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## **OPERATIONALIZING HUMAN SECURITY** **CONCEPT, ANALYSIS, APPLICATION**

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*Barrio Marin, Caracas. Photo Yves Pedrazzini, January 2008 (left)*

*Caracas. Photo Albrecht Schnabel, February 2008 (right)*

# OPERATIONALIZING HUMAN SECURITY

## CONCEPT, ANALYSIS, APPLICATION

Albrecht Schnabel and Yves Pedrazzini, Editors

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## Preface and Acknowledgements

Much has been said and written about the opportunities for and limitations of using human security as an academic paradigm and a practical tool to improve the security and well-being of people around the world. Despite the concept's goal of steering the focus on security from states to individuals and communities, in practice it has not changed the means and ways in which states provide security to their populations.

Serious engagement with the ideas that are inherent in the human security approach, however, invites several new perspectives that should lead to more relevant understanding of both the threats that compromise individuals' security and the measures which should be taken to mitigate those threats. Utilizing the human security concept for better threat assessment and mitigation means operationalizing human security to achieve improvements for individuals and populations at risk. Risks and threats are highly contextual and depend greatly on the specific geographic, political, cultural or economic context that defines an individual's immediate neighbourhood. A better understanding of the nature and impact of the risks and threats, paired with suitable mitigation measures and workable implementation strategies, should translate into improved security.

The Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project upon which this publication is based attempts to bring to life the link between human security analysis and human security provision to improve the lives of people living in threatened communities and to sensitize those responsible for providing security to the threats at hand and ways to channel existing resources most effectively towards the alleviation of as many serious threats as possible.

In two companion publications, *Operationalizing Human Security: Concept, Analysis, Application* (Cahier 20) and *Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human-Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments* (Cahier 21), conceptual discussions and practical findings of the OPHUSEC project are shared with a larger audience. The authors hope that, among the readers of these two cahiers, some will pick up where they left off – in further developing the OPHUSEC approach and in using its methodology to improve their own threat and mitigation efforts. The first publication offers analyses of the project's evolution, argumentation and potential, along with sample case studies and reflections on the project's implementation and findings. The second publication offers a series of practical suggestions and tools for easy replication of some or all of the project's practical assessment and mitigation components.

The OPHUSEC project and this publication would not have been possible without the kind support of a number of institutions and individuals. For institutional support we would like to acknowledge swisspeace, EPFL, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change. For financial support we thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). From within NCCR North-South we are grateful for guidance and support from Mira Arynov, Thomas Breu, Berhanu Debele, Ulan Kasymov, Didier Peclard, Mariam Perez and Bishnu Raj Upreti. We thank our main research partners, Andres Antillano, Gulnara Iskakova and Moges Shiferaw. We are furthermore grateful to those colleagues and local participants who attended our various workshops in Kyrgyzstan, Venezuela and Ethiopia, and those who have participated in and assisted the project throughout the years, including Ina Amann, Anna Bürgi, Marc Krupanski, Daniel Michel, Josbelk González Mejías, Indira C. Granda Alvarez, Gaby Guererro Serdán,

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## Abbreviations

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| DDR      | disarmament, demobilization and reintegration                  |
| GDP      | gross domestic product   |
| HDI      | Human Development Index  |
| HDR      | <i>Human Development Report</i>                                |
| ICISS    | International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty |
| NCCR     | National Centre for Competence in Research                     |
| NGO      | non-governmental organization                                  |
| OECD     | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development         |
| OECD/DAC | OECD Development Assistance Committee                          |
| OPHUSEC  | Operationalizing Human Security project                        |
| SIPRI    | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute               |
| SSR      | security sector reform   |
| UCDP     | Uppsala Conflict Data Program                                  |
| UN       | United Nations   |
| UNDP     | UN Development Programme                                       |



## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction: Human security and the OPHUSEC project

Albrecht Schnabel

#### INTRODUCTION

Human security has emerged as a concept that puts the security of individuals, communities and populations at the centre of security provision. Providing security involves the effective and successful prevention and mitigation of direct and structural security threats. Yet without a thorough and effective identification and assessment of threats – which vary greatly from context to context – effective and successful prevention and mitigation is not possible. The project “Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection: Analysis, Monitoring and Mitigation of Existential Threats by and for Local Communities” – in short *Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC)* – on which this publication is based has been carried out to explore the possibility of utilizing the concept of human (individual and population-centred) security for the definition, early detection and effective mitigation of context-relevant threat mitigation. This volume reflects on the findings, lessons and practical implementation experiences of this project. By doing so it hopes to encourage readers to pick up where the OPHUSEC project has left off, and use its methodology in supporting and facilitating potential security providers’ ability to assess and mitigate human insecurity within their communities.

This publication brings together some of the most significant outputs and results from the OPHUSEC project, incorporated into a single cahier available as both hard copy and a freely accessible electronic version. We hope that the lessons, results and suggestions generated by this project will stimulate interest in learning more about this analytical and practically applied effort to use a human security approach in identifying and mitigating highly context-specific threats with equally context-driven and resourced response measures.

The publication includes already published as well as new materials, and is accompanied by a separate companion publication (Cahier 21) in the form of a toolkit to facilitate the easy replication of OPHUSEC threat and mitigation assessment exercises.

This introduction will not go into great detail about the history, nature and method of the OPHUSEC project – these issues are discussed in detail in several contributions to this volume. In fact, a certain degree of repetition cannot be avoided when it comes to reporting on the OPHUSEC project background and description, as most chapters are meant to be read not only as an integral part of the volume but also as stand-alone essays. Without occasional repeated references to the OPHUSEC project basics, few of the chapters would be comprehensible outside of the volume’s overall context. Still, a few introductory words are in order to set the stage for the remainder of this chapter and the book.

Solid and thorough threat assessments depend in large part on the object of security: whose security are we concerned about? Whose security needs to be defended and improved? The academic and policy debates on security, particularly during the years following the end of the Cold War, have broadened and deepened our understanding of security. Its horizontal dynamic focuses on dimensions or themes, such as military, political, economic, ecological, socio-cultural and personal dimensions of security. The vertical dynamic of security focuses on different levels of analysis – from the global to the regional, national,

group and individual. Human security, which emphasizes the individual and society as the vertical focus of analysis and action without limiting itself to any specific horizontal threat dynamic, has emerged as an important focus of today's security analysis and security provision.

Why human security? While the focus on security needs and provision for individuals is not necessarily new, some of its inherent features are. They give new guidance to those who understand security as a holistic, comprehensive phenomenon and condition, drawing on both vertical and horizontal aspects of safety, development and protection needs of populations, their states and the regional and global community of societies and states. First, as already mentioned, the focus on human security implies a focus on the individual and the population as the "referent objects" of security – security is therefore in the first instance about improving the situations of individuals, communities and populations. Governments, states and institutions have been created and tasked by groups of individuals to govern the economic, social and political lives of society and protect their safety, security and well-being. Thus the protection and maintenance of national security, for instance, is a means towards providing human security. Second, "security" is not only about the absence or presence of direct threats through armed violence against individuals and their states, but also about structural threats linked to environmental issues, human rights, economic development, food or health. Third, in response to these evolving approaches to the meaning and purpose of "security", there is a need to rethink government policies, programmes and spending priorities on security provision.

Finally, two very important dimensions of managing threats to one's security emerge. On the one hand, it is important to prevent, avoid or – at minimum – reduce the impact of threats. On the other hand, particularly when threats cannot easily and quickly be avoided due to structural and systemic problems, it is important to "empower" populations themselves to strengthen their coping capacities to adapt to ongoing human insecurity. Thus human security is about both recognizing and alleviating the conditions and factors that cause and perpetuate threats (i.e. "root cause alleviation") and building threatened populations' capacity to cope with threats that cannot be alleviated quickly and easily, and so continue to affect their lives (i.e. symptom mitigation). The primary objective of human security provision is therefore threat alleviation, while a secondary, intermediate, objective is to build and strengthen resilience.

For the purpose of the OPHUSEC project (and presumably for the meaningful implementation of any human-security-focused policy, programme or activity), not every inconvenience, risk or threat can possibly be referred to as a human security threat. The OPHUSEC project uses the point where a threat has become or will likely become existential (thus threatening the physical survival of a human being) as the threshold at which it can be considered a "human security threat". Once existential threats have been alleviated, attention can and should be turned to the alleviation of non-existential threats. According to this understanding, human security stands for the ability of people to secure, at a minimum, their basic right to physical survival. If people's safety cannot be guaranteed for the next day, week or month, and if they have to struggle (and, in turn, threaten others) to secure their own survival and that of their families and communities, neither society nor the state can be stable or peaceful. It is those existential threats that endanger the lives of people and are at the heart of our understanding of human insecurity. It is also important to recognize and emphasize that threats, their impact and mitigation options are highly contextual. They vary across regions, countries and communities. They also vary depending on the social, economic, political or geographic conditions that characterize a certain context. The context is extremely important and guides the analysis and mitigation – and thus the implementation – of the means used to improve human security provision.

## THE OPHUSEC METHODOLOGY

The OPHUSEC project hoped to develop sustained and participatory multi-actor cooperation in order to identify, monitor and alleviate threats to human security. The empirical research of the project was carried out mainly in Venezuela (with a focus on its capital, Caracas), Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia. The reason for focusing on these three places can be explained by the project's attempt to draw on existing resources and research networks. The targeted places correspond to three of the main research locations in which the National Centre for Competence in Research North-South (NCCR-North-South), OPHUSEC's "mother project", had already been operational for a number of years by the time OPHUSEC was initiated under its umbrella. NCCR-North-South aimed to provide comparative analysis between and within three major geographic contexts: urban and peri-urban; highland-lowland; and arid and semi-arid. Our initial field research activities in Caracas, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia mirror those three geographic contexts, respectively. Subsequently, a number of further desk-based case studies were carried out to explore further the utility of the OPHUSEC approach; some of these are featured in Part Two of this volume.

Using the OPHUSEC approach, which will be explained in more detail in many chapters, particularly Chapters 13 and 14, the case studies in Caracas, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia in particular were initially designed to follow the same research process. In each case study, a small local team of researchers was assembled by the Swiss-based research team. In a first step, the research teams conducted context-relevant research on the causes and effects of human insecurity (human insecurity mapping), as well as past and existing mitigation measures at state and non-state levels. The teams gathered a wider group of representatives from a variety of major stakeholders, who addressed the same tasks in the context of a participatory multistakeholder consultation workshop. The workshops were organized and facilitated by the relevant case study team and the Swiss researchers. The findings of both the local research team's work and the multistakeholder meeting reflected how researchers and stakeholders similarly and differently characterized the human (in)security situation within their particular local and/or national context.

In a second step, the research teams selected key threats – existential threats – based on specific selection criteria. The resulting "human insecurity cluster" was designed as a set of core threats that each group defined as essential to monitor and address in order to preserve basic human security (i.e. survival), and had to meet a number of specific criteria. Each threat had to present existential dangers threatening the survival of individuals; be closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes; be capable of being effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and the strengthening of coping capacities; and present possible and feasible opportunities for success and multi-actor collaboration for mitigation. Thereafter the teams explored those threats as well as past, current and potential for mitigation measures in greater detail. This led to the development of specific response measures that would need to be taken by local, national and international actors to reduce threats and strengthen the coping capacity of affected populations. The same task was subsequently tackled by the participants of the multistakeholder workshop group and integrated into the local team's assessment.

In a third step, the research teams and multistakeholder groups designed indicators and measures to monitor both the development of core threats and the degree to which response measures have been taken in reducing populations' human insecurity. They also developed strategies to share the project's findings and recommendations with local, national and international actors and encourage their implementation. They explored options for the continuous analysis of human-security-based threat and response strategies as a decision support tool capable of influencing (and guiding) actual threat mitigation and human security provision by non-state, state and intergovernmental actors. This far-reaching ambition

extended beyond the confines of what was originally designed as a research project. Nevertheless, the research team vowed to pursue this larger objective after the conclusion of the initial research with the publication of a freely available consolidation of project lessons and hands-on practical guidance on the implementation of the project's main suggestions.

As much as possible, this basic three-step approach was applied to the initial field studies (Caracas, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia), while the remaining cases covered in this publication were conducted mainly as desk studies, without the benefit of feedback from multistakeholder consultation workshops. The main purpose of all our case studies was, in the first instance, to test the utility and feasibility of the OPHUSEC approach. Is it a useful approach that might potentially yield helpful, even unique, results and could eventually be worth replicating to assess context-relevant threats and mitigation strategies? After and parallel to the conceptual development and evolution of the OPHUSEC project and approach, the case studies amounted to what could be called "pilots" of the implementation of the OPHUSEC idea. A number of key questions guided those attempts to put the conceptual ideas of the project into practice.

- Do context-driven threat analyses point to the need to address different threats than those studied in conventional risk and conflict analyses?
- Have past responses been suitable and successful in addressing threats adequately? Are current measures effective in doing so?
- Do OPHUSEC-type threat and mitigation analyses (re)define conventional response measures – and do they unearth new, potentially more effective mitigation options?
- Is it possible to identify certain key threats that share the same root causes with other threats to the point that efforts in addressing one threat may also indirectly alleviate others through these common ties to shared root causes?
- Is it therefore possible that politically delicate threats can now be addressed – if not directly, then indirectly by focusing in the first instance on alleviating other, less sensitive threats?

We will return to these questions in the concluding chapter. The remainder of this chapter presents an outline of how this volume is organized.

## OUTLINE AND CHAPTER OVERVIEWS

This book is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, Part Two of the volume focuses on "Concepts and Methodology". Chapter 2, "The human security approach to direct and structural violence", by Albrecht Schnabel, places the concept of human security in the security debate and shows that human security is indeed an innovative approach to reflect on threats in a non-discriminatory manner as constituting both direct and structural violence. Mitigating violence thus means to prevent and manage direct as well as structural threats to populations' survival and well-being. Chapter 3, "Livelihoods, human development and human security: Exploring conceptual differences, similarities and complementarities", by Marc Krupanski, outlines differences and similarities between human security, human livelihoods and human development. Researchers, policy-makers and practitioners on the ground alike often have difficulties accepting and appreciating the coexistence of these different yet highly complementary concepts, all of which have a particular place in the work of, for instance, human rights, development and security communities. None of them provides comprehensive explanations about the sources of, and most effective mitigation strategies for, the wide variety of threats people face on a daily basis in different parts of the world or within different parts of a country. Yet the complementarity of these three concepts allows



different communities to communicate, plan and work together in effectively identifying and managing threats.

Chapter 4, “Towards a human-security-based early warning and response system”, by Albrecht Schnabel and Heinz Kruppenacher, shows how the OPHUSEC approach can be utilized for an early warning and response system that goes beyond the prevalent tendency of such systems to focus merely on the prevention of violent conflict. The chapter argues that a human-security-based system would be considerably more useful and relevant in improving the safety and security of populations threatened by a wide range of direct and structural violence, which, building on the argument presented in Chapter 2, should be the central focus of a comprehensive warning and response system. In Chapter 5, “Human security and security sector reform: Towards people-centred security provision”, Albrecht Schnabel links human security with the concepts of security sector governance and security sector reform (SSR). The chapter examines the theory-reality gap in applied SSR and requirements for ensuring that SSR, as designed in theory and applied in practice, lives up to broader human security and development goals. Following a discussion of the challenges and benefits of human-security-sensitive SSR, the chapter explains the added value of using OPHUSEC tools in assessing the needs and effects of SSR programmes, and having a post-OPHUSEC conversation with security sector and other security-providing actors and communities towards joint efforts in addressing human security threats affecting the well-being and security of a population and nation.

The third part of the volume, entitled “Case Studies – Experimenting with Implementation”, offers a number of contributions that report on threat and mitigation analyses of several countries (and one major city) carried out within the context of the OPHUSEC project. Chapter 6, “Operationalizing human security in an urban setting: The experience of Caracas”, by Albrecht Schnabel, Andres Antillano, Indira C. Granda Alvarez and Yves Pedrazzini, is an attempt to translate some key findings of the Caracas study into some general arguments about the management of human security threats in urban environments. Chapter 7, “Human insecurity and security in Caracas”, by Indira C. Granda Alvarez, Andres Antillano, Josbel González Mejías, Raphaël Zaffran and Marc Krupanski, is a streamlined and shortened version of the initial background report of the case study on Caracas. The chapter draws on the research team’s initial background study, enhanced by feedback from two multistakeholder workshops. It is meant to show that, while already quite useful in informing a more nuanced understanding of the human security situation in Caracas, there might be much to gain from following through on subsequent OPHUSEC steps to develop empirically based recommendations for mitigation action.

In Chapter 8, “Human insecurity and security in Ethiopia”, Moges Shiferaw offers a heavily abridged version of a much longer draft case study. It is presented as an early, yet fairly detailed, version of the OPHUSEC case study analysis of Ethiopia – although more advanced in terms of the OPHUSEC methodology than the Caracas chapter. With the benefit of two multistakeholder workshops, the case study reached the stage at which a human security cluster of core threats had been developed, mitigation actions had been explored and – to a certain extent – indicators for implementation outcomes had been discussed.

The subsequent case studies, Chapter 9 on Kyrgyzstan, Chapter 10 on Nepal (both by Ina Amann), Chapter 11 on Laos (by Gaby Guerrero Serdán) and Chapter 12 on Bosnia and Herzegovina (by Daniel Michel), are primarily desk studies (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which benefited from an initial round of multistakeholder consultations). They were written with a level of detail that allows the presentation of a fairly developed OPHUSEC study in the context of a compact case study report.

The final part of the volume offers “Lessons and Conclusions”. Chapter 13, “Challenges in operationalizing human security: Lessons from preparing and implementing the OPHUSEC project”, by

Albrecht Schnabel, is written as a reflection on the trials and tribulations experienced by the project members during the conceptual development and practical fine-tuning of the OPHUSEC project and their attempts at implementing a number of pilot case studies. The chapter focuses on identifying and avoiding some of the most common difficulties and pitfalls encountered during the implementation of various components of the OPHUSEC threat and mitigation assessment – and turn those into lessons for anyone interested in carrying out a similar assessment exercise.

In Chapter 14, “Operationalizing human security: From theory to implementation to institutionalization”, Albrecht Schnabel and Yves Pedrazzini offer a brief assessment of the OPHUSEC project and its achievements and shortcomings, and a brief outlook at the possibilities, opportunities and obstacles in putting the OPHUSEC approach into practice. As is argued in this concluding chapter, there appears to be great potential in putting a human security approach centre stage when assessing context-specific threat and mitigation scenarios. This will benefit not only those directly affected by prevalent threats, but also those expected to create the conditions for preventing and managing those threats so that societies can increasingly live without fear.

#### **A NOTE ON ACADEMIC RIGOUR AND PURPOSE OF THE CASE STUDIES**

Particularly the case studies in the third part of the volume have been written at various stages of the project, reflecting different levels of investment in time, effort and resources in terms of personnel, funds and empirical research. Some of the studies incorporate extensive stakeholder input, while others are desk studies. Particularly the case studies on Caracas, Ethiopia and Kyrgyzstan were initially written as background pieces in preparation for multistakeholder consultation workshops, enhanced with the information generated by these consultations. They are abridged versions of the larger internal draft studies prepared by the respective research teams and authors. Therefore they are written in a journalistic and informal project reporting and documenting manner, rather than as rigorous academic studies. The studies in Nepal, Laos and Bosnia and Herzegovina were written primarily as desk-style background studies and thus did not benefit from multistakeholder consultation input.

Reflecting a variety of detail, academic rigour, data coverage and compliance with OPHUSEC project guidelines, the case studies followed to varying degrees the report writing guidelines included in the OPHUSEC toolkit (Cahier 21). The reader may decide which level and depth of detail appears most useful and feasible in informing threat and mitigation assessments of the types carried out in the context of the OPHUSEC project. Moreover, as presented in this volume, the case studies do not reflect updated and comprehensive analyses of the countries they cover. The case studies are primarily meant to serve as demonstrations of how the OPHUSEC approach can be applied.

## CHAPTER 2

### The human security approach to direct and structural violence

Albrecht Schnabel

#### INTRODUCTION

In the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's *SIPRI Yearbook 2007* Elisabeth Sköns argues that there is a clear gap between the intended objective of security provision and its current focus on the prevention of collective violence, which leads to much human death and suffering.<sup>1</sup> In the same volume, Michael Brzoska calls for the traditional categories of collective violence and armed conflict to be augmented.<sup>2</sup> This chapter builds on their arguments. In exploring the causes and consequences of the disconnect between violence and insecurity, consideration must be given to those threats that are the main causes of death and injury to humans and affect the stability of societies – many of which do not fit into either the category of armed conflict or that of collective violence. Many such threats are the consequence of structural violence. A human security approach can encompass these threats and direct violence for both analysis and mitigation.

If individuals and communities feel secure and protected from the threats that emanate from direct and structural violence – that is, if their basic human security needs are guaranteed – then both individual suffering and conflict and violence at the communal, regional and international levels can be significantly reduced.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, the violation of individuals' and communities' basic human needs<sup>4</sup> leads to suffering as well as social and communal deterioration, thus increasing violence in its direct and structural manifestations. This chapter first defines “direct” and “structural” violence, and explores the utility of the human security concept in addressing both. The second section identifies armed violence as a unique catalyst of both types of violence. The third section makes suggestions on how to design human-security-driven threat and mitigation analyses that help identify and respond to both direct and structural violence more effectively. Finally, some conclusions are presented.

#### *Defining direct and structural violence*

Johan Galtung refers to “the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as *personal* or *direct*, and to violence where there is no such actor as *structural* or *indirect*”.<sup>5</sup> He further explains:

In both cases individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of these words, and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies. But whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.<sup>6</sup>

According to Galtung, both direct and structural violence can be expressed physically and psychologically, whether directed at specific objects or not, with acts that are intended or unintended, and expressed in manifest or latent terms. Direct and structural violence are interdependent forces, and although direct violence tends to be more visible and easily perceived, “there is no reason to assume that structural

violence amounts to less suffering than personal [direct] violence”.<sup>7</sup> As a particular expression of the direct form, armed violence causes damage and promotes conditions for structural violence. It also weakens a society’s capacity to resist or adapt to other life-threatening harm. Thus armed violence and its direct and structural debilitating effects threaten peace – both negative peace, which is characterized by the absence of direct violence, and positive peace, which is characterized by the absence of structural violence.<sup>8</sup>

Galtung’s differentiation between direct and structural violence is not an undisputed approach, but it makes sense in the context of human security analysis. If human security generally means “the security of people – their physical safety, their economic well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms”,<sup>9</sup> then threats experienced by individuals and groups that are part of specific social, cultural, economic and political communities are not limited to direct armed violence. Such threats may be overt expressions of violence committed by specific and identifiable actors or covert expressions of violence inherent in the disadvantaged position of individuals and groups in a social, political or economic system that is upheld by power structures beyond their control. Without violence there is greater potential to provide and meet at least basic human needs, and to develop possibilities to satisfy needs that determine not only survival but also well-being and quality of life. Galtung seems to have sensed the need to give greater consideration to the structural aspects and sources of violence, and shift the exclusive (or primary) focus, particularly by governments, from prevention of direct violence to the prevention of structural violence. Whether made voluntarily due to a sense of national and international responsibility or forced by others promoting such norms, such a shift would lower violence and increase human security.

Galtung argues that “there is no reason to believe that the future will not bring us richer concepts and more forms of social action that combine absence of personal violence with [the] fight against social injustice [i.e. negative and positive peace] once sufficient activity is put into research and practice”.<sup>10</sup> This chapter suggests that human security may well be the concept that offers this opportunity. Looking at the impact that both types of violence have on the human security of individuals and communities, without prejudicing one over the other in terms of strategic, political or economic significance, allows a more effective focus on the basic needs of individuals, compared to the security needs of states as expressed in more traditional national security thinking. This approach responds to one of the original components of the human security concept: that national and international political and security structures should consider human security equally important to national security. At this juncture, the human security concept is able to advance the distinctions between direct and structural violence and between negative and positive peace. Both accountability and responsibility for the prevention of human insecurity might eventually enter the theory and practice of international law and custom.

The contribution of human security in responding to direct and structural violence is discussed below, following a brief outline of the concept.

### ***The human security concept***

The concept of human security is much debated and has been given varying definitions by scholars and governments alike.<sup>11</sup> For the purpose of this chapter, “human security threats” are identified as those that threaten the lives of individuals and communities through either direct or structural violence. This approach is manageable both in research and in practice. Although it covers threats posed by both direct and structural violence, the approach applies an impact threshold requiring violence to be life-threatening to individuals and communities. The mere avoidance of direct and structural violence does not satisfy the full

range of requirements for positive peace, broad human security provision and the satisfaction of the complete hierarchy of human needs.<sup>12</sup> It does, however, offer a manageable definition that links population security with national security, structural violence with direct violence, and accountability for human insecurity with responsibility for the provision of human security.

## **VIOLENCE AND HUMAN INSECURITY**

From the literature cited above, three main streams of thought define the source, meaning and impact of human insecurity. Broad definitions focus on “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”; narrower definitions focus on the impact of direct, armed violence. The approach suggested in this chapter focuses on a combination of direct and structural violence in so far as they threaten the lives of individuals and communities. If the rationale for such an approach is pursued further, at least two critical questions arise. First, why does direct violence still figure so prominently in human security and insecurity analyses when its contribution to the overall numbers of people killed as a result of preventable violence is comparably low? Second, why work with structural violence, where the origins of threats are difficult to trace and the responsibility for their occurrence, impact and alleviation is even more difficult to assign? Instead, focus could be placed separately on direct, armed violence on the one hand and various other forms of harm on the other. As is argued below, opting for direct and structural violence as interdependent core variables in human security analysis and provision offers opportunities to address the most crucial threats to populations and prepare the ground for the most effective mitigation mechanisms.

### ***Direct violence as a catalyst of human insecurity***

Among the causes of insecurity, armed violence is a factor of unique significance because it prevents the adequate provision of human security through its debilitating direct and indirect effects; acts as an accelerator of human insecurity, with knock-on effects that increase the negative impact of existing levels of violence and harm; and is often the articulation of underlying, protracted and unresolved structural violence and thus an indicator of societal and political instability. Armed violence is a highly visible pointer to the long-overdue necessity of addressing structural violence and its manifestations.

To assess the impact of armed violence on prevailing stress levels and human insecurity potential, the type of violence must be determined (e.g. state-based or non-state). Furthermore, the existing and potential – increasing or decreasing – levels of armed violence must be ascertained in addition to its internal and external costs. (Internal costs include the probable number of victims, infrastructural damage and political, economic and social costs. External costs include, among others, the impact on regional peace and stability through conflict spillover or refugee movements.) The psychological effects of armed violence (such as fear and terror) on populations, on public opinion and on decision-makers are also significant, with definite yet difficult-to-estimate implications for peace and stability. If the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States were an attempt to destabilize the political, economic, social and cultural foundations of Western civilization, they may at least have shaken those foundations. The attacks created a sense of fear and terror that was powerful enough to persuade political decision-makers and populations in numerous (primarily) Western societies to limit significantly some long-held and protected values and norms (such as civil freedoms) in an effort to deter future terrorist activity of a similar kind. The structural and direct violence emanating from the “global war on terrorism”, triggered by the September 2001 attacks on (presumed)

Western stability and security, turned out to be significant threats to human security in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, and to the civil rights and freedoms of Western societies.<sup>13</sup>

While the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami with its thousands of victims did not cause major political or social breakdown in any of the affected countries, armed violence that results in far fewer victims can easily have this effect. Depending on the impact on the society where it occurs, armed violence can be considered an “extraordinary disaster” causing infrastructural, political, economic, psychological, environmental and socio-cultural damage. Environmental crises cause localized destruction (which can be repaired) and instability (which can usually be corrected fairly quickly), while an armed crisis can easily cause significant irreparable inter-communal damage and instability, affecting political and social relations for years or decades to come.<sup>14</sup> Thus armed violence can trigger protracted structural violence with extraordinary long-term consequences. In a 2007 study, the International Action Network on Small Arms, Oxfam and Saferworld estimate the economic cost of armed conflict to Africa’s development:

On average, armed conflict shrinks an African nation’s economy by 15 percent, and this is probably a conservative estimate... There are the obvious direct costs of armed violence – medical costs, military expenditure, the destruction of infrastructure, and the care for displaced people – which divert money from more productive uses. The indirect costs from lost opportunities are even higher. Economic activity falters or grinds to a halt. Income from valuable natural resources ends up lining individual pockets rather than benefiting the country. The country suffers from inflation, debt, and reduced investment, while people suffer from unemployment, lack of public services, and trauma.<sup>15</sup>

Preventing the outbreak of armed violence, or at least curtailing its scope and duration, is an important contribution to combating the unwieldy spread of structural and direct violence with compounded human security consequences. One of the first major attempts to address direct violence from the human security perspective emerged from the debate on the responsibility to prevent and mitigate grave violations of human security in the form of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities. This debate led to the UN General Assembly’s endorsement of the “responsibility to protect” concept at the 2005 UN World Summit, the establishment of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in New York and the creation of the position of a special adviser on the responsibility to protect in December 2007 to work closely with the office of the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Structural violence and human insecurity***

Structural violence can be expressed in various ways, one of which is as suffering by all or part of society as a consequence of local, national or international exploitive and unjust political, economic and social systems and structures that prevent people from meeting their basic needs. Structural violence impinges on the basic survival needs of individuals and communities and is thus a source of human insecurity. Many effects of structural violence are devastating in human terms as well as destabilizing in political terms. Economically or politically marginalized populations that suffer from structural violence may breed extremist violence (insurgency or terrorism). In this case structural violence feeds direct violence. Structural violence matters in terms of its immediate impact on human security and its correlation with increasing direct violence.

Elisabeth Sköns appears to state the obvious when she notes: “If the ultimate objective of security is to save human beings from preventable premature death and disability, then the appropriate security

policy would focus on prevention instruments and risk reduction strategies for their causes.”<sup>17</sup> The point is well taken, since the occurrence and scope of armed violence – and directly related casualties – are often used to inform general analyses of trends in peace and conflict worldwide. The *Human Security Report 2005* is an example of such thinking, although it is widely criticized for this approach.<sup>18</sup> Sköns further asserts: “While collective violence causes a great many premature deaths and disabilities, other types of injury cause an even greater number.”<sup>19</sup> She cites relevant statistics prepared by the World Health Organization, according to which worldwide 17 million people died of communicable diseases in 2005, while 184,000 deaths occurred as a result of collective violence.<sup>20</sup> Thus approximately 100 times more individuals died of preventable diseases than perished as a result of direct collective violence. The data cited by Sköns also show that almost five times as many individuals committed suicide and three times as many were killed in interpersonal violence than those who fell victim to collective violence.<sup>21</sup> However, in the light of those figures, an important caveat should be considered, as it is likely to increase the reported levels of indirect victims of armed violence. Recent Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data suggest that the promising decline in the number of state-based conflicts seen in the 1990s has ceased, and the annual number of such conflicts remained constant at 32 for three years (2004–2006).<sup>22</sup> The annual totals for “major armed conflicts”, as defined by the UCDP and SIPRI, also remained relatively stable for three years (at 14–15 conflicts in 2005–2007). Furthermore, since 2004 all the major armed conflicts recorded have been intra-state conflicts.<sup>23</sup>

While it is likely that damage from armed violence contributes greatly to years or decades of post-violence suffering, from a human security perspective deadly harm that is not caused by armed violence deserves at least as much attention. There is a need to rethink security analysis and provision by moving from analysing “conflict potential”, which focuses on direct violence, to “human insecurity potential”, which focuses on both direct and structural violence and their mitigation.

Structural violence matters in the analysis of both violence and possible mitigation efforts. It is both a source and a result of direct violence. Structural violence manifests itself in marginalization and repression, and in the intentional and unintentional creation of obstacles to the development or maintenance of individual and community-based strategies for managing harm. Based on the human security and human needs perspectives, both direct and structural violence are unacceptable burdens on human development, social justice and order – whether they are committed intentionally or not. The prevailing preoccupation in many quarters with the prevention of primarily direct violence (and the outbreak of violent conflict or its recurrence in the post-conflict reconstruction phase) should give way to a more thorough focus on the detection and mitigation of structural violence. The latter is a source of great human suffering and societal tension, with the potential to destabilize societies to the point where armed violence becomes unavoidable.

## THE HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS VIOLENCE

Alleviating, mitigating and coping with direct and structural violence are essential requirements for sustainable and positive peace – and for ensuring that fragile post-conflict societies in particular do not relapse into collective violence. The priorities and responsibilities for preventive and restorative engagement need to be clarified. The human security approach to structural and direct violence is a method to assist in identifying such priorities and responsibilities. It selects threats in a specific geographic context with a focus on the needs of the affected population, identifies sources of direct and structural violence and develops and communicates mitigation strategies to the actors in charge of human security provision.

A number of issues are thus necessary components of a framework for effective human insecurity mitigation: population- and context-specific threat and violence identification and analysis; threat-, context- and actor-specific designs of preventive and response measures; targeted prevention of direct and structural violence through multi-actor strategies; and monitoring and assessment of threat levels and the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures. Particular attention must be paid to the role of armed violence and its potential for escalating existing and creating new waves of direct and structural violence, and to the sources and impacts of structural violence. Using this framework as the basis for human security analysis will help identify priority threats and entry points for effective preventive measures. However, the response side of this equation will remain a challenge, although not a difficult one. Desirable outcomes include observable and measurable reduction of direct and structural violence and threat levels; decreasing vulnerability to direct violence and other life-threatening harm; increasing levels of human security; the reduced likelihood of conflict; and improvements in social and political stability.<sup>24</sup>

Such a systematic approach to the analysis of violence is particularly relevant in the presence of structural violence, which is not always easy to recognize and where the identification of responsible causes and actors are a challenge at best. In Galtung's words, "Personal violence represents change and dynamism – not only ripples on waves, but waves on otherwise tranquil waters. Structural violence is silent, it does not show – it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters."<sup>25</sup>

The human security approach is concerned with the needs of, and threats affecting, individuals and communities. Violence has to be analysed and mitigated primarily at the levels of social, political and economic interactions. Thus a human security approach to identifying and alleviating direct and structural violence must be able to identify sources of, and remedies to, violence that are realistically attributable to affected individuals and communities. Analysis of the sources of human insecurity and the responsibilities for security provision has to be undertaken in a context in which such analysis delivers relevant information to identify accountabilities and responsibilities, and where remedial or preventive strategies become feasible. In many instances, this will result in a multitiered approach to human security analysis and provision. Both direct and structural violence can be traced back to local, national, regional and international sources (i.e. structures and actors). Responsibilities for action lie with different actors at each of those levels. Sometimes remedial or preventive strategies can be pursued at all levels from the local to the global (with the greatest potential for effective and sustainable human security provision), while most often less ambitious (and possibly less effective) strategies will have to focus on measures at those levels where actors, structures and processes are most agreeable towards cooperation in the reduction of violence. For instance, financial or ideological support for an insurgency from local populations and external governments may be addressed at either or both of those levels. Global structural inequalities (such as globalization pressures or unfair trade patterns) might be identified as sources of structural violence at the local level, but would need to be addressed at the international level.



## CONCLUSIONS

As discussed in the previous section, the human security concept implies that the provision of human security requirements is largely the responsibility of states. Many states need to rethink and refocus their security policies and systems in order to provide effective human security for their population and – in cooperation with other states and coordinated by intergovernmental organizations – assist or encourage states that lack the necessary capacities to follow suit. The “responsibility to protect” concept seems a suitable response to these calls for the provision of universal human security. Yet it is for this very reason that scepticism prevails about the legality of a new norm which considers human security as an innate right and the provision of human security as the responsibility of states. Such expectations seem to be at odds with states’ rights to sovereignty and non-intervention. Protagonists of the concept point out that their work – and the accompanying evolving global norm – applies only to direct violence and, in that context, the extreme action of military intervention under the responsibility to protect concept is concerned only with the most grievous crimes: mass atrocities and genocide. However, the basic assumptions of the concept justifying measures short of military intervention are applicable to direct violence in more general terms and to structural violence “committed” by national and international cultural, social, economic and political structures – a major paradigm shift in international norms and values.

Depending on one’s reading of *The Responsibility to Protect*,<sup>26</sup> there seems to have been a struggle within the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty over the inclusion of some types of violence at the expense of other similarly destructive yet politically and legally less practicable ones. The responsibility to protect concept focuses on conflict and violence prevention and on post-conflict and post-violence rebuilding as the main tools available to the international community to fulfil its responsibilities towards disadvantaged and threatened populations worldwide. Direct violence short of mass atrocities and structural violence are gradually being recognized as viable and legitimate justifications for triggering international concern and pressure on states that are not able or willing to meet their populations’ human security needs.

Using existing means and instruments to address state-based conflicts and – although more challenging – other forms of collective violence might be easier, less expensive and under current international law more likely to occur. From a human security perspective, such an approach reflects concerns mainly with the impact that tensions or crises have on national, regional and international order and stability. The fate and survival of affected populations are not primary considerations despite the destructive impact of both direct and structural violence on the stability and fabric of societies and their political systems. Moreover, such narrow approaches to addressing collective violence ignore opportunities to become involved in dealing with major suffering that is short of direct violence, and in checking its escalation to armed violence. Focusing threat analysis and mitigation on an approach that applies human security to identifying and reducing direct and structural violence offers promising opportunities for creating the normative, legal and eventually political conditions for the consolidation of positive and sustainable peace in threatened societies.

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Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 87–96). The author thanks the editors and publishers for permission to republish the chapter in this volume.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Elisabeth Sköns, "Analysing Risks to Human Lives", in *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 243).

<sup>2</sup> Michael Brzoska, "Collective Violence beyond the Standard Definition of Armed Conflict", in *SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 94–106).

<sup>3</sup> Specific examples of structural violence include civilian grievances as a result of economic blockades or the discriminatory practices of global trade regimes; unequal access to political power, resources, healthcare, education or legal standing causing significantly higher risk for people from particular segments of society to suffer and prematurely die from communicable and non-communicable diseases or extreme poverty; and institutionalized race segregation (e.g. apartheid in South Africa), which can kill slowly by preventing people from meeting their basic needs.

<sup>4</sup> John Burton (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990).

<sup>5</sup> Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 1969, p. 170 (emphasis in original).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173; on the interrelationship between direct and structural violence see pp. 177–183.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 183.

<sup>9</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 15, para. 2.21).

<sup>10</sup> Galtung, note 5 above, p. 186.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now", Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003, [www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html](http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html); Ramesh Thakur, "From National to Human Security", in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (eds), *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997, pp. 53–54); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, note 9 above, p. 15, para. 2.21. On human security as a foreign policy tool see Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes (eds), "Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases", INEF Report 80/2006, Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg, 2006. See also Gerd Oberleitner, "Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?", *Global Governance*, 11(2), 2005, pp. 185–203; Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, note 9 above, p. xii; Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds), *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Possibilities* (London: Routledge, 2005); Mary Kaldor, "What Is Human Security?", in David Held, Anthony Barnett and Caspar Henderson (eds), *Debating Globalization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp. 175–190); Mary Kaldor, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", *Psychological Review*, 50, 1943, pp. 370–396.

<sup>13</sup> For an interesting study of the costs of the conflict in Iraq see Phyllis Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force, *A Failed "Transition": The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy in Focus, September 2004). The study reports and estimates the costs to the USA (human, security, economic and social costs); to Iraq (human, security, economic, social, human rights and sovereignty costs); and to the world (human costs, the costs of disregarding international law and undermining the United Nations and global security and disarmament, the costs of US-led *ad hoc* military coalitions, the costs to the global economy and global environmental costs).

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Béatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> Debbie Hillier, "Africa's Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict", Briefing Paper 107, IANSA, Oxfam and Saferworld, Oxford, October 2007.

<sup>16</sup> The responsibility to protect concept focuses on states' obligations to protect their populations and those of other states against genocide and other large-scale atrocities. United Nations, "World Summit Outcome", UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 138 and 139, [www.un.org/summit2005documents.html](http://www.un.org/summit2005documents.html). On the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect see [www.globalcenter2p.org/](http://www.globalcenter2p.org/).

<sup>17</sup> Sköns, note 1 above, p. 243.

<sup>18</sup> Human Security Centre, note 11 above.

<sup>19</sup> Sköns, note 1 above, p. 243.

<sup>20</sup> Although this figure is a highly uncertain estimate, it nevertheless captures the relative magnitude of such causes of death.

<sup>21</sup> Sköns, note 1 above, p. 250.

<sup>22</sup> Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989–2006", *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(5), 2007, p. 623.

<sup>23</sup> For more detail see Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1998–2007", in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 72–83).

<sup>24</sup> This approach was developed by the present author in the context of the research project "Operationalizing human security for livelihood protection: Analysis, monitoring and mitigation of existential threats by and for local communities", jointly sponsored by swisspeace (HUSEC) and the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change, [www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/human-security/index.html](http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/human-security/index.html).

<sup>25</sup> Galtung, note 5 above, p. 173.

<sup>26</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, note 9 above.

## CHAPTER 3

### Livelihoods, human development and human security: Exploring conceptual differences, similarities and complementarities

Marc Krupanski

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the meanings, similarities and divergences of the “human security” concept with other leading conceptual security frameworks for development practitioners, namely “livelihoods” and “human development”. Each serves as the guiding policy and analytical framework for a variety of governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies. While they hold significant currency within debates, policies and practices of international development, they are less prominent within the peace and security fields, where the concept of human security is better known. Moreover, the meanings of the three concepts – and more precisely their relationships with one another – often remain poorly understood. To situate and understand better the comparative advantage of operationalizing a human security framework – the focus of the OPHUSEC project – it is helpful to understand the relationship of the human security concept *vis-à-vis* other leading developmental frameworks. This chapter reflects upon dominant understandings of these concepts in order to make the case that the concepts and agendas of human security, livelihoods and human development are neither incompatible nor divergent. In fact, human security shares many of the same principles, methodologies and goals with those inherent to livelihoods and human development approaches.

Although in recent years human security has faded from its previously more prominent position within international development policy circles, often in favour of a livelihoods or human development approach, this chapter posits that human security offers a valuable analytical lens and reflects a development and security agenda that not only incorporates the concerns captured by a livelihoods approach, but moves it forward to address additional critical issues that affect individuals’ and communities’ daily lives and needs. Indeed, the added advantage of a human security framework lies in its ability to reformulate traditional notions of security (i.e. as existential threats to the state) to focus on the importance of safety, security and stability of the individual and community. In addition, it raises the significance of certain traditional development-specific concerns when they are considered or expected to pose existential threats to both individuals and communities. In making this analytical shift, the importance of conditions identified through a livelihoods or human development approach is increased in recognition of the potential or real threat these conditions have on the ability to survive of an individual, his or her family, or the community. In this sense, an effort to operationalize human security can potentially better reflect the practical realities of the relationship between security and development.

This chapter proceeds by reviewing select leading development agencies’ understandings and approaches to livelihoods, human development and human security. Thus it relies upon core definitions publicly offered by various agencies as well as select relevant academic literature. This is certainly not an exhaustive review, but rather an attempt to establish an exploratory base sample that represents the key elements of each concept. Its purpose is to provide some orientation for the reader to situate the concept of human security within the international development (and security) discourse as he/she moves through the

remainder of this volume. As such, the bulk of the chapter is descriptive in nature and resembles a mapping exercise. It is intended to provide an introduction to the concepts in order to place human security in relation to other leading, and closely related, development frameworks. Limited comparative analysis follows the descriptive sections.

## LIVELIHOODS

The livelihoods concept is arguably the most prevalent framework employed by both development and humanitarian agencies. Within the concept a variety of labels and names are used, such as livelihoods security, sustainable livelihoods, household livelihoods and – simply – livelihoods. However, despite the slight variation between the “subterms”, each can be considered to fall under a general livelihoods framework. Thus, for the most part, this section employs the general term of “livelihoods” as an umbrella, although specific titles may be discussed explicitly when attempting to account for slight variations.

### *Background of the concept*

The livelihoods concept emerged largely from the work of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research institutions, particularly in terms of a “sustainable livelihoods approach”. It was later adopted by governmental development agencies. Early forerunners of the approach include organizations such as Oxfam, the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. It was adopted by the UK Department for International Development in 1990, serving as one of the first government agencies to adopt the concept officially.<sup>1</sup>

Development and humanitarian policy-makers and practitioners utilize the framework of livelihoods to measure, assess, plan and evaluate interventions related to a range of conditions and means deemed necessary for a stable and sustainable living. Thus livelihoods is a normative framework through which policy-makers and practitioners stake a claim as to what are important, necessary and fundamental guarantees to live a life removed from poverty. In this way, livelihoods approaches are focused on poverty reduction strategies that strive to empower poor people to build their own opportunities and structure stable and predictable means of living – as opposed to a focus on physical, health or security threats, which is closer to the heart of a human security approach. The livelihoods approach thus avoids the so-called “security trap”<sup>2</sup> by focusing its analysis and intervention on the more traditional development and humanitarian concern of poverty reduction.

### *Core principles*

A number of core principles define the livelihoods approach and are crucial for development interventions: activities should be people-centred, responsive and participatory, multi-actor, conducted in partnership, sustainable and dynamic. These principles, especially participatory engagement aimed at empowering affected individuals, have always been key distinguishing features of this approach.

Livelihood has been defined as comprising a range of “capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living”.<sup>3</sup> Further, and respecting the core principles of a people-centred, responsive and participatory approach, people at the focus of interventions should be the ones to define their own desired livelihood outcomes.<sup>4</sup> A livelihoods approach is left

intentionally broad in order to capture and respond to the context-specific ways in which people obtain livelihood resources, including both formal and informal mechanisms.

International organizations and NGOs have found a livelihoods approach attractive, as it is flexible in application to different contexts. As it engages formal and informal processes, it is designed to capture the varied means to secure livelihoods not just between different individuals, but by individuals as well. For instance, the approach is designed to respond to the multiple income-generating activities someone might have in any given year. As noted in a UN Development Programme (UNDP) report on the subject, the approach “has the flexibility to tap into such kinds of adaptive responses and utilize them as entry points for policy making”.<sup>5</sup>

Additionally, sustainability is a core component of livelihoods.<sup>6</sup> It should be quite apparent that without sustainability (if not predictability), livelihoods would only be relevant to a temporary condition rather than to an entire lifetime. A typical understanding of sustainability in a livelihoods framework is expressed by Chambers and Conway, who state that “a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the long and short term”.<sup>7</sup>

Thus a sustainable livelihoods framework comprises what Bingen identifies as three interrelated components: “*First*, some combination or portfolio of capabilities, assets (including physical, natural and social resources or capital) and activities; that, *second*, enable people to deal with events and trends as well as develop various strategies to pursue desired livelihood outcomes; while, *third*, maintaining or enhancing their capabilities and assets over time.”<sup>8</sup> Based on this concept, sustainable livelihoods frameworks help diagram the various interrelationships among the events and trends affecting people’s lives, as well as the structures (levels of government, private sector actors, etc.) and processes (laws, policies, institutions, etc.) that influence people’s access to and use of livelihood assets.<sup>9</sup>

UNDP has adopted a sustainable livelihoods approach as a means to further its broader human development agenda, a distinction that will be made clearer in the following discussion on human development. As stated in a UNDP document on the topic, a sustainable livelihoods approach “brings together the thinking and practice of poverty reduction strategies, sustainable development and participation and empowerment processes into a framework for policy analysis and programming”.<sup>10</sup> In practice at the country level, UNDP has utilized the sustainable livelihoods approach in its work related to rural food security, micro private sector development and urban development.

When looking for a more explicit discussion and incorporation of “security” within a livelihoods approach, “household livelihood security” emerges as one of the leading concepts. This approach developed in response to a rising focus on “food security”, a concept that gained greater attention in the 1970s (in particular the 1974 World Food Conference) and 1980s (following a series of droughts and floods in parts of Africa that created severe food shortages). Relevant to human security, two critical analytical shifts emerged: *first*, an assessment that some threats which are not linked to physical violence nonetheless pose an existential security threat; and, *second*, that the focus of that threat moved from the nation to individuals and communities, in this case households. Indeed, this analytical shift, as will be demonstrated later, overlaps with the approach offered by human security.

Household livelihood security was adopted by NGOs such as CARE in the mid-1990s. In a 2011 report the UN Environment Programme employed livelihoods security as its framework for analysing threats

to individuals and communities caused by climate change.<sup>11</sup> More so, it analyses the intersections of climate change with statelessness, international conflict, vulnerability and development.

Livelihood security is often discussed in the context of households. As such, household livelihood security is defined as “adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic needs”.<sup>12</sup> This includes adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing and time for community participation and social integration.<sup>13</sup> In addition, this framework considers a range of activities to secure food and income in multiple places, both rural and urban.<sup>14</sup> As noted by Frankenberger and McCaston, “each household can have several possible sources of entitlement, which constitute its livelihood. These entitlements are based on the household’s endowments and its position in the legal, political and social fabric of society.”<sup>15</sup>

The risk of livelihood failure determines the level of vulnerability of an individual or household to income, food, health and nutritional insecurity. Livelihoods are secure when individuals and households have “secure ownership of, or access to, resources and income-earning activities, including reserves and assets to offset risk, ease shocks and meet contingencies”.<sup>16</sup> As Ghanim states, “households have secure livelihoods when they are able to acquire, protect, develop, utilize, exchange and benefit from assets and resources”.<sup>17</sup> The objective of the framework is to strengthen a household’s livelihood strategies relevant to the particular context in order to enhance predictable and sustained successful livelihood outcomes, such as gender equality, nutrition, health or shelter.

A review of what typical indicators utilized within a livelihoods approach aim to measure can help reveal the conceptualized priorities, methodologies, objectives and goals of the approach and its delivery. A ready example is that of CARE’s indicators for household livelihood security. CARE is one of the more prominent advocates for a household livelihoods security viewpoint, and in attempting to explain its application of this approach and framework – and encourage their use by others – it has attempted to establish effective benchmarks, or indicators, that serve to measure relative success or shortcomings of its activities. These indicators have attempted to account for progress towards security in *food* (measured by e.g. duration of lean period, share of household budget spent on food, dietary diversity by type of household member); *nutrition* (measured by e.g. stunting and wasting among children aged 6–59 months); *economics* (measured by e.g. annual household income stream, household asset index); *health* (measured by e.g. incidence of diarrhoea over the past month); *education* (measured by e.g. family members with completed primary education or adult literacy rates); *shelter* (measured by e.g. housing condition); *gender status* (measured by e.g. female participation in household decision-making or dowry); and *community participation* (measured by e.g. effective presence of village groups).<sup>18</sup> Such a review thus details common features of livelihood security (e.g. education, health, food) as well as having a particular focus on measurement of household units. However, there is a lack of indicators related to potential external and structural forces and conditions as well as to direct and structural violence. The only explicit indicator of violence relates to incidence of violence against women within the home as a measure of gender status. Thus although a household livelihoods security framework attempts to incorporate a “security” analysis, it stops short of incorporating more traditional elements of “security”. In doing so, it appears as an attempt to elevate the existential importance of livelihood threats (i.e. by labelling them as “security” concerns) while maintaining a clear separation from otherwise “traditional” existential threats due to violence.

In sum, livelihoods approaches are among the most prevalent frameworks for analysis and programme design and delivery used by governmental and non-governmental development and humanitarian agencies. Some threads of the approach, such as household livelihood security, engage a



more explicit discussion and incorporation of a “security” analysis. However, the framework is primarily focused on the development of poverty reduction strategies that are context-specific and designed in participation with those affected. Moreover, they are aimed at empowering individuals and households to make changes in their lives required to ensure their sustainability, while excluding more common understandings of security involving either direct or structural violence.

## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Human development has been a leading approach in development work for the past two decades. It has been utilized as a framework for a range of development interventions and agendas from small NGOs to broad international summits, such as the Millennium Summit and its result, the Millennium Development Goals. In particular, it has been championed by the United Nations in general and UNDP in particular since the introduction in 1990 of UNDP’s seminal and annual publication, the *Human Development Report* (HDR).

### *Background of the concept*

The conceptual forerunners of human development were Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, who helped develop the concept in the 1980s along with a groundswell of social movement activity in the global South. This happened in response to otherwise traditional development interventions that focused on national economic development as the principal if not sole means to improve individuals’ well-being. Since the first HDR in 1990, the concept of human development has been taken up largely by researchers and NGOs, and to a lesser extent by government development agencies. It has been employed overwhelmingly within the development field, and both humanitarian and security practitioners and researchers have also attempted to align their efforts in support of “broader” human development objectives.

### *Core principles*

In essence, the human development framework aims to put people rather than national economic standards in the centre of development interventions, and to expand the realm of human concerns beyond standard economic indicators. As noted in the first HDR, “Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.”<sup>19</sup> Human development represents an ambitious agenda that moves beyond a strict focus on poverty reduction strategies or economic figures to include issues such as political and cultural freedoms, good governance and gender equality, with only a limited inclusion of direct peace- and security-related issues. The first HDR served as an important benchmark, as it encouraged a shift in focus away from national wealth and to the living conditions and economies of individuals and communities, under the slogan that “people are the real wealth of a nation”. Through human development, people – and their well-being – are the “end” or objective of development, as opposed to the then mainstream approaches, which viewed humans as a “means” or resource for economic growth or production. In fact, proponents of human development contend that this approach represents the “authentic” intent and design of development, thus signalling a return to the “real” meaning of development. As Sen notes, “Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it.”<sup>20</sup> Thus, like livelihoods and

human security (discussed below) approaches, human development tries to change the conceptual reference point and indicator of development from the state to its people.

At a conceptual level, human development is understood as a process to widen people's choices, freedoms and opportunities in everyday as well as institutional and structural matters. This includes reforming state institutions to make them more accountable to people and introducing new legal frameworks for the protection of vulnerable populations. It moves beyond a livelihoods approach in that it seeks to address and respond to issues that may not be immediately or primarily understood as related to economic empowerment or poverty reduction strategies. Instead, the conceptual paradigm of human development presents a framework through which issues such as political choice, cultural expression and responsive state institutions are treated as essential components of one's well-being and quality and dignity of life, just as much as issues of poverty and economic livelihoods. In fact, within this framework, sustainable economic development and poverty reduction are not the end goals, but rather one set of means to enhance human development – i.e. one's overall well-being, defined as health, nutrition and basic education.<sup>21</sup> A livelihoods approach, then, would be one component of a broader human development agenda. However, and a significant point in relation to human security, a human development approach for the most part does not have a specific direct violence or security component, although its inclusion of and emphasis on issues such as health access and gender equality may permit an analysis and understanding of structural violence and allows for important synergies with human security.

According to the UNDP, human development “involves expanding the opportunities and capacities to enable [people] to live a creative and productive life according to their needs and interests. For this reason, development is focused on expanding the choices human beings have to have the life they value.”<sup>22</sup>

Indeed, as noted previously, the proponents of human development view this approach as reflecting the true purpose of development. For instance, in reference to the need for such an approach, Mahbub ul Haq, founder of the HDR, states:

The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and sense of participation in community activities. The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.<sup>23</sup>

Interestingly, in addition to “more secure livelihoods”, characteristic of the livelihood approach, in this quotation ul Haq makes reference to “security against crime and physical violence”, which is not explicitly an element of the human development approach – yet was subsequently picked up with the merger of development and security needs in the context of UNDP's 1994 HDR, which introduced the concept of human security.

Thus the concept of human development is an attempt not truly to revolutionize development, but rather to embody its real essence and original intent. Unlike a livelihoods approach, which is considered a particular approach within the broader development and humanitarian fields, human development is offered as an all-encompassing normative and universal understanding, framework and agenda for development.

However, despite the broad and encompassing view offered by ul Haq, a more confined approach to human development, one that often excludes engagement with direct violence and security, has

emerged. Within this more common and now standard approach, the four central components of human development are for people to “1) enjoy a long and healthy life; 2) obtain an education; 3) have access to resources that enable them to live in dignity; and 4) be able to participate in decisions that affect their community”.<sup>24</sup> To deliver on these ambitious goals and meet various changing and context-specific needs, human development is designed conceptually to evolve constantly. In more than two decades since its emergence, the concept has been enlarged and contracted – in fact human security was intermittently introduced in the 1994 HDR as an enlargement of human development (discussed below) – in order to meet changing conditions on the ground as well as changing demands of donors.

In many ways, an understanding of human development can best be grasped by a review of central indicators used to track and measure it. Indeed, indicators are designed to serve as useful benchmarks to measure, track and evaluate programme delivery. In this sense, conceptually at least, indicators should reflect the desired outcomes and goals of any programme (although there is quite a good deal of work dissecting the failings of many prominent indicators to capture accurately a desired goal or outcome). There is a sizeable number of indicator sets and indices that accompany human development; chief among these is UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), which is a composite of multiple indices and indicators. The HDI attempts to measure and rank national records not just in terms of income growth, but also regarding social indicators, such as education, life expectancy and political freedom. The 49 indicators that constitute the HDI are diverse and multiple, including, for example, adjusted net savings, carbon dioxide emissions per capita, fresh water withdrawals, education index (expected and mean years of schooling), adolescent fertility rate, public expenditure on health (percentage of GDP), gender inequality index, inequality-adjusted education index, impact of natural disasters, labour force participation rate and shares in parliament (female-male ratio).<sup>25</sup>

Many of the core principles and methodologies of human development resemble those of the livelihoods and human security approaches. Core principles include using a conceptual and practical approach that is people-centred, empowering, locally owned, holistic, sustainable and “does no harm”. Similarly, among the ideal methodologies to achieve human development are approaches that are participatory and engage those most directly affected by problems (rather than just national elites or government officials); that are consultative and coordinated with other external actors to eliminate redundancy and mutual harm and support coherence of activity; and that are multidimensional in design and programming.

Although it can be argued that structural violence-related issues are included within a human development framework, more “traditional” components of security or issues of direct violence occupy a less prominent place. As discussed above, the main components that constitute the HDI do not include substantive security-related factors except for life expectancy, which can maintain some connection to security issues if, of course, these lines are made in the analysis. Nonetheless, many substantive security-related programming takes place under a human development framework and with a stated objective to advance human development. Often such programming is related to “peacebuilding”, including, for instance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, rule of law initiatives, demining, institution building as a means for conflict prevention, and transitional justice. Often, however, an engagement with security-related issues such as these is justified as a way to advance poverty reduction and sustainable economic development, as well as health and nutrition. They are thus supported as a means towards promoting human development core activities, but not as ends in themselves.

In sum, conceptually human development has represented a significant refocusing of development priorities, goals and programming: it has attempted to shift the focus from one based on national economic

metrics, such as GDP, to one that is human-centred. It has attempted to make people's well-being the focus of development, rather than their use primarily for economic production. In terms of security, the concept embraces, to some extent, security-related issues and programming as necessary preconditions to achieve human development. Violence and conflict are viewed as significant impediments to both sustainable economic development and poverty reduction, as well as to the health, nutrition, equality and general well-being of the people. However, while security may be loosely included within the conceptual framework of human development, it remains excluded from its central focus or purpose.

## HUMAN SECURITY

### *Background of the concept*

The concept of human security was introduced in the 1994 HDR. Emerging from – and building on – preceding work on human development, human security represented a bold step towards reconfiguring traditional security paradigms and priorities.

### *Core principles*

Following in the path of its conceptual forefather, human development, as well as the livelihoods approach, the concept of human security shifts the referent object of security from the state and its elites to the individuals and communities of the state. In particular, it attempts to account for those most disadvantaged, marginalized and threatened (often considered the most vulnerable). In addition to this significant and controversial conceptual break, human security attempts to expand an understanding of security to capture development and humanitarian-related issues. In the broad understanding of human security, traditionally excluded issues, such as housing conditions, pollution, health, poverty, crime and political equality, were acknowledged as not just as threats to one's livelihood or development, but as existential threats. The goal of human security is to achieve freedom from fear (i.e. "security") and freedom from want (i.e. "development"). In doing so, it represents not just an analytical framework, but also an agenda for action and social change.

In presenting such a shift, human security represents an ambitious, broader and more holistic conceptual framework and agenda than those of livelihoods and, possibly, human development. First, its goal of freedom from fear and want is a significant shift for both development and security practitioners and policy-makers, as it attempts to bring both communities closer together through a conceptual framework that recognizes the linkages and dependencies between the two as well as an agenda for action within which both could conceivably work in partnership. Further, more so than with human development, human security attempts to grasp explicitly and engage with a security-development nexus, which "posits that there is an interaction between the security situation and development outcomes, between the development situation and security outcomes, and between performance and outcomes in security and development assistance".<sup>26</sup> Thus, as Schnabel notes, "Human security also for the first time introduced, from a development perspective, the security and development conundrum to a larger global community of practitioners, policy-makers and researchers."<sup>27</sup>

Additionally, human security represents an ambitious, broader and more holistic agenda and framework when considering its understanding of threats and violence. Rather than focusing exclusively on military or armed attacks and violence, as had been the traditional rendering of security by both

development and security policy-makers, human security attempts to identify and confront direct and structural violence – although over the years many human security practitioners, such as those within the Swiss or Canadian governments, have adopted a much narrower version that excludes the important (and foundational) component of structural violence. Thus inequality based on race, ethnicity or gender as well as inaccessible healthcare, pollution or water contamination may be reconfigured not just as concerns of one’s well-being (under human development) or livelihoods (in cases of nutrition, health and the environment), but as violence. In this sense, it encompasses concerns of livelihoods and human development, but posits them as potential existential security threats to an individual, a community or both, and strives to empower communities affected by these threats to develop the appropriate strategies and capacities to overcome them, in partnership with relevant traditional or public authorities. Of course, not all of these concerns or threats may be deemed “existential” (such as air pollution), but they are to be analysed and measured for this possibility.

Furthermore, this understanding of threats and violence and the shift of the referent object of security is what makes human security an agenda for action and change. Indeed, to confront structural violence against individuals and particular communities in a society, one must change that society. Thus not only is an immediate change to the threat required, but also a change to the structures and power relations that allow for and maintain such a threat. Human security, in this sense, requires a sensitive and undoubtedly tense engagement with power. One of the more immediate ways in which it proposes to do this is to redirect energies and priorities of security providers in a state (not to mention the state itself) towards confronting identified human security threats and elevating issues of structural violence to national priorities.

Much like livelihoods and human development, applied human security at its core maintains the principles of a people-centred approach, sustainability in design and implementation, local ownership and respect of the “do no harm” principle as outlined by Mary Anderson.<sup>28</sup> Likewise, its methodologies attempt to reflect these principles through participatory processes that aim to empower those directly affected and vulnerable populations, are multifaceted and multidimensional, and are coherent with interventions undertaken by other actors.

## ANALYSIS

From this exploratory review of these three concepts a number of convergences, compatibilities and similarities emerge. Rather than being quite divergent or opposing, each of these frameworks supports, rather than opposes, one another. For the most part, differences seem to be a matter of scope in the framework of analysis as well as the ambition to serve as an agenda for change.

Table 3.1 provides a basic overview of some of the core components of each concept that may be useful as a quick reference guide.

| Concept                  | Stated goal                             | Principles   | Methodology                                    | Engage with traditional "security"/direct violence concerns?  |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|---|
| <i>Livelihoods</i>       | Poverty reduction                       | People-centred<br>Sustainable<br>Locally owned<br>Holistic | Participatory<br>Multidimensional<br>Coherence | Only with regard to "household livelihoods security", which is largely confined to "food security"                            |
| <i>Human development</i> | Expansion of choice and well-being      | People-centred<br>Sustainable<br>Locally owned<br>Holistic | Participatory<br>Multidimensional<br>Coherence | Engages with structural violence, but limited engagement with direct violence or traditional security (e.g. DDR, mine action) |
| <i>Human security</i>    | Freedom from fear and freedom from want | People-centred<br>Sustainable<br>Locally owned<br>Holistic | Participatory<br>Multidimensional<br>Coherence | Yes, attempts to merge development and security concerns, communities and agendas   |

**Table 3.1:** Overview of core components of "livelihoods", "human development" and "human security" concepts

### ***Common features***

Among the commonalities of the human security, livelihoods and human development approaches are methodologies, principles and certain objectives. In terms of shared principles, each of these concepts includes the core components of people-centredness, sustainability, local ownership and holistic approaches. At this level, each concept attempts to shift the traditional referent object of the state and the nation as a whole to the people who make up the nation. Each may have a slight difference as to who this is – household, individual, community, or particular classes or communities of people. However, each offers a critical shift away from a focus on the state (and its elites) to the audience which the provision of development and security is ideally supposed to benefit – i.e. the people. Furthermore, each concept aims to be sustainable in its approach, delivery and impact. Rather than being conceived as a quick approach or something that is intended to serve an immediate need or band-aid effect, each is intended to take a long-term view, minimize negative unintentional outcomes and last much longer than the initial intervention.

In terms of methodologies, each concept is centred on a participatory approach that engages directly with affected communities and individuals in order to reflect more accurately the contexts and conditions of their lives, as well as empower them to identify their own problems or threats and the solutions to overcome them. Each strives to employ multidimensional activities that can engage with multiple converging issues and threats to make a holistic and lasting change. Finally, each emphasizes the need for coherence with other interventions and programmes to minimize overlap and mutual harm and maximize their synergies for greater positive impact.

Furthermore, each concept is designed to evolve constantly to address emergent needs or threats and reflect on new responses to these by the people it is designed to support and empower. Likewise, each concept has evolved in part by the introduction of new metrics for indicators and in response to academic research and political and donor pressures. In this sense they are concepts that can be adapted to address evolving threats and be responsive to those people affected.

Of course, there is some shared organizational affiliation as to who employs each concept. Some organizations, researchers and agencies may in fact use different approaches at different times, or to address different needs. In part, this may be influenced by the desires of donors or the level of acceptance

of each framework within the broader community. Generally, each concept has been taken up at one point or another by the development community, with parts of the United Nations, especially UNDP, leading the way. In this sense, although some may also be taken up by humanitarian and security actors or researchers, they all share the common feature of being development-oriented concepts.

Finally, all share common concerns. Although a livelihoods approach may not directly engage with substantive or “traditional” security issues, each stresses the mutually reinforcing effects and importance of health, nutrition, education and the environment, as well as (to some extent with livelihoods) political and community participation.

### *Distinguishing features*

Through this brief overview certain distinguishing features have also been identified. While human development and human security are closely aligned and similar (which can be expected, given that human security emerged within the context of human development), a livelihoods approach is divergent particularly in its relative disengagement from issues related to “security”. Issues of armed violence and conflict, and ineffective and unaccountable security provision and institutions rarely figure in a livelihoods approach.

Likewise, threats to health, nutrition and the environment are not viewed through the lens of structural violence, but rather through their effects on one’s ability to maintain and secure a livelihood. On the other hand, although different approaches of particular organizations may be more nuanced or varied, for the most part human security (and human development) does not view economic livelihood and poverty reduction as the ultimate objectives but rather as central components of achieving human security (i.e. freedom from fear and want).

Furthermore, human security is designed to engage with security providers and development actors. It is an embodiment of the security-development nexus and urges greater and closer collaboration and partnership between the two fields in order to maximize positive impact for both.

In addition, human security, like human development, is conceived as an agenda for action and change, not simply a conceptual framework or organizational approach. It is designed to be an evolving paradigm to be taken up by security and development actors across the world in order to secure sustained peace and development, particularly in transition societies. In this sense, human security builds upon the foundations of livelihoods and human development by elevating their shared concerns to national and existential importance and revealing the ways in which issues of direct and structural violence are interconnected and affect the daily lives of people.

## **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, this relatively brief and general review of livelihoods, human development and human security approaches to peace, security and development was designed to explore the conceptual underpinnings and goals of each in order to illuminate many of their shared features as well as the ways in which human security attempts to move beyond them.

Rather than being incompatible or divergent frameworks, this review has shown the common goals, concerns, principles and methodologies that all share. Similarly, it has also highlighted the ways in which human security offers a unique addition by approaching livelihood and development threats as structural violence and existential threats. Human security, the prime focus of the OPHUSEC project for which this

chapter has been prepared, engages intentionally and holistically with traditional security actors and concerns in order to mitigate both direct and structural violence for the benefit of the people. Out of the three concepts discussed in this chapter, human security might thus be the most people-centred approach towards the provision of development and security.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See for instance Karim Hussein, *Livelihoods Approaches Compared: A Multi-Agency Review of Current Practice* (London: DFID, 2002).

<sup>2</sup> While invoked for different purposes, in a development or humanitarian context a “security trap” often refers to the belief that when development or humanitarian activities engage more traditionally defined “security” concerns, they become “securitized” and reconfigured with goals (hard security), means (usually violent force) and actors (traditional security actors) in conflict and outside the principal goals and actors of development and humanitarian fields.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Chambers and Gordon R. Conway, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century”, IDS Discussion Paper 296, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, 1991, pp. 7–8.

<sup>4</sup> See for instance Diana Carney, *Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches: Progress and Possibilities for Change* (London: DFID, 2002); Ian Scoones, *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> Parakh Hoon, Naresh Singh and Samir S. Wanmali, *Sustainable Livelihoods: Concepts, Principles and Approaches to Indicator Development* (New York: UNDP, 1997, p. 3).

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, John Farrington, “Sustainable Livelihoods, Rights and the New Architecture of Aid”, *Natural Resources Perspectives* No. 69, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Chambers and Conway, note 3 above, p. 26.

<sup>8</sup> Jim Bingen, “Institutions and Sustainable Livelihoods”, paper presented at Forum on Operationalizing Participatory Ways of Applying Sustainable Livelihood Approaches, hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization, supported by DFID and in partnership with the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, UNDP and the World Food Programme, Siena, 7–11 March 2000.

<sup>9</sup> See proceedings of Forum on Operationalizing Participatory Ways of Applying Sustainable Livelihood Approaches, hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization, supported by DFID and in partnership with the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, UNDP and the World Food Programme, Siena, 7–11 March 2000, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/003/X9371E/X9371E00.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> Hoon et al., note 5 above, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> UN Environment Programme, *Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel* (Geneva: UNEP, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Timothy R. Frankenberger and M. Katherine McCaston, “The Household Livelihood Security Concept”, *Food, Nutrition and Agriculture* No. 22, FAO, Rome, 1998, p. 31.

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Anne M. Thomson, “Food Security and Sustainable Livelihoods: The Policy Challenge”, *Development*, 44(4), 2001, pp. 24–28.

<sup>14</sup> M. Drinkwater and M. McEwan, “Household Food Security and Environmental Sustainability in Farming Systems Research: Developing Sustainable Livelihoods”, paper presented at Adaptive Planning Research Team Bi-annual Review Meeting, Mangu, 13–16 April 1992.

