7 *UN support to SSR in peacekeeping contexts: A case study of the Central African Republic*

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Introduction

The value of the security sector rests in its ability to deliver security to the state and its citizens. By this measure, the security sector in the Central African Republic (CAR) has been roundly deficient. It has only occasionally succeeded in protecting the state, and still more rarely the people, and requires considerable external support.

CAR faces longstanding challenges in a security sector that has historically been focused primarily on the capital, exclusionary, and unaccountable, and which has long lacked legitimacy among much of the population. Professional and accountable security institutions have been elusive. Instead, these institutions have largely been instrumentalized to secure power and wealth for the ruling regime, leading to a deeply dysfunctional relationship between the people and the security sector. The size of the armed forces (FACA) has dwarfed that of the under-resourced police and gendarmerie, and the division of roles has been unclear, with the military frequently involved in what should be internal security matters. Furthermore, policy frameworks have been inadequate to the extent that they exist at all, and democratic oversight of the security sector has been minimal under a parliament that has been overly deferent to, and may even be considered an extension of, the executive branch.

Insufficient domestic political will, weak institutions, inefficient coordination mechanisms, and limited international commitment have hindered past SSR attempts in CAR.[1] This chapter offers an account of the problematic record of security institutions in CAR and an assessment of the UN's support to national efforts towards an effective and accountable security sector, including by ensuring coherence among UN actors and coordination between the UN and bilateral and regional partners.[2] The chapter is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, the second part presents the historical and geopolitical context of security sector

governance in CAR, followed by an account of SSR efforts before the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014, discussed in part three. The fourth part focuses specifically on SSR support efforts under MINUSCA, followed by the conclusion.

The historical and geopolitical context of the security sector in CAR

Despite an abundance of natural resources, CAR is among the world's poorest countries. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, it has experienced five military coups, each highlighting the need for comprehensive reform and transformation of the security sector. Like many countries in Africa, CAR inherited an extractive state apparatus, with development and the functioning of state services confined almost exclusively to the capital, Bangui.

In many senses, CAR has never represented a cohesive state, particularly in the marginalized, mostly Muslim northeast. Rather, the politicized security sector has typically mirrored the ethnicity of respective ruling regimes, with each successive regime creating its own core of loyalists. This has protected elite interests with little regard for the average citizen of CAR and has resulted in armed forces that are frequently absent from territories outside of Bangui, predatory where they are present, and lacking in a cohesive republican ethos. As Boubacar N'Diaye notes, CAR's security sector is characterized by "recurrent security crises fuelled by poor governance, military coups, ethnicization of the armed forces, rebellions, attendant widespread proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and dysfunctional institutions."[3]

The ethnicization of the FACA to reflect the governing regime has had particularly pernicious effects: favouritism in the military has bred resentment among groups that are not in power and has prevented the establishment of a truly representative and cohesive security sector. This follows a pattern well-established throughout CAR's troubled post-colonial history. During the protracted and brutal administration of Colonel Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966–1979), for example, soldiers were recruited mainly from his ethnic group, the *Ngbaka*. In the same vein, security forces under the administration of General André Kolingba (1983–1993) were dominated by his ethnic group, the *Yakoma*. N'Diaye notes that Kolingba's rule further increased the alienation of the people from the security sector, due to his "unabashed 'ethnicisation' of power," which would eventually "poison irremediably the political system."[4] Ethnic recruitments continued under Ange-Felix Patassé (1993–2003), who favoured the *Sara-Kaba*. After leading a successful coup in 2003, General François Bozizé in turn recruited from the *Gbaya*. Indeed, the FACA has

been nicknamed the "lasagna army," with successive presidents building their own layer of loyalists on top of the previous. Currently, the FACA is composed mainly of three Christian-adherent ethnic groups, the *Gbaya* (33%), the *Banda* (27%), and the *Manza* (13%),[5] reflecting their approximate percentages of the overall population. Muslim ethnic groups are very poorly represented in the FACA.[6]

CAR's security situation is complicated by both internal and external geopolitics. Poor governance of the security sector and its extremely limited reach outside of Bangui have enabled "political entrepreneurs" to exploit local grievances and mobilize armed groups that challenge the state and dominate access to natural resources. These groups have at times been armed by interests located in neighbouring countries, further weakening the security sector's already minimal provision of security across the country. Political agreements have consistently rewarded representatives of these armed groups with appointments to security posts, without any overarching process of reform.

Other countries, including neighbours such as Chad, Uganda, Angola, Sudan, the Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), have also powerfully influenced the political and security situation in CAR for their own ends. Chad in particular has been preoccupied by a desire to secure its perimeter against cross-border rebel groups. And according to independent analysts, Patassé's downfall in 2003 and the rise to power of his successor Bozizé was jointly engineered by Chad, France, the Republic of the Congo, and the DRC.[7] Yet by 2011, Bozizé's floundering administration had also fallen out of favour, leading him to seek South African support in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to retain control.[8] Bozizé was ousted in 2013, with assistance from fighters from Chad, Sudan, and Uganda.[9]

CAR remains consumed by the legacy of its most recent security crisis, triggered by the successful 2013 coup led by Michel Djotodia and his mostly Muslim *Séléka* rebels. The FACA collapsed swiftly under the *Séléka* onslaught, but Djotodia's government was short-lived and was marked by the looting of natural resources as well as human rights abuses by *Séléka* members, who were increasingly beyond his control.[10] Largely Christian self-defence militias, calling themselves the Anti-*Balaka*, clashed violently with ex-*Séléka* forces, injuring and killing thousands of civilians in the process. Djotodia was forced out of power in January 2014 by the Chad-dominated Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) over his failure to contain the violence. The subsequent administrations of Catherine Samba-Panza and Faustin-Archange Touadéra have since struggled to overcome ongoing internal strife and move beyond the legacy of exclusion, Bangui-centrism, and ethnic favouritism in the security sector, despite notable efforts under MINUSCA's revised mandate, which are described later in this text.

