Ukraine reported the most critical attitude to the authorities. Their choice between accusations of the authorities and criminals of human right violations (only one option) especially strikes the eye.

It is noteworthy that the view of the President in this infamous rating hardly rests on facts of real violations committed by the supreme state official and rather represents the biased assessment of the President's responsibility for problems with human rights existing in the country.

Although Ukrainians in general are not overly self-critical, the West and the Centre tend to accuse themselves and their compatriots much more in problems with human rights.

Choice of the methods of protection of human rights in Ukraine gives grounds for rather sad conclusions. Almost a third of those polled were unable to choose an answer from the proposed list. Almost every fourth citizen intends to seek protection not with the state but beyond its borders.

The overall picture did not qualitatively change last year. The share of those polled opted for “actions of civil disobedience (picketing, hunger strike, etc.)” as the most efficient method of defence of human rights increased.

### **Public trust, assessments of the roles and efficiency of the security and defence sector actors**

The critically high negative balance of trust/mistrust of society in the key state institutes formulating and implementing security policy causes deep concern and produces both a direct assessment of the efficiency of their work and an explanation to many other problems, reflected in the survey results.

The overwhelming majority of those polled believes that the President exerts the greatest influence on the formulation of the state policy in Ukraine. The role of the Government, Verkhovna Rada and NSDC are also considered important, but less than that of the President, big business and oligarchs. Ukrainians also feel strong external influence (of Western states and international organisations), and assess their own ability to influence the state policy overly pessimistically.

Despite the high ratings of the influence and importance of their role in formulation and implementation of the security policy, state structures, with few exceptions, got very critical assessments of efficiency. Pleasantly, citizens report a high level of trust in the military and confidence in its ability to defend the country. One should also note the contrast between the rather critical assessments of performance of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, on one hand, and a high appraisal of the efficiency of the Armed Forces and confidence in them – on the other.

### **Perception of corruption, readiness for and capabilities of countering**

The level of confidence of citizens in corruption of the state is shocking. While a year ago there were grounds to speak about small gains, compared to the pre-Maidan period, in 2017, the share of those who believes that corruption of the state authorities in general is a common or rather spread phenomenon exceeded even the figures of 2013.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has comparatively better indicators against the background of other structures, but they also witness serious problems with shaping the public image of NABU and drawbacks in informing society about its activity. A positive balance was only recorded in the attitude of citizens to international organisations active in Ukraine.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy of Ukraine provides for measures at promotion of cooperation between the authorities and citizens and overcoming the passivity of society in countering corruption. According to the poll data, more than half of Ukraine's citizens will remain passive if they detect a fact of corruption, while the most popular contacts for active citizens are the “anticorruption hotline” and mass media. NABU is still not seen as the main fighter with corruption. The most passive position is reported by representatives of the eldest age group.



The main reason for non-reporting about facts of corruption is the confidence that such a step will be useless. Other main reasons may be conventionally grouped in the following categories: fear, indifference, and “ideological corruption”.

More than half of those polled noticed no success of anti-corruption measures in Ukraine, while every fifth believes that it is too early to make an assessment. Assessment of the efficiency of anti-corruption reforms actually revealed no changes over the past 12 months.

### **Trust of citizens in state and social institutes**

Especially disturbing are sociological measurements of the level of public trust in state institutes. Results of public opinion polls demonstrate a critical low level of public trust in actually all Ukrainian central authorities. The regional distribution of answers makes the general picture even more dramatic. The highest negative balance of trust in the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers was recorded among residents of Southern and Eastern regions.

The rating of public trust is traditionally topped by volunteer organisations, the Church and the Armed Forces. In presence of an all-Ukrainian positive balance with respect to the security sector structures, one should note the differences in opinions of residents of the East as the only part of the country that produced a negative balance of trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the volunteer movement.

The most critical situation is observed with public trust in courts and public prosecution offices. NABU, despite its very strong presence in the media, now, after one year of operation, also has a negative balance of trust.

### **Security policy: key actors, formulation and implementation**

The overwhelming majority of those polled believes that the President exerts the greatest influence on formulation of the state policy in Ukraine, and that confidence is growing. The second place in terms of influence on formulation of the state policy was given to big business and oligarchs that, according to citizens, are more influential than the Government and the Verkhovna Rada.

Public assessment of the role of the opposition political forces may be viewed as an argument in favour of the assertion of progress of democracy in Ukraine and public recognition of the fact of presence of the opposition forces in the Ukrainian politics.

Rather low public assessments of citizens' influence on the state policy became even more pessimistic, compared to the previous poll. Much better assessments of the role of public organisations, volunteer movements prompt a way of growth of public influence on the state policy.

Regarding assessment of the role of external actors, nearly half of Ukrainians believes that the state policy is most of all influenced by the Western governments and international organisations.

Activity of the majority of state institutes tasked to counter threats to national security and possessing the relevant executive powers was de facto termed inefficient, including the President's efforts. Lower assessments than to the President were given only to Parliament and the Government. The highest marks were given to volunteer organisations, the Armed Forces and the National Guard, although the ability of the Armed Forces and other security structures to reliably defend the state from internal and external threats arouses doubts among the majority of citizens. The most critical opinions were expressed by residents of the East of Ukraine.

### **Law-enforcement bodies**

The block of questions dealing with law-enforcement bodies most profoundly demonstrates objective and subjective assessments of the feeling of personal safety, protection of human rights, and discloses a number of aspects related with provision of gender equality in the uniformed agencies and society in general.

Despite the legislatively provided main function of serving society by defending human rights and freedoms, countering crime, maintaining public security and order, citizens now believe that the police performs functions of guarding the officials best of all. The overwhelming majority of respondents is confident in close cooperation between the authorities and the police, in this way demonstrating their confidence in close connection between actions of law-enforcement officers and the authorities, and, respectively, their idea of division of responsibility between central and local authorities for specific actions of the police.

People mainly positively assess equal treatment of men and women by police officers; respect for human rights; treatment of victims. The public opinion on performance of official duties by the police is also mainly positive, but the assessment of police functions at fighting corruption shows a strong negative balance.

The overwhelming majority of those polled had no contact with the police over the past 12 months, while the majority of those who dealt with the police remained satisfied with the work of law-enforcement officers, and the share of positive answers increased, compared to the previous polls. Respondents highly praised their ability to attentively listen; also, the overwhelming majority did not recall any attempts of extortion by the police.

### **Reforms: intermediate results, responsibility and merits**

The year that has passed since the previous poll did not add optimism in public assessments of the success of reforms in the country. No sector has got at least a formally satisfactory mark on a five-point scale. The highest marks were given to reforms of the defence sector and of law-enforcement bodies. The judicial system and public prosecution offices expectedly got the lowest marks. Almost half of those polled saw no success of reforms in Ukraine whatsoever.

Almost a third of respondents believes that reforms in Ukraine have produced some results, first of all, thanks to the Ukrainian society that presses on the government, supports the authorities' actions and takes an active part, through individual activists and with assistance from Ukraine's international partners, which provide consultative, financial, technical support and encourage the Ukrainian authorities to implement reforms.

Almost half of Ukrainians believes that the country President should bear the main responsibility for implementation of reforms. Ukraine's Government and Verkhovna Rada got twice fewer "votes" than the head of state.

To better understand what influences public assessments, presented are respondents' answers about the degree of their awareness about reforms of the security and defence sector (police, army, security service), where the share of those who pointed to insufficiency or practical absence of trustworthy information is almost 5 times higher than of those who consider themselves sufficiently informed, and the picture actually did not change during the year.

Ukrainian citizens rather highly praised the merits of international partners in achievements made by this country on the path of reforms. They especially praised the role of the European institutions and NATO. Meanwhile, the level of awareness about international and regional organisations again demonstrates the relevance of the communication component in the work of international organisations in Ukraine.

The rating of support for reforms in Ukraine from separate countries is traditionally topped by the USA, Germany and Poland. Apparently, citizens' assessments are influenced not only and not as much by objective indicators of the scope of financial and technical assistance but first of all, by the presence of said partner countries in the Ukrainian media.

### **Civilian democratic control**

The absolute majority of Ukraine's citizens, irrespective of the place of residence and age, see to a smaller or lesser extent that it necessary to control the authorities. Meanwhile, the poll results show that people somewhat differently see the role of actors exercising civilian democratic control. Every third respondent believes that the leading role should belong to the President, while the legislatively provided leading role of Parliament was confirmed by answers of few respondents.

Unfortunately, not only the supreme political leadership but also Ukrainian citizens demonstrate insufficient understanding of the importance of civilian control of the defence establishment, as an apparent step towards European or Euro-Atlantic standards. They are also mainly against the appointment of a woman to the top position in the defence agency. On the good side, more liberal in their attitude to a female minister are respondents in the age of 18-24 years.

## Gender aspects

Citizens' opinions about equal chances of women and men (education and training) to hold all positions in the uniformed agencies split almost equally. The majority of respondents believes that with actually equal chances of training for service in the security sector structures, the rights of women to serve in the uniformed agencies are not limited.

The right and guaranteed possibilities for women to serve in the Armed Forces, the National Guard, police and other uniformed agencies are unanimously supported by the majority of representatives of both sexes. The most ardent adherents of guaranteed rights and possibilities for women are respondents in the age of 18-24 and 40-49 years.

Analysis of the body of answers with account of the time dynamics, age and gender differences, makes it possible to make some assertions supported by half or more respondents: women should have the right to serve in uniformed agencies on a par with men, hoping for proper conditions and norms of service with account of physiological makers and physical capabilities, desirably – in positions not related with immediate participation in combat operations or operational activity. The physiological make of women is not an obstacle, while their presence in a team has a positive effect.

The idea of guaranteed quotas for enrolment of women may have good chances to be supported by the public.

Less than a third of those polled agrees with the statement about the existence of gender discrimination in the uniformed agencies, but, according to the majority of citizens, the sex and age of a person influence his or her chances of enrolment to service in the uniformed agencies and judicial bodies in Ukraine. Only one in five is sure that chances are equal. Such indicator may be seen as indirect evidence of a high level of discrimination, first of all, based on age.



## EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS

Until 2014 Ukraine was one of the few countries in the post-Soviet space that managed to avoid bloodshed when leaving the USSR, peacefully settle conflict situations with neighbouring states and resolve numerous home policy and economic crises.

In the course of three years Ukraine moved in the Global Peace Index from the 111<sup>th</sup> (2013, among 162 countries of the world) to the 156<sup>th</sup> place (2016, among 163 countries of the world).<sup>1</sup> The greatest negative changes (-30) were recorded exactly in 2014, but the negative trend continued in 2016 (-4). Noteworthy, the greatest dramatic deterioration of GPI took place in 2012-2013 (-23) – yet before the beginning of the armed conflict with the Russian Federation.

More than three years ago the positive “credit history” of peace and stability in Ukraine was interrupted. A bloody armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine goes on for the fourth year in a row. In February, 2017, three years have passed since the beginning of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, that resulted in unlawful annexation of the Crimea and the unending hostilities in the East of Ukraine, huge economic losses and a massive human toll: thousands of killed and wounded, hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons.

The range of questions put to Ukrainian citizens during the public opinion poll covers actually the same aspects as the mentioned HPI study. Meanwhile, the public opinion poll data illustrate, first of all, the perception of security, rather than analytically perfect indicators.

### Internal threats

The top five most serious **internal** threats for Ukraine national security include:

- protracted economic crisis, unemployment, individual income drop – 4.5 points;<sup>2</sup>
- corruption – 4.5 points (including theft and illegal resale of property, nepotism, tender schemes, etc.);
- oligarchic groups (lobbying at the national level) – 4.1 points;
- growth of crime – 4.0 points;
- violence of armed detachments of “DPR” and “LPR” – 3.9 points.

<sup>1</sup> According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) data. The GPI ranks 163 nations using 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, which gauge three broad themes: (a) the extent of domestic or international conflict; (b) the level of safety and security in society; and (c) the degree of militarization. The GPI is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), guided by an international panel of independent experts and supported by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), which collates the data and calculates the rankings in conjunction with the IEP. For more detail see: <http://economicsandpeace.org>.

<sup>2</sup> On a scale from “1” to “5”, where “1” means no threat, “5” – the maximum threat.

The top five traditionally deals with threat relating to economy, corruption, oligarchs and crime, and only one threat is immediately related with the ongoing armed conflict (violence of armed detachments of “DPR” and “LPR”).

Changes in public assessments of the urgency of those threats in the past year generally did not influence the order of their priority.

It is worth noting that respondents from the South of Ukraine demonstrate the greatest concern, assessing the urgency of all internal threats without exception.<sup>3</sup> The most significant regional differences in assessments of the seriousness of threats were recorded for the following threats:

- violence on the part of fighters of volunteer battalions: West – 2.6, South – 3.8;
- antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexploded ammunitions: West – 2.9, South – 3.9;
- explosions at military depots: West – 3.0, South – 4.2 (diagram and table “*How serious are now the following internal threats for the national security of Ukraine?*”, pp.14-16).

## External threats

Despite the seemingly apparent priority of the threat of armed aggression and “hybrid war” (factual), financial problems, according to those polled, now pose a more dangerous external threat for the national security. Assessment of the threat from financial problems caused by Ukraine’s debt bondage with foreign creditors and international financial institutions actually did not change over the past 12 months (-0.1 points).


The scores given to those threats dropped slightly, compared to the previous poll. Meanwhile, citizens in their answers pointed to the growing threat of cyber attacks and unauthorised access to computer networks of Ukrainian state institutes and infrastructure facilities (+0.13 points) and of individuals and business entities (+0.18 points).