<sup>15</sup> Frankenberger and McCaston, note 12 above, p. 31.

<sup>16</sup> WCED, *Food 2000: Global Policies for Sustainable Agriculture*, a Report of the Advisory Panel on Food Security, Agriculture, Forestry and Environment to the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (London: Zed Books, 1987, p. 3), cited in Chambers and Conway, note 3 above, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> I. Ghanim, “Household Livelihood Security: Meeting Basic Needs and Fulfilling Rights”, CARE Discussion Paper, CARE USA, Atlanta, GA, 2000.

<sup>18</sup> Sarah Gillingham and Mehrul Islam, “Measuring Livelihood Impacts: A Review of Livelihoods Indicators”, CARE Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2004.

<sup>19</sup> Human Development Report 1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Nermeen Shaikh, "Amartya Sen: A More Human Theory of Development", interview with Amartya Sen, 6 December 2004, <http://asiasociety.org/business/development/amartya-sen-more-human-theory-development>.

<sup>21</sup> See, for instance, Sudhir Anand and Amartya K. Sen, "Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement", Human Development Report Office Occasional Papers, UNDP, New York, 1994.

<sup>22</sup> UNDP, "Human Development", UNDP, Belize, <http://www.bz.undp.org/content/belize/en/home/ourwork/humandevlopment/overview.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Mahbub ul Haq, Reflections on Human Development (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 14).

<sup>24</sup> UNDP, note 22 above.

<sup>25</sup> See "Human Development Index (HDI)", <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>.

<sup>26</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, "The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument", in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds), *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012, p. 29).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>28</sup> Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

## CHAPTER 4

### Towards a human-security-based early warning and response system

Albrecht Schnabel and Heinz Krumpal

#### INTRODUCTION: EARLY WARNING FOR HUMAN SECURITY PURPOSES

The recent attention given to the concept of human security – in both academic and political debates – is an encouraging development for those committed to improving the security and livelihood conditions of suffering populations. Instead of national security and defence, the security and safety of the population are at the core of human-security-focused domestic and international policy. While there are diverse interpretations of what is considered to be a human security threat, this chapter uses a definition developed in a project on the operationalization of human security (OPHUSEC) currently pursued by one of the authors: a human security threat constitutes an already or potentially life-threatening danger to a population in a specific geographic context. The specific source and nature of this threat depends on each situation and context – it could range from flooding to landslides, diseases or violent conflict.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, efforts to monitor, analyse and respond to such diverse threats vary greatly. In the chapter the authors argue that the contextualized, sometimes multilayered, nature of human security must therefore be matched with an equally multifaceted monitoring, warning and response system.

Depending on the nature and source of the identified threats and their symptoms and causes, monitoring and early warning exercises must focus on very specific information and threat indicators. As the salience of data and events monitored will inevitably vary from threat to threat, the monitoring and warning approaches used need to differ accordingly. Contemporary early warning systems lack the necessary flexibility to meet this requirement, and generally suffer from two major shortcomings. *First*, their focus lies exclusively on trends leading towards or away from violent conflict. Environmental, economic and other threats do not feature on the radar screen unless they trigger social unrest or political upheaval. *Second*, in the past early warning was only targeted at “third world countries” and the information gained was primarily used by Western states to enhance their internal policies and development programmes. We believe that in a globalized world where developments in one corner of the world sooner or later affect all societies, such “open source intelligence” provided more or less exclusively for the donor community is not appropriate anymore – indeed, it has never been. Early warning information needs to be shared with all stakeholders, and the response to human security threats has to be found in a participatory process with the response itself mainly being the responsibility of local/national governments and non-state actors. Hence no single-focus early warning system alone will satisfy the monitoring and warning capacity required for human security provision. Moreover, the up to now “extractive” approach to early warning practised by Western governments has to give way to one that is based on true partnership. The latter is a prerequisite for long-term, sustainable response strategies and mechanisms for potential and emerging threats to populations’ survival as well as state and regional stability.

The chapter begins with an examination of existing first- and second-generation approaches to early warning and an illumination of the factors that explain their relatively limited utility for human security early warning. This is followed by a discussion of the emerging concept of human security. We conclude by outlining how a third-generation early warning system would have to look in order to address societies’ genuine human security needs successfully.

## FROM CONFLICT- TO HUMAN SECURITY-FOCUSSED EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Most if not all current political early warning systems are geared towards one specific threat, i.e. violent conflict, while neglecting other existential risks to human security linked to economic, political, social or environmental developments. The main reason for this negligence lies in the fact that political early warning generally uses a traditional definition of security, which encompasses all forms of military threats and indirect warfare against a nation-state, while non-military threats to society are factored out. There are several reasons why decision-makers favour such a military-centred definition of security.<sup>2</sup>

The main argument was raised by Richard H. Ullman with regard to his home country:

Politicians have found it easier to focus the attention of an inattentive public on military dangers, real or imagined, than on non-military ones; political leaders have found it easier to build a consensus on military solutions to foreign policy problems than to get agreement on the use (and, therefore, the adequate funding) of other means of influence that the United States can bring to bear beyond its frontiers.<sup>3</sup>

The resurgence of ethnic conflict after the end of the Cold War era has seemed to reconfirm the prevalence of military conflict as the main source of national, regional and global instability and human suffering, further confirming the tendency to return to traditional definitions of security and security provision in the creation of early warning analysis.

### *Genesis of early warning*

Originally, early warning was a military concept. Over time it was adjusted for civil purposes, and various types of warning systems emerged to assist national and international actors in the early anticipation of, and timely preparation for, natural disasters, the outbreak of famine, political destabilization and forced migration.<sup>4</sup> The rationale behind these political early warning frameworks, however, was still reactive rather than proactive. Early warning and response measures were taken only after a humanitarian emergency had occurred, and not beforehand. Crisis de-escalation was the key issue, not solid early preparedness.

Contrary to this first generation of political early warning schemes, present-day systems address – at least in theory – not only the symptoms but also the underlying causes of violent conflict. As the term “early warning” indicates, monitoring and analysis of a potentially conflictive (or otherwise disastrous) situation should be initiated at the earliest possible stage in order to prevent rather than alleviate human suffering. The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, for example, defined (political) early warning as the “collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace”. It further argued that “Early warning is not only about assessing the possibility of conflict but also identifying the possible resurgence of conflict and the opportunities for peace.”<sup>5</sup>

On the one hand, such definitions are helpful as they link theoretical analysis of violent conflict to concrete action; acknowledge the necessity to involve a broad range of state and non-state as well as local, regional, national and international actors in addressing threats to sustainable peace; and point out the necessity to look for not only signs of escalating tensions but also peacebuilding opportunities. The fact remains, however, that this and similar definitions used within the early warning community still focus on one single facet of the threat spectrum: violent conflict. They neither take other existential threats to society into account, nor clearly delineate what type of information needs to be collected and analysed. Thus such

definitions invite decision-makers with a traditional military-centred understanding of security to continue looking at factors intimately linked to power structures and the adverse behaviour of opposition groups. The root causes of human insecurity, however, are easily neglected, as the focus is on inter- and intra-state violent conflict that is triggered by power struggles between opposing parties.

The FAST approach<sup>6</sup> to early warning circumvents this definitional cliff by stressing the need to use a so-called “analytical framework” to identify and categorize causes and issues of conflict for each observed country.<sup>7</sup> Yet in the FAST scheme, too, the dependent variable is violent conflict, and environmental or economic collapse, societal disintegration and state failure are beyond its explanatory power. In other words, while FAST is probably one of the most elaborate early warning systems that deals with violent conflict, it still does not capture the complex reality that contemporary societies face with regard to human security. If we are to create systems that live up to this complex reality, we need to build a third-generation type of early warning scheme. To this end, however, a number of challenges have to be overcome. Some of those pertain to models and approaches of early warning systems in general, while others are related to the fact that human security as a dependent variable is not as easily defined and operationalized as narrowly defined threats such as “famine”, “forced migration” or “violent conflict”.

### ***Why a human security focus?***

#### *Human security as a guide for preventive activity*

Why should we focus on human security when considering preventive action – including both early warning and early response? It is not easy to summon the necessary resources and goodwill to commit states and inter-state and non-state organizations to preventive activities, when so much of their attention is already required to address the consequences of ongoing crises. However, most of the very same actors who find it difficult to invest in preventive activities also realize and admit that prevention is the best insurance against the suffering and instability associated with structural and direct violence, and the costs of repairing the subsequent damage. Still, they remain stuck in a mainly reactive mode.<sup>8</sup>

How, then, can we ensure that this obvious preference to react can be utilized in encouraging preventive action? The concept of human security offers a solution. If we assume that certain basic human security needs must be met to maintain a minimum standard of stability and order, then we can respond to cases where such needs are neglected. Once such neglect is addressed and needs are met, chances of suffering, disintegration and conflict are significantly reduced. Thus reaction to observable slippage in the provision of basic security needs amounts to the prevention of eventual conflict, violence and, possibly, war. At the same time a foundation for long-term, positive peace is laid.

#### *Human security as a pragmatic notion*

The provision of human security is not simply an idealist sentiment, but a very pragmatic notion. Individuals want their needs fulfilled. In representative and participatory political systems politicians are interested in serving – at least nominally – the interest of their constituencies. If they want to secure political office, they have little choice but to accommodate their voters’ (reasonable) demands. Human security provision is thus the norm in well-functioning political systems where citizens have means and ways to keep those in power under control and ensure that the latter spend a substantial portion of their resources in securing the population’s interests. If citizens enjoy good, accountable and responsible governance, a culture of peace is more likely to develop than in an environment of oppression, insecurity and instability. This has positive

effects on cross-border relations as well. Human security provision is thus a key ingredient in the creation and consolidation of “security communities”.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately, the majority of the world’s population are ruled by governments that do not or cannot offer responsible, accountable and good governance.<sup>10</sup> Governments that are not interested in the welfare of their people will refuse to embrace a human security agenda. There have been suggestions to initiate human security audits or periodically publish a human security index or report. However, these efforts will not be successful as long as the provision of human security runs counter to the interests of many governments. What are needed are self-enlightened governments and leaders; the presence of domestic opposition groups capable of challenging irresponsible governments by non-violent means; and/or external pressure by states, subregional and regional organizations or the United Nations to encourage governments to more responsible behaviour.

#### *Human security concepts in and for the UN system*

While human security may be the key to good governance and peace, a fundamental shift of domestic, regional and international norms towards the recognition of the general welfare of individuals and communities (i.e. the population as a whole) as the primary goal of governance is difficult to achieve. The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is a prominent example of an attempt to integrate human security in emerging global debates (and evolving norms) on the international community’s responsibility to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states for “human protection purposes”.<sup>11</sup> In its final report, entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, the ICISS defines “human security” as “the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms”.<sup>12</sup> It links the international community’s responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild directly to violations of human security. Other reports, proclamations and resolutions, many of which were the results of studies commissioned or undertaken by the United Nations, have produced a tremendously rich reservoir of recommendations for actions by nation-states and intergovernmental organizations to improve development, human rights and security provision, and thus to strengthen the chances for peace, stability and regional or global security for all.<sup>13</sup>

#### *Human security – From debate to policy?*

It is frustration of and threats to the basic human needs of individuals and communities that lead to human suffering, social and communal deterioration, and thus violence in its various direct and structural manifestations. On the other hand, if individuals and communities feel secure and protected from the existential threats that emanate from social, political and economic injustice, as well as from military violence, environmental disruptions and natural disasters – that is, if their basic human security is assured – human suffering on an individual level and conflict and violence on communal, regional and international levels can be significantly reduced.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, investing in human security – particularly if approached in a pragmatic, systematic and focused way – will produce improved livelihood conditions for individuals and communities that currently live in vulnerable and life-threatening situations. Investing in human security improvements is thus a win-win situation. Moreover, if done in a contextualized (i.e. adjusted to specific needs and specific contexts) and focused manner (i.e. addressing the root causes of threats), such investment is bound to produce positive results.

Many governments and international organizations have recognized the concept of human security as an important item on their national and international security and development agendas.<sup>15</sup> It is

championed by those governments and non-governmental groups and organizations that oppose power politics – the tendency by powerful states and multilateral organizations to wield their might in order to advance their own interests and views of the world – which, incidentally, often do not coincide with the views of many of the less powerful. When it was initially introduced to broader policy and academic debates by the *Human Development Report*,<sup>16</sup> where it was used as a comprehensive approach to encompass all human rights, security and development threats experienced by individuals and communities, the human security concept was meant to represent a key instrument in fighting poverty and improving human livelihoods. Human security has been promoted primarily by countries such as Sweden, Norway, Japan, Switzerland and Canada.<sup>17</sup> Some politicians and policy-makers have actively introduced the concept to the highest-level international debates – most prominently exemplified by former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy's initiative to introduce the concept into UN Security Council debates.<sup>18</sup> Japan's initiative of the Commission on Human Security gave added prominence and worldwide deliberations to the concept of human security.<sup>19</sup>

There has been an ongoing debate between those favouring a broad and those favouring a narrow definition of the human security concept. Some of the most forward-looking protagonists, such as Canada, champion a narrow definition of the concept, one focused on *freedom from fear*. For reasons of political expediency as well as intellectual clarity, the focus is on personal security, immediate threats from violent conflict and the provision of a *negative peace*.<sup>20</sup> Such threats are mitigated primarily by operational preventive action once violent conflict is imminent or – in post-war situations – its resurgence must be prevented.<sup>21</sup> Others think quite differently. Much like the 1994 *Human Development Report*, the Commission on Human Security's report "Human Security Now" argues that a broader bandwidth of threats should be addressed, and existential threats to individuals should be addressed regardless of their source. The commission equates human security with the protection of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment".<sup>22</sup> The commission further argues:

Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.<sup>23</sup>

Thus our understanding of human security analysis and provision – and our point of departure for a human-security-based early warning system – has five pillars.<sup>24</sup>

*First*, human security focuses not only on military conflict and its consequences for civilians, but also on many non-traditional security threats, including those arising from diseases or economic or environmental disasters. The costs of non-traditional security threats can be as – or more – devastating for human beings as those of traditional security threats. Moreover, they often have the potential to escalate into violence and war.

*Second*, human security and human insecurity depend highly on the context of one's analysis. For example, populations along border regions experience dramatically different threats than those living elsewhere in the country, or those living in a large capital. Thus analysis of human security threats and the identification of mitigation measures are highly context-specific.

*Third*, a thorough threat (not "conflict") analysis is the key to identifying the most pertinent human security challenges.

*Fourth*, using a vulnerability scale, one is able to differentiate between life-threatening and non-life-threatening dangers for the population. The former – actual or potential life-threatening danger – qualifies as a human security threat. Thus a sanitation issue with deadly consequences for the population of a refugee camp could be a major human security threat, while ethnic tensions within that same camp, yet with little potential of escalating into physical violence, are not human security threats. “Human security clusters” are formed by a small number of such existential threats within a given context.

While this seems to be a very selective approach, focusing on issues with the most severe impact on the survival of the population, the *fifth* component of this approach focuses on root cause analysis and alleviation. The root causes of such visible, actual, life-threatening dangers inevitably overlap with the root causes of non-life-threatening vulnerability, so tackling the root causes of the former will also reduce suffering at the level of the latter. Root cause alleviation in the context of the most severe human security threats is thus seen as a comprehensive tool for the prevention of both life-threatening and non-life-threatening dangers for suffering and endangered populations. Below we discuss the possibilities for building an early warning system on such an approach to human insecurity identification and human security provision.

### ***Challenges and opportunities of a human-security-based early warning system***

Many challenges of a human-security-focused early warning system reflect those of any early warning system. Some challenges are, however, unique to attempts of gearing a system towards a cluster of threats that have emerged as key obstacles to the survival and safety of the population. They focus on a different approach to threat analysis, the necessity to undertake ongoing analysis, assessment and possibly reconsideration of key threats, and the necessity to move away from “one-size-fits-all” approaches to the design and application of focus, method and implementation of early warning systems.

#### *Focus of early warning*

One of the key questions for any early warning effort is what do we warn of? What are the core threats to human security that need to be addressed and that we wish to cover with our early warning system? In the context of human security monitoring it is obvious that a wide array of environmental, economic, social, cultural and political dimensions need to be considered. However, the focus of monitoring and warning as well as the indicators used depend on the perceived real and potential threats identified in each covered geographic context. Once these threats are identified, the early warning system must develop indicators, methodologies and approaches to data collection and analysis that are suitable to the type of information required to measure such threats. For instance, event data may be particularly useful to track latent conflict developments but not the onset of environmental disasters. Thus the nature of the threats monitored will influence the methodology and type of data collection and assessment. One has to envision running parallel systems based on a diversity of threats – or generating one system with several thematic analysis units utilizing the same information collection, monitoring and analysis system. In the latter case the data collection and indicators used must be broad and versatile enough to accommodate the diversity of information required when tracking developments of several threat scenarios.

#### *Method*

Once the threats to, and vital requirements for, human security in a given country or region are identified, appropriate methodological approaches to monitoring and analysis have to be chosen. There are basically three methodological types of early warning systems: qualitative and quantitative approaches, and a combination of both. Examples of qualitative early warning systems are the publications of Human Rights



Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group.<sup>25</sup> Analysts of such institutions are normally based in the countries monitored, and produce risk assessments and recommendations based on context-specific background expertise. Quantitative early warning models boomed in the 1990s, partly because of a greater availability of data due to the fall of the Iron Curtain, and partly because of significant improvements in computer technology. The basic principle behind such models is the collection of structural or event data, which are then analysed to provide statistical trends of a country's stability or the level of conflictive and cooperative actions. Examples of quantitative-oriented early warning systems are the Kansas Event Data System developed by Deborah Gerner and Philip Schrod, <sup>26</sup> Barbara Harff's work in the field of genocide and politicide<sup>27</sup> and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy programme run by David Carment.<sup>28</sup> Early warning systems that combine both approaches, such as FAST International<sup>29</sup> and CEWARN (which is based on the FAST methodology),<sup>30</sup> benefit from the combination of extensive, standardized data collections, quantitative analysis and qualitative expertise of country experts. We strongly believe in the necessity of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection and analysis.

### *Recipient of analysis*

It is not enough simply to generate information and hand it to those who might be in a situation to make necessary responses. If the recipients of early warning information are not placed, capable or willing to take action, early warning analysis would be nothing but an exercise without any effect on the improvement of volatile situations. Those who are engaged in early warning work, particularly if operating a system that focuses on context-specific threats and their amelioration, must ensure that recipients of analyses and response actors are closely involved in the early warning process and support the work done by early warning systems. Thus those of us involved in early warning must ask a number of important questions. Whom do we want to warn? Who is the appropriate recipient of our analysis and warning? Are we aware of the political context within which recipients will receive our analysis and warning? Will they use the results of analysis and warning to serve the population's or their own particular interests? Is the transparency of early warning analysis and recommendations assured? In short, how do we treat information, and who should receive it and who not? Have the recipients of warning signals been adequately involved in developing the system so that it responds as closely as possible to their needs, capacities and requirements? Are the outputs/products of the system presented and packaged in a way that is most appropriate for quick and thorough consumption by the recipients, and is tailored to their needs and capabilities? Without satisfactory answers to these questions, early warning activities stand on very weak ground.

### *Quality of analysis*

As a result of the "cottage industry" that emerged from the prevention hype of the early to mid-1990s, many institutions claim to produce early warning analysis and policy description. However, only a few have been able to supply useful products on a consistent, systematic basis, and others have clearly overstepped their mandate of providing solid analysis to embark on the slippery path of advocacy. Despite the obvious need to pool resources and know-how, institutions show little willingness to cooperate, share information or develop and use common tools and methods. Funding continues to be rare, and competition for it is high. Donors are not without fault – they tend to show interest in supporting a diversity of small programmes with limited funds rather than a limited number of collaborating programmes with more significant funds. Donor coordination and cooperation could improve much in this direction. Furthermore, as regards the methods used to collect and analyse data, too many institutions cover too many countries in unsystematic ways, with very little attention to detail and long-term analysis. The more countries covered by early warning efforts, the less "selective", judgemental and thus politically sensitive it would appear if a nation finds itself included on

a certain organization's early warning roster. Unfortunately, governments' and regional and international organizations' willingness to fund early warning and preventive activities seems to have declined sharply in the past years, despite repeated and continuing calls in major international reports and policy statements for strengthening, not weakening, preventive capacities of state and intergovernmental actors.

#### *Warning-response gap*

The main challenge of early warning is the ability to bridge the gap between early warning and early action. Strong commitment by all stakeholders to act in a timely, appropriate and coordinated way is imperative in ensuring effective early warning and crisis mitigation. With the help of thorough conflict and threat analyses, stakeholders (and key security providers, including foremost government authorities) can work with early warning systems on the root causes of potential violence and the identification of early indications for evolving instability and crisis. Focusing on human security – on the survival needs of the populations – states would be able to show their commitment to serving society, not merely themselves. With their support, security providers would be able to adapt their work to the aim of long-term, sustainable and preventive action. Early action requires proper preparedness and the selection of the most appropriate and effective entry points for mitigation strategies. Both should be pursued in close cooperation with early warning systems. However, the issue of timing is crucial not only in the initial involvement in evolving crises situations, but also in choosing the most appropriate exit strategy. At that point, one's assistance should have created the basis for sustainable improvement, and relevant stakeholders should be strengthened and equipped to the point where they can carry forward the work initiated by external actors, while progress should ideally be visible enough to allow external actors to sense that their input has been successful. Continuous monitoring of the impact of mitigation measures is thus a key issue in measuring what would otherwise be extremely difficult to measure: the impact of preventive activities. Such monitoring would quickly reveal if the gap between warning and response is not being closed. It would also inform those responsible for monitoring and analysis as to which recommendations and measures work, which do not, and what impact this may have on the approach, methodology and nature of monitoring, analysis and the generation and transfer of recommendations. If we talk about an "early warning system" – in contrast to early warning "activity" – we are referring to a system that spans monitoring, analysis, recommendation for (policy) response, design and implementation of response actions, and subsequent monitoring and assessment of such mitigation measures. For early warning to be successful – in any context and in regard to any threat – we have to take this "system" approach. Thus partners in early warning and response need to work closely together.

#### *Political sensitivity*

Resistance of those who fear intrusions in their own political backyards has been successful in spoiling efforts to strengthen early warning and preventive capacities by the United Nations and other well-intentioned international actors. Political sensitivities still surround "early warning" as a political activity: they concern on the one hand the presence of foreign representatives who conduct "intelligence" work for supposedly benign reasons to improve and strengthen development assistance programmes, and on the other hand the debates at highest international levels about a much-talked-about "responsibility to protect" populations whose human security needs are being violated at least partly at the hands of their own rulers. For many governments these are worrisome issues. These developments go hand in hand with a certain degree of loss of faith in the United Nations as the neutral "conscience of humankind" – because the organization is too heavily influenced by the North while proving extraordinarily resistant to efforts of further democratization, political opening and reform. Nevertheless, to be effective and be heard, early warning

systems need to find ways of remaining objective and maintaining the ability to offer constructive criticism – even directed at governments, if need be – while at the same time retaining the possibility to cooperate with government actors. Here again the advantage of a human security focus comes to the fore: focusing on issues below the level of armed violence creates space for tackling root causes of human misery through engaging less sensitive issues, yet with a chance for real impact.

### *Measuring success*

The role and success of early warning depend on the degree to which it can be translated into early action. Thus early warning can only be as useful as relevant organizations and individuals are committed to incorporating its analysis into their short-, mid- and long-term activities and planning, particularly if this refers to efforts at root cause mitigation. In general it is difficult to prove the effectiveness of early warning systems in preventing crises, disasters and destabilization: success depends on the counterfactual that negative events and developments do not occur. In addition, it is difficult to measure the extent to which early warning signals are incorporated into the work of relevant stakeholders, and to what degree and extent they do trigger early action. Should a deteriorating situation improve, it is moreover difficult to link such developments to the implementation of recommendations generated by the early warning system. Often, credit for constructive mitigation efforts have to be situated with the implementing actor (for instance, government agencies), even if they were triggered by analysis and recommendations from the warning system. Nevertheless, this challenge may be less problematic for a human-security-based early warning system, where specific – and very concrete – threats are monitored, and specific response measures are designed and assessed for their implementation and effectiveness. Assessment of response measures requires a clear understanding of the targets, goals and indicators for success associated with each of them. We are thus not dealing with counterfactuals: we do not search for what has not happened (i.e. a crisis), but what has happened (i.e. the effect that countermeasures had on specific root causes). Human-security-based early warning focuses on key problems that can be alleviated in order to prevent key threats. If such key problems persist, countermeasures were either misplaced, ineffective or never implemented. Information on these issues will inform revised measures and undoubtedly have an impact on the results of threat monitoring.

## **CONTOURS OF A HUMAN-SECURITY-BASED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM**

Despite their often-lamented lack of measurable success, early warning systems are likely to proliferate. Catastrophes of various kinds will continue to happen, but authorities at state and international levels as well as private business and civil society actors are increasingly wary of the high costs of post-disaster rebuilding. While even functioning early warning will not always lead to early and effective responses, there is no alternative to the creation and strengthening of early warning systems. The often-mentioned argument that despite the ample and timely availability of information and warning, response measures fail due to inadequate political will is also overstated and unhelpful. Any warning effort outside a well-lubricated early warning system in which each part of the system feeds off and informs the others will have great difficulties in generating the desired results. Moreover, if – as is the case with most warning systems – threats are pre-selected with little or no effort in consulting stakeholders or adapting to changing security situations, such early warning efforts simply miss the point of their very existence: to generate knowledge about effective response options to prevent major disasters from threatening populations and their survival. What we propose here can be summarized very simply in three points: early warning must be part of a monitoring-

warning-response system, without which it cannot be effective; early warning systems must respond to the actual threat(s) at hand, facing the security and survival of the population in a given context; and the key threats monitored and responded to by these systems must be defined as a result of collaborative, participatory, multistakeholder processes. Particularly the latter point will also increase the likelihood that different components of warning systems will not only speak to each other but also act with each other in addressing successfully those root causes that are responsible for the most severe threats to people's survival and future well-being.

### ***Human security threat analysis***

Human-security-based early warning, if properly conceived, would help resolve a great number of problems that have so far plagued such systems. Due to the multistakeholder process in identifying (and over time verifying) key threats and respective response strategies to life-threatening dangers, chances are high that an early warning system would target the most relevant threat(s), including traditional (and non-traditional) security threats. Focusing on threats that primarily affect populations will add legitimacy to early warning efforts at the level of society, state and the international community. All three communities will have to contribute to response efforts, and thus must be able to identify themselves with the legitimacy, approach and focus of any given early warning system.

Human security early warning systems will prioritize a small number of severe threats and outline feasible response measures to alleviate root causes effectively, thus increasing the likelihood that response actors (or human security providers) find it necessary to implement response options. Root cause alleviation will in all cases reduce suffering among the population and thereby generate positive – and observable – results that speak to the necessity and success of implementing contextual human security warning and response systems. Focusing on issues other than armed conflict, genocide or failed statehood (issues that are at the centre of existing early warning programmes) will increase the likelihood that government actors will listen and act in political contexts that tend to be hostile towards early warning and prevention initiatives.

### ***Structure and procedure***

In addition to these basic requirements, we can identify a few technical issues of structure and procedure which would help overcome some of the challenges to successful early warning outlined above. These apply to attempts at generating new human-security-based early warning systems, and at upgrading existing systems so they are able to meet the basic criteria of human security early warning.

When developing early warning systems or integrating an early warning component into one's work, one should ideally use comprehensive approaches that combine monitoring, analysis, early warning and early response. Thus applied prevention should take the form of integrated, systematic and long-term commitments, and close cooperation between all those involved in the early warning cycle, ranging from threat monitoring to response implementation. Existing efforts should be evaluated, revised and adjusted to reflect such comprehensive approaches.

The scheme should offer systematic early warning services for in-house access, for partners within the early warning system, and for external audiences and users. While early warning systems can collect, monitor and analyse data (at local, country, regional or global levels) either locally or externally, linking both local and external monitoring, data collection and processing provides a solid balance between local and external expertise and biases.

Early warning systems can process their collected event and structural data through either qualitative or quantitative methods. While there are often clear preferences towards one or the other method (often related to misplaced mistrust towards the other “school of thought”), both approaches to early warning analysis are highly complementary and should go hand in hand. Whenever possible, long-term, systematic and thorough analysis of positive and negative trends should be combined with short-term expert analysis of particular events, how those events affect certain more or less problematic situations, and how these may impact on the level and nature of the threat under observation by the early warning system.

### ***Taking an early warning “system” approach***

Ideally, a number of very general steps should be standard practice for early warning systems: those who collect and code pertinent data should possess local expertise; only state-of-the-art data processing and analysis tools should be utilized; local and international experts should interpret the results of such analysis in a holistic manner, by taking into account political, economic, social and cultural factors in crisis and disaster situation assessments; those experts relate the findings to entry points for local and external actors who have the capacity to slow down or alleviate negative – and strengthen positive – developments; early warning analysts are informed about policy and programme design and implementation; and performance of implementation measures is included in monitoring activities.

Early warning is a team effort. Few organizations have the capacity, competence and mandate to be responsible for all aspects of early warning and early response: from monitoring to analysis to decision support and policy design, implementation and evaluation. Realistically, several actors, at both state and non-state levels, need to cooperate closely if an early warning system is to run smoothly and for the benefit of all stakeholders. Some organizations are better placed to conduct monitoring and analysis, others to develop policy options and ensure implementation. Nevertheless, without close cooperation – starting with a common decision as to what to warn of (threat) and what to look for (root cause indicators) – no early warning system can function effectively. The ownership of warning systems should as much as possible rest with local or national actors. This may help to counter and alleviate any possible misgivings about the practice of certain countries, mostly from the North, and certain intergovernmental organizations to interfere in the internal affairs of states.

If willingness to engage in such cooperation can be secured, the first step towards an effective warning and response tool is accomplished. If the various actors involved in an early warning system are not willing to cooperate, the effectiveness and success of the system are doomed. Therefore it pays to accept delays in launching systems until the key stakeholders have reached the point where they will in fact be ready to give life to a cooperative early warning and response system. That point, we believe, will be reached quicker if an early warning system is based on human security criteria, speaks directly to the stakeholders’ needs and context concerned, and builds on cooperative efforts between a range of governmental and non-governmental human security providers.

## CONCLUSION

Physical survival is the very basic need of a human being. Other needs beyond mere physical survival determine the quality and comfort of life. For the majority of the world's population, life is a constant struggle to secure a minimum of comfort and self-fulfilment. Human security, as defined earlier based on the human security research conducted by one of the authors, stands for the ability of people to secure this minimal right – the right of physical survival. If people cannot be sure if they will survive the next day or week or month, if they have to fight to secure their families', communities' and own survival, society will be neither stable nor peaceful. It is therefore these existential threats that endanger the lives of people which are at the heart of our understanding of human insecurity. These threats vary from region to region, from country to country, from place to place.

Most of today's early warning efforts focus on violent conflict as the key threat to prevent. However, consider these figures. The number of armed international and intra-state conflicts has declined sharply over the past 60 years – and so has the number of battle-related deaths.<sup>31</sup> Violent conflict is by far not the greatest threat to people's survival. Even if we continue to focus on violent deaths, in the year 2000, out of a total estimated 1,659,000 global violence-related deaths, only 310,000 were war-related, while 520,000 were homicides and 815,000 suicides.<sup>32</sup> World Health Organization data show the following:

Of the 45 million deaths among adults aged 15 years and over in 2002, 32 million, or almost three-quarters, were caused by noncommunicable diseases, which killed almost four times as many people as communicable diseases and maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions combined (8.2 million, or 18% of all causes). Injuries killed a further 4.5 million adults in 2002, 1 in 10 of the total adult deaths. More than 3 million of these injury deaths – almost 70% of them – concern males, whose higher risk is most pronounced for road traffic injuries (three times higher) and for violence and war (more than four times higher).<sup>33</sup>

According to the same data, in 2002 approximately 473,000 adults aged 15–59 died as a result of violence and war, 814,000 of road traffic injuries and 672,000 from self-inflicted injuries (including suicide). At the same time, 2.3 million died of HIV/AIDS, 1.3 million of ischaemic heart disease, 1 million of tuberculosis, and 783,000 of cerebrovascular disease.<sup>34</sup> For the same year, the leading causes of death in children in developing countries include perinatal conditions (2.4 million), lower respiratory infections (1.9 million), diarrhoeal diseases (1.6 million), malaria (1.1 million), measles (551,000), congenital anomalies (386,000) and HIV/AIDS (370,000).<sup>35</sup> Similar comparisons could be made in relation to casualties of environmental catastrophes and indirect casualties of environmental pollution. According to recent estimates, the latter is responsible for millions of death worldwide: According to the World Health Organization, “ambient (outdoor air pollution) in both cities and rural areas was estimated to cause 3.7 million premature deaths worldwide in 2012”,<sup>36</sup> while “over 4 million people die prematurely from illness attributable to the household air pollution from cooking with solid fuels.”<sup>37</sup>

These statistics show that threats to people's survival are manifold – and that the focus of today's early warning systems on violent conflict is greatly inadequate if we want to prevent the most significant threats to people's survival. Moreover, reducing the danger of such threats will create the conditions for social and political stability and avoid wars, which, in turn, will prevent further suffering caused by the destruction of infrastructure and land resulting from military conflict.

Beyond this main finding of our own research – the necessity of early warning systems to refocus on threats beyond military violence – we found that too many early warning efforts operate in virtual

vacuums. They monitor, analyse and generate more or less suitable recommendations for security providers that are more or less informed and convinced about the utility of such information. Most of today's early warning systems are not "systems" as such – they are individual components of what should be considered a full-fledged early warning (and response!) system.

A number of questions remain to be answered, such as who should take the lead and coordinate early warning and response systems, how tasks can be distributed based on each partner's comparative advantage, and how different early warning systems – each focusing on very specific priority threats – can collaborate to avoid overlap and duplication in the collection of data and events, and the generation of response measures that would be relevant to a variety of warning systems (and their priority threat focus). These and other questions need to be answered in the abstract and by trial and error – yet the fundamental mind-shift towards human-security-focused early warning must first happen before further technical challenges can be resolved.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The methodological approach towards human security analysis, monitoring, warning and response described in this chapter relies in large part on swisspeace's ongoing work in human security research, particularly the four-year project "Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection: Analysis, Monitoring and Mitigation of Existential Threats by and for Local Communities", jointly sponsored by swisspeace (HUSEC) and the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change. The project is directed by Albrecht Schnabel, who acknowledges NCCR North-South for their support of his work. For further background see Albrecht Schnabel, "Human Security and Conflict Prevention", in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Opportunities and Innovations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004, pp. 109–131); Albrecht Schnabel and S. Neil MacFarlane, "Human Security and Regional Non-Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus", paper presented at 46th annual convention of International Studies Association, Dynamics of World Politics: Capacity, Preferences & Leadership, Honolulu, 1–5 March 2005; Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security: Paradigm – Policy – Local Implementation", paper presented at annual meeting of Swiss Political Science Association, Balsthal, 18–19 November 2004; Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security", paper presented at international workshop on Evolving Perspectives on Peace and Security in Africa, Benin City, 13–15 December 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Krummenacher discussed these motives with regard to Swiss security policy. See Heinz Krummenacher, "Was hat die Klimakatastrophe mit Dissuasion zu tun? – Überlegungen zur Weiterentwicklung der schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik", in Schweizerische Friedensstiftung (ed.), *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedenspolitik: Gegensatz oder notwendige Ergänzung?* Lenzburger Protokolle I (Bern: Schweizerische Friedensstiftung, 1989).

<sup>3</sup> Richard H. Ullmann, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, 8(1), 1983, pp. 129–153.

<sup>4</sup> An overview is given by Heinz Krummenacher, Günther Baechler and Susanne Schmeidl, "Beitrag der Frühwarnung zur Krisenprävention: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen in Theorie und Praxis", in Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ed.), *Krisenprävention: Theorie und Praxis ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung* (Zürich: Verlag Rüegger 1999, pp. 77–99); Susanne Schmeidl and J. Craig Jenkins, "Early Warning Indicators of Forced Migration", in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems* (New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 56–69).

<sup>5</sup> Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, *A Manual for Early Warning and Early Response* (London: FEWER, 1999, p. 3).

<sup>6</sup> The FAST methodology distinguishes four vital components in early warning exercises: systematic information collection on root, proximate and intervening factors explaining the likelihood of armed conflict; analysis of these factors and their interlinkages; timely communication of early warning signals to all relevant stakeholders; and linking early warning signals to concrete preventive activities. See [www.swisspeace.org/fast/](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> For a series of case studies on efforts to mainstream conflict prevention within the United Nations and regional organizations around the globe see David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003); David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Opportunities and Innovations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004); Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment (eds), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality: Organizations and Institutions* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004). Cases analysed by these studies include the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Association of South East Asian States.

<sup>9</sup> Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>10</sup> According to Freedom House's 2012 annual report, of a total of 195 countries, 87 (45 per cent) are considered "free", 60 (31 per cent) are "partly free" and 48 (24 per cent) are "not free". Of an approximate global population of 7 billion, 43 per cent live in "free" countries, 22 per cent in "partly free" countries and 35 per cent in "not free" countries. See Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global Repercussions* (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2012, p. 24).



<sup>11</sup> The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Canadian government, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, and modelled on the Brundtland Commission (1987). See [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp).

<sup>12</sup> ICISS, “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty”, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001, para. 2.21.

<sup>13</sup> Among these are UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, <http://hdr.undp.org/>); United Nations, “UN Millennium Development Goals”, [www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html); United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, United Nations, New York; United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict”, UN Doc. S/2001/574, 2001, United Nations, New York; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (New York: United Nations, 2004); United Nations, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, United Nations, New York; Commission on Human Security, “Human Security Now”, Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003, <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf>; Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, [www.humansecurityreport.info](http://www.humansecurityreport.info)).

<sup>14</sup> David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, *International Security*, 21(2), 1996, pp. 41–75.

<sup>15</sup> For an analysis of human security as a foreign policy tool see Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes (eds), “Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases”, INEF Report 80/2006, Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg, 2006.

<sup>16</sup> UNDP, note 13 above.

<sup>17</sup> See the “human security” website of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, [www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp](http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp). See also, by Canada’s former foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership”, *International Journal*, 52(2), 1997, pp. 183–196; Ronald M. Behringer, “Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40(3), 2005, pp. 305–342. For more information on the work of the Human Security Network see [www.humansecuritynetwork.org/](http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/).

<sup>18</sup> Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?”, *Global Governance*, 11(2), 2005, pp. 185–203; Jürgen Dedring, “Human Security and the UN Security Council”, in Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czesław Mesjasz, John Grin, Pal Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou, Patricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta (eds), *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Vol. 3 (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2008, pp. 605–619).

<sup>19</sup> Commission on Human Security, note 13 above.

<sup>20</sup> Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 1969, pp. 167–192.

<sup>21</sup> Human Security Centre, note 13 above.

<sup>22</sup> Commission on Human Security, note 13 above, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Schnabel, “Operationalizing Human Security: Paradigm – Policy – Local Implementation”, note 1 above.

<sup>25</sup> We consider them to be early warning systems even though they often lack typical early warning characteristics such as theoretical rigidity and periodicity. The country reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, do not focus stereotypically on the same conflict-relevant factors but highlight varying specific dimensions or thematic issues of a conflict. In addition, reports are issued in irregular intervals and end-users of ICG reports never know when they can expect the next issue.

<sup>26</sup> Philip A. Schrod, "Twenty Years of the Kansas Event Data System Project", *The Political Methodologist*, 14(1), 2006, pp. 2–6.

<sup>27</sup> Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(3), 1988, pp. 359–371.

<sup>28</sup> For more information on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy programme at Carleton University in Ottawa see [www.carleton.ca/cifp/](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/).

<sup>29</sup> For more information on the FAST programme of swisspeace see [www.swisspeace.org/fast/](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/).

<sup>30</sup> For more information on CEWARN, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, see [www.cewarn.org/](http://www.cewarn.org/).

<sup>31</sup> As reported in Human Security Centre, note 13 above, p. 42; Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 22).

<sup>32</sup> Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano (eds), *World Report on Violence and Health: Summary* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002, p. 10), [http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615\\_eng.pdf?ua=1](http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_eng.pdf?ua=1).

<sup>33</sup> World Health Organization, *The World Health Report 2003: Shaping the Future* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003, p. 13).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12. For more recent statistics see World Health Organization, *The World Health Report 2003: Research for Universal Health Coverage* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2013).

<sup>36</sup> World Health Organization, "Ambient (Outdoor) Air Quality and Health", *Fact Sheet N°313*, March 2014, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/>.

<sup>37</sup> World Health Organization, "Household Air Pollution and Health", *Fact Sheet N°292*, March 2014, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs292/en/>.

## CHAPTER 5

### Human security and security sector reform: Towards people-centred security provision

Albrecht Schnabel

#### INTRODUCTION

Efforts to reform a nation's security sector are meant to improve the legitimate, accountable, efficient and effective provision of justice and security in response to existing and potential threats to the nation and its population. Key to designing relevant security sector reform (SSR) programmes are adequate and context-relevant assessments of security needs, inadequacies of existing security provision and realistic measures to establish conditions for good security sector governance (SSG). The latter, in turn, is characterized by accountable and representative democratic control mechanisms exercised by governmental and non-governmental institutions representing the needs and preferences of the state and society at large.

Without the security sector and its various governmental and non-governmental institutions at national, regional and local levels, human security provision is hardly imaginable – neither in the short nor in the long run. However, neither is the security sector alone able to meet all security threats affecting the wellbeing of society and its individual members. As suggested by the OPHUSEC approach of context-specific threat and mitigation assessments, providing human security depends on contributions of and collaboration between all relevant providers of peace, security and stability.

The security sector, particularly if reformed to meet good governance standards as an effective and legitimate public service provider, is well placed to address at least some of the threats affecting people's security, as identified by OPHUSEC analyses. Other threats might be more effectively addressed in collaboration with other public service providers – or exclusively by other actors. Finding the right approach and division of labour among internal and external actors dedicated to facilitating societies' peaceful and just political, economic and social transition processes is key to sustainable reform efforts. The OPHUSEC approach can help identify the most adequate and promising strategies towards bringing peace, stability and welfare to societies that are plagued by social and political instability and economic suffering. Putting human security requirements at the centre of security sector governance and reform will increase chances to improve social peace, stability and development, particularly during transition periods.

It is one of the primary aims of human security to assure that all members of society receive adequate assistance to empower them to gain or regain their capacity to cope with existing and future dangers to their well-being. This includes in particular those who had previously been marginalized as a result of unequal treatment, mistreatment or exclusion based on their gender, ethnic belonging, social standing, young or old age, illness, or physical or mental handicap. Human-security-inspired and focused approaches to the objectives, processes and functioning of the security sector are instrumental in reaching these aims. Definitions of human security, the security sector, SSG and SSR are offered below, highlighting for each the need to evolve in close interaction with the others.

For SSR – and, for that matter, all other reform efforts – to be successful and sustainable, commitment to human security ideals and objectives is pivotal. Thorough threat assessments are needed to put SSR on firm ground and ensure that it responds to realistic reflections of existing security environments. Only then will the security sector be able to protect society adequately, within the means

available to perform the roles that it is expected to play – and in collaboration with other providers of security, development and stability. The mitigation assessments produced by an OPHUSEC exercise can go a long way in putting the security sector as well as other assistance communities on the right track towards ensuring that societies suffering from political, economic, social or other transitions are changing – and are changed – primarily with people’s interests in mind, not those of the institutions meant to serve them. This alone reflects a major paradigmatic shift driven by the human security agenda, significantly influencing how security and other public service providers are expected to function in free and modern societies.

The chapter is divided in four main sections. The first examines recent discussions on the evolving concept of security, culminating in debates on the extent, nature and utility of human security. The second section introduces the concepts of security sector governance and security sector reform. Here the main objectives of reforming a nation’s security sector are discussed. The third section focuses on the theory-reality gap in applied SSR, as well as requirements for assuring that SSR, as designed in theory and applied in practice, is able to live up to broader human security and development goals. The fourth section focuses on the challenges and benefits of human-security-sensitive SSR. It examines the added value of using OPHUSEC tools in assessing the needs and effects of SSR programmes, and of having a post-OPHUSEC conversation with security sector and other security-providing actors and communities towards joint efforts in addressing human security threats affecting the well-being and security of a population and a nation. The concluding paragraphs summarize the main arguments of the chapter.

## SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY

This section outlines the relatively recent evolution of the security debate away from a primary focus on traditional state security to broader and deeper approaches that cover different security themes and objects. Particularly the shift from the state to the individual as the primary security object has been changing the nature of security analysis and provision. The concepts of SSR and human security both emanated from and characterized this evolution of the security concept.

### *The evolving security concept<sup>1</sup>*

The end of the Cold War, commencing in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and culminating in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved, as well as the emergence of “new” security threats triggered a number of major changes in the security debate. The preoccupation with a bipolar world order between East and West, the arms race and a potential nuclear Armageddon gave way to a focus on intra-state conflicts. This shift was accompanied by increased public and official focus on ethnic and minority conflicts, and expanded later to include environmental and other (root) causes of armed violence. There was greater emphasis on the prevention of violent conflict as well as on something new and bold: attention was given to options for external efforts to prevent internal conflict. These efforts were in part spearheaded by the United Nations. Prominent advocates of the new thinking were UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose 1992 “Agenda for Peace” defined much of the subsequent policy and academic debate,<sup>2</sup> followed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who wanted the United Nations and the international community of states, as well as other actors such as the business community, to move from a “culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”.<sup>3</sup>

A better understanding and appreciation emerged about the significance of structural violence, such as the inequalities and injustices between the rich and poor, North and South, men and women, and its potential to contribute to conflict.<sup>4</sup> These newly accentuated facets of insecurity brought about greater appreciation of how security is perceived and experienced by different sexes, ethnic groups, elites and individuals. It became more obvious that multiple forms of insecurity affect different people at different times and for diverse reasons. The idea that “security” could be delivered in the same way across different locations began to be questioned. Such questioning of cause, effect and remedy was much better able to expose the real, interlinked and highly context-dependent origins of many violent conflicts. As a direct result, the interconnected and multilayered nature of insecurity and underdevelopment, for instance, was understood as both roots and triggers of social tensions, conflict escalation and armed violence. Broader, more comprehensive definitions and approaches to security began to emerge.<sup>5</sup>

To be sure, there are drawbacks to this broadening. The simplicity of characterizing the so-called “long peace”<sup>6</sup> of the Cold War as a bipolar struggle between two easily discernible ideologically, geostrategically and geopolitically opposed camps has given way to a considerably more complex security concept. That also makes it more difficult to analyse security and insecurity, and to design complex strategies of security provision. The burgeoning number of international and national actors whose security inputs need coordination is also a new challenge.

However, the times have gone when threats were simply identified in terms of national security and insecurity – and when response strategies focused mainly on serving ideational and ideological security objectives defined by political elites, into which all other security dimensions and actors were simply subsumed. The time has also passed when human and group security needs at home and abroad were defined and pursued merely in the confines of national political security concerns.

In traditional thinking the security and rights of individuals and groups could be sacrificed for the sake of national security objectives. This was the case even in democracies, without much resistance from populations that trusted yet rarely challenged the arguments of their political leaders. More recently, a similar dynamic developed in the aftermath of 9/11, when civil liberties were sacrificed for what were perceived to be and sold as larger national and global security interests. Likewise, in traditional approaches, resources for security provision focused on the political and military aspects: the defence of borders, investment in quality and quantity of military personnel, material and equipment, and the support of countries that shared the same ideological camp. Other needs – especially structural security – were serviced only when resources were available and populations effectively claimed the right to argue for responses to different needs and entitlements through democratic decision-making processes. In countries with less wealth and political participation, structural insecurity was at best a distant secondary priority for their governments and the international aid community.

Such approaches are now clearly outmoded, and there has been a widespread change of mind and argument. New security debates facilitated a rethinking towards the multidimensional nature of security, away from a politically and ideologically motivated oversimplification towards the empirically and reality-driven complexity of security provision that can be seen today. In “new security” thinking, both horizontal and vertical dynamics are at play.<sup>7</sup> The horizontal encompasses different thematic dimensions of “security”. The *militaristic* dimension refers to the role of armed forces, military doctrine, defence, deterrence, arms control, military alliances, demilitarization, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), the wider scope of the security sector, SSG and SSR. The *political* dimension includes norms and values, democracy and the stability of the political system. The *economic* dimension refers to public finances, currency stability, trade balance and access to or dependence on resources. The *environmental* dimension relates to the

depletion and use of natural resources, climate change, biological diversity, the greenhouse effect, global warming and access to water. The *social* dimension includes issues of culture, religion, identity, language, minorities, gender equality, human rights and health; and the *personal* dimension includes issues of crime, domestic violence and human trafficking.

The vertical dynamic of security alludes to the different dimensions of insecurity and our analytical responses to them. Firstly, there is global security, meaning those threats that are relevant across borders and require international, even global, responses. The globalization of world trade exacerbates local vulnerability to fluctuating global economic dynamics; and financial or political instability in one country affects the wider region and the world. The United Nations was created in part to address such global threats. Secondly, regional security addresses conflicts that have cross-border and regional repercussions in terms of both causes and responses. Most regional organizations were created to enhance regional security by supporting their members' national security and/or economic growth and development. Thirdly, national security is the main preoccupation of national decision-makers who are, at least in democracies, mainly accountable to their fellow citizens. The challenge with national security interests is that at times they are misunderstood or seen too narrowly, so that larger dynamics, such as regional and global perspectives, are neglected. A narrow focus on national security can also cause local-level distortions when it prioritizes the security and well-being of the state, the government and the ruling elite at the expense of the population. The human security concept, which works both at home and abroad, is a corrective to this problem. It articulates well with the assumption that when human security is provided for, national, regional and global security will also benefit.

Differentiated interpretations of whose security matters – or matters most – are not new. However, focusing on the individual and communities as the main referent objects of security – rather than the state – is novel and potentially very sensitive. It challenges state sovereignty and forces new questions, for example on the role the state occupies *vis-à-vis* its citizens. How can human security concerns be met when political authorities and elites prioritize their own interests and cannot or do not want to focus on the needs of the larger population? From the perspective of states, international organizations and many researchers, the answer is broadly uncontested: the (legitimate) state remains in its current central position but acknowledges its responsibility and accountability to the population and the international community of states. Thus new security thinking has paved the way for a new approach to state sovereignty, with human security as an essential ingredient. Concepts and emerging norms such as the “responsibility to protect” are among the consequences of such new thinking.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Some basics about human security***

Human security is based on the assumption that threats to the basic human needs of individuals and communities cause human suffering, as well as social and communal deterioration, which, in turn, can trigger direct and structural violence, possibly leading to armed violence. The latter increases human suffering – thus completing a vicious, cyclical relationship. By contrast, if individuals and communities feel secure and protected from the existential threats that emerge from social, political and economic injustice, military violence, environmental disruptions or natural disasters – that is, if their human security is protected and guaranteed – then individual human suffering as well as communal, regional and international conflict and violence are less likely to emerge. The concept of human security focuses not only on armed conflict and its consequences for civilians, but also on many non-traditional security threats, including disease and economic, environmental or inter-group threats. Moreover, the human costs of non-traditional security

threats – those not related to armed conflict – are devastating, and it is now widely understood that such threats can readily escalate into armed violence and war.<sup>9</sup>

When the concept of human security was introduced in the 1994 UN Development Programme *Human Development Report*, it was used as a comprehensive approach to encompass all threats to human rights, security and development experienced by individuals and communities.<sup>10</sup> Human security was meant to represent a key instrument, or rather an agenda, to fight poverty and improve human livelihoods – it was seen as providing both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. Human security also for the first time introduced, from a development perspective, the security and development conundrum to a larger global community of practitioners, policy-makers and researchers.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document emphasized that:

We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.<sup>11</sup>

Keith Krause goes as far as arguing that “if the 20th century can be characterized as the century of the ‘national security state’, perhaps the 21st will unfold under the sign of human security”.<sup>12</sup> The call for a return to a human security focus expressed in the World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011* revitalized the concept after some years of silence in academic and policy debates.<sup>13</sup> The following section focuses on contrasting and linking this approach with SSG and SSR activities.

## SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND REFORM

Achieving good, democratic security sector governance is a key objective of SSR. Thus SSR facilitates the evolution of “good” governance of the security sector, which draws on the key principles of good governance: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability.<sup>14</sup> The following briefly describes these principles, along with their significance for SSG.<sup>15</sup>

### **“Good” governance of the security sector<sup>16</sup>**

*Participation.* Participation by both men and women is a cornerstone of good governance. Participation can be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society will be taken into consideration in decision-making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand, and an organized and informed civil society on the other. For the security sector this means that equity and inclusiveness are assured.

A society’s well-being and sense of security depend on ensuring that all its members feel they have a stake in it and are not excluded from the mainstream. This requires security institutions to be representative of the population so that all groups, particularly the most vulnerable and previously excluded,

enjoy ample opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being through direct or indirect participation in the public service provided by the security sector.

*Rule of law.* The rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, including the state, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated. These laws are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Good governance means fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities and vulnerable groups. For the security sector impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force, or judicial institutions and law enforcement bodies that are capable of properly interpreting and upholding the law.

*Transparency.* Transparency means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and their enforcement, and that enough information is provided in easily understandable forms and media. For the security sector this means that security institutions operate in an open and accessible manner, and that civil authorities have access to and are periodically informed of the work of these institutions (with the exception of certain aspects of national security for reasons of confidentiality).<sup>17</sup>

*Responsiveness.* Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable time frame. For the security sector this means that, as just one among many other public services, the delivery of security and justice has to be professional and without any unnecessary delay.

*Consensus orientation.* Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community, and how this can be best served. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a society or community. For the security sector this means that objectives and policies are coherent and based on a review (and, eventually, a national security strategy and vision) that clearly defines the tasks and responsibilities of all components of the sector, and involves a thorough and inclusive stakeholder consultation process.<sup>18</sup>

*Effectiveness and efficiency.* Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results meeting the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. For the security sector this means that security institutions embrace the principles of professionalism and efficiency: they must be capable of delivering security professionally and at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps ensure the security needs of all individuals and groups are addressed. Moreover, it means that through effective management, executive and civil authorities in charge of security institutions are capable of giving the security forces proper direction and management. Furthermore, domestic security sector actors must be capable of interfacing and coordinating smoothly with one another, and domestic institutions must be well integrated into regional and international security frameworks.

*Accountability.* Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. In general, an organization or institution should be accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. This concerns not only governmental bodies but also private sector and civil society organizations, which must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Accountability cannot be ensured without transparency and the rule of law. For the security sector this means that security forces are overseen by, and accountable to, civilian and democratically constituted authorities. It also means there must be



provisions and opportunities for an autonomous civil society: active and independent civil society bodies have to be given a role in monitoring security sector performance, informing and educating the public and supporting official policy development.

Good governance of the security sector is based on the conviction that, as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in 1999, the sector “should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other [public] service”.<sup>19</sup> It is this spirit of a “culture of service” that is recognized in the current Secretary-General’s report on SSR as “promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and respect for human rights among security actors and shaping the manner in which they carry out their duties”.<sup>20</sup> Only then are societies assured that “the security institutions perform their statutory functions – to deliver security and justice to the state and its people – efficiently and effectively in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles of good governance and the rule of law, thereby promoting human security”.<sup>21</sup>

SSG principles are very much in line with key human security and human development principles and objectives. Respecting good governance principles in managing and overseeing the roles, responsibilities and performance of security institutions is instrumental in utilizing the sector to mitigate human security threats and avert structural and direct threats from both inside and outside society.

### ***Security sector reform***<sup>22</sup>

Conceptual and practical debates on SSR suffer from the great diversity of definitions of the institutions and actors that make up a security sector, as well as the specific tasks and activities that define the process of reforming it. In contrast, the UN Secretary-General’s 2008 report on SSR offers a solid framework for a common, comprehensive and coherent approach by the United Nations and its member states, reflecting shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of SSR.<sup>23</sup> The report notes that:

It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, in the words of the report, “Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”<sup>25</sup> As is characteristic for UN reports of this kind, the UN Secretary-General’s definitions represent the result of extensive and broad consultation processes that generate broadly supported UN norms and guidelines for its member states. Although reflecting the result of a similarly careful and inclusive consultation process, the definition of SSR provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is slightly more comprehensive and demanding in terms of its coverage of actors, processes and principles. The OECD/DAC’s *Handbook on Security System Reform*, a much-referred-to standard elaboration on the concept of SSR, calls for a holistic approach to the security

“system” and offers helpful elaborations on the roles and tasks of all state and non-state institutions and actors that contribute to the provision of security for the state and its people. These actors include the following.

- *Core security actors:* the armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coastguards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve and local security units (civil defence forces, national guards and militias).
- *Management and oversight bodies:* the executive, national security advisory bodies and legislative and select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers and financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
- *Justice and the rule of law:* the judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions; ombudspersons; and customary and traditional justice systems.
- *Non-statutory security forces:* liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private security and military companies; and political party militias.<sup>26</sup>

In addition, although not specifically mentioned in greater detail beyond their inclusion in the group of management and oversight bodies but usually thought to have considerable influence, this list should include civil society actors such as professional groups, the media, research organizations, advocacy groups, religious bodies, non-governmental organizations and community groups.<sup>27</sup>

### **Objectives – What does security sector reform do?**

The main objectives of SSR are, first, to develop an effective, affordable and efficient security sector, for example by restructuring or building human and material capacity; and, second, to ensure democratic and civilian control of the sector, for example through strengthening the management and oversight capacities of government ministries, parliament and civil society organizations.

In operational terms SSR covers a wide range of activities within five broad categories.<sup>28</sup>

- *Overarching activities*, such as security sector reviews and their development, needs assessments and development of SSR strategies and national security policies.
- *Activities related to security- and justice-providing institutions*, such as restructuring and reforming national defence, police and other law enforcement agencies as well as judicial and prison systems.
- *Activities related to civilian management and democratic oversight* of security and justice institutions, including executive management and control, parliamentary oversight, judicial review and oversight by independent bodies and civil society.
- *Activities related to SSR in post-conflict environments*, such as DDR, control of small arms and light weapons, mine action and transitional justice.
- *Activities related to cross-cutting concerns*, such as gender issues and child protection.

In addition, SSR's contribution to peacebuilding has specific political, economic, social and institutional dimensions. The political dimension entails the promotion and facilitation of civil control over security institutions; the economic dimension ensures appropriate consumption and allocation of society's

resources for the security sector; the social dimension holds that the provision of the population's physical security should in all cases be guaranteed, and not additionally threatened, by the assistance of the security sector; and, directly related, the institutional dimension focuses on the professionalization of all security actors.<sup>29</sup>

In addition to these technical objectives, the academic and practitioner literature as well as official statements and operational and institutional statements, such as the OECD/DAC guidelines and the UN Secretary-General's report, argue that SSR should embrace the following principles.

- SSR should be people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law, so it can provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime. This principle must be upheld in both the design and the implementation of SSR programmes; it should not simply remain at the level of proclamation and intention.<sup>30</sup>
- SSR must be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations, through more integrated development and security policies and greater civilian involvement and oversight. National, broad and public consultation processes as well as a national security strategy are thus inherent requirements of feasible SSR strategies.
- SSR activities should form part of multisectoral strategies, based on broad assessments of the range of security and justice needs of the people and the state. They have to respond to the needs of all stakeholders.
- SSR must be developed in adherence to basic governance principles, such as transparency, accountability and other principles of good governance.
- SSR must be implemented through clear processes and policies that enhance institutional and human capacities to ensure that security policy can function effectively and justice can be delivered equitably.<sup>31</sup>

### ***When and why do we need security sector reform?***

How does one know if a security sector is in need of reform? If the sector is not inclusive, is partial and corrupt, unresponsive, incoherent, ineffective and inefficient and/or unaccountable to the public, then it (or any of its affected institutions) is in need of reform. The term "reform" describes an institutional transformation that leads to the improved overall performance of a legitimate, credible, well-functioning and well-governed security sector, which serves society in providing internal and external, direct and structural security and justice.

The extent of the reform required depends on what steps are needed to ensure the smooth functioning of an effective and accountable security sector – and rarely means a total overhaul. Certain components and aspects of a nation's security sector may be functioning admirably well, while others might be in need of extensive improvements. Thus identifying where, how and when individual components must be (re)built, restructured, changed and/or fine-tuned is an important step and requires a solid assessment of the sector's roles, tasks and requirements in light of national and local assessments of a society's security and development needs. SSR processes therefore vary from country to country, with each SSR context being unique. These differences extend to specific security requirements and objectives, which must be defined through inclusive and context-specific consultation processes – and thus could benefit considerably from the OPHUSEC approach. However, all too often SSR activities are planned and implemented without the benefit of careful assessments and respective, sector-wide, reform agendas.

## OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

### *The trap of “SSR-light”*

As previous research by the author has revealed, “SSR is a highly political process, shifting and reshuffling power relationships in government, the security sector and society. If pursued as intended – shifting power over a society’s security provision from the few to the many – SSR puts security institutions in the service of an empowered society.”<sup>32</sup> Yet the “reality of SSR can be described as muddling through constantly changing, unpredictable and highly political realities”.<sup>33</sup> In fact, “all too often quasi- or partial-SSR activities are mistaken for full-fledged SSR programmes and are then, unsurprisingly, criticized for their failure to live up to SSR objectives and principles”.<sup>34</sup> Some even go as far as interpreting quasi-SSR activities as failed efforts to implement SSR properly, thus calling for rethinking and reconceptualizing SSR in the form of a new generation. At closer look, however, it appears obvious that what are generally described as SSR failures are in fact traditional, institutional reforms only remotely related to proper SSR. They are often partial or old-fashioned (pre-SSR) reform activities, focused on “train and equip” or other assistance programmes that are falsely promoted or rebranded as “SSR” in the spirit of new “donor talk”.

Experience tells us that SSR is implemented as what could be named “proper”, “light” and “quasi” versions. What is the difference between these? “*SSR-proper*” requires at a minimum the reform of two security-providing institutions as well as respective state and non-state oversight/management institutions; for example, police and military reform programmes carried out alongside training of a parliamentary security committee and civil society organizations. “*SSR-light*” requires at a minimum the reform of one security-providing institution, along with its oversight/management institutions; such as training of police and a parliamentary security committee. In both cases these activities take place as sequential steps in the context of a broader programme that envisions reform efforts eventually to cover the entire security sector. “*Quasi-SSR*” stands for activities that take place outside of a broader SSR programme and/or where reforms of one or more core security institutions are not simultaneously accompanied by reforms of their governance institutions, thus omitting the crucial governance (management/oversight/accountability) dimension of SSR.

Of course, covering the full range of tasks and options ideally included in a SSR process represents a demanding and formidable challenge. Yet it is certainly not undoable if planned, prepared and implemented in collaboration with all relevant actors as part of a sensible, sequenced, phased and context-responsive strategy. SSR is a long-term exercise that does not lend itself to quick-fix approaches, even though some initial steps can be taken fairly swiftly. Yet an apparently short-term activity, such as a “train and equip” programme for armed forces, police or border guards, or some other technical measure to address immediate security and stabilization needs, will only succeed fully if it is seen as part of a longer-term reform approach.

Taking an “SSR-light” approach may seem tempting if reforms are unavoidable, yet full commitment to deep-seated changes is lacking. It might ensure quick approval by national actors who stand to lose influence, power and privileges as a consequence of full-fledged SSR programmes. But if “SSR-light” is not followed up by more comprehensive approaches, it might turn out to be counterproductive to the long-term improvement of stability, peace, security and development.

### *Shortcomings of applied SSR*

What are common problems and shortcomings that prevent the implementation of “SSR-proper”? A comparison between ideal and real SSR contexts helps outline some of the challenges, which can be broken down in procedural and institutional; political, ideological and financial; and ethical and normative.

Problems include corruption; impunity and inadequate steps to “deal with the past” and work on crimes committed during a conflict; poverty; ongoing military conflict; ongoing structural violence; a prevalence of small arms and light weapons; lack of donor funds and programme coherence; rigid funding cycles by donors; national agendas and vested interests of donors; donor fatigue; donors’ fear of getting pulled into local violence; rigged elections; lack of democratic traditions; a government’s lack of political legitimacy and credibility; lack of public confidence in security providers; organized crime; national and regional resource conflicts; the presence of armed non-state actors; inadequate, poorly designed and ill-conceived peace agreements; insufficient levels of social capital; insufficiently developed and possibly oppressed civil society; and lack of an accountability and transparency culture – and other principles of good security governance – among security institutions and oversight mechanisms.<sup>35</sup> A comparative study of experiences with SSR programmes carried out in the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Morocco, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste suggests that:

In part due to these obstacles SSR is often conducted in a partial and limited manner. All too often the focus lies on the modernisation of the armed forces, while little attention is paid to other security institutions or strengthening the institutional and legal frameworks that underpin accountability and good governance in the sector. Preparation for SSR is poor, as security sector reviews remain incomplete, are not conducted at all or are not followed up by concrete measures to implement the recommendations produced.<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, as the authors suggest:

In addition to the general obstacles in transitional and post-conflict societies, the eight country case studies... especially highlight as challenges to the implementation of “ideal-type” SSR the negative impact of ongoing and past conflicts on reform programmes; the resistance to SSR implementation by powerful domestic elites inside and outside the security sector; the lack of accountability to parliament, courts and civil society; insufficient attention paid to the gender dimension of SSR; and poor donor coordination experienced in many SSR programmes.<sup>37</sup>

Faulty SSR planning and implementation are not only a missed opportunity for building legitimate, democratic and liberal state institutions, but might easily lead to the undermining of legitimate and instead bolstering of illegitimate security institutions, state institutions and governance processes. This may in turn strengthen the legitimacy of alternative security providers, including traditional security and justice providers, former armed non-state actors and their remnants, and private military and security actors. Such a development cannot be in the interest of those hoping for constructive reforms.

### *Navigating challenging SSR contexts<sup>38</sup>*

If done right, on the other hand, SSR can be a considerable blessing. A number of steps can be taken to avoid quasi-SSR and support SSR-light towards the eventual implementation of SSR-proper: they include taking a pragmatic approach to SSR; strengthening accountability measures; recognizing that SSR is to a

large extent about change management; giving serious attention to gender mainstreaming in SSR; and dealing with the political nature of SSR.

Several specific suggestions might help to ease the challenge of meeting the most crucial SSR principles in even the most difficult reform contexts. They include developing a keen understanding of the local SSR context; assisting in making the local environment conducive to SSR; securing buy-in at the top; keeping long-term objectives in mind; working towards small successes, while avoiding successive failures; being realistic about goals and timelines; being clear on objectives and challenges; working with and grooming local networks of SSR practitioners and supporters; being inclusive in planning and implementing SSR activities, while retaining a healthy sense of criticism when dealing with international and local partners; and being transparent.

Especially in post-conflict situations, it is important to plan SSR programmes in a conflict-, development- and governance-sensitive manner, ensuring that SSR is implemented in a way that, at the very least, does not increase the risk of further violence and instability – and thus strengthen and prop up a predatory and illegitimate state. One might have to accept the fact that there may be cases where minimum requirements for SSR engagement do not (yet) exist. Sometimes it might thus be better not to take action at all instead of engaging in activities that would likely be counterproductive to long-term SSR and broader peacebuilding objectives. Careful and thorough assessments and reviews tend to help in identifying and utilizing the best possible timing, entry points and priority tasks for SSR activities.<sup>39</sup>

## BENEFITING FROM THE HUMAN SECURITY-SSR NEXUS

### *Conceptual commonalities between SSR and human security*

In a 2005 article on the relationship between human security and SSR, David Law argues that both have common roots and ideological affinities that stem from the strategic shifts emanating from the end of the Cold War, as both were part of the anticipated “peace dividend” that did not materialize to the degree expected by many observers. During the first years after the end of the Cold War strategic thinking seemed to shift:

- from territory and border to individuals and communities
- from external security to internal and transnational security
- from a focus primarily on military security to multidimensional phenomena, including the security of communities and the roles of culture and economics
- from human-made threats to threats emanating from the natural environment
- from an East-West strategic divide to a global focus
- from a focus on reaction towards a culture of prevention
- from a focus on the role of the state to a more qualified understanding of the state (relative sovereignty) and the roles of other actors.<sup>40</sup>

Both human security and SSR were responses to these shifts, making security analysis and provision more adequate to changes in conceptual but also strategic thinking.

### *The need to bridge conceptual divergence*

However, as Law further points out, different schools of thought within each debate make it difficult to develop internally coherent definitions and undertake cross-conceptual comparisons. There are numerous misunderstandings by critics that distract from useful interactions. Some of the main objectives of each concept seem at odds with each other. Human security provides a normative lens through which to look at security, offering values that should shape security. SSR, meanwhile, seems to be more operational and focused on providing policy frameworks.<sup>41</sup> However, current debates on SSG and SSR and accounts of recent experiences with applied SSG and SSR, as already discussed in this chapter, show that we have moved far beyond the perception of such differences and are ready to focus on mutually beneficial complementarities.

### *Making SSR sensitive to human security: What is required?*

What are the main requirements that a reformed security sector/system must fulfil in order to become an asset, a primary provider of a society's human security needs and a key contributor to human security maintenance and improvement? In traditional security provision, the focus should be on mitigating direct violence and its manifold consequences for both direct and structural violence. In non-traditional security provision, the focus should be on mitigating both direct violence (such as armed non-state actors, terrorism or crime) and indirect, structural violence (such as injustices, inequalities or underdevelopment).

### *Interdependence of human security and SSR: Disadvantages and advantages*

Without an explicit human security focus there cannot be sustainable, meaningful security sector reform and governance. In the spirit of the OECD/DAC approach to link it with broader developmental and good governance aspirations and objectives, SSR reaches far deeper into society, politics and economics than a more traditional approach might suggest.

Beyond protecting society from external and internal direct violence, threats and instability, the focus on a population's entitlement to comprehensive human security means that the security system has to work closer with the key actors (at governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental levels) in protecting populations from direct and structural violence. The sector is thus an important part of a human security provision system. Paying closer attention to human security requirements translates into both advantages and disadvantages for SSR planning and implementation.

*Disadvantages* of security sector governance and reform activities include:

- the extent of economic resources and political will required for addressing a broader and longer-term security provision agenda
- the need to work with a broader set of actors, along with larger transaction costs
- the need to cooperate and collaborate with a broader set of actors, at local, national and international levels
- the need to respect – and live up to commitments to – local ownership
- the need to match and fine-tune one's own interests with those of the larger political and security sector governance community
- the responsibility towards integration and the need to bridge interests and needs internally and externally.