Security sector reform before MINUSCA

Efforts until 2008

Against this challenging backdrop, what is the record of externally supported SSR efforts in CAR and what explains their ineffectiveness? Insufficient national leadership and ownership, combined with uncoordinated international support, are some of the main causes of SSR failures, particularly where a common security vision is lacking and where a problematic relationship exists between the state and society more broadly. The need for SSR emerged as a topic of political discussion only relatively recently in CAR, after Bozizé's successful March 2003 coup made reform of security institutions an urgent priority. Bozizé subsequently won a presidential election and was sworn in on 11 June 2005. This was followed by the 2005 *Déclaration de Politique Générale*, which signalled the Government's growing interest in SSR.[11] The UN Development Programme (UNDP) led early efforts and pushed strongly between 2004 and 2007 for a national seminar on SSR, as well as on DDR. The UN peacebuilding office, BONUCA, also implemented human rights training programs for the police.[12]

2008 National Seminar and Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD)

Internationally supported SSR planning began in earnest in 2008. A National Seminar on SSR was held in Bangui on 14–17 April, facilitated by UNDP and funded by the EU and other donors. The Seminar outlined five SSR principles for CAR: (i) a holistic approach; (ii) national ownership; (iii) the commitment of the Government; (iv) democratic oversight; and (v) a role for civil society.[13] Critically, the National Seminar also resulted in the adoption of a detailed chronogram, or roadmap, for the subsequent two years. Key tasks included the removal of illegal checkpoints, the issuance of uniforms, parliamentary legislation on integrated security sector spending and oversight, and legal clarification of the status of the police.[14] The National Seminar was followed by the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) from 8–20 December 2008, which brought together actors including armed groups and the political opposition, with support from Gabon and other ECCAS countries.[15] This resulted in various recommendations, including the immediate implementation of DDR activities, the restructuring of the armed forces, a multi-year military spending program, and a public information campaign.[16]

These promising beginnings stalled, however, when a dearth of political will on the part of CAR authorities was met by a decline in international support. The Bozizé regime's interest in SSR was limited to strengthening its own position and bringing in international funding. According to N'Diaye, Bozizé and his confidants

viewed SSR as "a potentially useful concept [. . .] given the unsatisfactory, indeed dysfunctional, state of the security apparatus, but only if it [could] be used to consolidate freshly acquired power."[17] In fact, according to Bagayoko, CAR political actors have viewed SSR as "a means of building up a security apparatus (essentially a militarised one) that can guarantee the State's legitimate violence and thus ensure political continuity and the hegemonic position of ruling actors."[18] Thus, while politically expedient reforms, particularly train-and-equip interventions, were on the table in CAR, truly transformative changes to the security sector requiring a redefinition of power relations between the regime and the wider population were not contemplated under Bozizé.

The effect of this dynamic was far-ranging. Not only did Bozizé's hesitant embrace of SSR limit the impact and scope of reforms, this lack of commitment extended to FACA leadership and the officer corps, raising suspicion among armed groups.[19] As N'Diaye notes, the chronogram's deadlines passed without progress, "casting a legitimate doubt over the sincerity of the commitment on the part of the CAR authorities to carry out meaningful SSR (and even DDR)."[20]

Problems existed on a broader level, beyond Bozizé's leadership, as well. The sensitization campaigns that followed the National Seminar were inadequate and ineffective, and a common vision of the security sector did not emerge for the international community to support. Civil society had no influence on SSR implementation, and the country continued to be threatened by the proliferation of armed groups. Uncoordinated and international efforts also doomed reforms: France supported the restructuring of the FACA and the gendarmerie within the old security framework rather than the new SSR roadmap; China and South Africa focused on security assistance through training and equipping the FACA, including the construction of barracks; the EU suspended financial support in January 2009, following the failure of the Government to implement the SSR roadmap;[21] and Chad's involvement was channelled extensively through ECCAS, and focused on maintaining border security. In the end, an ambitious start to 2008 resulted in little more than small-scale technical projects and failed to produce broad security sector transformations needed to break the cycle of instability plaguing CAR.

ECCAS/MICOPAX and AU/MISCA

Parallel peacekeeping efforts that began in 2008 were also met by coordination challenges. Following an attempted peace agreement in Libreville in June 2008, ECCAS expanded the small Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) peacekeeping force, renaming it MICOPAX and ostensibly broadening its mandate to include support for SSR and DDR. However, MICOPAX was composed almost entirely of military forces and lacked the requisite civilian staff to oversee

a meaningful SSR program, due in part to non-payment by ECCAS member states. Even training exercises for the FACA did not come to fruition.[22] And despite receiving EU funding, MICOPAX never comprised more than 3,000 troops even during the peak of the 2013 violence.

The direction MICOPAX took under ECCAS was dominated by Chad, the priorities of which centred on immediate stability and border control rather than on transformational intervention. This approach echoed the shortcomings of central African sub-regional security structures in general, and their lack of alignment with an emerging UN focus on governance-focused, sector-wide SSR. Angela Meyer observes that, for "Central African regional communities, security is still defined from a predominantly military and state-centric perspective," a process which "addresses only the direct manifestations of insecurity – rebellions, fighting, and criminal activities," rather than root causes such as poverty and ethnic favouritism.[23]

In 2013, when it became clear that violence could spread during the Djotodia administration, the AU moved to take over peacekeeping in CAR, through what would become the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). The transition to this Mission was beset by coordination challenges. Tatiana Carayannis and Mignonne Fowlis note that both the Republic of the Congo and Chad resisted ceding leadership to the AU, a grudge Chad continued to nurse in its disinterest in future peacekeeping operations in CAR.[24] Martin Welz indicates that strained relations caused a four-month delay in the hand-off from MICOPAX to MISCA, and during an especially violent time.[25] And the problems did not end there, as MISCA struggled initially due to "repeated financial delays" from international donors.[26]

MISCA, which was only active from December 2013 to September 2014, had an SSR mandate under Security Council resolution 2127 (5 December 2013), which outlined its role in assisting a government-led restructuring of the security sector with support from the UN political mission, BINUCA. But MISCA suffered from a lack of unified command, rivalries among troop-contributing countries, and the same Bangui-centrism that had degraded public trust in the FACA over the years.[27] It also possessed insufficient military, police, and civilian components.[28] Despite a troop ceiling of 6,000, MISCA reached only 5,142 troops at its peak,[29] or 85% of its proposed capacity. MISCA was ultimately able to contribute very little to SSR or to CAR's security in general, and worsening violence resulted in a UN takeover of the mission as of September 2014, via resolution 2149 (10 April 2014). Some members of the AU felt undercut by this sudden "transition" after only nine months of deployment.[30]

MINUSCA: what is new?