The highest scores in the list of probable **external** threats were reported for:


- financial problems caused by Ukraine’s debt bondage with foreign creditors and international financial institutions – 4.4;
- overt armed aggression of a foreign state (large-scale or local) – 4.3;
- “hybrid war” (including trade, economic and energy pressure, hostile propaganda, support for separatist movements) – 4.1.

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<sup>3</sup> The regional division hereinafter is as follows: **West**: Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions; **Centre**: Kyiv city, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions; **South**: Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson regions; **East**: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv regions and the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by Ukraine.



\* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means no threat, "5" – the maximum threat.



\* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means no threat, "5" – the maximum threat.  
\*\*In the questionnaire of 2016 "antipersonnel and antitank mines" and "unexploded ammunitions" were separate answers.




**How serious are now the following INTERNAL threats  
for the national security of Ukraine?\***  
average score

(continued)

	REGIONS (April 2017)			
	West	Centre	South	East
Protracted economic crisis, unemployment, income drop	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.6
Corruption (including theft and illegal resale of property, nepotism, tender schemes, etc.)	4.6	4.3	4.7	4.5
Oligarchic groups (lobbying at the national level)	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.2
Growth of crime	3.8	3.9	4.5	4.1
Violence of armed detachments of "DPR" and "LPR"	4.0	3.9	4.3	3.8
Violence of armed groups defending interests of oligarchs	3.5	3.9	4.3	3.9
Terrorist and subversive activity	3.6	3.8	4.3	3.9
Activity of illegal armed formations ("titushkas", private security companies, volunteer detachments uncontrolled by the government)	3.5	3.7	4.2	3.9
Confrontation between different branches of power	3.6	3.7	4.1	3.7
Subversive anti-Ukrainian activity of the "fifth column" (instigation of ethnic, religious enmity, separatist movements)	3.7	3.6	4.1	3.8
Aggravation of internal political struggle up to its violent forms	3.4	3.7	4.1	3.8
Technical accidents	3.3	3.6	4.2	3.7
Explosions at military depots	3.0	3.7	4.2	3.8
Mass protests against socio-economic policy of the government	3.3	3.5	3.9	3.4
Antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexploded ammunitions**	2.9	3.4	3.9	3.7
Growing numbers of internally displaced persons	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.6
Split in society (language, religious affiliation, national heroes, history, foreign policy preferences, etc.)	2.8	3.6	3.7	3.6
Violence on the part of fighters of volunteer battalions (both active and disbanded)	2.6	3.1	3.8	3.7

\* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means no threat, "5" – the maximum threat.

\*\*In the questionnaire of 2016 "antipersonnel and antitank mines" and "unexploded ammunitions" were separate answers.




\* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means no threat, "5" – the maximum threat.

The categories of external threats of a military nature (aggression, “hybrid war” and international terrorism) still slightly yield to financial problems. Paradoxically, the threat of an “Overt armed aggression of a foreign state (large-scale or local)” seems less pressing in the East and South of Ukraine – located closer to the possible source of that danger – than in other regions. For residents of the South, the most serious external threats are of a financial nature.

Some changes in the assessments and rating of the urgency of threats are insufficient to suggest that they lost their urgency and give no grounds to neglect the seriousness of each of them. Even the lowest score (3.2) of threat perception remains in the “red” sector of the scale (diagram and table *“How serious are now the following external threats for the national security of Ukraine?”*, p.17).

Analysis of public assessments of the danger from external and internal threats proves expert conclusions that the main threats to the national security of Ukraine are mainly of an internal nature (inefficient government, corruption, insufficient defence capabilities, etc.).

A half (50.9%) of those polled considers internal and external threats to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine equally dangerous. In turn, the share of those who stick to the opinion that internal threats are more dangerous (28.6%) is twice higher than of those who see the main danger in external threats (armed aggression, subversive activity, economic war, information and psychological war – 14.6%).



## PERSONAL SECURITY AND FACTORS OF FEELING SAFE


Ukrainian citizens feel safer (completely and rather safe) in their apartment (80.1%) than in their entrance lobby and courtyard (70.1%) or in their neighbourhood (60.6%). By and large, the share of those who feel safe in those places far exceeds the share of those who do not. Meanwhile, the security situation, where from 15.3% (in one's own dwelling) to 42% (in often visited populated localities) of citizens permanently feel unsafe in customary places, can hardly be termed normal.

The need of consideration of gender specificities in course of formulation and implementation of the security policy is demonstrated by the fact that men in most cases declare a stronger perception of safety than women (by approximately 10%): in their own house/apartment (84.2% against 76.8%), entrance lobby/courtyard (75% against 66.1%), in their neighbourhood (65.9% against 56.1%). The biggest difference (18.2%) refers to the perception of safety in one's own car (men – 63.8%, women – 45.6%).


Similar peculiarities were also recorded in security perceptions from people of different age groups. There is a clear trend to a decrease in the perception of safety with growth of respondents' age: the share of positive answers among young people of 18-24 years is approximately 10% higher than among citizens in the age of 50 years and older. Respondents of the youngest age group feel especially confident in their own car (67.9%), which may be an additional factor of danger for other road traffic participants (diagram and table “*Do you feel safe...?*”, pp.20-21).

According to 28.7% of citizens, their dwellings became less safe (the aggregate of answers “much” and “slightly”). The share of those who reported feeling safer (the aggregate of answers “much” and “slightly safer”) is less than half (12.3%). Stability of the level of safety in places of residence (in one's neighbourhood) over the past 12 months was reported by the majority (52.8%) of those polled. Comparison of the total body of answers “the degree of safety did not change” with the body of answers to the question “How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood?” makes it possible to decipher the nature of stability. The majority (71.7%) of respondents who reported that in their neighbourhood the level of safety over the past 12 months did not change, also gave a positive answer to the second question. I.e., this means that almost three quarters of those polled, whose perception of safety did not change, mean exactly a positive perception of safety. A negative nature of stability was reported by 22% of those polled.

**How safe do you feel  
in your neighbourhood?**  
% of those who answered  
that safety in their neighbourhood  
in the past 12 months did not change



**Do you feel safe...?**  
% of those polled



\* The aggregate of answers "safe" and "rather, safe".


\*\* Сума варіантів відповіді "unsafe" and "rather, unsafe".

Do you feel safe...? % of those polled <span style="float: right;">(continued)</span>								
	AGE, years						SEX	
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
<b>In your apartment (house)</b>								
Safe*	85.0	82.8	82.1	82.4	75.5	76.9	84.2	76.8
Unsafe**	11.6	12.3	13.2	13.1	20.5	17.6	11.4	18.5
Hard to say	3.4	4.9	4.7	4.5	3.9	5.5	4.3	4.8
<b>In your entrance lobby (courtyard)</b>								
Safe*	75.0	76.5	69.4	73.4	68.3	65.3	75.0	66.1
Unsafe**	21.1	17.6	24.0	22.5	27.5	29.2	20.8	27.9
Hard to say	3.9	5.9	6.6	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.2	6.1
<b>In your neighbourhood</b>								
Safe*	62.9	66.3	60.7	62.6	60.8	55.7	65.9	56.1
Unsafe**	29.3	27.3	30.2	29.6	33.0	36.7	27.0	35.9
Hard to say	7.8	6.4	9.1	7.8	6.2	7.6	7.1	8.0
<b>In public transport</b>								
Safe*	57.6	53.2	51.2	48.5	45.7	47.7	55.2	45.3
Unsafe**	31.7	33.9	32.7	37.4	41.2	36.4	31.4	39.9
Hard to say	10.7	12.8	16.0	14.1	13.2	15.9	13.4	14.8
<b>In other districts or populated localities you often visit</b>								
Safe*	50.3	42.6	46.7	43.7	46.4	40.6	50.8	39.3
Unsafe**	36.5	44.6	40.9	43.5	43.3	42.2	36.4	46.5
Hard to say	13.3	12.7	12.4	12.8	10.3	17.3	12.7	14.2
<b>In your car (% of those who own a car)</b>								
Safe*	67.9	53.5	58.7	53.6	53.5	47.0	63.8	45.6
Unsafe**	20.4	34.6	25.8	31.6	31.9	31.7	24.4	34.9
Hard to say	11.7	11.9	15.5	14.8	14.5	21.3	11.8	19.5

\* The aggregate of answers "safe" and "rather, safe".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "unsafe" and "rather, unsafe".

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The general trend of changes in the past three years is not too optimistic, given a higher share of citizens who began to feel less safe over the past 12 months, and also given that in May 2016, growth of safety was reported by 3.2% more respondents than in April 2017 (diagrams “*How did the level of security in your area of residence change in the past 12 months?*”, p.21, “*How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood?*”, p.19).

The next block of questions was intended to identify the perception of safety of citizens as they face a wide range of threats – from home to global. The analysis of the distribution of answers prompts the conclusion that the perceptions of safety are strongly influenced by two key factors: (1) the idea of the relevance of each threat to personal safety, and (2) people’s expectations of reliable protection by the state in case of a threat that cannot be repelled on their own.

People feel the least protected from theft and robbery (86.2%), unlawful acts by the Ukrainian authorities (82.6%) and natural calamities (82.3%). The first place in the rating is probably due to the fact that in the recent years the country has seen an increase in crime, first of all, against property.<sup>4</sup> The ability of people to defend themselves from thieves and robbers is limited, and the infamous second place of the authorities in this rating may be attributed to the low expectations of citizens.

People feel the most protected from the following threats: drug trafficking; unexploded mines and ammunitions; clashes on ethnic, regional or religious grounds; human trafficking (approximately 24-26% of those polled).

The perception of safety of those polled somewhat deteriorated during the past year. The share of those who feel unprotected from theft and robbery increased by 3.4%, from unlawful acts by the Ukrainian authorities – by 5.3%, natural calamities – by 6.4%. Similar negative trends are recorded in next to all areas.


Apparently, regional, gender and age differences in assessments of the perception of safety are not always in line with impartial statistics, but deserve deeper analysis and consideration in the process of formulation and implementation of the state policy, international and civic initiatives, especially in cases where answers of some groups deviate from the average by 10 per cent and more (diagram and table “*Do you feel protected from...?*”, pp.23-27).

The perceptions of personal safety by those polled are most of all influenced by: the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine (40% of the polled), economic situation (38.1%) and criminal situation (34.1%).


<sup>4</sup> Crime in Ukraine rose by 25% – Dekanoidze. – [http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/13531032-zlochinn\\_st\\_v\\_ukra\\_n\\_zrosla\\_na\\_25\\_dekano\\_dze.htm](http://news.liga.net/ua/news/politics/13531032-zlochinn_st_v_ukra_n_zrosla_na_25_dekano_dze.htm).

**Do you feel protected from...?**  
% of those polled


**Clashes on ethnic or religious grounds\***




**Drug trafficking\*\***




**Human trafficking\*\***



**Unexploded antipersonnel, antitank mines and ammunitions\*\***



**Attempts to take your property (business, land, housing, etc.)**



□ Yes ■ No □ Hard to say

\* In 2009-2008, such answers were not proposed.


\*\* Before 2016, such an answer was not proposed.




**Do you feel protected from...?**  
% of those polled

(continued)


**Military aggression**



**Epidemic diseases (tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, etc.)**



**Terrorist attacks**




☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Hard to say


**Do you feel protected from...?**  
% of those polled

(continued)


**Technical accidents**




**Extortion of money by officials and corruption\***




**Natural calamities**



**Robbery, theft\***



**Unlawful acts by the Ukrainian authorities\***



□ Yes   ■ No   □ Hard to say

\* Before 2016, such an answer was not proposed.

Do you feel protected from...? % of those polled <span style="float: right;">(continued)</span>											
	REGIONS				AGE, years						SEX
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men Women
<b>Clashes on ethnic, regional or religious grounds</b>											
Yes	30.8	23.6	22.4	28.0	28.0	27.9	25.3	27.2	29.1	23.0	29.9 23.4
No	56.1	62.9	61.0	63.8	57.8	59.3	64.7	61.1	59.7	62.8	60.2 62.3
Hard to say	13.1	13.5	16.6	8.3	14.2	12.7	9.9	11.7	11.2	14.2	10.0 14.3
<b>Drug trafficking</b>											
Yes	30.0	28.1	20.7	18.8	24.9	21.2	22.3	27.8	23.8	28.3	26.2 24.5
No	57.2	57.6	62.2	71.7	61.8	69.0	68.4	56.4	63.6	56.5	61.7 61.7
Hard to say	12.9	14.3	17.0	9.6	13.3	9.9	9.3	15.8	12.6	15.2	12.1 13.8
<b>Human trafficking</b>											
Yes	30.7	26.2	16.6	21.6	23.6	18.2	22.0	27.5	24.6	28.6	24.7 24.9
No	57.3	58.0	66.0	65.3	62.7	70.4	63.7	57.6	59.7	56.4	61.3 60.3
Hard to say	12.1	15.8	17.4	13.1	13.7	11.3	14.3	14.9	15.7	15.0	14.1 14.7
<b>Unexploded antipersonnel, antitank mines and ammunitions</b>											
Yes	37.4	17.4	19.9	20.9	25.8	23.2	22.5	24.0	24.1	22.2	25.2 21.8
No	50.3	67.0	58.9	65.4	59.2	63.1	64.0	60.5	61.1	61.6	62.8 60.7
Hard to say	12.3	15.6	21.2	13.7	15.0	13.8	13.5	15.6	14.8	16.3	12.0 17.5
<b>Attempts to take your property (business, land, housing, etc.)</b>											
Yes	18.2	17.8	8.7	15.4	21.0	18.2	16.8	14.6	15.4	14.2	17.2 15.4
No	69.5	66.0	78.0	75.0	66.1	68.5	72.0	72.5	70.3	71.5	71.4 70.0
Hard to say	12.3	16.2	13.3	9.6	12.9	13.3	11.3	12.8	14.3	14.2	11.4 14.6
<b>Military aggression</b>											
Yes	19.2	12.4	13.3	16.0	18.5	13.8	13.2	15.0	18.8	12.5	16.3 14.0
No	73.2	79.5	77.2	77.1	72.8	75.9	78.5	79.0	74.2	79.7	76.6 77.5
Hard to say	7.6	8.0	9.5	7.0	8.6	10.3	8.3	6.0	7.0	7.8	7.0 8.5
<b>Epidemic diseases (tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, etc.)</b>											
Yes	15.0	18.3	8.7	14.4	17.7	13.2	16.3	16.5	15.4	13.6	16.2 14.6
No	77.2	71.6	83.4	76.4	72.8	78.9	74.9	77.5	75.1	75.2	74.5 76.4
Hard to say	7.8	10.1	7.9	9.2	9.5	7.8	8.8	6.0	9.5	11.2	9.2 8.9

