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From peacebuilding to sustaining peace and preventing conflict: What role for SSR?

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Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed a range of intra-state conflicts across the developing world that have led to the breakdown of states and to humanitarian crises of various proportions in places such as the Balkans, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda. This security landscape, which confounded initial expectations of a “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War, is also transforming the international regime of political and security governance.¹ Even though the end of the Cold War permitted a shift in focus from national security to human security, it did not, per se, result in enduring peace. Rather, intra-state conflicts proliferated while inter-state conflicts declined. Simultaneously, new or worsening sources of insecurity, including cybercrime, trafficking, organized crime, and Ebola, do not respect borders.

Much has changed since the UN first developed its traditional peacekeeping approach, in which military personnel were typically interposed between recognized fighting forces to keep a peace that had, in principle, been arranged. The UN has since adapted its approach to an ever-changing terrain in which conflicting parties innovate forms of violence to inflict maximum damage on their opponents. During this process, the lines between the domestic and international, military and civilian, and state and society have become blurred.²

So far, the UN’s record in terms of building lasting peace and instituting a functioning political order has been mixed, even when assessed against the minimal criterion of achieving short-term stability. While the UN endured an utter failure in Somalia in the 1990s for example, it was able to restore a semblance of political order elsewhere, and in some instances, took over the entire administration of conflict-ravaged states until a functioning political order was instituted. This was the

case in Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo. As the international community gained more experience in interventions to restore stability and build peace, the approach was adapted, and the perspective, sequencing, and priorities evolved. Accordingly, there has been a shift in attention, from restoring order and ensuring an early exit via elections and the transfer of power to elected authority, to building the institutions of the state – including security institutions – and engaging the wider society beyond the state.

In the course of addressing these challenges, there emerged the need for a contemporary framework by which to operationalize the foundational provisions of the Charter in the search for peace. The Secretary-General's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, defined peacebuilding as activities undertaken to build structures and processes that sustain peace.³ By 2005, a peacebuilding architecture was in place, consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Peacebuilding Fund. However, until recently, the urgency of conflict management has focused the efforts of the UN and the broader international system only on the aftermath of conflict. The current conflict prevention and sustaining peace agenda, which grew out of the report of the 2015 Advisory Group of Experts, is the culmination of a normative evolution that now encompasses the entire peace continuum beyond post-conflict contexts.

This move from post-conflict peacebuilding to a more comprehensive sustaining peace approach is central to the UN SSR agenda, given that SSR has been described as both a “tool” and a “thematic area” of peacebuilding.⁴ This chapter identifies and discusses the key elements manifested in the evolution of the UN's peacebuilding agenda since its inception in the early 1990s. The chapter is divided into four major parts. This introduction is followed by an analytical framework, which focuses on the evolution of UN policy on peacebuilding and the linkages between peacebuilding and SSR and serves as the basis for observations on SSR and peacebuilding presented in part three. The fourth part of the chapter offers policy advice for the future UN conflict prevention and sustaining peace agenda.

SSR and peacebuilding: An analytical framework

The following section traces the connection between SSR and peacebuilding, and outlines the evolution of the UN's peacebuilding doctrine towards a sustaining peace approach, as a means to draw observations and recommendations. The core conceptualizations of SSR and peacebuilding, as distinguished from how they have frequently been applied in practice, are closely aligned. However, political and practical realities have often prevented the realization of intuitive and necessary

connections between the two on the ground. This chapter is based on two pillars of analysis: inherent linkages between peacebuilding and SSR, and the relevance of peacebuilding doctrine for SSR.