Given such a troubled history of international support, does MINUSCA offer something different, or will the same scattered national reform processes and international involvement likely produce the same results? While political and security issues remain, MINUSCA has greatly expanded support to SSR that is focused on governance and sector-wide issues as well as to the development of laws and policies aimed at enhancing the performance and civilian control of CAR's security institutions. MINUSCA is engaged in multiple aspects of SSR support to CAR: (i) political support for the establishment of a strategic framework and vision for national security, including a National Security Policy and a Higher Council for National Security (*Conseil supérieur de la sécurité nationale*), as well as for the inclusion of minority and marginalized groups in security institutions; (ii) institutional support for effective and professional security institutions; (iii) democratic accountability through parliamentary oversight and civilian control, and sustainability; and (iv) coordination of international support. The following section first introduces the evolution of MINUSCA's SSR mandate before analysing successes and challenges in each of the abovementioned areas of SSR, including support for political processes, institutional strengthening of the security sector, and coordination of internal and international SSR actors.

Getting the mandate right: SSR coordination moves to the centre of MINUSCA efforts

As indicated above, international SSR support in CAR has not necessarily been well-coordinated or sufficiently prioritized in prior peacekeeping operations. As Carayannis and Fowlis point out, "each successive peace operation in CAR has had SSR and DDR as part of its mandate, yet the standard template of SSR has largely been ill suited to the CAR context." This has especially been true where armed groups have opposed a historically malevolent military, and when measures to restore state authority have taken place where "the state generally never held such control to begin with."[31] The situation therefore called for peacekeeping operations with a mandate and capacity to support more transformative SSR processes than had hitherto been undertaken in CAR.

The succession to MINUSCA from MISCA offered the opportunity to tackle this ongoing need for SSR that would address CAR's recurrent security sector crises. However, MINUSCA's authorizing mandate, resolution 2149 (2014), concentrated on initial priority tasks but not the longer-term strategic objectives that would be included in later mandates. Unfortunately, this positioned SSR as only an "additional task" to be undertaken where possible, and did not directly link it to the initial priority task of DDR. Still, each progressive mandate moved SSR closer to the centre

of MINUSCA's objectives. Resolution 2217 (2015) included SSR in its second level of "essential tasks," reflecting the growing importance of SSR but also the perceived need to prioritize DDR support. MINUSCA was assigned to support Government SSR activities through strategic policy advice in coordination with the EU, and to coordinate technical assistance and training between international partners.[32]

Resolution 2301 (2016) greatly clarified the role of MINUSCA in the coordination and coherence of SSR efforts, and rightly included SSR among the Mission's priority tasks under the strategic objective of creating conditions conducive to reducing armed groups. Specifically, MINUSCA was mandated to "provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a strategy for [. . .] SSR" in conjunction with the EU.[33] Priority tasks also involved supporting the Government in developing vetting and accountability measures, in police development and recruitment, and in creating a clear division of labour among security sector components. The coordination role of MINUSCA is also vital; the Mission was mandated to "coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners [. . .] to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR."[34] These roles remain part of MINUSCA's mandated tasks under resolution 2448 (2018).

Political support to a national SSR framework and national security vision

Armed with a stronger SSR mandate, MINUSCA has provided more coherent support to efforts to develop a national SSR framework and a common vision for the security sector in CAR. At the same time, though, MINUSCA's role is essentially advisory and the viability and impact of any SSR initiative in the country will ultimately depend on sustained national leadership and inclusive ownership of the reform process. MINUSCA's attempts to meet these challenges are examined below.

The May 2015 Bangui Forum on national reconciliation was very significant for bringing together the state and the people, and in doing so, addressing a historically estranged relationship. The Forum featured the participation of a wide swath of society, including the Government, armed groups, political parties, and civil society organizations. MINUSCA provided technical support through SSR background documents and facilitated the Forum's planning. A resulting Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction emphasized elections, decentralization, judicial reform, and DDR,[35] and reflected "the full commitment of the participants in the Forum to a comprehensive reform of the security sector, including the establishment of accountable, multi-ethnic, professional and republican defence and internal security forces."[36] Yet, while the Forum was an innovative and necessary platform for articulating a common national security vision, it was not sufficient to resolve all points of contestation and thus did not result in a common

national security agenda. There was also a lack of effort to sustain the dialogue or implement its recommendations for the next two years.[37]

MINUSCA has more successfully assisted SSR processes and structures within the Government, including through a December 2015 roundtable that led to a Declaration on the Principles of National Security, which was followed by a draft National Security Policy in March 2016. In response to a May 2016 Government request, the UN, EU, and World Bank jointly undertook a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment for CAR, which the Government adopted as the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–2021 (RCPCA) in October 2016. The RCPCA consists of three interlinked pillars, meant to: (i) support peace, security, and reconciliation; (ii) renew the social contract between the state and population; and (iii) promote economic recovery and boost productive sectors.[38] The first pillar, which is most germane to SSR, addresses four strategic objectives at a total estimated cost of US $461 million: (i) violence reduction through disarmament and reintegration; (ii) stability through SSR; (iii) justice reform and ending impunity; and (iv) reconciliation and the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and solutions to displacement.[39] With a budget of US $131 million dedicated to the second, SSR-specific objective, the Government was to finalize and adopt a political and strategic framework for SSR by 2017, including a National Security Policy, National SSR Strategy, and priority reform plans for defence, internal security, and justice, as well as the establishment of a Higher Council for National Security. However, the implementation of RCPCA strategic activities was delayed due to the late establishment of coordination bodies and the slow disbursement of funds pledged at a November 2016 donor conference in Brussels.