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Do you feel protected from...? % of those polled												(continued)
	REGIONS				AGE, years						SEX	
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Terrorist attacks												
Yes	11.0	14.0	11.3	10.5	14.2	10.3	9.6	11.7	16.5	10.4	13.5	10.9
No	82.3	78.1	81.3	79.9	77.2	82.3	83.5	79.9	76.5	80.3	78.9	80.7
Hard to say	6.8	7.9	7.5	9.6	8.6	7.4	6.9	8.4	7.0	9.3	7.6	8.4
Technical accidents												
Yes	9.7	13.2	4.6	11.6	12.5	9.8	9.9	11.3	12.1	10.4	11.4	10.6
No	83.5	76.5	87.1	78.0	76.7	81.9	81.0	83.3	79.5	77.6	79.6	79.9
Hard to say	6.8	10.2	8.3	10.3	10.8	8.3	9.1	5.4	8.4	12.0	9.0	9.5
Extortion of money by officials and corruption												
Yes	15.4	11.1	7.9	6.8	14.2	11.8	10.2	8.7	11.8	9.1	12.4	9.1
No	73.8	78.8	74.7	86.5	76.4	75.9	80.5	80.5	78.4	80.5	79.1	79.2
Hard to say	10.8	10.1	17.4	6.8	9.4	12.3	9.3	10.8	9.8	10.4	8.5	11.7
Natural calamities												
Yes	7.6	12.1	6.3	12.6	11.6	7.8	11.5	10.2	10.9	10.1	11.1	9.9
No	86.3	80.7	88.8	78.4	78.9	83.3	80.8	84.1	82.1	83.5	82.5	82.2
Hard to say	6.1	7.3	5.0	9.0	9.5	8.8	7.7	5.7	7.0	6.5	6.5	7.9
Robbery, theft												
Yes	9.5	10.4	5.0	4.5	7.3	7.8	9.9	7.8	8.4	7.0	8.8	7.3
No	86.7	81.3	92.9	90.0	86.2	86.8	84.6	87.1	86.0	86.7	85.9	86.5
Hard to say	3.8	8.3	2.1	5.5	6.5	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.6	6.3	5.3	6.1
Unlawful acts by the Ukrainian authorities												
Yes	8.9	10.4	3.3	5.6	10.7	6.4	7.7	6.9	10.7	6.3	8.6	7.4
No	82.5	78.9	85.1	87.1	77.7	85.8	82.1	83.0	80.3	85.0	82.5	82.7
Hard to say	8.7	10.8	11.6	7.3	11.6	7.8	10.2	10.1	9.0	8.7	9.0	9.9

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Although those factors (the armed conflict, economic crisis, criminal situation) dominated even in May 2016, their effect substantially dropped, compared to the previous year. The influence of the former two went down by 9.1% and 7.7%, while the importance of the criminal situation as a factor influencing the perception of safety rose by 11.7%.

Respondents paid much more attention to events taking place beyond Ukraine – the share of those for whom armed conflicts, migration crises, terrorist attacks all over the world are an important factor of influence on personal safety almost doubled.

Sadly, in their assessments Ukrainians pay rather little attention to observance of fundamental rights and freedoms as a key precondition of security and development, (6%). In this respect, regional, age and gender differences are statistically insignificant.

Results of reforms in Ukraine's security sector influence the perception of personal safety far less (7%) than results of economic, political, social reforms (18.3%). Some suggestions as to the nature of the effect of reforms (negative or positive) follow from the analysis of answers to other questions about the level of threat and assessments of the progress of reforms in Ukraine.

Regional, age and gender distribution of answers point to similar factors of influence on the safety of those polled, irrespective of the place of residence, age and sex. The most significant differences are observed in assessments by residents of the East of the effects of the armed conflict and unexploded mines and ammunitions, and by residents of the South – of the effect of the growing use of firearms (diagram and table *“Which of the following factors most of all influence your personal security?”*, pp.29-30).


## HUMAN RIGHTS

According to those polled, the main perpetrators of human rights in Ukraine are: the President of Ukraine (14.8%), criminal structures (13.5%), the Government (8.8%). Very few residents see state power structures and volunteer battalions as the main perpetrators of human rights.

There are rather notable regional differences in the choice of the main perpetrator of human rights. The East of Ukraine reported a more critical attitude to the President and the Government of Ukraine than the other regions. What is especially striking is their choice between accusations (only one answer) of violation of human rights by the authorities and by criminals: residents of the East of Ukraine put the blame on the President twice more often (18.2%) than on criminal structures (9%).

The infamous first place of the President in this rating can hardly be explained by the statistics of real violations in acts of the top state official. Rather, it reflects the personal opinion of those polled about the President's responsibility for problems with human rights observed in the country, proceeding from the public perception of his influence on developments within the state.

**Which of the following factors most of all influence your personal security?\***  
% of those polled



\* Respondents were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

**Which of the following factors most of all influence your personal security?\***

% of those polled


(continued)

	REGIONS				AGE, years						SEX	
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Armed conflict in the East of Ukraine	38.7	35.5	39.8	47.6	41.8	42.4	38.0	40.6	43.1	37.1	41.8	38.5
Economic situation in Ukraine	32.6	40.5	41.1	38.2	38.8	45.1	37.1	40.9	34.7	36.4	39.6	36.9
Criminal situation	35.3	32.7	41.1	31.9	33.0	37.3	34.3	34.1	36.1	31.9	34.1	34.1
Corruption	29.4	32.0	27.4	25.7	29.2	31.5	29.5	28.7	30.8	27.3	31.4	27.4
Growing use of firearms	11.8	15.5	34.9	22.7	19.4	19.7	20.9	17.1	20.8	16.9	19.6	18.2
Results of economic, political, social reforms in Ukraine	14.8	17.5	24.1	20.1	15.9	20.7	20.1	19.4	18.5	16.5	18.9	17.8
Personal wellbeing	17.5	15.4	18.3	17.9	15.1	14.7	16.0	16.8	17.9	18.4	16.2	17.5
World developments (armed conflicts, migration crisis, terrorist attacks)	15.9	10.8	15.8	14.3	13.3	13.8	14.0	16.1	13.4	11.6	12.5	14.4
Results of reforms in the security sector of Ukraine (defence, special services, law-enforcement bodies)	7.8	5.7	9.1	6.9	3.9	4.4	10.7	6.3	7.8	6.5	7.5	6.5
Observance of fundamental rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, faith, etc.)	7.0	5.6	7.1	5.5	5.6	6.9	7.2	6.0	6.7	4.5	5.8	6.1
Antipersonnel and antitank mines, unexploded ammunitions	0.6	1.0	2.1	4.5	2.1	1.5	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.1
Other	1.5	0.4	0.4	0.9	1.3	0.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.4	1.1
Nothing of the above	3.6	3.5	1.2	3.9	4.7	2.0	2.2	1.5	3.9	4.9	3.0	3.7
Hard to say	5.1	6.5	2.5	4.5	4.3	2.5	5.5	6.3	3.7	6.3	3.8	6.2

\* Respondents were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

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While Ukrainians are generally not too hard on themselves, the West and the Centre much more tend to accuse themselves and their compatriots of human rights problems.




\* In 2006, such an answer was not proposed.




## Who is the main perpetrator of human rights in Ukraine?

% of those polled

(continued)



\* Before 2016, such an answer was not proposed.



\* Before 2016, such an answer was not proposed.

Who is the main perpetrator of human rights in Ukraine? % of those polled <span style="float: right;">(continued)</span>				
	REGIONS (April 2017)			
	West	Centre	South	East
President of Ukraine	15.0	12.1	15.7	18.2
Prime Minister of Ukraine	1.1	1.6	2.9	0.9
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	0.8	1.3	0.4	1.5
Government of Ukraine	3.6	7.5	11.6	14.1
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	9.9	5.2	4.1	6.6
National deputies of Ukraine	8.7	5.6	5.8	5.8
Local authorities	2.3	3.9	0.4	3.2
Police	1.7	0.1	2.9	2.3
Public prosecution offices	0.4	2.6	2.1	2.4
Courts	7.8	6.5	5.4	2.6
Security Service of Ukraine	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.2
Armed Forces of Ukraine	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.6
Business	3.0	1.6	2.5	1.9
Private armed units (security companies)	1.1	1.7	2.5	2.8
Criminal structures	12.7	17.3	13.2	9.0
Citizens themselves	9.7	8.4	3.3	6.6
Volunteer battalions	0.0	0.3	1.2	1.3
Human traffickers	3.2	0.9	2.5	0.6
Other	2.7	1.9	0.4	4.3
None	1.1	0.9	2.5	0.8
Hard to say	15.2	19.5	20.7	14.4

The choice of the method of protection of human rights in Ukraine gives grounds for rather sad conclusions about people's hopes for protection by the state. Almost a third (30.8%) of those polled failed to choose any option of protection from the proposed list. Almost every fourth citizen plans to seek defence beyond the country borders: recourse to the European Court of Human Rights – 18.6%, to international organisations – 4.7%. Only 15.7% hopes for state assistance: recourse to court – 6.7%, recourse to bodies of power, including national deputies and the President – 3.9%, recourse to public prosecution offices – 3.0%, recourse to the Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner – 2.1%. One should pay particular attention to the attitude of Ukrainians to the office of the Ombudsman – the state institute called to defend rights. Apparently, the problem is of a systemic rather than personal nature.

The youngest generation (18-24 years) expressed the most optimistic opinion about the chances of finding justice in the Ombudsman's office (4.3% – twice higher than the average score) and recourse to the European Court of Human Rights (21.6%). Almost

a third (30.8%) of respondents failed to choose an option of protection of their rights from the proposed list, among representatives of the oldest age group (60+) this indicator (“hard to say”) was as high as 37.4%.

The overall picture did not qualitatively change during the past year. The share of those polled who opted for “actions of civil disobedience (picketing, hunger strike, etc.)” as the most efficient method of defence of human rights (12.1%) rose by 2.2%. Such an increase does not go beyond the limits of a statistical error but reveals the absence of a downward trend. Almost every sixth (17.1%) respondent in the Centre of Ukraine sees actions of civil disobedience (picketing, hunger strike, etc.) as the most efficient method of defence of human rights in Ukraine (diagram and Table “*Which method of defence of human rights is the most efficient in Ukraine now?*”, p.36).

Corruption in Ukraine is seen as one of the main problems, and fighting corruption – as the key priority. Corruption tops the rating of the most serious internal threats to the national security of Ukraine, and the overwhelming majority of those polled feels unprotected from corrupt acts on the part of officials.

Fighting corruption in Ukraine is high on the agenda of home policy and relations with international partners. Fighting corruption is a separate priority domain of reforms provided in “Strategy 2020”<sup>5</sup> and an integral element of sectoral reforms in Ukraine. As the general provisions of the Anticorruption Strategy for 2014-2017 rightfully state, “solution of the problem of corruption is among the priorities for Ukrainian society at today’s stage of the state development ... corruption is one of the reasons that led to mass protests in Ukraine in the end of 2013 – beginning of 2014”.<sup>6</sup>

During the three recent years Ukraine somewhat improved its position in the international rating of the *Transparency International Corruption Perception Index*, ascending from the 142<sup>nd</sup> place to the 131<sup>st</sup> with 29 points in 2016 (2013 – 25) on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).


The level of citizens’ confidence in corruption of the state is just shocking. Only 7.5% of those polled tends to believe that corruption is actually absent from the state authorities, or such instances are untypical. While just a year ago there were grounds to speak of slight progress, compared to the pre-Maidan period, in 2017, the share of those who believe that the state authorities are swept over with corruption or it is

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<sup>5</sup> “Following the performed surveys of the state of corruption, indicators of successful implementation of the Anticorruption Strategy may include: an increase in the share of the population disapproving corrupt acts; an increase in the number of citizens ready to report corrupt acts to ... the concerned bodies”. See: Fundamentals of the State Anticorruption Policy in Ukraine (Anticorruption Strategy) for 2014-2017, approved by a Law of Ukraine of 14 October 2014. – <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1699-18/paran16#n16>.

<sup>6</sup> Fundamentals of the State Anticorruption Policy in Ukraine (Anticorruption Strategy) for 2014-2017, approved by a Law of Ukraine of 14 October 2014. – *Ibid*.