Linkages between peacebuilding and SSR

SSR and peacebuilding are fundamentally concerned with the creation and maintenance of accountable institutions upon which peace and socio-economic development can be based, hence their common relevance to Sustainable Development Goal 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies. As has been observed elsewhere, in conflict-affected states, lasting stability and development require a shift away from hard security towards a citizen- and governance-centred security agenda.⁵ SSR is a critical element of peacebuilding because the security sector is often the “face of the state” to its citizens, and its value is closely linked to legitimacy and accountability. SSR is therefore a tool for peacebuilding in that “a democratic and accountable security sector is critical for conflict management and the preservation of peace and security,” as a report of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office has noted.⁶ Heiner Hänggi has made a similar observation on the importance of security in peacebuilding efforts: “If peace is to be lasting, the security needs of both the state and its population must be addressed equally and in parallel with political and socio-economic aspects of reconstruction.”⁷ Peacebuilding is thus deeply reliant upon SSR both as a tool and a factor of success, without which development gains can be quickly overturned by the next crisis, which may be caused by poorly governed security institutions or opposition to them.

The long-term perspective required for peacebuilding also has the potential to help mitigate the tendency in some cases to implement narrow, short-term “SSR” efforts that focus on train-and-equip exercises rather than on the transformative and long-term engagement needed for sustainable reform of security institutions. A peacebuilding lens can not only bring SSR back to its holistic, preventative, and development-centred origins, it can also help expand the scope of the security sector being reformed to include non-statutory security actors beyond the central government. The Peacebuilding Fund’s support for the development of local security committees in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia represents a good example.⁸ The UN’s growing emphasis on sustaining peace and addressing the full continuum of peace, from prevention to post-conflict, only further underlines the linkages between SSR and peacebuilding.

The evolution of UN peacebuilding doctrine, and its relevance for SSR

The UN's peacebuilding doctrine has evolved significantly from 1992 to the present, with key implications and lessons for the UN approach to SSR. In 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* reflected a post-Cold War movement towards human security, envisioned to include an economic and social focus in international interventions. However, peacebuilding was still viewed as a post-conflict phenomenon involving the arrival of UN peacebuilders after peace agreements had been signed to mark the end of a conflict.⁹ By 1995, the Secretary-General acknowledged in his *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* that post-conflict peacebuilding measures "can also support preventive diplomacy."¹⁰ This coincided with a growing understanding that peacebuilding encompasses conflict prevention and management.¹¹ As with SSR, however, peacebuilding remained mostly associated with post-conflict activities, frequently as part of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations in support of a peace agreement, in which, by the Secretary-General's own admission, "the United Nations already has an entrée."¹² This limitation was not merely practical but also political: "mostly due to intervention/sovereignty dilemmas among Member States, peacebuilding was restricted to the post-conflict terrain and prevention of the recurrence of conflict."¹³

Peacebuilding's characterization as a post-conflict activity closely tied to SSR was underlined in a presidential statement on post-conflict peacebuilding by the Security Council in 2005, which noted even before the formal enunciation of the UN approach to SSR that "priorities in the post-conflict environment should include [. . .] security sector and economic and social reform."¹⁴ Later that year, UN Security Council resolution 1645 formally established what would become known as the peacebuilding architecture: the Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body, together with the Peacebuilding Support Office within the Secretariat and the project-based Peacebuilding Fund, all firmly oriented towards post-conflict peacebuilding.¹⁵

A common approach to international peacebuilding developed from the field practice of the UN and other international peacebuilders, whereby peace agreements are signed by warring factions, followed by a transitional period – often featuring a transitional government or transitional administration – and then by elections, after which the major peacebuilding agenda is declared achieved.¹⁶ Peacebuilding and most other international state-building efforts are confined to this period, after which, a Country Coordinator and UN Country Team pursue the "normal" development agenda. Peacebuilding is thus "under-recognized and under-prioritized,"¹⁷ and the prevention of armed conflict has not been given sufficient attention and resources in the actual practice of peacebuilding interventions.

Still, an emerging consensus at the UN indicates that the conception of peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity may be changing, or may indeed have already changed. Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) assumed the definition of sustaining peace put forth by the Advisory Group of Experts, which moves beyond post-conflict peacebuilding to an approach that “encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.”¹⁸ This will be particularly relevant for SSR efforts going forward and reflects some observations that were already revealed through the evolution of peacebuilding, some of which are detailed below.