*Advantages of security sector reform and governance include:*

- the fact that security institutions are more likely to gain legitimacy, both internally as well as externally, and will be considered assets and providers of security, not nuisances and threats to people's real and felt sense of security
- security sector governance will be more participatory (particularly in relation to civil society), which will further add legitimacy to the government, as it is not seen as using the security sector against its population and for the protection and expansion of its own political and economic interests
- greater respect for good governance principles, in the process of which SSR is bound to become more people-centred and more representative of a population that lives in a given society and social, political, economic and geographic context and thus has very specific security needs
- the ability to recognize and respond more accurately to evolving and existing threat environments, a process which can be aided by OPHUSEC threat and mitigation analyses
- a greater chance that SSR and governance reform efforts will be sustainable and contribute to a society's long-term stability and well-being
- respect for local ownership through a focus on the empowerment of populations, which thus become an integral and important part of the security system
- the assurance that security actors are more likely to be seen as partners, not competitors, by other governmental and non-governmental actors.

#### ***Human-security-sensitive SSR: A win-win dynamic***

Both the operationalization and the provision of human security depend on a constructive role played by the security sector. At the same time, SSR will not likely succeed without positive advances accomplished in terms of people's everyday situation, as defined by a minimum of human security and human development. As Law points out so aptly:

The bottom line in all this is that without a functional security sector, the state will not be able to provide the secure environment that is required to realize human security goals. Similarly, unless guided by a human security perspective, security sector reform risks generating a security sector that is not accountable to those it is supposed to serve and that can act oppressively towards them. These are terribly real problems in today's world, where there are far too frequent instances of states failing to meet their security responsibilities – whether this is because of resource shortages, inefficiency, neglect or ill will towards the people in their care.<sup>42</sup>

Human security provision and security sector reform are highly compatible. They are highly interdependent. Neither can be achieved meaningfully without the other. This will require SSR to be firmly anchored and established in society as a key asset to sustainable human security provision – working with and through states and civil society. Moreover, desired national and human security conditions and objectives need to be identified, linked to and based on thorough assessments of prevailing threats and suitable mitigation requirements. Finally, honest attempts and political will must guide the provision of human security with the assistance of the security sector, as this cannot be achieved in a sustainable manner without a supportive security sector, let alone against its interests and imperatives.



### *Towards people-centred SSR: Credibility and sustainability through accountability<sup>43</sup>*

Within the human security paradigm, both safety and economic well-being (freedom from fear and freedom from want) are key ingredients of a stable society with a promising future characterized by economic and political stability. SSR is a key ingredient in ensuring better and longer-lasting – and thus sustainable – fulfilment of a society's security and development needs.<sup>44</sup> SSR efforts – and sustainable SSG – ensure that a nation's security institutions are effective, provide for the safety and security of the population and the state, and are overseen and controlled by civil society organizations and democratically elected representatives. Insufficient impact in reaching these objectives and generating positive and constructive security and development dividends can be traced back to poor planning and implementation of SSR activities. Improvements in this shortcoming could be achieved through mutual accountability mechanisms that would allow those driving and financing SSR activities as well as beneficiary communities to hold each other accountable for honest and dedicated efforts towards achieving commonly envisaged goals.

However, at the moment there are no mechanisms for assuring mutual accountability in SSR processes. For the most part, beneficiary populations have no recourse to hold donors accountable to their stated commitments to provide, for instance, sustainable and effective human security and human-development-sensitive SSR support; while donors cannot hold national and local state authorities and beneficiary populations accountable for ensuring that reforms are effectively implemented and human security and broader human development objectives are met. Further work should focus on mechanisms that assure mutual accountability in synchronizing SSR programmes with security and development objectives. Here, too, OPHUSEC proves to be useful, as it approaches insecurity and security provision from a contextual perspective, prioritizing threats that directly affect beneficiary communities and identifying mitigation measures that draw on existing political, security and economic resources.

Such work would translate into and inform the creation of a specific code of conduct and global compact between all stakeholders, local, national and international, who invest in and benefit from SSG and SSR that are sensitive to human security and development. Member-donors of the global compact would be responsible for adhering to and implementing norms and guidelines they have produced and agreed. They would be held accountable in fulfilling the obligations and commitments they express in statements and documents accompanying and underlying the global compact. Similar commitments would be required from the beneficiary community. Donors and beneficiaries of SSR would be obliged to live up to their respective promises. Both sides would be careful not to start undertakings they are unable to complete, or raise expectations they are not able to meet. Moreover, beneficiaries would play an oversight role in monitoring and checking the accountability of donors' own assurances. The OPHUSEC approach could be used to provide the relevant monitoring and assessment tools.

The objective of such work would be to achieve more effective, meaningful, impact-oriented and measurable provision of security and development – and more specifically defined human security and human development goals – with the help of SSR. This implies that overall security and development objectives benefit rather than suffer from SSR; and that the security and development needs and expectations of a broad spectrum of society are solicited and well understood before SSR programmes are designed and implemented, drawing again on OPHUSEC threat and mitigation assessment tools. Such an approach would result in changed and improved policy, programming (design and implementation), training and impact, supported by sustainable and inclusive security- and development-responsive SSR programming.

### *OPHUSEC's potential contribution to improve SSR's human security relevance*

Two main advantages emerge from linking the OPHUSEC approach with SSR planning and implementation. First, OPHUSEC assessments offer the type of detailed, context-driven threat analysis lacking in many SSR planning processes. Second, building SSR strategies and activities around OPHUSEC threat assessments helps generate more effective and people-centred SSR.

How should one go about linking the OPHUSEC approach with security sector governance and reform agendas? This brief summary draws on the guidelines provided in the OPHUSEC toolkit (presented in Cahier 21) for organizing a familiarization and consultation workshop with SSR community representatives. The main purpose of such a workshop is to enhance planners' ability to design SSR in a people-centred manner and thus boost its ability to contribute to overall security and development objectives during political and economic transitions, often in post-conflict peacebuilding contexts. This consultation event with security sector representatives follows thorough multistakeholder threat and mitigation assessment exercises. After the workshop, results are discussed with various communities (or groups of actors) involved in the security sector, to give them a better, more thorough understanding of the types of threats that are most relevant to their areas of activity and expertise, and a chance to discuss mitigation activities with other actors involved. The expected outcome includes more appropriate threat perceptions on the part of everyone involved in mitigation measures, the development of more adequate threat scenarios and, eventually, more effective and efficient threat mitigation.

The need to share OPHUSEC's threat and mitigation assessment findings with a large number of potential security providers and the larger development and assistance communities is based on a number of assumptions. *First*, different threats and different mitigation measures involve different sets of subnational, national and international actors – as either causes of threats, victims of threats and/or those whose collaboration and action are required to mitigate threats. On the one hand, each threat has to be mitigated by a specific set of actors whose expertise, support and active participation are necessary to implement a mitigation strategy. On the other hand, no one actor is capable of responding to any one threat – let alone every threat – and therefore needs to understand where its own comparative advantage lies when it comes to mitigating threats alone or in collaboration with others.

*Second*, discussing the results of the threat and mitigation analysis among fellow security providers and relevant internal, governmental and non-governmental oversight and management institutions assists in generating realistic and effective programme priorities. It offers opportunities to generate a supportive environment among key actors as they leave the workshops with a greater appreciation for the problems and solutions associated with each of the most relevant threats that characterize a particular security or insecurity situation. They also gain a better understanding of where and when they might be called upon to contribute to the implementation of the recommendations presented by the OPHUSEC analysis.

*Third*, the analysts responsible for the threat and mitigation assessment can use the results from workshop deliberations to generate and fine-tune more realistic policy and programme recommendations, particularly regarding the participation of security sector institutions in mitigation efforts. Similar conversations with other potential security providers further refine recommendations for multi-actor implementation strategies to address key human security threats. Such further thematic workshops should be conducted with actors involved in, among others, development, human rights protection or political reform processes. Additionally, to fine-tune mitigation strategies further and define multi-actor divisions of labour, actor-specific workshops should be held for civil society and community-based organizations, media representatives, international organizations, individual security sector institutions and national, provincial or local government institutions.

To return to the suggestions for a familiarization and consultation workshop with SSR community representatives, a workshop entitled “Human Security Threats and Mitigation: Relevance for Security Sector Governance and Security Sector Reform” would likely contribute to fostering a common identity among diverse security sector actors and instilling a shared sense of their respective roles and responsibilities according to international standards and principles of good SSG. This would offer the various security institutions an opportunity to learn more about various threats’ relevance for themselves and the security sector as a whole. They would learn more about the security sector’s relevance for both generating and mitigating specific threats, and about each other’s roles, tasks and comparative advantages. Finally, such an experience would allow them to reflect on options for the implementation of joint response measures.


In particular, security-providing and oversight institutions within the security sector would be sensitized to the importance of “mutual accountability” that should exist among external and internal actors; governmental and non-governmental actors; people and authorities at local, national and regional levels; and providers and beneficiaries of mitigation action. They would also benefit from examining the role and importance of sustainability in threat mitigation, which often requires unpopular yet long-term commitments with unknown exit strategies, and without quick and regular feedback on predictable accomplishments of measurable, stable and sustainable threat reduction.

A useful strategy for organizing a workshop for the security sector community includes the following steps. *First*, the results and recommendations of the OPHUSEC workshops and research work should be made available to the participants ahead of time. *Second*, at the workshop itself the authors of the OPHUSEC report summarize their findings, with a focus on those threats, responses and recommendations that specifically mention or implicate security sector actors among those causing or mitigating threats. *Third*, the participants discuss these findings as well as their potential role in mitigating key human security threats. For this exercise it is useful to begin with small-group discussions among the representatives of individual security sector areas (such as the military, police, armed groups, parliament, civil society, etc.) before continuing discussions jointly with all others. *Fourth*, participants are asked to develop recommendations as to when, how and why they should be involved in reducing threats and implementing mitigation measures. They could also be encouraged to identify the conditions required for their most effective and efficient involvement. *Fifth*, the workshop ideally concludes with a set of recommendations, focusing in particular on their most constructive contribution to the implementation of the proposals presented in the original threat and response mapping. These suggestions help identify the roles that could and should be played by various security sector actors. They also identify key non-governmental, governmental and international actors who need to be involved in implementing those aspects of the mitigation recommendations that are outside the purview and expertise of the security sector. *Finally*, the group identifies steps towards feeding the recommendations generated into decision- and policy-making processes within and beyond their own institutions.

After the workshop it is important that the analysts responsible for the OPHUSEC analysis carefully reflect on the findings of the multistakeholder event, verify the findings and recommendations through further research, and carry out additional research to supplement issues that were not adequately addressed during the meeting. The results are ideally shared with the workshop participants, who would then reach out to partners within their own institutions, across the security sector and within the broader community of security providers in order to implement some or all of the recommendations.

## CONCLUSION

Building activities on periodic human-security-focused and context-relevant threat and mitigation assessments will help those involved in SSG and SSR to provide people-centred, legitimate and sustainable public (security) services. Security sector governance and reform are key ingredients in maintaining or – in cases of political, economic or post-conflict transitions – building stable, peaceful and secure societies. Yet reform strategies – and relevant activities – are only effective and constructive if they respond to real security needs, defined by those whose security is threatened in a specific context. It is this context that the SSR community (and others responsible for activities geared at the promotion of development, justice, peace and stability) must understand and use as the foundation of their activities. Without a keen understanding of the security challenges and needs confronting a particular population in a particular context, those paving the path towards a peaceful and stable future are unlikely to put the most relevant measures in place to reach their expected objectives. Conversely, if the challenge at hand is understood and measures are subsequently designed relative to one’s own and others’ comparative advantages, contributions are more likely to have a beneficial impact.



**Table 5.1:** The security sector and security provision

\* Direct and structural violence

Ideally, all stakeholders involved in a society’s security and stability would participate in and learn from the results of an OPHUSEC-based threat and mitigation assessment. Joint support of and participation in continuous threat and mitigation assessments are powerful bases for fostering all-of-government approaches to providing and improving human security conditions within a society – and thus strengthening the legitimacy and stability of institutions that govern society at state and non-state levels.

As argued earlier in the chapter, taking advantage of the OPHUSEC approach would further allow SSR efforts to pay sufficient attention to highly complementary human security principles. *First*, SSR should embrace and build on the core ideas and principles of human security. Prevailing discussions at the margins of human security conceptual debates, and disagreements and quarrels about the range and reach of human security “coverage” in terms of relevant threats and their severity, should not divert attention from the need to embrace human security principles as an opportunity to devise more context-relevant and people-focused provision of development, justice and security and people’s defence against threats from within and without. *Second*, if SSR and security governance in general are committed to the core human

security principles of prioritizing the direct and structural security (and development) needs of individuals and communities/populations as the main objective of the activities of non-state, state and intergovernmental security provision, then no particular groups can be marginalized in the process of assessing threats and mitigation measures and implementing them. Thus those who may have been historically marginalized or not taken seriously for political, economic, or socio-cultural reasons must be consulted and brought on board in an inclusive manner. *Third*, women and children in particular have been among the groups whose needs and contributions have been traditionally pushed to or left at the margins of security governance debates.<sup>45</sup> This applies also to victims of past injustices, ethnic minorities and many local (particularly rural) communities in general – in fact to much of the population. Where are the ex-combatants, suppressed minorities, victims of ethnic exclusion or cleansing, prisoners, religious minority groups, the “silent and silenced majorities”, when it comes to needs assessments, and design and implementation of security sector (and other public) reform programmes? In the interest of long-term sustainability it is critical to include previously excluded or marginalized communities in assessing, designing, implementing and evaluating SSR efforts, and in evaluating and improving the civilian management and public oversight (SSG) of security institutions.

Any solid SSR strategy, programme or activity necessarily has to be based on thorough need and threat assessments, as has been highlighted numerous times throughout this chapter. They can be carried out on an *ad hoc* basis and by a variety of state and non-state actors. The OPHUSEC approach has been created to offer a means to carrying out threat and mitigation assessments devoid of particular disciplinary and professional “lenses”, which tend to limit the extent and nature of threats discovered to those matching one’s own analytical lens and response instrumentation. The OPHUSEC approach provides threat and mitigation analyses from a variety of perspectives and with a range of response options in mind. The security sector might possess clear comparative advantages over other actors in addressing some key threats – and in turn increase its own chances for leaving a constructive and lasting imprint on a safer, more stable and better-off society.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An early version of this chapter was presented at the Security Sector and Constitution Building Consultative Workshop, co-hosted by International IDEA and Interpeace, 8–10 August 2008, Stockholm.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This section is a slightly adapted version of the section entitled “Understanding security” in Albrecht Schnabel, “The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument”, in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds), *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012, pp. 32–38).

<sup>2</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”, report pursuant to the statement adopted by Summit Meeting of Security Council, 31 January 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, United Nations, New York.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization”, Supplement No. 1 (A/54/1), 31 August 1999, United Nations, New York, para. 61, [www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/54/plenary/a54-1.pdf](http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/54/plenary/a54-1.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, “The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence”, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 87–96); Chapter 2 in this volume.

<sup>5</sup> Schnabel, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, *International Security*, 10(4), 1986, pp. 99–142.

<sup>7</sup> See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, *International Affairs*, 67(3), 1991, pp. 431–451.

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001); W. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is a diplomatic initiative aimed at addressing the interrelations between armed violence and development, as armed violence undermines development and aid effectiveness and hinders the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. A core group of states and affiliated organizations advocate effective measures for the implementation of the Geneva Declaration, and so far more than 100 countries have signed it. For further information see [www.genevadeclaration.org/](http://www.genevadeclaration.org/).

<sup>10</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 24).

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1, as cited in Keith Krause, “Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda”, Policy Paper No. 26, DCAF, Geneva, 2007, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Krause, *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> For the discussion on good governance and good governance of the security sector the author follows the definition of “good governance” provided by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, [www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp](http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp). For an alternative yet similar definition by the World Bank see [www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/gov300.asp?p=policies](http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Governance/gov300.asp?p=policies).

<sup>15</sup> Heiner Hänggi, “Making Sense of Security Sector Governance”, in Heiner Hänggi and Theodor Winkler (eds), *Challenges of Security Sector Governance* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003, pp. 3–22); Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, “Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework”, Clingendael Institute for Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 2003, [www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030800\\_cru\\_paper\\_ball.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2003/20030800_cru_paper_ball.pdf); OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005).

<sup>16</sup> The text in this section contains slightly adapted excerpts from Albrecht Schnabel, “Ideal Requirements versus Real Environments in Security Sector Reform”, in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2009, pp. 4–7).

- <sup>17</sup> See, for instance, Hans Born, Loch Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds), *Who Is Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005).
- <sup>18</sup> While the focus on consensus holds for SSG, it only partially holds for SSR processes – which are inherently political in nature and thus necessarily involve political power struggles among mutually exclusive interests and expectations as to the final outcome of the reform process.
- <sup>19</sup> Kofi Annan, “Peace and Development – One Struggle, Two Fronts”, address of UN Secretary-General to World Bank staff, 19 October 1999, p. 5.
- <sup>20</sup> United Nations, “Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform”, report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/62/659-S/2008/392, 3 January 2008, United Nations, New York, para. 15(e).
- <sup>21</sup> United Nations, “Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform”, concept paper prepared by Slovak Republic for Security Council open debate, UN Doc. S/2007/72, 9 February 2007.
- <sup>22</sup> The text in this section is based on Schnabel, note 1 above, pp. 49–54; Schnabel, note 16 above, pp. 7–11.
- <sup>23</sup> Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, “Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform”, in Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer (eds), *Security Sector Reform and Integrated Missions* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008, pp. 3–4).
- <sup>24</sup> United Nations, note 20 above, para. 14.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 17.
- <sup>26</sup> OECD/DAC, *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2007); see also UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002* (New York: UNDP, 2002, p. 87).
- <sup>27</sup> UNDP, *ibid.* For this expanded definition UNDP was referring to Nicole Ball et al., note 15 above, pp. 32–33.
- <sup>28</sup> These definitions were elaborated by Hänggi and Scherrer, note 23 above, p. 15.
- <sup>29</sup> Herbert Wulf, “Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries”, Berghof Research Center, Berlin, July 2004, p. 5, [www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue2\\_wulf.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue2_wulf.pdf).
- <sup>30</sup> For excellent discussions of the dynamics of local ownership in SSR see Laurie Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* (Birmingham: GFN-SSR, University of Birmingham, October 2007); Timothy Donais (ed.), *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008).
- <sup>31</sup> United Nations, note 20 above. See also United Nations, note 21 above; European Commission, “A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform”, communication to Council and European Parliament, SEC (2006); Council of the European Union, “EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)”, EU Doc. 12566/4/05; Heiner Hänggi, “Security Sector Reform”, in Vincent Chetail (ed.), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 337–349).
- <sup>32</sup> Albrecht Schnabel and Hans Born, “Security Sector Reform: Narrowing the Gap between Theory and Practice”, SSR Paper No. 1, DCAF, Geneva, 2011, p. 62.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
- <sup>35</sup> Schnabel, note 16 above, pp. 16–17.
- <sup>36</sup> Schnabel and Born, note 32 above, p. 31.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>38</sup> The text in this section draws on Schnabel, note 16 above, pp. 30–32.

<sup>39</sup> Moreover, it is important to integrate the security sector in assessing human security threats and mitigation measures, and to pursue whole-of-government and multistakeholder inputs into designing SSR programmes and activities. See Chapters 2 and 4 in this volume.

<sup>40</sup> David M. Law, “Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Contrasts and Commonalities”, *S+F: Sicherheit und Frieden*, 23(1), 2005, pp. 14–15.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>43</sup> This subsection draws on Schnabel, note 1 above, pp. 64–65.

<sup>44</sup> On the development roots and “mission” of SSR see Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds), *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012).

<sup>45</sup> See, for instance, Albrecht Schnabel and Anara Tabyshalieva (eds), *Defying Victimhood: Women and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012); Albrecht Schnabel and Anara Tabyshalieva (eds), *Escaping Victimhood: Children, Youth and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2013).



## CHAPTER 6

### Operationalizing human security in an urban setting: The experience of Caracas

Albrecht Schnabel, Andres Antillano, Indira C. Granda Alvarez and Yves Pedrazzini

#### INTRODUCTION

The concept of human security focuses on the needs of individuals and communities. They are the primary objects of security – not the state, or the government and its institutions. The latter exist to serve the population's needs and protect people from external and internal threats to their existence and well-being. If the state assures human security, then political, social and economic development and stability can be significantly enhanced. At the same time, sustained progress on political, social and economic development and stability increases opportunities for the provision of human security.

A serious focus on the provision of human security generates considerable potential for the improvement of livelihoods, particularly for populations living in precarious conditions. To tap this potential, the concept needs to be operationalized and applied meaningfully in the governance of states and society. The Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project set out to establish how the innovations offered by the human security approach can be helpful in achieving this goal. The project explored the urban dimension of the analysis and provision of human security in the context of Caracas. It furthermore examined, as full country case studies, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos and Nepal – the latter three primarily as exploratory desk studies. The findings of our research into the human security conditions prevalent in Caracas – the main focus of this chapter – challenge the common perceptions of policy-makers and the general public regarding the key threats experienced by this city's inhabitants.

The chapter offers a snapshot of the project findings generated so far with respect to human security conditions in Caracas and this methodology's utility in examining human security in an urban context. A brief project review and discussion of the concept of human security are followed by the lessons learned so far from the application of the project's methodology, as well as preliminary findings on threat analysis in Caracas and their significance for applying the human security concept in urban contexts. The chapter concludes with comments on current and future research priorities.

#### THE PROJECT AND ITS CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

##### *Methodology*

In a nutshell, OPHUSEC focuses on the scientific conceptualization and practical implementation of the concept of human security – and thus individual and population-centred security – to define, detect and mitigate vulnerability to local threats. In the long run, taking this approach is expected to facilitate the development and stabilization of sustainable livelihood strategies.

The 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, equates human security with the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”.<sup>1</sup> The commission further argues that:

Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.<sup>2</sup>

As the commission elaborates, “What people consider to be ‘vital’ – what they consider to be ‘of the essence of life’ and ‘crucially important’ – varies across individuals and societies.”<sup>3</sup> OPHUSEC proposes and tests mechanisms through which local communities can undertake efforts to define what should be – in *their* context, experience and reality – identified as “the vital core” of human life, what qualifies as “critical and pervasive threats”, and how processes and structures can be strengthened and/or built within the community and governing institutions to permit effective and sustained mitigation of these threats.

The project results are expected to offer useful suggestions about how to strengthen the protection of affected populations’ livelihoods and bring community and civil society actors as well as official institutions at local, national and international levels closer together in understanding and responding to salient human security threats. In addition to external and local research, the project emphasizes sustained multistakeholder participation in identifying, monitoring and alleviating threats to human security.

OPHUSEC covers case studies in three of the NCCR North-South’s partnership regions: the Caribbean and Central America (Caracas), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia). In addition, brief case studies are being conducted in South Asia (Nepal) and Southeast Asia (Laos). The case studies in Caracas and Ethiopia both follow the same methodology.

In a first step, a local research team conducted context-relevant research into the causes and effects of the population’s vulnerability and human insecurity (human in/security mapping). The team also explored past and existing mitigation measures applied at the state and non-state levels to address the threats affecting the population’s ability to be safe from life-threatening dangers. The team then assembled a wider group of 15–20 participants from major stakeholders within the society and the state. This wider circle included representatives of the academic and research community, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations working on security and development, community groups (in the case of Caracas, organizations from the *barrios*) and government agencies (such as the police and the mayor’s office). These representatives repeated the human (in)security mapping in a three-day participatory multistakeholder workshop. The research team then integrated its own findings with those from the multistakeholder consultation. Using the consolidated results, the team identified key threats – existential threats – based on criteria that combined the severity of the threat, the potential for feasible mitigation options and the implicit and explicit impacts of mitigation on the reduction of other threats not directly included in the selected key threats.

In a second step, a *human insecurity cluster* was identified in consultation and negotiation with the multistakeholder group. These jointly agreed core threats were then further analysed, and response measures were developed for local, national and international actors to reduce the threats and strengthen the coping capacities of the affected populations. Suggested responses were analysed for their feasibility and likeliness to have a positive impact on the recurrence and severity of core threats. Moreover, this step

included analyses of the actors most able and likely to contribute to mitigation measures, as well as development of indicators for assessing variations in threat levels and the performance and impact of response measures. In a third step, finally, the research team and the stakeholders developed strategies to transfer the knowledge thereby generated to those actors responsible for, and capable of, local, national and international policy and programme implementation.

The described project activities pursue three aims. First, they are designed to contribute to academic debates on human and livelihood security through publications and presentations. Second, they attempt to operationalize the concept of human security as a tool for understanding and responding to key threats to the survival and livelihoods of populations by employing context-driven analyses and policy responses. And third, they are intended to trigger the development of improved human security policies and programmes by governmental and non-governmental actors.

### *Human security and the urban context*

What is unique about human security? The debate has been characterized by ongoing quarrels about the definition and meaning of the very term “human security”.<sup>4</sup> Among a bewildering array of definitions,<sup>5</sup> the one provided by the Commission on Human Security and cited above comes closest to the way the concept of human security is applied in this project.

The concept offers some innovations, such as an explicit focus on the individual and the population as the “referent objects” of security, building on many trademarks of the new security debate of the 1990s. While the debate focused on widening and deepening our understanding of “security”, the concept of human security constitutes a specific attempt within this debate to shape the way people and their governments think about the roles and responsibilities of the individual, society, the state and international actors in preventing both structural and direct violence experienced at the level of the population.<sup>6</sup>

The concept reflects a new way of thinking about politics (and policies!), focusing on the population as the nation’s sovereign, with the state as the servant of people’s security and development needs. More comprehensive definitions of human security share this vision and position human security within wider debates about justice and legitimacy, structural violence and positive peace.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, narrower definitions of human security, which concentrate primarily on the impact of direct violence on individuals, focus more heavily on issues of public order and political stability.<sup>8</sup>

As tends to be the case with concepts that are employed simultaneously in social science research and actual public policy, the concept of human security is rarely used for critical examination. It is mostly used as a normative means of, and justification for, the political, social or economic transformation of reality. It calls on the moral, ethical and legal foundations of a state’s responsibility to protect the interests of the population. On this basis, it has so far received greater recognition as a political agenda than as an analytical or programmatic concept. This is problematic and unsatisfactory for those concerned with political and social change, because it does not allow for a priori consideration of the urban – or any other – context as a specific environment in which it is necessary to understand the particular nature of insecurity and security. Yet insecurity is usually the consequence of a state of human relations: power relations, social relationships and inequality specifically expressed in a specific context – in the case of Caracas in the context of a city.<sup>9</sup> Thus human security in Caracas depends on the dynamic state of these relations as they, and their transformation, are conditioned by the urban context.

The usefulness of the concept of human security for scientific analysis of the urban context depends heavily on the methodology used in the analysis. Our approach of working together with those

directly affected by the human security condition of their surroundings aims to generate greater value in terms of analytical and policy relevance.

## LESSONS OF ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

So far the project results have generated some initial lessons about the usefulness of conducting threat and response analyses through a human security lens. One of our hopes was to understand whether unprejudiced, context-driven threat analyses point to different, perhaps more relevant, threats than traditional risk and conflict analyses undertaken by very specific actors with their particular interests, priorities and capacities. Our findings suggest that this is indeed the case: population-centred threat analyses were conducted without a prior disciplinary, geographic or actor-specific focus, preference or specialization; and they do point to more relevant, appropriate and realistic reflections of threat conditions, profiles and scenarios.

For example, our analyses included, but were not restricted to, the core problems and threats that contribute to the escalation and outbreak of violent conflict – which tend to be the main focus of political conflict analysis. Violent conflict frequently materializes as a symptom of underlying threats that first need to be addressed in their own right, given the magnitude of damage they cause to people's livelihoods and survival. The record on investments in political conflict prevention has tended to be poor; waiting until a threat becomes "securitized"<sup>10</sup> – in other words, until it becomes an important conflict "ingredient" – will rarely help to resolve violent conflict. Threats do not necessarily have to cause or trigger violence in order to be detrimental to people's survival and well-being. While street and gang violence, for instance, are real threats and have destabilizing effects on urban security perceptions,<sup>11</sup> many more urban dwellers suffer from other threats, such as inadequate public service provision or traffic accidents, which are equally lethal and detrimental to those directly affected. Nevertheless, such threats are often not given the necessary attention. Insights from research conducted so far suggest that shifts in the policies of governments, non-governmental organizations and international institutions are required to address these problems, which, although not necessarily highly visible, are most pressing and relevant.

This does not, however, mean that for pragmatic reasons only the most serious threats are addressed at the expense of all others. Far from it: according to a main hypothesis of the OPHUSEC project, close linkages through similar or the same root causes among seemingly diverse threats can trigger positive spin-offs for a wide range of related threats when the root cause of one specific threat is addressed. Is it, therefore, possible to identify a limited number of core human security threats that share root causes with other threats? This would allow strategically and politically adept decision-makers to address politically delicate threats indirectly by alleviating other less sensitive threats. So far, our results confirm this expectation. The multiplier effect resulting from the alleviation of shared causes of threats allows human security providers to approach the mitigation of politically or socio-culturally sensitive threats by addressing threats that are less "touchy" or for which political and financial momentum as well as public support can be more readily secured. Such thinking takes into account the often highly political nature of threat identification, politicization and mitigation, while respecting the fact that, for practical purposes, human security providers can address only a limited number of threats directly and in a meaningful and effective manner.

Here we return to our project's methodology – and its focus on context-driven threat and response analyses. As our results show, the usefulness of the human security concept is greater when we base our

analyses on the visions of threats expressed by urban actors themselves, although – or perhaps because – these visions are based to a large degree on perception. Urban dwellers feel the real and comparative significance of threats and therefore also the impact of these threats on the city as a “real” and very specific environment. In this way, the various urban elements of security and insecurity can be identified, defining “urban human security” as it is desired and required in the first instance by the inhabitants rather than local and national government agencies and international actors. As a result, security is not simply defined by classical characteristics of urban security, focusing primarily on direct criminal violence as a threat, nor is the main task in security provision to “free” the city from crime by locking it up in fear and creating further insecurity.

### EXPLORING THE USEFULNESS OF THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT IN THE URBAN CONTEXT OF CARACAS

The human security threat assessments conducted by both the research team and the local multistakeholder group in Caracas identified the following main threats: precarious labour and living conditions; delinquency and crime; problems of mobility, accessibility and traffic accidents; and poor access to food supplies.<sup>12</sup> Three further issues were identified at the threshold between being causes of threats and being actual threats: urban lifestyles, deterioration of medical assistance services and exposure to solid waste. The first of these refers to a broad combination of factors driven by social and cultural peculiarities associated with life in a large city. It thus reflects urban contexts elsewhere, both in and outside the region. The second and third threats largely refer to the inability of the Municipality of Caracas to provide the level of public services necessary to assure a safe and sustainable life for all inhabitants. As the research team point out, numerous other threats are closely linked to the core threats identified. For instance, improving labour and living conditions would offer many poor and threatened families in Caracas new livelihood options. Positive spin-off effects can be expected not only on other core threats such as delinquency and crime, but also on threats that are not considered core according to the assessment, such as forced evictions from the city and widespread health problems among the elderly, women and children.

The concept of human security proved to be extremely helpful in reconceptualizing the prevailing and dominant perception and understanding of what makes for a safe – and of course an unsafe – city in Caracas. A “safe city”, for political scientists, criminologists and sociologists, is one where, in order to attain an acceptable quality of life, security is assured by means of prevention and suppression of direct violence by the main actors of a traditionally defined security sector: the military and the police.<sup>13</sup> From this perspective, security is achieved when crime, violence and corruption are fought and significantly reduced through deterrence and counter-violence. However, such thinking in the urban context has also led to the phenomenon that political scientists call the “security dilemma”<sup>14</sup> – the spiral of violence, counter-violence and reciprocal violence. State-driven use of force to oppress violence results in more societal violence, a sense of state oppression and, most importantly, overall neglect of many other sources of (structural) violence and threats to the population’s basic existence and well-being.

According to this type of thinking, the security of urban territories, streets, places, parks and malls, where economic – and social – (business) interactions are conducted within a context of public order facilitated by the presence of police officers, is provided through strict application of a very traditional concept of security. Such a vision of security is based on panicky fears of dormant instability (which in itself is a manifestation of other more significant but neglected threats that are often overlooked in traditional

security thinking) and regards the city as an urban battlefield, instead of a “habitat”.<sup>15</sup> As a consequence, a safe and secure city is considered to be one where the primary goal is not safety but stability.

The same can be said about traditional and “national” security thinking *vis-à-vis* human security approaches if applied at the national level. As public authorities are unable to assure even a minimum level of public security for all inhabitants, particularly in cities divided into precarious and wealthy territories, they inform inhabitants of the existence of easily identifiable threats and easily identifiable villains – the *malandros* – who are blamed for all the troubles, dangers and threats affecting urban life.<sup>16</sup>

Analysing threats from a human security perspective might reveal other “villains” or “criminals” responsible for urban insecurity: as a result, previous accusers may suddenly turn out to be among the main perpetrators, and, if willing to live up to their responsibility *vis-à-vis* the population, can be given a chance to identify and address this situation by returning to their role as caretakers of the people. For responsible human security providers, understanding their own inadequacies and responsibilities is an important first step towards effective and lasting improvement. This approach is not only a pragmatic response to urban insecurity and the challenge of providing security as a shared public and private responsibility, but also a moral and philosophical evolution, as it is driven by the pursuit of positive and sustainable peace in a fair and safe society.

Threats such as social inequality, hunger, lack of education or accommodation, road accidents and deficiencies in virtually all areas of public service provision, including transport, healthcare, waste removal and protection from recurring natural disasters, affect society equally or to a greater extent than violence and crime. An approach based on the concept of human security thus fundamentally changes our understanding of what security – and security provision – could and should be in a modern society, and, more specifically, what an inclusive and safe city should look and feel like.

If these “new” threats are accepted for what they are – that is, the main reasons for urban insecurity – security providers will be able to consider and confront all threats affecting the city, rather than only a “shortlist” of threats preselected by authorities with certain political and ideological convictions, under a certain political system, based on traditional conceptions of safety and security, as well as on the existence of equally traditional and readily available recipes for “hard” security provision.

As with every case study, the experience from Caracas may be significant but not representative. Nevertheless, the analyses of threats and mitigation strategies have so far identified challenges and solutions that promise to be valid not only for Caracas and its particular historic, political, economic and social characteristics, but also for urban contexts in general. Numerous lessons learned in Caracas can be applied to other urban contexts as well. This relates to both the usefulness of the OPHUSEC methodology and the type of threats and mitigation strategies relevant to a particular city. Of course, this also means that lessons from other urban analyses would likely prove useful in Caracas – particularly experiences with the method for selecting and applying specific mitigation strategies in response to specific threat dynamics.

## CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

Developing a proper understanding of the key threats that plague the urban population of Caracas is certainly invaluable. It is equally invaluable to determine which mitigation measures work, which do not, and which need to be initiated afresh and by whom. Yet the most revealing threat and mitigation analyses and the most astute recommendations are of little value if no pathways are found to transfer this newly acquired knowledge to those actors which are in a position to implement the recommendations. How can relevant actors (identified as the best placed, most responsive and potentially effective human security providers) be “enticed” to embrace these recommendations and find it in their own interest to follow up on them? Continuing research in Caracas has to focus on the identification of concrete, practical recommendations on how to mitigate key threats to the urban population, as well as opportunities for – and obstacles to – transferring this knowledge to relevant actors among the city’s government authorities and community organizations. Joint input and analysis by representatives of various stakeholder groups and the expertise of the local research team will again be required to identify the most promising and feasible mitigation measures and determine the right place, time and approach to “reach” the most significant human security providers. Just as threat analysis is a transdisciplinary, multistakeholder exercise, so is the definition of mitigation measures and the identification of entry points for the transfer of knowledge and advice.<sup>17</sup>

In the concluding stage of OPHUSEC, the project is engaged in fine-tuning its methodology and developing practitioner guidelines and a toolkit to facilitate easy replication in other urban and non-urban contexts. The objective is to accomplish the project’s transformation from a time-intensive and – in the eyes of practitioners who are eager to achieve rapid results – drawn-out research project into a practical tool that can be meaningfully applied in different situations. Moreover, this tool needs to be flexible enough to accommodate different levels of financial and human resources and capacities available for conducting assessments. In addition, recommendations will be made to strengthen the applicability of this approach by using the initial OPHUSEC analysis as a baseline report on which subsequent follow-up analyses could be conducted. These later analyses would focus on the roles of specific groups of mitigation actors (such as the security sector, the development community or humanitarian actors), individual actors (such as the government, local civil society organizations, a specific regional organization or the United Nations) and their individual or joint contributions to the mitigation of particular threats identified by the OPHUSEC baseline report.

Local communities, as well as state and non-state human security providers who consider the approach taken in this project to be innovative and useful, will be invited to make use of this people-centred and context-driven threat identification and mitigation mechanism in their own efforts to identify and improve their population’s human security conditions. The methodology developed in this project is intended as a valuable and complementary addition to existing instruments used by political, humanitarian and development actors in assessing and mitigating vulnerability, risk and insecurity.

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## NOTES

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## CHAPTER 7

### Human insecurity and security in Caracas

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#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes and analyses preliminary findings gathered by the research team working in and on Caracas, Venezuela. Caracas was chosen to explore the feasibility and utility of a human-security-based threat analysis in a developing urban centre. While the research could not be fully completed as originally designed, considerable preliminary steps were undertaken, including background research and multistakeholder workshops. The chapter presents findings from these initial analyses. It begins with a discussion of the general country and city contexts; then, based on results from stakeholder interviews and the research team's threat identification, it addresses the key threats and discusses aspects for mitigation analysis.<sup>1</sup>

#### COUNTRY CONTEXT

##### *Geography*

Venezuela is a country located in the northern part of Latin America. It occupies a territory of 916,445 km<sup>2</sup> (not including 159,500 km<sup>2</sup> in dispute with neighbouring Guyana), and has a population of 28,946,101 (2011 census figures). About 93 per cent of the population live in cities, making it one of the most urbanized countries in the region. The majority are concentrated in the northern coastal region, especially in the central part of the country, where the great urban centres, key industrial areas and sites of oil exploitation are located. Four different geographic systems converge on Venezuela's territory: a mountainous region, made up mainly by the Andean range and the La Costa mountain chain; a coastal region (covering an area of 2,813 km); the Sylvan region, which occupies most of the southern area; and Los Llanos, a vast tropical grassland plain running from the east to the west of the country. Much of the population is concentrated in the valleys, hillsides and plains located around the coastal axis and the La Costa range.

##### *Political development*

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (its official name since the approval of a new constitution in 1999) is a federal state with a strong presidential system. The head of government (who is also the head of state) is elected every six years. A left-wing government has been in power since 1999, and the political environment has been characterized by polarization and confrontation between opponents and supporters of the government over changes that have occurred since then. The recent death of President Hugo Chávez generated uncertainty with regard to Venezuela's political future.<sup>2</sup> However, as widely expected, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela has remained in power under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro, who acted as interim president following Chávez's death. Maduro secured the presidency after winning the April 2013 poll by a narrow margin of 1.49 per cent, which represents fewer than 225,000 votes. The election outcome

led to clashes between opponents and supporters of Maduro, and opposition candidate Henrique Capriles demanding a full recount of the votes.<sup>3</sup>

### *Economic situation*

The economic system is characterized by a rentier system. The Venezuelan economy fundamentally depends on the extraction and export of oil and its derivatives, and the redistribution of the income from oil towards public policy and the revitalization of areas of the economy. In 2012 Venezuela's gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP was \$401,898 billion, while the GDP based on PPP per capita was \$13,616.<sup>4</sup>

## **CARACAS**

The official name of Venezuela's capital is Santiago de León de Caracas. It has been the country's capital since 1579. Based on the latest available official figures from the 2011 census, the population of Caracas proper (Distrito Capital) is estimated to be just under 2 million, while the population of the wider Metropolitan District of Caracas (Distrito Metropolitano) is put at around 2.9 million.<sup>5</sup> However, some believe that the government underreports its statistics, and thus the population of Caracas could be as high as 5 million. About 14 per cent of the Venezuelan people live in the city, which has an estimated population density of about 4,489 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>6</sup>

### *Geography*

Caracas is located in a valley, at an average altitude of 1,000 metres above sea level, close to the shores of the Caribbean Sea. The Guaire River flows through the city from southwest to east, fed by the El Valle and San Pedro Rivers, before emptying into the Tuy River. These particular geographic features, as well as the city's proximity to areas with tropical storms and seismic activity, make Caracas especially sensitive to geological and hydro-meteorological disasters.

### *Political development*

Politically and administratively, the city consists of five municipalities. It merges with surrounding areas (Guatire, Guarenas, Los Altos Mirandinos, Vargas State), although not united with these on an administrative level. The five municipalities are divided into two different federal entities (the Capital District and Miranda State) and are pooled in the Metropolitan District, governed by the Metropolitan mayoralty. This complex political-territorial division creates some problems, as the convergence of political entities of different types and levels makes it difficult, for instance, to obtain homogeneous and consolidated information. It also poses challenges for governability, coordination and allocation of competencies and responsibilities. These difficulties are exacerbated by the social and political polarization of the metropolitan territory. Although the Metropolitan mayoralty and the two most populous mayoralties are administered by authorities related to the central government, the other three mayoralties (less populated and predominantly of middle and high class) are governed by authorities hostile to it.

## *Demographics*

During much of its history Caracas has had slow population growth; on numerous occasions growth was even negative as a result of migration, natural disasters and civil war. By the beginning of the twentieth century its population was no higher than 90,000 inhabitants, barely twice as much as a century earlier. However, the shift from agricultural export to an economic rentier system led to rapid population growth and expansion of the city after the 1940s. The population of 200,000 jumped to 623,713 by 1950 and reached 1,116,245 in 1961, 1,658,500 in 1971, 1,816,901 in 1981 and 1,823,222 in 1990. According to the 2011 census, the population of the Distrito Capital was estimated to be 1,943,901.<sup>7</sup>

## *Urbanization*

In the 1970s the rate of urban expansion decreased by 35 per cent, as most areas suitable for construction had been completely urbanized. It was reported that in 1975 all areas on slight slopes were occupied, as were almost all (93 per cent) of those situated on moderate slopes. On the other hand, public investment in the city also shrunk considerably compared to the previous period. Throughout most of the nineteenth century the city's population represented approximately 3 per cent of the national total. During the twentieth century this figure grew steadily, and in 1980 22 per cent of the country's urban population lived in the metropolitan area of Caracas.<sup>8</sup>

Within only a few years, a process of massive migration from the countryside to the cities made Venezuela one of the most urbanized countries on the continent, with 94 per cent of its population living in cities.<sup>9</sup> The speed and intensity of Caracas's growth and expansion led to a growing gap between urban planning, land availability and coverage of services on the one hand, and increasing demands on urban development on the other hand. As a result the process of growth was deregulated, which has created serious urban disorders and a chronic deficit in services, infrastructure and basic equipment for urban life.

Further consequences of the process include growing social inequalities and urban asymmetries. Today, over 40 per cent of Venezuelans living in urban areas are considered poor.<sup>10</sup> The Venezuelan government's Institute of National Statistics<sup>11</sup> reports that 13.5 per cent of the population of the Distrito Capital are considered poor and about 2.9 per cent extremely poor.<sup>12</sup> Many Venezuelans live in self-constructed settlements on inappropriate land, and are thus kept away from legality and urban zoning and deprived of adequate access to services and urban infrastructure. These precarious settlements also display the highest rates of unemployment, malnutrition, lack of education and mortality due to preventable diseases. Moreover, mortality due to violence is extremely high in Caracas, with homicide rates there being 2.6 times higher than in Venezuela as a whole.<sup>13</sup>

## HUMAN SECURITY THREAT AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS

The analysis presented here is based on the broader definition of human security used by the OPHUSEC approach, which considers human security provision as internal and external approaches towards lowering levels of fear, threat and want to assure basic and existential individual and community security. Through internal brainstorming and preliminary analysis, the local Caracas team compiled an initial list of threats to human life in the city. The following threats were identified:

- earthquakes
- storms
- floods
- landslides
- fire
- precarious conditions of occupation and habitation
- overcrowding
- collapse of houses
- delinquency
- criminal violence
- police violence
- domestic violence
- habits and urban lifestyles
- mobility and accessibility
- environmental damage
- HIV/AIDS
- preventable diseases
- deterioration of medical assistance services
- malnutrition
- insufficient and unreliable food supply
- traffic accidents
- inadequate handling of solid wastes
- deficiency in public services
- diseases caused by deficient access to drinking water
- occupation of lands at risk
- inadequate buildings
- air pollution
- heart and cerebrovascular diseases.

Having established this initial list, the team considered the ways in which these threats could be interconnected and affect one another, and thereby selected eight threats that they considered to have the greatest impact on the largest number of people as well as the largest number of other threats. This assessment was accomplished through rigorous debate and discussion based upon individual and collective research. A mapping exercise was undertaken that attempted to locate and weigh each threat

based upon its links to other threats, as well as its relative severity. The following eight main threats were identified:

- precarious conditions of occupation and habitation
- habits and urban lifestyles
- deterioration of medical assistance services
- insufficient and unreliable food supply
- problems of accessibility and urban mobility
- traffic accidents
- urban violence and crime
- inadequate handling of solid wastes.

These eight threats to human security constituted the focal points of the research team's preliminary background study. The team proceeded to conduct in-depth documentation and analysis of each threat, including literature reviews as well as interviews with representatives of governmental institutions, academics, technical experts and community group members. In addition, two multistakeholder workshops were organized to provide representatives and experts from academia, government and non-governmental organizations with the opportunity to interact and feed their knowledge and experience into the project. The results gained from the process are presented in the first section of this chapter, with one independent section devoted to each of the eight identified threats listed above.

### ***Precarious conditions of occupation and habitation – Threat analysis***

Precarious occupation and habitation conditions constitute one of the main threats to security for the inhabitants of Caracas. Occupation conditions refer to the ways urban spaces are utilized for residential purposes, while habitation conditions refer to the characteristics and use of homes.

Massive unplanned urbanization has become the norm in Caracas due to real estate speculation, difficult access to land and adequate homes, and accelerated population growth since the 1950s.<sup>14</sup> In addition, a high percentage of land in Caracas is located on steep slopes, in geologically risky areas and near water flows. As a result, recent growth has been characterized by precarious settlements, which are commonly self-built on the fringe of urban regulations, located on unstable ground and with extreme population density. Other problematic characteristics include deficits in and lack of services and infrastructure, as well as problems related to highway administration and access. These types of settlement are known in Venezuela as *barrios*. In Caracas they are home to 40–50 per cent of the city's population.<sup>15</sup>

These occupation patterns result in a high exposure to environmental risks (e.g. landslides, floods, fires), as well as structural housing risks (e.g. building collapses). Furthermore, as Caracas is vulnerable to such natural catastrophes as earthquakes and tropical storms, the occupation risks are substantially increased in self-built *barrios*, which are located on steep slopes, unstable ground or seismic faults, and are subject to flooding. According to the Civil Protection Disaster Division chief of the Libertador municipality, between 2005 and May 2007, 30,550 homes were lost as a result of natural disasters, mainly due to hydro-meteorological events and landslides.<sup>16</sup>

Due to their location in non-qualified residential areas and their intricate topography, which complicate the access to and extension of urban systems, the *barrios* have precarious and deficient

services. These include unreliable drinking water provision, poor sanitation and erratic access to electricity, gas and sewers.

As a result, many residents commonly attempt to compensate for inadequate delivery of public services, which generates additional security risks. For instance, illegal use of electricity leads to increased risks of fire and electrical accidents, while inappropriate waste disposal (e.g. garbage burning and dumping waste in rivers) generates further health hazards.

*Most-threatened population segments: Poor families, women and children*

Due to their geographic location as well as structural and urban characteristics, a large portion of the population in Caracas are subject to dangers caused by their occupation and habitation conditions. However, it is difficult to document precisely the number of families at risk of these threats. Estimated numbers vary substantially depending on the authors and organizations, data collection methods, the factors taken into account, and possibly ideological and moral considerations as well.

These conditions are worse in irregular settlements inhabited by poor families. According to the research undertaken, these risks increase exponentially in poor *barrios* that tend to be located on steep slopes and built with low-quality materials and techniques which, in order to save costs, amplify the structural fragility of homes. According to a study of *barrios* in Caracas in 2000, edited by Josefina Baldó and Federico Villanueva, it is estimated that 13.90 per cent are located in areas of high geological risk, 26.77 per cent in areas of medium geological risk and 56.85 per cent in areas of low risk.<sup>17</sup>

Vulnerability to precarious conditions of occupation and habitation appears to have a gender dimension, as women face greater threats to their livelihoods and physical safety than men. For instance, pregnant women face particularly harmful environmental conditions such as toxic gases, consumption of polluted water and inadequate handling of solid waste. These health hazards are all risks that are characteristic of *barrio* environments and can cause serious reproductive harm and birth defects as well as complications during delivery, putting both children's and mothers' lives at risk. Moreover, the types of activity usually carried out by women, especially those in precarious economic contexts, expose them to various dangers associated with their habitation and occupational conditions. Due to socially determined gender roles, women generally spend more time at home than men, thus exposing them to domestic accidents at a higher rate.

Children are also disproportionately threatened by dangers associated with occupation and habitation conditions. Factors associated with the mother's health and complications during pregnancy, labour or delivery are among the main causes of infant mortality nationwide. In fact, the 2005 annual mortality report stressed that prenatal disorders represent the seventh most common cause of death in Caracas.<sup>18</sup> Accidents are another important cause of infant mortality in the city;<sup>19</sup> in 2005 they were the most common cause of death nationwide for children between one and 14 years of age.<sup>20</sup>

In communities affected by poverty, children are particularly vulnerable, as many suffer and die from infectious intestinal diseases such as diarrhoea and enteritis. Infectious intestinal diseases represent the third most common cause of death nationwide for children below the age of one and the second most common cause for children aged one to four.<sup>21</sup> Due to poor access to water, living quarters can often not be cleaned properly, and food commonly remains unwashed before consumption.<sup>22</sup>



### *Precarious conditions of occupation and habitation – Key aspects for mitigation analysis*

As detailed above, precarious conditions of occupation and habitation represent an objective, current and immediate threat to human life and its quality for Caracas families living in poor conditions. Table 7.1 provides details on the mortality rates and population at risk in relation to habitation and occupation conditions.

| Related habitability conditions   | Consequences                                       | Mortality*<br>rate per 100,000             | Population at risk**             |
|---|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Occupation of at-risk land  | Natural catastrophes<br>Structure collapse         | 25 deaths per year caused<br>by landslides | Between 250,000 and<br>1 million |
| Lack of water/consumption of<br>contaminated water  | Diarrhoea and enteritis                            | Cases: 84<br>Rate: 4.0                     | 1.5 million                      |
| Improvised construction,<br>overcrowding, exposure to<br>chemicals and flammable products                           | Accidents of all kinds                             | Cases: 163<br>Rate: 7.8                    | 1.5 million                      |
| Air contamination due to use of<br>charcoal or combustion-based<br>stoves or open-air fires; lack of<br>ventilation | Respiratory problems<br>(serious chronic diseases) | Cases: 904<br>Rate: 43.5                   | 1.5 million                      |
| Exposure to sanitarly precarious<br>environments  | Disorders originating<br>during perinatal period   | Cases: 358<br>Infant mortality rate: 15.6  | -----                            |

**Table 7.1:** Mortality and population at risk in relation to habitation conditions

\*Source: Ministerio de Salud, *Anuario de mortalidad* (Caracas: Ministry of Health, 2005); authors' calculations.

\*\*Source: Alfredo Cilento Sarli, "Hogares sostenibles de desarrollo pogractivo", Guayaquil, *Auc Revista de arquitectura*, 24-25, 2002, pp. 25-35. Cilento Sarli gives this estimate of population living in poor settlements or *barrios*.

### *Key actors and exacerbating conditions*

It must be noted that government actors may in fact contribute to the threats to human security discussed here. This results mainly from the lack and inadequacy of social and urban planning policies; implementation of irregular settlements plans; tolerance of urban speculation and inadequate urban projects; the lack of effective programmes for detection and mitigation of and response to urban physical risks; and vague institutional response to housing problems. Private real estate actors also contribute to human insecurity through speculation in land and housing; monopolies of urban land; inadequate urban developments; and high costs of building materials.

Habitation conditions permanently threaten poor urban sectors. However, people suffer more during the rainy season, when the land on which their houses sit becomes more fragile and susceptible to landslides. Additionally, various diseases are most prevalent and can be treated less effectively during the rainy season as a result of a lack of potable water; reproduction of insects, rodents and other animals; deterioration of means of access to food transport and medical assistance; and deterioration of already precarious sanitation services.

### *Trigger events and proximate/structural causes*

A number of trigger events spark off some of the disorders caused by precarious habitation conditions. These include overcrowding and physical/natural phenomena such as precipitation, landslides and floods.

Proximate causes of habitation-related threats include:

- precarious constructions
- precarious landscape and environment
- poor sanitary conditions
- overcrowding
- miscellaneous environmental characteristics (e.g. insects, parasites, toxic elements).

Structural causes of habitation-related threats include:

- lack of adequate access to homes and urbanized grounds
- real estate speculation
- lack of technical assistance and loss of traditional building culture in poor sectors
- high cost of building materials
- insufficiency of residential service networks
- lack of adequate plans for social housing, and recognition and rehabilitation of *barrios*
- institutional shortcomings
- low economic status and structural poverty
- continuing migration from the countryside to the city
- unplanned urban development.

### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario would see recognition of the “informal city”, a vision that avoids massive resettlements to other poor areas in the city or the country. It implies a strategy that aims at ensuring the integrity, rehabilitation and consolidation of poor settlements, thus giving them complete legality and adequate urban habitation conditions. These would include, among other things, sufficient and regular supply of water; improved solid waste collection and elimination services; technical assistance in infrastructural recovery of housing and access ways; and granting of official land title to occupants.

On the other hand, an unfavourable scenario would for instance envision the evacuation and resettlement of numerous families, generating high economic and social costs, as well as considerable human suffering. Similarly, policies of intentional “non-intervention” in areas of precarious habitation are harmful for the population’s health, prolonging the conditions that make people subject to disease or even death.

### *Urban lifestyle and habits – Threat analysis*

There are serious threats related to the urban way of life in a large city characterized by unequal distribution of resources, poor public services and widespread poverty. Moreover, Table 7.2 demonstrates that urban lifestyle and habits represent an objective threat to human life, presenting both current and future potential challenges. While this threat is posed across the urban landscape, it appears dependent upon where people live, as certain parts of the city, especially the *barrios* and other low-income communities, are more affected by illness, disease and physical violence than other sectors of the city.

| Threat  | Consequence               | Mortality rate (per 100,000) |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Urban lifestyle <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stress</li> <li>▪ High-fat and high-calorie diet</li> <li>▪ Sedentary lifestyle</li> </ul> | Heart diseases            | Cases: 2,521<br>Rate: 138.5  |
|   | Cancer                    | Cases: 2,094<br>Rate: 114.3  |
|   | Cerebrovascular accidents | Cases: 865<br>Rate: 47.3     |
|   | Hypertension              | Cases: 506<br>Rate: 27.5     |

**Table 7.2:** Mortality, morbidity and population at risk in relation to urban lifestyle

Source: Ministerio de Salud, *Anuario de mortalidad* (Caracas: Ministry of Health, 2005); authors' calculations.

Classical sociological debates highlight the relationship between urban processes, alienated ways of life and physical and mental health.<sup>23</sup> More recently, several studies have added the effect of urban changes to the study of behavioural patterns and their impact on human health. Key issues are the processes of social disorganization; abandonment of traditional lifestyles and cultural traits; acquisition of consumer habits; changes in diet; damage to the environment and exposure to contaminants (such as lead, fumes and others); sedentary lifestyle; stress; and drug and alcohol consumption.<sup>24</sup> These risks are not distributed homogeneously, but are divided along the same social inequality patterns that structure the city.

Health problems caused and aggravated by poverty and underdevelopment are found everywhere in the urban region. They include infectious intestinal diseases and nutrition deficiencies, which are among the 20 most frequent causes of death nationwide; and problems that are typical of modern and urban life, such as cardiovascular diseases and traffic accidents, respectively the third and fifth most common causes of death in the country.<sup>25</sup>

#### *Most-threatened population segments: Adults, young people, men*

Although urbanization is associated with better living conditions and a better health standard (attracting many rural inhabitants to the cities in hope of a better life), it does not necessarily mean that such better conditions are equally distributed among those living in urban areas.

Adults between the ages of 45 and 75 are most affected by diseases related to urban lifestyles. However, increasingly, younger people in Caracas are becoming more affected by disease.

Young people are at a particularly high risk of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. By 1997 the largest number of HIV/AIDS cases in Caracas was reported for people between the ages of 25 and 44 years: 73.5

per cent of cases are found in this age group, with rates of 74.6 per cent for males and 63.2 per cent for females. The age group between 20 and 24 years is also significantly affected, with 7.6 per cent for males and 6.2 per cent for females.

In terms of the gender distribution of such “urban” diseases, men show higher mortality rates than women (Table 7.3). However, differences observed in cerebrovascular diseases and cancer equally affect women and men. Men tend to suffer from cancer in the digestive system, whereas women suffer mostly from mammary cancer.

| Mortality causes          | Men (rates per 100,000) | Women (rates per 100,000) |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| Heart diseases            | 159.3                   | 120.1                     |
| Cancer                    | 121.1                   | 109.8                     |
| Cerebrovascular diseases  | 48.2                    | 46.4                      |
| Digestive system diseases | 44.3                    | 21.9                      |
| Diabetes                  | 37.9                    | 32.6                      |

**Table 7.3:** Gender dimension of mortality rates for main urban diseases in Capital District, 2005

Source: Ministerio de Salud, *Anuario de mortalidad* (Caracas: Ministry of Health, 2005); authors' calculations.

### *Urban lifestyle and habits – Key aspects for mitigation analysis*

Trigger events include:

- economic pressures
- spatial disorganization and social fragmentation processes
- rural-urban migration
- scarce recreational opportunities
- sensory overload, including noise pollution, environmental contamination and vehicular congestion.

Proximate causes include particular habits and lifestyles, such as:

- stress
- sedentary work
- consumption of animal-fat-based food
- tobacco smoking and alcohol consumption
- hostility and social conflict.

Structural causes include aspects associates with urban lifestyle, such as:

- urban destructuration and generalized collapse of public services
- poverty and economic polarization between formal and informal activities, both legal and illegal
- a crisis of legitimacy in the state and its traditional management
- difficulties of upward social and economic mobility
- higher rate of gang violence, which is considered to be a form of socialization and self-affirmative action within a particularly urban environment.<sup>26</sup>

### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario involves the promotion of a nutritional and health culture based on the idea that taking care of oneself and improving one's life habits can make a marked difference. This includes healthy and balanced nutrition with greater consumption of fruit and vegetables and less consumption of canned and chemically processed food products, along with reduction of tobacco smoking, moderate consumption of alcoholic drinks and integration of physical exercises in the daily routine. Among others, these steps would improve living conditions while protecting health and decreasing risk factors that are associated with morbidity and mortality caused by "urban" diseases.

An unfavourable scenario depicts the worst consequences of maintaining the urban habits and lifestyles outlined above, manifested in a reduction of life expectancy, especially among the most-affected population, caused primarily by "urban" diseases whose outbreak could and should – with the necessary resources and change of lifestyles – either be prevented altogether or at least treated.

### ***Deterioration of medical assistance services – Threat analysis***

The deterioration of the national health system, which began in the 1980s and worsened in the early 1990s, dramatically affected the population's quality of life and human security. The conditions of health services and delivery are a current threat and appear to remain so in the immediate future. The threat is felt most acutely in the metropolitan public health assistance system. The threat is significant for immediate, short-term and long-term health services and, as a consequence, does pose a threat to human life. Due to readily available assessments regarding accessibility and availability of care, this is an objective threat. However, conditions related to which healthcare programme should be implemented as well as labour disputes within hospitals and care facilities remain subjective.

The public healthcare system began to weaken as the health sector's main actors deviated from their original purpose to focus on preventive care and significant disputes emerged related to funding and delivery priorities (as to what, to whom and where healthcare should be provided). Today, medical assistance centres are in a critical state, with widespread lack of medical and surgical supplies, decaying physical structures and insufficient medical attention. Among the most important indicators of availability and level of health services is the number of hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants, which stood at 18.5 in the metropolitan sector in 2005. Compared with international standards (40 beds per 10,000 population), this represents a deficit of 21.5 beds – far below the international standard.<sup>27</sup>

The actors that appear to have the most direct control over the threat include the Ministerio de Salud, the Secretaría de Salud de la Alcaldía Metropolitana de Caracas, the Colegio de Médicos and, to a much lesser degree, the medical doctors, nurses and personnel working for the public health system.

### *Most-threatened population segments*

All those who are not able to afford medical attention in private clinics are threatened. This includes large portions of the city's population. Those facing acute emergencies and in need of immediate medical help are most vulnerable. Among others, this includes pregnant women and victims of serious accidents.

### *Deterioration of medical assistance services – Key aspects for mitigation analysis*

Trigger events and proximate/structural causes include:

- disputes at policy-making level regarding funding, delivery priorities and overall coverage
- labour conflicts between medical doctors and the Health Ministry that help exacerbate already poor conditions.

Proximate causes include:

- shortage of medical and surgical supplies
- insufficient medical and nursing personnel
- damaged medical equipment due to a lack of maintenance
- deterioration of physical structures (elevators, air-conditioning equipment, filtration)
- unsafe installations
- shortage of ambulances
- limited office hours
- overcrowding of hospitals and emergency and consultation facilities
- lack of hospital beds, especially obstetric and intensive care beds.

Structural causes include:

- lack of public funding and the budget deficit<sup>28</sup>
- redundancy and lack of cooperation between the traditional public health system and the Misión Barrio Adentro<sup>29</sup>
- dominant vision for healthcare (curative and assistant) is costly and unsustainable.

#### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario would see the public health system guaranteeing the right to access to and availability and quality of services. The system should offer preventive care, and medical facilities should be adapted to people's needs in sanitary environments, increasing the population's quality of life and collective welfare.

A most unfavourable scenario is characterized by a continuously critical situation of public health services, where the right to health cannot be assured due to limited human and material resources; insufficient medical services; direct and indirect charges for services and medication; waiting lists for surgery and medical examinations; or the necessity to visit several assistance centres before receiving treatment. All this affects in particular the most vulnerable, such as those living in poverty; those with chronic health problems; children and the elderly, both of which groups are less able to cope with the results of diseases or accidents; and pregnant women who suffer from medical complications due to the above-mentioned precarious conditions.

Table 7.4 captures each threat in this category related to availability of medical and health services, international standards and the particular numbers, cases and populations at risk in Caracas.

| Threat                                       | International standards             | Metropolitan District indicator      | Cases  | Population at risk   |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Deterioration of medical assistance services | Hospital beds:<br>40/10,000         | Hospital beds:<br>24/10,000          | Although medical doctor rate surpasses international standard, there is a deficit in some important medical specialities<br><br>In 2006–2007 PROVEA registered 14 complaints about a deficit of obstetric beds, which meant patients had to visit several centres receiving care | 1.5 million people living in a state of poverty in Caracas |
| Lack of access to services                   | Obstetric beds:<br>163/10,000       | Obstetric beds:<br>124/10,000        |  |  |
| Scarce availability of services              | Rate of medical doctors:<br>1/1,000 | Rate of medical doctors:<br>6/10,000 |  |  |
| Low quality of services                      | Rate of nurses:<br>125/1,000        | Rate of nurses:<br>25/1,000          |  |  |

**Table 7.4:** Availability of and access to medical assistance services

Source: Authors' own calculations.

### ***Food scarcity – Threat analysis***

“Food security” provides the human security requirement to satisfy basic food needs and ensures that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to the basic food they need. Food insufficiency and food-borne diseases have a chronic effect. There have been frequent shortages of milk, sugar and eggs in the city of Caracas since October 2006, while meat shortages occurred from the beginning of that year. Food scarcity is undoubtedly a threat to human lives. It is a current threat, with a real potential to aggravate. Finally, food shortage is an objective threat; but it has a strong psychological or subjective effect, as the social anguish it causes can be a source of conflict and unrest.

The relationship between food and the city is complex and delicate. Usually, food products must travel long distances from the production points to the place of consumption. This requires an efficient road system, markets, places for sale and systems for the collection and disposal of waste. The cycle of supply, distribution and marketing guarantees the availability of food in the urban context; and the accessibility, quality and security of foods that are available in the city depend on policies facilitating their handling and distribution. Thus the quality of urban life is closely related to – and depends on – the efficiency of food management.

The threat is posed by public institutions that do not ensure the availability of basic foods at affordable market prices; producers that inhibit, destroy or divert the production of certain items; owners of establishments that hoard products in the pursuit of skyrocketing prices; and consumers who buy unnecessarily and in “panic” amounts that do not correspond to their actual demands.

*Most-threatened population segments: Based on sufficiency, accessibility and stability*

For the threat “food scarcity”, the most-threatened population segments should be analysed according to three different dimensions, namely “sufficiency”, “accessibility” and “stability”.

In terms of “sufficiency”, in 2005 nutritional deficiencies were reported among the 25 most common causes of death nationwide. Children, elderly people and the sick are more vulnerable to health problems when their nutritional requirements are not met; children, in particular, can suffer irreversible physical, cognitive and emotional damage if they are exposed to sustained nutritional hardship. According to the

weight/age indicator, in the Capital District in 2001 12.44 per cent of the population under 15 years old were affected by some form of malnutrition.<sup>30</sup>

People living in poverty have the lowest income, affording them the weakest purchasing power. They suffer the most from inflation and speculation in food prices. They are also the ones who suffer the most from greater restrictions in mobility, as they do not possess their own vehicles to visit food supply centres and transport food to their homes. As a consequence, they are more prone to consume less-regulated food from informal vendors.

A shortage of sugar, milk, eggs and beans in popular markets has been observed.<sup>31</sup> Everyone in Caracas suffers from food shortages; while some basic staples such as milk, sugar and meat are either unavailable or must be purchased at much higher than normal prices in the formal or regulated market.

### ***Food scarcity – Key aspects for mitigation analysis***

Trigger events include:

- price regulation of food products
- increased food demand
- insufficiency of the productive system to satisfy the demand
- political conflicts between the government and the private sector responsible for the production and marketing of food products.

Proximate causes include:

- shortage of essential products such as milk, sugar, meat, eggs and some types of beans
- loss of time and effort in the search for food products
- sale restrictions for the number of items per person
- monopolization and surcharge of some items
- anguish because of the uncertainty about food availability.

### ***Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios***

Food shortage's impact on people's health may be regarded as two-fold. First, insufficient food intake may lead people to develop hunger-related and sometimes life-threatening illnesses. Second, food shortage also has a financial impact, as the revenues derived from selling crops and food items are commonly people's only source of income. A favourable scenario involves improving the effectiveness of the right to food and the guarantee to a state of food security in terms of calorie sufficiency, accessibility of goods, stability of supply and national autonomy in food production.

As food shortage results in great loss of time (up to three hours daily due to the difficulties involved in searching for food), unfavourable scenarios include the consumption of substitute products that take less time to find but often do not meet the nutritional or hygiene requirements of regular and healthy food. It leads to a situation of monopolization and speculation by traders interested in maximizing profits at the expense of the population's adequate food supply. It also promotes panic purchases by consumers which exceed the real needs of their families, and thus in turn lead to escalation of the situation of insufficient food supply and access.



| Threat        | Consequence              | Mortality* | Rate per 100,000** |
|---------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| Food shortage | Nutritional deficiencies | 37 cases   |                    |
|               | Anaemia                  | 24 cases   | 458                |
|               | Amoebiasis               | 5 cases    | -----              |
|               | Diarrhoea                | 84 cases   | 2,344              |

**Table 7.5:** Food shortage, its consequences and mortality rates

\*Source: Ministerio de Salud, "Data for the Capital District", in *Anuario de mortalidad* (Caracas: Ministry of Health, 2005).

\*\*Source: Data provided by the director of epidemiology, Department of Health of Caracas Metropolitan Mayorality.

### ***Problems of urban mobility and accessibility – Threat analysis***

Difficulties of accessibility and mobility are among the main threats to a decent standard of living for the urban population. Jordi Borja believes that the right to accessibility and mobility is essential for the realization of so-called "urban freedoms": less mobility means less access to work, housing supply, education, and services in general, which in turn leads to greater exclusion and marginalization.<sup>32</sup> Mobility and accessibility problems are manifest throughout the entire city. However, the greatest vehicular congestion – and thus risk – occurs on the main highways and avenues during peak hours. Based upon statistical and anecdotal reports, the threat remains an objective as well as a current and potential one.

Lack of public investment in infrastructure, equipment and services for the *barrios* puts their population in a cycle of socio-spatial segregation that impedes or restricts access to basic services. The people suffer from shortages of public services; collapsing roads or poor road conditions; insufficient, inadequate or irregular public transport; long distances between places of residence and urban centres; the widespread and dangerous use of motorcycles and cars; vehicular congestion; and high transportation costs.

#### ***Most-threatened population segments***

The general population is threatened, as mobility through the city is impeded or hindered. The poor cannot afford to travel by car or motorcycle, but there are often no forms of transport or urban infrastructure that link their homes with their destinations. Children are also affected, because disadvantageous mobility conditions have a negative impact on school attendance and, eventually, even the rate of school dropouts. Although it is not a direct threat to human lives, the manifestations of lack of mobility can create life-threatening situations. For instance, people in need of medical attention are prevented from getting to hospital; there is limited access for social and technical assistance teams during disasters or emergencies; and security institutions may be prevented from intervening in clashes between armed groups. In addition to the marginalization and underdevelopment from which people suffer, they are also isolated from the main channels of social integration, such as education, employment and health.

The threat is mainly posed by the state, which neglects to make the necessary and required investments to improve and expand road networks and public transportation. Likewise, the state is responsible for the lack of traffic laws and regulations regarding the use of private vehicles. By failing to update and improve public transport units, as well as by not guaranteeing minimum standards of service, private transport companies carry some responsibility for the bad state of urban mobility and accessibility in Caracas.