**Which method of defence of human rights is the most efficient in Ukraine now?**  
% of those polled



	REGIONS (April 2017)				AGE, years (April 2017)					
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Recourse to the European Court of Human Rights	18.1	14.8	21.4	23.2	21.6	16.7	17.7	19.8	20.1	17.1
Actions of civil disobedience (picketing, hunger strike, etc.)	9.7	17.1	11.1	7.3	10.8	12.8	13.0	14.1	12.3	10.1
Recourse to a lawyer	8.9	15.4	8.2	9.4	12.9	9.9	11.3	15.3	10.3	9.9
Recourse to court	3.6	7.3	6.6	8.8	5.6	7.4	8.3	6.3	5.6	7.0
Recourse to non-governmental human rights organisations	9.5	5.6	4.9	6.6	6.0	6.9	7.7	6.0	9.5	4.7
Recourse to international organisations	3.6	5.3	4.5	4.9	3.0	3.4	5.5	4.8	5.3	4.7
Recourse to bodies of power (including national deputies and the President)	3.0	5.3	2.9	3.2	5.2	2.0	3.6	3.0	3.3	5.3
Recourse to public prosecution offices	1.7	2.2	2.5	5.6	3.9	4.9	2.2	3.3	3.6	1.9
Recourse to the Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner	3.0	2.1	0.8	2.2	4.3	2.5	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.9
Hard to say	39.0	25.0	37.0	28.8	26.7	33.5	29.0	25.5	28.7	37.4

rather spread rose by 9.5% and exceeded the figures of 2013 (88.3% against 82.3%, respectively).

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau has comparatively better scores against the background of the other structures, but the fact that the majority (51%) sees NABU as a corrupt body shows serious problems of NABU positioning and drawbacks in its activity.



A conventionally positive balance was recorded only in the attitude of citizens to international organisations active in Ukraine.


There is a notable correlation between the share of answers “hard to say” and the rating of corruption, which may witness that respondents produced rather balanced assessments, avoiding sweeping accusations of corruption against everyone (diagram *“To what extent is corruption spread in each of the following sectors?”*, pp.38-40).

According to the public opinion poll data, more than half of Ukrainian citizens will remain passive, if they detect facts of corruption: 43.1% of those polled reported reluctance to appeal to anyone, plus another 13.8% who found it “hard to say”, which may witness the absence of an acceptable answer in the proposed list. The share of those who will not report facts of corruption rose by 8%, compared to the previous poll (May 2016 – 35%). The share of people ready to call through the hotline fell by 12.4% (from 26.6% in 2016 to 14.2% in 2017). The share of respondents who will appeal to the police also fell (from 13.6% to 9%).

For citizens with a proactive attitude, the most popular destinations were the “anticorruption hotline” (14.2%)<sup>7</sup> and “mass media, journalists” (11.1%). The Verkhovna Rada, national deputies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the President, the Cabinet of Ministers as suggested addressees of people’s reports of corrupt acts all together won 3.3%.

<sup>7</sup> Noteworthy, there is no one-window “anticorruption hotline” in Ukraine. Respectively, this option should be seen as a method of reporting rather than the addressee.

**To what extent is corruption spread in each of the following sectors?**  
% of those polled




\* The aggregate of answers "everything is swept over with corruption" and "corruption is rather spread".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "there are separate instances of corruption" and "corruption is actually absent".

## To what extent is corruption spread in each of the following sectors?

% of those polled

(continued)



\* The aggregate of answers "everything is swept over with corruption" and "corruption is rather spread".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "there are separate instances of corruption" and "corruption is actually absent".

\*\*\* Before 2016, such an answer was not proposed.


\*\*\*\* Before 2017, such an answer was not proposed.



## To what extent is corruption spread in each of the following sectors?

% of those polled

(continued)



\* The aggregate of answers "everything is swept over with corruption" and "corruption is rather spread".


\*\* The aggregate of answers "there are separate instances of corruption" and "corruption is actually absent".

\*\*\* Before 2017, such an answer was not proposed.

The recently established specialised body fighting corruption, NABU, is still not viewed by society as the main opponent of corruption – only 8.2% chose this answer.

Among age differences, one should note that the smallest share of those who will not apply to anyone is among young people of 18-24 years. The most passive position with respect to most options was reported by representatives of the age group of 60 years and above (diagram and table "To whom will you appeal in case of detection of facts of corruption?", p.41).

**To whom will you appeal in case of detection of facts of corruption?\***  
% of those polled



	AGE, years (April 2017)					
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
President of Ukraine	0.4	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8
Government of Ukraine	0.0	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.4
Verkhovna Rada, national deputies of Ukraine	1.3	0.0	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.1
Police	12.1	9.9	6.6	8.4	7.8	10.1
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine	1.7	1.0	1.4	0.9	0.8	0.9
Security Service of Ukraine	5.2	4.4	2.2	5.1	3.4	4.4
National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine	11.2	6.9	6.3	7.8	10.4	7.6
Public prosecution offices	4.3	4.9	3.8	4.5	3.4	4.0
Mass media, journalists	14.6	8.3	15.7	12.3	10.6	7.0
Anticorruption "hotline"	17.6	16.2	15.4	17.0	16.2	7.8
Public organisations	8.6	11.3	7.4	6.3	7.0	6.1
Other	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.2	0.8	1.7
No one	33.0	42.2	40.5	40.1	44.0	50.9
Hard to say	12.9	16.2	14.6	13.4	13.7	13.1

\* Respondents were supposed to give all acceptable answers.

\*\* In 2016 such an answer was not proposed.

The main reason for the reluctance to report corruption is the confidence in the uselessness of such a step. Three quarters (75.5%) of those who will not apply to anyone believes that their “application will change nothing”.<sup>8</sup>


The other answers may conventionally be categorised as follows: *fear*, *indifference*, and *“ideological corruption”*. Every fifth (21.2%) of those who will not report corruption is guided by *fear*: of representatives of central bodies of power (2.7%), representatives of local authorities (4.9%), somebody’s revenge (8.6%), of losing income (a source of income, a job) (3.3%), access to certain social privileges, social services (1.7%). The share of *indifferent* (“It is none of my business”) is relatively low (8.9%). The aggregate share of those who will not apply to anyone for *ideological* reasons (“A corrupt decision may often be more fair than a legitimate one”, “I do not consider corruption unacceptable”) is 2.5%, which is 2.5 times lower than last year (6.3%) (diagram and table “*If you do not plan to appeal to anyone in case of detection of corruption, why?*”, p.43).

According to 12.9% of citizens, anticorruption programmes and anticorruption reforms in Ukraine have been very or rather successful, another 21.3% believes that it is too early to make an assessment, while 56.3% saw no progress. Summing up, this produces rather a sceptical assessment of the efficiency of anticorruption reforms, which actually did not change over the past 12 months (diagram and table “*How successful are anticorruption programmes and anticorruption reforms in Ukraine?*”, p.44).



<sup>8</sup> The list of the proposed options was supplemented, following the results of the previous poll. The option “My application will change nothing” sums up the answers of respondents in the category “other” in May 2016 (“it is in vain”, “no one will help”, “everybody steals”, etc.).

**If you do not plan to appeal to anyone  
in case of detection of corruption, why?\***  
% of those who reported that they would not appeal  
to anyone in case of detection of corruption




	AGE, years (2017)						SEX (2017)	
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
My application will change nothing	68.8	77.9	74.1	76.9	70.1	79.9	77.3	74.2
It is none of my business	9.1	9.3	7.5	9.6	9.6	9.0	6.7	10.7
Fear of revenge from certain persons	18.2	7.0	4.1	6.7	8.9	9.3	7.2	9.7
Fear of representatives of local authorities	2.6	4.7	6.8	6.7	4.5	4.1	5.1	4.6
Fear to lose income (or a source of income, a job)	0.0	2.3	2.7	5.2	7.0	1.5	2.1	4.2
Fear of representatives of central bodies of power	5.2	1.2	1.4	4.5	3.2	1.9	2.9	2.4
Fear to lose access to certain social privileges, social services	2.6	2.4	0.0	0.7	1.3	2.6	1.6	1.8
A corrupt decision may often be more fair than a legitimate one	2.6	3.5	1.4	0.0	2.5	0.7	1.1	2.0
I do not consider corruption unacceptable	1.3	0.0	1.4	0.7	1.3	0.7	0.5	1.2
Other	3.9	4.7	3.4	0.7	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.6
Hard to say	2.6	0.0	2.7	1.5	3.8	1.9	2.7	1.6

\* Respondents were supposed to give all acceptable answers.

\*\*In 2016, such an answer was not proposed.

**How successful are anticorruption programmes  
and anticorruption reforms in Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



	REGIONS (April 2017)			
	West	Centre	South	East
Very successful	0.0	3.2	1.3	0.6
Rather successful	16.7	11.0	7.1	8.8
Not successful at all	55.4	53.8	62.1	58.1
It is too early to give an assessment	17.3	23.6	20.0	22.2
Hard to say	10.6	8.3	9.6	10.3

## **PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTES, PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS, MASS MEDIA**

Sociological measurements of public confidence in state institutes are especially bothering. The low level of confidence in supreme bodies of power and political leaders of the state mainly stems from the absence of expected changed in Ukraine after Maidan.

In absence of trust and public support, real, non-populist reforms are impossible. Public confidence lies in the core of legitimacy of the state authorities and presents a precondition of efficient governance in general and security governance in particular.

As before, we have to admit the risk of loss of public support and legitimacy of the state due to the low trust of citizens. The problem deals not only with Ukrainian law-enforcement bodies, the army and special services.

The indicators of the level of public confidence in state institutes are kind of a catalyst of their perceptions of personal safety, protection from threats and, finally,

influence on the civic stand and readiness to actively support the state policy in the security sector. Mistrust in the state authorities is one of the main reasons for people's evasion from payment of taxes as a source of revenues for the state budget and, respectively, resources for implementation of the state security policy, as well as the citizens' readiness to actively support reforms.

Results of public opinion polls reveal a critical low level of public confidence in next to all Ukrainian central authorities. The regional distribution of answers makes the general picture even more dramatic. The highest negative balance of trust in the President, Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers was reported by residents of the Southern and Eastern regions – more than three quarters of those polled mistrust said state institutes.

In presence of an all-Ukrainian positive balance of trust in the security sector structures, one should also note the distinct opinion of residents in the East, as the only region producing a negative balance of trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (-10.8%), the National Guard (-10.3%), volunteer movement/territorial defence (-3.3%). This fact, for apparent reasons, requires particular attention and additional studies. It is hard to judge impartially, what exactly influences the “hearts and minds” of residents of frontline regions – hostile propaganda, or personal experience.

Against the background of absolutely legitimate calls to enhance the role of Parliament as the supreme representative body of the state in formulation of the security policy, organisation of efficient democratic control of the security sector, one should not neglect the problem of low public trust in the Verkhovna Rada. Only one of 10 respondents – with slight regional differences – reported full or partial confidence in the Verkhovna Rada. That said, the already low level of trust dropped further, compared to May, 2016 (from -72.2% to -77.6%).

The rating of public trust is traditionally topped by volunteer organisations (+42.2%), the Church (+36.4%) and the Armed Forces (+18.4%).

Volunteers are trusted by 66% of all those polled, and that trust is virtually “nation-wide” – from 59% in the South to 75.9% in the West.



People mainly trust the Armed Forces (55.9%), the National Guard (49%), the State Service for Emergencies (45%), volunteer movement/ territorial defence (45.2%).

The balance of trust in the National Police deteriorated, compared to the previous poll (from -1.2% to -19.9%). The share of those who fully or generally trust the police declined from 40.7% to 33.7%, compared to the figures of 2016. However, the level of trust in one of its subdivisions – patrol police – is 8.3% higher.

The level of trust in the Security Service of Ukraine (a special service with law-enforcement functions) is much lower: the Security Service of Ukraine is fully or generally trusted by 29.5% of citizens, mistrusted – by 56.6%. Such figures present a serious reason for analysis of the methods and results of work of the Security Service of Ukraine, approaches to the Service reform, and the strategy of public relations.

The most critical situation is observed with public trust in courts and public prosecution offices, mistrusted by 86.6% and 83.3%, respectively. Over the past 12 months the reform of public prosecution offices has not won a single additional percentage point of trust, while courts lost 6%.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine despite its very strong presence in the media space, is trusted by only 21.3%, which is 6.6% more than a year ago (14.5%). Meanwhile, the share of those who mistrust NABU also rose by 5.5% (from 59.3% to 64.8%, respectively). While in May 2016, people's assessments evidenced kind of a credit of trust (for a short period of NABU operation<sup>9</sup>), today it may be said for sure that the balance of trust after one year of its work is negative (-43.5%) (diagram and table “*Do you trust..?*”, pp.47-51).


## KEY ACTORS, FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY POLICY

The overwhelming majority (83.5%) of those polled believes that the President exerts the greatest influence on formulation of the state policy in Ukraine, and this confidence increased by 3.3% over the past 12 months. Respondents gave the second place in terms of influence on formulation of the state policy to big business and oligarchs (79.8%) who, according to citizens, became more influential than the Government and the Verkhovna Rada (78.4% and 77.3%, respectively). However, taking into account the statistically insignificant differences, it may be suggested that people meant the same actors.

The public opinion of the role of the opposition political forces may be viewed as an argument proving democracy development in Ukraine. In fact, the indicators of strong (31.3%), limited (39.2%) or no influence (19.5%) may be interpreted differently, but the main thing is that citizens admit the fact of a presence of opposition forces in Ukrainian politics.

<sup>9</sup> A.Sytnyk was appointed the Director of the newly-established National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine on the 16<sup>th</sup> of April, 2015.






\* The aggregate of answers "trust" and "rather, trust".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "mistrust" and "rather, mistrust".

\*\*\* The difference between "trust" and "mistrust".

♦ In 2016 such an answer was not proposed.





\* The aggregate of answers "trust" and "rather, trust".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "mistrust" and "rather, mistrust".

\*\*\* The difference between "trust" and "mistrust".

◇ In 2016 such an answer was not proposed.