Significantly, CAR authorities have agreed to provide a political chapeau over the RCPCA, in the form of the Framework of Mutual Engagement (*Cadre d'engagement mutuel*, CEM-RCA). The CEM-RCA was signed on 17 November 2016 in Brussels by President Touadéra and Jan Eliasson, then the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, on behalf of the Secretary-General and the wider international community. It renews the commitment of bilateral and multilateral partners to support the implementation of the national SSR programme in CAR and states that the main objective of reform of the FACA and the internal security services is to establish national defence and security services that are professional, non-political, ethnically representative, and regionally balanced.

Additionally, MINUSCA played a critical advocacy and facilitation role in the establishment of the Strategic Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR), and National Reconciliation, which is the highest decision-making and coordination body for these three policy areas. Chaired by President Touadéra, the Committee includes the Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defence, Interior, and Finance as well as other relevant ministries; the Chief of

Defence (*Chef d'état-major des FACA*); and the Directors-General of the Gendarmerie and Police. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as well as senior officials of MINUSCA, the AU, the EU, ECCAS, France, the US, and the World Bank also attend. On 4 November 2016, the Committee endorsed a National DDRR Strategy, a National Security Policy, and a five-year capacity-building and development plan for the police and gendarmerie.[40]

The National Security Policy (NSP) was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 2 February 2017.[41] On 4 July 2018, the National Assembly passed a law establishing the Higher Council for National Security, an inclusive body mandated to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the NSP. In line with its mandate to provide strategic and technical advice on SSR, MINUSCA supported the drafting committee that converted the NSP into a National SSR Strategy. The 2017–2022 National SSR Strategy was adopted by the Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation on 10 March 2017. The Strategy is focused on three key areas: (i) strengthening security sector capacity, (ii) reinforcing the security of persons and goods and restoring state authority, and (iii) fostering good governance and the rule of law. It represents CAR's first true national SSR strategy and remains a top presidentially-endorsed document. Support to its implementation by MINUSCA is likely to remain on the Security Council's agenda.

An overarching goal has been support to peace talks. In order to address the absence of a political settlement between the Government and the 14 recognized armed groups, the African Initiative for Peace and National Reconciliation supported a dialogue in April 2017. The African Initiative was led by the AU, ECCAS, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), with the support of Angola, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and MINUSCA. The resulting Roadmap for Peace and National Reconciliation, adopted on 17 July 2017 in Libreville, "reaffirms the legitimacy of the country's constitutional system, the importance of the conclusions reached at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, held in 2015, and the need for strong national ownership of the peace process to promote reconciliation."[42] Subsequent discussions focused greatly on the integration of former combatants and a geographically-balanced recruitment of soldiers, police and gendarmerie officers. Consultations from 8-11 January 2019 led by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, and senior officials from ECCAS countries and CAR's neighbours led to direct talks in Khartoum and the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic in Bangui on 6 February 2019.

The Agreement includes important SSR provisions, including: (i) Government commitment to the inclusion and representation of all social groups in the FACA and internal security forces through equitable and transparent recruitments; (ii)

Government commitment to establishing a mixed commission to address issues of rank harmonization, integration of ex-combatants and re-incorporation of former FACA into the armed and security forces; and (iii) agreement by the parties to establishing special mixed security units, composed of FACA and internal security forces personnel and demobilized armed group elements for a transitional period of 24 months. The implementation of these defence and security measures is likely to be fraught with technical and political challenges.[43] The international guarantors and facilitators of the Agreement, led by the AU and with MINUSCA support, will have to provide extensive political, technical and financial support to ensure implementation of this or any future agreements.

Table 7.1: Developments in the institutional, legal, and strategic framework for SSR: Late 2016–Early 2019

Completed

16 November 2016: Framework of Mutual Engagement (CEM-RCA) outlines key SSR commitments and national priorities; endorsement of National Security Policy (NSP) and Internal Security Forces Capacity Development Plan in first meeting of Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation

17 November 2016: National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding (RCPCA) sets out key SSR benchmarks (strategic objectives, strategic results, and activities)

2 February 2017: Adoption of NSP at Council of Ministers

17 February 2017: Presidential Decree establishing National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons

10 March 2017: Endorsement of National SSR Strategy in second meeting of Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation

March 2017: Military Justice Code adopted by National Assembly

11 September 2017: Adoption of National Defence Plan, which, based on the National Security Policy and the National SSR Strategy, offers a vision for the transformation of FACA into a garrison army

15 September 2017: Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation decides to integrate 60 combatants demobilized by a DDR pilot project into the FACA

4 July 2018: Law on the Higher Council for National Security (*Conseil supérieur de la sécurité nationale*, the body responsible for coordinating and overseeing implementation of the NSP)

18 December 2018: National Assembly passes a five-year military appropriations bill for fiscal years 2019-2023.

9 January 2019: Government endorses a national strategy on the demilitarization of the penitentiary system

Pending

Law on National Security Policy: not yet drafted
Legal framework for the Higher Council for National Defence: not yet revised
Implementation of the National SSR Strategy: not yet underway
Drafting of Sector Development Plans based on National SSR Strategy: significantly behind schedule
Slow progress in implementation of internal security forces development plan: delays in revision of legal framework for police and gendarmerie, resulting in lack of clarity on institutional positioning and command and control of gendarmerie (organic law on gendarmerie not yet adopted)

Support to institutional capacity

SSR efforts in CAR are predicated on linking sector-wide reforms (including the national vision and strategies) with component-specific operational changes in defence and internal security institutions, outlined below.

A. Defence sector reform

While there are emerging signs of progress, the most immediate challenges facing defence sector reform are severe institutional and operational capacity gaps, and the urgent need to reform and restructure the FACA. The Ministry of Defence and Defence Headquarters have already been restructured with help from the EU,[44] so that the FACA are now overseen by the Minister of Defence. And with support from the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), the Ministry of Defence has formulated several foundational documents for the sector. The National Defence Plan was signed by President Touadéra on 11 September 2017, and on 18 December 2018, the National Assembly passed a five-year military appropriations bill for fiscal years 2019-2023 (*Loi de programmation militaire,* LOPM).