Key elements for SSR and peacebuilding

Based on the linkages between peacebuilding and SSR noted above, the following observations drawn from the UN’s experience thus far in peacebuilding support since the 1990s are particularly salient as both peacebuilding and SSR activities at the UN move towards a more preventative, sustaining peace approach.

Security is political

UN experiences in peacebuilding and in supporting SSR processes demonstrate and affirm a key observation of the 2015 report of the High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), that “lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions.”¹⁹ The report emphasizes that the ramifications of “the primacy of politics” revolve around inclusive approaches to peace.

From the external perspective, supporting national SSR processes is a function of the national security interests of those states/actors providing support, and of broader geo-strategic politics. What is supported, how it is supported, when and where such support is provided, and the measurement of “success” are all defined and confined by this reality. Therefore, neither peacebuilding nor SSR is altruistic; both are instead the products of the domestic politics of supporting states and the external relations between them. In this regard, UN SSR support includes efforts to promote dialogue and build consensus among and between international “partners.” Although the focus has primarily been on post-conflict states, such efforts are not divorced from, but rather, reflect the interests of external actors concerning counter-terrorism and migration. The sensitivities and suspicions of some UN Member States in the global South (embodied in the G77) that such agendas could become a pretext for unwanted interventions in their internal affairs, particularly where the security sector

is concerned, has often led UN agencies to pursue a “strict” development agenda,²⁰ as though development failure and success are immune from the influence of politics. The tendency to relabel development projects as peacebuilding undertakings looms large.²¹

Within states undergoing peacebuilding, the political nature of SSR is manifested in domestic political will to address the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the process of building security institutions, as well as in the institutions themselves. Fundamentally, this is a question of whether a security sector will be not merely strengthened but *reformed*, in part through the development of a common national vision of security with the participation of excluded and vulnerable groups as well as broad agreement among constituencies on the threats facing the country and the institutions needed to confront them. Thus, the impact and success of SSR in these countries do not rely solely on the efficacy of specific security institutions but also on their political and public legitimacy, accountability, and responsiveness – all of which are only possible through inclusive reform processes and structures. Continuing challenges with constructing political consensus out of the multiple, and arguably conflicting, political representations in Somalia, for example, have had a debilitating impact on the reform of the security sector by a central government struggling to pull along its constituent regional parts.

Given that the quality and functioning of institutions depend on the settlement that emerges from the power balance between actors negotiating the basic rules of the game,²² the politically transformative impact of SSR interventions is essential. To the extent that the powers of different actors, classes, groups, or influential individuals whose interests are best served by a more peaceful, just, and inclusive social order are strengthened, expanded, and linked with other likeminded actors, they contribute to altering the nature of this settlement and its security and development outcomes. Whenever there are “critical masses” of reformist and transformational leadership at various levels whose interest is best served by a more peaceful and just political order, preventative measures are likely to have a higher chance of success.

Instances of catalytic funding and intervention during periods of imminent instability, and their effect on conflict outcomes, indicate the relevance of supporting, nurturing, and strengthening constituencies with transformative potential. Interventions by the UN Development Programme (UNDP)-UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA)²³ peace and development advisors (PDAs) in a number of countries are evidence of this. In Malawi’s contentious 2014 election, PDAs worked alongside DPA mediation experts and the UNDP to support Public Affairs Committees that served as “insider mediators,” the role of which was instrumental in mobilizing a series of “peace voices” from a cross section of Malawian society that, in the end, limited the extent of violence.²⁴ Other conflict prevention intervention efforts also demonstrate that such interventions are more

likely to be successful when they are backed by local constituencies supportive of peace. In Nigeria, the UNDP supported National Peace Committees composed of key personalities, which were instrumental in preventing election-related violence in 2015.²⁵

Transformation does not occur overnight

Closely related to these political dynamics is the need to harness *sustained* support from potentially transformative constituencies beyond the state. Within societies undergoing reform, the central and disproportionate role of the state relative to other political constituencies often leads to a palpable gap between policy and practice in the UN's peacebuilding efforts in general, and SSR in particular. The transformation of state-society relations in fragile states is therefore essential to peacebuilding.