Do you trust...? % of those polled				
(continued)				
	West	Centre	South	East
<b>President of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	27.2	27.1	15.3	13.1
Mistrust**	67.1	66.0	75.1	83.1
Hard to say	5.7	6.9	9.5	3.8
Balance of trust***	-39.9	-38.9	-59.8	-70.0
<b>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	8.5	10.8	9.1	7.0
Mistrust**	87.8	84.4	84.7	89.6
Hard to say	3.8	4.7	6.2	3.4
Balance of trust***	-79.3	-73.6	-75.6	-82.6
<b>Government of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	18.2	11.9	11.5	9.3
Mistrust**	79.1	81.3	80.6	86.3
Hard to say	2.8	6.7	7.9	4.3
Balance of trust***	-60.9	-69.4	-69.1	-77.0
<b>State machinery (officials)</b>				
Trust*	7.2	8.4	11.1	6.4
Mistrust**	87.7	86.3	80.5	90.1
Hard to say	5.1	5.3	8.3	3.6
Balance of trust***	-80.5	-77.9	-69.4	-83.7
<b>Armed Forces of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	67.0	57.6	60.6	41.4
Mistrust**	27.6	36.0	29.8	52.2
Hard to say	5.5	6.4	9.5	6.4
Balance of trust***	39.4	21.6	30.8	-10.8
<b>State Border Service</b>				
Trust*	44.7	46.1	51.2	32.1
Mistrust**	45.8	43.3	30.4	56.7
Hard to say	9.5	10.6	18.3	11.1
Balance of trust***	-1.1	2.8	20.8	-24.6
<b>National Guard of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	54.4	51.8	48.3	40.4
Mistrust**	32.4	36.6	35.9	50.7
Hard to say	13.1	11.7	15.7	8.8
Balance of trust***	22.0	15.2	12.4	-10.3
<b>National police</b>				
Trust*	35.6	35.8	35.2	28.3
Mistrust**	51.7	51.7	45.2	61.5
Hard to say	12.7	12.6	19.5	10.1
Balance of trust***	-16.1	-15.9	-10.0	-33.2
<b>Security Service of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	27.7	31.8	31.3	26.9
Mistrust**	58.4	53.8	47.6	63.5
Hard to say	14.0	14.4	21.3	9.8
Balance of trust***	-30.7	-22.0	-16.3	-36.6

\* The aggregate of answers "trust" and "rather, trust".

April 2017

\*\* The aggregate of answers "mistrust" and "rather, mistrust".

\*\*\* The difference between "trust" and "mistrust".

Do you trust...? % of those polled				
(continued)				
	West	Centre	South	East
<b>State Service for Emergencies</b>				
Trust*	53.8	42.6	52.7	37.3
Mistrust**	32.5	44.3	28.3	46.9
Hard to say	13.7	13.1	19.1	15.8
Balance of trust***	21.3	-1.7	24.4	-9.6
<b>Public prosecution offices</b>				
Trust*	9.7	8.4	10.8	10.7
Mistrust**	83.9	85.3	80.5	80.9
Hard to say	6.4	6.2	8.7	8.4
Balance of trust***	-74.2	-76.9	-69.7	-70.2
<b>Courts</b>				
Trust*	5.7	7.1	7.0	8.1
Mistrust**	89.5	87.7	82.6	84.2
Hard to say	4.9	5.2	10.3	7.7
Balance of trust***	-83.8	-80.6	-75.6	-76.1
<b>National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)</b>				
Trust*	20.9	19.1	24.9	23.4
Mistrust**	63.9	68.6	58.9	62.7
Hard to say	15.2	12.3	16.2	13.9
Balance of trust***	-43.0	-49.5	-34.0	-39.3
<b>Patrol police (new)</b>				
Trust*	50.5	43.8	40.9	32.7
Mistrust**	37.0	45.7	41.7	55.9
Hard to say	12.5	10.5	17.4	11.4
Balance of trust***	13.5	-1.9	-0.8	-23.2
<b>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman)</b>				
Trust*	34.4	19.2	35.2	25.6
Mistrust**	40.4	51.9	31.5	49.8
Hard to say	25.2	28.9	33.2	24.8
Balance of trust***	-6.0	-32.7	3.7	-24.2
<b>Ukrainian media</b>				
Trust*	58.9	48.2	38.2	28.8
Mistrust**	33.2	43.8	48.9	65.6
Hard to say	7.8	8.1	12.9	5.6
Balance of trust***	25.7	4.4	-10.7	-36.8
<b>Russian media</b>				
Trust*	2.1	3.1	2.5	5.0
Mistrust**	90.7	88.5	68.4	83.2
Hard to say	7.2	8.4	29.0	11.8
Balance of trust***	-88.6	-85.4	-65.9	-78.2
<b>National Bank of Ukraine</b>				
Trust*	7.4	12.8	12.8	13.5
Mistrust**	87.3	80.2	78.8	79.3
Hard to say	5.3	7.0	8.3	7.1
Balance of trust***	-79.9	-67.4	-66.0	-65.8

\* The aggregate of answers "trust" and "rather, trust".

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\*\* The aggregate of answers "mistrust" and "rather, mistrust".

\*\*\* The difference between "trust" and "mistrust".

Do you trust...? % of those polled				
	West	Centre	South	East
<b>Commercial banks</b>				
Trust*	6.8	11.0	12.4	11.7
Mistrust**	87.5	84.0	81.8	81.6
Hard to say	5.7	4.9	5.8	6.8
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>-80.7</i>	<i>-73.0</i>	<i>-69.4</i>	<i>-69.9</i>
<b>Trade unions</b>				
Trust*	21.3	18.7	31.6	18.7
Mistrust**	57.5	64.9	42.0	64.5
Hard to say	21.1	16.5	26.6	16.7
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>-36.2</i>	<i>-46.2</i>	<i>-10.4</i>	<i>-45.8</i>
<b>Political parties</b>				
Trust*	7.0	6.7	12.9	10.5
Mistrust**	87.7	84.4	75.8	82.3
Hard to say	5.3	8.9	11.3	7.1
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>-80.7</i>	<i>-77.7</i>	<i>-62.9</i>	<i>-71.8</i>
<b>Public organisations</b>				
Trust*	53.0	43.2	38.2	38.1
Mistrust**	34.6	43.9	37.0	45.8
Hard to say	12.4	13.0	24.9	16.1
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>18.4</i>	<i>-0.7</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>-7.7</i>
<b>Western media</b>				
Trust*	48.0	27.2	22.0	18.1
Mistrust**	29.8	53.6	46.0	63.6
Hard to say	22.2	19.3	32.0	18.4
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>18.2</i>	<i>-26.4</i>	<i>-24.0</i>	<i>-45.5</i>
<b>Church</b>				
Trust*	81.9	56.5	56.6	59.6
Mistrust**	12.4	34.1	21.9	31.8
Hard to say	5.7	9.5	21.5	8.6
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>69.5</i>	<i>22.4</i>	<i>34.7</i>	<i>27.8</i>
<b>Volunteer movement (territorial defence)</b>				
Trust*	56.9	44.0	39.3	39.2
Mistrust**	19.6	32.4	31.8	42.5
Hard to say	23.4	23.6	28.9	18.2
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>37.3</i>	<i>11.6</i>	<i>7.5</i>	<i>-3.3</i>
<b>Volunteer organisations</b>				
Trust*	75.9	66.8	59.0	59.2
Mistrust**	15.5	24.8	21.5	31.1
Hard to say	8.7	8.4	19.5	9.7
<i>Balance of trust***</i>	<i>60.4</i>	<i>42.0</i>	<i>37.5</i>	<i>28.1</i>

\* The aggregate of answers "trust" and "rather, trust".

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\*\* The aggregate of answers "mistrust" and "rather, mistrust".

\*\*\* The difference between "trust" and "mistrust".

Rather low public assessments of the significance of people's influence on the state policy became even more pessimistic, compared to the previous poll. The number of those who believe that citizens exert substantial influence changed little. Meanwhile, a 4.1% increase was recorded for those who reported "limited" (31.7%), and by 6.5% – "no influence" (38.4%). In this connection, a question arises about the availability of tools of influence of individual citizens and society on the state policy, as well as correspondence of the state policy to their needs and expectations.

Much better assessments of the role of public organisations and volunteer movements show one of the ways of the enhancement of societal influence on state policy. Only one in five (22.5%) agrees with the statement that public organisations and volunteer movements exert no influence. Sadly, the data of 2017 reveal some pessimism, compared to 2016: the share of those who see significant influence declined by 2.8%, of those who reported "no influence" – on the contrary, rose by 3.9%.


Assessing the role of external actors, a bit more than half (54.1%) of all Ukrainians believes that the state policy is most of all influenced by the governments of the Western states, and approximately half (48%) – by international organisations. Every third (31%) reported influence of the Russian Government (diagram and table *"How important is the influence of the following institutions on state policy-making in Ukraine?"*, pp.53-57).

The activity of the majority of state institutes entrusted with functions of countering threats to the national security and relevant administrative powers, was de facto termed inefficient. Citizens assessed the efficiency of the work of Ukraine's President – Supreme Commander-in-Chief – at countering threats to national security at 2.4 points. Lower scores than to the President were given only to Parliament (2.0) and the Government (2.1).

Over the past year, public assessments of the efficiency of dealing with threats actually did not change. The highest scores were given to volunteer organisations (3.4 points), the Armed Forces (3.1) and the National Guard (3.1). It is worth noting that, for the second year in a row the answers given by citizens confirm the substantial difference in assessments of the efficiency of the Ukrainian army and its top political (MOD) and military (GS) leadership (Diagram *"How would you assess the efficiency of the following structures countering threats to the national security?"*, p.58).

The ability of the Armed Forces and other security structures to firmly defend the state from internal and external threats causes no doubts among 12.7% of those polled, which is 3.9% lower than a year ago. The majority (57.7%) of citizens expressed some doubts, having chosen the option "partially", while every fifth respondent does not believe in the capabilities of the power structures. The most critical opinions were expressed by residents of the East of Ukraine (diagram and table *"Can the Armed Forces and other structures that must provide security for the state reliably defend the state from internal and external threats?"*, p.59).


**How important is the influence of the following institutions  
on state policy-making in Ukraine?**  
% of those polled



\* The aggregate of answers "very important" and "rather important".

**How important is the influence of the following institutions  
on state policy-making in Ukraine?**  
% of those polled

(continued)



\* The aggregate of answers "very important" та "rather important".

**How important is the influence of the following institutions  
on state policy-making in Ukraine?**

% of those polled

(continued)

	AGE, years					
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
<b>President of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	85.3	81.3	84.0	81.5	85.2	83.3
Limited	6.9	6.9	7.7	9.0	8.4	7.2
No influence	2.6	2.0	3.3	5.1	1.4	3.6
Hard to say	5.2	9.9	4.9	4.5	5.0	5.9
<b>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	82.5	75.9	77.4	76.4	79.1	74.4
Limited	6.4	8.8	11.8	9.3	10.6	12.9
No influence	4.3	6.4	4.7	8.4	4.7	6.3
Hard to say	6.8	8.8	6.0	6.0	5.6	6.4
<b>Government of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	79.8	76.8	78.8	76.0	82.6	76.9
Limited	6.9	9.9	9.9	11.4	8.7	11.2
No influence	6.0	4.9	6.1	7.5	4.2	5.1
Hard to say	7.3	8.4	5.2	5.1	4.5	6.8
<b>National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	57.1	54.6	57.1	55.4	54.3	57.3
Limited	23.2	26.1	21.7	20.1	23.5	19.4
No influence	6.9	4.9	6.6	10.8	6.7	7.2
Hard to say	12.9	14.3	14.6	13.8	15.4	16.2
<b>Opposition political forces</b>						
Important*	32.1	27.9	31.4	35.3	28.5	31.7
Limited	38.5	38.2	38.8	35.8	43.3	39.5
No influence	16.2	20.6	20.7	19.7	18.7	18.4
Hard to say	13.2	13.2	9.1	9.3	9.5	10.4
<b>Armed Forces of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	43.4	39.7	38.0	41.3	39.4	41.5
Limited	32.6	40.7	38.6	33.5	39.1	34.0
No influence	12.0	9.8	14.3	14.7	12.6	12.9
Hard to say	12.0	9.8	9.1	10.5	8.9	11.6
<b>Police and other law-enforcement bodies</b>						
Important*	39.1	30.6	33.5	38.9	36.2	36.6
Limited	33.0	40.9	39.3	30.2	35.6	33.0
No influence	16.7	15.8	16.8	20.4	18.5	17.3
Hard to say	11.2	12.8	10.4	10.5	9.8	13.1

\* The aggregate of answers "very important" and "rather important".

April 2017



**How important is the influence of the following institutions  
on state policy-making in Ukraine?**  
% of those polled

(continued)

	AGE, years					
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
<b>Security Service of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	50.3	41.6	46.5	47.7	48.0	48.5
Limited	26.6	33.3	27.5	26.3	24.2	25.4
No influence	9.4	9.3	11.8	12.8	12.1	11.2
Hard to say	13.7	15.7	14.0	13.1	15.7	14.8
<b>Judicial system</b>						
Important*	53.7	50.2	52.6	52.5	51.8	48.2
Limited	26.6	22.7	24.5	26.0	25.5	27.9
No influence	9.9	15.3	13.2	14.9	15.4	13.7
Hard to say	9.9	11.8	9.6	6.6	7.3	10.2
<b>Public prosecution offices</b>						
Important*	53.6	46.6	52.9	51.8	51.2	50.2
Limited	25.8	28.9	25.1	25.7	28.5	26.2
No influence	10.3	12.7	12.9	15.0	12.0	13.1
Hard to say	10.3	11.8	9.1	7.5	8.4	10.4
<b>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman)</b>						
Important*	38.2	36.4	32.4	35.0	33.3	37.3
Limited	28.3	25.6	28.0	30.2	29.1	27.3
No influence	13.7	12.8	16.5	17.1	17.1	13.4
Hard to say	19.7	25.1	23.1	17.7	20.4	22.0
<b>Citizens of Ukraine</b>						
Important*	28.5	21.5	23.3	24.1	26.7	23.3
Limited	35.8	33.8	32.4	33.7	27.0	30.7
No influence	30.6	37.3	39.0	37.6	40.7	40.9
Hard to say	5.2	7.4	5.2	4.5	5.6	5.1
<b>Ukrainian public organisations, volunteer movements</b>						
Important*	30.1	28.6	24.0	29.1	29.4	25.9
Limited	41.6	41.4	46.8	44.6	39.2	42.2
No influence	20.6	21.2	22.9	22.5	24.1	22.6
Hard to say	7.7	8.9	6.3	3.9	7.3	9.3
<b>Big Ukrainian business, oligarchs</b>						
Important*	79.5	82.3	80.9	77.2	80.6	79.4
Limited	10.7	9.4	8.3	10.2	8.4	9.1
No influence	3.4	1.5	5.0	8.1	4.8	5.3
Hard to say	6.4	6.9	5.8	4.5	6.2	6.3

\* The aggregate of answers "very important" and "rather important".