The National Defence Plan provides for a radical transformation of the FACA into a garrison army and the establishment of four military regions aligned with administrative entities (prefectures). It aims to improve the capacity and accountability of the FACA and calls for balanced ethnic representation and diversity, civilian oversight, and support for national reconciliation through the integration of ex-combatants. Vetting and retirement measures will be used to facilitate the departure of some current members of the armed forces, allowing space for re-integration and new recruits. The LOPM provides $374 million to implement the garrison army concept.

A three-pronged approach was adopted by MINUSCA and the EU to support the restructuring of the FACA. First, international partners focused their efforts on rationalizing the human resource management system. To start, an accurate accounting of the number and identity of military members was necessary: while 7,465 FACA soldiers are registered in the official database of the Ministry of Defence, 8,400 FACA personnel are on the payroll of the Ministry of Finance. By mid-February 2018, CAR military authorities, supported by MINUSCA and EUTM RCA, had verified the identity of 7,737 registered soldiers.[45] Additionally, in response to a Security Sector Public Expenditure Review undertaken jointly by the World Bank and MINUSCA on the public financial management of the national security forces,[46] the Government launched an audit of the FACA in February 2017. A March 2018 presidential decree authorized the retirement of over 800 armed forces personnel, making room for new recruits and former combatants.[47]

The second prong of this work was centred around strengthening the capacity of FACA battalions to perform military tasks. EUTM RCA took the lead on retraining FACA troops on an incremental basis. As of March 2019, four deployable infantry battalions have completed their training.

The third prong of FACA restructuring involves the procurement of equipment and arms. FACA rearmament is severely constrained by the general and complete arms embargo first imposed by the Security Council on CAR on 5 December 2013 with the adoption of resolution 2127 (2013). Resolution 2399 (2018) maintains an exemption regime for supplies of non-lethal equipment and assistance (operational and non-operational) to the security forces in CAR for SSR purposes, with advance notice and approval.[48] Bilateral partners, including France, China, and the US, have taken advantage of the exemption regime to provide non-lethal equipment to the FACA. In a significant development, Russia supplied weapons and ammunition in January-February 2018, mostly to the FACA.

In his National Day speech on 1 December 2018, President Touadéra emphasized the progress made in professionalizing and operationalizing the FACA and internal security forces, including through EUTM RCA training and the procurement of weapons and vehicles. He noted the launch of the recruitment campaign of 1,023 new soldiers as well as the deployment of EUTM RCA-trained FACA personnel to Bambari, Bangassou, Dekoa, Grimari, Obo, Paoua and Sibut with MINUSCA support. However, the FACA still lack the basic command and control and logistics capabilities to effectively plan, deploy, support, and sustain military operations without MINUSCA and Russian support. And given the growing political pressure on authorities to deploy the FACA to fill security vacuums in many regions of the country, an expedited process of defence sector reform is essential.

B. Reform of the police and gendarmerie

Set against the backdrop of a military-centred culture of regime security, the gendarmerie and police have historically been marginalized in CAR. Their current collective strength is approximately 2,817 officers, including 1,684 gendarmes and 1,133 police officers, serving a total civilian population of 4.6 million in a territory as large as France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands combined. This makes for a very low police-citizen ratio of 1:1,277. Furthermore, the presence of these internal security forces is limited in the provinces, with only about 38 percent of gendarmes and 22 percent of police officers deployed outside of Bangui. The average age of officers is 50 years, and 380 are due for immediate retirement. Both the gendarmerie and police face crippling governance deficits – including a high level of politicization resulting in the frequent turnover of directors-general, unclear reporting lines, and weaknesses in management, internal oversight, and accountability.

Recognizing the continued dire need for institutional strengthening and capacity building among the internal security forces in CAR, resolution 2387 (2017) stipulates that MINUSCA:

- Promote and support the rapid extension of state authority over the entire territory of CAR, including by supporting the deployment of vetted and trained police and gendarmerie;
- Co-locate with police and gendarmerie in priority areas outside of Bangui;
- Support CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of security elements, to promote accountability;
- Take a leading role in supporting CAR authorities in implementing the National Capacity-Building and Development Plan for Internal Security Forces;
- Support the CAR Government in developing an incentive structure for police and gendarmerie and for the selection, recruitment, vetting, and training of police and gendarmerie, taking into account the need to recruit women; and
- Provide technical assistance to facilitate the functioning of the Special Criminal Court, in particular in the areas of investigations, arrests, detention, criminal and forensic analysis, evidence collection and storage, recruitment and selection of personnel, court management, prosecution strategy and case development, and the establishment of a legal aid system.[49]

With strong MINUSCA support, the CAR Ministry of Internal Security had developed a National Capacity-Building Plan for the Internal Security Forces for 2016–2020, which was endorsed by the Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR and National Reconciliation on 4 November 2016. The Plan sets out strategic goals and specific objectives and outlines key benchmarks in five thematic areas: (i) legal and regulatory framework; (ii) human resources management, including retirement, recruitment, and the augmentation of female representation; (iii) logistical and

budgetary requirements; (iv) operations and training; and (v) conduct and discipline matters. The document also details priority activities, including: (i) legislative review and development of a Law on the Gendarmerie, to institutionalize the operational authority of the Ministry of Interior over the gendarmerie; (ii) the rehabilitation and equipping of police and gendarmerie units; (iii) the identification and registration of personnel; (iv) the recruitment of 250 police officers and 250 gendarmes; (v) the development of curricula and training programs for new recruits; (vi) the rehabilitation and equipping of police and gendarmerie academies; and (vii) capacity strengthening of police and gendarmerie academy trainers.

As of March 2019, progress in implementing the Plan has been limited. CAR is not on track with achieving its ambitious objective of a 10,000 strong police and gendarmerie force by 2023, and faces capacity deficits in executive leadership and coordination, as well as oversight. Policing reform has suffered additionally from a lack of consensus on various contentious issues related to the reconstitution of the FACA. The effective development of the internal security forces will require a reallocation of both political engagement and financial resources away from the FACA and towards the police and gendarmerie. One notable success, however, was the recruitment, vetting, basic and specialized training of 250 new police officers and 248 new gendarmes with UN support.