### *Problems of urban mobility and accessibility – Key aspects for mitigation analysis*

For trigger events, an already difficult situation in terms of limited mobilization is accentuated during the rainy season, especially when urban population centres are struck by landslides. Heavy machinery necessary for relief and rebuilding is often unable to respond to such situations, and the transport and access for food supply and waste collection services are restricted, if not totally impeded.

Proximate causes include:

- immobilization or reduced mobility
- collapse of efficient and effective public transportation services (e.g. unrest at bus stops due to a shortage of buses; speculation in transport ticket prices; lack of bus schedules; frequent skipping of bus stops and routes due to widespread indiscipline among bus companies and drivers)
- vehicular congestion.

The main structural causes of the access and mobility difficulties are:

- accelerated urban growth
- dissociated public policy of the prevailing mobility system (prioritizing private and individual travel over public and mass transport systems)<sup>33</sup>
- concentration of activities in city centres<sup>34</sup>
- socio-economic segregation.

### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario envisions the use of public instead of private transportation, facilitating rapid, timely and safe mobility for the most vulnerable groups, as well as the movements of goods and services necessary for the protection of their living conditions. The positive results would include easier availability of food; urban cleanliness; readily available medical, technical and social assistance during emergency situations or natural disasters; lower levels of congestion and pollution; lower death rates from accidents; and less time and money spent on commuting.

An unfavourable scenario sees continued and serious problems of access and mobility, especially for those living in poverty. This contributes to affected population groups increasingly relying on alternative, informal and usually unsafe means of transport. Death rates from traffic accidents increase, while physical marginalization and segregation as well as the absence of means for social integration become an impediment to development. Furthermore, continued support for private vehicles over public and collective ones, as well as investments in urban infrastructure that favours private vehicles altogether, lead to greater traffic congestion, pollution and reduction of the public space.

| Socio-economic Stratum | Private vehicle (%) | Public transport (%) | Walking (%) |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| ABC                    | 49.49               | 34.97                | 15.85       |
| D                      | 20.51               | 59.44                | 20.03       |
| E                      | 9.50                | 64.60                | 25.80       |

**Table 7.6:** Types of mobility per socio-economic stratum (percentage of distance travelled)

Source: Caracas urban mobility research by Metropolitan Transport Institute (2005).

| Period        | Peak hours  |
|---------------|---|
| First period  | Between 6:00 and 7:00, can extend to 9:00; 33.0% of daily traffic occurs in this period |
| Second period | Between 17:00 and 19:00; 17.0% of daily traffic   |
| Third period  | Between 12:00 and 14:00; 13.1% of daily traffic   |

**Table 7.7:** Peak hours in the Capital District

Source: Caracas urban mobility research by Metropolitan Transport Institute (2005).

### *Traffic accidents – Threat analysis*

According to the Technical Body of Traffic Vigilance and Terrestrial Transport, 20 persons perish daily in car accidents throughout the country. Every year there are over 80,000 accidents, which leave more than 4,000 dead and 20,000 injured. An average of five accidents occur every hour, with one death for every 90 accidents; 57 per cent of deaths occur at the accident site, 16 per cent during transport of the injured and 27 per cent after hospitalization.<sup>35</sup> As vehicular flow increases, the number of traffic accidents increases as well. This dynamic results from the interaction of three factors: the driver, the vehicle and the route or environment. According to the Ministry of Health, a fatal traffic accident is the fifth most common cause of death in the Capital District, and is one of the two main causes of death among all persons between 15 and 50 years old.<sup>36</sup> Based upon statistical evidence of fatalities and serious injuries, traffic accidents pose an evident threat to human life. The threat is an objective one that is both current and likely to persist in the future.

Potentially all users of public roads pose a threat; however, some bear greater responsibility than others. Drivers who are drunk, drowsy, fatigued, distracted or reckless are greater sources of risk. The condition of Caracas's road network cases further risks: according to the director of Fedecámaras for the transport sector, 60 per cent of the roads nationwide are in precarious shape; and the lack of maintenance and replacement of road equipment is a direct source of traffic accidents.

Traffic accidents are more frequent during the months of July, August and September (vacation season); in December, during weekends and other holidays, particularly Carnival and Easter; and at the weekend during early morning hours. Tazón slope is one of the most critical roads, along with the Francisco Fajardo highway and the Petare-Guarenas road.

### *Most-threatened population segments*

The most vulnerable group are pedestrians, cyclists and motorbike drivers, as they are the groups with the highest probability to die per kilometre travelled. Those who travel by motorbike, for example, are 20 times more likely to die per kilometre travelled than those who use a car, nine times more than pedestrians and eight times more than cyclists. Although all users of urban roads are threatened (including pedestrians, car and motorbike drivers, and their passengers), risk levels depend on one's mode of transportation, gender, age and socio-economic status.

In terms of gender, the World Health Organization and the World Bank agree that, globally, the number of victims of traffic accidents is higher among men than among women. In 2002, for example, the mortality rate caused by traffic was 27.6 per 100,000 males and 10.4 per 100,000 females. The Ministry of Health yearbook detailed that in 2005 there were 386 deaths due to traffic accidents in the Capital District, of which 57 per cent were men.<sup>37</sup>

Poverty is a further contributing factor to this risk. Poor people are more often exposed to accidents because they tend to commute longer distances on difficult roads, use unsafe means of transport (such as motorbikes) and often overload them.

### *Traffic accidents – Key aspects for mitigation analysis*

In terms of trigger events, traffic accidents are particularly preponderant during vacation season, such as Christmas and other holidays, due to large numbers of family trips; at the end of the school year because of large numbers of school parties among young people; during football or baseball matches; in rainy conditions; and whenever excessive numbers of vehicles and passengers are on the city's streets. Further, the exponential increase of the number of vehicles on Caracas's streets contributes to greater levels of traffic accidents.

Proximate causes include:

- collisions
- overturns.

Structural causes include aspects linked to institutional shortcomings, such as:

- lack of traffic police to monitor road traffic and catch and penalize speeding offences and violations of maximum carrying capacities of trucks and people carriers
- lax rules on granting driver's licences without proper proof of driving skills and qualifications
- authorities' negligence in maintaining urban infrastructure and basic road conditions, road repair, and servicing and replacement of road maintenance equipment and traffic.

### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario envisions a complete road safety analysis, which would provide sound evidence for the magnitude and characteristics of the problem. Such analysis would also envisage the official resources required for addressing the issue in collaboration with those government institutions that are responsible for traffic (e.g. health, education and law enforcement) in addition to the technical assistance provided by academics, social institutions and communities. Financial and human investments would be provided to reduce the deaths caused by traffic accidents. Prevention campaigns would be adapted to the common practices of the main risk groups. The number of traffic accidents would drop, congestions of bus stations would be avoided and the public transport fleet would be enlarged. Using public transport would thus result in considerable savings in both time and energy.

An unfavourable scenario would include serious health and development problems for the country, especially as a result of the economic repercussions of deaths and injuries caused by traffic accidents, as well as the emotional and psychological consequences for the victims and their relatives. Such deaths also result in the loss of potential years of economically productive lives.

| Threat         | Deceased | Injured |
|----------------|----------|---------|
| Road accidents | 167      | 6,022   |

**Table 7.8:** Number of road accidents, January–November 2007

Source: Metropolitan Fire Brigade.

### ***Urban violence: Delinquency and crime – Threat analysis***

Crimes against individuals (homicides and injuries) have increased both in absolute volume and in the proportion of the total number of crimes. Based upon statistical and anecdotal information, the threat is current, poses a clear threat for human life and is likely to persist in the future. Violence has an objective dimension that is evident not only in officially recorded crime rates, but also in the number of crimes that went unreported, and the probability and risk of becoming a victim of a crime. Additionally, there is the subjective dimension of the level and impact of crime, which is referred to as the security perception citizens express in relation to their social environment, or the feeling of safety and fear expressed at individual levels.

According to official statistics, these types of criminal acts have increased from 1.0 per cent to 5.2 per cent of the total number of reported crimes between 1990 and 2006. The federal district of Caracas experienced the highest number of violent deaths, with 2,218 murder cases for 2006, or a rate of 107 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>38</sup> These figures rank both Venezuela and Caracas among the places with the highest homicide rate in the region. Homicides are not all treated as crimes, as significant numbers are perpetrated by the security forces. According to the Public Ministry, from 2000 to 2006 there were 5,684 deaths caused by police officers in alleged confrontations.<sup>39</sup>

There appears to be a local pattern of victimization; indeed, most crimes occur in areas close to the victim's residence. Homicides usually occur at night or in the early morning hours. Public places such as bakeries, squares, sport courts and streets of common transit in the *barrios* are considered high-risk areas. Also, on holidays such as Mother's Day, the number of homicides and attacks causing personal injury increases.<sup>40</sup>

The majority of perpetrators appear to be young males, especially those known colloquially as the *hampa común* (ordinary underworld), who typically are often part of semi-organized criminal gangs and units. Another important source of the threat seems to come from police officers, both because of their excessive use of force and for their complicity in crimes.

#### ***Most-threatened population segments***

Young males are most vulnerable to death or injury in a violence event. According to Sanjuán, 69 per cent of victims of reported homicides from 1985 to 2000 were between the ages of 15 and 29. Since 1993 homicide has been the most prominent cause of death in the country among males aged 19–40. In addition, according to a national victimization survey, homicides and personal injuries most affect those among the poor strata of the population.<sup>41</sup>

### ***Urban violence: Delinquency and crime – Key aspects for mitigation analysis***

Triggering events include the consumption of alcohol and other drugs, as well as the availability of firearms. In particular the latter play an increasingly prominent role in recent years, as they are used in 70–95 per cent of all homicides. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the 5 million firearms available in Venezuela are illegal, as their owners do not possess legal licences and/or the arms are not registered.

Proximate causes are linked to the dual dimensions of urban violence: on the one hand, urban violence has instrumental value; on the other hand, it has expressive value. The former finds its purposes in the pursuit of lucrative goods, whereas the latter is considered an end in itself, since it is a mechanism of identity, expression and recognition for the perpetrators of violent acts.

Structural causes include:

- socio-economic inequalities
- degraded welfare state
- institutional weakness in crime control and widespread impunity.

#### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

To prevent violence, it is necessary to advance and support public policies that reject the repressive character of a police state, and instead invest in social participation as an alternative mechanism of social control. It is recommended that communities do not entirely replace the state in its role as key security provider.

However, open and effective spaces of intervention are crucially important instruments to create a new sense of safety and security. They facilitate democratic strategies for the prevention and control of key threats, as well as the practice of peaceful resolution of disputes and the appropriation of public spaces previously lost due the fear of being victimized. The state is responsible for controlling the availability of illegal weapons; penalizing impunity cases; reforming the system of penal justice; investing in physical modification of space popular for committing crimes; and stimulating, for instance, the empowerment of communities and police officers about human rights – all with the aim of diminishing cases of violent deaths.

High levels of crime and violence seriously compromise the credibility of the democratic system, mainly because they impede good governance and promote an authoritarian and repressive political culture that restricts fundamental rights and guarantees. The most unfavourable consequences include an increase in repressive approaches of police agencies and an associated increase of cases of discretionary and excessive use of force; the loss of confidence in public institutions; intolerant informal and legal mechanisms of social control; hostile public spaces; and limitation of community participation. Among the most regrettable consequences are increasing rates of violent deaths, especially among the most vulnerable groups.

| Delinquency and crime | Consequences | Mortality (rate per 100,000 inhabitants) |
|-----------------------|--------------|--|
| Violence (2006)       | Homicides    | 107                                      |
|                       | Injuries     | 277                                      |

**Table 7.9:** Violence in Caracas

Source: Charlie Devereux and Robert Samet, "Crime runs amok in Caracas' slums", *Chronicle Foreign Service*, November 2008, <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Crime-runs-amok-in-Caracas-slums-3261556.php>.

#### ***Inadequate handling of solid waste – Threat analysis***

The inadequate handling of solid waste has direct effects on people's health and the environment with which they interact. Contact with physical, chemical and biological agents that contain wastes decreases the quality of life and may cause serious illness or disorders to those who are permanently exposed to them. The dangers emanating from poor waste collection services are mainly threats to the quality of life, as they damage people's health and thus, among many other consequences, their school or work attendance. However, the threat can also directly cause death as a source of illness or other indirect consequences (such as the increased likelihood of landslides and floods during the rainy season). The problem occurs particularly in places where waste is produced and accumulated. This includes the old downtown, where a

significant portion of informal businesses operate, and in highly populated urban settlements that lack regular waste collection services. The threat is active/current and is likely to persist in the future. Moreover, based upon evidence, the inadequate handling of solid waste appears to be an objective threat.

The problem further occurs near waste treatment sites, such as in the case of communities located near to the transfer plant from Las Mayas. The community of Ojo de Agua is also affected because of its proximity to an old landfill that has substantially degraded the environmental quality and safety of the area.

In Caracas the problem of waste disposal has become a source of human insecurity for all people, especially those living in the most populous sectors of the city: the harsh topography that characterizes these settlements, the shortage and poor condition of garbage containers and inefficient urban waste collection services result in direct exposure to large and diverse quantities of waste. Poor habits of waste handling among the population increase the risk of situations that can become detrimental to people's health – and even survival. One example is the common habit of discharging waste into local rivers, creeks and other drainage systems, which contributes to the likelihood of overflows and contaminated water supplies.<sup>42</sup>

Public institutions, particularly metropolitan mayoral administrations, bear significant responsibility for the precarious conditions of solid waste collections. None of them has so far been able to create and maintain a viable and efficient waste management programme. Private institutions can also be blamed for these conditions. Waste collection companies offer services that are insufficient and often infrequent in relation to the magnitude of the problem.

Local communities with no collection services tend to deposit their waste in collective waste disposal containers. Such wild landfills become sources of disease, causing and contributing to deaths and property loss during floods that could be prevented if the polluted and clogged-up drainage systems were kept clean.

#### *Most-threatened population segments*

All inhabitants of Caracas are exposed to the damaging impacts of inadequate handling of solid waste; however, those directly exposed to such waste are affected the most. The most vulnerable to the environmental quality and health problems that result from exposure to solid waste are those who are not provided with regular waste collection, especially those living in the *barrios* or near waste treatment and deposit sites.

#### ***Inadequate handling of solid waste – Key aspects for mitigation analysis***

Trigger events include:

- irregularity in rubbish collection services
- labour conflicts within public waste collection companies
- segregators removing the wastes
- the role played by the informal economy.

Proximate causes include:

- abundant scattered waste in the public areas of the city
- illnesses and general unhealthy lifestyles
- reproduction of insects and rodents.

Structural causes include:

- topographical conditions that contribute to problems with waste collection, and limited accessibility in the *barrios*
- transfer of urban waste collection services to private operators
- excessive consumption habits.

#### *Favourable and unfavourable mitigation scenarios*

A favourable scenario would include regular and efficient waste collection services that are adjusted to the volume of waste generated by each community. Such tailored waste collection strategies would be the product of agreements between public institutions and communities. Once more effective and efficient waste collection is available to all communities, mechanisms of social control need to be encouraged to avoid illicit waste disposal into drains and creeks, thus creating a cleaner, healthier and safer urban environment.

The most unfavourable scenario is caused by continuing direct exposure of the city's inhabitants to solid waste. This situation causes the spread of insects and rodents that become carriers of infectious diseases. People suffer from respiratory disorders when they come in contact with the fumes produced by the burning of wild landfills – a common practice in the *barrios*. As a consequence, medical resources are unnecessarily strained in an effort to treat an easily preventable and affordable problem. Furthermore, the concentration of large volumes of waste in the tributaries of streams and/or drainage systems will cause floods or landslides that lead to the collapse of fragile infrastructure, including houses and access roads.

## FEEDBACK FROM INDIVIDUAL STAKEHOLDER GROUP DISCUSSIONS

### *Diversity in threats identified*

The threats identified by different stakeholder groups during the consultation workshop were characteristic of the particular interests, attitudes or roles of their members. The non-governmental organizations and academics tended to identify threats that were related to their specific areas of expertise; the institutional actors identified institutional deficiencies as main sources of threats; and social groups tended to present problems of current interest and importance to their communities or on the agendas of their own organizations (such as land possession or housing).

However, while much more variety and diversity were evident in the initial brainstorming of threats, as the workshop developed this evolved into a greater degree of concentration and homogeneity during subsequent small group discussions, and the surfacing of numerous common elements in the plenary meeting. This suggests that when the discussion is less structured, the actors put their “existential” position (their role, expertise, experience) in the centre, while the structured discussion could permit the discovery of shared and common experiences and assessments from the jointly analysed urban surroundings.



The main threats tended to concentrate on aspects linked to homes (such as collapse, overcrowding, loss due to natural disasters and landslides) and land occupancy conditions (such as urban growth, environmental problems or underlying causes of collapses and overcrowding).

Further important threats identified were those related to crime and violence (such as delinquency, police and military abuse, firearms and citizen security). Although three out of four groups selected this type of threat as being relevant, it is important to highlight that it was not considered a top threat by any group – in stark contrast with the general (and often generalized) perception of personal insecurity and violence as the main concern of the citizens of Caracas. This point should be considered a crucial one, as it was stressed as important by several social organizations and popular community groups.

It was interesting to observe that the group of institutional actors self-critically identified institutional responses – or a lack thereof – as the main threats. They characterized resistance to change as the main and general source of all other threats, calling upon institutions to address threats in a more efficient and appropriate manner.

Two groups – communities and social organizations – agreed in their selection of problems related to solid waste handling as a main threat, while the group of experts and the communities agreed in identifying problems associated with transport (such as excess motorized traffic and inadequate public transportation) as sources of danger for the population.

Other threats were identified by only one work group, without being considered by another: the community group identified “alcohol and drugs” and “lack of supplies”; the institutional group picked “resistance to change” and “human activity without control or equilibrium”; the academic group identified the threats of “unemployment and labour insecurity” and “traffic accidents”. It is interesting to note that automobile accidents appeared to receive little overall attention, despite the high incidence of deaths and injuries they cause throughout the city. Perhaps automobile accidents are considered an occupational hazard that is part and parcel of modern life in a large city.

### ***Comparison of multistakeholder and research team threat analyses***

The threats identified by the participants are similar to the general information gathered by the research team. In the threats selected, the research team pointed out the physical-urban factors (occupation and habitation conditions) as main threats to life in Caracas, due to their impact on other types of processes (such as natural disasters, home collapses, overcrowding, service deficit or environmental deterioration). This is similar to the elements pointed out by the workshop participants, who highlighted urban aspects such as overcrowding, natural disasters, urban growth and densification or contamination of the environment. However, the research team preferred a broader category, which could include and explain different linked phenomena (including use of space and conditions, access to residential services, quality of life and quality of the environment), while the workshop groups chose a greater degree of diversification.

A similar analysis may be provided regarding violence and criminality, which the local team identified as the main threats. The research team grouped different types of mortal violence (criminal, interpersonal or police-related) in the same category, which was then incorporated into a broader category referred to as “delinquency”. The workshop groups, on the other hand, identified separate threats: delinquency (by the social organization group); police and military abuse (by the social organization group); and firearms (by the academic group). This latter threat was discarded by the local research team due to the presence of ideological and subjective elements that could have been prejudicial to the analysis.

However, in both cases there is clear similarity between what is stated by the research team and by the workshop participants.

The threat concerning transportation (excess vehicles), identified by the community group, and the threat referring to public transportation, pointed out by the academic group, were included in another more general threat: “urban access and mobility problems”.

The threats related to ground transit, identified as “traffic accidents” by the academic group and the research team, are very similar in both cases. The same applies to “inadequate handling of solid waste”, which was identified as “solid refuse” by the social organization group and “solid waste” by the community group.

Threats related to “urban habits and lifestyles” and “deterioration of medical assistance services” were not raised by any of the workshop groups.

## CONCLUSION

All threats identified by the investigation team, as well as by those who participated in the workshop, can be grouped according to different day-to-day processes involved in the urban context.

- Associated with space and habitat (occupation and habitation conditions, collapse of homes, overcrowding, natural disasters and urban growth).
- Associated with basic services required for life in the city (water, sanitation, electricity and gas).
- Associated with mobilization inside the city (mobility and access, public transportation and traffic accidents).
- Associated with basic elements produced outside the city (lack of goods and access to food and nutrition).
- Associated with interpersonal relations in the city (violence, delinquency, firearms, “human behaviour” and polarization).
- Associated with urban lifestyles (diseases, drugs and alcohol).
- Associated with urban social conditions (overcrowding and unemployment).
- Associated with the interaction of urban and natural environments (contamination, environmental deterioration, natural disasters).

Overall, it could be considered that threats to human security in a context like Caracas present different processes of urban articulation and functioning, such as relations with spaces, natural environment, people, mobilization, public services, supply of external basic elements for subsistence (related to external systems) and urban lifestyles. However, even when these processes or factors are common for all the inhabitants of the city, the threats are distributed in a discriminatory manner.

The workshop participants and the information compiled highlighted that the threats are concentrated in the least privileged sectors of the city. The urban structural processes exclude, segregate or marginalize large segments of the population. Those segments are subject to living conditions that expose them to threats and reduce their coping capacities. They find themselves in predetermined and seemingly unchangeable relations with space and the natural environment, with basic services, interpersonal relations, mobility and transit conditions, and access to externally produced goods. As it is impossible for them to generate efficient resources to mitigate the threats, they are forced to depend on institutional responses that are largely inefficient.

## NOTES

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<sup>2</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, “Latin America after Chavez”, Economist Intelligence Unit: Latest Economic Developments for Venezuela, 7 March 2013, [www.cmegroup.com/education/files/eiu-chavez-2013-03-07.pdf](http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/eiu-chavez-2013-03-07.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> BBC News, “Venezuela Election: Madura Victory Margin Narrows”, 1 May 2013, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22353241](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22353241).

<sup>4</sup> International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: Venezuela”, Data and Statistics, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013, [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=32&pr.y=1&sy=2009&ey=2013&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=299&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=#download](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=32&pr.y=1&sy=2009&ey=2013&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=299&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=#download).

<sup>5</sup> República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular del Despacho de la Presidencia, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “XIV Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda: Resultados por Entidad Federal y Municipio del Distrito Capital”, p.10, [www.ine.gov.ve/documentos/Demografia/CensodePoblacionyVivienda/pdf/distrito\\_capital.pdf](http://www.ine.gov.ve/documentos/Demografia/CensodePoblacionyVivienda/pdf/distrito_capital.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> World Bank Development Indicators, “Population in the Largest City (% of Urban Population)”, 2013, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.URB.LCTY.UR.ZS/countries?page=6>.

<sup>9</sup> This number reflects 2011 trends. According to the World Bank, the percentage of the Venezuelan population living in urban areas is expected to continue to increase. See World Bank Development Indicators, “Urban Population (% of Total)”, 2013, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>.

<sup>10</sup> International Fund for Agricultural Development, “Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, June 2009, [www.ifad.org/operations/projects/regions/pl/factsheet/venezuela\\_e.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/regions/pl/factsheet/venezuela_e.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> Authors’ translation of Instituto Nacional de Estadística.

<sup>12</sup> See República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular del Despacho de la Presidencia, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “Demográficos: Censos de Población y Vivienda, Pobres y Pobres Externos por Entidad Federal y Municipios”, [www.ine.gov.ve/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&id=95&Itemid=26](http://www.ine.gov.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=95&Itemid=26). However, it must be noted that these figures might not reflect the reality of poverty and extreme poverty in Caracas, as the government is suspected of underreporting such statistics.

<sup>13</sup> Natalie Brender, “Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence”, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2012, [www.idrc.ca/EN/Programs/Social\\_and\\_Economic\\_Policy/Governance\\_Security\\_and\\_Justice/Documents/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-summary\\_e.pdf](http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Programs/Social_and_Economic_Policy/Governance_Security_and_Justice/Documents/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-summary_e.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> See T. Bolivar and Y. Pedrazzini, “La Venezuela urbana: una mirada desde los *barrios*”, *Bitacora Urbano Territorial*, 12(1), 2008, pp. 55–76.

<sup>15</sup> See Rosario C. Giusti de Pérez, *Analyzing Urban Poverty: GIS for the Developing World* (Redlands, CA.: ESRI Press, 2008, pp. 1–21). This represents a much greater percentage of the population than that living in the *favelas* of Sao Paulo (20 per cent) and the *villas* of Buenos Aires (40 per cent).

<sup>16</sup> See the daily newspaper *Últimas Noticias*, Caracas, 10 May 2007, p. 10.

- <sup>17</sup> J. Baldó and F. Villanueva, "Dimensión social y política del Programa Nacional de Viviendas para el año 2000", En: Pulido (dir.): SIC, Caracas, Centro Gumilla, Año LXIII(623), 2000, pp. 104–105.
- <sup>18</sup> Ministerio de Salud, *Anuario de mortalidad* (Caracas: Ministry of Health, 2005). The infant mortality rate in Venezuela in 2004 was 16.48 deaths for every thousand registered births. In the Capital District 14.40 infant deaths were registered for every thousand registered births in that year, which represents a rate 12 per cent lower than the national average. However, a historical analysis shows that the indicator for Caracas has a tendency to oscillate around the national rate. In 1995 it was 5 per cent above the average, but only four years later, in 1999, it was 30 per cent lower. From that year on it shows a slight increase until 2004, and then begins to decrease again.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* This category includes falls; drowning; exposure to fumes, fire and flames; poisoning; wounds caused by cuts and bites; and street accidents. These are excluded from the analysis in this section.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>22</sup> D. Satterthwait, "The Impact on health of urban environments," *Environ Urban*, 5(4), 1993, p. 91.
- <sup>23</sup> See, for example, such "urban philosophers" as Georg Simmel in Germany in the 1920s and Ernest Burgess, Robert E. Park and Louis Wirth of the so-called Chicago School during the first half of the twentieth century.
- <sup>24</sup> M. Goldbaum, "Lifestyle and Modernity", in Delia Sanchez, Roberto Bazzani and Silvio Gomez (eds), *Priorities in Collective Health Research in Latin America*, Vol. 1 (Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 1998, pp. 101–125); E. Jacoby, F. Bull and A. Neiman, "Cambios acelerados del estilos de vida obligan a fomentar la actividad fisica en las Americas", *Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica*, 14(4), 2003, pp. 223–225; B. Perez, "Efectos de la urbanización en la salud de la población", *Anuario Venezolano de Nutrición*, Vol. 6 (Caracas: SciELO Public Health Venezuela, 2003, pp. 97–104).
- <sup>25</sup> R. Briceño-León, "Salud no rentista y petrolera para el desarrollo humano", in B. Kliksberg, *El desarrollo humano en Venezuela* (Caracas: PNUD and Monte Avila Editores Latinoamericana, 1994); Ministerio de Salud, note 18 above; M. Balbo, "Ciudad y Alimentación: Alimentarse en la ciudad", in M. Balbo and R. Jordan, *La ciudad inclusive* (Quito: Cuadernos del CEPAL No. 88, 2003).
- <sup>26</sup> See for example M. Sanchez and Y. Pedrazzini, *Malandros, bandas y niños de la calle: la cultura de urgencia en la metrópoli latinoamericana* (Caracas and Valencia: Vadell Hermanos Editores, 1991).
- <sup>27</sup> This is slightly less than the national deficit which, according to Ministerio de Salud, reaches 22.4 beds below the standard: Programa Venezolano de Educación Acción en Derechos humanos (PROVEA), 2005.
- <sup>28</sup> PROVEA, *ibid.*, states that public investment in health as a percentage of social expenses keeps a decreasing tendency; nevertheless the investment carried out in Misión Barrio Adentro has not been taken into account due to a lack of information, which will lower the differences in the historic registry of public assignments in the health sector.
- <sup>29</sup> The Misión Barrio Adentro ("Mission Inside the Neighborhood") is a national social welfare program established during the presidency of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. The main objective of the Misión Barrio Adentro is to provide comprehensive and publicly funded health care, dental care and sports training to poor and marginalized communities in Venezuela.
- <sup>30</sup> Fundación Escuela de Gerencia Social/Database of School of Social Management Foundation, *Problemas sociales: Condiciones precarias del Hábitat y de la Vivienda* (Caracas: FEGS, 2007).
- <sup>31</sup> *Últimas Noticias*, Caracas, 21 October 2007.
- <sup>32</sup> J. Borja and Z. Muxí, *Espai públic: Ciutat y ciutadania* (Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona, 2000).
- <sup>33</sup> According to the Institute of Urban Planning, Central University of Venezuela, 60 per cent of the city population use public transport as the principal means of commuting.

<sup>34</sup> See all annual reports of the National Institute of Traffic and Transportation in the 2000s. See also R. Montezuma, "Ciudad y transporte: la movilidad urbana", in M. Balbo and R. Jordan, *La ciudad inclusiva* (Quito: Cuadernos del CEPAL no. 88, 2003).

<sup>35</sup> Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, 14 November 2005.

<sup>36</sup> OPS, "La epidemiología en el análisis e intervención sobre las lesiones producidas por lo incidentes de tránsito", *El Universal*, 8 January 2007, [www.ops-oms.org.ve/site/venezuela/ven-sit-salud.htm](http://www.ops-oms.org.ve/site/venezuela/ven-sit-salud.htm).

<sup>37</sup> Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS), "Por qué hay tantos jóvenes implicados en accidentes de tránsito?" Preguntas y respuestas en línea (Septiembre 2012), <http://www.who.int/features/qa/59/es/>; and Organización Panamericana de la Salud (2007), "Informe sobre el estado de la seguridad vial en la región de las Américas", [www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/road.../gsrrs\\_paho.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road.../gsrrs_paho.pdf).

<sup>38</sup> Charlie Devereux and Robert Samet, "Crime runs amok in Caracas' slums", *Chronicle Foreign Service*, November 2008, <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Crime-runs-amok-in-Caracas-slums-3261556.php>.

<sup>39</sup> L.G. Gabaldon and A. Antillo (eds), *La policía venezolana: Desarrollo institucional y perspectivas de reforma al inicio del Tercer Milenio*, Vol. 1 (Caracas: Comisión Nacional para la Reforma Policial, 2006, pp. 64 – 158).

<sup>40</sup> Comisión Nacional para la Reforma Policial (Venezuela, 2006). The National Commission on Police Reform was a 2006 Venezuelan national commission which, in consultation with police and local communities, examined law enforcement in Venezuela and proposed reforms.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> C. Rakodi, "Urban Politics: Exclusion or Empowerment", in N. Devas et al, *Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World* (London: Earthscan, 2004), p. 166.



## CHAPTER 8

### Human insecurity and security in Ethiopia

Moges Shiferaw

#### INTRODUCTION

Within the framework of the Operationalizing Human Security project, this chapter focuses on developing sustained and participatory multi-actor cooperation to identify, monitor and alleviate threats to human security in Ethiopia.

The case study was designed to follow a particular research path. The first step was to establish a small team to conduct field research on the causes and effects of local vulnerability, as well as existing mitigation measures available at state and non-state levels. This involved consulting representatives of local stakeholder groups through interviews and participatory workshops. In the workshops, project researchers and invited stakeholder groups analysed key causes of insecurity in the Ethiopian context. In a second step, they analysed and defined key threats, both existential and non-existential, based on mutually agreed vulnerability criteria. They also designed indicators to monitor and measure “human insecurity clusters” – which represented a set of core threats that were deemed essential to monitor and address in order to preserve basic human security. As a third step, measures to mitigate those threats were identified, along with processes that assess the implementation of those measures.

The chapter summarizes the main results from the Ethiopian case study, with an emphasis on multistakeholder workshop discussions. It is a summary of a much longer internal research paper, and does not follow the academic rigour (including full citations and references) of the original paper. The chapter reports on the results of threat assessments, the selection of core human security threats, suggested mitigation measures and implementation strategies.

#### BRAINSTORMING, IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING THREATS IN THE ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT

This section summarizes the activities, processes, strategies and results of the first phase of the assessment. The Ethiopia case study was launched in 2006, with the creation of a core research team and a group of potential multistakeholder representatives, which included local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), research and academic institutions, and government agencies. In its first phase, a joint effort was made to develop a human insecurity “cluster”.

The development of the Ethiopian human insecurity cluster (EHIC) involved the screening, identification and mapping of threats, as well as analyses of responses taken so far in alleviating them. Although all stakeholder groups applied a concept analysis method – and thus provided answers for the same sets of open-ended questions – to identify human security threats, considerable variation emerged across the groups in terms of what would eventually constitute the five core threats to human security in Ethiopia. Some were primarily concerned with specific sources of threats or security dimensions, or with determining the general conditions that must be met for specific human security issues. Others focused on establishing human security for only certain segments of the population. In an effort to simplify the process

and find unity among the groups, the research team catalogued their findings in five individual groups of threats (economic, personal, environmental, social and health), each containing one key human security threat.

Subsequently the Ethiopian research team consolidated the preliminary findings and prepared them for presentation and debate in a second workshop with the multistakeholder groups (MSGs). Seven general threats that required further negotiation among the groups were identified: unemployment; food; politics; HIV/AIDS; environmental change; inter-ethnic/inter-clan conflict; and discrimination and domination. Using this preliminary consolidated result, the second multistakeholder workshop was organized, with two objectives: first, to present and discuss the findings generated so far; and second, to establish a common set of clearly defined core human security threats.

During the course of the workshop, five preliminary core threats were identified: health epidemics (HIV, malaria and tuberculosis – TB); drought and flood; lack of basic income; intra/inter-clan conflict; and culturally embedded gender discrimination. These are the key threats included in the EHIC. These five core human security threats were chosen from a total of 122 identified threats established after a lengthy interactive process of threat and response analyses as well as negotiations between the research team and the MSG participants. In the following section, these threats are screened based on data obtained from secondary sources, community surveys and multistakeholder interviews, which are all described and referenced in the larger internal study summarized by this chapter.

### **ANALYSING CORE THREATS AND RESPONSES: OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES, RESULTS**

Once key threats were identified, the focus shifted towards identifying, analysing and recommending responses to the five core threats that make up the EHIC. The MSGs addressed a number of questions. Are the existing response strategies feasible and effective? Are existing actors capable of addressing the threats? Are new actors and strategies required for effective mitigation of human security threats? To answer these questions, it was necessary to appraise existing actors, responses and approaches, and evaluate the comparative advantages of different options.

The stakeholder groups represented local and international NGOs, academic and research institutions, and government organizations, with each of those actors possessing different individual and organizational capacities, responsibilities, roles, priorities, political authority and influence in the country. However, all found common ground in their interest in exploring and developing the concept of human security in relation to the needs of and threats to the Ethiopian people. The main challenge was to find consensus among the different groups, which was eventually achieved through a highly participatory, inclusive and cooperative process.

During the participatory multistakeholder workshop, each stakeholder group was expected to undertake an isolated insecurity cluster analysis. This was achieved by providing a detailed analysis of each threat; an evaluation of the feasibility of existing responses and newly suggested responses; development of indicators for threats and responses; an analysis of existing actors; and an evaluation of the feasibility of suggested approaches. Participants were given worksheets that helped them in recording their findings. The results were then further analysed by the local research team.

The following pages describe in some detail the multistakeholder consultation discussions on core threats and suggested responses.



## ANALYSING CORE THREAT 1: “LACK OF INCOME FOR SURVIVAL”

Lack of income necessary for survival has been a consistent threat for most Ethiopians and was identified as the most salient threat by both the MSGs and the research team. Building on the outcome of the multistakeholder workshop, the research team subsequently reviewed secondary sources to test and substantiate the consultation results. The lack of necessary income to cover the cost linked to the minimum nutritional intake of 2,200 calories per day as well as non-food items that are essential for basic human survival is the main human security threat for a majority of Ethiopians living in both rural and urban areas.<sup>1</sup>

### *Research team’s introduction to threats, responses and actors*

According to national statistical data, about 4–6 million people countrywide either have no adequate income or no means to cover basic human survival needs.<sup>2</sup> These people, mostly pastoralists, farmers and poor urban dwellers, suffer from malnutrition, a condition of nutrient deficiency that causes general weakness and fatigue, and stymies mental and physical development in children.<sup>3</sup> Malnutrition makes them susceptible to potentially fatal diseases such as dysentery, whooping cough and TB.<sup>4</sup> Broadly, the majority of the country’s undernourished people live in rural highlands and lowlands, home to more than 83 per cent of the population.<sup>5</sup>

In the context of Ethiopia, consumption rather than income was used as a preferred welfare indicator, as it is believed that consumption captures welfare levels better than current income levels. The research team found the consumption dimension of poverty useful to analyse the threat because it relates directly to the survival dimension of income levels. Consumption reflects households’ access to credit and savings at times when their income is very low – hence it reflects the actual standard of living in Ethiopia. Available statistical data indicate that the poor in Ethiopia spend 60–70 per cent of their income on food.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Ethiopia does not have an adequate supply of food (quantity of food), including stores from previous years and international food aid. Obtaining enough food is an important human security concern for significant portions of the population. Lack of income to afford basic needs such as access to food and other life-supporting goods is one of the key threats to survival in both rural and urban areas of Ethiopia.

The per capita real household consumption expenditure can be used to measure the level of adequate income in Ethiopia. The level of real total per capita household consumption expenditure stood at 1,256 Birr in 2007–2008, with food accounting for 577 Birr and non-food items for 678 Birr.<sup>7</sup> The level of real total household consumption expenditure per adult, which is used to calculate poverty, was 1,542 Birr.<sup>8</sup> The fact that more than 45 per cent of Ethiopians were living below the poverty line implies that nearly half the population had an income below the minimum required to sustain adequate livelihoods and survival.<sup>9</sup>

To address poverty levels, government agencies and NGOs have implemented a number of programmes and strategies over the past decade. Under its accelerated poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP), the government developed and implemented different policies and programmes to reduce unemployment and improve the income of the poor.<sup>10</sup> These included a youth and unemployment programme, micro- and small-scale enterprise development programmes and pastoral development programmes, among others. NGOs and international donors have supported government plans for the past ten years. No significant alternative activities have been introduced, as NGO and international donor engagements are designed to contribute to the official poverty reduction programmes and are coordinated and planned centrally. Despite the growing intervention and much engagement by multiple actors in this effort, poverty reduction measures have not resulted in significant improvements for most of the population.

### Results of multistakeholder consultations

The four groups' responses are presented in Table 8.1. The groups identified a core threat as one that is serious and life threatening, with a wide range of symptoms and multiple root causes. For all four groups, negative long-term scenarios outweigh chances for positive scenarios.

| Questions                | Multistakeholder groups  |  |   |   |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|---|
|                          | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research   | International NGOs  |
| 1. Who is threatened?    | Urban unemployed; rural underemployed; housewives; families of unemployed  | All sections of society, especially youth (15–29), who form 20 per cent of population; females; informal sector, reflecting 57 per cent of population  | Youth; women; physically and/or mentally challenged persons   | Everybody   |
| 2. By whom?              | Government policies and practices do not support each other; lack of entrepreneurial spirit; unreliable policies; less job absorption capacity | Structural problems: lack of good governance, including poor policies, favouritism, nepotism, corruption, governmental and private sector restructuring (privatization, business process re-engineering, decentralization); lack of adequate skills and education; attitudes; bounded rationality, lack of out-of-box thinking | Inappropriate education and rural development policies; harmful traditional practices for women; war and conflict; disease; car accidents | Government policies; international factors  |
| 3. Where and when?       | Across entire country (urban and rural); urban: throughout year; rural: especially during cultivation and harvesting times                     | Everywhere, but becoming especially chronic in urban areas   | In rural and urban areas; particularly in past  | Among pastoralists; where there is low agricultural potential; in remote areas where government agencies or NGOs are not accessible |
| 4. How serious a threat? | Serious  | Serious  | Question of survival  | Most serious after election of June 2005  |
| 5. Life threatening?     | Yes (particularly in rural context)  | Lethal   | Yes   | Yes, gradually  |
| 8. How many victims?     | > 53 per cent (population living below poverty line)   | 53.5 per cent of population living below poverty line; 8 per cent of population that is officially unemployed; 12 per cent of educated and 9 per cent of urban population  | Several millions  | > 55 per cent   |
| 9. Potential/actual?     | Actual, always visible   | Both   | Both  | Actual  |

| Questions               | Multistakeholder groups  |   |  |   |
|-------------------------|--|---|--|---|
|                         | Local NGOs   | Government  | Academic and research  | International NGOs  |
| 10. Symptoms?           | Unemployed college graduates; migration of women to Arab countries under risky conditions; rural beggars in cities; seasonal migration to urban places | Increase in number of “chat” selling establishments; child malnutrition and mortality; maternal mortality; rural to urban and cross-border migration; increase in number of participants in self-help industries                        | Volume of street begging; rural to urban migration; corruption; theft; disease; prostitution   | Street begging; migration to urban areas and abroad; mental illness (15 per cent of population according to hospital estimates); sudden explosion of riots; hatred towards each other   |
| 11. Root causes?        | Drought; outbreak of diseases; violent conflicts   | Lack of good governance; lack of adequate skills and education  | Mismatch between population and resource scarcity; poor or inappropriate implementation of policies; globalization (e.g. emphasis on raw materials export) | Lack of redistributive policies; top-down and elite-oriented policies; structural factors; drought; lack of or decreasing donor funds; tax burden; lacking culture of savings; lack of coping mechanisms; price of imports due to external factors (oil/fuel price); imposed (top-down) support for farms |
| 12. Triggering factors? | Underdevelopment (lack of capital, skills); lack of appropriate policies such as land tenure system; skills development trends                         | High population growth and rapid workforce growth; fewer farming opportunities; relatively slow creation of new jobs; conflict and regional instability; macroeconomic instability; privatization restructuring; stabilization measures | Absence of public participation in policy formulation and implementation   | Civil unrest under different regimes for past 50 years due to poor governance, lack of technology, inappropriate policies; irregularities in lawmaking under different regimes (four Ethiopian constitutions under different regimes); corruption (politically empowered people are privileged)           |
| 13. Positive scenario?  | N/A  | Rate will sustain or drop by 10 per cent  | Greater availability of resources; human resource potential; better image at international level   | Settlement schemes; subsidy schemes   |
| 14. Negative scenario?  | Increased joblessness; uncontrolled population growth; crime; begging; conflicts; prostitution; addictive habits                                       | Deterioration, leading to public unrest   | Lack of good governance  | Increased malnutrition; migration; spreading to those previously better off   |

**Table 8.1:** Multistakeholder groups’ detailed threat analysis

The MSGs' results indicate that for decades there have been attempts to address the most serious threats to the Ethiopian population. However, it was very difficult to determine specific trends across the various responses, which covered employment, self-employment, changing means to income generation, access to resources, and efficiency and effectiveness of existing programmes, policies, strategies and services.

The stakeholder groups also analysed responses to six specific questions posed by the research team. The four groups' results are summarized in Table 2. The first four questions identify responses, and actors and beneficiaries of response measures. The last two questions are focused on the evaluation of responses. The time frame can help us examine the trends of responses, actors and beneficiary groups. While in the past the government was the primary actor responsible for human security provision, nowadays the government, NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) as well as the private sector are involved.

| Questions  | Multistakeholder groups  |  |                       |  |
|--|--|--|-----------------------|--|
|  | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs   |
| 1. What has been done?<br>Which mitigation measures? |  |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | Employment by assignment; cooperatives; state farms (for labour); better job security  | Employment by assignment; cooperatives; state farms (for labour); better job security  | N/A                   | Redistribution of land; establishment of cooperatives; settlement  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | Improved education and training policies; more educational institutions and training centres; encouragement of private investment and social safety-net programmes; employment programmes  | Improved education and training policies; more educational institutions and training centres; encouragement of private investment and social safety-net programmes; employment programmes  | N/A                   | Poverty reduction programmes; food aid programmes; micro-credit programmes   |
| <b>Future</b>  | Improvements to system through policy reviews; review of strategies; loosening up of bureaucratic chains; integrated and coordinated efforts; development of training approaches that focus on practical skills and quality; actions against corruption; good governance | Improvements to system through policy reviews; review of strategies; loosening up of bureaucratic chains; integrated and coordinated efforts; development of training approaches that focus on practical skills and quality; actions against corruption; good governance | N/A                   | Rights-based approach must be basic; redistributive policies must be in place; job creation; income redistribution; promotion of savings culture (financial management) and education; awareness raising regarding effects of different policies on vulnerable |
| 2. By whom?  |  |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | Government   | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government   |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | Government; private sector investors   | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government (national and regional); international donors; NGOs (local, international, private)   |

| Questions         | Multistakeholder groups  |  |                       |   |
|-------------------|--|--|-----------------------|---|
|                   | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs  |
| <b>Future</b>     |  | Communities; government; donors; research institutions   | N/A                   | Private actors: government; international community                           |
| 3. To whom?       |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Educated people; farmers; unemployed; urban dwellers   | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women  | N/A                   | Affected groups/ parts of society   |
| <b>Present</b>    | Youth; chronically food-insecure population groups   | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women  | N/A                   | Affected groups/ parts of society   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Youth; chronically food-insecure and poor population groups  | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women; vulnerable groups such as physically challenged | N/A                   | Disabled; youth; women; affected urban and rural population; civil servants   |
| 4. Feasibility?   |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Feasible   | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Feasible  |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not feasible in terms of education policy; higher education feasible both in private and public institutions   | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Yes, feasible   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Feasible   | Feasible   | N/A                   | Yes, feasible   |
| 5. Effectiveness? |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Not effective; cost implications for state; poor management  | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of poor implementation and top-down management          |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not effective due to low capacity (material and human) of educational institutions; cost-sharing policy will not create conducive employment conditions; low capital and bureaucratic capacity; lack of coordination and integration | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of political affiliations and corruption                |
| <b>Future</b>     | Effective  | Effective, provided that participation, integrated approach and capacity are present                             | N/A                   | Yes, if policies, programmes and mitigation measures are properly implemented |

**Table 8.2:** Multistakeholder groups' response analysis

Based on Table 8.2, it appears that both feasibility and effectiveness of responses have been – or are expected to be – increasing over time.

Three groups furthermore developed indicators that could be used to measure threats and responses (Table 8.3).

| Indicators                          | Multistakeholder groups  |            |  |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------|--|--|
|                                     | Local NGOs   | Government | Academic and research  | International NGOs   |
| 1. Indicators for threat            | Changes in numbers of unemployed college graduates, female migrants to Arab and similar countries, people entering early retirement, people migrating to cities/bigger towns; situation of women/girls as reported by Commission on Status of Women; crime rates |            | Changes in number of unemployed and underemployed, of employers and of job seekers qualified in a different skills | Number of persons with below-average income; student/teacher ratios in educational institutions (< 40 students per instructor); availability of pure water (< 20 litres per day)   |
| 2. Indicators for responses         | Number of people employed; amount of capital invested; number/quality of policies revised and amended; changes in labour productivity; number of trained professionals   | N/A        | N/A  | Traffic incidents per head of population, consumption data per household regularly   |
| 3. Suggestion to measure indicators | Information on amount of capital invested; number of crime incidents   | N/A        | N/A  | Rate of access to quality education services (permanent and affordable, credit service); access to quality health services; number of households with above-average incomes; safety and security situations at community level |

**Table 8.3:** Multistakeholder groups' analysis of indicators to measure threats and responses

Similarly, only the local NGO group managed to carry out an actor's analysis. A longer workshop or subsequent research by the team would have been necessary to fill these information gaps.

## ANALYSING CORE THREAT 2: “INTRA-/INTER-CLAN/TRIBAL CONFLICT”

In the social dimension, intra-/inter-clan conflict was identified as one of the most significant human security concerns for the Ethiopia case study group. While armed conflict in general is feared by the entire population, clan-related conflict is found in specific geographic areas. Such conflicts are different in terms of their sources, causes, consequences and frequency of occurrence. This section focuses on clan or tribal conflicts, particularly in the pastoral communities of Ethiopia.

### *Research team’s introduction to threats, responses and actors*

Significant portions of the population living in the lowland and border areas of Ethiopia maintain pastoral ways of life that require large areas with adequate water and pasture supply. They depend on the yields of these shared natural resources for their economic activity and to meet their basic needs. Because of significant water and land scarcity in pastoral areas, largely caused by herds and human population growth, agricultural intensification, climate change and degradation of the environment, competition for pasture and water is increasing.<sup>11</sup> Lack of adequate space and natural resources has threatened the economic base of the pastoral community and hence the survival of the pastoral way of life.

Pastoral societies living in the same region organize and structure their social and economic activities as well as their interactions with others and the environment based on bonds of kinship (clan and tribe). Historically, most pastoral areas have been administered by clan or tribal leaders, and each clan maintained a clearly demarcated territory.<sup>12</sup> However, scarcity of and the need to control vital natural resources has led to inter- and intra-clan conflict, which is beyond the control of clan administration. State institutions are weak in pastoral areas and traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms have failed to manage the growing conflicts and violent clashes that have become common occurrences. In 2006, for instance, clan-induced conflict is said to have displaced more than 200,000 people.<sup>13</sup> Until recently, pastoralism (animal herding) and challenges faced by pastoral societies have received little attention.

Some 10 million semi-nomadic people depend primarily on grazing herds of cattle, camels and goats, and are concentrated mostly in the dry lowland areas of Afar and Somali.<sup>14</sup> Human development indicators and poverty among this group have been uniformly worse than anywhere else in the country, while the affected populations have proven difficult to reach with traditional services. In recent years the government has introduced a pastoral area development programme and pastoral development department under the Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>15</sup> These intervention programmes place emphasis on improving the quality of life through increasing social services and sedenterization (discouraging migration). Despite these efforts to improve the quality of life of pastoralists, the interventions have not directly addressed issues of conflict. Field reports indicate that inter- and intra-clan conflicts are increasingly widespread in most pastoral areas despite the increase in basic service delivery and development of the area.<sup>16</sup>

The research team believes that besides providing basic services and improving the material welfare of the pastoral community, conflict resolution may need institutional intervention. Pastoralism as a mode of production requires movement across and within boundaries in search of water and pasture. This movement, when restricted, often leads to disputes between pastoralists and other neighbouring groups. The major causes of conflict are associated with range and limitation of resources such as water and land. Hence necessary measures must be put in place to encourage pastoralists to settle voluntarily, as well as for provision of basic social services to those who prefer to travel and resettle in different areas. At the same time, traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms must be strengthened to decrease the degree of conflict in

pastoral areas. Accordingly, the need to capitalize on indigenous knowledge and institutions should be advocated. Formal structures have displayed limited understanding of clan conflicts and might therefore create further disputes within and across clans.

### *Results of multistakeholder consultations*

The multistakeholder consultation results are summarized in Tables 8.4 and 8.5.

| Questions                | Multistakeholder groups   |                          |   |  |
|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--|
|                          | Local NGOs  | Government               | Academic and research   | International NGOs   |
| 1. Who is threatened?    | Border communities; pastoral and semi-pastoral communities; some minorities, such as Mursi versus Surma   | N/A                      | Minority within majority ethnic group; dominant versus dominated clan                     | Entire population (fear)   |
| 2. By whom?              | By each other; some minorities with back-up from other powerful bodies (e.g. Geri versus Borana)  | Minorities by majorities | N/A   | By conflicting groups; opportunists within those groups  |
| 3. Where and when?       | Border areas; pastoral areas; river banks in east, southwest, northwest/Baro-Omo, especially during drought   | N/A                      | In most regional states; throughout political history of Ethiopia                         | Most pastoralists and those in capital city (creates tension)  |
| 4. How serious a threat? | Acute   | N/A                      | Acute   | Acute  |
| 5. Life threatening?     | Yes   | N/A                      | Yes   | Yes  |
| 8. How many victims?     | About 12 per cent of population   | N/A                      | Large numbers   | Millions   |
| 9. Potential/ actual?    | Both potential and actual   | N/A                      | Both  | Both   |
| 10. Symptoms?            | Frequent violence; frequent conflict situation; antagonistic attitudes  | N/A                      | Denial of common property rights; proliferation of small arms; displacement               | Lack of tolerance; poverty (deteriorating living conditions); lack of education; migration   |
| 11. Root causes?         | Drought; political interests; free movement of armaments  | N/A                      | Problem of implementing institutional rights; absence of participatory governance systems | Lack of good governance; obsessive hunger for power; misguided policies (top-down, decentralization); donor-driven policies; natural factors such as drought; structural factors such as physical/physiographical features; agrarian way of life |
| 12. Triggering factors?  | Environmental degradation (grazing land and water); weakened traditional conflict resolution; unbalanced interference; inappropriate implementation of decentralization | N/A                      | Prejudices; stereotypes; territorial demarcation  | Political/new decentralization policy; economic and social situation; population growth; impractical cessation rights; lack of modern education  |



| Questions              | Multistakeholder groups |            |  |                    |
|------------------------|-------------------------|------------|--|--------------------|
|                        | Local NGOs              | Government | Academic and research  | International NGOs |
| 13. Positive scenario? | Awareness efforts       | N/A        | Traditional conflict-resolution method; history of coexistence | N/A                |
| 14. Negative scenario? | Political interests     | N/A        | Weak institutions; expansion of neopatrimonialism              | N/A                |

**Table 8.4:** Multistakeholder groups' detailed threat analysis

| Questions   | Multistakeholder groups   |  |                       |   |
|---|---|--|-----------------------|---|
|   | Local NGOs  | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs  |
| 1. What has been done? Which mitigation measures? |   |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>                                       | Employment by assignment; cooperatives; state farms (for labour); better job security   | Food security; agriculture led development strategy; micro-finance institutions; rural and urban development   | N/A                   | Redistribution of land; cooperative establishment; settlement   |
| <b>Present</b>                                    | Improved education and training policies in place; more educational institutions, training centres; private investment is encouraged; safety-net programmes   | Agriculture led development strategy; micro-finance institutions; youth policy; civil servant reform; rural and urban development policy; PRSP/Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty | N/A                   | Poverty reduction programmes; food security and food reserves; micro-credit schemes for small-scale businesses  |
| <b>Future</b>                                     | Improvement of system through policy reviews; review of strategies; reform of bureaucratic processes; integrated and coordinated efforts; training approach should be changed to practical skills and quality; actions against corruption and in support of good governance | Grassroots participation; research and development plus extension; sustainability and capacity; partnership  | N/A                   | Rights-based approach must be basic; redistributive policies must be in place; job creation; income redistribution; creation of culture of savings (financial management); education; awareness raising regarding effects of different policies on vulnerable |
| 2. By whom?                                       |   |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>                                       | Government  | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government  |
| <b>Present</b>                                    | Government; private sector investors  | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government (national and regional); international donors; NGOs (local, international, private)  |
| <b>Future</b>                                     | Government; professional and ethical trainers; lobbying and commitment by citizens  | Communities; government; donors; research institutions   | N/A                   | Private; government; international community  |

| Questions         | Multistakeholder groups   |  |                       |   |
|-------------------|---|--|-----------------------|---|
|                   | Local NGOs  | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs  |
| 3. To whom?       |   |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Educated people; farmers; unemployed; urban dwellers  | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women  | N/A                   | Affected population   |
| <b>Present</b>    | Youth; chronically food-insecure areas  | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women  | N/A                   | Affected population   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Youth and chronically food-insecure poor areas  | Rural and urban population; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women; vulnerable groups such as physically challenged | N/A                   | Disabled; youth; women; affected urban and rural population; civil servants   |
| 4. Feasibility?   |   |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Feasible  | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Yes, feasible   |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not feasible for secondary education; feasible for higher education at both private and public institutions   | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Yes, feasible   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Feasible  | Feasible   | N/A                   | Yes, feasible   |
| 5. Effectiveness? |   |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | Not effective; cost implications for state; bad management  | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of poor implementation; top-down management             |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not effective, due to low capacity of education institutions (material and human power); cost-sharing policy will not create conducive employment conditions; low capital and bureaucratic capacity; lack of coordination and integration | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of political affiliation; corruption                    |
| <b>Future</b>     | Effective   | Effective, provided that participation, integrated approach and capacity are present                             | N/A                   | Yes, if policies, programmes and mitigation measures are properly implemented |

**Table 8.5:** Multistakeholder groups' response analysis

### ANALYSING CORE THREAT 3: “CULTURALLY EMBEDDED GENDER DISCRIMINATION”

One core human security threat facing Ethiopian society is culturally embedded gender discrimination. Historically, Ethiopia is a male-dominated society and women face political, economic and social discrimination on the basis of their sex and corresponding gendered identities. In the past, the denial of equal rights to women received little attention. As most Ethiopian women have lacked the educational and economic resources that would enable them to challenge the prevailing social order, for decades they have generally accepted their inferior status as their only option. Until recently, females at all ages were treated unequally and with less privileges and rights than males within the family and community and under the law.<sup>17</sup>

#### *Research team's introduction to threats, responses and actors*

To address this problem, the government drafted a new constitution and new family laws that guaranteed equality between women and men. It has also undertaken comprehensive economic, legal and political actions at the national level to eliminate existing gender inequality. This has involved increasing women's participation in the workforce as well as in the country's social and political processes. Measures taken include a major push to increase girls' and women's education, improved access to water supply and sanitation, increased services related to mothers' and women's health, and adoption of agricultural programmes and both technical and vocational training to meet women's needs.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the government has undertaken efforts to safeguard women's rights regarding access to land or credit.

Further, civil society organizations that promote gender equality, such as the Ethiopian Women Lawyer Association and the Ethiopian Journalist Association, have increased in number and action.<sup>19</sup> For its part, the government has established the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

The government has moved decisively to advance the agenda of gender-related dimensions of poverty through the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program.<sup>20</sup> A significant number of initiatives are under way, including the National Action Plan on Gender, which forms the core of the gender strategy under the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, and includes analytical initiatives such as mainstreaming gender in the budgeting process and strengthening gender-disaggregated data reporting to inform policy better.<sup>21</sup>

Despite these advances, gender discrimination against women and girls remains a significant human security threat. Culturally embedded activities, such as female genital mutilation, early marriage and *telefax* (marriage by abduction) continue to threaten the livelihoods and at times the lives of women in rural areas.<sup>22</sup> It must be noted that in recent years Ethiopian women have gained significant legal, economic and political rights compared to the past. However, throughout much of rural Ethiopia, deep-seated cultural beliefs limit the social, economic and political opportunities for women and negatively affect their livelihoods and lives.<sup>23</sup>

Many rural communities maintain that women's natural and sole roles are as mothers and wives, thus they are considered to be better suited for childbearing and homemaking than involvement in public life. There is widespread belief that women are intellectually inferior to men and, as a result, women's education should be limited to domestic skills. This is most evident in regions such as Somali, Afar, Benishangul and Gambelle. Indeed, Ethiopian society is generally male-dominated and patriarchal.

### Results of multistakeholder consultations

| Questions                | Multistakeholder groups  |  |   |  |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|--|
|                          | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research   | International NGOs   |
| 1. Who is threatened?    | Rural and urban unemployed; housewives; families of unemployed   | All sections of society, especially youth (15–29), reflecting about 20 per cent of population; females; informal sector (about 57 per cent of population)  | Youth; women; physically and mentally challenged  | Broad population   |
| 2. By whom?              | Government practices and policies do not support each other; lack of entrepreneurial spirit; unreliable policies; less job absorption capacity       | Structurally: lack of good governance (lack of systematic policies, favouritism, nepotism, corruption); governmental and private sector restructuring (privatization, business process re-engineering, decentralization); lack of adequate skill and education; bounded rationality; lack of out-of-box thinking | Inappropriate education and rural development policies; harmful traditional practices for women; war and conflict; disease; car accidents | Government policies; international factors   |
| 3. Where and when?       | Throughout country; urban and rural areas; in urban areas throughout year; in rural areas during cultivation and harvesting time                     | Everywhere; becoming chronic, particularly in urban areas  | In both rural and urban areas; particularly in past   | Pastoralists, agricultural areas; remote areas where government or NGO services are not accessible   |
| 4. How serious a threat? | Serious  | Serious  | Question of survival  | Most serious after election of June 2005   |
| 5. Life threatening?     | Yes (particularly in rural areas)  | Lethal   | Yes   | Yes, gradually   |
| 8. How many victims?     | > 53 per cent (those living below poverty line)  | 53.5 per cent (population living below poverty line)   | Millions  | > 55 per cent  |
| 9. Potential/ actual?    | Actual, always visible   | Potential and actual   | Potential and actual  | Actual   |
| 10. Symptoms?            | Unemployed college graduates; female migration to Arab countries under risky conditions; rural beggars in cities; seasonal migration to urban places | Increase in number of “chat” selling houses; child malnutrition and mortality; maternal mortality; rural-urban and cross-border migration; increase in number of participants in self-help industries  | Begging and streetism; rural-urban migration; corruption; theft; disease; prostitution  | Street begging; migration to urban areas and abroad; mental illness (15 per cent of population according to physician from Amanuel Hospital); sudden explosion of riots, hatred towards each other |

| Questions               | Multistakeholder groups   |   |  |   |
|-------------------------|---|---|--|---|
|                         | Local NGOs  | Government  | Academic and research  | International NGOs  |
| 11. Root causes?        | Drought; outbreak of diseases; conflicts  | Lack of good governance; lack of adequate skills and education  | Mismatch between population and resource scarcity; poor or inappropriate implementation of policies; globalization (e.g. emphasis on raw material exports) | Lack of redistributive policies; top-down and elite-oriented policies; structural factors; drought; drop in donor funding; tax burden; absence of savings culture and coping mechanisms; imposed (top-down) support for farms   |
| 12. Triggering factors? | Underdevelopment (lack of capital, skills); lack of appropriate policies such as land tenure system; skill development trends | High population growth with rapid growth of workforce; fewer farming opportunities; relatively slow creation of new jobs; conflict and regional instability; macroeconomic instability; privatization restructuring; stabilization measures | Absence of academic community's participation in policy formulation and implementation   | Civil unrest under different regimes for past 50 years; poor governance; lack of technology; inappropriate policies and irregularities in lawmaking under different regimes; four Ethiopian constitutions under different regimes; corruption; privileging of politically empowered individuals |
| 13. Positive scenario?  | N/A   | Will sustain or reduce by 10 per cent   | Availability of resource, human resource potential, good image at international level  | Settlement scheme, subsidy scheme, issue is hot topic of discussion, food for work in urban areas   |
| 14. Negative scenario?  | Increased joblessness; uncontrolled population growth; crime; begging; conflicts; prostitution; bad and addictive habits      | Deterioration, leading to public unrest   | Lack of good governance  | Increased malnutrition and migration; increasingly those previously better off are being affected   |

**Table 8.6:** Multistakeholder groups' detailed threat analysis

| Questions  | Multistakeholder groups  |  |                       |   |
|--|--|--|-----------------------|---|
|  | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs  |
| 1. What has been done?<br>Which mitigation measures? |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>  | Employment by assignment; cooperatives; state farms; better job security   | Employment by assignment; cooperatives; state farms; better job security   | N/A                   | Redistribution of land; establishment of cooperatives; settlement   |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | Improved education and training policies; more educational institutions, training centres; encouragement of private investment; safety-net programmes; increased employment  | Improved education and training policies; more educational institutions, training centres; encouragement of private investment; safety-net programmes; increased employment  | N/A                   | Poverty reduction programmes; establishment of food reserves; micro-credits for small businesses  |
| <b>Future</b>  | Improving system through policy strategy reviews; loosening of bureaucratic chains; integrated and coordinated efforts; training approaches that focus on practical skills and quality; actions against corruption; promotion of good governance | Improving system through policy strategy reviews; loosening of bureaucratic chains; integrated and coordinated efforts; training approaches that focus on practical skills and quality; actions against corruption; promotion of good governance | N/A                   | Rights-based approach must be basic; redistributive policies must be in place; job creation; income redistribution; promotion of savings culture (financial management); education; awareness raising regarding effects of different policies on vulnerable |
| 2. By whom?  |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>  | Government   | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | Government; private sector investors   | Government; donors; NGOs   | N/A                   | Government (national and regional); international donors; NGOs (local, international, private)  |
| <b>Future</b>  | N/A  | Communities; government; donors; research institutions   | N/A                   | Private actors; government; international community   |
| 3. To whom?  |  |  |                       |   |
| <b>Past</b>  | Educated people; farmers; unemployed people; urban dwellers  | Rural and urban populations; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women   | N/A                   | Affected population   |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | Youth; chronically food-insecure areas   | Rural and urban populations; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women   | N/A                   | Affected population   |
| <b>Future</b>  | Youth; chronically food-insecure areas   | Rural and urban populations; pastoralists; farmers; youth; women; vulnerable groups such as physically challenged  | N/A                   | Disabled; youth; women; affected urban and rural populations; civil servants  |

| Questions         | Multistakeholder groups  |  |                       |  |
|-------------------|--|--|-----------------------|--|
|                   | Local NGOs   | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs   |
| 4. Feasibility?   |  |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>       | Feasible   | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Feasible   |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not feasible for secondary education policy; feasible for higher education by private and public institutions  | Partly feasible  | N/A                   | Feasible   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Feasible   | Feasible   | N/A                   | Feasible   |
| 5. Effectiveness? |  |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>       | Not effective; cost implications for state; poor management  | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of poor implementation and top-down management               |
| <b>Present</b>    | Not effective; low capacity of educational institutions (equipment and human resources); cost-sharing policy will not create conducive employment condition; low capital and bureaucratic capacities; lack of coordination and integration | Below expectation  | N/A                   | Not effective because of political affiliations (partiality); corruption           |
| <b>Future</b>     | Effective  | Effective, provided that participation, integrated approach and capacity are present | N/A                   | Effective if policies, programmes and mitigation measures are properly implemented |

**Table 8.7:** Response analysis results

| Indicators                          | Multistakeholder groups   |            |  |  |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------|--|--|
|                                     | Local NGOs  | Government | Academic and research  | International NGOs   |
| 1. Indicators for the threat        | Numbers of: unemployed; college graduates; female migrants to Arab and similar countries; early retirements; migrants to cities/bigger towns; women/girls in commissions on the status of women; crimes | N/A        | Numbers of: unemployed; underemployed; employees qualified in different skills | Income of persons below average; poor student/teacher ratio (> 40 students/class); less availability of pure water (< 20 litres per day) |
| 2. Indicators for the responses     | Number of people employed; amount of capital invested; number/quality of policies revised and amended; increased labour productivity; number of trained professionals                                   | N/A        | N/A  | Traffic incidents per head of population; consumption data per household   |
| 3. Suggestion to measure indicators | Amount of capital invested; crime levels  | N/A        | N/A  | Access to quality education; access to quality health service; above-average income; safety and security at community level              |

**Table 8.8:** Multistakeholder groups' analysis of indicators to measure threats and responses

#### ANALYSING CORE THREAT 4: "DROUGHT AND FLOODS"

Environmental threats, namely droughts and floods, pose another significant human security threat to the people of Ethiopia. Roughly 70 per cent of the land area is dry, sub-humid, semi-arid or arid, and thus vulnerable to desertification.<sup>24</sup> Because of the general mountainous terrain, even the more humid parts of the country are prone to land degradation.<sup>25</sup> Recurrent droughts and extreme weather events compound land and environmental degradation. Environmental degradation threatens physical and economic survival. It reduces the environment's ability to produce biomass for food, livestock feed and household energy. It undermines poverty reduction and sustainable development efforts. Halting and reversing environmental degradation and poverty are mutually reinforcing imperatives and have to be implemented together in Ethiopia's development initiatives. National economic development programmes and environmental regulatory systems must be harmonized to optimize these initiatives. This means that Ethiopia must take urgent necessary action, as envisaged in target nine of the seventh Millennium Development Goal (MDG), to promote sustainable social and economic development through sound management and use of natural and human-made cultural resources and to enhance the quality of life of its present generation of citizens without compromising that of its future generations.

As environmental resources are the foundation of the country's social and economic development, governmental efforts have focused on addressing environmental mismanagement and underutilization, particularly regarding land use and management. Overgrazing and the expansion of farming into unsuitable areas have devastated land fertility.<sup>26</sup> This is manifested in problems such as loss of vegetation cover and biodiversity, escalating soil erosion, declining soil fertility, expanding salinization and soil compaction and desiccation through hydrological cycle disruption. Further, water and soil pollution, especially by agrochemicals, are becoming a greater problem.<sup>27</sup> In addition to degradation caused by human use,



climate change and general weather conditions compound land and resource degradation. Indeed, during the workshops the stakeholder groups identified drought and flood-induced crises as the number one environmentally induced human security threat.

### ***Research team's introduction to threats, responses and actors***

In Ethiopia drought is an age-old and common occurrence, as compared to the incidence and magnitude of floods – some highland and lowland areas are frequently affected. Drought is a condition of abnormally dry weather within a geographic region where some rainfall would usually be expected. In the context of human security, drought is thus quite different from a traditionally dry climate. Throughout most of lowland and highland Ethiopia, precipitation is not evenly distributed over the landscape during the course of the year.<sup>28</sup> In lowland areas, annual precipitation falls far below the national average, resulting in low water supply. In those areas, water supply reached the level of famines, which distinguishes Ethiopia from many other countries.

Droughts occur in periods when an unusual scarcity of rain causes a serious hydrological imbalance: reservoirs are empty, wells dry up and crop damage ensues. The severity of the drought is gauged by the degree of moisture deficiency, its duration and the size of the area affected. Typically, catastrophic droughts occur in the lowland (most pastoral) areas of Ethiopia bordering the permanently arid regions of the country. However, droughts are common in the highlands as well. Approximately every two decades – with a precision of three to four years – a major drought occurs in Ethiopia, most seriously affecting the lowland and highland areas.<sup>29</sup> The effects of droughts are aggravated by overcropping, overpopulation and lack of timely relief measures.

The “Ethiopia famine” of the mid-1970s was the result of the worst drought of the twentieth century.<sup>30</sup> The agriculture and livestock of much of the highland and lowland areas were devastated and the country's economy suffered. Civil disturbances, chronic hunger and malnutrition resulted from the shortage of food, inefficient food distribution, severe poverty and population growth in the northern regions, which lasted throughout the drought. Its immediate consequences were weight loss in adults and stunted growth in children. Malnutrition, especially protein-energy malnutrition, increased throughout the affected population, diminishing the ability to fight infections and causing mortality rates to rise, especially among the elderly and young children. In addition, higher rates of diarrhoea, measles and TB were reported. Although recent droughts and floods have not been as devastating, their effects have still been severe. For instance, in 2006 floods and droughts led to the displacement of more than 220,000 people,<sup>31</sup> and caused extensive property damage in eastern Ethiopia (Dire Dawa) and southern Ethiopia.<sup>32</sup>

Although droughts cannot be predicted reliably, few precautionary measures are taken in drought-prone areas. NGOs have taken some steps, such as construction of reservoirs to hold emergency water supplies, education to avoid overcropping and overgrazing, and programmes to limit settlement in such areas. Despite these efforts, greater actions can be taken by regional and national governments.