In post-conflict settings, healing societal wounds caused by war while sufficiently reconciling warring factions in order to shape some sort of political community requires far longer than is accounted for in contemporary UN peacebuilding interventions. According to the World Bank, transforming fragile institutions into fairly effective ones took between 15–30 years in countries considered to have undergone fast transformations.²⁶ As the Advisory Group of Experts noted, “sustaining peace after conflict is a particularly lengthy and costly challenge. Evidence strongly suggests that undue haste and a narrow focus on cessation of hostilities rather than addressing root causes are significant factors in relapse.”²⁷ Success in peacebuilding, and SSR in particular, is a process, not an event.

This highlights the value of transformative processes not only in preventing relapse in post-conflict settings, but also in avoiding the outbreak of conflict initially. An ongoing challenge to the peacebuilding agenda has been the significant dependence of the UN, as an intergovernmental entity, on powerful states that aim to manage crisis rather than prevent it.²⁸ An under-emphasis on peacebuilding as prevention is in part connected to a global constellation of forces unwilling to commit politically and financially to prevent conflict. In the meantime, actors in developing countries are often wary about peacebuilding interventions that begin prior to the eruption of a crisis, which they frequently perceive as “external interference” and “threats to national security.”

The long-dominant post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm is only now beginning to take on a sustaining peace approach, and SSR faces a similar transition from a “crisis response” impulse towards a longer-term view. The framing of peacebuilding and SSR as crisis response has tended to focus primarily on hard security concerns related to war and violence. As such, efforts to address conflict situations early on so that they do not reach crisis level, and to sustain peace where it already exists, attract much less attention and far fewer resources. This is reflected in the field,

where UN peacebuilding and SSR are often confined to post-crisis phenomena in multidimensional peace operations. Once the Security Council approves an operation, the exit strategy tends to hinge on the transfer of the task of maintaining peace and public order to national authorities and, in select cases such as in Sierra Leone, to special peacebuilding offices. Thus, the marriage between peacebuilding and post-crisis situations is forged out of practical expediency, not long-term strategy. As an organ primarily concerned with international peace and security, the Security Council is likely to privilege policy options and strategies that bring short-term stability, with unintended side-effects for the deeper roots of conflict. In light of this, a greater commitment from all Member States to long-term SSR and peacebuilding may be required through enhanced General Assembly engagement.

The UN's comparative advantage: helping states help themselves

While the UN has a developed normative framework for guiding SSR processes, actual practice – usually involving a broad range of actors beyond the UN, and particularly, bilateral and regional actors – often falls short of these normative principles. The UN's relatively recent entry into SSR, combined with the prevalence of (often bilateral) interventions that emphasize short-term train-and-equip interventions, has resulted in coordination that is both internal, among UN actors, as well as external, with other actors on the ground. In practice, this means: reform that is supposed to be holistic is frequently piecemeal; compliance with human rights standards is not a given if a government disregards these rights when its interests are threatened; national ownership is envisioned to include citizen ownership but the actual “owners” are frequently governing elites; and the enhancement of the functional effectiveness of the state overrides aims to achieve security for all. Moreover, while the UN does engage in reform of specific security institutions, bilateral and regional actors have been known to be more prominent and enjoy greater credibility in these programmatic interventions. Thus, the UN is one of many actors in peacebuilding and SSR and its comparative advantage relative to other actors lies in its role as the custodian of SSR norms, principles, and ideals on which states should base the governance and reform of their security institutions.

In this conceptualization, the UN “helps states help themselves” through guidance on sector-wide SSR processes, in line with articulated norms. This emphasis on support for security architectures and policies, as opposed to programming, is in line with Security Council resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR, which notes that the UN is “particularly well positioned to support and coordinate sector-wide reforms as necessary in specific situations and has broad experience as well as comparative advantages in this area working in close collaboration with relevant international and regional actors.”²⁹

Regionalism and multiple levels of security governance have impact

As noted by the Advisory Group of Experts, “numerous and varied stakeholders – public and private, national, regional and international – share the responsibility for peacebuilding.”³⁰ The same holds true for SSR, which concerns national-level institutions, regional interactions and cross-border security issues, local security providers (including informal institutions), and global dynamics such as international arms flows, terrorism, and the broader geo-strategic agenda.