Enhanced democratic oversight and sustainability

Democratic oversight and financial sustainability help underpin the areas discussed above, as part of the larger SSR framework. For CAR, an important milestone in this regard was the adoption of a new Constitution in December 2015. MINUSCA assisted the constitution drafting committee, including by deploying a legal advisor from the UN's standby mediation team. The Constitution includes articles that specifically contribute to a coordinated SSR agenda; in particular, Article 27 underlines that the security sector shall be composed of citizens, barring the use of mercenaries from outside CAR as in the past, and notes the need for the sector to be "professional, multi-ethnic, republican, and politically neutral."[50] This article has been adhered to, with recent police and gendarmerie recruitment requiring proof of citizenship. Article 80 is also significant because it specifies that the organization of national defence should be based in law, thereby providing a "constitutional basis for the development of a legal framework for national security."[51] A Military Justice Code was subsequently adopted by the National Assembly in March 2017, in line with the RCPCA, to address the history of impunity for FACA troops and build public confidence through accountability.

Another area where MINUSCA actively supported oversight and sustainability of the security sector was through the previously mentioned Security Sector Public

Expenditure Review with the World Bank. A review of the public financial management of the FACA, Police, and Gendarmerie was completed in January 2017. As described above, this review has helped identify ghost soldiers on public payrolls and led to an audit of the FACA. It also highlighted the structural imbalance of the current security sector budget: with 83.5% of the FACA budget paying wages and salaries, only 15.5% is allocated for operations and a paltry 1.5% for investments in infrastructure and equipment. The review concluded that the cost of the SSR component of the RCPCA far exceeds the fiscal resources of the Government of CAR, which may thus be forced to rely on voluntary contributions from partners.

Challenges to enhanced oversight remain, with parliament still playing only a minimal role. The traditional dominance of the security sector by the presidency, and the long history of winner-take-all politics in CAR, have not resulted in a culture of effective parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Nonetheless, MINUSCA's support for initiatives to clarify constitutional roles and develop a national security strategy and vision has contributed to improvements in this area, including through constitutional training for members of the defence and security committees of the National Assembly. These efforts have been largely piecemeal thus far, however, and should be part of a more comprehensive approach to supporting enhanced parliamentary oversight. While the National Assembly is finding its voice on security sector governance, it will require further technical capacity building to support security legislation drafting, military expenditure management, and civil society relations.

Coordinating diverse international actors and interests

MINUSCA plays an increasingly important role in coordinating several layers of SSR support from diverse international and regional actors in CAR. These layers of coordination are described below. A first layer relates to internal MINUSCA dynamics; a second to coordination between MINUSCA and the UN Country Team (UNCT); a third to coordination between MINUSCA and some bilateral actors, as well as the EU; and a fourth to coordination between MINUSCA and regional actors, including the AU, ECCAS, and CAR's neighbours.[52] Each of these actors brings different interests and different conceptualizations of SSR to CAR, which are not necessarily aligned. Just as national SSR efforts have at times struggled to gather around a common vision, as described above, so too have international support efforts.

Layer 1: Internal UN coherence – As a starting point, it is important that MINUSCA is structured to respond effectively to CAR's needs. UNPOL, SSR, DDR, civil affairs, political affairs, and gender components all exist under one

MINUSCA umbrella, but the division of labour has not always been clear. This led to the creation of the MINUSCA Working Group on SSR, which mirrors the structure of the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force at UN Headquarters, bringing potentially disparate components together under the leadership of the Deputy SRSG to advance a coherent and holistic understanding of, and UN approach to, SSR tasks by the full range of relevant actors in MINUSCA. While ongoing challenges remain in this process, both within MINUSCA and at Headquarters, inter-agency meetings play a key role in reducing overlap and encouraging coherence in SSR efforts.

Layer 2: MINUSCA-UNCT coordination – MINUSCA-UNCT coordination is tasked to the Office of the triple-hatted Deputy SRSG/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. With the exception of UNDP, members of the UNCT do not usually participate in meetings of the MINUSCA SSR Working Group. Roles are clearly delineated between MINUSCA and the UNCT, with the former focusing on political and security support, and the latter on programmatic support and technical assistance.

Layer 3: MISUSCA-bilateral and MINUSCA-EU coordination – Though the UN covers the widest scope among SSR actors in CAR, it is not always the most influential. Given the operational imperative that the FACA address continued insecurity, train-and-equip exercises by bilateral actors frequently dominate SSR in ways that are not always conducive to transformative reform processes. Indeed, bilateral support to SSR in CAR has historically focused on immediate stability, rather than on the more complex long-term reconstitution of the FACA into a representative and accountable security actor. Bagayoko notes:

> "[The] SSR concept promoting a human-security perspective on security is clearly side-stepping the traditional French approach to military/security cooperation: the French approach to CAR security reform is still deeply informed by the views of a traditional network of security assistance *coopérants* (military and police officers) whose approach is operationally-driven in essence and mainly focused on the security of the state as well as on the re-organisation of the security forces."[53]

Such an approach does not always allow for the productive DDR that is needed to underpin more successful SSR efforts. France's influence is likely to remain significant, including through its role as penholder at the Security Council for CAR-related issues. In the past, MINUSCA structures have existed to help bring French and EU approaches in closer harmony with the approach of the UN. During the transitional administration of Samba-Panza, for example, MINUSCA held strategic level coordination meetings among bilateral actors addressing SSR. Unfortunately, the subsequent administration did not elect to maintain these sector-wide strategic meetings, though monthly meetings are held on technical or thematic areas of SSR, such as defence sector reform.

The EU approach, including through EUTM RCA, tends to align with that of France, such that Europe collectively implements train-and-equip exercises rather than efforts to enhance security governance. Thus, when the UN envisioned defence sector reform in CAR to involve recruitment for a representative national army, the EU policy was simply geared towards training whichever troops the Government provided. However, training and equipping soldiers who are largely supportive of the Anti-*Balaka* or who were part of the old military establishment poses a risk of sustaining predatory behaviour and human rights violations.