April 2017

**How important is the influence of the following institutions  
on state policy-making in Ukraine?**  
% of those polled


(continued)

	AGE, years					
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
<b>Small and medium Ukrainian business</b>						
Important*	23.6	24.1	22.6	20.1	24.9	22.8
Limited	42.1	42.2	39.7	41.6	37.5	40.9
No influence	26.6	24.5	29.2	33.5	30.0	27.0
Hard to say	7.7	9.3	8.5	4.8	7.6	9.3
<b>Western governments</b>						
Important*	55.6	52.0	55.1	51.2	54.5	55.2
Limited	24.1	25.7	25.9	29.3	29.2	23.9
No influence	8.6	9.4	6.9	10.8	6.5	8.9
Hard to say	11.6	12.9	12.1	8.7	9.8	12.0
<b>Russian Government</b>						
Important*	27.9	32.1	31.6	29.9	31.8	31.7
Limited	25.8	24.6	20.1	26.0	29.6	23.9
No influence	26.6	21.2	28.3	28.4	23.2	24.3
Hard to say	19.7	22.2	20.1	15.8	15.4	20.1
<b>International organisations</b>						
Important*	49.7	45.8	47.1	47.9	48.0	48.7
Limited	25.8	29.6	27.5	32.0	29.5	27.3
No influence	8.6	8.9	11.0	10.5	9.6	9.3
Hard to say	15.9	15.8	14.3	9.6	12.9	14.8
<b>Ukrainian media</b>						
Important*	37.3	34.5	32.8	33.2	35.0	32.8
Limited	38.6	41.4	40.2	35.5	37.8	38.1
No influence	14.6	13.3	17.4	21.2	18.8	17.6
Hard to say	9.4	10.8	9.6	10.1	8.4	11.6
<b>Russian media</b>						
Important*	17.6	20.6	17.3	18.0	17.1	17.6
Limited	28.8	28.9	26.4	28.1	28.6	27.4
No influence	36.1	31.4	38.6	37.7	34.7	35.0
Hard to say	17.6	19.1	17.6	16.2	19.6	20.0
<b>Western media</b>						
Important*	30.2	30.9	27.2	30.8	29.7	27.5
Limited	31.5	35.8	31.4	26.9	30.0	31.9
No influence	20.7	17.2	22.3	24.6	22.1	20.7
Hard to say	17.7	16.2	19.0	17.7	18.2	19.9

\* The aggregate of answers "very important" and "rather important".


April 2017

**How would you assess the efficiency of the following structures  
countering threats to the national security?\***  
average score




\* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means "very inefficient", "5" – "most efficient".

**Can the Armed Forces and other structures that must provide security for the state reliably defend the state from internal and external threats?**  
% of those polled



**REGIONS (April 2017)**



## LAW-ENFORCEMENT BODIES

A separate block of questions dealing with law-enforcement bodies in more detail shows partial and impartial perceptions of safety, defence of human rights, and reveals a number of aspects related to the provision of gender equality in power structures and society in general.

It is not unreasonably believed that the police is at the forefront of interaction between a citizen and the state, and is one of the main tools of the state by discharging state functions of provision of security at home, protection of life, health and property of citizens. Creation of a new police is seen as one of the most successful reformist projects in Ukraine. The National Police was designed to serve “society through provision of protection of human rights and freedoms, countering crime, maintaining public safety and order”<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Law of Ukraine “On National Police”, Article 1. – <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/580-19>.

Meanwhile, for the time being, people believe that the police best of all performs functions of protection and guarding of representatives of the authorities (3.5). Protection and maintenance of public order (3.0) and fighting violations of traffic rules, provision of road safety (3.0) rank second and third. The lowest scores were given to the police efforts at prevention of offences and solution of crimes (2.5 each), fighting bribery, corruption within the authorities, other state structures (2.3) (diagram and table *“How would you assess the performance of police in your city (in rural areas – your district) in each of the following sectors?”*, p.61).

The majority of respondents is sure of close cooperation between the authorities and the police: police officers are supported by the state authorities (70.8%); police officers are supported by local authorities (66.4%), and police officers work together with local authorities (63.6%). In this way citizens demonstrate their confidence in close connection between actions of law-enforcement officers and the authorities and, respectively, co-responsibility of central and local authorities for specific actions of the police. Any actions of the police are viewed by citizens as committed on behalf of and with support from the authorities.

Citizens mainly positively assessed all actions of the police from the proposed list: police officers equally treat men and women (54.3% against 19.2%); respect human rights (49.4% against 29.8%); treat aggrieved persons well (45.1% against 27%).

The public opinion of the police performing its duties “fully and honestly” can hardly be termed really positive (43.7% against 31.1%), while the assessment of police actions at fighting corruption is largely negative: only 25% of those polled agrees that police officers do not support corruption, while 48.2% is confident in the opposite.


Perceptions of relations between communities and the police are illustrated by the distribution of opinions, if police officers are supported by the local community and citizens. A bit less than half (42.9%) of those polled agreed with the statement of existence of such support, while roughly equal shares (approximately 28% each) either disagreed or were not sure (diagram *“Police officers are mainly...”*, pp.62-63).

The overwhelming majority (81.5%) of those polled had no contacts with the police in the past 12 months. The age and sex of respondents do not influence the frequency



of contacts with the police, despite some differences in the answers about the reasons for such contacts. For instance, policemen stop men in the street more often than women, and young people in the age of 18-24 years – more often than elderly people (60+) (table *“Did you contact police because of the following reasons in the past 12 months?”*, p.64).

**How would you assess the performance of police\* in your city (in rural areas – your district) in each of the following sectors?\*\***  
average score




	REGIONS (April 2017)			
	West	Centre	South	East
Protection and guarding of representatives of the authorities	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.5
Protection and maintenance of public order	3.1	3.0	3.2	2.9
Fighting violations of traffic rules, provision of road safety	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.0
Overall policing in your city (in rural areas – your district)	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.0
Provision of personal safety of citizens, defence of their rights and freedoms	3.0	2.9	3.1	2.9
Fighting street crime	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7
Prevention and termination of offences	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7
Solution of crimes	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.5
Fighting bribery, corruption within the authorities, other state structures	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.3


\* In 2014, the statement referred to militia and its officers.  
 \*\* On a five-point scale from “1” to “5”, where “1” means a very low assessment, “5” – a very high assessment.

**Police officers are mainly<sup>◇</sup> ...,  
% of those polled**


**Police officers are supported by the state authorities**




**Police officers are supported by local authorities**




**Work together with local authorities**



**Police officers equally treat men and women\***



**Respect human rights**




◇ In 2014, the statement referred to militia and its officers.

\* In 2014 such an answer was not proposed.

\*\* The aggregate of answers "agree" and "rather, agree".

\*\*\* The aggregate of answers "disagree" and "rather, disagree".



♦ In 2014, the statement referred to militia and its officers.

\* The aggregate of answers "agree" and "rather, agree".

\*\* The aggregate of answers "disagree" and "rather, disagree".

The majority of those who dealt with the police remained fully satisfied with the work of law-enforcement officers (62.8%), and the share of positive assessment increased, compared to the previous polls. Meanwhile, 30.6% were not fully satisfied. Respondents highly praised the ability of police officers to listen to them (73.3%), respectful treatment (69.9%); also, the majority (70.2%) could not recall any hints at extortion of money and gifts from the police (diagram "Recalling your most recent contact with the police...", p.65).



**Did you contact police\* because of the following reasons  
in the past 12 months? \*\***  
% of those polled


	2014	2016	2017					
You had to have some documents executed	5.4	4.7	3.7					
Police (militia) stopped you in the street for any purpose (document check, etc.)	5.0	2.5	3.1					
You, your relatives or friends were victims of crime	4.4	3.0	2.7					
You applied for assistance or advice (for instance, asked the way)	2.0	2.8	2.4					
You reported about the need to render medical assistance to someone	1.4	1.1	1.9					
You gave evidence	1.9	0.7	1.8					
You, your relatives or friends were suspected of a crime	1.8	0.6	1.7					
You reported about a traffic accident	1.6	1.1	1.7					
You were invited to a district division (section, department) by police officers conducting some investigation	1.5	0.7	1.5					
Police officers came to your home with the purpose of some investigation	1.6	1.5	1.4					
You reported about a suspicious person or event	1.2	0.7	1.1					
You complained about noise or loud music	1.2	0.9	1.0					
You reported about an alarm signal	1.3	0.6	0.9					
You reported about a crime	1.2	0.9	0.9					
Other	1.8	1.7	1.2					
Had no contacts whatsoever	80.0	81.8	81.5					
	AGE, years (2017)						SEX (2017)	
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +	Men	Women
You had to have some documents executed	4.7	3.4	4.7	4.8	3.6	1.9	4.0	3.4
Police (militia) stopped you in the street for any purpose (document check, etc.)	4.3	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.9	0.9	4.9	1.5
You, your relatives or friends were victims of crime	3.0	2.5	2.2	2.4	1.7	4.2	2.5	2.9
You applied for assistance or advice (for instance, asked the way)	3.4	0.5	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.8
You reported about the need to render medical assistance to someone	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.5	2.2	2.5	2.4	1.5
You gave evidence	2.1	2.9	1.9	1.5	2.8	0.9	2.1	1.6
You, your relatives or friends were suspected of a crime	1.7	2.0	1.1	1.2	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.4
You reported about a traffic accident	1.7	1.5	2.2	1.2	2.8	0.9	1.4	2.0
You were invited to a district division (section, department) by police officers conducting some investigation	0.4	1.5	2.5	0.9	2.5	1.1	1.4	1.6
Police officers came to your home with the purpose of some investigation	0.9	3.4	1.4	1.8	1.4	0.6	1.9	1.0
You reported about a suspicious person or event	1.3	1.5	1.6	0.6	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.4
You complained about noise or loud music	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.9	1.4	1.3	0.9	1.1
You reported about an alarm signal	0.4	2.0	0.8	1.2	1.1	0.6	1.1	0.7
You reported about a crime	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.1
Other	2.2	2.0	0.6	0.9	1.4	0.8	1.5	0.9
Had no contacts whatsoever	79.7	79.3	81.8	80.3	81.2	83.9	80.4	82.5

\* In 2014, the statement referred to militia and its officers.


\*\* Respondents were supposed to give all acceptable answers.

**Recalling your most recent contact with the police\*...,**  
 % of those who contacted the police


**Police officers attentively listened to you**



**Police officers treated you with respect**



**You remained fully satisfied**




**Police officers acted promptly**




**Police officers explained what they were doing and why**



**Police officers encouraged or prompted you to give money or gifts**



**Police officers unreasonably used force**



□ Agree\*\*    ■ Disagree\*\*\*    □ Hard to say

\* In 2014, the statement referred to militia and its officers.


\*\* The aggregate of answers "agree" and "rather, agree".

\*\*\* The aggregate of answers "disagree" and "rather, disagree".

## REFORMS: INTERMEDIATE RESULTS, RESPONSIBILITY AND CREDITS

The year that passed after the previous poll did not make public assessments of the success of reforms in the country any better. On a five-point scale, where “1” means that reforms are almost or totally absent, no sector has got at least a formally satisfactory mark, which proves the absence of results of reforms seen by the public or a lack of publically available information about them. The highest scores were given to reforms in the defence sector and law-enforcement bodies. The judicial system and public prosecution offices expectedly got lower marks.

**How would you assess the overall progress of reforms in each of the following sectors?\***  
average score



\* On a five-point scale from “1” to “5”, where “1” means that reforms are almost or totally absent, “5” – that reforms are most successful.


The next two questions were intended to identify the public opinion about the distribution of responsibility for implementation of reforms and the merit for their success. First of all, it should be noted that almost half (46.6%) of those polled saw no success of reforms in Ukraine whatsoever.

Regarding the merits, almost a third of respondents believes that reforms in Ukraine brought some results mainly thanks to the Ukrainian society that exerts pressure on the authorities, supports them, and actively engages in the person of individual activists (20.7%) and volunteer movements (9.9%).

Another 17.7% of those polled believes that reforms in Ukraine produce some results thanks to Ukraine’s international partners, providing consultative, financial, technical support and encouraging the Ukrainian authorities to implement reforms (diagram and Table “*To whom does the credit for the success of reforms in Ukraine go?*”, p.68).


Answers to the question of responsibility should be analysed exactly through the prism of assessment of the success of reforms. Almost half (48.4%) of Ukrainians believes that the President of the state should bear the main responsibility for implementation of the reforms. The Government of Ukraine (14.9%) together with the heads of the concerned ministries and agencies (7.3%) and the Verkhovna Rada (10.1%) got more than two times fewer “votes” than the head of state. The citizens’ idea of distribution of responsibility for implementation of reforms promised by the authorities changed in favour of the President by 9.9% over the past 12 months.