UN activities must take these multiple levels of security governance into account, with an understanding that different levels can impact each other both positively and negatively. And here, the regional aspect is particularly important. On one hand, “contemporary conflicts show a strong tendency to spill across borders,” and “regionalization of conflicts sees States intervening militarily across boundaries, directly or through proxies, and exacerbating local drivers of conflict.”³¹ This is notably the case in the Sahel region,³² where chronic security sector deficits are aggravated by regional trafficking and terrorism, and in a number of countries that have recently hosted peacekeeping operations and have faced challenging cross-border conflict dynamics – the most salient being Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia. Not all multi-level impacts are negative, however. As a regional instrument, the African Union (AU) has developed continental peacebuilding and SSR policies, including the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy and the AU SSR Policy Framework, to guide regional efforts. Similar work has been undertaken at the sub-regional level by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has developed a Security Sector Reform and Governance Framework and has supported SSR in various African contexts, such as in Mali, Liberia, and most recently, Guinea-Bissau (as part of ECOMIB).³³

Fragmentation necessitates “working better together”

Coordination and coherence, which have routinely been acknowledged as important to improving outcomes of the UN approach to peacebuilding, have proven difficult to achieve in practice. The Advisory Group of Experts attributes this to the fragmentation of the UN into separate “silos,” each of which has a different understanding of its mission, its mandate, and of peacebuilding.³⁴ Further, with each of the UN’s principal organs “hold[ing] pieces of the peacebuilding puzzle [. . .] the fragmentation between them is reproduced throughout the United Nations: within the Secretariat, between the Secretariat and the rest of the Organization, and in operations on the ground where peacebuilding actually takes place.”³⁵ This invariably impacts SSR support as well.

Thus, crafting organizational structures, operating principles, and modalities as well as generating the political interest to coherently respond to this conflation has proved challenging. The Secretary-General's efforts to reform the UN's peace and security architecture offer the potential to address these coordination issues, particularly as they relate to peacebuilding and SSR. 1 January 2019 saw a restructuring into a Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and a Department of Peace Operations (DPO), as well as the establishment of a single political-operational structure with regional responsibilities, reporting to both departments. The reform also established a Standing Principals' Group of the Secretary-General and the heads of both DPPA and DPO.³⁶ The relocation of the Peacebuilding Support Office into DPPA may offer an opportunity to better integrate a long-term peacebuilding perspective into daily political work, while closer inter-departmental coordination could further enhance the role of the UN SSR Unit at headquarters in supporting SSR efforts in both mission and non-mission settings, including through the DPPA-DPO single regional structure.

Funding matters

The predictability and sustainability of funding is important for successful peacebuilding and SSR, which are, in their truest sense, long-term and transformative activities, as described above. Yet, over the years, programmatic efforts have frequently been undertaken without any guarantee of predictable future resources. The Advisory Group of Experts noted that, in supporting SSR and rule of law activities, "even if mission budgets appear, from the outside, to be considerable, a closer examination reveals that, somewhat astonishingly, they come without any of the resources necessary for programming in those core mandate areas. Instead, program resources depend on the unpredictable generosity of donors;" it also observed that "a solution must be found to ensure predictable funding for critical program efforts towards sustaining peace."³⁷ Peacebuilding activities that lack a long-term perspective differ little from quick-impact projects and cannot bring lasting peace. Similarly, short-term funding for training exercises that do not address the political and institutional challenges of the security sector cannot be expected to have major impact. While financing alone does not guarantee well-designed interventions, predictable financing does open up possibilities for more comprehensive SSR support frameworks that span multiple years.³⁸ Such funding must also be a national responsibility, and not primarily externally derived.