MINUSCA has taken important steps to clearly delineate responsibilities and coordinate some diverging bilateral focuses and interests through a Joint Support Plan on SSR and the Rule of Law with the EU Delegation and the EUTM RCA, which was endorsed at the 21st meeting of the UN-EU Steering Committee on 16 March 2017 and signed in Bangui on 17 July by the head of MINUSCA, the Head of the EU Delegation, and the EUTM RCA Mission Commander. The Plan directs collective efforts towards a transformative SSR process and aligns them with CAR's National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–2021.[54] In particular, it commits MINUSCA and the EU to supporting the Government on the National Security Policy, National SSR Strategy, and Higher Council for National Security, with specific roles for each participant, based on existing national laws and frameworks. Partners are to undertake joint information exchange and analysis, while employing RCPCA-based coordination mechanisms, with a new MINUSCA Defence Sector Strategic Liaison Team that connects its senior military officers with the EUTM RCA's vetting and training tasks for the FACA. Additionally, the EU and MINUSCA established Coordination Groups made up of international partners, on defence, internal security, justice, and weapons and ammunition management.[55] The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General chairs regular meetings of the International Coordination Group on CAR Defence and Internal Security Forces.

The Joint Support Plan also underlines MINUSCA's "primary responsibility to support the CAR authorities in ensuring coherence of the SSR process, through provision of strategic and technical advice to national authorities, including formulation and implementation of a national SSR strategy," as well as the coordination of technical assistance and training between international partners in CAR to align them with the broader SSR framework.[56] Additionally, as regards defence sector reform, the Plan emphasizes that strategic review and renewal of MINUSCA and EUTM RCA's mandates will be "closely coordinated with one other, with a view to maintaining alignment."[57]

In 2018, MINUSCA and EUTM RCA prioritized mobilization of donor funding for the FACA and the internal security forces, with MINUSCA coordinating international partners in support of national priorities.

Layer 4: Regional actors – While this chapter is not focused specifically on regional aspects of the CAR crisis, several regional actors are especially relevant to the UN's SSR efforts in CAR. Chad has had a problematic role in the conflict in CAR and has often faced distrust from Bangui, particularly given that some armed groups in CAR are known to have sympathizers across the border in Chad. Still, Chad has attempted to support the current peace process. Cameroon has a similarly influential role as the "door" into CAR for various goods and services, both legal and illegal, making it an important player in the political economy of its neighbour.

To gain autonomy from its neighbours, CAR has been attempting to diversify its security partners beyond traditional allies such as Angola and South Africa to include Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. The AU has supported the broader peace process in CAR, together with ECCAS and the AU, ECCAS, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

Table 7.2: Security sector crises and reform attempts in CAR, 1996–2019

1996-1997	FACA mutinies
2003	March: Coup by General François Bozizé
2005	*Déclaration de Politique Générale*
2008	April: National Seminar on SSR December: Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD)
2010	SSR process stemming from National Seminar and IPD stalls
2013	March: *Séléka* coup led by Michel Djotodia December: MISCA deployed
2014	September: MINUSCA deployed
2015	May: Bangui Forum
2016	October: National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (RCPCA) adopted November: National Security Policy (NSP), national DDRR policy approved by Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation; Framework of Mutual Accountability (CEM-RCA) signed
2017	February: NSP adopted March: National SSR Strategy adopted by Strategic Committee for DDRR, SSR, and National Reconciliation
2019	February: Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic signed in Bangui

Conclusion

SSR support to CAR has improved, particularly since the permanent members of the Security Council have demonstrated their commitment to MINUSCA leading the

coordination role. During MINUSCA's deployment, various coordination and policy structures have been put into place, and assistance has been provided to nationally-led efforts to build the legal and constitutional foundations of an accountable and professional security sector. MINUSCA's role in coordinating SSR support has been clearly outlined in the Mission's recent mandates, helping both the UN and international actors utilize their comparative advantages in SSR activities in CAR.

However, with the process still ongoing, it is too early to say whether SSR will be deeply transformative for CAR in the long term, and there are some worrying signs. The drive to "operationalize" the FACA threatens to reduce SSR to a concentration on military functionality only.

The future of SSR in CAR depends on expanded work by the UN and international partners in further strengthening coordination, enhancing accountability and oversight, expanding security services beyond Bangui, developing a culture of inclusivity towards a security sector that serves all citizens – including through national dialogue – and bolstering the country's ability to respond to internal and external threats. Specific areas of importance for continued and coordinated international support could include the following.

Political inclusiveness to support SSR: Given CAR's history of exclusionary and elite-oriented politics, supported by an instrumentalized security sector, political progress remains the central challenge to all SSR efforts. The election of President Touadéra may have addressed the issue of the *legality* of the state but it has done little to address the *legitimacy* of the state. This is a significant obstacle given that the centre of gravity in the SSR process remains within the state rather than the wider society. The question of legitimacy largely depends on how inclusive and transformational the reform process is, and the President's commitment to reform is confronted by the presence of an entrenched Bangui-centric elite.

International efforts must collectively encourage political leaders to address the marginalization and exclusion experienced by many CAR citizens. The Government must also promote a "common level of citizenship," such that those living further from Bangui are not considered (and do not feel) any less citizens than those near the centres of power. It should "communicate an inclusive narrative that embraces all religious and ethnic groups as Central Africans."[58] The security sector's relationship with the public has historically reflected the alienation of certain groups and the sociological strains of an insufficiently shared national identity. A sense of shared citizenship will reflect, and be the true measure of, a transformation of the security sector in CAR. The UN should thus intensify its advocacy efforts to promote greater inclusion of Muslims and other ethnic minority groups in security institutions. As the only guarantors of the peace agreement with a SSR mandate and capacity, the AU and

the UN will have a critical oversight and advisory role in the implementation of the SSR commitments of the signatory parties.

Enhanced policy and coordination frameworks: To avoid the tendency towards incoherent donor projects or bilateral assistance, continued work on national frameworks for international SSR support is vital. The new Constitution provides an important starting point for a national security framework that can address security sector needs holistically, and thereby invite coordinated international support over the long term. Full implementation of the National SSR Strategy, coordinated by the Higher Council for National Security and with enhanced parliamentary oversight and civil society engagement frameworks, will be critical going forward. Another important aspect of this process is support by the UN for implementation of the RCPCA and the CEM-RCA, to better direct international efforts towards SSR priorities determined at the national level.[59] Within the peacekeeping context, enhanced coherence at Headquarters and among UN agencies on the ground can ensure that all aspects of UN assistance are working together.