### Results of multistakeholder consultations

The MSGs' analysis of threats, responses and indicators is presented in Tables 8.9 and 8.10.

| Questions                | Multistakeholder groups   |            |  |                    |
|--------------------------|---|------------|--|--------------------|
|                          | Local NGOs  | Government | Academic and research  | International NGOs |
| 1. Who is threatened?    | Drought: highlanders and lowlanders<br>Flood: lowlanders and riverbanks   | N/A        | N/A  | N/A                |
| 2. By whom?              | Climate change  | N/A        | Flood; environmental mismanagement; human action                                     | N/A                |
| 3. Where and when?       | Flood during rainy season<br>Drought mostly unpredictable   | N/A        | Highland and lowland during rainy season; occasional dry season                      | N/A                |
| 4. How serious a threat? | Serious   | N/A        | Serious  | N/A                |
| 5. Life threatening?     | Yes   | N/A        | Yes  | N/A                |
| 8. How many victims?     | Eastern and northern part; sometimes south  | N/A        | Thousands  | N/A                |
| 9. Potential/ actual?    | Both  | N/A        | Both   | N/A                |
| 10. Symptoms?            | Flooded areas: loss of life and properties; displacement<br>Drought: absence of rain during short rainy season; migration to urban areas; appearance of cattle and used household goods on market; increased price of goods and grain | N/A        | Displacement; animal and human death; epidemics                                      | N/A                |
| 11. Root causes?         | Floods: excessive rain in higher topographies<br>Drought: shortage of rainfall  | N/A        | Environmental degradation; deforestation   | N/A                |
| 12. Triggering factors?  | Degradation of natural resources; lack of soil conservation methods and mechanisms; spread of desertification   | N/A        | Mismanagement; environmental change; policy  | N/A                |
| 13. Positive scenario?   | Implementation of early warning system; contingency plan; storage; food transportation  | N/A        | Ongoing debate; NGO-government partnership   | N/A                |
| 14. Negative scenario?   | Frequency of drought cycle shortens over time; geographical expansion; lack of survival options e.g. at river banks   | N/A        | Irreversible degradation; contradictory policy; lack of social cost-benefit analysis | N/A                |

**Table 8.9:** Multistakeholder groups' detailed threat analysis

| Questions  | Multistakeholder groups   |   |                       |  |
|--|---|---|-----------------------|--|
|  | Local NGOs  | Government  | Academic and research | International NGOs   |
| 1. What has been done?<br>Which mitigation measures? |   |   |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Deforestation; terracing; dam construction                                  | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Water harvesting; awareness creation; watershed management                  | N/A                   | Disaster prevention and preparedness measures; awareness raising about flooding; meteorological support; evacuation; settlement; safety-net measures; food-for-work programmes; locally adapted drought mitigation measures  |
| <b>Future</b>  | Strengthening early warning strategies and expansion of such systems to lowest (village) level; capacity building for community members/ professionals on reporting and mobilization; reducing dependency on rain-fed agriculture; irrigation scheme; introduction of technologies for improved production (e.g. irrigation); better water harvesting systems and practices; rehabilitation of natural resources, especially soil and forest; creation of rural development opportunities other than farming (e.g. road construction); effective family planning; voluntary settlement programmes away from river banks | Clear property rights; well-planned resettlement; sustainable afforestation | N/A                   | Knowledge on issue of drought and flood through research; policy diversification away from rain-fed agrarian economic policy; technology to reduce risk of drought through research; awareness raising; education; social capital accumulation; strategy of partnership among actors |
| 2. By whom?  |   |   |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Government; NGOs; CBOs; associations; farmers                               | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Government; NGOs; CBOs; associations; farmers                               | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Future</b>  | All actors  | Government; farmers; local government action                                | N/A                   | N/A  |
| 3. To whom?  |   |   |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Society   | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Society   | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Future</b>  | All affected communities  | Society   | N/A                   | N/A  |

| Questions         | Multistakeholder groups |                 |                       |                              |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
|                   | Local NGOs              | Government      | Academic and research | International NGOs           |
| 4. Feasibility?   |                         |                 |                       |                              |
| <b>Past</b>       | N/A                     | Partly feasible | N/A                   | N/A                          |
| <b>Present</b>    | N/A                     | Partly feasible | N/A                   | Feasible                     |
| <b>Future</b>     | Feasible                | Yes             | N/A                   | Yes                          |
| 5. Effectiveness? |                         |                 |                       |                              |
| <b>Past</b>       | N/A                     | Partly          | N/A                   | N/A                          |
| <b>Present</b>    | N/A                     | Partly          | N/A                   | Mixed record                 |
| <b>Future</b>     | Effective               | Yes             | N/A                   | Yes, if properly implemented |

**Table 8.10:** Multistakeholder groups' response analysis

#### **ANALYSING CORE THREAT 5: "EPIDEMIC = HIV/AIDS + MALARIA + TB"**

Chronic and acute health conditions, often related to levels of poverty, were identified by the research team and MSGs as one of the core human security threats. In particular, HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria were noted as the key health threats that constitute a national human security threat. As noted by the World Health Organization (WHO), each of these is considered at the level of an "epidemic".<sup>33</sup> An epidemic is an outbreak of a contagious disease affecting an unusually large number of people or involving an extensive geographical area.

The national health-related reports and statistics indicate that HIV and TB are increasingly prevalent in nearly all urban and rural areas, while malaria is common in lowland areas in particular.<sup>34</sup> These diseases significantly shorten Ethiopians' life expectancy and undermine their quality of life and participation in income-generating activities. Statistical data from the Ministry of Health indicate that these three diseases have overwhelmed health services, destabilized the community, shortened lives and disrupted societies at large.<sup>35</sup> The extent of the diseases' distribution has progressed in recent years. Not only do infection rates affect the mortality and health of infected individuals, but they also diminish the available labour force, contributing to stagnant and depreciated livelihoods.

While the population of Ethiopia has proven resilient in the past, it appears that the increasing prevalence of the diseases will extract a huge cost from both rural and urban people in the future. By overwhelming the country's limited health and social services and destabilizing family structures, the diseases are causing significant social and economic problems, which in turn threaten social and economic stability.

Comparing Ethiopia with global data, the national HIV/AIDS epidemic is far more extensive than initially anticipated. The number of Ethiopians living with HIV/AIDS at the end of the twentieth century was more than 45 per cent higher than what had been predicted in 1991 by the WHO. According to the Worldwatch Institute, the HIV epidemic is severely altering the country's demographic future.<sup>36</sup>

At the end of 1999 Ethiopia was one of 16 sub-Saharan Africa countries in which more than one-tenth of the adult population aged 15–49 was infected with HIV.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, at least one adult in five was living with the virus.

The infection rate is generally high among young men and women. Several factors are responsible for this. First and foremost, safe sex practices are limited, either because the protective value is unknown or because they are culturally or individually disliked. In addition, teenage Ethiopian girls often start their sex lives with older men – whether married to them or not – who are more likely to be infected than boys their age. At the same time, as knowledge of HIV/AIDS has spread, men have sought to have sex with even younger girls in the belief that they might not yet be infected.

TB is a chronic or acute bacterial infection that primarily attacks the lungs, but may also affect the kidneys, bones, lymph nodes and brain.<sup>38</sup> The disease is caused by *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*, a rod-shaped bacterium.<sup>39</sup> Symptoms of TB include coughing, chest pain, shortness of breath, loss of appetite, weight loss, fever, chills and fatigue.<sup>40</sup> Children and people with weakened immune systems are the most susceptible.<sup>41</sup> The disease was recognized as an epidemic in Ethiopia in 1993. Although it is suspected that TB has existed in Ethiopia for a long time, its prevalence has only been reported in the past two decades. Researchers attribute the sharp increase of TB in recent years to the spread of HIV/AIDS, as people with HIV/AIDS have weakened immune systems and are particularly susceptible to contagious diseases like TB. Half of those infected with TB in Ethiopia are not treated. Further, the poorly supervised treatment of TB has led to an increase in drug-resistant strains, furthering the spread of the disease.

### ***Research team's introduction to threats, responses and actors***

The government has attempted to address these threats through the Health Sector Development Programme (HSDP) I and II, now extending into HSDP III, with a clear focus on communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria.<sup>42</sup> Efforts are geared towards rural areas, particularly by extending availability of services to rural villages. The government's main implementation modalities include three particular activities. First, the Health Services Extension Programme involves the delivery of various health services in four main areas: hygiene and environmental sanitation; disease prevention and control; family health services; and health education and communication.<sup>43</sup> The programme has gone through a pilot phase, with early success, and is being rolled out nationwide. Second, accelerated expansion of primary healthcare coverage has been developed and endorsed by the government in view of achieving universal coverage of primary healthcare to the rural population.<sup>44</sup> Third, a healthcare financing strategy aims at increasing resource flows to the health sector, improving efficiency of resource utilization and ensuring sustainability of financing to improve the coverage and quality of health services.<sup>45</sup>

Data from the Ministry of Health indicate that there has been a proliferation of NGOs and CBOs working in the health sector in the past decade, with a special focus on HIV and TB prevention and treatment. At the time of writing there were approximately 65 health-specific NGOs and literally thousands of CBOs, 80 per cent of which offering HIV/AIDS and TB intervention programmes.

### Results of multistakeholder consultations

The MSGs' analyses of health threats and responses are summarized in Tables 8.11 and 8.12.

| Questions                | Multistakeholder groups  |            |  |   |
|--------------------------|--|------------|--|---|
|                          | Local NGOs   | Government | Academic and research  | International NGOs  |
| 1. Who is threatened?    | HIV/AIDS and TB: entire population<br>Malaria: primarily population in lowland areas   | N/A        | HIV/AIDS: entire population<br>Malaria: pastoralists, population in lowland areas                          | TB and malaria: entire population<br>HIV/AIDS: especially productive labour force                                     |
| 2. By whom?              | Disease (viruses and vectors)  | N/A        | HIV: virus<br>Malaria: mosquitoes  | Diseases themselves: HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB   |
| 3. Where and when?       | Malaria: lowlands, seasonal<br>HIV/AIDS and TB: anywhere, anytime  | N/A        | HIV/AIDS: throughout country, always<br>Malaria: lowland areas, seasonal                                   | HIV/AIDS: everywhere, particularly since 1970s<br>Malaria: more prone areas, always<br>TB: everywhere, always         |
| 4. How serious a threat? | Serious  | N/A        | Very serious   | Very serious  |
| 5. Life threatening?     | Yes  | N/A        | Yes  | Yes   |
| 8. How many victims?     | Malaria: affects population living on 60 per cent of Ethiopian landmass<br>HIV/AIDS and TB are a nationwide threat   | N/A        | Millions   | Millions  |
| 9. Potential/actual?     | Potential and actual   | N/A        | Potential and actual   | Potential and actual  |
| 10. Symptoms?            | Increasing number of deaths; increasing number of orphans  | N/A        | Number of people affected; loss of productive labour force; family breakdown; increasing number of orphans | Number of deaths and affected population; loss of income; increasing cost for medication; rising number of diseases   |
| 11. Root causes?         | Hunger; exposure to malnutrition; unsafe sex practice; unsafe blood transfusion; lack of sanitation exposure; bodily weakness (poor resistance)  | N/A        | Lack of infrastructure and destitution; inadequate preventive government policies and programmes           | Sexual behaviours; lack of awareness; poverty; environmental degradation  |
| 12. Triggering factors?  | Illiteracy; lack of awareness; addictions; lack of basic income; lack of behavioural change; increasing numbers of new cases of disease, orphans and street vending; rising vulnerability in high-altitude areas | N/A        | Poverty; illiteracy  | Sexual behaviour; poverty; lack of awareness; environmental degradation; poor legislation; technological backwardness |
| 13. Positive scenario?   | More attention; conducive environment; decreased stigma and discrimination   | N/A        | Appreciation of problem by stakeholders  | Resource mismanagement; change resistance; poverty; destitution   |
| 14. Negative scenario?   | N/A  | N/A        | N/A  | N/A   |

**Table 8.11:** Multistakeholder groups' detailed threat analysis

As one can see from Table 8.11, no group provided answers to the last question (“negative scenario”) and the government group did not undertake any analysis for this particular threat. The remaining three groups characterized the threat as serious, life threatening, actual and potential, multiple root causes and with multiple symptoms.

| Questions  | Multistakeholder groups   |  |                       |  |
|--|---|--|-----------------------|--|
|  | Local NGOs  | Government   | Academic and research | International NGOs   |
| 1. What has been done?<br>Which mitigation measures? |   |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Awareness creation;<br>institutionalization;<br>policy creation                        | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Mainstreaming;<br>awareness creation;<br>partnership and networking                    | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Future</b>  | Strengthening of women’s societies and associations; awareness creation on gender issues for all; socio-economic empowerment; capacity building of law enforcement bodies; ensuring equal access to education for males and females; ensuring fair political representation | Strengthening of local government institutions; involving partners; integrated efforts | N/A                   | Strengthening partnerships with private actors, NGOs and international actors; strengthening existing efforts to create jobs for women; prevention of female genital mutilation; proper implementation of policies; research and technology on HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; education and awareness raising among patriarchal society and breaking down of taboos |
| 2. By whom?  |   |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Government;<br>NGOs; CBOs  | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Government;<br>NGOs; CBOs;<br>multilateral and bilateral donors;<br>UN agencies        | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Future</b>  | All stakeholders, including government agencies; NGOs; CBOs; male and female community leaders; elders; religious leaders   | Government;<br>NGOs; CBOs;<br>multilateral and bilateral donors;<br>UN agencies        | N/A                   | N/A  |
| 3. To whom?  |   |  |                       |  |
| <b>Past</b>  | N/A   | Women  | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Present</b>                                       | N/A   | Women  | N/A                   | N/A  |
| <b>Future</b>  | All community levels  | Women and men  | N/A                   | N/A  |

|                   |           |  |     |   |
|-------------------|-----------|--|-----|---|
| 4. Feasibility?   |           |  |     |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | N/A       | Partly feasible                                  | N/A | N/A   |
| <b>Present</b>    | N/A       | Partly feasible                                  | N/A | Yes   |
| <b>Future</b>     | Feasible  | Feasible, provided that capacity is strengthened | N/A | Feasible  |
| 5. Effectiveness? |           |  |     |   |
| <b>Past</b>       | N/A       | Ineffective                                      | N/A | N/A   |
| <b>Present</b>    | N/A       | Ineffective                                      | N/A | Ineffective because of politicization; weak commitment; female genital mutilation because of illiteracy; cultural practices |
| <b>Future</b>     | Effective | Effective  | N/A | Effective   |

**Table 8.12:** Multistakeholder groups' response analysis

## CONCLUSION

All five core human security threats have been present in Ethiopia for more than a decade. They are recognized as both development and security problems, although responses have taken the form of traditional development interventions. They are represented in the MDGs, national development policies and sectoral policies. In recent years there has been an increase in both the range of actors involved and the policies implemented. Nonetheless, as detailed by the MSGs and supported by the research team, these threats continue to remain serious, calling for more effective mitigation measures.

Based on the analysis of past, current and future responses for each human security threat, the multistakeholder consultations generated a number of strategies to lessen or minimize the effect of these core human security threats. Some of these methods are “front-door solutions”, meaning they pertain to policies and practices by state and non-state actors that deal with health, education, income generation and women’s affairs. Other are “back-door solutions”, involving strategies to reduce the occurrence of a threat in advance. The responses vary across groups in terms of level, number and types of suggested measures. The results of the MSG analysis are so heterogeneous that it is difficult to make generalizations or aggregated propositions.

In terms of methodology the MSGs and the research team both focused on community-based approaches. From the consolidated results it seems that traditional top-down development, directed by the government and financed by foreign aid, is unable to mitigate the identified human security threats. One can draw from the MSGs’ suggestions and recommendations that achieving the goal of human security requires a new approach, one that goes beyond conventional development responses and instead focuses on micro, individual and community levels.

In envisioning improvements in human security, this case study also points to the value of empowerment and agency of those directly affected, and thus to the role of individuals as agents of change. An expanded notion of human security requires growing recognition of the role of people – both individuals and communities – in ensuring their own security. Human security is not simply the challenge of “protecting” and “providing”, but involves fostering the empowerment of people and their participation.



People are not passive recipients of “security” or victims of its absence, but active subjects who should contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to security problems.

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## NOTES

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## CHAPTER 9

### Human insecurity and security in Kyrgyzstan

Ina Amann

#### INTRODUCTION

The present study<sup>1</sup> analyses the security of the Kyrgyz population through a human security lens, and is organized in three main sections. The first describes the general country context by highlighting some of the most important historical, political, socio-economical and geographical features of Kyrgyzstan. The second section explains and defines the concept of human security as it is applied throughout this study, before exploring 23 different threats to human security, including past and present mitigation measures. Using the Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project guidelines, the final section identifies the core threats to Kyrgyz human security. The conclusion summarizes the main arguments and findings.

#### COUNTRY CONTEXT

Kyrgyzstan, officially the Kyrgyz Republic, is a landlocked and mountainous country in Central Asia with an average elevation of 2,750 metres.<sup>2</sup> Bishkek is the nation's capital and largest city. Based on figures from 2009, when the research for this case study was carried out, Kyrgyzstan has a population of 5,431,747, which translates into a very low population density of only 26 people per km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>3</sup> Holding position 120 out of 182 on the Human Development Index (HDI), it is a country with medium human development.

#### *Political development*

The Kyrgyz have been known in Central Asia for 3,000 years. In Kyrgyzstan, clans and tribes are highly influential, and even today being affiliated with one is a central part of Kyrgyz society. In 1876 the territory came under Russian rule.<sup>4</sup> Later, as part of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan played a small but highly integrated role supplying a few agricultural and industrial products as well as minerals, especially uranium. During the *glasnost* period national consciousness was raised, and between the late 1980s and early 1990s ethnic frictions emerged between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. On 30 August 1991 Kyrgyzstan was declared an independent nation and presidential elections were held.<sup>5</sup>

The first Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic as an independent state was adopted on 5 May 1993. However, political tension continued over issues of land distribution, official language, the presidential model of government, corruption and ethnic relations. After the March 2005 parliamentary elections, the so-called Tulip Revolution emerged with the aim of ending the presidency of Askar Akayev and bringing improved democracy to Kyrgyzstan. Although Akayev formally agreed to resign, his successor, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, did not fulfil the promise of better democracy.<sup>6</sup> Political concerns include prevalent poverty, privatization of state-owned enterprises, the need to boost the economy, negative trends in

democracy and political freedoms, reduction of corruption and nepotistic practices, improving inter-ethnic relations and combating terrorism.<sup>7</sup>

### ***Economic situation***<sup>8</sup>

Following independence in 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic went through three phases in its transition to a democratic system and a market economy.<sup>9</sup> From 1991 to 1995 there was a painful reduction in output and income, and 50 per cent of the population fell under the poverty line. This was mainly due to a loss of transfers (about 13 per cent of GDP) and the disruption of economic linkages.<sup>10</sup> From 1996 until 1999 the reforms showed some effect and the economy started to recover. However, growth was concentrated in a limited number of sectors (notably agriculture, gold-mining and energy), and the economy remained vulnerable as it was hit by the breakdown of the Russian rouble in 1999. From 2000 onwards there was continued growth (average 3.7 per cent per year), a slowing down of inflation and decreasing levels of inequality. This lowered the poverty rate from 63 per cent in 2003 to 39.9 per cent in 2006.<sup>11</sup> Average GDP in 2008 was US\$2,200 per person. The 2011 unemployment rate was estimated to be 8.6 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

Kyrgyzstan is a very rural country with agriculture providing a livelihood for 48 per cent of the population and accounting for 29.8 per cent of national GDP. Industrial activity accounts for 12.5 per cent of total GDP and employs 19.7 per cent of the population. Gold makes up 8 per cent of real GDP and 25 per cent of exports. Due to this high percentage and volatile international gold prices it is an insecure source of GDP.<sup>13</sup> Services make up 39.5 per cent of total GDP, employing 50.6 per cent of the population.

### ***Socio-cultural dimension***

Kyrgyzstan's population is young, with a median age of 24.4 years, which implies expected population growth in the future.<sup>14</sup> The Kyrgyz topology is very mountainous and therefore most people live in the south of the country, with more than 50 per cent living in the Ferghana Valley. Kyrgyzstan has an ethnically mixed population composed of more than 60 ethnic groups. Kyrgyz (66.9 per cent), Russians (10.7 per cent) and Uzbek (14.1 per cent) are the most common.<sup>15</sup> The majority of the population is Muslim (at least 75 per cent). Russian Orthodox is the second most common religion.<sup>16</sup> Kyrgyzstan has two official languages: Kyrgyz and Russian.

### ***Human development situation***

The educational system is often considered as the most positive feature of Kyrgyzstan's Soviet legacy. Basic general education is free of charge and compulsory, resulting in an adult literacy rate of 99 per cent. However, it is argued that access and quality are decreasing, while dropout and illiteracy rates are higher than official statistics indicate.<sup>17</sup> Kyrgyzstan also inherited a complex Soviet health system and has since been faced with the task of maintaining and reforming an expensive and inefficient system. Life expectancy at birth is 67.6 years, with a huge gender gap: female life expectancy is 71.4 years compared to just 63.9 years for males.<sup>18</sup>

During Soviet times access to potable water was reported to be almost universal. Over the past few years Kyrgyzstan has faced serious issues in preventing pollution of underground water, especially in Chui, Osh and Jalal-Abad *oblasts* where nearly 50 per cent of rural town centres do not have central water supply

systems. Much clean water is wasted during transportation (around 20–26 per cent of total annual flow), and centralized sewage systems with purification devices are only available in 56 per cent of places.<sup>19</sup>

The rate of malnutrition was 4 per cent in 2002.<sup>20</sup> According to the World Food Programme, an estimated 24 per cent or about 1.3 million people are “food insecure”.<sup>21</sup> The situation is becoming more severe as a result of inflationary pressures, depletion of productive agricultural assets and an anticipated fall in remittances from Russia and Kazakhstan.<sup>22</sup>

Kyrgyzstan has several environmental issues. Land and pasture degradation is a major agricultural problem in all regions that negatively affects economic growth and individual livelihoods, contributing to floods, soil erosion and stagnant agricultural output. Problems of air pollution and waste management are so far mainly confined to the big cities. Furthermore, today, many of the former uranium mining sites are improperly secured and pose ecological and health dangers.

## HUMAN SECURITY THREAT AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS

The analysis presented here is based on the broader definition of human security used by OPHUSEC, which considers human security provision as internal and external approaches towards lowering levels of fear, threat and want to assure basic and existential individual and community security.

### *Operationalizing human security*

The human security concept offers the opportunity to improve livelihood conditions for a population living under precarious conditions. Using the OPHUSEC framework, this study evaluates threats to human security in Kyrgyzstan. The threats were identified and further analysed based on fieldwork carried out with diverse focus groups in Kyrgyzstan, one multistakeholder consultation and analysis of relevant contemporary literature. The choice of threat is based primarily on consultations with focus groups and multistakeholder workshop participants. As the threats were identified by representatives of local communities and organizations, they reflect local perceptions. However, the next step of the full OPHUSEC approach, namely an assessment of the validity of the threats identified by local groups and subsequent identification of key threats, is not reflected in this particular background study. That step would have followed the background study if the full OPHUSEC “package” had been applied in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the following threats were identified:

- malnutrition
- maternal, infant and under-five mortality
- drug addiction and drug industry
- HIV/AIDS
- road accidents
- vulnerability to illness and diseases
- alcoholism
- natural disasters
- agricultural problems
- blackouts
- unemployment

- access to drinking water
- environmental damage
- radioactive and hazardous waste
- corruption
- stratification of society (between rich and poor)
- low level of professional qualification leading to shortage of qualified personnel
- human trafficking
- crime
- application of torture by law enforcement bodies
- inter-ethnic conflict and border problems
- religious extremism.

The following sections analyse threats and mitigations options in more detail.

### ***Malnutrition – Threat analysis***

Recently there has been a significant decrease in the percentage of the population that is undernourished. In 1994 21 per cent were undernourished, but by 2002 this number dropped to only 4 per cent.<sup>23</sup> Although there are no newer data available, a further decline is suspected to have occurred in recent years, especially in Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Osh *oblasts*. According to the UN Common Country Assessment, 12.4 per cent of all children from one to six years and 11.9 per cent of children between ages seven and ten are malnourished.<sup>24</sup> In particular, the proportion of stunting among under-fives increased from 24.0 per cent to 29.3 per cent between 2006 and 2007.<sup>25</sup> Vitamin A deficiency and anaemia caused by a deficit of micronutrients are widespread. Anaemia affects 70 per cent of young children and 50 per cent of pregnant women.<sup>26</sup> Such a lack of micronutrients is referred to as “hidden hunger” and results from a diet comprising cheap, filling food that is low in nutrients. During the winter, adequate food intake is further undermined by increased costs for coal, electricity and other heating and cooking sources, which leaves little money for purchasing food. Importantly, the identified risks cover both rural and urban areas.<sup>27</sup>

### ***Malnutrition – Mitigation analysis<sup>28</sup>***

When this study was written, the 580,000 most vulnerable people, about 10 per cent of the overall population, were receiving national and international support to meet their nutritional needs. A World Bank grant supports the government’s programme to address nutritional vulnerabilities by subsidizing fortified flour for 300,000 of the poorest families, training health staff and village health committees, raising public awareness and disseminating information, and supplementing vitamin A. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provides technical support to the Ministry of Health for developing a national nutrition strategy, which involves social marketing of home-based food fortification as well as improving infant and young child feeding practices nationally.

To deal with the current food crisis, grants were made by the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs Central Emergency Response Fund to provide supplies of fodder, winter wheat seeds and veterinary services to vulnerable rural households. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) provided contributions for the purchase of 280 tonnes of seeds and livestock feed. Since August 2009 USAID has continued distributing food to the most vulnerable households in the four poorest districts, with a particular focus on pregnant women and children under five. As beans constitute the main part of the distributed food



even though they are not a traditional part of Kyrgyz meals, Mercy Corps Kyrgyzstan has developed a special cookbook to help recipients derive maximum value from the distributed beans.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, several organizations are involved in small-scale assistance programmes. To address the phenomenon of hidden hunger, the government passed a law in February 2009 that regularizes flour fortification with minerals and vitamins.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, UNICEF has worked with the Ministry of Health to deliver vitamin A supplements to nearly half a million new mothers and children under five.<sup>31</sup> In May 2009 a law was signed to set up the Council for Food Security to monitor prices of wheat and bakery products, dairy products, meat, sugar and vegetable oil. Should a crisis occur, this council would have the power to set prices.<sup>32</sup>

As food crises in Kyrgyzstan are usually triggered by specific events, it is important to monitor early warning signs in order to implement immediate mitigation programmes. Signs include food prices in relation to income, the availability of basic commodities on the market, cold winters, bad weather and the level of remittances.<sup>33</sup> Ultimately, it is important to continue securing funding and enhancing international cooperation. The current funding levels only reach 35 per cent of the intended beneficiaries.<sup>34</sup>

### ***Maternal, infant and under-five mortality – Threat analysis***

Overall, there has been a recent deterioration in maternal and child health in Kyrgyzstan. This is due mainly to a change in survey criteria, but also to the country's deteriorating socio-economic situation. Furthermore, official statistics may not accurately reflect the real situation, which is expected to be worse than reported.<sup>35</sup> Figures for 2009 identified an infant mortality rate of 33/1,000 and an under-five rate of 38/1,000.<sup>36</sup> The most common causes of death were neonatal problems (44 per cent), pneumonia (17 per cent), diarrhoea (14 per cent), injuries (7 per cent), malaria (1 per cent) and other causes (18 per cent).<sup>37</sup> Immunization coverage in Kyrgyzstan has involved a multi-year plan in the national health budget; this has been successful overall, covering all major vaccinations for virtually the entire population.<sup>38</sup>

Maternal mortality rate was reported to vary between 110<sup>39</sup> and 150<sup>40</sup> deaths per 100,000 live births.<sup>41</sup> This is surprisingly high given the fact that 98 per cent of all births are attended by health personnel.<sup>42</sup> However, healthcare is often of poor quality due to a shortage of qualified staff and medical supplies.<sup>43</sup> In hospitals, standard procedures are usually not followed and commonly lead to mistakes being made.<sup>44</sup> The situation is aggravated by a lack of awareness about pregnancy in general: 45 per cent of women do not consult health services before birth and do not follow doctors' orders.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Maternal, infant and under-five mortality – Mitigation analysis***

The issue of neonatal deaths is closely intertwined with maternal health. Most pre-term births are due to poor maternal health. Many infections, as well as birth asphyxia, can be prevented if delivery takes place at a medical centre with qualified birth assistance. Mitigation measures aspiring to decrease maternal mortality should focus on upgrading the overall quality of health staff and facilities. In addition to training, innovative ways of retaining skilled personnel are required. Many doctors and health staff tend to emigrate to Kazakhstan and Russia because of higher salaries and better working conditions.

UNICEF has tried to promote good practices by labelling and supporting hospitals as "baby friendly" when they provide adequate professional care.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, between 2009 and 2011 the World Bank and the German Development Bank provided more than €10 million to support various initiatives.<sup>47</sup> Through the ZdravPlus Project, USAID provides resources to help the government improve the financial

sustainability, efficiency, and quality of its healthcare while preserving equitable access.<sup>48</sup> It is important to inform and educate women about both the risks associated with pregnancy and child health issues.

### ***The drug industry and drug addiction – Threat analysis***

There are two main aspects of the drug trade in Kyrgyzstan. The first is caused by its geographic location on the drug-trafficking route from Afghanistan through Kazakhstan and Russia. This makes smuggling a lucrative business, which increases the amount of cheaply available drugs. Secondly, during the Soviet period Kyrgyzstan was the site of opium cultivation for medicinal use; now the equipment and skills are used for private, illegal production. It has been suggested that up to 70–80 per cent of the consumed opium is produced locally.<sup>49</sup> However, the opium poppy industry is still relatively small, and the more urgent problem is the illicit cultivation of cannabis and its smuggling. In 2007 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported confiscated drug totals as cannabis 4,028.5 kg; hashish 440.2 kg; heroin 431.4 kg; opium 270.6 kg; others 975.3 kg; poppy straw (*kuknar*) 724.3 kg.<sup>50</sup>

It is difficult to estimate the number of people who use drugs. According to official figures, at the end of 2007 there were 8,734 drug users, which is a 38 per cent increase since 2003.<sup>51</sup> However, some figures estimate the number of drug addicts in the Kyrgyz Republic to be between 80,000 and 100,000.<sup>52</sup> Drug users show some similar characteristics: a large majority (70–95 per cent) use intravenous drugs,<sup>53</sup> and drug use is more common in urban areas (75 per cent of addicts)<sup>54</sup> and among young men (93 per cent of all addicts).<sup>55</sup>

### ***The drug industry and drug addiction – Mitigation analysis***

There are two basic ideas on how to combat drug use: prevention and treatment. In 2002 a methadone-replacement therapy programme was established in Osh and Bishkek.<sup>56</sup> In 2008 13 centres offered opioid-substitution therapy and 729 drug users were treated. The programme is fully funded by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.<sup>57</sup> However, other programmes tend to be underfunded and only 2.9 per cent of all injecting drug users are covered.<sup>58</sup> Private treatment facilities exist but are prohibitively expensive, with average costs ranging around US\$200–300 for a ten-day course<sup>59</sup> and up to €8,500 for a complete treatment course.<sup>60</sup> The first needle-exchange programme was launched in 2000 by an organization called Parents Against Drugs and targeted 200 intravenous drug users in Osh.<sup>61</sup> Since then it has expanded to other places and has helped prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Injecting drug use accounts for 72 per cent of all transmission of the HIV virus.<sup>62</sup>

Prevention programmes mainly target young people, and are particularly important because drug intake starts at an increasingly early age. One survey carried out in a prison also showed that educating drug users about health risks and infections while providing them with the possibility of needle exchange significantly improved risky behaviours and decreased drug use.<sup>63</sup>

Drug trafficking is not just a Kyrgyz problem. It is important to have regional border-crossing programmes and coordinated efforts that are supported by a variety of international actors, as demonstrated by the following two examples. The European Union runs the large Central Asian Drug Action Programme, which targets supply and demand reduction aspects. It encompasses activities to prevent and detect smuggling and to establish a sustained capacity to analyse drug-related data based on European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction guidelines. The Central Asian Regional Information and

Coordination Centre has a special section to deal with the collection, storage, protection, analysis and exchange of information, and develops partnerships with states and organizations.<sup>64</sup>

Although there are mitigation measures in place, the number of people addicted to drugs has increased sharply. This clearly shows that current measures are not efficient enough to deal with the problem. More programmes are needed that aim to prevent people, especially youngsters, from taking drugs.<sup>65</sup> The existing opioid-substitution therapy and needle-exchange programmes need to be enhanced and extended to the penitentiary system.

### *HIV/AIDS – Threat analysis*

The officially reported HIV/AIDS infection rate in Kyrgyzstan is very low (around 0.1 per cent).<sup>66</sup> The first cases of HIV/AIDS in Kyrgyzstan were recorded in 1996, but the number has increased since 2001.<sup>67</sup> Although there are no official numbers for children, since 2006 two Kyrgyz hospitals have reported at least 72 children being infected with the virus. Investigators suspect that they were infected through tainted blood and poor needle hygiene.<sup>68</sup> The most vulnerable groups include injecting drug users, sex workers and prisoners. Among intravenous drug users, in 2002 prevalence rates were as high as 65 per cent in Bishkek and 91 per cent in Osh. More than half of prison inmates are injecting drug users, and many commonly share needles. The prevalence of HIV among prisoners in 2002 was 2.7 per cent. More than half of those reported to be living with HIV/AIDS in Kyrgyzstan were located in a single prison in the district of Osh.<sup>69</sup> Injecting drug use is the source of infection in 76 per cent of cases, but the number of cases resulting from sexual transmission is growing: 65.9 per cent of women contract HIV through sexual intercourse. Of these, 88 per cent contract HIV with a permanent partner.<sup>70</sup> Sex workers are at high risk because they are more likely to have unprotected sex. Stigmatization of infected people further contributes to the threat's prevalence. One expert explains that people who are already infected or at high risk of contracting HIV are too afraid to get tested out of fear of stigmatization.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, knowledge of how HIV/AIDS is transmitted is fairly low. Only 32 per cent of the population between ages 15 and 24 could correctly identify two ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV and reject two misconceptions about HIV transmission.<sup>72</sup> Among high-risk groups this number was even lower.<sup>73</sup>

### *HIV/AIDS – Mitigation analysis*

Kyrgyzstan has a network of national and provincial-level AIDS centres responsible for HIV diagnosis, treatment and prevention. Furthermore, international and national stakeholders undertake significant efforts within the country. Nevertheless, responses remain largely fragmented due to the range of large donors, ministries and competing non-governmental organization (NGO) networks involved.

The USAID-funded CAPACITY Project provides assistance in all five countries of Central Asia with respect to coordination efforts,<sup>74</sup> education of vulnerable populations, improving the quality of AIDS care and treatment services and integration of HIV services within national healthcare systems.<sup>75</sup> The Harm Reduction Network Kyrgyzstan is a group of five NGOs working towards reducing discrimination and stigmatization. Since 1997 Info Centre Rainbow has raised awareness among young people. Although the centre primarily targets the youth, its services are also available to other affected populations. Every year more than 1,000 people visit the centre for anonymous consultations, and it is estimated that this has indirectly benefited over 30,000 people. Tais Plus was founded as an initiative by sex workers and aims to raise awareness among the Kyrgyz population through seminars, training and fieldwork.<sup>76</sup>

Although HIV/AIDS is a relatively new problem in Kyrgyzstan, comprehensive measures have been taken to contain the spread of the disease: in 2006 around US\$7 million was spent on activities to prevent and combat HIV/AIDS, 91 per cent of which was provided by international donors.<sup>77</sup> Educating young people about the risks and prevention possibilities is crucial to contain new infections. A combination of education and anti-stigmatization campaigns needs to be developed, as this can encourage people to get tested and behave more responsibly. However, as the HIV/AIDS problem is closely intertwined with the problem of drug use, it is important to combine mitigation measures.

### ***Road accidents – Threat analysis***

Road accidents caused by, among other things, poor road conditions, bad driving habits and low law enforcement represent an increasing threat, particularly among men. While road traffic fatalities have declined steadily in Western Europe (below 6.0 per 100,000 people in 2006), Kyrgyzstan's mortality rate from road accidents is 22.8 per 100,000.<sup>78</sup> Because of the country's topology, road transport is crucial: it accounts for 97 per cent of cargo and 80 per cent of passenger traffic. In 2001 700 fatal accidents were reported;<sup>79</sup> by 2005 this number had risen to 899 fatalities and 4,600 injuries;<sup>80</sup> and in 2007 a record 1,252 deaths and 6,223 injuries were reported.<sup>81</sup> By comparison, a country such as Denmark with approximately the same population and ten times more vehicles suffered only one-third of Kyrgyzstan's reported number of traffic-related deaths in 2007.<sup>82</sup> Despite being officially forbidden, drink-driving causes 7.1 accidents per 100,000 people.<sup>83</sup> Corruption among traffic police is another problem, as it is often cheaper to bribe officers than pay traffic fines. Furthermore, around 35 per cent of all vehicle owners are deemed "untouchable" because they are judges, politicians or police officers.

### ***Road accidents – Mitigation analysis***

There are only a few mitigation measures in place and the prevalent corruption impedes their implementation. Educating drivers, especially young men, about traffic rules is an important aspect of decreasing road accidents. The European Commission launched a grassroots initiative through the Netherlands Red Cross with the Red Crescent Society of Kyrgyzstan to promote a non-aggressive driving culture and raise public awareness about the importance of road safety.<sup>84</sup> Due to the high incidence of drunk-driving accidents, the Main Road Safety Department recently suggested higher charges for drunk-driving as well as increasing the licence suspension period.<sup>85</sup> However, this can only show effect if the rules are enforced rigorously; otherwise it might only increase the profits of corrupt officers. Furthermore, better coordination and sustainable funding among responsible ministries are needed.<sup>86</sup> Experience from other countries shows that improving road safety requires a consistent effort over the course of 20–30 years to develop and implement comprehensive, integrated programmes.<sup>87</sup>

### ***Vulnerability to illness and disease – Threat analysis***

Some of the major threats to health and life in Kyrgyzstan are zoonosis, ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease and tuberculosis (TB). Other common problems are pulmonary diseases (6 per cent of all deaths caused by diseases), lower respiratory infections (5 per cent) and cirrhosis of the liver (4 per cent), with stomach cancer, nephritis and nephrosis and self-inflicted injuries each accounting for 2 per cent.

Zoonoses are diseases that can be passed from animals to humans; they can be transmitted through close contact with animals or their products, but not between humans. The most common is

brucellosis, mainly transmitted via infected cattle, sheep or goats, which causes chronic debilitating infections. Official data from the Ministry of Health reported 50.3 cases of zoonosis per 100,000 people for the year 2003. This underscores the seriousness of the situation in Kyrgyzstan and suggests a clear gap with other Central Asian countries, considering that Kazakhstan had 13.3 cases per 100,000 people, Tajikistan 13.6, Uzbekistan 1.7 and Russia 0.27.<sup>88</sup> In 2008 there were 74.3 cases of brucellosis per 100,000 people.<sup>89</sup> Anthrax is another disease that mainly spreads among animals and from animals to humans: 46 cases were reported between May 2008 and February 2009.<sup>90</sup> Reasons for the increase in zoonoses range from poverty of the rural population to a low hygiene culture, inadequate veterinary supervision and the collapse of the Soviet system.<sup>91</sup>

Ischaemic heart diseases are the most common cause of death, accounting for 24 per cent of all deaths, followed by cerebrovascular diseases at 19 per cent.<sup>92</sup> Risk factors include age, smoking, alcohol use, hypercholesterolemia (high cholesterol levels), obesity, diabetes and hypertension (high blood pressure).

The prevalence of TB is 134 per 100,000, with a mortality rate of 18 per 100,000. This represents 2 per cent of all deaths, and TB is the eighth most common cause of death in Kyrgyzstan.<sup>93</sup> Its incidence and mortality have clearly increased since 1990,<sup>94</sup> and 17 per cent of all new cases are caused by multi-drug-resistant (MDR) viruses.<sup>95</sup> Kyrgyzstan has the seventh highest rate of MDR TB in the world.<sup>96</sup> Although drug-resistant TB is generally treatable, it requires extensive chemotherapy (up to two years of treatment) with second-line anti-TB drugs, which are more costly than first-line drugs.<sup>97</sup> TB is a contagious disease which spreads through the air. Left untreated, each person with active TB will infect on average between ten and 15 people every year.

### *Vulnerability to illness and diseases – Mitigation analysis*

To combat the two most common diseases (i.e. ischaemic heart disease and cerebrovascular disease), it is important that Kyrgyzstan's general health system be improved to deliver effective, affordable medication and early detection mechanisms. Furthermore, it is important to educate people about underlying risk factors and early symptoms.

In 1996 Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian republic to adopt DOTS (the internationally recommended strategy for TB control) as the country's national TB control strategy. DOTS coverage, including in the penitentiary system, has reached 100 per cent as of 2004.<sup>98</sup> It is supported by Project Hope in a region-wide initiative, with the goal of improving capacity in Kyrgyzstan's healthcare system to address TB effectively.<sup>99</sup> Kyrgyzstan is also one of the World Health Organization (WHO) 25 priority countries for MDR TB programming, and the WHO is providing increased support for improvements in infection control and increased use of quality-assured anti-TB drugs.<sup>100</sup> Other donors include the German Development Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières.

Since 1993 reforms have been undertaken to restructure hospitals and sanitary epidemiological services, in an attempt to strengthen the primary healthcare system; reforms include establishing mandatory health insurance and an incentive-based payment system, as well as the development of a health information system and better pharmaceutical management.<sup>101</sup>

The battle against zoonoses, especially brucellosis, has to be fought on two levels. First, it is important to educate people about the ways in which the disease is transmitted, while increasing veterinary services and reducing the prevalence of the disease among animals. To achieve this, the government

instituted a national vaccination programme in 2008, which has been combined with a public awareness campaign.<sup>102</sup> Second, if the pathogen spreads to humans it needs to be treated timely and effectively.<sup>103</sup>

It is important to reform and develop Kyrgyzstan's general health system further, because this will strengthen the country's capacity to deal with these common diseases. A strong emphasis must be put on educating people about the transmission and risks of diseases. It is also vital to secure funding and develop international partnerships, as well as finding innovative ways to retain skilled doctors in the country.

### *Alcoholism – Threat analysis*

Alcohol is an important cause of premature mortality in countries of the former Soviet Union, especially among men. Many Kyrgyz are Muslims, but the consumption of alcohol is widespread. Although the reported average per capita consumption is very low, at only 2.4 litres of pure alcohol per person per year,<sup>104</sup> surveys show that the actual figure may be much higher, owing to unregistered consumption and illegally produced alcohol.<sup>105</sup>

The national poverty reduction strategy of 2003–2005 states that the consumption of alcohol had increased by 28 per cent in the past five years and alcohol-related mortality rates had increased by 130 per cent.<sup>106</sup> In 2004 liver cirrhosis was the sixth most common cause of death, mainly caused by excessive alcohol consumption.<sup>107</sup> A study undertaken in 2001 and published in 2008 examined different patterns of hazardous drinking behaviours and confirmed that binge drinking, daytime drinking and consuming illegally produced strong spirits are responsible for most of the negative alcohol-related health effects.<sup>108</sup> Episodes of heavy drinking were reported to occur at least once every two to three weeks for 11 per cent of all male respondents and 2 per cent of females. More than 210 g of alcohol per week is thought to be consumed by 7 per cent of male respondents, and 3 per cent consumed more than 420 g per week. Only 1 per cent of all female respondents consumed more than 140 g per week and less than 1 per cent consumed more than 280 g per week.<sup>109</sup> Approximately 6 per cent of males and 5 per cent of females were found to consume privately manufactured alcohol only, while 40 per cent of males and 30 per cent of females consumed a mix of privately produced alcohol and alcohol from an official source.<sup>110</sup> The increase in alcohol consumption by adolescents and even children is worrying.<sup>111</sup> There are no national laws specifying a minimum purchase age for alcohol in Kyrgyzstan.<sup>112</sup>

### *Alcoholism – Mitigation analysis*

The responsible official agencies are the Republican Narcological Centre and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health. Alcohol abuse treatment possibilities are little developed in Kyrgyzstan. Mass media and school-based programmes as well as work and community-based campaigns against alcoholism and drink-driving are almost non-existent.<sup>113</sup> Besides the absence of discussion and debate on the topic and its general neglect by Kyrgyz officials, very few NGOs are active on this issue. An interesting project is the Kyrgyz-Swiss Health Reform Project, initiated by the Swiss Red Cross in 2000. It supports local people in addressing their health problems, including alcohol abuse, by appointing village health committees that work on a voluntary and unpaid basis. In collaboration with about 60 per cent of households, the health committees have compiled a list of all types of alcohol consumed and monitored drinking habits. This is believed to have changed attitudes towards alcohol use and prepared villagers for change. Due to its relative success in Naryn province, the project was extended nationwide.<sup>114</sup> It is important to make the problem of alcohol abuse in

Kyrgyzstan a priority and, among other measures, introduce a minimum age and restrictions concerning hours for the sale of alcohol.

### ***Natural disasters – Threat analysis***

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' 2007 World Disasters Report put the number of people affected by natural and technological disasters in Kyrgyzstan at 34,661 between 1997 and 2006 and the number of people killed at 207, with around 21,125 people affected in 2006 alone.<sup>115</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that the direct economic damage in Kyrgyzstan caused by natural disasters exceeds US\$20 million in a normal year. This figure does not include indirect damage and secondary effects, such as ecological harm, epidemics, deterioration of living conditions and decreasing soil fertility.<sup>116</sup>

Due to the special geology of the Tien Shan Mountains, Kyrgyzstan is classified as Central Asia's most seismically dangerous territory.<sup>117</sup> Four earthquakes with a magnitude above 7.5 and seven others with a magnitude around 7.0 have occurred in the area in the past 120 years. Earthquakes of relatively small magnitudes happen frequently, usually without causing any significant damage. The last big quake occurred in 2008, killing at least 75 people and injuring 141.<sup>118</sup>

Large landslides and mudslides (up to more than 1 million cubic metres) represent one of the major natural hazards. Their great destructive power and sudden occurrence make them especially dangerous. Floods are also common and dangerous, resulting in 357 emergency situations during the period 1990–2002.<sup>119</sup>

### ***Natural disasters – Mitigation analysis***

There are several possible approaches to mitigate the threat arising from natural disasters. It is important to assess the threat properly in order to prepare and train people for emergency response plans. Against this background, collaboration has started between the Remote Sensing Section of GFZ Potsdam and the Department of Monitoring of Dangerous Natural and Technical Processes of the Ministry of Emergency and Environment. Since 2003 the European Commission has also funded disaster preparedness action plans for Central Asia through European Community Humanitarian Office aid.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the local NGO CAMP Alatau has been involved in a project that attempts to raise awareness among the population and local institutions about managing the risks of natural disasters. It aspires to increase understanding of integrated management principles by strengthening cooperation between different institutions, conducting workshops and providing support in developing and implementing plans for managing natural disasters at the local level.<sup>121</sup> After a disaster strikes, various international organizations and bilateral donors are engaged in bringing immediate relief measures to the population.

### ***Agricultural problems – Threat analysis***

Agriculture is an integral part of the Kyrgyz culture and contributes about 55 per cent to national GDP. The most important farming products are tobacco, cotton, potatoes, vegetables, grapes, fruits and berries, sheep, goats, cattle and wool. The strong traditional livestock sector makes up 44 per cent of agricultural output.<sup>122</sup> Today most farms are relatively small and privately held, with more than 96 per cent of cattle and sheep, 97 per cent of horses and 85 per cent of poultry being privately owned. Around 40 per cent of production is for subsistence purposes, but once the need for animal and farming products in Kyrgyzstan is satisfied, farmers have the opportunity to sell their excess production. However, livestock sales are rarely

planned and usually based on need for cash or excess production.<sup>123</sup> While the institutional and physical market infrastructure may be rudimentary, market chains for livestock products operate fairly efficiently and continue to develop.<sup>124</sup>

Evidence suggests that recent growth rates were mostly due to price rises rather than an increase in production. Productivity levels are low, and fall short of both the genetic herd potential and the international average. This is mainly due to poor nutrition, diseases, parasites and poor animal and farm management. Poor irrigation, decaying systems and soil degradation are other hindering factors. Furthermore, the veterinary system is insufficient and suffers from obsolete administrative structures, and this leads to low vaccination rates.<sup>125</sup> Thus it would be possible to improve output and profit without increasing herd sizes.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the restructuring of state farms into small, privately owned farms led to a lack of access to fertilizers, seeds, machinery and tools. More than 70 per cent of arable land depends on irrigation for its productivity. However, Kyrgyzstan's irrigation system, initially built to supply large socialist farms, was not entirely adequate for the needs of small-scale farmers. There is currently no formal organization officially in charge of the general farming system's funding, maintenance and management. As a result, between one-quarter and one-third of the land has gone out of production.<sup>126</sup> Moreover, in Soviet-era large collective farms, tasks and skills were limited and highly specialized, which means that many farmers today lack the necessary farming and management skills required to operate an independent farm in a market economy.<sup>127</sup>

### ***Agricultural problems – Mitigation analysis***

As the agricultural sector is crucial to the Kyrgyz economy and provides employment for over 50 per cent of the country's working population, many donors are actively involved in improving its performance. The main donors in this area are the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the government of Japan.<sup>128</sup>

The World Bank in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) supports 800 rural veterinarians to control the spread of infectious diseases among livestock.<sup>129</sup> In efforts to improve pasture use and management, the USAID Land Reform and Market Development Project began a legal and institutional review in coordination with the World Bank and the Agriculture Support Services Project.<sup>130</sup> The World Bank is also the main donor in the field of improving farm irrigation. Its first irrigation project started in 2000 with US\$20 million of funding.<sup>131</sup> Due to its success, the World Bank initiated a second project, which started in 2008 and aimed to build on and expand the earlier achievements with US\$16 million of additional funding.<sup>132</sup> The FAO conducted a project from April 2005 to November 2006 to improve farmers' management skills and create viable, income-generating small-scale enterprises in mountain communities. The project developed a long-term investment programme that further expanded the successful pilots countrywide.<sup>133</sup> The European Commission has financially supported the Kyrgyz government's agricultural development strategy, and supports water-user associations through contributing to awareness campaigns, preparing office bearers and providing training on general and financial management.<sup>134</sup>

Besides international donors, local initiatives have emerged. CAMP Alatoo is a Kyrgyz NGO that promotes sustainable development in mountainous regions. It supports a project focusing on sustainable pasture management;<sup>135</sup> another project in effect during 2008 aimed to improve soil and water conservation through the development, establishment and dissemination of new technologies.<sup>136</sup> ULGU is a national



NGO that promotes organic farming methods to improve the livelihoods of farmers. Its activities directly benefit 1,600 farmers and provide additional indirect benefits to 10,000 people. The Kyrgyz NGO Agro Foundation for Development started with emergency aid but nowadays focuses on agricultural rehabilitation and development assistance in the rural areas of southern Kyrgyzstan.

Although there have been many initiatives aimed at improving the agricultural sector, much still remains to be done. The institutional environment and governance standards in agricultural markets are still poorly developed, giving rise to various problems, for instance regarding export and quality assurances.<sup>137</sup> Correcting imbalances with regard to the use of summer and winter pastures is crucial to stop pasture degradation and related issues. This requires urgent action on several fronts, including reforms of the agriculture sector's legal and regulatory framework.<sup>138</sup>

### ***Blackouts – Threat analysis***

The electricity sector has several acute structural problems. Kyrgyzstan's electricity needs rely largely on hydroelectric sources based on the Naryn River: five of the country's six hydroelectric power plants are located on this river and generate 93 per cent of the domestically consumed electricity, while only three thermoelectric plants are in operation.<sup>139</sup> The Toktogul reservoir regulates the water cascade of the Naryn River. In April 2008, as a result of a harsh winter followed by low precipitation in the spring, the water volume of the Toktogul reservoir fell to 6.5 billion m<sup>3</sup>, just 20 per cent above the critical point (5.4 billion m<sup>3</sup>) at which turbines would stop working.<sup>140</sup> This led to massive shortages of electricity and blackouts lasting between six and eight hours, and sometimes up to 12 hours during the winter.<sup>141</sup> Energy is also needed to operate water pumps for an uninterrupted supply of potable water; blackouts hinder proper functioning and damage the pumps in the long haul.<sup>142</sup> This crisis increased water and electricity prices by around 25–30 per cent, which cost the Kyrgyz Republic about 60 billion Som (approximately 6 per cent of GDP).<sup>143</sup>

The situation is further complicated by the related interests of neighbouring countries. Uzbekistan's agriculture depends heavily on irrigation during the summer, while Kyrgyzstan needs water mostly for electricity production in the winter. During the Soviet period, central economic planning solved the deadlock by releasing water during the summer and providing Kyrgyzstan with fuel during the winter.<sup>144</sup> Since then, annual agreements have attempted to regulate the amount of water used for electricity production and irrigation, and supply fuel in exchange, which has led to political conflicts between the countries.<sup>145</sup> Hence, according to an opinion poll, 60 per cent feel the crisis is due to institutional corruption, 30 per cent blame it on mismanagement and only 3 per cent blame unpredictable environmental trends.<sup>146</sup>

### ***Blackouts – Mitigation analysis***

The provision of electricity and maintenance of electrical facilities and equipment are costly and technically complicated endeavours that cannot be done solely through private initiatives, thus it is more difficult for private actors to be involved in mitigation measures. Most initiatives are governmental infrastructural projects financially supported by international donors. Several projects for new power plants and pipelines have been initiated. For example, Russia announced in February 2009 financing for the construction of the Kambarata power plant (US\$1.7 billion).<sup>147</sup> CASAREM is an overall strategic umbrella for regional electricity trade. It includes projects for new pipelines and power plants as well as strategies for cooperation within the region.<sup>148</sup> Other donors are active in renovating and maintaining the distribution infrastructure. The SDC is the biggest bilateral donor in the energy sector, focusing on electricity distribution companies by providing

assistance for technical and commercial loss-reduction measures and policy dialogue.<sup>149</sup> The World Bank conducted an emergency energy assistance project to increase the volume and reliability of the national energy supply, especially thermal power in the winter.<sup>150</sup> Small initiatives include the civic environmental foundation UNISON, which is active in Bishkek and strives to implement energy-saving measures at a school.<sup>151</sup>

It is estimated that Kyrgyzstan uses only about 9 per cent of its total hydroelectric potential. Most of the existing power plants were constructed during Soviet times and have mainly made use of the Naryn River, disregarding smaller rivers.<sup>152</sup> Limiting corruption and governmental mismanagement is crucial to capitalize fully on existing resources as well as attract new sources of funding and enhance regional cooperation for new resource extraction possibilities.

### *Unemployment – Threat analysis*

Unemployment and its effects have a major influence on human security in Kyrgyzstan. The total labour force in 2007 was 2.344 million people, and the unemployment rate was estimated to represent between 8.3 per cent and 18 per cent of the workforce<sup>153</sup> – the rates are not precise due to conflicting definitions and measures of unemployment. For a better understanding of unemployment and its effects it is important to highlight some of the distinguishing features of the Kyrgyz labour market. These include the considerable divides between urban and rural and formal and informal labour markets, and between opportunities available to women and to men.<sup>154</sup>

The urban labour market offers more high-paying jobs, but also suffers from higher unemployment rates. Prospects of higher salaries have attracted many migrant workers, who comprise 29 per cent of the workforce.<sup>155</sup> One out of three jobs is in the informal sector, namely jobs that are outside the state's legal environment. An estimated 60 per cent of the urban poor are in this sector.<sup>156</sup> Informal work is usually characterized by low wages and insecure working conditions. The problem of unemployment and underemployment of the urban poor is aggravated by the fact that the poor have larger households with more dependants.<sup>157</sup> Women hold a relatively higher share of employment in low-wage sectors and their pay per hour is commonly lower than men's by about 25–30 per cent.<sup>158</sup> Women are less active in the labour market due to a lack of childcare and elder care services. In addition, more than 40 per cent of the working population are young people between 15 and 29 years of age. Unemployment is common in that age segment and it takes young people on average more than a year to find work after leaving school.<sup>159</sup> Youth unemployment is as high as 13.5 per cent for men and 16.2 per cent for women (based on the rate of 8.3 per cent).<sup>160</sup>

Internal and external labour migration represents a possible channel for employment opportunities, even for well-educated people. Because of brain drain, there has been a severe lack of skilled labour in Kyrgyzstan. The most popular destination countries are Russia and Kazakhstan (80 per cent of all emigrants), followed by Germany (12 per cent).<sup>161</sup> Internally, people migrate mainly from rural areas to the cities of Bishkek and Osh.<sup>162</sup> Many emigrants send remittances to their families: remittances constituted 14 per cent and 27 per cent of total GDP in 2005 and 2008 respectively,<sup>163</sup> with 79 per cent of all remittances sent from Russia.<sup>164</sup>

### ***Unemployment – Mitigation analysis***

The task of creating better employment opportunities lies mainly with the government, but is also supported by various organizations. The International Labour Organization has two ongoing projects related to employment opportunities in Kyrgyzstan. The first addresses the problem of youth unemployment and supports the inter-institutional framework of ministries, state agencies, trade unions and NGOs to build a youth employment network and national action plan.<sup>165</sup> The second project addresses labour migration in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, focusing on more effective regulation of migration flows in order to decrease informal migration, which commonly leads to unsafe and exploitative working conditions.<sup>166</sup>

Considering the ongoing population growth and the age structure, it is likely that the problem of unemployment will increase and continue to be a challenge for Kyrgyzstan. In addition to the official country programmes of the government and other organizations, it is essential to focus on background causes. Better education is needed to create a skilled workforce. The phenomenon of remittances and their effects on the Kyrgyz economy should be further studied: a system to channel remittances and use them more productively would help to alleviate some of the structural causes of unemployment and boost the economy. Finally, little has been done to tackle the problem of informal labour, which mainly affects the poor.

### ***Access to drinking water – Threat analysis***

Reliable access to drinking water and sanitation is essential for a population's health. Data about access in Kyrgyzstan are quite diverse. The WHO database for 2006 shows that access to improved water sources and sanitation is almost universal in urban areas (water 99 per cent and sanitation 94 per cent); in rural areas figures for sanitation are similar (93 per cent), although lower regarding access to drinking water (83 per cent).<sup>167</sup> Other sources give less optimistic figures. The 2003 UN Common Country Assessment saw the lack of universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation as an indicator of worsening living conditions, reporting that more than 75 per cent of homes did not have adequate sanitation and around 15 per cent of mostly rural households did not have access to clean drinking water.<sup>168</sup>

The 2007 World Bank Kyrgyz Republic Poverty Assessment reported that sanitation and water were available for only 59 per cent and 77 per cent of the population respectively, with huge disparities between urban and rural areas as well as between poor and non-poor segments of society.<sup>169</sup> The water and sanitation system was built during the Soviet period; since then, upgrading, investment and maintenance measures have been largely lacking due to unclear responsibilities and financial deficits.

### ***Access to drinking water – Mitigation analysis***

It is essential for Kyrgyzstan to repair and modernize existing water and sanitation networks, and possibly build new ones. In 2008 the World Bank started a project to upgrade basic urban infrastructure in semi-informal settlements in Bishkek and Osh. It includes building water supply networks and service installations as well as drainage networks. The World Bank allocated US\$12 million to the project.<sup>170</sup> To manage the problem in the future it is critical to improve the maintenance of existing water and sanitation systems, which will slow down their decay. Secondly, it is important to invest in modern systems and expand them to new settlements and rural areas.

### *Environmental damage – Threat analysis*

The key environmental issues in Kyrgyzstan are deforestation, solid waste management, air pollution and soil and pasture degradation (covered under agricultural problems).

Forest depletion is a major environmental issue because forests represent important economic assets for the country. Massive overexploitation during the Second World War and the unsustainable use of land caused a rapid decline in forest cover from 7 per cent in 1930 to only 4 per cent today.<sup>171</sup> Forests are critically important in maintaining the ecological balance in the whole region, as they play a vital role in retaining water and regulating flows to the reservoirs.<sup>172</sup> Moreover, deforestation contributes to soil erosion, thus leading to frequent landslides. Rural people make extensive, often illegal, use of forests for food, timber, fuelwood, fodder for livestock, forest farming and forest products for sale (hunting, etc.).<sup>173</sup> The lack of an effective forest management system following Kyrgyzstan's independence has increased mismanagement. Overall, the state is unable to ensure effective forest management on its own due to a lack of funding for protective and maintenance activities, poor legislation and corruption.<sup>174</sup>

Air pollution and waste management are environmental problems that almost exclusively affect urban areas, mainly Bishkek, Osh, Tokmok and Jalal-Abad. Although industrial air pollution decreased in the 1990s due to the economic slump, the growing amount of traffic and the burning of low-quality coal and oil for power and heating have increased toxic emissions.<sup>175</sup> The practice of illegal garbage dumping or burning is especially common in peri-urban informal settlements.<sup>176</sup> Bishkek alone has around 50 such settlements, which house around 20 per cent of the population (150,000–200,000 people). In Osh more than 50,000 people live in those semi-official settlements.<sup>177</sup>

Climate change also has a considerable impact on the Kyrgyz environment. A change of precipitation patterns and the melting of glaciers can affect the fragile water system in Central Asia. Melting glaciers can cause major changes in freshwater flows with dramatic and adverse effects on biodiversity, people and livelihoods. This can result in water scarcity, not only in Kyrgyzstan but for the whole region. Close monitoring of meteorological conditions and water levels is crucial to assess properly the ongoing and possible future effects of climate change.

### *Environmental damage – Mitigation analysis*

The government has no coherent nationwide plan on how to deal with these pressing questions. Different ministries are responsible for separate areas. Nonetheless, various international organizations have been actively running projects in different environmental fields, often in cooperation with a local ministry.

KIRFOR, a Swiss-funded project, supported the introduction of collaborative forest management (CFM) at two levels. Firstly, it focused on the walnut fruit forests in the south of the country, which are crucial for biodiversity conservation and important for local people's livelihoods. Secondly, at the national policy and legislative level, it has focused on obtaining legal recognition for CFM across the forestry sector.<sup>178</sup> The National Forestry Programme for 2005–2015 was adopted as a roadmap for consistent implementation of a forest concept. The concept is based on four pillars: institutional reform, legal reform, silvics development and public awareness.<sup>179</sup> In 1997, acknowledging the importance of environmental problems, the government approved the Concept of Environmental Security of the Kyrgyz Republic. It determines the main guiding principles behind improving environmental security, namely the need to integrate economic and environmental policies, and the principle of individual responsibility. It also provides an evaluation of environmental threats and socio-economic damage from which strategic goals, tasks and priorities are

derived, thereby suggesting short-, mid- and long-term steps that may be taken to improve environmental security.<sup>180</sup> In 2009 the government approved the UN Development Programme (UNDP) project Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic in Development of the First National Report in Response to its Obligations before the UN Convention on Climatic Change.

It is highly likely that environmental and climate problems will increase in the future, and population growth will put additional pressure on the environment. To put an effective stop to the use of illegally logged wood as an energy source, the government has to promote alternative sources at affordable prices. Due to its special topology, Kyrgyzstan has huge potential, most notably in hydrological energy. Environmental problems and their effects have different causes and symptoms in different regions. Beyond nationwide programmes, there is a need for community-based solutions and risk education. Effective waste management is particularly needed in cities and urban areas, and the regulatory framework for the disposal of industrial and hazardous waste needs to be strengthened and strictly enforced.

### ***Radioactive and hazardous waste – Threat analysis***

In the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries served as the main suppliers of natural uranium and other mineral resources. In 1955 Kyrgyzstan was the largest uranium manufacturer and the leading manufacturer of mercury, antimony and gold. All mining activities were under the control of Soviet ministries and thus out of reach of the Kyrgyz authorities. After independence Kyrgyzstan inherited the mines – and their economic and environmental problems. Due to economic difficulties and decreasing market demand, mining ceased except for gold. Today, handling mine waste is a serious problem that is aggravated by lax documentation about the exact location and content of the waste.<sup>181</sup> This has led to large amounts of radioactive waste in Kyrgyzstan not being adequately monitored and managed. Some 6,500 hectares of land have been exposed to radioactive contamination, and the country now hosts 92 hazardous dumps holding around 475 million tonnes of radioactive and toxic waste.<sup>182</sup> The Mailuu-Suu area is of particular concern; other big radioactive sites include Kara-Balta, Kadji-Say, Khaidarkan, Min-Kush, Samsar River, Shekaftar and Terek-Say.

Hazardous substances can pollute groundwater and be dispersed over large areas by the wind, thus potentially affecting neighbouring countries as well. Such a scenario amounts to an ecological catastrophe which could affect territories in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with a total population of 5 million people.

The underestimation of risks associated with mining in the early years of exploitation is causing serious challenges today. The lack of consideration for long-term stability and seismic conditions led waste dumps and tailings being located very close to human settlements or in areas that are prone to floods. Should a breach of a tailing site occur in the Mailuu-Suu area, the total volume of radioactive materials that would be brought to the Ferghana Valley could reach 1 million m<sup>3</sup>. This would contaminate up to 300 km<sup>2</sup> of agricultural land, affecting up to 100,000–120,000 people living in that area.<sup>183</sup>

Today, many of the waste dumps and tailing sites are not adequately fenced and equipped with warning signs. People access the facilities and use waste as construction material, while their cattle commonly graze on contaminated fields. Due to a lack of knowledge about the dangers, some people even dismantle existing fencing to use the material for their own purpose or for sale.

These problems are widely known and discussed. A relatively less-discussed aspect is the security threat these sites could pose, particularly in light of political instability and terrorist groups' incursions in the region. Although the material is unsuitable for fabricating nuclear weapons, it is easily obtainable and its

high levels of radioactivity make it suitable to produce radiological dispersal devices, also known as dirty bombs.<sup>184</sup> There have been several incidents of varying severity in recent years; some even led to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigations.<sup>185</sup>

### ***Radioactive and hazardous waste – Mitigation analysis***

Various organizations have been actively supporting Kyrgyzstan to secure tailing sites and waste dumps. It is important to assess the risks of existing tailing sites properly, and bring them into compliance with international safety norms by relocating hazardous material, rebuilding safety structures and replanting and reforesting the area. It is also important to fence contaminated areas properly and educate the affected population about the risks posed by hazardous materials. This subsection discusses examples of projects that have contributed to mitigating the threat of radioactive and hazardous waste in Kyrgyzstan.

In 2004 the World Bank donated US\$6.9 million for a project targeting the Mailuu-Suu area. The main objectives were to isolate and protect abandoned uranium mine tailings and waste dumps; create an effectively administered disaster management and response system; and develop and implement systems to detect and warn against active landslide movements. The government of Japan allocated US\$1.95 million to support the project, which ended in March 2010.<sup>186</sup> Another World Bank project was initiated in 2009 and aimed to move two tailing sites to a new and secure location.<sup>187</sup>

Under the Science for Peace Programme, NATO initiated two projects. The Uranium Extraction and Environmental Security in Central Asian Republics project examined the extent to which the Kyrgyz population was affected by uranium tailings. The Prevention of Landslide Dam Disasters in the Tien Shan project involved regional mapping, field investigations and 3D modelling of hazards and resulting risk scenarios. These tools were developed in close cooperation with the Kyrgyz Ministry of Emergency Situations, and have the potential to facilitate collaboration between scientists and governmental authorities.<sup>188</sup>

In 2004 the OSCE in cooperation with GeoPripor and the Kyrgyz National Academy of Science launched a project called Life Safety in Mailuu-Suu, aiming to raise awareness among citizens of the area.<sup>189</sup>

The European Community has conducted several projects under the TACIS programme. As early as 1997, a two-year project was initiated for the remediation of uranium tailings in Mailuu-Suu, including a study of environmental effects as well as the development of a management plan. In 2001 another programme was launched for the rehabilitation of tailing sites in Mailuu-Suu.<sup>190</sup>

These large-scale projects were often supported by bilateral donors. In total, Russia has invested more than US\$2 million for nuclear research since 2008.<sup>191</sup> The International Service and Technology Center contributed almost US\$50 million, spread among 140 projects related to radioactive waste in Central Asian countries.<sup>192</sup>

To combat trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, the IAEA has been supporting the training of police and customs officials.<sup>193</sup> In 2005 the IAEA launched a technical cooperation programme to coordinate a regional project involving four Central Asian member states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), with the objective of developing a consistent regulatory framework throughout the region.<sup>194</sup>

Finally, in June 2009 the Kyrgyz government and UNDP initiated a forum on “Uranium tailings in Central Asia: local problems, regional consequences, global solution”, focused on issues related to existing tailings in Central Asia.<sup>195</sup> The Kyrgyz government announced that in the near future an agency for nuclear and radiation safety will be established in Kyrgyzstan to help coordinate the work undertaken and ensure communication with neighbouring countries and the global community.<sup>196</sup>

The problem of securing nuclear tailing sites and other hazardous waste dumps remains a concern for Kyrgyzstan’s future. It requires significant investments and continuous international support. Due to the transnational character of the problem, it is also important to increase regional cooperation and assistance. To assess and mitigate the threat of hazardous waste properly, comprehensive measures with a long-term focus are needed.

### **Corruption – Threat analysis**

Corruption is a persisting problem in Kyrgyzstan, penetrating society at all levels. However, it is difficult to measure effectively as it usually wilfully hidden. Instead, proxies need to be used. Corruption is ingrained in government structures, and paying a bribe is a normal part of people’s daily lives.<sup>197</sup> Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly scored very poorly on the Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International (see Table 9.1).<sup>198</sup>

| Year    | CPI score | Position |
|---------|-----------|----------|
| 2003*   | 2.1       | 118/133  |
| 2006**  | 2.2       | 142/163  |
| 2009*** | 1.9       | 162/180  |

**Table 9.1:** Corruption Perception Index scores since 2003

Source: Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index” (updated 2014).