Conclusion and recommendations

The principles outlined above point to the need for a long-term and comprehensive approach to SSR, not only in post-conflict contexts but also for sustaining peace. The UN must continue to shift from “what it knows,” meaning old habits of reacting to and managing conflict, to “what it must (re-)learn,” which involves fully committing to a sustaining peace paradigm. Among other things, this will entail a more preventative approach to security governance. Specific recommendations include the following:

Continue to employ the UN’s comparative advantage in sector-wide reform:

Despite the challenges of coordinating SSR actors both inside and outside the UN, sector-wide support represents the UN’s competitive advantage and should remain central to its SSR engagement. Bilateral actors may provide substantial implementation support to SSR measures, including through training and by enhancing individual elements of the security sector. However, in the final analysis, the UN is uniquely situated to advise and support national efforts aimed at sustaining peace through inclusive and accountable security institutions. These efforts will also support other wider peacebuilding aims. For example, changing the composition of the security sector to better reflect a country’s demographic composition and integrating previously opposed armed groups into a cohesive national army can play important roles in advancing reconciliation and addressing previous sources of grievance.

Keep host states accountable: This chapter has noted the close link between peacebuilding and SSR, and it is important that host states do not take support in either of these areas for granted. In other words, peacebuilding support should remain coupled with improved governance of the security sector. Development assistance in the name of peacebuilding cannot become an excuse for inaction on urgently needed reforms to security institutions, nor should an ongoing UN mission presence allow a host country to delay the difficult task of advancing reconciliation and adequately funding security institutions. Support must be extended within a framework of mutual accountability, as outlined in the 2011 Busan Principles,³⁹ such that states define their development priorities and commit to outcomes with international support. For SSR, this involves outlining strategic priorities and commitments through instruments such as statements of mutual commitment with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, peacebuilding plans, or other similar compacts.

Further incorporate the work of the Peacebuilding Commission into the work of the Security Council: Given the Security Council’s tendency to focus attention on the “crisis of the moment,” the Council should be encouraged to follow the

guidance of the Advisory Group of Experts to “regularly request and draw upon the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission on the peacebuilding dimensions of mandates.”⁴⁰ The Commission’s advisory role was envisioned from the start, in Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), and simply needs to be consistently implemented. Movement has been made towards better institutionalizing this relationship by certain members of the Council in the most recent revision of presidential note 507 on working methods: “The members of the Security Council also acknowledge the importance of maintaining communication with the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body and express their intention to regularly request, deliberate and draw upon its specific, strategic and targeted advice, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1645 (2005) and 2282 (2016). The Chair of the Commission and the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Commission will be invited, as appropriate, to participate in public Council meetings.”⁴¹ The question is to what extent the Council, particularly its permanent members, will make use of this suggested approach in setting future mission mandates.

For a truly preventative approach, enhance UN General Assembly engagement:

Where the attention of the Security Council to preventative approaches reaches its limits, the role of the other main UN organs becomes increasingly critical. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 70/262 (2016) on the same day as the adoption of Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) to welcome the report of the Advisory Group of Experts symbolized the General Assembly’s interest and commitment in a more comprehensive and preventative approach to peacebuilding. This commitment was reaffirmed in April 2018 in General Assembly resolution 72/276, which coincided as it had two years earlier with a parallel Security Council resolution (2413) and, in this instance, with a High-level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace – where conflict prevention and improved system-wide coherence were main themes.⁴² The Assembly should increase its engagement in SSR to both complement the work of the Council and fill any “attention gaps” in long-term and preventative approaches. A General Assembly decision to adopt an identical or similar version of Security Council resolution 2151 on SSR, or even an entirely new resolution, could further support this role. Such a resolution could not only reaffirm existing UN principles on SSR, but also account for recent preventative/peacebuilding developments in which SSR support is provided in non-mission settings based on national requests. General Assembly action to devote more dedicated or pooled funding to SSR in both preventative and post-conflict settings could assist the UN in moving beyond short-term peacebuilding perspectives to a longer-term view focused on preventing conflict and sustaining peace.