National ownership: The UN can enhance the prospects of a coordinated response to SSR needs in CAR by ensuring that all voices, including women, youth, and civil society, are part of the national security vision, and that dialogue includes armed opposition and marginalized groups. Improved oversight capacity by the National Assembly based on more comprehensive constitutional training, as mentioned previously, will be important as well. The National Assembly will also have to ensure that the Government of CAR allocates sufficient budgetary resources to SSR, especially for the implementation of capacity development within the internal security forces.

Maintain political momentum among the leadership: Recent successes in developing frameworks for more coordinated SSR support can help bolster the political process in CAR but cannot substitute for it. While they were not as developed as today's structures, the 2008 National Seminar and IPD were both ambitious projects that failed nonetheless due to insufficient political will amid anxieties over the implications of SSR for existing power relations. Addressing anxieties such as these may be necessary to reach the desired end-state of security institutions that are accountable and responsive to citizens in all parts of the country.

Notes

1 United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Challenges and Priorities* (2016), xi.

2 For the purposes of this chapter, *coherence* refers to efforts within the UN, while *coordination* refers to the alignment between UN efforts and those of other SSR actors.

[3] Boubacar N'Diaye, "The Central African Republic," in *Disarmament, Remobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform: Insights from UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, eds. Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012), 115.

[4] Boubacar N'Diaye, "Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic," in *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, eds. Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009), 41.

[5] UN Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic*, 13.

[6] The *International Religious Freedom Report for 2017*, published by the US State Department (available from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=280722), cites Pew Research Foundation findings that Muslim ethnic groups make up approximately 9% of the population of CAR. They include the *Baggara*, *Fulani*, *Furu*, *Kara*, and *Hausa*.

[7] Tatiana Carayannis and Mignonne Fowlis, "Lessons from African Union-United Nations Cooperation in Peace Operations in the Central African Republic," *African Security Review* 26, no. 2 (2017): 222.

[8] Ibid., 223.

[9] Robert M. Perito, *UN Peacekeeping in the Sahel: Overcoming New Challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015), 11.

[10] International Crisis Group, *The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation*, Africa Report No. 219 (Nairobi/Brussels: ICG, 2014), i.

[11] N'Diaye, "Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic," 44.

[12] Ibid., 53.

[13] Ibid., 46.

[14] Ibid., 46.

[15] Ibid., 45.

[16] Ibid., 47.

[17] Ibid., 48.

[18] Niagalé Bagayoko, "Multi-level Governance and Security: The Security Sector Reform Process in the Central African Republic," IDS Working Paper 351, November 2010.

[19] N'Diaye, "Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic," 49, 57.

[20] Ibid., 54.

[21] Ibid., 56.

[22] International Crisis Group, *Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa*, Africa Report No. 181 (Nairobi/Brussels: ICG, 2011), 13.

[23] Angela Meyer, "Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX," *African Security* 2, no. 2–3 (2009): 166–167.

[24] Carayannis and Fowlis, "Lessons from African Union-United Nations Cooperation in Peace Operations in the Central African Republic," 231.

[25] Martin Welz, "Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International Response," *African Affairs* 113/453 (2014): 607.

[26] Carayannis and Fowlis, "Lessons from African Union-United Nations Cooperation in Peace Operations," 225.

[27] Ibid., 226.

[28] Perito, *UN Peacekeeping in the Sahel*, 12.

[29] Global Peace Operations Review, "Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions," www.peaceoperationsreview.org/non-un-military-missions.

[30] Welz, "Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International Response," 605–606.

[31] Carayannis and Fowlis, "Lessons from African Union-United Nations Cooperation in Peace Operations," 230.

[32] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2217 (S/RES/2217), 28 April 2015.
[33] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2301 (S/RES/2301), 26 July 2016.
[34] Ibid.
[35] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2015/576), 29 July 2015.
[36] UN Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic*, 9.
[37] Carayannis and Fowlis, "Lessons from African Union-United Nations Cooperation in Peace Operations," 227.
[38] For more, see Central African Republic National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–2021, 9. The second pillar of the RCPCA aims to renew the social contract between the state and the population by building the presence and capacity of the state to provide basic social services such as education, health, and water and sanitation. It covers four strategic objectives, with a total cost of US$1.326 billion. The third pillar aims to promote economic recovery and boost productive sectors, to rapidly provide the population with income-generating activities and employment opportunities in core productive sectors, and to improve the business and investment environment more broadly. It covers three strategic objectives at a total cost of $1.224 billion.
[39] Central African Republic National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–2021, 9.
[40] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/94), 1 February 2017.
[41] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/473), 2 June 2017.
[42] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/865), 18 October 2017.
[43] Mohamed M Diatta, Institute for Security Studies, "Will the latest Central African Republic peace deal hold?" Available from https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-latest-central-african-republic-peace-deal-hold.
[44] UN Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic*, 10.
[45] This process is called "*verification simplifieé*."
[46] World Bank, *Revue de la gestion financière des forces de défense et sécurité en République Centrafricaine*, October 2016.
[47] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, "Situation in the Central African Republic" (S/2018/611), 18 June 2018.
[48] See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2399 (S/RES/2399), 30 January 2018. This exemption was introduced in 2017, by resolution 2339; see United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2339 (S/RES/2339), 27 January 2017.
[49] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2387 (S/RES/2387), 15 November 2017.
[50] UN Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic*, 15.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Coordination has occurred between MINUSCA and some international NGOs as well, such as with the National Democratic Institute to enhance parliamentary oversight capacity, and with the US Institute of Peace on national reconciliation.
[53] Bagayoko, "Multi-level Governance and Security."
[54] Joint MINUSCA-EU Delegation and EUTM RCA-Support Plan on SSR, 4.
[55] Ibid., 7.
[56] Ibid., 8–9.
[57] Ibid. See "Support to Defence Sector Reform (DSR)," 1.
[58] *Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to the Central African Republic: Toward Strategic, Prioritized, and Sequenced Mandates* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2017).
[59] See United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit, *Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic*, 27.