It is noteworthy that respondents rather professionally described responsibility for implementation of reforms (and, possible, the roles) of the heads of the concerned ministries and agencies, compared to the responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers and especially the President.



Again, despite the sociological trustworthiness of the quoted data, one should keep in mind that they reflect opinions of citizens, not data of monitoring of reform indicators or a challenge to the legislatively provided division of administrative powers. For better understanding of the factors that influence public perceptions, we suggest looking at answers of respondents about their awareness of the security and defence sector reforms (of the police, army, Security Service of Ukraine).

**To whom does the credit for the success of reforms in Ukraine go?\***  
% of those polled




	REGIONS				AGE, years					
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Ukrainian society (pressure on/support for the authorities, involvement of activists)	28.8	22.4	8.7	16.2	23.2	20.7	23.7	20.0	19.0	19.0
International partners (consultative, financial, technical support and encouragement of the Ukrainian authorities to implement reforms)	24.1	14.3	13.3	18.8	19.8	16.3	17.6	19.7	18.2	15.7
Volunteer movements	13.5	9.3	6.2	9.4	10.7	12.3	12.9	8.7	9.3	7.8
President of Ukraine	7.8	9.3	10.4	5.4	7.8	7.9	8.0	5.4	9.2	9.3
Government of Ukraine	4.4	4.3	2.9	3.6	3.0	5.4	3.3	3.3	4.5	4.6
Heads of the concerned ministries and agencies	3.8	2.2	6.2	5.1	2.6	4.4	4.1	4.8	3.1	3.8
Prime Minister of Ukraine	2.5	5.7	2.1	2.4	3.4	4.4	4.1	2.7	4.2	3.6
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	1.5	2.3	5.0	1.3	3.0	3.0	2.2	1.5	1.7	2.1
I see no success of reforms in Ukraine	35.3	46.2	64.9	48.8	39.7	46.3	43.1	49.6	50.1	47.6
Hard to say	9.7	10.4	6.2	7.9	11.2	12.3	8.5	7.5	6.2	10.2

\* Respondents were supposed to give not more than three acceptable answers.

April 2017

Only 14.1% of those polled called their awareness about reforms of the security and defence sector sufficient, which is better than in 2016 (8.8%), but the share of those who reported insufficiency or practical absence of reliable information is almost 5 times higher and actually did not change during the year (69%).




As we noted above, the polled citizens of Ukraine rather highly praised the contribution of international partners to the progress of our country on the path of reforms (see “*To whom does the credit for the success of reforms in Ukraine go?*”). Only one in five or four respondents has a different opinion, but the shares of favourable (“significant support” and “some support”) assessments are much higher, when the role of each organisation is assessed.

People highly praised the role of the European Parliament (46%), the Council of Europe (45.9%), the EU Delegation to Ukraine (45.8%) and NATO (44.5%).


One should note the shares of answers “heard nothing about such organisation” and “hard to say” as an indicator of “awareness” of Ukrainians. Only one in 20 respondents “heard nothing” about NATO and the UN, while the least known

to Ukrainians are the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (20%) and the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine (19.1%).

**What is the role of each of the following international organisations in support for reforms in Ukraine, including in the sectors of security and justice?**  
% of those polled



The distribution of answers to the direct question about the awareness of international and regional organisations once again shows the urgent character of the communication component in the work of international organisations in Ukraine. Only 11.7% of those polled termed their awareness “sufficient”, which is 4.5% higher than in 2016. The shares of respondents who admitted that they did not have enough information (33.3%) or were not sufficiently informed (35.7%) remained actually unchanged (Diagram “How would you assess your awareness about international and regional organisations promoting reforms in Ukraine, including in the sectors of security and justice?”, p.71).




The rating of separate countries supporting reforms in Ukraine is traditionally topped by the USA (36.6%), Germany (31.3%) and Poland (27.9%). Apparently, the assessments of citizens are influenced not only and not as much by impartial indicators of the scope of financial and technical assistance as, first of all, by the presence of the mentioned partner countries in the Ukrainian media.

Rather demonstrative are the regional differences with respect to separate countries and Ukraine as a whole. For instance, more than a quarter (27.4%) of residents of the Eastern regions believes that “no country supports” reforms in Ukraine, while in the Western, this opinion is shared by only 11% (diagram and table “*What countries support reforms in Ukraine?*”, pp.72-73).






**What countries support reforms in Ukraine?\***  
% of those polled



\* Respondents were supposed to give all acceptable answers.

**What countries support reforms in Ukraine?\***  
% of those polled

(continued)




	REGIONS (April 2017)			
	West	Centre	South	East
USA	43.6	32.2	40.2	35.1
Germany	43.6	24.3	35.7	28.8
Poland	35.5	26.0	24.5	25.4
Lithuania	22.0	13.3	11.6	17.3
Canada	19.5	9.7	11.2	12.9
Great Britain	16.3	8.4	11.6	15.4
Georgia	11.6	10.9	11.6	13.1
Latvia	12.5	7.5	10.0	13.1
France	10.4	4.5	14.9	11.5
Estonia	5.3	2.1	6.2	4.9
Japan	3.6	1.8	2.9	3.4
Switzerland	2.5	1.3	3.3	2.1
Italy	2.7	0.6	1.2	3.4
Russia	1.3	2.2	2.9	2.1
The Netherlands	2.3	1.2	0.8	3.2
Sweden	3.4	0.6	2.1	2.3
China	1.3	1.4	4.6	1.1
Slovakia	1.7	0.4	1.2	3.8
Denmark	1.1	1.2	0.0	3.4
Norway	1.3	0.5	2.1	0.0
Finland	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.9
Other	0.6	0.3	0.8	2.4
No country	11.0	18.8	19.9	27.4
Hard to say	15.2	24.5	22.4	15.8

\* Respondents were supposed to give all acceptable answers.

## CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

The absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens, irrespective of the area of residence and age, is sure of the need to control the authorities' activity, to some extent. Only 1.1% of those polled shares the opinion that the authorities' activity should be beyond public control, and 11.1% remained undecided. The majority (69.2%) of Ukrainian citizens is sure that the public should to a smaller or greater extent control all actions of the authorities. Every third (35%) respondent believes that society should control all actions of the authorities without exception. Another third (34.2%) of those polled also stands for control of all actions of the authorities, but is ready for exceptions with respect to the security sector and state secrets.

**To what extent should the authorities' activity be controlled by (accountable to) the public, society?**  
% of those polled




	REGIONS (April 2017)				AGE, years (April 2017)					
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
All actions of the authorities without exception should be controlled by	29.7	39.0	31.3	35.5	32.3	35.6	32.8	37.7	35.3	35.4
All, except those falling within the security sector and constituting state secrets	43.2	30.3	35.4	31.4	33.6	38.5	37.5	32.3	33.1	32.4
Only the actions that immediately affect interests of citizens (or separate groups of citizens) should be controlled by society	13.3	12.3	14.6	16.5	18.1	13.2	12.7	14.1	16.8	11.2
Actions of the authorities should be controlled by society only in separate cases	2.5	5.7	4.6	5.1	4.3	3.9	4.7	4.2	4.8	5.5
Actions of the authorities should not be controlled by society	0.4	0.9	1.3	1.9	1.3	0.5	1.4	1.5	1.1	0.9
Hard to say	10.8	11.8	12.9	9.6	10.3	8.3	11.0	10.2	9.0	14.6

There are age and regional differences regarding the scope and criteria of control, but the share of those who agree with the opinion that the authorities' activity should not be controlled by society (from 0.4% to 1.9%) is very small in all groups.

The strong public demand for controllability of the state is proven with the fact that only 7.6% of those polled considers the process of national decision-making an exclusive prerogative of "state managers and politicians". A third (33.5%) of those polled believes that citizens – irrespective of their competence – should have real influence on state decisions that concern them. Another 44.9% of respondents believes that this right should be limited by the criterion of competence.

Age and regional differences in the opinions of respondents are generally insignificant. At the same time, it should be noted that in the West, twice fewer people than in the Centre of Ukraine believe that state decisions should be left to state managers and politicians (4.7% and 10.5%, respectively).




One tool of exercise of the citizens' right to control the authorities' activity and take part in the formulation and implementation of the state policy is presented by public councils. The key tasks of public councils include: assistance to citizens exercising their constitutional right to take part in the management of state affairs; exercise of public control of the activity of state bodies; better account of the public opinion by the state bodies during formulation and implementation of the state policy.<sup>11</sup> Public councils at ministries and agencies, local executive bodies

include representatives of non-governmental organisations, mass media, civic activists. According to the poll results, the majority (71.9%) of citizens knows nothing about the activity of public councils, which prompts a logical question about the efficiency of their performance of said tasks.

Public councils mainly present an auxiliary tool of civilian control of the military establishment and law-enforcement bodies. The legislatively provided list of actors is topped by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as the supreme representative body of state power.<sup>12</sup> The poll results show that citizens see the role of said actors somewhat differently. Every third (32.8%) respondent believes that the leading role should belong to the President, and this opinion gained 6.8%, compared to 2016. On the second place in the system of civilian democratic control of power structures respondents see public organisations. The legislatively provided leading role of Parliament was confirmed by only 6.8% of the polled citizens (Diagram "Who should have the leading role in civilian democratic control of power structures in Ukraine?", p.77).


An indispensable attribute of the system of civilian democratic control of the armed forces is presented by civilian management of the defence agency. None of the

**In the past years public councils involving representatives of non-governmental organisations and mass media have been set up at many ministries and agencies. Have you heard anything about the activity of such councils?**  
% of those polled



<sup>11</sup> Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution "On Guarantee of Public Participation in Formulation and Implementation of the State Policy" No.996 of 3 November 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Actors exercising civilian control of the military organisation and law-enforcement bodies: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Human Rights Commissioner; President of Ukraine; National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine; Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; central and local executive bodies within powers provided by the law; local self-government bodies within powers provided by the law; Ukrainian public prosecution offices; Ukrainian judicial bodies; citizens of Ukraine and public organizations established in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine for exercise and defence of civil rights and freedoms and satisfaction of political, economic, social, cultural interests of citizens; mass media. Law of Ukraine "On Democratic Civilian Control of the Military Organisation and Law-Enforcement Bodies of the State", <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/975-15>.




developed democracies (NATO, EU) appoints military servants to the position of the Defence Minister. To a great disappointment, not only the supreme political leadership, but also Ukrainian citizens demonstrate insufficient understanding of the importance of such an evident step towards European or Euro-Atlantic standards.

Almost half of those polled believes that the Minister of Defence should be civilian neither in peace nor in wartime (47.5%), and this stand remains actually unchanged. Only one in five respondents supported the necessity of civilian management of the defence agency (9.2% – in peace and wartime, another 11% – only in peacetime). The President and Parliament in their decisions were hardly guided by results of public opinion polls, but this is the case when the political elite should show due scholarship and responsibility, despite the dominant public opinion.




**Should the Defence Minister of Ukraine be a civilian person?**  
% of those polled



	REGIONS (April 2017)				AGE, years (April 2017)					
	West	Centre	South	East	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
The Defence Minister should be civilian neither in peace nor in wartime	50.2	49.9	50.0	40.6	45.5	43.6	50.0	50.9	47.3	46.3
The Defence Minister should be civilian only in peacetime	10.4	11.0	6.6	13.5	12.1	8.8	10.4	12.0	14.3	8.7
The Defence Minister should be civilian both in peace and in wartime	11.7	8.2	7.4	9.4	13.0	9.3	8.0	9.3	8.4	8.9
I do not care	8.5	14.1	14.0	21.2	14.7	16.7	14.6	13.8	13.2	15.4
Hard to say	19.3	16.8	21.9	15.2	14.7	21.6	17.0	14.1	16.8	20.7

The following question dealt not with the list of possible candidates to the post of the Defence Minister but with the attitude of Ukrainians to the problem of gender equality. Appointment of a woman to the top position in the defence agency is flatly opposed by 44.5% of those polled. A similar share (44.9%) of respondents welcomes this possibility (28.3% – ready to support, and 16.6% – “do not care”). The time changes in the public opinion on this issue are not encouraging – the share of staunch opponents rose by 4.5% during the year.

Men are 14.6% less supportive for a candidate of the opposite sex. Respondents in the age of 18-24 years are the most liberal in their attitude to a female minister (total of 51.3% “yes” and “do not care”) (diagram “*Would you support appointment of a woman to the post of the Defence Minister of Ukraine?*”, p.79).




## GENDER ASPECTS

Citizens' opinions about equal chances of women and men (education and training) to occupy all positions in power structures split almost equally: 39.4% – “yes”, 38.7% – “no”. Women and men share this opinion almost unanimously. There are some age differences. The prevalence of “pessimists” over “optimists” with regard to equal possibilities is observed in the answers of respondents in the age of 18-24 (-6%) and 25-29 years (-7.4%) (diagram “Do men and women in Ukraine have equal chances for education and training that let them occupy all posts and positions in national security structures?”, p.80).


With actually equal chances of training for service in the security sector structures, the right of women to serve in uniformed agencies, according to 58.4% of respondents, is not limited by anything. The share of men who see no limitations of the women's right to service is 6.4% higher than of women. Regarding differences in assessments dependent on the respondents' age, the share of negative answers among young people of 18-24 years is smaller than among respondents in the other age groups (diagram “Is the right of women in Ukraine to serve in so-called state “power” bodies, first of all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, limited now?”, p.80).