Notes

- ¹ Shahar Hameiri, *Regulating Statehood: State Building and the transformation of Global Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- ² United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, better known as the “Brahimi Report” (A/55/305–S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.
- ³ United Nations Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (A/47/277–S/24111), 17 June 1992.
- ⁴ See Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, *SSR and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform to Peacebuilding to Peacebuilding and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund* (United Nations, 2012).
- ⁵ Funmi Olonisakin, “Security and Sustainable Development: an African Perspective,” in *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development*, compilation of presentations made at the first joint seminar of the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and DCAF, 21 January 2003, 27. Available from www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Olonisakin.pdf.
- ⁶ Fitz-Gerald, *SSR and Peacebuilding*, 6 and 15.
- ⁷ Heiner Hänggi, “Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,” in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Geneva DCAF, 2005), 4.
- ⁸ Fitz-Gerald, *SSR and Peacebuilding*, 20–21.
- ⁹ Hänggi, “Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,” 6 and 10.
- ¹⁰ United Nations Secretary-General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* (A/50/60–S/1995/1), 25 January 1995.
- ¹¹ Hänggi, “Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,” 10–11.
- ¹² United Nations Secretary-General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*.
- ¹³ Sarah Cliffe and Alexandra Novosseloff, *Restructuring the UN Secretariat to Strengthen Preventative Diplomacy and Peace Operations*, New York University Center on International Cooperation (New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2017), 7.
- ¹⁴ United Nations, Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2005/20), 26 May 2005.
- ¹⁵ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1645 (S/RES/1645), 20 December 2005.
- ¹⁶ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture* (A/69/986–S/2015/490), 30 June 2015.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2282 (S/RES/2282), 27 April 2016.
- ¹⁹ United Nations, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People* (A/70/95–S/2015/446), 16 June 2015.
- ²⁰ After Burundians undertook their first post-conflict election in 2005, one senior UN bureaucrat opined that the UN wanted to iron out its relations with the government and return to its strictly developmental role. See Kristiana Powell, *Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Burundi: Accomplishments, Dilemmas and Ideas for International Engagement*, Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits /North-South Institute working paper, 2007. Available from www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2007-Security-Sector-Reform-and-the-Protection-of-Civilians-in-Burundi-Accomplishments-Dilemmas-and-Ideas-for-International-Engagement.pdf.
- ²¹ See Charles T. Call, “Addressing Two Problems with Peacebuilding,” United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 17 June 2015. Available from <https://cpr.unu.edu/addressing-two-problems-with-peacebuilding.html>.
- ²² Mushtaq Khan, *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions*, draft paper in research series on “Growth-Enhancing Governance,” University of London School of African and Oriental Studies, 2011.
- ²³ The Department of Political Affairs was renamed the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) in January 2019.

- ²⁴ United Nations, *Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention: Annual Report 2014*, 6–7.
- ²⁵ United Nations, *UNDP Nigeria: Annual Report (2015)*, 27.
- ²⁶ World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Available from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389>.
- ²⁷ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- ²⁸ See Karen A. Mingst and Karen P. Margaret, “United Nations and Conflict Management: Relevant or Irrelevant?” in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007): 497–520.
- ²⁹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2151 (S/RES/2151), 28 April 2014.
- ³⁰ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² See International Crisis Group, “Open Letter to the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping in Mali,” 24 April 2017. Available from www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/open-letter-un-security-council-peacekeeping-mali.
- ³³ See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2343 (S/RES/2343), 23 February 2017.
- ³⁴ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, *Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar (A/72/525)*, 13 October 2017.
- ³⁷ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- ³⁸ For examples of the governance-centered and transformative programme design that multi-year funding can allow, see Nicole Ball, *Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme* (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2014).
- ³⁹ See Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, “Principles,” <http://effectivecooperation.org/about/principles>.
- ⁴⁰ United Nations, *Challenges of Sustaining Peace*.
- ⁴¹ United Nations, Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), 30 August 2017.
- ⁴² See United Nations, High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Chair’s Summary, 24–26 April 2018. Available from <https://www.un.org/pgal/72/event-latest/sustaining-peace>.