\*[http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2003](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003)

\*\*[http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2006](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006)

\*\*\*[http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2009/cpi\\_2009\\_table](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table)

After seizing power in 2005, President Bakiyev made fighting corruption the top priority of his administration. However, political realities soon caught up, and corruption rates in public institutions and major economic sectors have been on the rise.<sup>199</sup> Moreover, the government is perceived to have a poor record of fighting corruption, as thousands of cases of suspected official bribe-taking, negligence, fraud, embezzlement and malfeasance have reportedly led to hundreds of arrests but no convictions.<sup>200</sup>

The Global Competitiveness Report 2009–2010 ranks corruption as the most problematic aspect with doing business in Kyrgyzstan, thus it represents a significant competitive disadvantage.<sup>201</sup> The Enterprise Survey 2009 conducted by the World Bank and International Finance Corporation supported the findings.<sup>202</sup> Corruption creates an unfavourable business environment by undermining firms’ operational efficiency. Bribes were estimated to amount to around 2.5 per cent of annual sales.<sup>203</sup> Corruption permeates society at almost all levels. It is also an issue in the education sector, where bribes are paid to

pass courses or be allowed to take exams. It is estimated that only 5–10 per cent of graduates in Kyrgyzstan can be regarded as properly qualified.<sup>204</sup>

### ***Corruption – Mitigation analysis***<sup>205</sup>

Several public anti-corruption initiatives are in place in Kyrgyzstan, although their effectiveness is questionable. Concerning international legislation, Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2005, but has yet to implement it fully and bring its national legislation into conformity.

In 2005 the government approved the state anti-corruption strategy, which was developed with the participation of stakeholders from government, NGOs, mass media, business structures and international organizations. It was established as a framework to guide efforts in preventing, detecting and eliminating corruption. Its effectiveness is doubtful, due to the lack of compliance, implementation delays and insufficient involvement. Beyond the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, five other agencies deal with the issue: the Prosecutor General's Office, the State Customs Committee, the Financial Police, the National Security Service and the Ministry of Interior. However, poor cooperation and coordination as well as a lack of equipment and training have stood as major obstacles to effectiveness.

Beyond official plans to combat corruption, various private initiatives and national NGOs have made efforts. The two main NGOs in this area are Citizens against Corruption and Public Fund Future without Corruption. Moreover, the NGO Kyrgyz Parliamentarians against Corruption has been involved in the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy. The International Business Council works against corruption with the aim of making Kyrgyzstan a more attractive place for investors.<sup>206</sup> Some international NGOs are also active; most notably, Transparency International has its own office in Bishkek and has been involved in several projects, while Global Integrity regularly reports on corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

The popularity of Bakiyev's anti-corruption campaign shows that it is perceived as serious problem. However, as of 2009 there were no signs that the government had kept its promises and undertaken serious efforts to curb corruption. Various national and international laws exist, but their enforcement has been problematic. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan's legal and regulatory environment is still developing and remains highly bureaucratic, inconsistent and fraught with corruption.

It is important that local and international organizations continue to monitor the situation and actively pursue measures to improve it. Combating corruption is a long-term endeavour. Even if the authorities are serious about eradicating it, it will still take several years before signs of progress may be observed.

### ***Stratification of society (between rich and poor) – Threat analysis***

Although several indicators exist, measuring stratification of a society is a difficult enterprise, as equality is often a matter of personal perception. A distribution that is regarded as acceptable in one society may be seen as too unequal and hence undesirable in another. According to the most prominent measure of equality, the GINI index,<sup>207</sup> Kyrgyzstan exhibits low stratification of society compared to the rest of the world: with a score of 30.3, it ranks at 113 out of 134.<sup>208</sup> The world average is 40.7.<sup>209</sup> When the first measurement was carried out in 1988 during Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan's score was 26.01. After the break-up of the Soviet Union the score increased to a record of 54.88 in 1996. When inequality decreased dramatically as property structures changed, the score declined to its latest value of 30.3 in 2003.<sup>210</sup> This clearly indicates that inequality has decreased steadily since 1996.



Another indicator of equality trends is the evolution of poverty distribution. This was measured and published in a study carried out by the World Bank and the Kyrgyz Republic.<sup>211</sup> It is observed that the decrease of poverty and extreme poverty has dropped by one-third since 2000. Because of relative achievements in poverty reduction, the *distribution* of poverty did not change significantly over time. By 2005 three out of four poor and four out of five extremely poor people still lived in rural areas. The study also finds that the poor have gradually become less poor, while inequality among the poor has improved. Focusing on the 2003–2005 period, the fall in total and extreme poverty was accompanied by a fall in the poverty gap and in poverty severity. This evidence underlines the earlier observation that poverty reduction was widespread and to the benefit of a large share of the population.

It is hard to find indicators that point towards increased stratification of the society in recent years. On the contrary, the opposite has seemed to be taking place. Factors other than those that directly measure equality and poverty reduction may play a significant role in the perception of equality. The level of remittances and the composition of incomes among the different wealth quintiles can give important hints about income security as well as different groups' vulnerability to exogenous factors. The changing nature of the labour market, corresponding employment opportunities and access to governmental services can influence the perception of equality in a society. Furthermore, equality depends on everyone's perception about what is acceptable and fair. For those who still live in poverty it might not be possible to see rich people without feeling deprived. The level of social security offered by the government can also exert influence on the perception of equality. In a society where everybody is comparatively well off and able to cover basic daily needs, the sight of a few very wealthy individuals might be more acceptable.

#### ***Stratification of society (between rich and poor) – Mitigation analysis***

As equality (or perceived inequality) is not a tangible subject *per se*, it is hard to design concrete mitigation measures. The goal of achieving an equal distribution of wealth across society can only be reached by integrating relevant measures into programmes targeting economic growth and development or governmental welfare programmes. To increase equality, it is also important to ensure that social transfers (pensions, unemployment benefits etc.) benefit the intended population segment. However, even if equality were further increased in the future, it is not assured that the level of *perceived* equality would increase as well.

#### ***Low levels of professional qualification leading to shortage of qualified personnel – Threat analysis***

Low levels of professional qualification and a resulting shortage of qualified personnel can constitute a serious threat, especially in the education and health sectors. Access to education is an important determinant of human security, as lack of education can seriously compromise people's future. A strong education system and a highly educated population were perhaps the most positive features of the Soviet legacy. However, public expenditure on education has declined, and evidence shows that both access to and quality of education have dropped. In 2008 estimated enrolment rates were 86 per cent at primary level, 80 per cent at secondary level and 41 per cent at tertiary level.<sup>212</sup> Although primary general education (grades 1–9) is compulsory for all Kyrgyz citizens and is in principle free of charge, poor learning conditions, such as decaying school buildings, inadequate heating, shortage of teachers, poor teaching materials and the unavailability of public transport, have constituted barriers to school attendance.<sup>213</sup> Moreover, low teaching salaries commonly lead to corruption. In April 2009 the minimum subsistence level in Kyrgyzstan was 3,571 Soms per month, while the average salary for a university professor was between 1,800 and 3,800 Soms (US\$45–95) and the average salary for a schoolteacher was about 2,000 Soms (approximately

US\$46) per month.<sup>214</sup> According to a 2009 UNDP report assessing progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, only 13.6 per cent of 15-year-old schoolchildren in Kyrgyzstan were able to pass an internationally standardized reading exam at the minimum level for their age, and only 11.7 per cent and 11.8 per cent managed to pass natural science and maths tests, respectively.<sup>215</sup>

Educational shortcomings unquestionably contribute to the low levels of professional qualification in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, this is not the only factor. Looking to unemployment rates among people with different levels of education generates somewhat paradoxical findings (Table 9.2).

|        | Primary education | Secondary education | Tertiary education |
|--------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Male   | 2.9               | 10.1                | 25.7               |
| Female | 2.2               | 13.8                | 40.5               |
| Total  | 2.6               | 11.6                | 31.5               |

**Table 9.2:** Unemployment rate by level of education attained

Source: International Labour Organization (ILO), "Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM)", [http://www.ilo.org/empelm/what/WCMS\\_114240/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/empelm/what/WCMS_114240/lang--en/index.htm).

Considering that there is a shortage of qualified personnel, one would expect to find low unemployment levels among people with higher education. However, the opposite trend appears. Given such high unemployment along with unattractive working conditions and low salaries in many sectors, it is hardly surprising that many Kyrgyz try to find work abroad. A large number of qualified people regularly emigrate to places with better working conditions and higher salaries.

### ***Low levels of professional qualification leading to shortage of qualified personnel – Mitigation analysis***

Addressing the numerous problems in the education sector is one way of improving the population's level of qualification. The World Bank Poverty Assessment acknowledges the importance of reforming the education sector and linking education to labour market needs.<sup>216</sup> The main responsibility for reforming the sector rests with the government, which needs to set clear reform plans and guidelines. However, many options also exist for donors to get involved.

The World Bank has carried out a project to improve pre-primary and primary schooling: 49 schools all over the country were renovated and supplied with teaching books, educational toys, visual support, sports equipment and furniture.<sup>217</sup>

Another example is the involvement of the Soros Foundation and its network partners in the Education Support Program, which aims to combat social exclusion through education. The project's main goals include providing low-income families, children from minority groups and children with special needs with equal access to quality education, ensuring equitable and efficient state expenditures on education, and advancing anti-corruption and transparency measures.<sup>218</sup> The Foundation for Education Initiatives Support, a Bishkek-based local NGO, works on similar issues in coordination with international donors and the Ministry of Education and Culture.<sup>219</sup> PEAKS, a project ended in 2007, helped improve the quality of education by focusing on strengthening the quality of teaching and distributing material on improved pedagogy. Partners in this effort included the Soros Foundation, USAID, Save the Children UK and US and

Abt. Associates. UNICEF's Community Management of Education Project aims to help local communities solve education-related problems in their villages and ensure that all children regularly attend school.<sup>220</sup>

However, improving the quality of education is just one aspect of improving the level of professional qualification. Addressing the phenomenon of brain drain by providing better employment opportunities and salaries is another crucial aspect. Improving salaries and working conditions is also a first step to address the corruption problem in the education sector. Decreasing corruption and stopping the practice of buying diplomas is necessary to establish standards of qualification that can be trusted.

### ***Human trafficking – Threat analysis***

The Kyrgyz Republic "is a source, transit, and to a lesser extent a destination country" for human trafficking.<sup>221</sup> Exact data about trafficked people, especially women and children, are difficult to obtain. The cautiously estimated number of people trafficked annually from Kyrgyzstan is approximately 4,000.<sup>222</sup>

Men are often taken to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia to work on tobacco plantations, farms and construction sites. Some claim that traffickers in Kazakhstan can earn as much as US\$250,000 by supplying Kyrgyz workers to tobacco plantations for a single season.<sup>223</sup> Young women, usually under the age of 25, are commonly sold as prostitutes to clients primarily in the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Turkey, China, Germany, Greece, South Korea and Cyprus.<sup>224</sup>

Kyrgyzstan also acts as a point of transit trafficking into countries bordering Europe, such as Russia and Turkey, and to markets in China, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates. The southern borders are particularly porous and are thus potential entry points.<sup>225</sup>

Victims of trafficking are often subject to slave-like work conditions and their official documents are generally taken away, making it very difficult for them to return home. Victims say traffickers are often known to them, as friends, family members or respected elders.<sup>226</sup> Victims' testimonies depict well-organized trafficking operations, often involving the participation of local police and government officials who are in charge of immigration issues and security in airports. Kyrgyz embassies and consulates abroad have been instructed to cooperate with NGOs and law enforcement bodies to find and assist Kyrgyz citizens willing to return, but many of these government agencies have not been adequately trained on how to deal with victims of trafficking.<sup>227</sup>

### ***Human trafficking – Mitigation analysis***

In efforts to prevent trafficking, the government publishes brochures and leaflets to warn people who seek work abroad of the dangers and providing them with contact numbers for trafficking assistance hotlines in several key destination countries. The Kyrgyz government maintains migration offices in six key destination cities in Russia to inform its nationals of their rights and advise those most vulnerable to labour trafficking. It also grants in-kind assistance to an NGO-run national labour migration hotline that offers legal advice and assistance.<sup>228</sup> Several active NGOs and organizations work to combat trafficking and assist victims. Their major areas of intervention are awareness raising, prevention, rescue and reintegration, advocacy, lobbying and legal training.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has conducted several projects on the subject. First, with the support of the Norwegian government, it published *Ainura's Dream*, an anti-trafficking book for children that will become part of school curricula. Since 2002 the IOM has worked on creating a network of

NGOs which now includes 35 regular members and covers all the country's regions. The network carries out programmes on countertrafficking and provides legal assistance, while aiming to build a knowledge base about trafficking among the authorities. The project also encourages regional cooperation on combating human trafficking. The EU-UNDP programme Border Management in Central Asia focuses on battling border issues and fighting illegal activities, aiming to change negative security trends in Kyrgyzstan through better border security. It had a budget of €25 million for the period 2003–2010.<sup>229</sup> In September 2003 Winrock International was awarded support from USAID-Central Asian Republics to implement the Predotvrashcheniye Torgovli Lyudmi (Preventing Human Trafficking) project, which empowers local NGOs. It implemented a grants programme for local NGOs; training; technical assistance; information dissemination and networking; created national capacity to prevent trafficking and better serve its victims; and developed linkages between NGOs and government agencies.<sup>230</sup> The Association of NGOs Against Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia is another network of local NGOs from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which coordinates its members' efforts.

The Kyrgyz government needs to increase its efforts to prosecute and convict trafficking offenders. This includes vigorously investigating, prosecuting, convicting and punishing government officials complicit in trafficking-related crimes; improving the collection of trafficking law enforcement data; and advancing trafficking sensitivity training for police, prosecutors, and judges.<sup>231</sup> Enhanced border controls in airports are vital to achieve results in the areas mentioned above. It is also important to continue efforts to repatriate victims and ensure they are not punished for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Shelters, legal counselling and related services are therefore needed. Cooperation between NGOs should be further extended and integrated with neighbouring countries, as they all face similar patterns of trafficking.

### ***Crime – Threat analysis***

Fear of crime and violence as well as socio-economic insecurity dominate the daily lives of many people. Political unrest, economic deprivation and ordinary criminal activities are often closely intertwined, reinforcing one another. Organized crime and corruption are entrenched in society and affect political and economic interactions. This subsection outlines the most important crime trends and how they are connected, giving an overview of individual crime before turning to organized crime.

The Kyrgyz Republic has a high rate of economically motivated crime and the number of organized gangs has been on the rise. Common crimes include car theft, muggings and pickpocketing in crowded places. Petty crime touches every sector of the economy. Power outages are frequent, for example, as any sort of equipment with salvageable metal is said to be quickly stripped if left unattended.<sup>232</sup> In 2008 29,519 crimes were officially reported. Larceny constituted the biggest share, with 11,257 felonies.<sup>233</sup> As of 1 January 2009, 35.1 per cent of registered crimes remained unsolved.<sup>234</sup> It is assumed that official figures do not adequately represent the reality of crime rates in Kyrgyzstan. The homicide rate is high compared to Europe, at 8.48 homicides per 100,000 people, as opposed to less than 3/100,000.<sup>235</sup>

Crime offenders' profiles provide some insight about crime patterns. Around 50 per cent are under age 30 and only around 10 per cent are older than 49 years. Only 10 per cent of all crimes are committed by women. Interestingly, approximately 75 per cent of all crimes are committed by unemployed people. This seems to confirm the assumption that the majority of crimes are motivated by economic necessity and lack of opportunities.

Furthermore, women face gender-based threats. Domestic violence and abduction for forced marriage (bride kidnapping) are pervasive forms of crime against women. Although officially illegal, bride

kidnapping is an old Kyrgyz tradition and still practised. A survey of 1,600 Kyrgyz women showed that 83 per cent of them face domestic violence, 4 per cent face daily violence and 24 per cent were married against their will.<sup>236</sup>

Organized crime is thriving in Kyrgyzstan. Legal businesses are often involved in illegal activities, while business people, law enforcement officials and political figures are either directly involved in organized crime or maintain close ties with its representatives. Through bribery, they are able to manipulate the legal system, avoid prosecution and push through favourable deals. Frequent forms of organized crime include smuggling drugs and other valuable goods, political influence through corruption and human trafficking. Several incidents of high-ranking political figures' involvement in organized crime are widely known.<sup>237</sup>

### ***Crime – Mitigation analysis***

The occurrence of (non-gender-based) crime is closely interrelated with people's political and economic situation, as crime holds back economic and social development. Equally, low social and economic development fuels crime and political unrest. This is reflected by the high number of crimes that are committed by unemployed people. Thus all activities described above as mitigation measures for various social and economic threats are expected to have a positive impact on crime. Furthermore, curbing corruption and organized crime is likely to have positive effects on the economy and foreign investments, hence profiting economic and social development in the long run.

Gender-based violence has different causes. It is deeply engrained in the culture and regarded as normal. The Law on Social-Legal Protection from Domestic Violence, adopted in March 2003, was a first step to recognize domestic violence as a specific offence. However, the law remains rather weak, as it is missing national gender institutions and a budget to be effectively implemented.<sup>238</sup> Most activities are initiated and implemented by either NGOs or international organizations.

The Association of Crisis Centers of Kyrgyzstan was established in 2001 and constitutes a network uniting 12 women's NGOs with the goal of decreasing gender-based violence in society through networking, capacity building, lobbying and awareness raising. The Sezim centre was created in 1998 and provides temporary shelter to women and children as well as operating a hotline. Sezim has set up affiliated branches in other villages, of which three have now become independent organizations. The Women Support Centre was established in 1996 by university lecturers and women's activists, with the mission to promote gender equality in Kyrgyzstan through the advancement of human rights and active participation in democratic reforms.

Economic deprivation and a lack of opportunities are important root causes of crime in Kyrgyzstan. The government, assisted by the international community, must keep pushing for incremental programmes that address those deficits. To combat domestic and gender-based violence, it is crucial to strengthen law enforcement and assign adequate responsibilities and funding. Furthermore, it is important that local NGOs secure funding to continue their work.

### ***Application of torture by law enforcement bodies – Threat analysis***

Kyrgyzstan is a state party to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and on 14 April 2008 it ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. In addition, national legislation bans torture under Article 305-1 of the criminal code. However, there are concerns regarding compliance and torture remains a problem in Kyrgyzstan. Torture practices include

regular and severe beatings, dousing with hot and cold water, burning, solitary confinement in cells filled with chlorine water for several days, forced shaving, forced undressing in sub-zero temperatures, forced confessions under duress and forced sexual intercourse.<sup>239</sup> The trial of 32 defendants accused of organizing or participating in mass unrest in Nookat on 1 October 2008 is an illustrative example: 30 of the defendants testified that they were tortured and maltreated during detention. Some of their lawyers complained that they had no access to court materials. However, the judge neither ordered investigations of the allegations nor dismissed the evidence obtained under torture. Unusually harsh sentences ranging between nine and 20 years were imposed. In May 2009 the Supreme Court reviewed the cases but upheld the verdicts.<sup>240</sup> The right to a fair trial is severely restricted in Kyrgyzstan. This problem is worsened by the fact that the police are not the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice but under the Ministry of the Interior. Hence it is more difficult for lawyers to have access to police detention cells.<sup>241</sup>

### ***Application of torture by law enforcement bodies – Mitigation analysis***

Many national and international human rights organizations closely monitor the situation in Kyrgyzstan. International organizations include the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the World Organization against Torture, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Amnesty International, Memorial and Freedom House. National organizations include Kylym Shamy, the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights, Golos Svoboda, Ferghana Valley Lawyers without Borders, Wosduch and Spravedliwost.

Making cases of torture and abuse public is one method used to increase pressure on the government to bring those responsible to justice. Assistance and advice services to victims and their families are another form of help that is commonly offered. Law enforcement, conditions of detention and adherence to international human rights standards are the responsibility of the Kyrgyz government and hence hard to influence from outside. This makes direct lobbying of the government to stop torture and ill-treatment the only workable measure. The NGO Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights is especially active and frequently collaborates with international and national organizations. Kylym Shamy, another local NGO, develops and conducts training for police officers, defence lawyers and staff of the Department of Internal Affairs. It also runs awareness-raising campaigns targeting civil society activists, journalists and the public at large, lobbies for law reform and uses international human rights instruments to exert pressure.

A large part of the problem stems from the fact that people lose trust and confidence in the justice system when cases of abuse are revealed frequently. It is important that perpetrators be brought to justice and impunity be stopped.

### ***Inter-ethnic conflict and border problems – Threat analysis***

Kyrgyzstan inherited a large array of complicated border issues following the collapse of the Soviet Union. During Soviet times not much attention was paid to the administrative border, which was set up and shifted if necessary by party officials. Today, while some border issues have been resolved in a constructive manner, each of the remaining unsolved problems may foment an actual conflict, thus making state borders the subject of heated debates. While border demarcation with China was successfully carried out, problems still remain with Kyrgyzstan's other three neighbours, mostly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The dispute surrounding the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is problematic, as the administrative border involves a route going right across cities and villages with enclaves and exclaves. There are no clearly defined boundaries and people act out of custom and practice. The problem is that Uzbekistan refers to

official documents dating from 1924 to 1927, whereas Kyrgyzstan recognizes those dating from 1955. Furthermore, disputes frequently arise from houses or roads being located right on the border, meaning a location may bear a different name from that given in the old documents.<sup>242</sup> Conflicts at the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border are frequent, with fatal casualties having occurred in the past. Tensions around border problems increasingly complicate initiatives and solutions in other areas, such as water and energy.

The discussion around the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is similar.<sup>243</sup> Issues like grazing rights, water use and migration are added to the demarcation problem, sometimes leading to lethal incidents.<sup>244</sup> Illegal migration is another factor heightening tensions. Tajiks are gradually moving into the area by building houses that are located just inside the border. In areas that are only sparsely inhabited by Kyrgyz people, Kyrgyzstan could, if ethnicity became a defining factor, lose from one-third to one-half of its Batken *oblast* to Tajikistan.<sup>245</sup>

Incomplete delimitation has become the source of various other conflicts, such as disputes about water and territory, illegal use of land and pastures, illegal migration and violent border and customs clashes. Disputes over resources and border crossings can resemble or transform into inter-ethnic conflicts. Although frequent, so far conflicts have been only involved limited and thinly populated areas. However, there is a permanent danger of escalation to an armed conflict. The lack of state funding and the government's limited involvement to resolve border issues hinder delimitation efforts, and few international donors have supported the issue because it is mainly a national problem that is difficult to influence from outside.

### ***Inter-ethnic conflict and border problems – Mitigation analysis***

The only viable and long-term solution is the final delimitation of the border in a way that is acceptable to all parties involved. However, border delimitation requires well-planned and precise agreements instead of hasty decisions. Agreements can only be achieved through negotiation between the different governments involved. NGOs and international organizations can help in peacefully resolving conflicts, monitoring the situation, briefing people about their rights when dealing with border issues and providing training to border guards and other officials.

The public association Ferghana Valley Lawyers without Borders leads the Peaceful Borders Project, funded by USAID, which aims to reduce border-crossing problems for Kyrgyz, Uzbek and foreign citizens by improving the skills of customs and border guards. To this end, the project plans to open an information resource centre and two legal centres near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek admission posts to provide citizens with access to information. ACTED Kyrgyzstan has been involved in the field of conflict prevention in the Ferghana Valley for the past seven years and has been implementing sustainable community-based interventions, which include creating and strengthening community-based government initiatives, raising awareness about citizen rights and increasing cross-border dialogue. Border guard services and local authorities have also been closely involved in these activities.<sup>246</sup> The South Kyrgyzstan Monitoring Network is a local NGO established in response to inter-ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan. Its tasks are to present information and analysis on inter-ethnic relations in the region and strengthen local experts' analytical capacity. The Foundation for Tolerance International is working to prevent conflicts and build peace and justice in Central Asia.<sup>247</sup> It was established as an independent Kyrgyz NGO in 1998 and has developed into one of the largest and most experienced NGOs in the region, working specifically on conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>248</sup>

Other NGOs working on conflict prevention include the Institute for Regional Studies in Bishkek; the Peacebuilding Group, Pravo i Ludi and Spravedlivost in Jalal-Abad *oblast*; Luch Sveta and Yntymak-Sayasaty in Batken *oblast*; Iret and Legal Clinic in Osh *oblast*; Foundation for Peace in Central Asia; Young Lawyers of the South; Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens; Ferghana Valley Lawyers without Borders; and the Ferghana Valley network Dolina Mira.<sup>249</sup>

So far, most NGO activities have aimed to change individuals' attitudes and perceptions through training, roundtables and providing objective information. Less attention has been given to the creation and reform of political institutions. Work to reform institutions or change the behaviour of whole groups is more likely to have an impact than changing individual attitudes, because non-violent approaches would be embedded and consolidated within society. Hence it is important that NGOs enhance their cooperation with official agencies.

### ***Religious extremism – Threat analysis***

During Soviet times religion was suppressed, but after independence a revival began. Islam is the most important religion in Central Asia, and some Islamic movements have been formed over the last two decades. The strong religious revival is due to the ideological vacuum that was created after the collapse of communism, as well as religion being used as a sign of protest against communist values. Religious values are also at least in part seen as a response to decaying living standards, rising unemployment and Central Asian states' limited capacity to solve their social and economic problems.

There are about 2,000 registered mosques in Kyrgyzstan, with an estimated additional 350 unregistered ones. Many of the locally educated mullahs lack knowledge about the canons of Islam and are thus more likely to support radical ideas.<sup>250</sup> The problem of religious extremism is also an issue in the penitentiary system, where many prisoners are turned into radical Islamists.<sup>251</sup> There are four main groups that are active and considered a threat on Kyrgyz territory: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and, as has been reported, Al Qaeda. Due to the political situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, many regional units of terrorist organizations have relocated their activities to Central Asia, which might cause more radical and dangerous organizations to gain ground in the future.<sup>252</sup>

Al Qaeda and its allies are present in Kyrgyzstan, although not very active. Their strategy is assisting Central Asian *mujahedin* with training and keeping open access to the territory. Access is important, as Kyrgyzstan is part of the drug route from Afghanistan and is used as a source for illegal weapons and young jihadist fighters.<sup>253</sup>

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was formed in 1998 with the aim of overthrowing the Uzbek president and creating an Islamic state under sharia law.<sup>254</sup> During a raid in the city of Jalal-Abad, the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security found weapons, instructions for making explosives, black masks and uniforms. Further members were imprisoned after their involvement in terrorist activities was brought forward.<sup>255</sup>

The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement is a Uyghur militant organization that advocates the creation of an independent Islamic state of East Turkestan in what is currently Xinjiang region of China. It is also active on Kyrgyz territory and is supposed to have financial relations with Al Qaeda. Its main targets are in China; however, it is increasingly interested in hurting American institutions. In May 2002 two of its members were accused of planning to bomb the US embassy in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.<sup>256</sup>



The Islamic Jihad Group is active in Central Asia, but primarily in Uzbekistan. It seeks to overthrow Uzbek President Islam Karimov and establish an Islamic government in the region. The group is thought to be responsible for lethal suicide bombings at the US and Israeli embassies and the Uzbek prosecutor general's office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.<sup>257</sup>

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is the strongest group in Kyrgyzstan and supports other groups. According to the US State Department's country reports on terrorism, membership in HT has grown strongly over the last few years: in 2006 it counted only 5,000 members, but this number increased to 15,000 in 2008.<sup>258</sup> HT draws its support mainly from the ethnic Uzbek part of the population, but is also becoming increasingly popular in the north of the country. Its goal is to create a borderless, theocratic Islamic state, a caliphate, throughout the entire Muslim world. To achieve this, the use of violence against opponents is legitimate.<sup>259</sup> To attract new members and gain widespread support, HT runs social welfare activities and small-scale development projects, thus filling a gap that is left vacant by the government.<sup>260</sup>

### ***Religious extremism – Mitigation analysis***

Terrorism is a phenomenon that is hard to capture due to its clandestine nature and constant evolution. Membership and programmes are vague, and it is hard to obtain detailed information; focal points and geographic main areas of activity change over time and go beyond national borders. Furthermore, terrorist ideas can be deeply rooted in people's beliefs, and can be caused by external factors such as economic deprivation, social marginalization or a combination of these. It is impossible to attribute the causes of terrorism to just one factor.

Weak and penetrable borders facilitate cooperation among different terrorist cells and their adaptation to changing environments. Improved border management that tracks the movement of suspicious goods and people would disrupt terrorist organizations' efforts. To increase multilateral regional cooperation, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization was established in 1996 as an economic forum, but started focusing on security issues after 9/11 as the USA began utilizing the Manas airbase and the Russian airbase near Bishkek.<sup>261</sup> In 2009 a joint operation involving the border services of every Central Asian state (except Turkmenistan) was carried out to enhance security and suppress criminal groups' and organizations' activities.<sup>262</sup> The Kyrgyz government continues to improve its border security, particularly in the Batken region, with financial support from various countries. In addition, Kyrgyz military forces have been improving their counterterrorism capabilities and expanding their cooperation with regional partners.

In 2008 the government announced the formation of the new Coordination Council on the Struggle against Religious Extremism. The council will be led by the State Agency for Religious Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Secret Police. It will comprise members from other parts of the government, the Muslim Board and the Russian Orthodox Church. The council is still in the phase of formulating policies, but civil society and religious organizations have expressed concerns. Critics suspect that it is also designed to suppress unwanted minorities in the country.<sup>263</sup>

Defence against terrorism is a key priority of NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme. In September 2008 an advanced training course was held in Bishkek on the use of force in countering terrorism, providing a forum for exchanging views and increasing international dialogue and cooperation. The participants, scientists and experts from NATO and their national counterparts, examined the concept and parameters of the use of force in this context and were introduced to relevant international law and treaties related to counterterrorism and armed conflict.<sup>264</sup>

As explained above, it is difficult to fight terrorism effectively. Economic development, reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and stable and legitimate states are all part of addressing its root causes. Because terrorism is a transnational problem, affected states should continue to work together and enhance their cooperation on coordinated intelligence, immigration, border security and arms and narcotics trafficking. It is important that any mitigation measure to improve security be implemented in accordance with fundamental human rights such as religious freedom and freedom of expression.

## CORE THREATS

Using threat analysis and the human insecurity index, the next step is to determine the key threats to human security in Kyrgyzstan (human insecurity cluster), and follow up with further steps in the OPHUSEC approach. A preliminary review and selection of key threats are offered here, based on OPHUSEC guidelines (see Chapter 1 and Cahier 21):

- key threats are existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals
- they are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes
- they can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and the strengthening of coping capacities
- success and multi-actor collaboration for mitigation are both possible and feasible.

This review has revealed four core threats warranting further OPHUSEC analysis and the development of mitigation measures and strategies: “maternal and infant and under-five mortality”, “malnutrition”, “HIV/AIDS” and “vulnerability to illness and diseases”. These threats cumulatively fulfil all four OPHUSEC criteria. They share several common root causes with numerous other threats, and it is possible to address these root causes. For instance, improvement of the national health system, awareness-raising campaigns, feeding programmes and nutritional supplements are all strategies to alleviate root causes across a number of threats. Although costly and time consuming, these measures have already shown positive results. As discussed in the threat analysis, multi-actor collaboration is already common in the existing mitigation and coping strategies, showing that relevant capabilities exist and effective responses are indeed possible. For instance, the Ministry of Health is supported by many national and international actors. Furthermore, various actors have taken independent steps to improve the Kyrgyz population’s health conditions. Indeed, it is highly recommended to increase collaboration to assist the government and alleviate these threats in the long run. Due to the same or similar root causes, mitigation measures addressing one threat are likely to have positive spill-over effects for the other threats.

Although political violence cannot be considered a core threat according to OPHUSEC guidelines, it is important to keep track of developments, as a deteriorating political situation or even renewed war will affect many other threats extremely negatively. This was illustrated with the June 2010 eruption of violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, which led to the central government’s *de facto* loss of control over the south of the country. These developments evidenced the lack of political legitimacy enjoyed by the interim government that overthrew President Kurmanbek Bakiy in April 2010, while risking destabilizing the region.<sup>265</sup> However, it is difficult to develop mitigation or coping capacities for political violence. The magnitude of influencing factors and actors involved make it hard to influence political stability.

## CONCLUSION

This study analyses specific threats to Kyrgyzstan through a human security lens. It highlights that many threats faced there are common to poor and developing countries (e.g. infant and maternal mortality, malnutrition, poor health, a decaying educational system). Other threats are common to many newly independent states because they are largely caused by the still ongoing transition resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union. In successful market economies the role of the state and its activities are differently defined compared to a centrally planned economy. Allocation and distribution of resources, organization of commercial activities and the demands on the legal and administrative system are just a few areas that differ markedly under the new system. The state's role is cut back and concentrates on carrying out a few core responsibilities, such as upholding rule of law, providing reliable public services, maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and creating a fair and transparent regulatory framework for private sector activity. These are all aspects of "good governance", which is an essential condition for successful and stable long-term development. Threats like alcoholism, unemployment, agricultural problems, decaying infrastructure, weak governmental services, social stratification, corruption and inter-ethnic conflict are typical problem areas for transitional countries. Other threats seem to be more specific to the local context (e.g. drug addiction and industry, blackouts, radioactive waste and religious extremism).

Although some threats are shared by many countries, mitigation measures have to be specifically adapted to the context and involve local agents. Reaching an adequate understanding of the types of measures in place and those required for more effective threat mitigation was part of the analysis. The quantitative measure of human security has been proposed to help not only to estimate the importance of threats and visualize them in a comparative context, but also to track and monitor them within a local framework.

In a country as diverse as Kyrgyzstan, no single solution can address the current array of threats to human security. Sparsely populated mountains pose different challenges to those found in densely populated urban regions. The rough topography and the problems caused as a result of the transition from Soviet rule complicate the even delivery of public services: poor and rural people are often excluded and face threats that differ from those confronting urban people. Thus for Kyrgyzstan it would be very useful to conduct a threat assessment for the different geographic areas, or at least distinguishing urban from rural areas, as specific threats only face certain segments of the population or have different symptoms and causes. An example of the latter is environmental pollution: urban areas are affected by air pollution and pollution due to solid waste, while in rural areas deforestation and pasture degradation are the greatest concern. In light of these aspects, the OPHUSEC framework is a useful tool, particularly as such actor-based assessments show who is threatened by which threat, where and to what degree. Moreover, it allows one to develop nuanced mitigation measures that target the essence of a problem while taking regional, gender and ethnic differences into account.

On a final note, one particularly important aspect (and challenge!) for poor countries undergoing political, security, social and economic transitions is the funding of mitigation and coping capacities. Governments will rarely be able to cope with the whole array of threats. Poor economic performance and deficits in legal frameworks are great obstacles to effective threat mitigation. For instance, an uncertain political environment can be detrimental to the acquisition of external funds or continued and active in-country support by international actors.

It is important to monitor how the human security situation and political situation develop, as this will strongly affect mitigation measures and influence the evolution of many threats currently endangering

security for the Kyrgyz people and their state. The further weakening of the government and its structures can heighten societal tensions and increase Kyrgyzstan's vulnerability to human security threats.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Although revised and edited in December 2012, the bulk of the chapter was written in November 2009, based on research carried out in the preceding months. The study was prepared as a contribution to the OPHUSEC project, which, as the main focus of this volume, is presented in more detail in Chapters 1, 2 and 12. It resembles the first two steps of the full range of OPHUSEC activities, including multistakeholder consultations on core threats and priority mitigation measures. If part of a fully implemented OPHUSEC project, the study would eventually serve as the basis of recurrent threat and mitigation assessments carried out at regular intervals. More current assessments would reveal results of more contemporary relevance.

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<sup>7</sup> World Facts Index, "Kyrgyzstan", 2008, <http://worldfacts.us/Kyrgyzstan.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, data are based on CIA, note 2 above.

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<sup>12</sup> CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>13</sup> International Monetary Fund, note 10 above, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>15</sup> More details can be found in UN Country Team, note 9 above.

<sup>16</sup> CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>17</sup> UN Country Team, note 9 above, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup> UNDP, "The Second Periodic Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals in the Kyrgyz Republic", 2009, p. 18, [www.undp.kg/en/resources/e-library/article/28-e-library/564-mdg-progress-report-2009](http://www.undp.kg/en/resources/e-library/article/28-e-library/564-mdg-progress-report-2009).

<sup>19</sup> See [http://eng.gov.kg/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=41](http://eng.gov.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=41).

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<sup>207</sup> This index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. It is calculated from the Lorenz curve, in which cumulative family income is plotted against the number of families, arranged from the poorest to the richest. The index is the ratio of the area between a country's Lorenz curve and the 45° helping line to the entire triangular area under the 45° line. The more equal a country's income distribution, the closer its Lorenz curve is to the 45° line and the lower its Gini index, e.g. a Scandinavian country with an index of 25. The more unequal a country's income distribution, the further its Lorenz curve is from the 45° line and the higher its Gini index, e.g. a sub-Saharan country with an index of 50. If income were distributed with perfect equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 45° line and the index would be zero; if income were distributed with perfect inequality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the horizontal axis and the right vertical axis and the index would be 100.

<sup>208</sup> CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>209</sup> Nationmaster, "GINI Index per Country", 2003, [www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco\\_gin\\_ind-economy-gini-index](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gin_ind-economy-gini-index).

<sup>210</sup> See Nationmaster, "GINI Index – Kyrgyzstan Historical Data", 2003, [www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=eco\\_gin\\_ind-economy-gini-index&country=kg-kyrgyzstan](http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=eco_gin_ind-economy-gini-index&country=kg-kyrgyzstan).

<sup>211</sup> World Bank, note 154 above, pp. 19ff.

<sup>212</sup> See [www.nationmaster.com/red/country/kg-kyrgyzstan/edu-education&all=1](http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/kg-kyrgyzstan/edu-education&all=1).

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<sup>214</sup> Ahiyam, note 204 above, p. 1.

<sup>215</sup> Cited in Hamid Toursunof, "Kyrgyzstan: A Corrupted Future", 2009, <http://chalkboard.tol.org/kyrgyzstan-a-corrupted-future>.

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<sup>217</sup> World Bank, "Education for All Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund Grant", 2010, <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P106451&theSitePK=40941&piPK=64290415&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&Type=Overview>.

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<sup>221</sup> US Department of State, "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009", 2009, p. 181, [www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/](http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/).

<sup>222</sup> Winrock International, "Preventing Human Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan Project", 2005, p. 5, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACG548.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG548.pdf).

<sup>223</sup> Aigul Rasulova, "Kyrgyzstan Struggles to Stop Slave Trade", 2004, January 2010, [www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav062904.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav062904.shtml).

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> UNDP in Europe and Central Asia, "New Gear to Help Kyrgyzstan Battle Border Problems", 2009, <http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/722D9750-F203-1EE9-B4FD3D04B4FA67E6>.

<sup>226</sup> OSCE, "Successful Prosecution of Human Trafficking – Challenges and Good Practices", 2008, p. 6, [www.osce.org/documents/cthb/2008/10/34495\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/cthb/2008/10/34495_en.pdf).

<sup>227</sup> Winrock International, note 222 above, pp. 5ff.

<sup>228</sup> US Department of State, note 221 above, p. 181.

<sup>229</sup> UNDP in Europe and Central Asia, note 225 above.

<sup>230</sup> Winrock International, note 222 above, p. 4.

- <sup>231</sup> US Department of State, note 221 above, p. 181.
- <sup>232</sup> See Country Data Online, “Kyrgyzstan”, 1996, [www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7697.html](http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7697.html).
- <sup>233</sup> See [www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/Соц/Кыргызстан%20в%20цифрах/Преступность/Prest%201.pdf](http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/Соц/Кыргызстан%20в%20цифрах/Преступность/Prest%201.pdf).
- <sup>234</sup> See [www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/Соц/Кыргызстан%20в%20цифрах/Преступность/Prest%201.pdf](http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/Соц/Кыргызстан%20в%20цифрах/Преступность/Prest%201.pdf).
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## CHAPTER 10

### Human insecurity and security in Nepal

Ina Amann

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter,<sup>1</sup> based on research carried out in 2009, analyses the security situation of the Nepalese population through a human security lens. It is organized in three main sections. The first part describes the general country context, highlighting some of its most important historical, political and socio-economic developments. The second section explores a range of human security threats and a selection of mitigation measures. Using the Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project approach (see Chapter 2), the final section identifies the core threats to Nepalese human security, while the conclusion summarizes the main arguments and findings.

#### COUNTRY CONTEXT

The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (referred to as Nepal throughout this chapter) is a landlocked country in South Asia. At position 144 of 188 on the Human Development Index, Nepal has low levels of development. Kathmandu is the capital and largest city. In 2009, when the research for this study was carried out, Nepal had a population of 28 million.<sup>2</sup> The terrain is divided into the Terai or flat river plain in the south (27 per cent), the central hill region (42 per cent) and the rugged Himalayas to the north (35 per cent). Only 17 per cent of the population live in urban areas, making Nepal one of the least urbanized countries worldwide.

#### *Political development*

In 1951 the Nepalese monarch ended the previous system of rule by hereditary premiers and instituted a cabinet system. In 1959, after years of power wrangling, the king ended the democratic experiment and instituted an absolute monarchy. In 1989 the Jan Andolan (People's Movement) forced the monarchy to accept constitutional reforms. These reforms did not put an end to political instability; an insurgency led by Maoist extremists broke out in 1996, escalating into civil war. After several weeks of mass protests in April 2006, known as Jan Andolan II, months-long peace negotiations between the Maoists and government officials culminated in a November 2006 peace accord. The king agreed to reinstate the House of Representatives. Using its sovereign authority, the House of Representatives abolished the monarchy, and on 28 May 2008 the government declared Nepal to be a secular and inclusive democratic republic.<sup>3</sup> However, political tensions and resulting power-sharing struggles have continued, and the political situation remains highly fragile.

### *Economic situation<sup>4</sup>*

Nepal is among the poorest countries in the world, with almost one-third of its population living below the poverty line. The average GDP per capita is \$1,100 (2008), and unemployment is estimated at around 46 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

In predominantly rural Nepal, agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, providing a livelihood for 75 per cent of the population and accounting for 33 per cent of the country's total GDP.<sup>6</sup> Industrial activity accounts for 16.6 per cent of GDP and 6 per cent of employment. Services make up 50.9 per cent of GDP, employing 18 per cent. Among the main problems for Nepal's future economic development (as of 2009) are the small size of the economy, a lack of skilled labour, technological backwardness, remoteness and its landlocked geographic location, as well as continuing political unrest, natural disasters and poor infrastructure.

### *Socio-cultural dimension*

Nepal is ethnically, culturally and geographically diverse. The 2001 census identified 103 distinct castes and ethnic groups, which can be arranged into five broad cultural groups: the caste-origin Hindu groups; the Newar, the Janajati, Muslims and others.<sup>7</sup> The main religion is Hinduism (80.6 per cent), followed by Buddhism (10.7 per cent), Islam (4.2 per cent) and Kirant Mundhum (3.6 per cent), with only 0.9 per cent belonging to other religions.<sup>8</sup> Based on the 2001 census, 92 languages are spoken as mother tongues. Many Nepalese in government and business also speak English.<sup>9</sup>

### *Human development situation<sup>10</sup>*

Although there has been a huge improvement over the past ten years, Nepal still scores badly on most human development indicators. Life expectancy at birth is only **65.46 years**, while under-five and infant mortality rates are high.<sup>11</sup> The literacy rate is only 48.6 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

The prevalence of diseases is higher than in other South Asian countries.<sup>13</sup> Healthcare facilities, hygiene, nutrition and sanitation are generally poor and beyond the means of most people, especially in rural areas. In addition to general health problems and risks, women face particular challenges during and after pregnancy. Poor maternal health and nutrition also affect new-borns: 27 per cent have low birth weights.<sup>14</sup> The Nepalese suffer from alarming rates of malnutrition.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, Nepal has numerous environmental problems which directly affect economic growth and individuals' livelihoods.

## HUMAN SECURITY THREAT AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS

The analysis presented in this chapter follows a broad definition of human security, as presented by the OPHUSEC project. Human security requires “individual-centred security provision and threat mitigation”.<sup>16</sup> Human security provision involves “internal and external approaches towards lowering levels of fear, threat and want” to assure basic and existential individual and community security.<sup>17</sup>

### *Operationalizing human security*

Taken seriously, the human security concept offers the opportunity to improve livelihood conditions for populations living under precarious conditions. Based on an analysis of existing papers and studies on prevalent threats to human security in Nepal, the following list of threats has been assembled:

- infant and under-five mortality
- maternal health and mortality
- malnutrition
- insufficient road network (mobility and accessibility)
- unemployment
- vulnerability to illness and diseases
- HIV/AIDS
- health system
- natural disasters (floods, storms, landslides, earthquakes)
- environmental damage
- landmines and ERW (explosives remnants of war)
- education
- human trafficking
- crime
- political violence.

Following the OPHUSEC methodology, ideally these initial threat assessments would be examined and verified by a wide range of local, national and international stakeholders. As a background study, the following more detailed analysis is based on desk research.

### *Infant and under-five mortality – Threat analysis*

With an under-five mortality rate of 76 per 1,000 live births, Nepal ranks among the bottom 30 per cent worldwide. Death is most commonly due to neonatal causes (44 per cent), diarrhoea (20 per cent), pneumonia (19 per cent), measles (3 per cent), injuries (2 per cent), malaria (1 per cent) and other causes (11 per cent).<sup>18</sup> The most common reasons for neonatal deaths are pre-term birth (30 per cent), infections (27 per cent), birth asphyxia (23 per cent), congenital anomalies (6 per cent), tetanus (4 per cent) and diarrhoea (3 per cent).<sup>19</sup> Mortality rates depend greatly on the social group, caste or region to which a person belongs.<sup>20</sup> In addition, exposure to lethal risks is 1.8 times higher for rural than for urban babies, as access to healthcare and the nutritional state of children tend to worsen among rural, poor and marginalized groups.<sup>21</sup> Infant mortality and maternal health also depend on the educational level of the mother.

### ***Infant and under-five mortality – Mitigation analysis***

In addressing the problems of neonatal deaths it is equally important to address maternal health, as most pre-term births are due to poor maternal health. This point is analysed further in the next section.

The national immunization campaign seems to have been successful. In recent years considerable progress has been achieved in child immunization: a total of 59 per cent of children under the age of five are fully immunized, 33 per cent are partially immunized and only 7 per cent are not immunized at all, with differences persisting between rural and urban as well as between poor and rich populations.

Numerous organizations aim at improving child nutrition, as this strengthens their health and thus assists in preventing diseases and illnesses. In treatment centres malnourished children receive a combination of fortified milk- and peanut-based, ready-to-use therapeutic food.

Further causes of bad health and child mortality include a lack of vitamin A and the presence of worms. A worming and vitamin A supplement programme was developed in 1993 and expanded across Nepal by 2002. Twice a year all children are given a high-dosage vitamin A capsule and a worming tablet. This programme covers approximately 98 per cent of all children and is thought to avert about 15,000–20,000 deaths per year.<sup>22</sup> The government and the Ministry of Health are supported by a variety of external actors, such as the Nepali Technical Assistance Group, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the US Agency for International Development.

An expansion of the national vaccination campaign, especially among rural and poor populations, could further increase the immunization rates. Furthermore, child nutrition programmes and the vitamin A and worming programmes need to be both continued and expanded to pregnant women.

Young children are dependent on help, and cannot take care of their own health and nutrition; thus issues of child and new-born health must be included in maternal programmes. As most health issues are particularly urgent in rural areas, it is important to train local health workers to take programmes into the countryside.

### ***Maternal mortality – Threat analysis***

Measuring the real number of maternal mortalities is difficult. Figures range from 280 per 100,000 births to a more pessimistic 830 per 100,000 births. Most estimates report a rate of around 500,<sup>23</sup> a level comparable to the poorest African countries. In total, 27 per cent of all deaths of women aged 15–49 years are attributed to complications related to childbirth.<sup>24</sup> The high level of maternal mortality stems in large measure from the low levels of access to prenatal, delivery and postnatal care. Only 57 per cent of all women receive prenatal care and just 13 per cent have postnatal check-ups. An estimated 84 per cent of all births take place at home; only 64 per cent are assisted by friends or family members, while a professional midwife or doctor is present in just 20 per cent of all deliveries.<sup>25</sup> In rural areas and among poor families the figures are even more worrisome. The most common causes of death are haemorrhages (46.3 per cent), followed by obstructed labour (16.3 per cent), eclampsia (14.3 per cent) and puerperal sepsis (11.8 per cent). A further major contributor to maternal death is anaemia: almost 60 per cent of all Nepalese women are anaemic, often due to nutritional deficiencies and hookworm infections.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, cultural and religious beliefs have a negative effect on maternal health. Menstruation, childbirth and the ten days immediately following childbirth are considered to be periods of impurity, during which women are secluded and sometimes kept in unhygienic places like cowsheds. Women are often unaware of the signs of pregnancy or delivery complications and, as a result of their low societal status, are rarely encouraged to seek professional help.

### ***Maternal mortality – Mitigation analysis***

Aided by numerous national and international donors, the Nepal Ministry of Health and Population has been committed to improving access to higher-quality health services for mothers. The most comprehensive and long-term cooperation framework is provided under a joint venture between Safe Motherhood Network Federation, a Nepal-based federation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with motherhood issues, and Support to the Safe Motherhood Programme (SSMP), a UK-funded bilateral support programme to the government of Nepal.<sup>27</sup> This initiative attempts to coordinate and include as many like-minded activities and agencies as possible.

The most obvious area of work is the improvement of health facilities and the training of qualified staff. SSMP works at the national level with the Family Health Division and other partners to develop and implement national quality standards and promote integrated safe motherhood and new-born health services. Furthermore, SSMP supports the implementation of programmes to develop health facility infrastructure.

Advocacy is an important activity that helps feed women's health issues into official programmes. SSMP works to strengthen government capacity and policy development. It initiated the practice of drawing on women's festivals (such as Teej) for awareness raising by organizing rallies with street drama and featuring songs related to issues of birth and female health. In addition, SSMP works with the Health Management Information System Unit and Family Health Division to ensure that the national monitoring system supports programme needs and key information is effectively analysed and disseminated.

The high costs of health services are barriers for many women. The SSMP Equity and Access Programme addresses social attitudes and practices that act as such barriers. SSMP supports the implementation of an innovative national maternity incentives scheme to reduce costs and provide incentives to give birth in a health facility; it helps women meet their travel costs and other expenses associated with the delivery.

During the past decade the maternal mortality rate has dropped and many improvements have been made. Ongoing activities seem to cover the most important areas that affect maternal health. However, an extension of incentive schemes and health insurance is required to increase access for poor and rurally based women who continue to be at high risk of maternal mortality.

### ***Malnutrition – Threat analysis***

Nepal does not face famines, but chronic malnourishment. This is the case despite the fact that the majority of the population live off agriculture. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), 17 per cent of the population suffer from malnutrition, and in some areas even up to 80 per cent. Children are a particular concern, with 48 per cent facing malnourishment.<sup>28</sup>

The causes of malnourishment are diverse and multidimensional. One reason is vulnerability to international price fluctuations and resulting price hikes on the food market. As food stock levels in the country are relatively low, Nepal has to import food, mainly from India. During the food crisis of 2008, 80 per cent of households in Nepal experienced difficulties in purchasing food.<sup>29</sup> Increasing fuel prices also drive up transport costs and thus food prices. A further important cause of malnutrition is lack of market access, often due to poor or non-existent roads.

Natural disasters and harsh weather conditions can have several effects on people's access to food. First, they influence the harvest yields. This is especially important for subsistence farmers in very

remote areas. About 65 per cent of landholdings are rain-fed rather than irrigated, and thus dependent on favourable weather conditions. Furthermore, natural disasters block or even destroy key market access roads, along with strikes, bans and similar events, which were important factors in the deteriorating situation in 2008 and limited access to food.<sup>30</sup> Another factor affecting people's secure access to (often home-grown) food is sickness. While around 78 per cent of all households depend on agriculture, subsistence farmers who heavily rely on manpower are among those who cannot afford to get sick.<sup>31</sup>

### ***Malnutrition – Mitigation analysis***

Due to the various sources of food threats and malnutrition, there are several options for mitigation. Initiatives are taken by the government and national as well as international NGOs.

One area of work has included the protection of livelihoods in crises that were mainly caused by natural disasters. Over the last two years the WFP alone has provided emergency food assistance to nearly 1 million people whose lives were devastated by floods and droughts. Food assistance is also given to people in areas with chronic food shortage. Special attention is paid to children. To increase school attendance rates, especially among girls, food is distributed in schools, reaching 450,000 children.<sup>32</sup> A further important step is the distribution of enriched food to children and pregnant women through maternal and child healthcare programmes. This helps reduce nutritional deficits for small children and women, especially iron deficits that cause anaemia.

The development of infrastructure, especially the construction of all-weather roads in rural areas, is a vital contribution to mitigating food deficits in the long run. To reduce dependency on imported food, investments in irrigation and other agricultural techniques are required. As such, distribution of seeds, veterinary training and herd monitoring are important activities.<sup>33</sup> Another area is food monitoring. Putting in place early-warning systems in vulnerable regions could indicate shortages at an early stage to prevent severe malnutrition and shortages in the longer term.<sup>34</sup> The programmes described above are fairly comprehensive. International cooperation and funding are crucial to sustain many of these activities.

### ***Insufficient road network – Threat analysis***

A working road network is vital for providing access to facilities like markets, healthcare centres, post offices and bus stops. In Nepal the road network is highly underdeveloped. In 2008 the total network covered 24,000 km (30 per cent paved, 27 per cent gravel and 43 per cent dirt roads). With a road density of just 6.39 km per 100 km<sup>2</sup>, Nepal lags behind most Asian countries. Some villages are as far as 13 days' walking distance from the nearest roadhead.<sup>35</sup> The poor condition of the roads hampers the delivery of social services in remote hill and mountainous districts and hinders economic development. Especially in rural areas and mountain regions there is very little access to vehicle-passable roads. In urban areas it takes on average 21 minutes to reach a paved road, while in rural areas it takes on average 5 hours 11 minutes.<sup>36</sup> This problem severely limits mobility, and in emergencies it is impossible to deliver effective relief to the people.

### ***Insufficient road network – Mitigation analysis***

The only viable mitigation measure is to build new roads while investing in the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing roads. There has been useful support from various donors.<sup>37</sup> Due to these efforts it was possible to increase the strategic road network from 4,740 km in 1998 to 9,399 km in 2006/2007. The

government is anticipating a further increase to 12,000 km by 2017.<sup>38</sup> As a result of the planned maintenance management system for Nepal's main roads, the number of roads classified as being in "good" condition increased from 5 per cent in 1992 to 63 per cent in 2001. The roads deemed to be in "bad" shape dropped from 45 per cent to 4 per cent within the same period.<sup>39</sup> In addition, Roads Board Nepal<sup>40</sup> was established under the Roads Board Act 2058 (2002) with the aim of providing sustainable funds for the planned road maintenance.

Despite these achievements, there is still tremendous demand for rural road development. Even though the rural network has grown by 11 per cent annually in recent years, the country's road network and density are still the lowest in the region.<sup>41</sup> The inclusion of local needs and environmentally friendly and participatory approaches is important for wider acceptance and more successful implementation of road-building policies and projects.

### ***Unemployment – Threat analysis***

Nepal's total labour force in 2009 numbered 14.6 million. The 2008 unemployment rate was 46 per cent, a slight increase from the 2004 figures (42 per cent).<sup>42</sup> This is especially precarious as Nepal has one of the highest dependency ratios in the world, with 84 dependants for every 100 people of working age.<sup>43</sup> Especially young, poorly educated people and women are at a disadvantage. Underemployment has also increased, as 42 per cent of working people – mostly young and undereducated individuals – are considered to be underemployed.<sup>44</sup> This indicates a lack of capacity by the local economy to provide productive employment opportunities. Due to this lack of opportunities, the level of labour migration is high, even among well-educated people. The resulting brain drain causes a severe lack of skilled labour. Males comprise 89.1 per cent and females 10.9 per cent of migrants, with most coming from rural Nepal (90 per cent).<sup>45</sup> Many emigrants send remittances to their families at home. Remittances constitute 35.4 per cent of the total household income in Nepal.<sup>46</sup>

### ***Unemployment – Mitigation analysis***

The task of creating better employment opportunities is mainly the government's responsibility. The government has identified employment creation as a pressing issue and ranked it as a high priority within national socio-economic policy.<sup>47</sup> To achieve its targets, the government has adopted strategies to attract investment; ensure industrial peace through social dialogue; revise policy and legal provisions to govern labour relations in the informal economy; strengthen labour administration; establish a social security fund; run social insurance and microfinance programmes jointly with trade unions in the informal economy; use labour-intensive technologies for job creation whenever possible; provide employment guarantee programmes; and establish employment information centres.<sup>48</sup> But all these ambitious and well-sounding mitigation measures are severely hampered by a lack of state resources and the unstable political situation. It is thus important that the government receives external support.<sup>49</sup>

In light of ongoing population growth and the existing age demographics it is likely that unemployment will continue to be a challenge for human security in Nepal. Besides programmes that directly target unemployment, it is necessary to focus on its background causes and the effects of remittances on the economy.

### ***Vulnerability to illness and diseases – Threat analysis***

Some of the major threats to the health and life of Nepalese people are malaria, tuberculosis (TB), diarrhoea and respiratory infections.

Approximately 45 per cent of the population are infected with TB.<sup>50</sup> Nepal has been reporting 2–3 per cent multi-drug-resistant TB among all new cases, which is a major concern for national programmes. Although drug-resistant TB is generally treatable, it requires extensive chemotherapy (up to two years of treatment) with second-line anti-TB drugs that are more costly than first-line drugs.<sup>51</sup> Left untreated, a person with active TB will on average infect between ten and 15 others every year.

Malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes carrying the parasite. Malaria makes people more prone to be anaemic, and to develop fevers and symptoms comparable to the flu. In combination with an already detrimental health condition, it can be lethal. In 2003 9,394 cases of malaria were confirmed, but it is estimated that the total number of cases was about 56,640.<sup>52</sup> In total, 15.6 million people live in areas at risk.<sup>53</sup> At the same time the morbidity rate stood at 0.51 per 1,000 people.<sup>54</sup>

Diarrhoea is a constant problem that is closely monitored by the WHO Nepal office. During the first eight months of 2009, 52,014 people were affected and 282 died of diarrhoea.<sup>55</sup> It can be caused by several factors, including viruses, bacteria and parasites. These microorganisms usually live in food or water of poor quality, and develop extremely well under poor sanitary and moist conditions.

Respiratory infections are responsible for 10 per cent of all deaths in Nepal.<sup>56</sup> These infections are slightly more common among urban people and men. They are usually caused by a virus or bacteria. Bad air quality, smoking, and indoor burning of fuelwood and its resulting pollution can increase the symptoms of and vulnerability to respiratory problems.

### ***Vulnerability to illness and diseases – Mitigation analysis***

Overall, Nepal's health system needs to be improved. For the most common diseases there are a variety of organizations and mitigation measures in place.

*Malaria* control services are provided to approximately 15.6 million people in areas at risk. The current malaria control strategies are very comprehensive and include a variety of measures.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, it is very hard to avoid malaria infections completely. The low mortality rate shows that the measures in place are quite effective.

To fight *tuberculosis*, in 1996 the Ministry of Health introduced the directly observed treatment short course, which has already reduced the numbers of deaths. Its five pillars are political commitment; diagnosis by microscopy; uninterrupted drug supply; daily observed therapy; and monitoring and supervision. By July 2000 the programme had been expanded to 178 treatment centres in 66 districts, reaching 75 per cent of the population. The treatment success rate in these centres is now approximately 89 per cent, and the national treatment success rate has nearly reached 85 per cent.

To prevent *diarrhoea* epidemics, education and awareness play an important role, particularly as unclean water and food as well as unhygienic conditions are among the major causes. The WHO estimates that in 2006 88 per cent of people in rural areas and 94 per cent in urban areas had access to drinking water. Improved sanitation facilities are available for 24 per cent in rural areas and 45 per cent in urban areas. Diarrhoea outbreaks are closely monitored by the WHO and the Ministry of Health to coordinate special mitigation measures according to the seriousness of the outbreak.<sup>58</sup>



It is important to develop Nepal's general health system further, as this will make it easier to deal with common diseases. In addition, the special programmes that are in place seem to be successful and thus need to be maintained. In the cases of malaria and diarrhoea, a strong emphasis has to be put on educating people about transmission and risks.

### *HIV/AIDS – Threat analysis*

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Nepal is estimated to concern 0.5 per cent of the population, meaning that 70,000 people live with HIV (confidence interval: 50,000–99,000), of whom 17,000 are women.<sup>59</sup> A mere 13 per cent of HIV-infected people were receiving antiretroviral therapy by the end of 2007.<sup>60</sup>

The most vulnerable groups are female sex workers and their clients, injecting drug users (IDUs), men who have sex with men, transgender persons and migrants.<sup>61</sup> According to Nepal's 2007 UN General Assembly Special Session report, labour migrants make up 41 per cent of all known HIV infections, followed by clients of sex workers (15.5 per cent) and IDUs (10.2 per cent).<sup>62</sup> Approximately 1.5–2.0 million people migrate seasonally.<sup>63</sup> Removed from their traditional social structures they often practise unsafe sex with varying, mainly commercial, partners. Men working abroad can acquire the virus and, once they return, pass it to their wives, who then risk infecting their children.

There are 25,000–34,000 female sex workers in Nepal, with an estimated HIV prevalence of 1.3–1.6 per cent on average, reaching a peak of 15–17 per cent in Kathmandu Valley.<sup>64</sup> They are socially marginalized, which prevents them from seeking medical services or negotiating the use of condoms with their clients. Often they also lack knowledge about how the virus is transmitted.<sup>65</sup>

Most of Nepal's drug addicts use injection drugs because they are considered to be more cost effective. Around 6,500 IDUs live with HIV or AIDS; most of them are in the Highway districts and Kathmandu Valley. HIV prevalence among IDUs was 34.7 per cent in 2007.<sup>66</sup> The situation is made more complicated by the stigmatization and discrimination caused by HIV/AIDS, plus the lack of knowledge about its prevention and treatment. Only 44 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females have comprehensive knowledge about HIV/AIDS.<sup>67</sup>

### *HIV/AIDS – Mitigation analysis*

In 1988, after the first cases of HIV were reported, the government launched the first national AIDS prevention and control programme. Today, the main government agency responsible for HIV/AIDS is the National Center for AIDS and STD Control.<sup>68</sup> In addition to governmental bodies there are almost 100 NGOs and other organizations working on this issue in Nepal, with international donors supplying 98 per cent of their budget.

In 2009 most recent data suggested a stabilization of the epidemic and a downward trend among key high-risk groups, indicating that the measures in place were effective. Antiretroviral treatment coverage has increased from no free or publicly available treatment three years ago to access to free treatment for at least 13 per cent of those estimated to be in need of it.<sup>69</sup>

Addressing the HIV epidemic in Nepal requires both immediate action and long-term continuity and sustainability. Considering the important role played by international funds and programmes, it is crucial to secure their long-term support. HIV/AIDS has to be seen as a development issue that requires a multisectoral approach and inputs from a variety of actors.

### ***Health system – Threat analysis***

The Nepalese health system is organized on four levels: central, regional, district and community/primary healthcare. It is quite weak and, compared to its neighbours, has a much lower doctor-per-patient ratio. For the year 2001, which were the latest data available at the time this research was carried out, the Ministry of Health reported a ratio of one doctor per 20,000 people. In India this ratio is 1:1,700 and in China 1:950. Estimates by the WHO indicate that at remote facilities essential drugs are available in only 40 per cent of all cases.

### ***Health system – Mitigation analysis***

In general the Nepalese health system needs to be further developed, especially in rural areas. In 1991 a national health policy was formulated, addressing service delivery as well as the administrative structures of the health system. Government expenditure on the health system as a proportion of total expenditure has been relatively high, reaching 9.2 per cent in 2009.<sup>70</sup> Government efforts to strengthen healthcare infrastructure are often supported by external development partners.<sup>71</sup>

The difficult geographical conditions make it hard to develop an effective health system across all of Nepal, although this is exactly what is needed, particularly in rural areas. It is important to incorporate health issues in the political planning process and to strengthen international partnerships. Moreover, increased involvement of health volunteers at the local level is an important step towards developing an independent, responsible health network.

### ***Natural disasters – Threat analysis<sup>72</sup>***

Various natural forces pose a threat to Nepal. According to the Regional Disaster Information Management System, 97.4 per cent of the total population live in areas that are prone to natural disasters.

Nepal is situated in a seismologically active area, and a strong earthquake can occur at any time. Earthquakes of small magnitudes happen frequently, usually without significant damage: during the first ten months of 2009 alone, ten minor quakes were reported.<sup>73</sup> From 1934 to 2006 five big earthquakes shook Nepal. Future major earthquakes with intensities above MMI VII<sup>74</sup> will most likely have worse consequences due to the increasing population density. Low construction standards and an uncontrolled building process are other major risk factors. Furthermore, no hospital in the country is built in compliance with international earthquake-resistant standards.<sup>75</sup>

The most common natural disasters are major landslides (which happen on average every 4.5 years) and floods (on average every 2.4 years). Smaller floods and landslides occur several times a year. Due to the heavy monsoon rains, floods kill on average 200 people per year. Almost all landslides are caused by heavy rainfall and floods. Intense deforestation and soil erosion aggravate the risk of landslides.

### ***Natural disasters – Mitigation analysis***

There are several approaches to mitigate the threat from natural disasters. Firstly it is important to assess the threat properly in order to be prepared, train the population to behave correctly and design emergency response plans. One initiative in this area is the earthquake risk reduction and recovery preparedness programme for Nepal, which is designed to strengthen the institutional and community-level capacity to plan and implement risk reduction and disaster recovery strategies.<sup>76</sup>

To address the recurrent problem of floods and landslides, in cooperation with various other organizations the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs maintains a monsoon monitor report as well as detailed maps and surveys with information about affected areas and communities. In the event of a disaster, various international organizations are ready to deliver immediate relief measures to affected populations.

Due to the unpredictable nature of natural disasters it is very difficult to predict future needs accurately. Nevertheless, in cases of emergency it is crucial to have detailed risk assessments and emergency plans at hand. Vital infrastructures such as hospitals need to be upgraded or built to earthquake-resistant standards.

### ***Environmental damage – Threat analysis***

Forest depletion is one of Nepal's major environmental issues. Forests represent important economic assets for many people and are directly related to numerous other environmental problems, such as landslides, soil erosion and degradation, floods, disappearance of animal habitat and the endangerment of various species. The main reasons for forest depletion include population growth, forcing people to create more arable land, and the use of wood as the primary source of energy. In fact, 83.7 per cent of the population use firewood.<sup>77</sup>

Soil erosion, another major problem, diminishes the fertility of arable land by depleting its mineral and organic components. It is caused by natural phenomena such as floods, landslides and forest degradation, as well as human factors such as overuse of farmland and inadequate application of fertilizers.

The management of solid waste is problematic, especially in urban areas, where it has led to environmental and water pollution and public health hazards, adversely affecting the local population as well as tourism. Furthermore, while waste used to be mostly organic and was either composted or sold to farmers, changing consumption patterns increase non-organic waste, which in turn negatively affects waste management.<sup>78</sup> Untreated waste pollutes and overburdens the self-cleansing processes of the over 6,000 rivers in Nepal.<sup>79</sup> In turn, polluted water poses numerous health risks and is a major cause of diarrhoea epidemics.

Air pollution is also an ever-increasing problem. In urban areas pollution is mainly caused by industrial and transport emissions. In rural areas poor indoor ventilation combined with the burning of waste and firewood cause bad air quality, leading to respiratory health problems.<sup>80</sup>

Nepal is also strongly affected by climate change, which has greatly impacted the glacier ecosystem in the Nepalese Himalayas. It is widely held that climate change is the main factor behind accelerated glacier retreat. Melting glaciers can cause the bursting of glacier lakes and resulting floods. It will also cause major changes in freshwater flows, with dramatic and adverse effects on biodiversity, people and their livelihoods. As well, retreating glaciers result in water scarcity for those who depend on glaciers and snow as sources of fresh water.<sup>81</sup>

### ***Environmental damage – Mitigation analysis***

The government has no coherent, nationwide plan on how to deal with these pressing problems. Different ministries hold responsibility for separate, but connected, dimensions of Nepal's environmental problems, while both national and international partners play potentially important roles.<sup>82</sup> The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development is a research body for the Himalaya and Hindu Kush regions with four

special areas of activity: integrated water and hazard management; environmental change and ecosystem services; sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction; and integrated knowledge management.<sup>83</sup> The World Wildlife Fund runs projects to protect forests, endangered species and fresh water, as well as programmes to deal with climate change. The UN Environment Programme closely monitors environmental conditions in Nepal and has carried out several projects in cooperation with the government and other organizations.<sup>84</sup>

It is highly likely that environmental and climate-change-related problems will increase in the future. The continuously growing population puts additional pressure on the environment. Reducing reliance on wood as the main energy source, for instance, would require the government to promote alternative options at affordable prices. Especially for cities and more urban areas, effective waste management is needed. This would help control the source of numerous diseases and diminish water and air pollution.

It is difficult to influence directly the course of climate change. However, risk assessments and mitigation plans that effectively address the negative effects of climate change are required.

In addition to general programmes to address nationwide problems, there is a need for community-based solutions to specific problems. It is particularly important to involve local communities, and explain why environmental protection is needed and how they can contribute.

#### ***Landmines and ERW – Threat analysis***

Nepal started using landmines in 2002, with an estimated 14,000 anti-personnel mines deployed so far. It is also estimated that about 25,000 command-detonated improvised explosive devices have been buried in the ground,<sup>85</sup> mainly around military installations, police posts and government infrastructures.<sup>86</sup> The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) committed the government and the rebels to halt the use of landmines, a commitment that seems to have been honoured in large part, as no new mines have been reported. While the total contaminated area is unknown, there are 53 known minefields and some 300 other areas protected with command-detonated devices.<sup>87</sup> In 2007 104 casualties in 42 incidents were recorded, including 13 people killed and 91 injured. The vast majority of casualties (72 per cent) were male, and 48 per cent of total casualties were children.<sup>88</sup>

As part of the peace agreement and the UN Mission in Nepal, there are mine-clearing activities as well as awareness-raising campaigns to sensitize the population about the risk of landmines.

#### ***Landmines and ERW – Mitigation analysis<sup>89</sup>***

UNICEF and its partners first established a mine risk education working group in 2004 to develop a mobilization campaign. This group was later expanded to a mine action joint working group, which has identified challenges to effective mine risk education, such as the lack of a universal sign to indicate a dangerous place, and persistently low literacy levels. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has conducted needs and capacity analyses and drafted a strategic framework to guide demining activities. Mine risk education tools have been developed, including a prototype emergency kit for preparedness and post-engagement risk education. In accordance with international mine action standards, by 2009 five minefields had been fully cleared, two partially cleared and two more were close to completion.