**Do men and women in Ukraine have equal chances for education and training that let them occupy all posts and positions in national security structures?**  
% of those polled




**Is the right of women in Ukraine to serve in so-called state "power" bodies, first of all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, limited now?**  
% of those polled



The right and guaranteed possibility of women's service in the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the police and other uniformed agencies are unanimously supported by the majority of women and men alike, although the share of opponents of equal rights among men is a bit higher.

The most active adherents of guaranteed rights and opportunities for women are respondents in the age of 18-24 and 40-49 years.



The next block of question was designed to identify the motives of answers to the previous questions. Analysis of the body of answers with account of the time changes, age and gender gaps prompts the following conclusions.

More than half of respondents support the following statements about women's service in "power" structures:

1. Women should have the right to serve in "uniformed" agencies on a par with men, hoping for provision of proper conditions and standards of service with account of their physiological characteristics and physical capacities, preferably – in positions not related with immediate participation in combat operations or operational activity;
2. Exercising their right of choice of profession on a par with men, women should discharge the relevant duties on equal footing with men;

3. Physiological characteristics of women are not an obstacle for their discharge of relevant duties on equal footing with men; their presence in units exerts positive influence on performance of law-enforcement functions/combat readiness, discipline, morale;
4. The main motive of opponents of women's service in power structures (adherents of restrictions) is of a socio-cultural nature: women should not serve in "power" structures in peacetime, since family, maternity, rather than military career should be the priority for women;
5. The rather disputable idea of guaranteed quotas for admission of women to service in state agencies, including power structures, seems to meet rather strong public support. Only 28.6% does not support this opinion, 44.3% supports it. That said, men and women report actually identical opinions.

Supporting the right of women to choose a profession in uniformed agencies on a par with men, 67.2% of those polled see it necessary to provide proper conditions and standards for their service. Differences in answers of women and men were minimal.

That said, 50.3% of those polled (women and men – virtually equally) believe that women should discharge their duties on a par with men, which does not necessarily run contrary to the previous point of creation of proper conditions of service, but institution of specific standards of service is hardly in line with equality in discharge of their duties.

In regards to some functional limitations during the exercise of the right to service in general, 54.6% of those polled agreed with the statement that women should not occupy positions involving immediate participation in combat operations, operational activity, etc. Adherents of this opinion among men are 3.6% more and the numbers of opponents are absolutely equal (25.3%).

The share of those who would agree with guaranteed quotas for admission of women to service in state agencies, including power structures, is rather high (46.1% totally, and 49.4% – in the age group of 18-24 years). Approximately 28% flatly disagreed with this, irrespective of the age.


A bit more than a quarter (28.8%) of respondents supports the opinion that women should have the right to serve in state "power" agencies only in case of emergency (martial law), in close correlation with the average share of adherents of other limitations.

Half of those polled believes that presence of women in military units exerts positive influence on combat readiness, discipline, morale (49.8%), while the majority believes that presence of women in police units exerts positive influence on performance of law-enforcement functions and public safety (54.5%). The confidence of the young people in the positive effect of presence of women among the military and police officers is much stronger than among elder people.

A third of citizens agrees with the statement that “women’s service in state “power” structures runs contrary to social and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian people. Family, maternity, rather than military career should be number one for women” (35.6%). It is worth noting that the shares of men and women adhering to such traditions are actually equal. Substantial differences in views are observed among representatives of different age groups, the most conservative naturally being those above 60 years – 39.2%, by contrast to 31.9% in the age group of 18-24 years.

Less than a third (29.4%) of those polled agrees with the statement of discrimination on a gender basis in power structures, 37.5% is convinced otherwise. A third (33.1%) of respondents found it difficult to answer, which witnesses lack of information of a large part of society on those problems (table “Do you agree with the following statements?”, pp.84-86).

Apparently, the problem of guarantee of equal opportunities for employment is not confined to representatives of the opposite sex alone. According to the majority (63.9%) of citizens, the sex and age of a person influence his or her chances to be admitted to service in the power structures and judicial bodies in Ukraine. Only 22.1% is sure of equal chances. This indicator may be viewed as indirect evidence of a high level of discrimination, first of all, on the basis of age, since in previous questions dealing with only sex the assessments of respondents were more positive.



Do you agree with the following statements? % of those polled						
	Agree		Disagree		Hard to say	
	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
Women should have the right to choose occupation on equal footing with men and serve in “power” structures at their own free choice, but <b>physiological characteristics</b> and physical capacities of women <b>should be taken into account</b> , and proper conditions and standards should be provides for their service.	63.4	<b>67.2</b>	20.1	<b>18.5</b>	16.6	<b>14.3</b>
Women <b>should have the right</b> to serve in state “power” agencies, but only in <b>positions not related with immediate participation in combat</b> , field work, etc. (medical staff, headquarters, logistics, communications, etc.)	54.6	<b>61.3</b>	25.3	<b>22.5</b>	20.0	<b>16.2</b>
Presence of women in police units exerts positive influence on performance of law-enforcement functions and public safety	54.5	<b>54.5</b>	19.2	<b>22.3</b>	26.4	<b>23.2</b>
Women <b>should have the right</b> to choose occupation on equal footing with men and serve in “power” structures at their own free choice, but also <b>perform their duties on equal footing with men</b>	45.4	<b>50.3</b>	32.8	<b>34.0</b>	21.8	<b>15.7</b>
Presence of women in military units exerts positive influence on combat readiness, discipline, morale	51.7	<b>49.8</b>	20.3	<b>24.5</b>	28.0	<b>25.7</b>
There should be <b>guaranteed quotas</b> for admission of women to service in state agencies, including power structures	46.1	<b>44.3</b>	25.2	<b>28.6</b>	28.7	<b>27.1</b>
Women’s service in state “power” structures runs contrary to social and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian people. Family, maternity, rather than military career should be number one for women	33.9	<b>35.6</b>	42.2	<b>45.5</b>	24.0	<b>19.0</b>
Women should serve in state “power” agencies only in case of emergency (martial law)	28.8	<b>35.1</b>	43.9	<b>44.2</b>	27.2	<b>20.7</b>
Women due to their physiological characteristics <b>cannot</b> perform duties of military servants (detective) on equal footing with men, and their presence in military units creates unnecessary problems	33.7	<b>35.0</b>	48.3	<b>50.9</b>	18.1	<b>14.0</b>
There is discrimination on a gender basis in Ukrainian power structures	30.8	<b>29.4</b>	29.3	<b>37.5</b>	39.8	<b>33.1</b>

Do you agree with the following statements? % of those polled <span style="float: right;">(continued)</span>								
Women should have the right to choose occupation on equal footing with men and serve in “power” structures at their own free choice, but physiological characteristics and physical capacities of women should be taken into account, and proper conditions and standards should be provides for their service								
	AGE (years)						SEX	
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	71.7	71.4	65.9	65.4	70.6	63.2	65.0	68.9
Disagree	18.9	19.2	19.8	20.0	14.8	18.8	20.8	16.6
Hard to say	9.4	9.4	14.3	14.6	14.6	18.0	14.1	14.5
Women should have the right to serve in state “power” agencies, but only in positions not related with immediate participation in combat, field work, etc. (medical staff, headquarters, logistics, communications, etc.)								
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	62.9	66.5	62.0	63.0	58.5	59.3	61.1	61.5
Disagree	22.4	21.7	23.4	22.1	23.8	21.4	22.8	22.2
Hard to say	14.7	11.8	14.6	14.9	17.6	19.3	16.1	16.3
Presence of women in police units exerts positive influence on performance of law-enforcement functions and public safety								
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	61.5	65.0	52.9	58.7	50.7	48.5	53.5	55.4
Disagree	17.1	16.3	22.6	20.1	24.9	26.3	24.1	20.8
Hard to say	21.4	18.7	24.5	21.3	24.4	25.2	22.4	23.8
Women should have the right to choose occupation on equal footing with men and serve in “power” structures at their own free choice, but also perform their duties on equal footing with men								
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	57.3	54.7	48.4	51.5	51.0	45.9	50.8	50.0
Disagree	31.0	32.5	35.7	33.5	32.8	35.9	34.5	33.6
Hard to say	11.6	12.8	15.9	15.0	16.2	18.2	14.7	16.4
Presence of women in military units exerts positive influence on combat readiness, discipline, morale climate								
	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	55.8	57.6	47.1	50.6	48.9	46.1	49.1	50.3
Disagree	21.0	23.6	25.3	23.7	25.0	26.0	25.3	23.8
Hard to say	23.2	18.7	27.5	25.7	26.1	27.9	25.5	25.9

**Do you agree with the following statements?**

% of those polled

*(continued)*

**There should be guaranteed quotas for admission of women to service in state agencies, including power structures**

	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	49.4	47.8	45.6	47.5	38.7	41.7	44.8	44.0
Disagree	28.3	28.6	26.6	28.7	31.4	28.1	28.8	28.4
Hard to say	22.3	23.6	27.7	23.9	30.0	30.2	26.5	27.6

**Women's service in state "power" structures runs contrary to social and cultural traditions of the Ukrainian people. Family, maternity, rather than military career should be number one for women**

	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	31.9	33.5	36.8	35.0	33.1	39.2	37.3	34.2
Disagree	51.3	49.3	42.6	47.0	47.6	41.1	44.2	46.5
Hard to say	16.8	17.2	20.6	18.0	19.3	19.7	18.4	19.2

**Women should serve in state "power" agencies only in case of emergency (martial law)**

	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	30.5	36.3	36.4	35.8	36.1	34.7	35.6	34.7
Disagree	51.1	48.5	43.0	42.7	44.0	41.5	43.2	45.0
Hard to say	18.5	15.2	20.7	21.5	19.9	23.9	21.2	20.3

**Women due to their physiological characteristics cannot perform duties of military servants (detective) on equal footing with men, and their presence in military units creates unnecessary problems**

	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	30.0	34.0	37.2	33.4	29.7	40.8	35.7	34.4
Disagree	56.7	53.7	52.3	50.7	53.8	44.6	50.7	51.2
Hard to say	13.3	12.3	10.5	15.8	16.5	14.6	13.6	14.4

**There is discrimination on a gender basis in Ukrainian power structures**

	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+	Men	Women
Agree	30.9	34.0	29.7	30.7	31.1	24.7	29.9	28.9
Disagree	42.1	34.0	37.1	37.9	35.9	38.0	38.6	36.5
Hard to say	27.0	32.0	33.2	31.3	33.1	37.4	31.5	34.5

April 2017

## Methodology

The field stage of the survey was performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service on April 21-26, 2017, in all regions of the Ukraine, with the exception of the Crimea and the occupied territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 2,018 respondents aged above 18 years were polled.

The general totality was made up of citizens above 18 years old (with the exception of the occupied Crimea), permanently residing on the territory of Ukraine.

The poll sample was stratified, multilevel, random at the initial stages of sampling and with quota-based selection of respondents at the final stage.

At the first stage, the choice of localities for the poll was performed, at the second one – the choice of streets where routes were planned, at the third – choice of households, and at the final stage – selection of respondents.

Populated localities in each region were stratified by size and type (rural, urban). The probability of appearing in the sample in every populated locality was proportional to its population. In the selected populated localities the streets were selected, using the basic number (the basic number was selected using a random-number generator), where the route was laid for choice of households. At the final stage respondents were selected using sex and age quotas.

The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%.

The sample quality was tested by comparing the obtained data with statistical data. For assessment of possible data shifts, the poll results were compared with data of the State Statistic Committee.



Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents	
Sex	
Men	45.2
Women	54.8
Age	
18-24 years	11.5
25-29 years	10.1
30-39 years	18.0
40-49 years	16.6
50-59 years	17.7
60 years +	26.1
Education	
Incomplete secondary	1.9
General secondary	20.1
Vocational secondary	41.1
Higher or incomplete higher	36.1
No answer	0.7
Social status	
Business or office manager	0.4
Business unit manager	1.3
Entrepreneur	2.5
Technical specialist	6.0
Specialist in natural sciences	0.9
Humanitarian specialist (including economists, lawyers, workers of education, arts, healthcare, etc.)	10.6
Military servant, officer of the Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs	1.1
"Blue collar"	17.0
"White collar"	3.7
Labourer	5.3
Agricultural worker	1.2
Farmer, landholder	0.1
Pupil, student	4.2
Housewife	7.8
Pensioner	27.3
Incapable for work (including disabled)	0.9
Non-employed (but not registered as unemployed)	6.1
Officially registered unemployed	1.0
Other	1.9
Did not answer	0.7
Material standing of your family	
We hardly make ends meet, money is insufficient to buy even necessary foodstuffs	17.6
It is sufficient for food and acquisition of inexpensive necessary items	44.8
By and large, can live with it, but acquisition of durables, such as furniture, a refrigerator, a TV set, causes difficulties	30.9
We do well but so far, but cannot afford some purchases (an apartment, a car, etc.)	4.3
We can afford actually anything we want	0.2
Hard to say	2.1

**Distribution of the population of Ukraine in the age of 18 years and more by four macroregions, settlement type, age and sex**

	State statistics	Poll results (body of data)	Deviation of the body of poll data from statistical data
<b>Areas</b>			
Western	23.4	23.4	0.0
Central	38.2	38.2	0.0
Southern	11.9	11.9	0.0
Eastern	26.4	26.4	0.0
<b>Populated locality</b>			
City	66.9	66.9	0.0
Village	33.1	33.1	0.0
<b>Sex</b>			
Men	45.2	45.2	0.0
Women	54.8	54.8	0.0
<b>Age</b>			
18-24 years	10.4	11.5	-1.1
25-29 years	9.9	10.1	-0.2
30-39 years	18.9	18.0	0.9
40-49 years	16.6	16.6	0.0
50-59 years	17.7	17.7	0.0
60 years +	26.5	26.1	0.4