Mine action strategies and programmes appear to be adequate responses to the threat. It may not be necessary to create additional new practices, but rather to ensure the continuation of ongoing

activities.<sup>90</sup> Above all, it is especially important to obtain long-term commitment of international partners to finance these activities.

### ***Educational system – Threat analysis***

Nepal's public education system is not very old. The first public schools were opened in 1951; prior to that, only members of the royal family and their courtiers were allowed to attend school. Today, 14.9 per cent of total government spending is invested in education, representing 3.8 per cent of GDP.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, only 45.8 per cent of the population have ever attended school. This number is higher for men (61.2 per cent) than for women (32.6 per cent).

The average literacy rate is 48.6 per cent, with large differences between sexes and geographical areas. The rate for males is 62.7 per cent, compared to 34.9 per cent for females. In urban areas, 72.8 per cent are literate (84.8 per cent male; 61.2 per cent female), compared to only 42.7 per cent in rural areas (59.9 per cent male; 28.5 per cent female).<sup>92</sup> The higher urban literacy rates can largely be attributed to the availability of more and better educational opportunities, a greater awareness of the need for education and the exodus of educated people from rural to urban areas.

The enrolment rate for primary school is now 74.4 per cent, indicating that increasing numbers of young people attend. However, after the mandatory five years of primary school, only 42.0 per cent continue to secondary school, while just 5.6 per cent are enrolled in a tertiary institution.<sup>93</sup> The reasons for not attending school among those aged six to 24 are varied, but only 2.7 per cent of absentees, almost exclusively from hill areas, are discouraged by the long distance to the nearest public school. The major reasons given for non-attendance are the need to "help at home" (20.3 per cent) and the fact that "parents did not want" their child to attend school (32.8 per cent).<sup>94</sup>

The long-standing prejudice against education of women seems to be breaking down very slowly, as attested by girls' increasing school enrolment. Although enrolment rates for primary schools rise steadily, the quality and availability of higher education are much more restricted and biased towards urban areas, males and wealthier parts of the population.

### ***Educational system – Mitigation analysis***

The government works on several projects to extend schooling to a larger part of the population. Due to the high costs involved and the limited funds available, these efforts are supported by several external actors.

The World Bank, for instance, supports three projects: a community project that aims to strengthen the community management of schools; a project entitled "Education for All", which focuses on excluded groups; and the "Second Higher Education Project", which focuses on increasing access to higher schools for excluded and underprivileged groups. Open Learning Exchange Nepal is a Nepali-led NGO that works on the promotion of digital learning material in Nepali. Girls Education Nepal<sup>95</sup> is an NGO sponsoring girls from underprivileged families by, for instance, providing them with school uniforms and a daily lunch package. The Nepal Education Fund offers similar assistance, and also supports schools in upgrading teaching materials and infrastructure.<sup>96</sup> VSO UK provides experienced volunteer teachers and education managers, and assists in mapping government plans. It works with schools, training centres and the Ministry of Education.

Despite such examples of successful assistance projects, numerous problems and challenges remain. Educational management, quality, relevance and access are some of the critical issues. Societal

disparities based on gender, ethnicity, location or economic class are yet to be eliminated, and the resource crunch has always been a problem. These difficulties have made the goal of providing education for all a great countrywide challenge.

### ***Human trafficking – Threat analysis***

Data about human trafficking, especially women and children, are difficult to obtain and often inconclusive because of the clandestine nature of trafficking and a lack of consensus on its definition. However, various studies have put the number of girls and women who are trafficked every year, particularly to India for the commercial sex trade, at 7,000–12,000. Moreover, there is general agreement that trafficking is on the rise. While trafficking crosses many caste and ethnic groups of Nepal, at greatest risk are members of the hill ethnic group and those from lower castes. Fifty per cent of Nepalese sex workers in Mumbai brothels are estimated to be HIV positive.<sup>97</sup>

Nepalese girls and women are preferred in India as men find them particularly attractive. In addition, they are considered to be “easier to control” than local women, because they are far from home, isolated and do not speak the language. Other industries with a demand for trafficked children, including boys, include carpet factories, circus agencies, agricultural projects, road construction sites and those organizing forced beggary in large cities such as Delhi or Mumbai.<sup>98</sup> As police or custom officers are often customers or financial beneficiaries of the business, it is risky and of little use for the victims to attempt to escape or report to the police.

Trafficking victims are subject to slavish work conditions, and there is almost no chance to escape. The victims are lured by local recruiters, neighbours or even relatives, who promise jobs or marriage, and sold for amounts as small as Nepali Rs.200 (\$4.00) to brokers who “sell” them to brothel owners in India for anywhere from Rs.15,000 to Rs.40,000 (\$500–\$1,333).<sup>99</sup> Due to its open border with Nepal, India is an especially attractive destination for trafficking purposes.

### ***Human trafficking – Mitigation analysis***

An estimated 50–100 governmental and non-governmental agencies are involved in efforts to stem human trafficking. Their activities include awareness raising, prevention, rescue and reintegration, advocacy, lobbying and legal and paralegal training. Many are involved in income-generating projects, education, research, surveillance activities and healthcare, with very few of them providing HIV/AIDS treatment.<sup>100</sup> A comprehensive list of such organizations and their areas of activity has been prepared by Save the Children UK.

It is generally acknowledged that there is a serious lack of coordination, collaboration and networking among the different agencies and organizations involved in anti-trafficking activities. A national campaign network against trafficking does not yet exist.

The most important requirement for dealing more effectively with the trafficking of children and women is better coordination and integration of the anti-trafficking efforts of the various organizations active in this field. Their knowledge and experience should be integrated into a nationwide campaign, which should in turn be extended to include organizations in India, the main destination country of human trafficking from Nepal.

### *Political and non-political crime – Threat analysis*

In 2006 the CPA was signed between the Maoists and the government of Nepal, ending a decade of civil war that killed more than 13,000 people and displaced nearly 200,000. Although there was much optimism, the political situation after the elections remained very fragile and the political process did not seem to meet the expectations of the Nepalese people. Fears of crime and violence as well as socio-economic insecurity have dominated the daily lives of many Nepalese. Political violence and unrest, as well as economic deprivation and ordinary criminal activities, are often closely intertwined and reinforce one another. It is thus difficult to draw a clear line between political and non-political crimes. The following paragraphs offer an overview of the most important trends and their relationship with political and non-political crime and violence. However, keeping in mind that strong and capable national security institutions should deal with both kinds of crime, mitigation measures and future requirements for both cannot easily be separated.

*Political violence.* Maoist rebels and the government signed the CPA in 2006. Despite successful elections in 2008 and a ceasefire, Nepal's peace process remains unstable and there are growing concerns about the country's stability. Various armed groups and political parties still engage in violence to achieve their goals. The government does not live up to certain CPA stipulations. Most political unrest is concentrated in the Terai region.<sup>101</sup> There are increasing incidents of clashes among the various groups. Assaults against the police, kidnapping, attacks on property and people and roadblocks are among the strategies used to draw attention to their political demands or increase their power. Groups' demands range from greater political participation and representation of minorities to creation of a separate state for Madhesi.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, ordinary criminal gangs mingle with political extremists and are used by influential political figures. In 2008 there were 83 reported incidents of bombing that killed 23 and injured 239.<sup>103</sup> It is reported that incidents of political violence grew in 2009 and the peace process is more than ever at stake. There is growing dissatisfaction about how the newly elected government addresses security and development issues. These tensions increased in May 2009, when the Maoists left the government. They initiated a series of protests, including a threat to close down the country's main airport. These developments risked raising tensions and economically disrupting the fledgling republic even further.<sup>104</sup>

*Non-political crime.* According to a 2008 study on safety perceptions in Nepal, 2 per cent of the population claim to have been victims of crime. The most common crimes include theft, physical assault/beatings, extortion/forced donation, threats and robbery.<sup>105</sup> The homicide rate is estimated at 2.1–8.0 per 100,000 inhabitants, which is higher than in neighbouring countries.<sup>106</sup>

The general perception and fear of crime are high: 40 per cent of the population worry about becoming a victim of crime. However, there are noticeable differences in perceptions across geographical regions: in mountain areas 18 per cent feared becoming victims of crime, compared with 33 per cent in hill regions and 47 per cent in the Terai.<sup>107</sup> The greater perception of insecurity in the Terai region is based on the experience of continuing political struggles and its proximity to the Indian border. Many criminal groups are involved in smuggling and organized crime.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, women face gender-based threats such as rape and domestic violence, and thus feel a greater sense of insecurity than men.<sup>109</sup> Only 53 per cent of the women surveyed would report such crimes, with illiterate and poorly educated women particularly reluctant to do so.<sup>110</sup>

### *Political and non-political crime – Mitigation analysis*

The occurrence of crime is closely related to the country's political and economic situation, as it hinders economic and social development. At the same time, low social and economic development fuel crime and political unrest. Thus all activities described above as mitigation measures for various social and economic threats are expected to have a positive impact on the reduction of crime.

There are various efforts under way to design a security architecture for Nepal under the new constitution. Many international actors are actively helping Nepal to reform its security institutions, especially its police services, to make them more effective and accountable. The international community needs to continue its push for concrete, step-by-step progress on building democratic control of the security sector; provide technical assistance, as requested, to parliamentary oversight mechanisms and the Ministry of Defence; and press the Nepalese Army to accept civilian oversight and participate in training and capacity building.<sup>111</sup>

A major root cause of political violence and many other threats described above is bad governance.<sup>112</sup> According to worldwide governance indicators, the Nepalese government scores badly across the board (see Table 10.1).

| Indicator                                   | Percentile rank <sup>113</sup> |
|---|--------------------------------|
| Voice and accountability                    | 25 per cent                    |
| Political stability and absence of violence | 8 per cent                     |
| Government effectiveness                    | 24 per cent                    |
| Regulatory quality                          | 28 per cent                    |
| Rule of law                                 | 25 per cent                    |
| Control of corruption                       | 30 per cent                    |

**Table 10.1:** Governance indicators of Nepal<sup>114</sup>

As the peace process is still relatively young, it is important to incorporate principles of good governance and rule of law in the new constitution and the political process. Structural causes of violence, such as the exclusion of certain groups from political participation and access to government services, have to be addressed. It is crucial that all political parties are able and willing to express their demands without resorting to violence.

Finding ways to design the new security architecture and increase the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the state's security institutions is part of the comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) process in Nepal. To elaborate on detailed needs and principles of an SSR programme is beyond the scope of this study. International actors, the United Nations, India and Nepal's long-standing donors have played important roles in promoting peace and now need to maintain consistent pressure on all parties to live up to their commitments. The exclusion of important political and ethnic groups, and making the peace process an elite-ruled process in the capital while ignoring key developments elsewhere, have been criticized as major flaws of the post-conflict political development of the country.<sup>115</sup>



## CORE THREATS

The OPHUSEC approach applies several selection criteria that help define a limited number of core threats (see Chapter 2). Core threats display the following characteristics:

- they include existential dangers that threaten the survival of individuals
- they are closely intertwined with several other threats through common root causes
- they can be effectively addressed through the alleviation of root causes and the strengthening of coping capacities
- success and multi-actor collaboration for mitigation are both possible and feasible.

Based on these criteria, and drawing on information gathered in this background study, three core threats were chosen: “infant and under-five mortality”, “maternal mortality” and “vulnerability to illness and diseases”. These threats fulfil all four OPHUSEC criteria. They share common root causes, such as malnutrition, poor health facilities and a lack of knowledge and awareness; and it is possible to address these causes. Improving the national health system, campaigns to raise awareness, feeding programmes and nutritional supplements are all strategies designed to alleviate root causes. Although costly and time-consuming, these measures have already shown positive results when comparing current trends to mortality rates several years ago. As seen in the threat analysis above, multi-actor-collaboration is already taking place in existing mitigation and coping strategies, indicating that relevant capacities exist and effective responses are indeed possible. The Ministry of Health, which is the main body responsible, is supported by many national and international actors. Due to the same or similar root causes, mitigation measures addressing one threat are likely to have positive effects on other threats.

Although political violence cannot be considered a core threat according to OPHUSEC guidelines, it is important to keep track of developments, as a deteriorating political situation and renewed war would have extremely negative consequences for many other threats. However, it is difficult to develop mitigation or coping capacities for political violence. The magnitude of influencing factors and actors involved, as well as the unpredictable nature of escalating political tensions, make it hard to influence political stability. Still, investments in the consolidation of good, democratic governance, effective SSR and close attention to implementation of the CPA are necessary steps in alleviating the risks of renewed violence and armed conflict.

## CONCLUSION

Within the OPHUSEC framework this chapter offers a background study that, in the context of Nepal, maps and analyses a number of threats and respective mitigation measures through a human security lens. Some of the threats faced by the Nepalese people are fairly common to many poor and developing countries. These include infant and maternal mortality, malnutrition, and poor health and educational systems. Other threats are more specific to the local context, namely political violence, landmines, human trafficking and an inadequate road network. Although some threats are shared by many countries, mitigation measures always need to be specifically adapted to the local context and implemented by local actors, who are more often than not dependent on assistance from external actors. To identify the most effective mitigation measures and select future mitigation priorities, those measures that are in place need to be understood. This chapter attempts to define both core threats and the most relevant mitigation measures. In a next step,

and prior to analysing these threats and associated mitigation measures in greater detail, the findings need to be verified with the help of multistakeholder consultations.

In a country as diverse as Nepal, no single solution can address the whole range of threats to human security. Mountains sparsely populated by people with Tibetan language and nomadic traditions pose different challenges to the densely populated Terai regions, a context not much different from that experienced by their Indian neighbours. The rough topography complicates the even delivery of government services throughout the country. In fact, in the case of Nepal it would be particularly useful to carry out separate threat assessments for different geographic areas and/or for urban and rural areas. Some threats are likely to occur in only one part of the country, or are characterized by different symptoms and causes in different contexts. The threat of environmental pollution might be such a case. Urban areas are affected by air and water pollution due to solid waste, while in rural areas deforestation and indoor pollution are the greatest concerns. In this aspect the OPHUSEC framework is a useful tool: actor-based assessments allow one to see who is threatened by which threat, and to what degree. Moreover, it allows one to develop nuanced mitigation measures that target the core of the problem, while still being able to take regional, gender and/or caste-based differences into account.

On a final note, one particularly important necessity (and challenge!) for poor countries undergoing political, security, social and economic transitions is the funding required for mitigation and coping capacities. Governments are rarely able to cope with the whole array of threats with which a society is faced. Poor economic performance and ongoing political violence are considerable obstacles to effective threat mitigation. For instance, an uncertain political environment can be detrimental to the acquisition of external funds or continued and active in-country support by international actors. It is important to monitor how the human security situation and the underlying political situation develop, as these strongly affect both mitigation measures and the development of many of the threats that continue to endanger sustainable peace and security for the Nepalese people and their state.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Although slightly revised and edited in March 2012, this chapter was written in November 2009 based on research carried out in the preceding months. The study was prepared as a contribution to the OPHUSEC project, which, as the main focus of this volume, is presented in more detail in Chapters 1, 2 and 12 in particular. It resembles the first step in the full range of OPHUSEC activities, which would be followed up by multistakeholder consultations and further, more detailed assessments of core threats and priority mitigation measures. If part of a fully implemented OPHUSEC project, the study would eventually serve as the basis of recurrent threat and mitigation assessments carried out at regular intervals. More current assessments would reveal results of more contemporary relevance.

<sup>2</sup> CIA, "CIA World Factbook: Nepal", 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>.

<sup>3</sup> BBC, "Timeline Nepal", [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/country\\_profiles/1166516.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1166516.stm).

<sup>4</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, data are based on CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>5</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, "Nepal Living Standard Survey", Vol. 2, Kathmandu, 2004, p. 43, [www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%202.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%202.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> CIA, note 2 above.

<sup>7</sup> Ram D. Dahal, "Social Composition of the Population: Caste/Ethnicity and Religion in Nepal", in Central Bureau of Statistics (ed.), *Population Monograph of Nepal*, Kathmandu, 2003, p. 89, <http://cbs.gov.np/?p=500>.

<sup>8</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, "Nepal in Figures", Kathmandu, 2008, [www.cbs.gov.np/Nepal%20in%20figure/Nepal%20in%20Figures%20%20eng%202008.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.np/Nepal%20in%20figure/Nepal%20in%20Figures%20%20eng%202008.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> A complete list of languages spoken can be found in P. Y. Yadava, "Language", in Central Bureau of Statistics (ed.), *Population Monograph of Nepal 2003*, Kathmandu, 2003, pp. 164ff, <http://cbs.gov.np/?p=500>.

<sup>10</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, data are based on Central Bureau of Statistics, "Nepal Living Standard Survey", Vol. 1, Kathmandu, 2004, [www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%201.pdf](http://www.cbs.gov.np/Surveys/NLSSII/NLSS%20II%20Report%20Vol%201.pdf); Central Bureau of Statistics, note 5 above.

<sup>11</sup> World Health Organization, "Mortality Country Fact Sheet", 2006, p. 2, [www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort\\_searo\\_npl\\_nepal.pdf](http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort_searo_npl_nepal.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> Definition: age 15 and over can read and write.

<sup>13</sup> Library of Congress, "Country Profile: Nepal", Federal Research Division, Washington, DC, November 2005, p. 9, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nepal.pdf>; World Health Organization, "Country Health Profile", 2002, p. 8, [www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Nepal\\_nepal.pdf](http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Nepal_nepal.pdf).

<sup>14</sup> UNDP, "Nepal Human Development Report 2004", 2004, [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/nepal\\_2004\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/nepal_2004_en.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> World Food Programme, "Nepal", [www.wfp.org/countries/nepal](http://www.wfp.org/countries/nepal).

<sup>16</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security: Paradigm – Policy – Local Implementation", paper presented at annual meeting of Swiss Political Science Association, Balsthal, 18–19 November 2004 (revised draft April 2005), p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> World Health Organization, note 11 above, p. 2.

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<sup>20</sup> World Health Organization, "World Health Statistics 2009", 2009, p. 172, [www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN\\_WHS09\\_Full.pdf](http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS09_Full.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

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- <sup>24</sup> UNDP, note 14 above, p. 34.
- <sup>25</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 10 above, pp. 103ff.
- <sup>26</sup> B. K. Shah and L. A. Baig, “Association of Anaemia with Parasitic Infestation in Pregnant Nepalese Women: Results from a Hospital-Based Study Done in Eastern Nepal”, 2002, [www.ayubmed.edu.pk/JAMC/PAST/17-1/Binay.htm](http://www.ayubmed.edu.pk/JAMC/PAST/17-1/Binay.htm).
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- <sup>36</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 10 above, p. 53.
- <sup>37</sup> Tulasi Prasad Sitaula, note 35 above, p. 4.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*
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- <sup>46</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 5 above, p. 75.
- <sup>47</sup> ILO, note 44 above, pp. 3ff.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>50</sup> World Health Organization, "TB Country Profile", 2009, p. 1, [http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/TB/PDF\\_Files/npl.pdf](http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/TB/PDF_Files/npl.pdf).

<sup>51</sup> World Health Organization (WHO), "Nepal: Tuberculosis profile", 2012, [https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=%2FWHO\\_HQ\\_Reports%2FG2%2FPROD%2FEXT%2FTBCountryProfile&ISO2=NP&LAN=EN&outtype=html](https://extranet.who.int/sree/Reports?op=Replet&name=%2FWHO_HQ_Reports%2FG2%2FPROD%2FEXT%2FTBCountryProfile&ISO2=NP&LAN=EN&outtype=html).

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<sup>54</sup> The WHO estimated the malaria morbidity rate in Nepal to be 0.51/1,000. The rate subsequently dropped to 0.17/1,000 in 2008. See World Health Organization (WHO), "Nepal: Malaria", 2014, <http://www.who.int/countries/npl/en/>.

<sup>55</sup> World Health Organization (WHO), "Outbreak Situation Report", 10 August 2014, [www.nep.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Outbreaks\\_Oubtreak\\_Sitrep\\_100809.pdf](http://www.nep.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Outbreaks_Oubtreak_Sitrep_100809.pdf).

<sup>56</sup> World Health Organization, note 11 above, p. 2.

<sup>57</sup> In 1997 only 2.7 per cent of the population were equipped with insecticide-treated nets. See World Health Organization, "Global Malaria Report", 2008, p. 167, [www.who.int/malaria/wmr2008/malaria2008.pdf](http://www.who.int/malaria/wmr2008/malaria2008.pdf); World Health Organization, note 52 above, p. 1.

<sup>58</sup> See diarrhoea situation reports at [www.nep.searo.who.int/EN/Section60.htm](http://www.nep.searo.who.int/EN/Section60.htm).

<sup>59</sup> World Health Organization, "Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS", 2008, p. 5, [http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008\\_NP.pdf](http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008_NP.pdf).

<sup>60</sup> USAID, "Nepal: HIV/AIDS Health Profile", 2008, p. 1, [www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/global\\_health/aids/Countries/asia/nepal\\_profile.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/asia/nepal_profile.pdf).

<sup>61</sup> World Bank, "HIV/AIDS in Nepal", Washington, DC, August 2008, p. 1, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBARCHIVES/0,,MDK:22202673~menuPK:64654237~pagePK:64660187~piPK:64660385~theSitePK:2564958,00.html>.

<sup>62</sup> United Nations General Assembly Special Session Country Progress Report [Nepal], 30 January 2008, [http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008nepal\\_2008\\_country\\_progress\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008nepal_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> World Bank, note 61 above, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> World Health Organization, "World Health Statistics 2009", 2009, pp. 43–45, [www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN\\_WHS09\\_Full.pdf](http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS09_Full.pdf).

<sup>68</sup> World Bank, note 61 above, p. 3.

<sup>69</sup> USAID, note 60 above, p. 1

<sup>70</sup> UNDP, "Nepal Human Development Report 2009", 2009, pp. 199ff, [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/NHDR\\_Nepal\\_2009\\_EN.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/NHDR_Nepal_2009_EN.pdf).

<sup>71</sup> A list of all Ministry of Health partners can be found at [www.moh.gov.np/partners](http://www.moh.gov.np/partners).

<sup>72</sup> Data on natural disasters are based on the Regional Disaster Information Management System ([www.redat.be/CountryProfile/Nepal/nepal\\_natdis.html](http://www.redat.be/CountryProfile/Nepal/nepal_natdis.html)). To be included in the database a natural disaster has to meet at least one of four

criteria: ten or more people are reported killed; 100 people are reported affected, meaning they are injured or suffering property loss; a call for international assistance has been issued; and a state of emergency has been declared.

<sup>73</sup> Government of Nepal, Ministry of Industry, Department of Mines and Geology, National Seismological Centre (Lainchaur, Kathmandu: Nepal, 2009), <http://www.seismonepal.gov.np/index.php?action=earthquakes&show=past>.

<sup>74</sup> The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MMI) for measuring the strength of an earthquake ranges from I to XII.

<sup>75</sup> World Health Organization, "Non-Structural Vulnerability Assessment of Hospitals in Nepal", 2003, pp. 15ff, [www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Nepal\\_-\\_EPR\\_Publications\\_Final\\_Report\\_Hospital\\_assessment.pdf](http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Nepal_-_EPR_Publications_Final_Report_Hospital_assessment.pdf).

<sup>76</sup> For more information on the programme see [www.errp.org.np/document/publication/file/earthquake-brochure.pdf](http://www.errp.org.np/document/publication/file/earthquake-brochure.pdf).

<sup>77</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 5 above, p. 41.

<sup>78</sup> UNEP, "State of the Environment Report: Nepal", 2001, p. 100, [www.rrcap.unep.org/reports/soe/nepal/soe.cfm](http://www.rrcap.unep.org/reports/soe/nepal/soe.cfm).

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>80</sup> World Health Organization, note 11 above, p. 3.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>84</sup> United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific, "Mainstreaming Environmental Rights and Sustainable Development Principles Into the New Constitution of Nepal", 2000, <http://www.rrcap.ait.asia/partner/np/project/me/index.cfm>.

<sup>85</sup> UNMIN, "Mine Action Update", 2008, [www.unmin.org.np/?d=activities&p=activity\\_detail&aid=63](http://www.unmin.org.np/?d=activities&p=activity_detail&aid=63).

<sup>86</sup> ICBL, "Landmine Monitor Report 2008", 2008, <http://lm.icbl.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/nepal.html>.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this paragraph is taken from United Nations, "Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: Nepal", 2013, [http://www.mineaction.org/resources/project?search\\_type=country&c=129](http://www.mineaction.org/resources/project?search_type=country&c=129).

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> World Bank, "Education at a Glance: Nepal", 2009, p. 1, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEDSTATS/Resources/3232763-1171296190619/3445877-1172014191219/NPL.pdf>.

<sup>92</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 10 above, p. 65.

<sup>93</sup> World Bank, note 91 above, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics, note 10 above, p. 70.

<sup>95</sup> Girls Education Nepal, Giving Girls in Nepal the Gift of Education, "Home", 2014, <http://www.girlseducationnepal.org/>.

<sup>96</sup> The Nepal Education Fund, "About the Children", 2014, <http://www.nepaledfund.ca/>.

<sup>97</sup> World Bank, note 61 above, p. 2.

<sup>98</sup> Terre des Hommes, "Child Trafficking in Nepal", 2003, p. 10, [www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/tdh-nep-2jun.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/tdh-nep-2jun.pdf).

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## CHAPTER 11

### Human insecurity and security in Laos

Gaby Guerrero Serdán

#### INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s the debate on the evolving concept of security has become increasingly central not only in academia but also within international organizations and among development practitioners. The 1994 UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, “New Dimensions of Human Security”, embraced the concept of security centred on people rather than on nation-states.<sup>1</sup> It expanded the notion of security by emphasizing the protection of people from threats such as diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime and environmental hazards. The focus on human-centred security raised concerns about its definition and methodological utility. So far, there is no common agreement on a definition of human security, although there is broad understanding that security is primarily about people.

The study presented in this chapter analyses the security of Laotians through a human security lens. The first section describes the country context. The second introduces the human security framework developed by the OPHUSEC project. The following subsections provide an analysis of ten identified life-threatening risks to human security in Laos. The third section introduces an index for measuring human security among threats. This measure is applied as an attempt to quantify specific life-threatening risks in Laos. The fourth section offers an overview of past and present responses to such threats. After outlining existing coping mechanisms and mitigation tools, it identifies some possible future actions, along with a number of positive and negative scenarios of the evolving human security situation in Laos. The conclusion is followed by an annex summarizing the author’s exploratory design of a technical note to measure human insecurity.

#### LAOS’S COUNTRY CONTEXT

Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), commonly known as Laos, is a land-locked and least developed country situated in the heart of Southeast Asia. Surrounded by Thailand, Myanmar, China, Cambodia and Vietnam, its borders encompass 5,000 km<sup>2</sup>, half of it along the Mekong River. With 5.6 million inhabitants and an area comparable to that of the UK, Laos has one of the lowest population densities in the world. Ranked 133 out of 177 countries in UNDP’s Human Development Index and with a GDP per capita of less than US\$2,000 (purchasing power parity), Laos is one of the poorest nations in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Historical and political developments*

The Lang Xang or “Land of a Million Elephants” dates back to 1354, when Prince Fa Ngum established a kingdom that flourished for more than 300 years, ruling from Muang Sua (Luang Prabang today) and covering parts of what are now Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. The population was made up of Lao and Thai ethnic groups as well as Chinese-origin hill tribes. Laos fell under French rule as part of Indochina from

the late nineteenth century until independence in 1954. The aftermath of the Vietnam War gave victory to the communist political movement Pathet Lao, marked by the revolution of 1975. Pathet Lao emerged victorious from the Laotian civil war, abolished the monarchy and established Lao PDR. A communist system mirroring the Vietnam model has been in place since then.

The political framework is based on a one-party system and is fairly centralized, with major policy developments being decided at the central level. The governors of the 18 provinces enjoy great autonomy over the administration and implementation of policy, for example regarding most tax collection mechanisms. The single-party system is guided by the politburo of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Major reforms are proposed and adopted during the party congress, which is held every five years.

### ***Economic developments***

Laos is a very rural country. Its economy is based on subsistence agriculture and relies heavily on natural resources, which represent approximately 60 per cent of the country's GDP. Despite increasing migration trends, more than 70 per cent of the population live in rural areas. Land was widely accessible until recent land reform, displacement and resettlement policies decreased its availability. Lately, agricultural output of rice, the main staple, has decreased and the country has had to import staples. Agriculture forms the largest part of GDP, followed by industry, including hydroelectric power and mining. Services, mainly tourism-related, have been increasing steadily since the country opened up to foreign tourism in 1999.

The new economic mechanism adopted in the 1980s marked a shift to an opening of the economy, while also introducing important decentralization reforms. Since the 1990s the Lao economy has had steady annual growth averaging 6 per cent.<sup>3</sup> Large infrastructure projects, in particular in the hydroelectric, mining and transport areas, have been undertaken, the majority financed through credits and grants by multilateral banks. The road network has considerably improved within only a few years: in 1999 there was only one all-season road in the country outside the capital; now road networks cover all provincial capitals and connect several villages to all-season roads. Nevertheless, many rural areas and villages are only accessible during the dry season. Inhabitants of remote villages use boats or have to walk for several days to reach major towns.

Despite the steady economic growth, high unemployment (particularly among youth in urban centres), poor living conditions and the lack of economic opportunities and available land cause many to migrate, often to neighbouring Thailand.

Laos's location at the crossroads of larger countries such as Vietnam, China and Thailand places it in a strategically important but difficult situation. On the positive side, this opens up opportunities for trade, investment and employment. On the negative side, the strong interest of China and Vietnam in Lao's natural resources, in particular forests and minerals, threatens the environment and people's livelihoods. In addition, there is fear that the observed increase in human trafficking will boost still relatively low HIV/AIDS rates. Moreover, the Thai cultural domination, predominantly among the youth, risks undermining Lao's rich history, traditions and customs.<sup>4</sup>

### ***Socio-cultural dimensions***

Lao PDR is a multiethnic country with more than 49 recognized groups,<sup>5</sup> which are divided into three major subgroups, Lao Leum, Lao Theug and Lao Soung, corresponding to lowland, midland and upland groups, respectively. Group differences are most visible between lowland and highland people. The inhabitants of the north are mainly from hill tribes, such as the Aka and Yao, that have lived for centuries in south China,

Myanmar and Thailand. The south and parts of the east host such ethnic groups as the Katum and other tribes of Vietnamese origin. The centre is predominantly composed of Lao-Thai groups, making up about one-third of the total population. The official language of the country is Lao – despite the fact that it is the mother tongue of only 40 per cent of the population. Lao is also widely spoken in the northeast part of Thailand.<sup>6</sup> The country's diversity makes for a very rich culture. People living in the forests observe specific traditions and beliefs that are directly linked to the forest, its animals and natural resources. Indeed, spirits are central to their daily life, and specific rituals and customs regulate social life, marriages, births and funerals. Highland beliefs have merged with lowland customs, such as in the Baci ceremony,<sup>7</sup> where animist rituals unite with the Buddhist faith.

People in the highlands have harvested locally produced opium for several centuries.<sup>8</sup> Opium smoking is part of elders' social life within some groups and is used by local shamans. People in remote areas continue to smoke opium for pain relief to this day. Being part of the so-called Golden Triangle, Laos has been exposed to various forms of trading and smuggling.<sup>9</sup>

The displacement and resettlement of people have had a major impact on the country's development and shaped the life of highland populations. Although not an official policy, a large majority of government development projects induced displacement from high and mountainous areas to the lowlands, where more services were to be provided to the people.<sup>10</sup> To provide adequate education, water and health services, the government established development clusters to merge a certain number of villages. To form clusters, villages were often relocated.<sup>11</sup> However, there are no official documents defining the criteria for relocation, which vary from province to province depending on district officials' interpretation. Based on research and informal discussions with villagers, a study on livelihoods supported by UNDP reports that a village was kept in its original location if it had at least 30 households and access to a primary school, a health clinic and a gravel or paved road within a range of 6–10 km.<sup>12</sup> However, more rigorous criteria were applied to clear land for large-scale infrastructure projects. A recent project, the Nam Theun 2 dam in Khammouane province, has possibly resettled more than 6,000 and affected around 100,000 people living downstream.<sup>13</sup>

From an environmental perspective, traditional agricultural practices such as shifting cultivation methods cause environmental degradation of land and forests. In the past, several villages that practised such methods and therefore used to move from place to place following crop-free periods were forced to become sedentary. In some cases they were settled in villages alongside other ethnic groups, creating conflicts over land and customary practices.

Several international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have argued that resettlement is politically motivated in specific areas, as it targets the Hmong population, a group that backed the US during the Vietnam War. Inhabiting the mountainous areas of central and east Laos, they have lived in isolation since the end of the war in 1975 with limited public services. The Hmong are said to have a strong and proud character with great self-reliance. They have migrated to the US, France and Australia in large numbers.

Internal migration is an escalating phenomenon with positive and negative effects. It provides better access to public and health services, but also affects people's livelihoods and their exposure to human security threats such as new diseases, trafficking and exploitation.

### *Human development conditions*

Investments in development and infrastructure projects have undoubtedly enhanced human development conditions in the country. In particular, some progress has been made in the fields of education and health. At the time of writing the literacy rate had risen to 80 per cent, with net enrolment rates in primary school exceeding 80 per cent.<sup>14</sup> This progress is seen equally among men and women. Health improvements are more modest. Under-five and infant mortality decreased from 170 and 134 (per 1,000 live births) in 1990 to 98 and 70 in 2005.<sup>15</sup> While these are notable improvements, the rates are still comparable to the poorest parts of Africa.

Women still face several health challenges during and after pregnancy. The maternal mortality rate dropped from 750 (per 100,000 live births) in 1990 to 450 in 2005.<sup>16</sup> Many women die as a result of lack of basic medication, malnourishment and infections. Few births are attended by skilled personnel, and health clinics are poorly accessible in rural areas. Malaria and other diseases pose considerable health risks. The HIV/AIDS rate is still low, but vulnerability is high and increasing. According to 2005 figures, 1,827 cases of HIV/AIDS had so far been reported, of which 60 per cent were infected through heterosexual sex.<sup>17</sup> The rate of other sexually transmitted diseases, especially among female sex workers, has been increasing. Reportedly, more than 40 per cent of sex workers suffer from either chlamydia or gonorrhoea.<sup>18</sup>

Among the cruel legacies of the Vietnam War is the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and cluster ammunition, which still claim more than 200 lives per year. During the Vietnam War, US planes attacked not only Vietnamese territory but also the Lao border in the east and northern areas, as the Ho Chi Minh Trail connecting North and South Vietnam passes through some parts of Laos. Sources indicate that planes which were not able to drop their bombs on Vietnam dumped them over Lao territory, as they could not land with bombs on board.<sup>19</sup> The Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXO Lao) recently received files on the US aerial bombardment in Laos: approximately 2 million tons of bombs were dropped over Laos, including 300 million anti-personnel cluster bombs, with recent estimates mentioning up to 6 million tons. Thirty per cent of the cluster bomb units failed to explode, leaving millions of them on Laotian land, covering one-third of the territory. So far there have been 13,000 recorded casualties; around 50 per cent are children and the majority are men.

## **HUMAN SECURITY ANALYSIS**

The concept of human security covers different dimensions, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.<sup>20</sup> The analysis presented here uses the broad definition of human security. Human security is related to freedom from *fear*, *threat* and *want* not only in war, genocide and terrorism; it also includes threats from hunger, disease and natural disasters.<sup>21</sup> The study uses the OPHUSEC project definition of “individual-centred security provision and threat/syndrome mitigation”.<sup>22</sup> It therefore considers human security provision as “internal and external approaches towards lowering levels of fear, threat and want” to assure basic and existential individual and community security.<sup>23</sup>

In the Lao context, there have been studies covering one or several different dimensions of the concept of human security. As many of these dimensions are interlinked, it is of great importance to analyse them in an integrated manner, using the framework developed by the OPHUSEC project introduced in this volume.

The following section is based mainly on a desk review of existing papers and studies, complemented by the author's knowledge of and experience in the country. After an initial review, various threats and risks to human security are identified. These threats are significant only in the context of Laos and are therefore selected based on the local situation and conditions. Moreover, this analysis focuses only on threats that are life threatening or perceived to be life threatening.

### *Threat-based analysis*

Table 11.1 presents the ten local threats on which this analysis focuses. They include common risks to human security which also exist in many other parts of the world: risks relating to UXO; HIV/AIDS; human exploitation and trafficking; addiction to opium and drugs; infant and child mortality; maternal mortality; malaria and other communicable diseases; food insecurity; and road accidents.

These threats also represent some of the main global human development indicators reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Many are interlinked, and their causes and symptoms have similar roots. The chapter analyses each identified threat, followed by an analysis of the main actors affected.

| What is the threat?                     | Who is threatened?  | By whom?   | Where?   | How serious is the threat?  | Life threatening? | How many victims?  | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms  | Root causes  |
|---|---|--|--|---|-------------------|--|--|---|--|
| <u>UXO and landmine explosives</u>      | Men; children   | Presence of 90 million cluster bombs and 200,000 purpose bombs dropped by US and remaining unexploded in ground        | One-third of territory or 25% of all communities in 15 of 18 provinces | Very serious  | Yes               | 13,000 UXO-related accidents since 1973 (50% children, 81% male, 43% lethal)   | Real   | Loss of legs and/or arms; physical impediments; psychological trauma; loss of family members; diminished cultivation of paddies | <u>Direct:</u> UXO (mainly “bombies”, but also unexploded heavy bombs, rockets, grenades; artillery munitions; mortars; anti-personnel landmines; improvised explosive devices)<br><u>Indirect:</u> Farming activities; working in paddies; children playing |
| <u>AIDS, vulnerability to illnesses</u> | Sex workers; mobile populations (truck drivers, construction workers); police; military; housewives; children | Sex workers and their clients; HIV-positive persons who are aware of their health status but do not practise safer sex | Mainly border areas with Thailand                                      | Potentially serious, could spread and become epidemic as in Thailand and Cambodia | Yes               | Deaths <100 [<200 potential]; number living with HIV: 3,700 [1,800–12,000]; adults 15–49 with HIV: 0.1% [1–4%], 3,600 [1,700–10,000]; women 15+ with HIV: <1,000 [260–2,000] | Perceived  | Vulnerable immune system; frequent illness; prostitution  | <u>Direct:</u> HIV<br><u>Indirect:</u> Unprotected sex; to lesser extent through blood transfusion or injuries; unawareness and ignorance  |

| What is the threat?   | Who is threatened?  | By whom?   | Where?  | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening?   | How many victims?  | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms   | Root causes   |
|---|---|--|---|----------------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|---|
| <u>Human exploitation and abuse</u>   | Mainly females aged 12–18; children   | Organized crime groups; trafficking networks operating in Thailand and across Southeast Asia | Most vulnerable lowland groups, originally from rural farming backgrounds but living in urban areas | Serious                    | Yes (in some cases) | 17% of children in survey areas disappeared and never returned to homes and families | Perceived  | Forced prostitution and forced labour for domestic and factory work; violence; drug use; sexual exploitation; HIV/AIDS | <u>Direct:</u> Unemployment; cheated by trafficking networks promising job in Thailand<br><u>Indirect:</u> Resettlement; migration; economic motivation; search for opportunities |
| <u>Opium addiction</u>  | Rural households; individuals (mostly men as per UN Office on Drugs and Crime report) | Opium consumers  | Mainly north and highlands  | N/A                        | N/A                 | Addiction rates: 11,200–20,000 addicts (2006)  | Indoctrinated                                      | Addiction of family members; low level of nutrition status among family; lack of food; psychological damage            | <u>Direct:</u> Often used as painkiller; cultural and social smoking<br><u>Indirect:</u> Lack of medicine; need to grow to earn money and subsequent own consumption              |
| <u>Drug addiction and drug trafficking – mainly amphetamine-type stimulants</u> | Mainly youth  | Consumers of amphetamines and other chemical drugs   | Border areas; increasingly urban areas; expanding from urban to rural areas                         | Potentially very serious   | Yes (in some cases) | Approximately 40,000 addicts in 2006   | Potentially real threat                            | Youth crime gangs; alcohol abuse; physical abuse of family members; human trafficking                                  | <u>Direct:</u> Illegal trade and production of drugs<br><u>Indirect:</u> Poverty; lack of awareness   |

| What is the threat?                            | Who is threatened?                                  | By whom?   | Where?   | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening? | How many victims?   | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms   | Root causes  |
|--|---|--|--|----------------------------|-------------------|---|--|--|--|
| <u>Infant and under-five mortality</u>         | Infants and children under five                     | Inadequate health services; mothers and families who are unaware of risks and do not consult health services | Mainly rural areas; places without midwives                          | Very serious               | Yes               | 82 infant deaths and 107 child deaths per 1,000 live births   | Real   | Poor health and frequent illness of infants and children           | <u>Direct:</u> Malnutrition, diarrhoea; malaria and communicable diseases<br><u>Indirect:</u> Lack of health facilities; lack of medicine; food insecurity; poverty; lack of awareness |
| <u>Maternal mortality</u>                      | Women of reproductive age; primarily in rural areas | Inadequate health services; mothers and families who are unaware of risks and do not consult health services | Villages without access to health services; remote areas             | Very serious               | Yes               | 650 per 100,000 live births   | Real   | High mortality of women after pregnancy and during and after birth | <u>Direct:</u> infections; post-partum haemorrhage and abortions<br><u>Indirect:</u> Poor quality of health services; to some extent underutilization of services that do exist        |
| <u>Malaria and other communicable diseases</u> | Pregnant women; children                            | Mosquito   | Remote areas; side streams of Mekong River; areas without sanitation | Serious                    | Yes               | 3.5 deaths per 100,000 population; malaria morbidity 48 per 1,000 population; 72% of risk areas do not take protective measures; tuberculosis prevalence rate 144 per 100,000 | Perceived  | Illness  | <u>Direct:</u> Poor sanitation; unsafe water<br><u>Indirect:</u> Lack of awareness; poverty; lack of treatment and prevention tools, resettlement from highlands to lowlands           |



| What is the threat?                     | Who is threatened?               | By whom?  | Where?  | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening? | How many victims?   | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms   | Root causes  |
|---|----------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------|-------------------|---|--|--|--|
| <u>Malnutrition and food insecurity</u> | Rural households                 | Authorities responsible for displacement and allocation of land; natural disasters; pests; diseases | Highlands; areas without irrigation systems; persistence of drought or floods | Serious in some parts      | Yes               | Population in 25 of 146 districts; 47% of children under five   | Perceived  | Malnourished children; prevalence of diseases; lack of good health; lack of labour | <u>Direct:</u> Lack of rice; lack of livestock<br><u>Indirect:</u> Animal disease; poverty; pests; floods; lack of agricultural infrastructure; diminishing non-timber forest products; environmental degradation; resettlement; UXO; land allocation; floods and droughts |
| <u>Road accidents</u>                   | Population of capital, Vientiane | Incapable drivers of motor vehicles, including cars, motorcycles and <i>tuk-tuks</i>                | Main roads within city  | N/A                        | Yes               | In 2006 492 people died and 7,825 were injured in 4,620 road traffic accidents; 542 traffic accidents per month | Perceived  | Prevalence of head and/or facial injuries; loss of limbs; death                    | <u>Direct:</u> Poor use of safety helmets; drunk-driving; speeding; lack of night-time visibility<br><u>Indirect:</u> Lack of awareness; lack of law enforcement   |

Table 11.1: Threat analysis

### UXO and landmine explosives<sup>24</sup>

UXO and cluster ammunition pose an immense risk to the population, covering 15 out of the 18 provinces and 25 per cent of all villages. In 1996 the authorities established a Lao UXO unit in charge of planning and coordinating clearing efforts. However, estimates indicate that it will take more than 100 years to clear at least the inhabited land. The UXO office requires a vast amount of financial resources and relies mainly on donor funds. Priority for UXO clearing is given to infrastructure projects such as building schools, houses, health centres and new roads. Data on total casualties, mainly civilians, are not accurately known, although several estimates exist. The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) affirms that there have been more than 13,000 casualties since 1973, of which 43 per cent were lethal. A 1997 Handicap International survey recorded 10,649 casualties (5,495 killed, 5,154 injured) between 1973 and 1996.<sup>25</sup> According to Landmine Monitor reports (see Table 11.2), there was an increase in the number of incidents from 43 in 2002 to 91 in 2005. The number of casualties also increased from 122 in 2001 to 164 in 2005. The majority of recent casualties have been reported in the province of Xiengkhouang.<sup>26</sup>

| Year | Casualties | Killed | Injured | No. of incidents |
|------|------------|--------|---------|------------------|
| 2001 | 122        | 35     | 87      | n/a              |
| 2002 | 99         | 28     | 71      | 43               |
| 2003 | 118        | 33     | 85      | 59               |
| 2004 | 198        | 66     | 132     | 90               |
| 2005 | 164        | 36     | 128     | 91               |

**Table 11.2:** 2001–2005 trend of UXO/mine casualties

Source: Landmine Monitor, various reports. Casualties from UXO and mines.

Casualties often occur when making a fire, during agricultural activities or tampering with UXO. More recently, the increasing commerce in UXO metal has triggered a number of incidents as people search for scrap to sell.<sup>27</sup>

In past decades one of the main difficulties was the lack of specific geographic identification of the contaminated areas. Although maps existed, the Lao government only recently received files from the aerial bombardments, and the specific location of UXO is rarely known until detectors are employed or a bomb explodes. Furthermore, the mud-covered and swampy soil in Laos allows UXO to move several centimetres (or even metres) over time. Since farmers mainly use their legs for planting rice, bombs are pushed deeper into the ground and hidden for years.<sup>28</sup> Once a bomb explodes, clearing teams can identify the location of other bombs hidden in the nearby ground.<sup>29</sup>

The root causes of this threat are evidently not only the mere presence of UXO, but also the lack of awareness, financial burdens and the linked economic gains of the scrap-metal trade. The financial costs are enormous. From 1996 to 2005, contributions to a UNDP-managed trust fund totalled \$27,841,061. In 2004 the international community (ten donor countries) provided \$8.1 million for mine action in Laos, twice as much as in 2003.<sup>30</sup>

## *HIV/AIDS*

The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Laos is estimated at 0.1 per cent. This is low in comparison with neighbouring countries:<sup>31</sup> Laos miraculously remained untouched until recent years. The increasing movement of Lao workers to Thailand, the creation of large infrastructure projects attracting foreign workers, the increasing volume of tourists and the vast amount of new roads that have increased the number of transit drivers have triggered an escalation of HIV/AIDS infections. UNAIDS estimates that approximately 3,700 people live with HIV/AIDS in Laos, of whom fewer than 1,000 are women aged 15 and older.<sup>32</sup>

Official estimates indicate that in 2004 1,470 people were identified as being infected with HIV. Of these 279 were known to be living with AIDS, 191 were under treatment, 556 had died<sup>33</sup> and 62 per cent of the reported HIV cases were male. People infected are relatively young, with 50 per cent being between 20 and 39 years. The National Strategic and Action Plan on HIV/AIDS/STI 2006–2010 states that “of those whose mode of transmission was known, 95 percent had been contracted through heterosexual sex, 4 percent from mother to child, 0.7 percent through homosexual sex, 0.3 percent through blood products, and 0.2 percent through unsterilised needles”.<sup>34</sup> In fact, the number of officially registered AIDS-related deaths is much higher than the estimated number of people dying of AIDS, based on 0.08 per cent prevalence. One of the main difficulties has been the lack of data. Only two rounds of behavioural and zero-surveillance surveys have been conducted.<sup>35</sup> A 2004 survey covered only six out of 18 provinces. The surveillance targeted mainly sex workers, leaving out other vulnerable groups. The results suggest that two of the border provinces, Bokeo and Savannakhet, have the highest prevalence rates, at 3.9 and 3.3 per cent respectively.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, men working abroad often acquire the virus and return infected; they pass on the virus to their wives, who then risk infecting their children. This circular situation is particularly relevant for the Lao-Thai border areas in the southern parts of the country and in the capital, Vientiane.

## *Opium, drugs and amphetamine-type stimulants*<sup>37</sup>

Since the 1990s Laos has been the third-largest opium producer worldwide and an important transit country, being part of the so-called Golden Triangle.<sup>38</sup> Illegal trade is a major concern, but the majority of drug production is consumed locally.<sup>39</sup> The government has committed to an opium eradication policy as part of national poverty reduction and development plans, causing production to decrease.<sup>40</sup> As a result, Laos has changed from being a net exporter to a net importer.<sup>41</sup> This trend had reversed in the year prior to the time of writing: as a UN Office on Drugs and Crime survey reports, opium production had increased from 1,800 ha. in 2005 to 2,500 ha. in 2006. Moreover, poppy eradication had decreased from 2,574 ha. to 1,518 ha. This represents an increase in production of 39 per cent. Some of the causes of this reversal might have been related to reasons such as poverty, lack of coping capacities or decrease of livelihoods. However, the number of households involved in cultivation had substantially decreased from 200,190 to 133,600.<sup>42</sup>

Cultivation of opium as a cash crop in Southeast Asia was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century after the Opium Wars. Previously, poppy had traditionally been used as a painkiller and a medical supplement. Even now, for many hill tribes in northern Laos there is no other medicine for pain relief. Continuous use of opium causes addiction. Smoking opium has also merged with other traditional cultures of various ethnic tribes.<sup>43</sup> The exact nature and extent of commercialization outside Laos are unknown, although it is assumed that opium transits from Myanmar and Laos to Thailand and China. Within Laos, trade was sparked when tourists arrived seeking opportunities to smoke opium. The Lao legal system penalizes consumption or trafficking of opium with capital punishment, although the law is less seriously

enforced among those who require the drug for pain relief. How serious a threat opium addiction is to human security is not really known and difficult to estimate, as the causes of death are registered as chronic illnesses, diseases or infections.<sup>44</sup>

For many years reported opium addiction rates were among the highest in the world.<sup>45</sup> However, these numbers seem to be decreasing, probably because of the opium reduction policy and the scarcity this has generated. According to a Norplan and EcoLao report the number of addicts reported by authorities was approximately 30,000 in 2003. Of these, 9,700 (32 per cent) were over 60 years of age and about 5,600 (19 per cent) were women.<sup>46</sup> The majority were located in the northern provinces of Luang Prabang, Houaphanh and Phongsaly. The estimated decline is backed by other sources.<sup>47</sup> A report from the US Department of State noted that there were 20,160 opium addicts as of May 2005.<sup>48</sup> It also mentioned that demand reduction efforts had mixed results. Nevertheless, more than 6,000 addicts were treated in 2005.<sup>49</sup>

Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and intravenous drug use (IDU) addiction and trafficking are becoming a real threat, particularly to the youth. The openness of the country to trade and communication networks makes it an easy transit route, with an increasing number and variety of drugs being trafficked through Laos. In contrast to opium, many ATS addicts are from urban centres, residing mainly in Vientiane and the southern provinces.<sup>50</sup> Efforts to monitor ATS abuse and trafficking are recent. In 2003 the government adopted a national strategy on demand reduction.<sup>51</sup> It is difficult to estimate the number of addicts, but it was reported that in 2006 there were 40,000 addicts in the country.<sup>52</sup> Studies in some educational institutions showed that ATS were commonly abused, particularly among 15–19 year olds, who are most vulnerable.<sup>53</sup> Although a surveillance study in 2001 found no IDU occurrences, the risk nevertheless remains. Like the ATS threat, IDU emergence could expand due to increasing trafficking and proximity to countries with high IDU prevalence rates.<sup>54</sup>

#### *Human exploitation and abuse*

The UN estimates that 300,000 women and children are trafficked in Asia each year. Trafficked persons are exposed to exploitation and abuse, and are also vulnerable to other threats such as the risk of HIV infection.<sup>55</sup> Together with Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar, Laos is among the main human trafficking routes. As in many similar cases around the world, Lao people migrate in search of better opportunities, but are often deceived when promised a good job and salary. They often have to pay a fee, which can generate huge debts that must be repaid during months of work.

Trafficking networks operate throughout Southeast Asia, including Laos. The lack of a legal agreement between Thailand and Laos on migration makes it hard to distinguish between immigrants and trafficking victims.<sup>56</sup> Since 2005 there has been a memorandum of understanding between Lao PDR and Thailand with respect to the protection of victims.<sup>57</sup> However, illegal migrants or trafficked persons are less inclined to look for help or assistance. Moreover, Lao and Thai people share similar cultural backgrounds and in some cases even the same language. It is therefore sometimes impossible to distinguish between them. The third Laos National Human Development Report calculates, based on Thai estimates, there are 200,000 illegal workers in Thailand. These numbers do not identify those who are being exploited.<sup>58</sup>

A UNICEF-sponsored study conducted among 253 victims of trafficking revealed that many of them are not among the poorest or illiterate. Victims often come from urban centres. They seem to believe they will be migrating to a better place and a better job.<sup>59</sup> The same report found that, in addition to international trafficking, internal trafficking was common. The provinces most affected are Houaphanh and Xiengkhouang in the north.<sup>60</sup> Although many of the people trafficked are from ethnic minorities, the majority,

62 per cent, are from Lao-Thai groups.<sup>61</sup> There is no law that directly addresses the issues of trafficking, although the penal code specifies some punishments for offences related to trafficking activities and trade and abduction of humans.<sup>62</sup> But none of the articles defines trafficking, which makes it difficult to use them as legal instruments.

#### *Malaria and communicable diseases*<sup>63</sup>

Some of the major threats to the health of Lao people are malaria, dengue, acute respiratory infections and other communicable diseases. Malaria claims 3.5 deaths per 100,000 and morbidity is 48 per 1,000.<sup>64</sup> At the beginning of the 1990s the malaria death rate increased alarmingly, reaching 15 per 100,000 in 1994. It then started to decline as protective measures, such as the distribution of impregnated bed nets, were put in place. The proportion of the population using bed nets increased from 25 per cent in 1999 to 60 per cent in 2002.

Malaria is transmitted by mosquitoes carrying the parasite. Those living in remote areas along streams and without proper sanitation are the most vulnerable. According to the MDG indicators, 72 per cent of people living in risk areas do not use protective measures and only 25 per cent use bed nets.<sup>65</sup> Particularly vulnerable people include migrants or relocated people from the highlands and those living in rural areas. Often they are unaware of risks, as mosquitoes do not normally survive at higher altitudes. Potable water is mainly accessible in Vientiane and urban centres; people in rural areas lack safe water and have poor sanitation conditions. They tend to store water during the months of the rainy season. The stagnant water attracts mosquitoes, which then infect people. The disease makes people prone to be anaemic and get fevers and flu-like illnesses, which, when combined with already poor health, can lead to death.

#### *Malnourishment and food security*

Laos is not a country that faces famine, but malnourishment. Floods and droughts damage harvest yields and cut rice production. The majority of the population practise subsistence agriculture, with rice being the main staple and – for many families – the only source of food. Non-timber forest products (NTFPs), wildlife and aquatic resources are collected by the highland ethnic groups as major components of their diet.<sup>66</sup> Although the economy largely relies on agriculture and natural resources, the magnitude of malnourishment is alarming. According to the MDG indicator on hunger, the proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption is 30 per cent.<sup>67</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) country nutrition profile reports that 1.4 million people were undernourished between 1997 and 1999.<sup>68</sup> Rice insufficiency is not the only reason for malnourishment – the causes are diverse and multidimensional.<sup>69</sup> While in some cases poverty and food insecurity are the main reasons, in others the problem lies not with the lack of food but the lack of nutrients.<sup>70</sup>

In the highlands and midlands, for centuries people have relied for survival on the availability and collection of NTFPs, wildlife hunting and aquatic resources. Deforestation and displacement have diminished the possible amount of NTFPs and therefore their nutritional intake. Aquatic resources are also in decline in the country, and animal diseases kill livestock.<sup>71</sup> As a consequence, the diversification of food intake is limited. Fewer animals not only reflect a lower meat intake for families but also a decrease in household coping capacities, as animals are not consumed, but sold to generate cash.

In some areas people who have practised pioneering or rotational agriculture systems have been resettled. Some researchers and international NGOs claim that the development policy of the government has relocated and displaced thousands of people.<sup>72</sup> According to a government and UNDP-sponsored

study, communities that have been relocated tend to experience several months of rice shortage and are more prone to fall sick as they are exposed to new illnesses or viruses.<sup>73</sup> In addition, they are faced with inadequate access to sanitation and lack of safe water and basic health services. It was also reported that government services often arrive only several months after the relocation, putting a tremendous burden on families, as they have to sell livestock and belongings to cover their basic needs. However, if well implemented with timely and adequate support to relocated families and communities, such displacement projects do not necessarily have to be a threat to the affected populations.

### *Road accidents*

Risky driving and road safety are a threat that often does not attract the requisite attention of human security analysis. Road accidents in Laos have increased since 1997, when 3,407 cases were reported. In 2001 this number increased to 4,157, and in 2003 a record 9,788 road accidents were reported.<sup>74</sup> This is mainly due to bad driving manners. Increasing numbers of new roads and vehicles have translated into more drivers, many of whom are not familiar with traffic rules. Many new drivers do not receive driving and road safety training. Since 2005 a number of road safety projects have been launched, along with a review of road transport rules and regulations. The majority of road accidents involve motorcycle, *tuk-tuk* and, to a lesser extent, truck drivers.<sup>75</sup>

Police data estimate that there were more than 4,600 road traffic accidents in Vientiane municipality in 2006, killing almost 500 and injuring more than 7,800.<sup>76</sup> The police estimated there had been a 19 per cent increase in accidents from 2005 to 2006.<sup>77</sup> A survey by Handicap International reports that, during the month of April 2006 alone, about 540 road accident victims sought emergency treatment in one of the four hospitals in the capital.<sup>78</sup> These numbers might not seem large in comparison to global accident tolls. However, considering the population of Vientiane is approximately 690,000,<sup>79</sup> the per capita death rate due to road accidents is estimated to be around 70 per 100,000,<sup>80</sup> one of the highest in Asia.<sup>81</sup> The major causes of death in road accidents are the very rare use of safety helmets among motorcycle and *tuk-tuk* drivers; violations of traffic rules; unawareness of the consequences of breaking traffic rules or lacking protective clothing; and a lack of law enforcement. The majority of victims are motorcycle users and young people between the ages of 15 and 25 years.<sup>82</sup>

### *Actor-based analysis*

The actor-based analysis is intended to highlight some of the main threats and risks faced by each group. The actors are divided into children, youth, women and men. Each subsection points out the main human insecurities that each group faces, and does not intend to cover all the threats.

#### *Children*

Children are the most vulnerable segment of the population in Laos, reflected by very high infant and under-five mortality rates. According to the National Statistics Centre, there are 82 infant deaths and 107 child deaths per 1,000 live births. In other words, with a population growth of 2.3, approximately 8,000 or more children die every year. Direct causes include malnutrition, diarrhoea, malaria and communicable diseases. Moreover, there is a lack of adequate health facilities and medicines, food insecurity and unawareness of existing remedies. The majority of vulnerable children live in rural communities and in the highlands.

Children are also vulnerable to the risks induced by UXO and landmines. The UXO NRA in Laos estimates that 50 per cent of all UXO casualties are children. This is not specific to Laos: in many parts of the world children are unaware of the presence of UXO and play in contaminated fields, risking an explosion

that could either kill them or leave them disabled. A Handicap International survey in 1997 estimated that UXO is present in a third of Lao territory, which means that children in one of four villages are at risk.

Human exploitation poses an unaccountable risk to Lao children. The number of people trafficked in Laos is very difficult to estimate, given increasing migration. It is difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal movements. A lack of data makes it even harder to assess the threat. Nevertheless, a report suggests that 63 per cent are under the age of 18; while 17 per cent of the children trafficked into neighbouring Thailand simply disappear.<sup>83</sup> Reasons for trafficking children are diverse: family poverty, lack of adequate schooling and the need to search for opportunities are some of the factors that make parents hand over their children to traffickers.<sup>84</sup> Children are also vulnerable as they are unaware of the consequences of being trafficked.

Malnutrition is a human insecurity condition that threatens the lives of children. The FAO estimates that 47 per cent of children in Laos are malnourished,<sup>85</sup> and MDG indicators suggest that around 40 per cent of children under five are underweight. This percentage has not changed since the 1990s. The number of malnourished and underweight children is alarming, considering the low population density and the availability of natural resources. It is a consequence of a range of factors, including low calorie intake, lack of food diversification, poverty, bad sanitation and lack of opportunities. Malnutrition thus cannot be tackled by increasing rice sufficiency – a combination of measures is needed.

### *Youth*

Young people in Laos face difficulties in completing education and finding a job. The lack of opportunities has pushed many from rural areas to urban centres. Many fall into illegal work, drug trafficking or drug use. The emergence of ATS and poly-drug-abuse patterns is leading to health problems. Surveys indicate that among ATS users 42 per cent are unemployed youth, 34 per cent disco clients and 14 per cent sex workers. A study conducted in schools shows that ATS abuse increased from 3.7 per cent in 2003 to 27.6 per cent in 2005.<sup>86</sup> Other data indicate that ATS are commonly used by 15–19 year olds. The consequences of this threat among young populations can be devastating, as the negative effects also affect the generations that follow.

### *Women<sup>87</sup>*

The human security of Lao women is at risk along many dimensions. Women from remote areas are especially threatened during their reproductive years, in pregnancy, delivery and the months after giving birth. Maternal mortality is extremely high, not only in comparison to neighbouring countries but also compared to many nations in Africa.<sup>88</sup> Data on maternal mortality rates vary, but the National Statistics Centre estimates that per 100,000 live births 650 Lao women die.<sup>89</sup> International reports speak of 450 deaths.<sup>90</sup>

The root causes are infections, post-partum haemorrhage and poor health services, although the latter are often underutilized. As part of the government's poverty reduction efforts, health centres have been built in and around remote areas. However, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Ministry of Health argue that underutilization persists due to the perception among Lao communities that health services are poor. The lack of adequately trained doctors and nurses contributes to this perception. In addition, some traditional ethnic groups prefer to have children delivered in their own communities, rather than in neighbouring towns where the health centres are located. They often feel uncomfortable with midwives from other villages or different ethnic groups, who might speak a different language. Moreover, in some cases customs put restrictions on how the delivery is arranged.

Young women between the ages of 12 and 18 make up 60 per cent of human exploitation and trafficking cases in Laos.<sup>91</sup> As with children, there is no available estimate on the number of women exposed to such risks. An International Labour Organization report states that 35 per cent of trafficked women are forced into prostitution in neighbouring Thailand. Others encounter forced labour in factories or domestic slavery.<sup>92</sup> The conditions in which they are often obliged to live expose them to such risks as HIV and other diseases. Trafficked women come from both poor rural areas and urban centres, thus making this not only a rural-related issue.<sup>93</sup>

### *Men*

Although children and women are vulnerable to the majority of the threats identified, men are also exposed to a variety of life-threatening risks. Eighty per cent of UXO victims are men. In several provinces agricultural land is contaminated by different types of UXO. Farmers are faced with the dilemma of either working their land or leaving it uncultivated. Since in particular the location of “bombies”<sup>94</sup> is difficult to identify before one explodes, farmers might work for years or decades near them without even noticing their existence. Lao farmers practise labour-intensive techniques and use their feet constantly, in particular for rice cultivation. They always run the risk of touching and thus detonating such bombs. Due to the high costs of bomb clearing, most of the affected areas have not yet been cleared.

### ***Discussion of symptoms and root causes***

Many threats to human security in Laos are interrelated and their root causes are similar. Table 11.3 presents the common root causes for each identified threat. It includes direct and indirect causes, which are often connected but do not necessarily affect the threat in the same way, and also shows – in a very general way – the number of threats affected by each direct root cause.

Malnourishment and food insecurity are detrimental to the health of children and infants. However, these also make women vulnerable to haemorrhages during and after pregnancy. In instances where malnourishment is combined with a lack of adequate sanitation, health assistance or medicine, risks of death of children and women increase considerably. Food insecurity and malnourishment are identified as root causes of three threats.

Poverty is often perceived to be a direct root cause of the majority of threats. In Laos it is an indirect cause, because it depends on the definition of poverty. In many cases, the extent of poverty does not depend on a certain amount of money required, but more on access to a particular service or medicine. Poverty, but also the lack of job opportunities, affects women’s willingness to migrate to other countries, where they do not always achieve better living conditions.

Unawareness of the existence of risks is identified as a root cause of eight threats. For example, unawareness of the existence of mosquitoes that transmit malaria or the availability of health facilities in some rural communities poses serious detriments to people’s health conditions. Similarly, a low level of safety-helmet use (despite their broad availability at affordable prices) causes the death of many young people. Such threats could be considerably diminished if people were aware of the severity of certain risks.



| Root causes  | Threats affected |
|--|------------------|
| Unexploded ordnance                                | 1                |
| Unprotected sex                                    | 1                |
| Illegal trafficking                                | 2                |
| Lack of medicine, lack of treatment                | 3                |
| Lack of adequate health services                   | 3                |
| Lack of law or law enforcement                     | 2                |
| Lack of awareness of solutions and risks           | 8                |
| Relocation, inadequately planned migration         | 2                |
| Food insecurity, malnourishment                    | 3                |
| Lack of access to safe water and sanitation        | 3                |
| Diarrhoea, malaria and other communicable diseases | 3                |
| Failure to use safety helmet                       | 1                |

**Table 11.3:** Common root causes of threats to human security

Some of the root causes are also identified as threats. For example, food insecurity and malnourishment can be seen as a threat but also as a direct and indirect cause of infant and child mortality. The linkages between nutrition, access to adequate food, access to livelihoods and health services imply that one cannot isolate them but rather must recognize their linkage. Diarrhoea, malaria and other communicable diseases are threats, but also directly affect the mortality of children and women.

Which are thus the main threats to human security? Looking at rough estimates, we can note that the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drug addiction and human exploitation are all potentially serious threats in Laos. However, if we consider absolute numbers, the death figures are lower relative to other threats, such as UXO, road accidents, malaria and other communicable diseases. Overall, infant, child and maternal mortality appear to be the greatest threats to the population. But these also reflect symptoms and root causes of other threats. It is therefore important to keep in mind that one might not be able to isolate completely each of the threats without considering the effect of other life-threatening risks. Nevertheless, as it is important to complement the analysis with objective measures, a proposal below suggests how to measure the level of human insecurity of the mentioned threats.

### *Lao human insecurity cluster*

The above analysis shows that there are many threats to human security in Laos. From a practical viewpoint, it is important to know which threats are most serious to the population not only in the short but also in the long term. The OPHUSEC project proposes to include two or three threats in a human security cluster, which would form the basis for a response analysis that includes mitigation and coping capacity measures to deal with the reduction of such threats.

### Measuring human insecurity

As an attempt to measure the level of human insecurity, I develop an index for the threats. A comparison among them will allow determining the severity of each threat with the help of quantitative tools. An index can be developed to account for short- and long-term risks. Hypothetically, a value of 100 means the threat has the greatest risk in comparison to other selected risks; a value of 0 means that the threat poses no risk. All the risks carry a value between 0 and 100: none has 0 value nor a total 100 value, as the value is determined in comparison to other threats. Two of the selected threats, HIV/AIDS and food insecurity and malnutrition, were removed from the analysis due to data limitations. The remaining eight threats were used in calculating a short-term and a long-term index of insecurity, which were then combined to form the human insecurity index (see the annex for details of the index composition). Figure 1 shows the final index values for the levels of human insecurity for each selected threat. This index allows the quantification and comparison of threats. Calculated numbers for the short- and long-term measures are included in the annex.




Figure 11.1: Human insecurity index – Comparing threats

The chart clearly shows that infant mortality is the major risk to human security in Laos, with a human insecurity index value of 76. It is followed by malaria and road accidents, with values of 31 and 28 respectively. UXO and maternal health follow, with 24 and 21 points. Opium addiction receives a value of 17. Less alarming threats include drug addiction and human exploitation. It is important to highlight that several assumptions have been made to make a quantification exercise feasible. These assumptions were kept as simple as possible; for details please see the annex.

### Selection of Lao local threats

By using the threat analysis and human insecurity index one can determine the most important threats to Lao human security. I clustered the threats in two groups, as some share the same root causes and symptoms and can be tackled with parallel or similar programmes. The first cluster comprises health-related threats, such as infant mortality, maternal mortality and malaria. These are important, as the majority

of the Lao population dies as a result of one of these threats. I chose to cluster them together because they are not directly the consequences of human behaviour, but are related to structural, country-specific problems. They are threats that need to be considered within a long-term perspective, as risk-reducing actions could take many years to take root. The second cluster comprises threats that pose a great risk, but in comparison to the previous cluster do not threaten people's lives as much as specific health risks. The threats are sometimes triggered by unconscious actions and could be avoidable in many instances. They include accidents linked to UXO and motor vehicles.

## **Response analysis**

### *Coping capacities<sup>95</sup>*

Lao people and communities have developed mechanisms to cope with hardship situations and disasters by reducing their vulnerability. In particular, communities living in rural areas and the highlands have responded to shocks to their livelihood systems with indigenous coping mechanisms. They have transmitted such strategies between generations to mitigate the impacts of floods, droughts, pests, animal diseases, epidemics and health-related shocks.<sup>96</sup> Coping strategies in Laos are distinct and evolve progressively. Sarah Wood refers to four stages, which, for the purpose of this chapter, have been reorganized as short- and long-term strategies. Communities often use short-term measures, in particular when coping with seasonal effects. Some examples of such measures developed by Lao people are trade of NTFPs, collection of aquatic resources, change of food habits, assistance through a *kor khau* (community in-kind assistance), use of herbal medicines and consumption of dead animals. When people are unable to overcome hazards with short-term measures because the shock turns out to be longer than predicted or the measure is not capable of mitigating vulnerability, long-term measures are taken. For example, sale of essential assets such as livestock or land, consumption of seeds for the coming harvest, borrowing food and money outside kinship relations and in some instances displacement, permanent out-migration or begging have been adopted as options of last resort.

The socio-economic and environmental changes during the past decade have affected the ways in which people cope with hazards, not only seasonal and known threats such as UXO, but also new threats that were hitherto unknown. Many of these were previously relevant in more urban areas, but are now becoming threats to rural communities as well. They include risks of malaria when communities have been displaced, HIV/AIDS or dangers of human exploitation when migrating, and drug addiction.

Several programmes aim to reduce such threats and vulnerabilities. These mitigation and response measures have been put in place by communities and local governments, some with the support of NGOs or international organizations. The following subsections examine these in greater depth, and Tables 11.4 and 11.5 summarize the mitigation measures and response analysis for each identified threat in the two selected clusters.

### *Cluster 1*

The responses to the first cluster, which includes risks of death due to malaria, infant and child mortality and maternal mortality, are explored below. Health infrastructure, the availability of medicine and the provision of mosquito nets have increased considerably in Laos. These measures have been targeted mainly at people in rural areas and are having a modest impact on the reduction of risks. The Ministry of Health, along with some multilateral and bilateral donors, has supported the construction of health clinics and the improvement of hospitals. The soft part of improving health services has focused on the development of

better-qualified nurses and midwives. Several organizations, including UNICEF, UNFPA and the World Health Organization (WHO), have supported the provision of emergency health services for pregnant women and their children. Better health infrastructure is crucial for improving health conditions. However, proper medicines and suitable health personnel are indispensable to improving health services. It would be a good option to train midwives and nurses from people's own communities. They are more aware of local traditions and customs and speak the local languages, which in turn makes communication much easier.

Raising awareness on how to respond to emergencies along with some first aid training can be vital for people's survival. Such awareness raising has taken place to some extent, but the impact has been smaller than envisaged. It might be that selected techniques do not fit with the local context or traditional customs. In some instances, a risk might not have been taken as seriously as it should be. This is particularly important for the prevention of malaria in remote areas where sanitation is poor. Villagers who need to collect water and store it for future use are at great risk. Mosquito-net usage has improved, but not all people at risk have access to them yet. This is unfortunate and could be easily rectified, as mosquito nets are fairly inexpensive and efficient tools that help prevent malaria and dengue and could easily be more widely supplied to villagers.

Nutritional supplements are necessary for the survival of many people, in particular infants and pregnant women. Along with vaccines, they help reduce the risk of death. They have been provided to some extent by international organizations within the framework of development projects. Examples include the food-for-work and school feeding projects, which are supported by the World Food Programme and offer food rations to participants. For many schoolchildren, who often have to walk several kilometres to reach school, this scheme supplies their main dietary and nutritional intake. Such programmes thus serve two objectives: they improve school attendance rates and enhance nutrition. Unfortunately, scarce financial resources do not allow the establishment of nationwide programmes. Yet the Ministry of Health could do more to persuade additional donors of the necessity and practicality of such projects.

Self-sufficiency in food production and the assurance of an adequate daily dietary intake could be improved by providing people with farming tools, access to irrigated land and support for traditional methods such as collecting NTFPs and aquatic resources. As animal diseases kill livestock, which impoverishes households and decreases their self-sufficiency, vaccination and veterinary services need to be improved as well. As public services like these tend to be very poor, farmers depend on assistance from NGOs.

Overall there is common agreement among all actors involved (government, civil servants, development workers, donors, families and others) on the importance of improving health conditions among the population, but this requires adequate efforts and resources. The government's reliance on donors for the implementation of programmes poses risks to the completion of projects, as donor funds are only allocated for a set period and are bound by specific rules and requirements. Meanwhile, the international community puts pressure on Laos to reduce its aid dependence and invest hydropower revenues in the education and health sectors.

|   |   |   |  |   |   |
|---|---|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Cluster 1:<br/><u>Infant and maternal mortality, malaria</u></b> | <b>What has been done in the <u>past</u>? Which mitigation measure?</b>   | <b>By whom?</b>   | <b>To whom?</b>  | <b>Feasibility?</b>   | <b>Effectiveness?</b>   |
|   | Provision of health services, medicine, awareness and emergency interventions, mosquito nets                            | International organizations such as UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO; Ministry of Health            | Children, pregnant women and people in malaria-prone areas       | Feasible, costly  | Effective to some extent in less remote areas   |
| <b>Cluster 1:<br/><u>Infant and maternal mortality, malaria</u></b> | <b>What is being done <u>now</u>? Which mitigation measure?</b>   | <b>By whom?</b>   | <b>To whom?</b>  | <b>Feasibility?</b>   | <b>Effectiveness?</b>   |
|   | Provision of health services, medicine, awareness and emergency interventions, mosquito nets, training of medical staff | Health authorities with support from development partners and NGOs                    | Children, pregnant women and people in malaria-prone areas       |   | Health infrastructure is not always effective as there are no proper medicines or staffing; lack of resources |
| <b>Cluster 1:<br/><u>Infant and maternal mortality, malaria</u></b> | <b>What needs to be done in the <u>future</u>? Which mitigation measure?</b>  | <b>By whom?</b>   | <b>To whom?</b>  | <b>Feasibility?</b>   | <b>Effectiveness?</b>   |
|   | More health-related risk awareness and advocacy, provision of basic medical supplies, bed nets                          | Health authorities, development practitioners and community groups, Lao Women's Union | Pregnant women and their families, people in malaria-prone areas | Feasible but needs adequate tools and financial commitment  | If well targeted could be a great tool  |
|   | Improve nutrition status of children and pregnant women, nutrition education and feeding practices                      | Families and communities  | Pregnant women and infants                                       | Complex, as poor families lack food and sanitation, but vaccines and food supplements could be provided | Improving nutrition status improves health conditions of infants and women                                    |

Table 11.4: Response analysis to Cluster 1

## Cluster 2

The second cluster includes two further major threats: UXO and motor vehicle accidents. As mentioned in the threat analysis, there have been a number of responses to the danger posed by UXO. The government coordinates all demining efforts through the NRA, which has established mechanisms to support victims and created a database that assists in monitoring of implementation activities and victims. As demining is a very expensive and slow task, the government relies on donor funding for such efforts. From 1996 to 2005 the donor community contributed almost US\$28 million to support demining projects. With the assistance of ten donor countries, within ten years 7,422 hectares of land were cleared and released for agricultural production and development activities.<sup>97</sup>

While UXO Lao is still the largest clearance operator, Mines Advisory Group, Handicap International Belgium and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action have begun to work as independent clearance operators.<sup>98</sup> An important and essential component of these projects has been risk and awareness education. For instance, the UXO unit has established centres where risk education classes are offered to adults and children. In 2004 300,000 people received mine/UXO risk education.<sup>99</sup> Awareness raising saves lives, as the majority of incidents occur during agricultural activities, tampering with UXO and playing. However, despite this awareness raising, households are increasingly searching for UXO to sell it. Although they are aware of the dangers inherent in this activity, poverty drives them to take these risks.

| Cluster 2:<br><u>UXO and motor<br/>vehicle accidents</u> | What has been done<br>in the <u>past</u> ? Which<br>mitigation measure? | By whom?  | To whom?   | Feasibility?   | Effectiveness?   |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|
|  | Demining and<br>clearing of land  | UXO Lao with<br>help of demining<br>teams,<br>international<br>organizations<br>and international<br>NGOs | Land, areas near<br>schools, health<br>clinics and roads | Very costly,<br>feasible for<br>specific target<br>areas | Effective to some<br>extent                                      |
|  | Assistance to victims   | Health<br>authorities with<br>help of<br>international<br>organizations<br>and international<br>NGOs      | Affected persons   | Costly treatment   | Effective in some<br>areas where<br>financial<br>resources exist |
|  | Advocacy for UXO<br>risks   | UXO Lao with<br>help of demining<br>teams,<br>international<br>organizations<br>and international<br>NGOs | Communities  | Feasible   | Effective  |

| Cluster 2:<br><u>UXO and motor vehicle accidents</u> | What is being done <u>now</u> ? Which mitigation measure?                  | By whom?  | To whom?   | Feasibility?     | Effectiveness?  |
|--|--|---|--|------------------|---|
|  | Demining and clearing land   | UXO Lao with help of demining teams, international organizations and international NGOs | Land, areas near schools, health clinics and roads | Very costly      | Effective to some extent                                |
|  | Assistance to victims  | Health authorities with help of international organizations and international NGOs      | Affected persons                                   | Costly treatment | Effective in some areas where financial resources exist |
|  | Advocacy for UXO risks   | UXO Lao with help of demining teams, international organizations and international NGOs | Communities  | Feasible         | Effective   |
| Cluster 2:<br><u>UXO and motor vehicle accidents</u> | What needs to be done in the <u>future</u> ? Which mitigation measure?     | By whom?  | To whom?   | Feasibility?     | Effectiveness?  |
|  | Demining and clearing land   | UXO Lao with help of demining teams, international organizations and international NGOs | Land and places                                    | Very costly      | Effective to some extent                                |
|  | Assistance to victims  | Health authorities with help of international organizations and international NGOs      | Affected persons                                   | Costly treatment | Effective in some areas where financial resources exist |
|  | Continue advocacy for UXO risks and motor vehicle drivers, law enforcement | UXO Lao with help of demining teams, international organizations and international NGOs | Communities  | Feasible         | Effective   |

**Table 11.5:** Response analysis to Cluster 2

UNICEF plays a major role in community awareness and has established an information system to support victim assistance. World Education Laos (also known as World Education/Consortium) has developed an in-school programme which is being implemented in nine provinces by some 3,700 teachers. Aside from its clearing activities, Handicap International Belgium is working on risk education and awareness through a

village volunteer scheme in Savannakhet province. It is estimated that UXO Lao awareness teams have reached 5,554 villages and more than 1.4 million children and adults.<sup>100</sup>

On the issue of road safety there have been some recent efforts to ameliorate the situation. In 2005 the government developed a road safety strategy. The Asian Development Bank has been involved in creating synergies to support road construction programmes and maintenance funds. It has also been involved in advocacy and awareness raising within the region.

A major project on road safety started in 2003, implemented by Handicap International Belgium and covering Vientiane municipality and Savannakhet province. It collects data on road accidents, supports victim rehabilitation and disability, and provides road safety education, including developing teaching material and curricula.

The threats of UXO and road safety are likely to be substantially reduced if educational and awareness-raising programmes are well targeted and implemented. Such efforts do exist and need to be continued. However, these activities are not by themselves sufficient. For instance, UXO education programmes do not help much if people continue to search for scrap metal. Other measures are necessary to cope with these risks, such as improving family incomes. Road safety mitigation measures need to be combined with implementation of road regulations. Drivers need to be aware that accidents can occur, and that they are responsible for their own lives as well as those of third parties.

### *Human insecurity in different scenarios*

How can human security levels change once adequate mitigation measures are pursued or put in place? This section uses the human security index to measure changes in threat levels. Using this index as a baseline, two scenarios emerge.

The positive scenario envisions that mitigation measures are put in place or coping capacity increases. Under such circumstances, the largest impact can be expected in the long term. Nevertheless, some short-term impacts might also occur. In my hypothetical situation, I reduced the short-term index by one-fifth and the long-term index by one-third.

The negative scenario describes a situation where responses and coping capacities are not strengthened or expanded. This has consequences in the short and long terms: the short-term index increases by one-fifth but the long term by one-third.

It is not within the scope of this chapter to predict how existing measures will affect human security in Laos – to do so it would be necessary to quantify several of the existing programmes and projects. Instead, this exercise explores some general but objective methodologies to track progress on human security and envision how different threats might be affected when different “possible scenarios” occur.

Figure 11.2 shows that in a positive scenario the threat of infant mortality could be reduced considerably, from 77 to 60, and malaria from 31 to 23. The remaining threats are all below 20. Similarly, in a negative scenario levels of insecurity would rise substantially: infant mortality would reach 90, and five other threats would exceed 20.






Figure 11.2: Human insecurity index – Positive and negative scenarios

## CONCLUSION

This study has applied a human security lens to an analysis of local threats that are specific to Laos. The case study highlights that some threats are quite common on a global level, while others are specific to the context of Laos. For example, while infant and maternal mortality are major threats in many countries throughout the developing world, the dangers associated with UXO and opium addiction seem to be more regional and particular to Laos. The study has also undertaken a response analysis while touching on possible coping and mitigation measures that could help alleviate such threats. In addition, a quantitative measure of human security has been proposed to help not only estimate the importance of threats but also track and monitor them within a local framework.

## ANNEX: TECHNICAL NOTE ON MEASURING HUMAN INSECURITY

Although scholars have debated extensively the definition of human security and reached a consensus, discussions on how to measure or quantify human security lag far behind. The Human Security Project in its *Human Security Report 2005* explicitly argues that it is not feasible to create a composite measure. In particular, the report states that “it is certainly not currently possible” and “it is probably not desirable” because existing datasets “are not comprehensive enough”.<sup>101</sup> The report therefore argues against a cross-country composite index that would allow ranking countries. In contrast, Kings and Murray argue in their article “Rethinking Human Security” that such a measure is necessary to expand the concept of human security. They develop an index based on well-being and poverty concepts.<sup>102</sup> Arguments against the creation of an index also point to the fact that there are already several indexes covering different dimensions of human security. The best known is UNDP’s Human Development Index.

It is evident that the lack of measurable tools for human security undermines the feasible application of the concept in practice. Moreover, although basic agreement on the threat dimensions of the concept exists, human security varies across populations and it is difficult to determine which threats are more important than others.

Rather than aspiring to a cross-country comparison, it is important to focus on national or local aspects. Using a life-threatening human security framework and taking the broader definition of “individual-centred security provision and threat/syndrome mitigation”,<sup>103</sup> one can focus on such life-threatening local risks, as suggested by the OPHUSEC project. Given the presence of various threats, one needs to determine objectively how important each of them is to human security and how actions will be prioritized. This can be achieved with a human insecurity index, which can be used *to measure and rank the importance of such threats*. It also provides some guidelines on where most resources are needed to alleviate their impact on human lives.

The following steps need to be taken.

1. First, an absolute measure of insecurity related to each threat is generated. This is represented by the absolute number of deaths per year originated by a particular threat.
2. Second, a relative measure of a threat among the population is created to assess its seriousness. This is measured in terms of the proportion of people who are at risk or vulnerable to the threat. This measure is less objective, as it depends on one’s assessment as to where the people are located, who they are, their gender, age and ethnicity, socio-economic status, short-term versus long-term aspects, etc. Such data are not normally readily available or collected, which therefore poses difficulties in attempts to quantify it.
3. Third, an index is generated based on the previous two measures. The index gives values from 1 to 100 to the different threats. The index proposed here is based on the same principle as the Human Development Index developed by UNDP in 1990.

## FIRST AND SECOND STEPS

The absolute and relative measures of insecurity for each threat help the researcher to establish *benchmarks* and select the most important local threats that exist for a particular population. They also provide *benchmarks for policy-makers and development practitioners* on the nature and potential impact of the threats. It will thus be easier to identify the causes and existing coping mechanisms, and this will help prioritize the required resources adequately.

The absolute and relative measures are weighted by population numbers, then two indexes are created for each threat. The first, a *short-term index*, measures how important the threat is based on the number of people who have perished as a result of the threat during a year. The second, a *long-term index*, measures the population that is potentially at risk of being killed by the threat, and thus provides a longer-term perspective. Each index is calculated using the following formula:  $\text{Index} = (\text{actual value} - \text{min}) / (\text{max} - \text{min})$ .

## THIRD STEP

The two indices are then used to generate a composite *human insecurity index*. The short-term index is weighted 75 per cent and the long-term index is weighted 25 per cent. Again, the human insecurity index is calculated for all local threats that are identified.

A weighted value of .75 is given to the short-term index and a value of .25 to the long-term index. This is done for two main reasons. First, it is important to account for the real and actual human impact, thus the short-term index is given more weight. Second, estimates are more general in the long term than in the short term because the population at risk is always larger than the one that is actually affected. Giving a lower weight to the long-term index does not change the overall result, but it changes the importance that one allocates to the population at risk. Thus the following formula is used:  $\text{Human insecurity index} = .75 \text{ ST index} + .25 \text{ LT index}$ .

A value of 0 means the threat does not pose a major risk in comparison to other threats; a value of 100 indicates that the threat is of great importance. One could also appoint values from 1 to 10 (1 less serious, 10 more serious) to provide a better visual comparison among the specific threats experienced in the relative context.

Table 11.A1 shows a mathematical example using the Lao case study on human security.

|                      | Step 1   | Step 2   |  |          |   |
|----------------------|--|--|--|----------|---|
| Threat               | Absolute measure of human insecurity (estimated deaths per year) | Relative measure of human insecurity (based on population at risk) | Short term (absolute measure weighted by population) | ST index | Long term (relative measure weighted by population) |
| 1 UXO                | 200  | 800,000  | 0.00003571   | 0        | 0.14286   |
| 2 Human exploitation | 253  | 200,000  | 0.00004518   | 0.006625 | 0.03571   |
| 3 Opium addiction    |  | 324,800  |  |          | 0.05800   |
| 6 Infant mortality   | 8,200  | 7,000  | 0.00146429   | 1        | 0.01250   |
| 7 Maternal mortality | 650  | 309,700  | 0.00011607   | 0.05625  | 0.05530   |
| 8 Malaria            | 1,960  | 268,800  | 0.00035000   | 0.22     | 0.04800   |
| 10 Road accidents    | 492  | 451,750  | 0.00008786   | 0.0365   | 0.08067   |

**Table 11.A1:** Human insecurity measurement

In sum, the overall process consists of the following steps.

- List all possible threats.
- Conduct a threat analysis (who, what, where, etc.).
- Calculate the absolute measure of the threat (by the number of victims/deaths per threat).
- Calculate the relative measure of the threat (by the number of people at risk).
- Generate short-term and long-term indicators.
- Calculate the human insecurity index.
- Select key threats to include in the human insecurity cluster, based on the human insecurity index.
- Develop responses for selected threats.




Figure 11.A1: Human insecurity in Lao PDR: Short-term impact of threats (values reflect the additional risk of a threat based on the values of the threat posing minimal risk)




Figure 11.A2: Human insecurity in Lao PDR: Long-term impact of threats (values reflect the additional risk of a threat based on the values of the threat posing minimal risk)

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>.

<sup>2</sup> Country factsheets and human development indicators in UNDP, *Human Development Report 2007* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), [http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_LAO.html](http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_LAO.html) and [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic\\_78\\_1\\_1.html](http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_78_1_1.html); World Bank, "Lao Economic Monitor", May 2007, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/293582-1163107098038/3145698-1174622249581/LaoEconomicMonitorMay2007English.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> During the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 Laos was affected, but to a lower extent than its neighbour Thailand due to the closed nature of its capital market.

<sup>4</sup> Information in this section was drawn from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Committee for Planning and Investment, National Statistics Centre (NSC), "International Trade and Human Development: Lao PDR", *Human Development Reports*, 2006, [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/lao\\_2006\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/lao_2006_en.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Some scholars argue that there are more than 200 groups. This depends on the ethno-linguistic divisions used. See for example Asian Development Bank, *Participatory Poverty Assessment* (Manila: ADB, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> This has facilitated the integration of migrants into Thailand, as they can be perceived to be from the Thai region of Isan.

<sup>7</sup> The Baci is a ritual ceremony among family and friends aiming to bestow success in life and happiness. It is held for marriages, funerals, new-born babies and before/after moving into a new house or changing jobs.

<sup>8</sup> See Charles Alton and Houmphanh Rattanavong, "Service Delivery and Resettlement: Options for Development Planning", 2004, Lao/03/A01, UNDP/ECHO, Field Report, Livelihoods Study, Vientiane, Lao PDR; UNODC, *Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand* (Vienna: UNODC, 2006).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Olivier Evrard and Yves Goudineau, "Planned Resettlement, Unexpected Migrations and Cultural Trauma in Laos", *Development and Change*, 35(5), 2004, pp. 937–962.

<sup>11</sup> Some argue that today villages are still relocated for this purpose. The government argues that relocation is mainly due to large-scale infrastructure projects.

<sup>12</sup> Alton and Rattanavong, note 8 above.

<sup>13</sup> It was reported that 5,000 people would be involuntarily resettled. See Norplan and EcoLao, "Cumulative Impact Analysis and Nam Theun 2 Contributions, Annex 7: Drugs and Human Trafficking, Final Report", prepared by NORTRAM and EcoLao for ADB and Government of Lao PDR, October 2004. Other reports suggest that 6,000 people would be resettled and 40,000 affected: see Amnesty International, "AI Report 2005: Laos, Covering Events from January–December 2004", 2005, <http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/lao-summary-eng>. Some media reports estimated numbers in the range of 70,000–100,000. See, for example, *International Herald Tribune*, "Dam Project Brings Laos Cash and Controversy", 15 March 2006, [www.ihf.com/articles/2006/03/15/news/rcorpdam.php](http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/03/15/news/rcorpdam.php); Agence France Press, "Controversial Mega-Dam Takes Shape in Laos", 1 July 2007, [http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Controversial\\_mega\\_dam\\_takes\\_shape\\_\\_07012007.html](http://rawstory.com/news/afp/Controversial_mega_dam_takes_shape__07012007.html).

<sup>14</sup> UNDP and NSC, note 4 above.

<sup>15</sup> UN and GOL, "Common Country Assessment", 2006, [www.unlao.org/Publications,%20Media/publications/CCA%20Lao%20PDR%20Final%20\\_June2006.pdf](http://www.unlao.org/Publications,%20Media/publications/CCA%20Lao%20PDR%20Final%20_June2006.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> UXO Lao (Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme – [www.uxolao.org](http://www.uxolao.org)); UNDP, "Assessments of Development Results (ADR)", 2007, p. 46, [www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/ADR\\_Reports/ADR\\_Laos.pdf](http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/ADR_Reports/ADR_Laos.pdf); Handicap International Belgium, *Living with UXO: Final Report on the National Survey on the Socio-economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR* (Brussels: Handicap International Belgium, 1997), <http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/LIMA/Hi-National-survey-on-SE-impact-of-UXO-in-Lao-PDR-1997.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> AVERTing HIV and AIDS (AVERT), “HIV and AIDS in Asia: Laos”, 2014, <http://www.avert.org/hiv-and-aids-asia.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> UNDP, note 16 above.

<sup>19</sup> These statements are partly drawn from conversations with ex-Peace Corps members. See also Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997); Grant Evans, *A Short History of Laos* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002).

<sup>20</sup> See UNDP, note 1 above.

<sup>21</sup> See *ibid.*; Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2005* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2006* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, “Operationalizing Human Security: Paradigm – Policy – Local Implementation”, paper presented at annual meeting of Swiss Political Science Association, Balsthal, 18–19 November 2004 (revised draft April 2005), p. 14.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> This section is based on UXO Lao, note 16 above; UNDP, note 16 above; Handicap International Belgium, note 16 above.

<sup>25</sup> As cited in Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic”, 2009, <http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2005/laos.html#fnB85>.

<sup>26</sup> Landmine Monitor, “Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine-Free World”, 2005, [www.icbl.org/lm/2005/laos.html](http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/laos.html).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> This is based on anecdotal evidence collected by the author.

<sup>29</sup> Landmine Monitor, note 26 above.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> UNAIDS/World Health Organization (WHO) Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance, “Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections: Lao People’s Democratic Republic”, 2004, Geneva, [http://data.unaids.org/publications/fact-sheets01/laos\\_en.pdf](http://data.unaids.org/publications/fact-sheets01/laos_en.pdf).

<sup>32</sup> UNAIDS, “Country Situation Analysis: Challenges and Emerging Issues for 2007”, 2007, [www.unaids.org/en/Regions\\_Countries/Countries/laos\\_peoples](http://www.unaids.org/en/Regions_Countries/Countries/laos_peoples). Latest figures from 2012 estimate that approximately 12,000 are living with HIV/AIDS, 4,900 of whom are women aged 15 and up. See UNAIDS, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic: HIV and AIDS Estimates (2012)”, <http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/laopeoplesdemocraticrepublic/>.

<sup>33</sup> National Committee for the Control of AIDS, “National Strategic and Action Plan on HIV/AIDS/STI 2006–2010”, fifth draft, NCCA, Vientiane, July 2005.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> One at the beginning of the 2000s and the other in 2004. The survey is not nationwide – in 2004 it covered only six provinces. See National Committee for the Control of AIDS, note 33 above.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle* (Vienna: UNODC, October 2006).

<sup>38</sup> The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported Laos as the third main opium producer. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2003* (Kabul: UNODC and Afghan Transition Government, Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), October 2003), p. 31, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan\\_opium\\_survey\\_2003.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> UNODC, “Strategic Programme Framework 2006–2009”, 2006, [www.unodc.org/pdf/laopdr/publications/laos\\_strategic\\_programme\\_framework\\_2006-2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/laopdr/publications/laos_strategic_programme_framework_2006-2009.pdf).

- <sup>40</sup> GOL, “National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy”, Vientiane, 2004, <http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/other-publications/national-growth-and-poverty-eradication-strategy-lao-pdr/>; GOL, “National Socio-economic Development Plan 2006–2010”, Vientiane, 2005, [http://www.moe.gov.la/laoesdf/background\\_docs/Eng/NSEDP\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.moe.gov.la/laoesdf/background_docs/Eng/NSEDP_Eng.pdf).
- <sup>41</sup> See UNODC, note 37 above; and UNODC, note 38 above.
- <sup>42</sup> UNODC, note 38 above. Statistics taken from the factsheet table.
- <sup>43</sup> For example, elderly from ethnic groups in northwest Laos sit around to smoke as a social event. Based on author’s conversations with villagers.
- <sup>44</sup> Based on author’s conversations with UN Office on Drugs and Crime staff.
- <sup>45</sup> UNDP and NSC, note 4 above; US Department of State, “INCSR – International Narcotics Control Strategy Report”, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2001, 2006 and 2007, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).
- <sup>46</sup> See Norplan and EcoLao, note 13 above.
- <sup>47</sup> UNODC, note 38 above.
- <sup>48</sup> US Department of State (2006), note 45 above.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> Norplan and EcoLao, note 13 above.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Australian Regional Chair for South East Asia and China, *Regional report [to the Dublin Group] on Southeast Asia and China* (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2007).
- <sup>53</sup> UNODC, note 38 above.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Ranga Sirilal, “Human Trafficking Helps Spread HIV/AIDS in Asia-UN”, Reuters, 22 August 2007, [www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L223252.htm](http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L223252.htm).
- <sup>56</sup> This reflects the situation up to September 2007.
- <sup>57</sup> Government of Lao PDR and Thailand, “MoU on the Protection of Victims of Trafficking”, 2005, [www.humantrafficking.org/updates/96](http://www.humantrafficking.org/updates/96).
- <sup>58</sup> UNDP and NSC, note 4 above.
- <sup>59</sup> James Chamberlain, “Broken Promises, Shattered Dreams: A Profile of Child Trafficking in the Lao PDR”, Lao PDR Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and UNICEF, 2003, [www.unicef.org/media/files/BrokenPromisesFULLREPORT.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/media/files/BrokenPromisesFULLREPORT.pdf).
- <sup>60</sup> Inthasone Phetsiriseng, “Lao PDR – Preliminary Assessment of Illegal Labour Migration and Trafficking in Children and Women for Labour Exploitation”, International Labour Organization and International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Bangkok, January 2003, [www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms\\_bk\\_pb\\_21\\_en.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_bk_pb_21_en.pdf).
- <sup>61</sup> UNDP, note 16 above. Other groups were Mon-Khmers (27 per cent), Tibeto-Burman (10 per cent), Hmong-Mien (1 per cent).
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid. Article 92 relating to trade and abduction of humans gives a punishment of five to 15 years’ imprisonment to any person trading or abducting humans for ransom.
- <sup>63</sup> Data in this section are taken from UN and GOL, “Millennium Development Goals Report”, Vientiane, 2004.



<sup>64</sup> Death rate refers to crude death rate, the total number of deaths per 100,000 people. Morbidity refers to the prevalence rate of a disease per 1,000 people. See *ibid.*; see also United Nations, *Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals – Definitions, Rationale, Concepts and Sources* (New York: United Nations, 2003).

<sup>65</sup> UN and GOL, note 63 above.

<sup>66</sup> Jutta Krahn and Arlyne Johnson, “Upland Food Security and Wildlife Management”, *Juth Pakai: Perspectives of Lao Development*, 9, July 2007; Pernille Dyg, “Understanding Malnutrition and Rural Food Consumption in Lao PDR”, *Journal of Food Composition and Analysis*, 19, 2006, pp. 763–764.

<sup>67</sup> UN and GOL, note 63 above.

<sup>68</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization, *Nutrition Country Profile – Lao PDR* (Rome: FAO, 2003).

<sup>69</sup> For example, rice insufficiency is related not only to poor yields and low income but also to declining household labour, shortening fallows, lack of affordable credit, poor health and land allocation policies, to name a few. For a discussion on casual linkages and poverty analysis see Asian Development Bank, note 5 above; UNDP, *National Human Development Report 2001: Advancing Rural Development* (Vientiane: UNDP, 2002).

<sup>70</sup> Dyg, note 66 above.

<sup>71</sup> Jutta Krahn, “Cooking Up Dietary Change in Lao Upland Kitchens”, *Juth Pakai: Perspectives of Lao Development*, 1, December 2003; Krahn and Johnson, note 66 above; Dyg, note 66 above.

<sup>72</sup> Evrard and Goudineau, note 10 above.

<sup>73</sup> UN and GOL, note 63 above.

<sup>74</sup> UNESCAP, “Health Without Borders: Situation Analysis of Lao PDR”, regional workshop report, 2007, [www.unescap.org/esid/hds/pubs/2442/5\\_LaoPDR.pdf](http://www.unescap.org/esid/hds/pubs/2442/5_LaoPDR.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* *Tuk-tuk* is the Southeast Asian version of a vehicle known elsewhere as an auto rickshaw or cabin cycle. It is a widely used form of transport in Southeast Asia.

<sup>76</sup> Data reported in project information listed on INGO Network: Handicap International Belgium, “Road Safety Project Phase II – Preventing Road Traffic Accidents and Disabilities in Vientiane and Savannakhet Province (LA07 RDS)”, 2007, [www.directoryofngos.org/pub/project.php?id=587](http://www.directoryofngos.org/pub/project.php?id=587)

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> UN and GOL, note 15 above.

<sup>80</sup> Author’s calculations based on 492 annual fatalities. Population of Vientiane estimated to be 690,000.

<sup>81</sup> Rates in the Asia-Pacific region are the highest in the world. Estimates for Indonesia are approximately 30,000 and for Thailand and Vietnam 13,000. However, city per capita levels are higher in Laos considering that almost all the accidents occur in Vientiane. See Asian Development Bank, “Road Crashes Costing Southeast Asian Countries US\$15 Billion per Year”, 2004, <http://www.m2.com/m2/web/story.php/2004305258217313252B85256F5400396132>.

<sup>82</sup> Chamberlain, note 59 above, p. 15. See also Handicap International Belgium, note 76 above.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Phetsiriseng, note 60 above.

<sup>85</sup> FAO and WHO, “Country Overview on Food Safety: People’s Democratic Republic of Laos”, paper presented at Regional Conference on Food Safety for Asia and the Pacific, Seremban, 24–27 May 2004.

<sup>86</sup> UNODC, note 38 above. The study was conducted with 14,260 students from 99 schools in 17 provinces.

- <sup>87</sup> This paragraph is written using UN and GOL, note 15 above; National Statistics Centre, “Committee for Planning and Investment: Several Statistics”, 2007, [www.nsc.gov.la/Statistics](http://www.nsc.gov.la/Statistics); author’s personal communications with villagers and development workers.
- <sup>88</sup> Only the Solomon Islands are reported to have a higher maternal mortality within Asia-Pacific countries. In comparison to Africa, Laos has a higher rate than Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.
- <sup>89</sup> National Statistics Centre, note 87 above.
- <sup>90</sup> UN and GOL, note 15 above.
- <sup>91</sup> The ILO study was cited in the section on the programme to combat trafficking in humans in International Labour Organization, “Situation on Human Trafficking in Lao PDR”, 2005, [www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/child/trafficking/downloads/laosituationnote.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/child/trafficking/downloads/laosituationnote.pdf).
- <sup>92</sup> Phetsiriseng, note 60 above.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid. See also Chamberlain, note 59 above.
- <sup>94</sup> In Laos, unexploded bomblets are often called bombies. Several bomblets are contained in a cluster bomb.
- <sup>95</sup> This section draws largely on Sarah Wood, “Coping with Disasters: The Challenge of Ongoing Hazards. What Are Coping Mechanisms?”, *Juth Paka: Perspectives on Lao Development*, 1, December 2003; Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use Programme, “Vulnerability Assessment of Climate Risks in Attapeu Province, Lao PDR”, 2005, [http://www.seachangecop.org/sites/default/files/documents/2006%20ADPC%20Laos\\_Vulnerability\\_Assessment\\_of\\_Climate\\_Risks.pdf](http://www.seachangecop.org/sites/default/files/documents/2006%20ADPC%20Laos_Vulnerability_Assessment_of_Climate_Risks.pdf).
- <sup>96</sup> Wood, *ibid.*; Dyg, note 66 above.
- <sup>97</sup> UNDP, “Factsheets. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Lao Programme & National Regulatory Authority (NRA)”, 2006, [www.undplao.org/whatwedo/crisisprev.php](http://www.undplao.org/whatwedo/crisisprev.php).
- <sup>98</sup> UN Mine Action Service, “Electronic Mine Information Network. Lao PDR”, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, [www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=15](http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=15).
- <sup>99</sup> Figure includes the first quarter of 2005. See Landmine Monitor, “Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine-Free World”, 2005, [www.icbl.org/lm/2005/laos.html](http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/laos.html).
- <sup>100</sup> UNDP, note 97 above.
- <sup>101</sup> Human Security Report Project (2005), note 21 above, p. 90.
- <sup>102</sup> Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, “Rethinking Human Security”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 116(4), Winter 2001-2002, pp. 585–610, <http://euroakadeemia.ee/materjalid/King%20Murray%20-%20Rethinking%20Human%20Security.pdf>.
- <sup>103</sup> Schnabel, note 22 above, p. 12.

## CHAPTER 12

### Human insecurity and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Daniel Michel

#### INTRODUCTION

Since its appearance in the 1990s the concept of human security has evolved from an academic debate into a concrete policy component of many governments' foreign ministries as well as numerous intergovernmental organizations. The new thinking that puts the individual at the centre of a state's security policy has appealed to academics, researchers and decision-makers alike. Over the years the concept has been much debated, leading to its advancement and maturation.

This chapter applies the Operationalizing Human Security (OPHUSEC) project approach of utilizing the human security concept to carry out threat and mitigation analyses within the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Which are the main threats, and how can they be mitigated? In particular, this chapter takes advantage of OPHUSEC as a particularly useful method to identify key threats and provide pragmatic as well as efficient mitigation measures. As advanced by the OPHUSEC approach, the relation between threats and their root causes plays a significant role when searching for effective mitigation measures. Different threats are presumed to share similar root causes. First, this chapter suggests that in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina individual root causes are responsible for a variety of threats. Second, mitigating individual root causes seems to have positive effects on the mitigation of several threats. The results of the country study confirm this assumption. The relation between the mitigation of particular threats and their effect on other threats seems evident. Employing a slightly abridged version of the full OPHUSEC approach, the study highlights key threats and suggests mitigation strategies.

The first part of this chapter highlights the theoretical aspects of the human security concept, briefly outlining its emergence, strengths and weaknesses, while drawing on the conceptual discussions presented earlier in this volume. After a brief discussion of the methodological approach applied in this country case study, the brunt of the chapter focuses on an analysis of the human security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A general threat analysis is followed by the identification of three key threats, along with suggested mitigation strategies.

The chapter's main objective is to test OPHUSEC's assumption that if similar root causes are responsible for different threats, there are positive effects on a variety of threats even though only a limited number of key threats are treated. In the conclusion we return to this assumption.

## THEORETICAL APPROACH

This section briefly summarizes the current debate on the human security concept.

### *Appearance of the human security concept*

Several factors fostered the emergence of the human security debate at the beginning of the 1990s. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of international wars decreased. While at first glance this appears to indicate the dawn of a new quality of international peace and security, the reality has been quite different. The security of ordinary citizens worldwide was hardly improved. On the contrary, an emerging shift from inter-state to domestic conflicts has increasingly put civilians in the midst of armed violence. Thus the number of civilian casualties in domestic conflicts has increased. While containment strategies by the superpowers had guaranteed a certain level of stability during the Cold War years, an increase in ethnic and religious tensions and the appearance of so-called “failed”, “failing” or “fragile” states have put populations in those states at great peril.<sup>1</sup>

Against this background, academics, policy planners and decision-makers have welcomed the increasing focus on providing individuals and the communities in which they live with a minimum level of security as being key to stability and preventing violent conflict. In particular the so-called “Middle Powers” countries such as Canada, Norway and Japan advanced the discussion on individual security and promoted it in the context of their foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report (HDR)*,<sup>2</sup> published in 1994, contributed considerably to the promotion of the human security concept.<sup>3</sup>

### *What is human security?*

After this short introduction on how the debate on human security emerged, we can explore in more detail the main components of the concept. The 1994 UNDP HDR triggered serious academic and public discussion of human security. Trachsler states that criticisms of the then-predominant security debate marked the emergence of the concept.<sup>4</sup> Until then, security was primarily interpreted as territorial security from external aggressors. National security and safety from a possible nuclear strike were at the centre of policy concerns. The desire of ordinary people to achieve security in their daily lives was a secondary concern at best.

UNDP's 1994 HDR provided an alternative approach and a counter-argument to that predominant assumption.<sup>5</sup> For the first time, the individual and not the state was put at the heart of security considerations. According to the report, human security covers two aspects: “It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”<sup>6</sup> To add flesh to its definition the report lists seven main categories of threats: “Economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.”<sup>7</sup> A further definition of human security advanced by the HDR describes its essence as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” for all individuals.<sup>8</sup> Since its publication in 1994 the report has inspired many academic and policy debates, which have led to numerous publications.<sup>9</sup> The definition of the human security concept was amended, elaborated and rewritten. Soon it became increasingly difficult to delineate the essence of human security when it seemingly included everything that could possibly be considered a threat or discomfort to human beings.

Canada and Japan in particular have continuously advanced the concept since its inception. Despite their different interpretations, each country has assumed a leading role within the human security debate. In 1996 Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, declared the concept to be a central component of Canadian foreign policy. Yet Canada primarily focused on the protection of individuals from violent threats. With this narrow definition of human security, resembling UNDP's definition of "freedom from fear", Canada prioritized issues such as public safety, protection of civilians, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and peace support operations.<sup>10</sup>

Like Canada, Japan rapidly prioritized the human security approach in its foreign policy. Yet Japan understood the concept in its broader sense. It considered the sources of human insecurity as more inclusive, covering such dimensions as poverty, environment degradation, conflicts, mines, refugee problems, illegal drugs and diseases.<sup>11</sup> With such a broad understanding of human security as "freedom from want", Japan added an important dimension to the debate.

In the spring of 2003 the debate received a new impulse. The Commission on Human Security presented its report, entitled "Human Security Now", to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.<sup>12</sup> The report defined human security provision as follows: "To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life."<sup>13</sup> According to the commission, human security has three main components: "It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."<sup>14</sup> Thus the definition combines the "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" dimensions and adds an empowerment aspect – an individual's "freedom to take action on one's own behalf".

Although the concept has developed and matured over the years since its appearance in the 1990s, its influence on local, national and international policy is fairly limited and its systematic application in practice is largely missing. Is the human security concept only hot air, as some critics ask?<sup>15</sup> The following section summarizes some of the main criticisms of the concept.

### ***Criticism of the human security concept***

The main shortcoming of the concept has already been mentioned, and concerns the lack of a precise definition. The concept has narrow and broad definitions. It is difficult to achieve a consensus, as these definitions remain open to individual interpretation. As Roland Paris argues, "Human security is like 'sustainable development' – everybody is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means."<sup>16</sup> Because of its inclusiveness the concept risks losing value for both theoretical and practical applications. Some argue that it lacks academic rigour and accuracy, it risks relevance as an analytical tool – and thus becomes useless as a support tool for policy analysis.<sup>17</sup> Others fear that the concept could be misused as an ideological instrument, legitimizing external interference (in the guise of "humanitarian intervention") in the national affairs of sovereign states. Finally, others see little uniqueness in the human security debate, as threats and dangers to individuals have long been part of security debates and the international policy agenda, possibly with different names and in association with different concepts.<sup>18</sup>

Despite criticisms targeting the human security concept, a number of positive aspects are testimony to its usefulness. The most important characteristics include the following:

- the focus on the individual as the referent object of security
- the perception – right or wrong – of the concept as a potential “sovereignty breaker” when governments are the direct cause of insecurity
- the recognition that a focus on the security and well-being of individuals is at least as important as the security and well-being of states (i.e. human security is equally as important as national security)
- the recognition that investments in national military security (i.e. maintaining armies to ward off potential external enemies) are at the expense of investments in sustainable development and must be rethought, considering that most people are killed in civil wars by their own oppressive governments, or because of environmental disasters (e.g. drought, floods, earthquake, etc.) and diseases
- the need to redefine government policy and spending priorities on security provision to reflect more accurately contemporary security threats.<sup>19</sup>

Taking into account the achievements and shortcomings of the human security debate, Albrecht Schnabel put forward a practical application of the concept by developing the OPHUSEC approach, which is presented, discussed and tested throughout this volume (for conceptual introductions of the approach see Chapters 1, 2 and 13; for practical applications, Chapter 6–12 as well as the toolkit detailed in the companion publication, Cahier 21). The country study provided in this chapter is based on desk research and applies a simplified version of the OPHUSEC approach while resembling in large part what is referred to as a “background study” in the OPHUSEC toolkit (Cahier 21).

## THE OPHUSEC APPROACH

The backbone of the OPHUSEC project is divided into three areas of project activities. The first addresses concept and policy issues, with international and local experts and practitioners exploring the conceptual nature and utility of human security. The second area focuses on analysis, identification and response. It allows local experts to analyse the local security context and identify key security threats while developing and implementing relevant response mechanisms. These are the project’s core participants. The third area focuses on monitoring, early warning and evaluation. It envisions continuous monitoring of the provision or violation of locally identified human security priorities, as well as an evaluation of selected response strategies and their impact on key threats.

These activities are carried out through four approaches. First, researchers analyse and review the human security literature. Second, regional case studies are carried out by local and international academics, who analyse the human security situation and evaluate existing and desired response strategies. Third, in multistakeholder workshops local participants discuss the same questions as the research teams, complementing the work previously done by researchers. Finally, options are explored for sharing and implementing the assessment’s results; this phase includes the evaluation of response strategies’ feasibility and their potential to improve public policies for human livelihood security.<sup>20</sup> Working with a broad definition of human security, the OPHUSEC approach considers its provision as “external and

internal approaches towards lowering levels of *fear*, *threat* and *want* to assure individuals' basic, existential human security requirements”.

What is the general utility of the OPHUSEC approach? The project aims to obtain information about human security for the definition, early detection and effective mitigation of local vulnerability to local, national, cross-border, regional and global threats. One of its strengths lies in its practical utility, due to the wide variety of stakeholders involved in the process. Through the involvement of local and international experts with academic, civil society, state and intergovernmental backgrounds, the analysis of key components of human security threats in specific local contexts might be more accurate than if such analyses were carried out solely by external or internal researchers.

Furthermore, only the most dangerous threats to the physical existence of individuals are identified and monitored. The project assumes that while response measures target primarily the root causes of key threats, numerous other threats will also indirectly be reduced, as root causes tend to be linked to a variety of threats. This implies that a focus on response measures to a few key threats might have a much larger effect because other threats may be reduced as well. Overall the human security situation might improve as a result of this innovative approach to the identification and mitigation of threats.

## THE OPHUSEC METHODOLOGY

The country study presented in this chapter follows a simplified OPHUSEC approach. In a first step and on the basis of a threat analysis, possible threats to the population are analysed, based on the following questions/criteria.

- What is the threat?
- Who is threatened?
- By whom?
- Where?
- How serious is the threat?
- Is it life threatening?
- How many victims are affected?
- Is the threat imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real?
- What are the symptoms of the threat?
- What are the root causes?

In a second step, the most important key threats were selected based on vulnerability criteria: threats were distinguished between those that are life threatening and those that are not. Those that are considered to be life threatening were labelled “key threats” only in the partial or complete absence of coping capacity.<sup>21</sup> In a third step, two or three key threats were analysed in more detail. Past, current and required responses were examined. Finally, based on step two, implementation strategies for the mitigation of key threats were developed. Special attention was paid to players at the local, national and international levels; an examination of which actor takes which role; the search for possible entry points; and consideration of the feasibility and potential effectiveness of suggested mitigation measures.

## COUNTRY STUDY: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The country study is composed of four steps. In the first step, a short overview of the country highlights the political, social and economic situations of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to data available when this study was carried out.<sup>22</sup> In the second step, a threat analysis is presented. According to the vulnerability criteria explained above, the most important key threats are listed and explained in more detail in the third step. In the final step, potential response measures are identified and implementation strategies are proposed.

### *Step 1: Country profile – Political, social and economic situation*

According to the European Commission, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007 was estimated at 3.8 million. The total area of the country is 51,066 km<sup>2</sup>, and the density of inhabitants per square kilometre is estimated at 71. Roughly 43 per cent of the population live in an urban context, while 57 per cent live in the country. The population is composed of three main ethnic groups: 48 per cent are Bosniaks, 37 per cent are Serbs and 14 per cent are Croats; 1 per cent is defined as “others”. Official languages are Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. Forty per cent of the people identify as Muslim, 31 per cent as Orthodox, 15 per cent as Catholic, 4 per cent as Protestant and 10 per cent belong to other religious groups. The average life expectancy is 78, with males reaching on average 74 and females 82 years.<sup>23</sup>

#### *Political history and political system*

The gradual break-up of Yugoslavia, beginning in 1990, led to a unilateral proclamation of independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. This marked the outbreak of a cruel and bloody civil war that lasted until 1995. The Dayton (USA) Peace Agreement (DPA) ended this violent war between the three main ethnic groups. It was decided that the international borders would be retained. Within that state, the agreement provided for the creation of two entities: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska. The Peace Implementation Council and a UN-mandated high representative to support peace implementation were established. Provided with strong executive powers, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) oversees the implementation of civilian aspects of the DPA. From 1995–1996 onwards a NATO-led peacekeeping force (IFOR) was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; this was soon replaced by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR was in turn succeeded by European Union peacekeeping troops (EUFOR) in 2004, whose mission is to consolidate the progress achieved in terms of peace and stability.<sup>24</sup>

The political system is complex. As mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities. At the top of the political system the central government is headed by a rotating, collective, three-member presidency – one person from each ethnic group. The House of Representatives and the House of Peoples make up the two-chamber parliament. Following the population’s ethnic composition, two-thirds of the members are elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one-third from Republika Srpska. Although the central government was only granted limited powers, it has taken on more responsibilities since Dayton. Alongside the central government both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have their own executives, which oversee many governmental functions.<sup>25</sup>

#### *Economic and social situation*

Economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-war years can be characterized as largely successful, contributing to growth, fostering macroeconomic stability and maintaining low inflation and a



balanced revenue budget. In 2007 the Central Bank in Bosnia and Herzegovina was strong and the transition to a market economy was progressing. Growth during that period was about 5.5 per cent per year.<sup>26</sup>

Despite these developments, the situation for many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains precarious. Economic insecurity still exists: almost one-fifth (17.8 per cent) of the population live below the poverty line, and another one-third are exposed to the risk of poverty because of considerable income fluctuations. Recent surveys show an unemployment rate of 31.1 per cent, the second highest in the region behind Macedonia. Of even greater concern is the high level of those who do not even participate in the labour market: inactive persons represent 57 per cent of the working-age population. According to the National Human Development Report 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced a slight rise in the Human Development Index, from 0.793 in 2003 to 0.804 in 2004, which is slightly above the world average of 0.741.<sup>27</sup>

### Step 2: Threat analysis

Table 12.1 shows a section of the threat analysis carried out as part of this study. The table lists 14 threats that were selected after desk research of relevant academic literature, documents, reports and internet-based sources. The table presents only a selection of threats and by no means claims to be exhaustive; it does not cover all the research questions. For the full table, please see the annex.<sup>28</sup>

|    | WHAT is the threat?                           | WHO is threatened?                                    | By WHOM?   | WHERE?   | Life threatening?   | How many victims?   | ROOT CAUSES   |
|----|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| T1 | Violence against minority groups              | Ethnic minorities                                     | Ethnic majorities; government, mainly local authorities; nationalist politicians and parties | Entities; cantons; communities   | Yes, human rights violations and certain risk of death exist (scenario)   | By end of 2003 a total of 12,659 human rights concerns had been registered  | War, ethnic division by entities / cantons, propaganda, nationalism                             |
| T2 | Inequality in economic development and income | People living in economically under-developed regions | Economic situation; government (policies)  | Particularly eastern and northwestern Bosnia; economically weak regions; rural regions | No  | 18% of population living below poverty line, 30% close to it; 44.6% unemployment  | Political context; differences in economic prosperity based on geography; pre-war economic base |
| T3 | Return of refugees to minority areas          | Refugees returning to minority areas                  | Ethnic majority in these areas, government, local authorities                                | Areas in which returnees are a minority  | No, although human rights violations; security is not provided; incidents and violence are rare, but do still occur | 50,000 refugees remain in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro; 200,000 are displaced within Bosnia; 639 reported cases of returnee-related | War (ethnic cleansing); ethnic division   |


|     | WHAT is the threat?  | WHO is threatened?   | By WHOM?  | WHERE?  | Life threatening? | How many victims?   | ROOT CAUSES   |
|-----|--|--|---|---|-------------------|---|---|
|     |  |  |   |   |                   | violence in 2001–2002   |   |
| T4  | Social protection system   | Socially vulnerable people like orphans, neglected children and youth; elderly people; traumatized people              | Lack of social system; government   | Entire country  | No                | 35,000 children have lost one or both parents during the war; many elderly and traumatized people | Post-war situation; difficult economic situation; return process                      |
| T5  | Mines  | 1.38 million people directly affected; entire population; returning refugees and internally displaced people; children | Landmines and explosive remnants of war   | 11,519 locations defined as "suspect areas", covering nearly 1,900 km <sup>2</sup> or roughly 3.6 per cent of territory | Yes               | 2005: 19 casualties (10 dead, 9 injured) 2006: 34 casualties (18 dead, 16 injured)                | War   |
| T6  | Possession of small arms and light weapons among population                          | Civilians; ethnic minorities   | 19 per cent of population estimated to possess firearms                             | Throughout country; at private level  | Yes               | 3,855 violent deaths between 1996 and 2002  | War; insufficient disarmament in post-war period; ethnic division                     |
| T7  | Influence of organized crime on political groups                                     | Citizens; political groups   | Criminal structures; mafia  | Entire country  | No                | N/A   | Weak judicial system; weak police and government                                      |
| T8  | Kosovo status question and its influence on secession of Republika Srpska (scenario) | Minorities in Republika Srpska; Muslim-Croat Federation  | Ethnic Serbs; nationalists living in RS   | Republika Srpska  | No                | Scenario  | Ethnic division; idea of interconnection with Serbia                                  |
| T9  | Terrorism  | Local people; politicians  | Terrorist groups; religious and other extremist groups; former paramilitary members | Entire country  | No                | N/A   | Political-military; economic; environmental; human dimension                          |
| T10 | Police system  | Population; ethnic minorities  | Police  | Particularly in Republika Srpska, but also in Bosniak-Croat Federation  | No                | N/A   | Two ( <i>de facto</i> three) different police systems in each entity; ethnic division |
| T11 | War criminals  | Ethnic groups / minorities   | War criminals   | Entire country  | No                | N/A   | War   |

|     | WHAT is the threat?                           | WHO is threatened?                                   | By WHOM?  | WHERE?              | Life threatening? | How many victims?        | ROOT CAUSES   |
|-----|---|--|---|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|---|
| T12 | Bad governance                                | All citizens; minorities; poor people                | Government; international community                         | Entire country      | No                | N/A                      | Lack of commitment; lack of capacity; ethnic division   |
| T13 | Corruption; money laundering; organized crime | All citizens; public and private sector              | Criminals; criminal network; mafia; corrupt business people | Whole country       | No                | N/A                      | Unemployment ; poor-quality education; weak economic growth; hopelessness, especially among youth; intergenerational tensions |
| T14 | Human trafficking                             | Particularly young and vulnerable women and children | Traffickers; smuggling organizations                        | Northeastern Bosnia | No                | None in 2000; 11 in 2004 | Economic situation; poverty; lack of security   |

**Table 12.1:** Threat analysis

*Source:* See annex.

The 14 threats in Table 12.1 present an overview of the human security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007. Drawing on this analysis, the first research question as to whether “similar root causes are responsible for a variety of different threats” can already be answered. In fact, the threat analysis shows that one root cause in particular – ethnic antagonism – appears to be responsible for a variety of threats, as illustrated in Figure 12.1. Ethnic antagonism appears as a root cause for violence against minority groups, which is often ethnically motivated. It also influences the return of refugees: returnees frequently fear repression motivated by ethnic antagonism when they return to their pre-war homes. Moreover, at least at the time of writing, the looming Kosovo status question was expected to have a negative knock-on effect on the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina once the independence of Kosovo was proclaimed. It seems possible that ethnic Serbs in Republika Srpska may eventually also demand secession from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic antagonism is also visible in the police system, as the police of one entity might not guarantee the security of another ethnic group. When individuals suspected or accused of war crimes are hidden and given protection to avoid being prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ethnic antagonism is also apparent. And finally, ethnic antagonism can be interpreted as a root cause of bad governance when politicians use propaganda or promote ethnic nationalistic policies.



**Figure 12.1:** Ethnic antagonism as a root cause of several threats

Source: OPHUSEC threat analysis; format by author.

Is there a way to classify the threats in a useful manner? As mentioned, the 1994 UNDP HDR<sup>29</sup> proposed seven main categories of threats to human security. Based on this proposal, the 14 threats extracted for Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classified as shown in Table 12.2.

| UNDP criteria          | Corresponding threat for Bosnia and Herzegovina |
|------------------------|---|
| Economic security      | T2  |
| Food security          |   |
| Health security        | T4  |
| Environmental security |   |
| Personal security      | T1, T3, T4, T5, T6, T8, T9, T10, T12, T13, T14  |
| Community security     | T1, T3, T5, T7, T8, T9, T10, T12, T13           |
| Political security     | T1, T3, T9, T10, T11, T12, T13, T14             |


**Table 12.2:** Threats corresponding to UNDP human security criteria

Source: Author.

This table illustrates that the human security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is marked by threats endangering primarily personal, community and political security. Which of these threats can be classified as real key threats? This question is explored in the next section.

### Step 3: Selection of key threats according to vulnerability criteria

As proposed in Schnabel's seminar version of the OPHUSEC approach,<sup>30</sup> a simple selection procedure for identifying key threats is based on the following approach. On the one hand, there are threats and risks for which effective coping capacities have been developed: despite the continued presence of these threats, vulnerability is present but not life threatening. On the other hand, if certain threats and risks exist for which coping capacities are not in place, with potentially lethal consequences for all or parts of the population, we speak of a life-threatening vulnerability caused by what is now considered a key threat (see Figure 12.2).



**Figure 12.2:** Simple selection procedure for key threats

Source: Author.

Based on the threat analysis, violence against minority groups (T1), mines (T5) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) (T6) are considered to be life threatening. The following sections analyses these three key threats in more detail.

#### *Violence against minority groups (T1)*

As depicted above, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ethnically divided society. The three main groups are Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats; there are also small communities of Roma, Montenegrins, Slovenes and Jews, which together constituted no more than 1 per cent of the population during past years. The most relevant of these are Jews and Roma. While Jews are well integrated within the urban population, mostly in Sarajevo, Roma still live on the margins of society.<sup>31</sup>

After the war, the Bosnian population was divided into three ethnically homogeneous territories. Although some areas remained ethnically diversified, the country transformed from an intermixed society in 1991 to an almost segregated and regionally divided society less than five years later. It is estimated that from a total of 4.3 million people in 1991, during the conflict 1.2 million fled abroad, while 1.1 million Bosnians were displaced within the country's borders.<sup>32</sup>

Different ethnics groups living side by side in post-war Bosnia proved to be problematic. As Florian Bieber stresses, "Human rights violations against Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs living in areas where they are not dominant and against national minorities are frequent."<sup>33</sup> Other sources appear to confirm this statement. Charged with investigating human rights violations in the country from 1996 until the end of 2006, the Human Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed 14,761 from a total of 15,191 registered reports. Any person, non-governmental organization (NGO) or group of individuals claiming to have been victim of a violation by any party or acting on behalf of alleged victims who are deceased or missing may report human rights violations to the commission.<sup>34</sup>

Why is violence against minority groups considered to be a key threat? The success of the commission in resolving these cases of human rights violations is an indicator that the problem has not diminished over the past decade. Although the threat is not perceived as life threatening, the large number of applications along with the potential risk that ethnic tensions could worsen make it a key human security threat nonetheless.

#### *Small arms and light weapons (T6)*

The UN Institute for Disarmament Research defines SALW as all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual or a light vehicle. Small arms include pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, machine guns and ammunition. Light weapons include small-calibre cannons, grenades, landmines, mortars, light anti-tank weapons, anti-tank mines, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition.<sup>35</sup>

The problem of SALW lies in the legacy of the war. Since the outbreak of the war in 1992, thousands have been killed by small arms. During the war the Yugoslav National Army distributed large numbers of weapons to local combatants. The war was characterized by person-to-person fighting, leaving traumatic memories among many civilians. Due to a desire for self-protection in the context of general distrust of the country's security services, many people decided to hold on to their weapons after the war.<sup>36</sup> At the time of writing some 19 per cent of the population were estimated to possess firearms.<sup>37</sup> Between 1996 and 2002 the Federation Statistics Institute registered 375 murder cases and 1,115 suicides; many of them presumably involved the use of SALW.<sup>38</sup> As the threat is still present and life threatening to the population after the end of the war, the proliferation of SALW in private hands has to be considered a human security key threat.

#### *Mines (T5)*

Mines, landmines, explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance continue to present a significant threat to the population after the end of the war. As a direct result of the war, from 1992 to 1995 more than 14,000 locations were contaminated with mines. With 1,738 km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land, representing 3.68 per cent of its territory, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest mine saturation in the region.<sup>39</sup>

The number of victims is appalling: 3,339 were registered between 1992 and 1995. From 1996 to 2008 1,666 casualties were registered, 486 of whom had died.<sup>40</sup> The continued presence of mines is undoubtedly life threatening to the population, thus qualifying as a key human security threat.

### **Step 4: Response measures**

Following the presentation of the three key threats, what can be said about past, current and required response measures to mitigate these threats? What has been done in the past? Which are current response measures; and what should be done in the future? Existing response measures might play a crucial role in making the threats less critical. With few or no response measures in place, a threat remains life threatening and should be prioritized. An analysis of response measures should also help in identifying potential implementation strategies (see the annex for a range of response measures for each key threat). In the following section, the main results for each threat are summarized and explained.

#### *Response measures for mitigation of violence against minority groups (T1)*

What response measures have been taken in the past – and how can they be assessed? Several international human rights conventions were signed and implemented alongside the Dayton Peace Agreement. The establishment of the OHR played an important role in observing implementation of the DPA

and contributes to greater protection of minority groups. In addition, together with the Human Rights Commission the establishment of the Human Rights Ombudsman gives victims an important tool for combating and investigating ethnically motivated violence.

Several measures have been adopted. In 2000 the government signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and in 2003 a law on uniform school material (textbooks and curricula) was passed. Both approaches contribute to a certain improvement in the situation but are not sufficient, as some minorities, such as the Roma, still lack full protection: their minority rights cannot be sufficiently guaranteed, and discrimination persists. Furthermore, the make-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina as two entities contributes to continued segregation. Nationalistic politicians sharpen ethnic divisions with partisan propaganda.

A number of steps would be necessary to mitigate this key threat. In the first place, it is essential that the existing legal system is improved and strengthened. Minority rights need to be expanded and protected. Existing segregation between ethnic groups needs to be abolished, for instance by promoting joint schooling for children from different ethnic groups. In addition, inter-ethnic programmes for schoolchildren should be offered, which could reduce prevailing prejudices against different ethnicities. Another focus lies in the reconciliation process. Although requiring considerable efforts, reconciliation is essential in this context. It is thus important to promote and fund projects by NGOs or government institutions, which contribute to the process of dealing with the past.

If the violence against minority groups could be reduced or even abolished, resulting effects on other threats will be likely. For example, inequalities in economic development and income (T2) might be favourably adjusted. If minority rights were granted and respected, this would help reduce discrimination. Thus it would be easier for ethnic minority groups to find employment. A further effect would be fewer threats to returning refugees (T3). The positive outcome would be that refugees could return to their pre-war homes without the fear of repression at the hands of other ethnicities – which in turn would increase peace and stability within society at large.

#### *Response measures for mitigation of small arms and light weapons (T6)*

Which response measures have been taken in the past? An effective measure to combat the possession of SALW was the so-called Operation Harvest, an arms-collection programme that operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1998 to 2004. NATO/SFOR troops, members of civil society, local government, local police and the local Civil Protection Agency (CPA) were involved in this operation, which was considered to be successful. Furthermore, UNDP established the Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SACBiH), which is seen as highly effective, and several campaigns against possession of SALW have been launched by different NGOs. EUFOR continued Operation Harvest by offering an amnesty to those who surrendered illicit arms. Collection campaigns have encouraged civilians to turn in their weapons. Several decisions, codes of conducts, programmes and protocols have been assigned between the government and international organizations such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union and NATO. With civil society organizations, EUFOR ran public information campaigns to increase awareness of SALW activities. Grassroots awareness-raising campaigns were also organized by UNDP.

Based on these response measures, the society's coping capacity can be judged as generally satisfactory. International organizations, NGOs, local governments and the local police would be well advised to pursue collection programmes further. Moreover, it is vital that campaigns are intensified through

cooperation with local and national media, in order to reach out to as many parts of the population as possible.

While there is coping capacity, the key threat should still be considered as ongoing and worthy of special mitigation measures, particularly as their effect on other threats is considerable. For example, it is likely that violence against minority groups will diminish once the availability of SALW is reduced. The reduction of SALW also has a positive effect on organized crime as a result of a crackdown on the smuggling and trafficking of illegal weapons. This may also limit the access of terrorist organizations to weapons, which might reduce the risk of terrorist activities.

#### *Response measures for mitigation of mines (T5)*

Which mitigation measures have been undertaken in the past? A central role has been played by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMIC), which is responsible in particular for coordinating mine action activities in the country. Its operations are monitored by the Demining Commission, which also represents Bosnia and Herzegovina at the international level. More than 35 accredited mine action organizations and NGOs are involved in mine clearance operations on the spot. The BHMIC, Civil Protection of Federation BiH and several NGOs work with the population and schoolchildren in mine risk education and training. Other organizations need to continue with the provision of medical and psychological assistance to victims of landmines.

Overall, there is considerable coping capacity, which benefits from the continuation and intensification of mine clearance operations, mine risk education and training, landmine victim assistance and stockpile destruction by mine action organizations. All of these depend on continued financial support for equipment and manpower.


Despite the existing coping capacity mines remain a key threat due to the life-threatening character. This is a negative influence on the human security situation within the country, as people face restrictions in their daily life. For instance, farming activities are restricted or impossible due to the risk posed by mines and unexploded ordnance. This impedes desperately needed development in the agricultural sector. The mitigation of this key threat would have effects on two other threats: it would facilitate the return of refugees to their pre-war homes, as many areas are currently not accessible; and geographic inequalities in economic development and income would be mitigated as well. If new areas can be made available, people will be able to cultivate these lands. This would foster activity in the third sector, while having more people in income-earning jobs would help decrease economic inequality.

#### *Positive effects of mitigating key threats for other threats?*

From the conclusions above it appears that the mitigation of the three key threats could indeed have positive effects on other threats. Figure 12.3 summarizes the correlations. Thus one of the key hypotheses can be confirmed, at least in the context of this country study: mitigating particular key threats positively supports the amelioration of numerous other threats.

In this specific case, concentrating on three key threats allows one simultaneously to mitigate four additional threats (T2, T3, T9 and T13). This implies that a total of seven threats can be mitigated by concentrating on the mitigation of three key threats. Through such “economizing” it is possible to allocate more means for the treatment of the remaining seven threats, so treating those threats becomes more effective and the overall situation can be improved as a result.





**Figure 12.3:** Positive effects of the mitigation of key threats for other threats

Source: Threat analysis, visualization by author.

## CONCLUSION

This study of the human security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina focused on an analysis of 14 different threats. Three of these were identified as “key threats”: violence against minority groups; mines; and the problem of small arms and light weapons. These three threats are lethal and affect all or parts of the population. Existing, current and future efforts to mitigate these threats were examined. The discussion above shows that if decision-makers, international organizations and NGOs focus primarily on the mitigation of the three key threats, not only will they be effectively mitigated, but so will a range of other threats.

As proposed by the OPHUSEC approach, the study assumes that diverse threats share common root causes. Addressing the root causes of a particular threat could thus presumably have a mitigating effect on other threats as well. The study shows that, in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the root cause “ethnic antagonism” is linked to violence against minority groups and returning refugees, the Kosovo status question, the police system, war criminals and bad governance. Thus the mitigation of ethnic antagonism as a root cause will likely have positive effects on every one of these actual and potential threats.

As shown with the help of this country study, the mitigation of the key threat “violence against minority groups” also has the effect of mitigating economic and development inequalities as well as the return of refugees. If the key threat “small arms and light weapons” could be alleviated, other threats such as return of refugees, violence against minority groups, organized crime and terrorism could be mitigated

as well. The mitigation of the key threat “mines” could positively influence threats such as the return of refugees and inequalities in economic and development income. With this knowledge the allocation of funds can be organized more efficiently. A prioritization of mitigation strategies will then become more easily communicable to stakeholders and thus more likely.

It is important to note that the expected positive spillover effects of mitigating one key threat can only – in the context of a desk study like this – at best be presumed. The study has applied the OPHUSEC methodology as a heuristic model, whose value seems to be confirmed by the findings of this brief examination. However, correlations raised in this chapter could be analysed and tested empirically beyond the scope of this study. Future research could thus further contribute to the overall human security situation in a given geographic context by making a more solid, evidence-based case for the positive and far-reaching contributions that single-threat-based root cause alleviation has on the mitigation of a wide variety of threats.

## ANNEX

### Step 2: Threat analysis (extended version)

|    | WHAT is the threat?                           | WHO is threatened?                                   | By WHOM?   | WHERE?   | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening?   | How many victims?  | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms  | Root causes   | Source  |
|----|---|--|--|--|----------------------------|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| T1 | Violence against minorities                   | Ethnic minorities                                    | Ethnic majorities, government, mainly local authorities, nationalist politicians and parties | Entities, cantons, communities   | Very serious               | Yes, human rights violations; certain risk of death exist (scenario)  | By end 2003 a total of 12,659 human rights concerns had been registered  | Real/imagined                                      | Deprivation of minority rights; educational / religious rights; significant aspects of political participation      | War, ethnic division by entities / cantons; propaganda; nationalism                             | Florian Bieber, <i>Post-war Bosnia</i> (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006, pp. 33, 114) |
| T2 | Inequality in economic development and income | People living in economically underdeveloped regions | Economic situation; government; policy   | Particular eastern and northwestern Bosnia; economically weak regions; rural regions | Serious                    | No  | 18% of population living below poverty line, 30% close to it; 44.6% unemployment   | Real   | Class society; social inequity leads to social tensions; corruption; crime  | Political context; differences in economic prosperity based on geography; pre-war economic base | Bieber (2006: 38–39)  |
| T3 | Return of refugees to minority areas          | Returning refugees to minority areas                 | Ethnic majority in these areas; government; local authorities                                | Areas in which returnees are in minority   | Serious                    | No, although human rights violations; security is not provided; incidents and violence are rare, but do still occur | 50,000 refugees remain in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, 200,000 are displaced within BiH; 639 reported cases of returnee-related violence in 2001–2002 | Real   | Harassment; ethnic discrimination; ownership of property and restitution of real estate; lack of economic prospects | War (ethnic cleansing); ethnic division   | Bieber (2006: 111–112)  |

|    | WHAT is the threat?   | WHO is threatened?   | By WHOM?  | WHERE?  | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening? | How many victims?   | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms  | Root causes   | Source  |
|----|---|--|---|---|----------------------------|-------------------|---|--|---|---|---|
| T4 | Social protection system                                    | Socially vulnerable people such as orphans and neglected children and youth, elderly people, traumatized people        | Lack of social system, government               | Whole country   | Serious                    | No                | 35,000 children lost one or both parents during war; many elderly people and traumatized people | Real   | Waywardness; street children; crime   | Post-war situation; difficult economic situation and return process | <a href="http://www.sdc-seco.ba/en/Home/Projects/Social_domain">www.sdc-seco.ba/en/Home/Projects/Social_domain</a>  |
| T5 | Mines   | 1.38 million people directly affected; entire population; returning refugees and internally displaced people; children | Landmines and explosive remnants of war         | 11,519 locations defined as "suspect areas", covering nearly 1,900 km <sup>2</sup> , or roughly 3.6% of country | Serious                    | Yes               | 2005: 19 casualties (10 dead, 9 injured); 2006: 34 casualties (18 dead, 16 survived)            | Real   | Deaths; injuries; constraints in agriculture and use of natural resources; poverty  | War   | <a href="http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/bih.html">www.icbl.org/lm/2006/bih.html</a> ; <a href="http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=4">www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=4</a> ; <a href="http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&amp;content_id=BB889CFF-F203-1EE9-B3437ED5EE2FAE57">http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&amp;content_id=BB889CFF-F203-1EE9-B3437ED5EE2FAE57</a> ; <a href="http://www.mine.ba/?PID=3&amp;RID=17">www.mine.ba/?PID=3&amp;RID=17</a>  |
| T6 | Possession of small arms and light weapons among population | Civilians; ethnic minorities   | 19% of population estimated to possess firearms | All over country; on private level  | Serious                    | Yes               | 3,855 violent deaths between 1996 and 2002  | Real/imagined                                      | Shootings; act of revenges; assaults and assassinations; increase of violence; undermining rule of law; crime and insecurity; exacerbating conflict and undermining post-conflict peacebuilding | War; insufficient disarmament in post-war period; ethnic division   | <a href="http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&amp;content_id=523887D5-F203-1EE9-BB002C2F88C222E C">http://europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_cms/show&amp;content_id=523887D5-F203-1EE9-BB002C2F88C222E C</a> ; <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/king_2000/section03-en.asp">www.international.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/king_2000/section03-en.asp</a> ; <a href="http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/SALWPaper.pdf">www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/SALWPaper.pdf</a> |

|    | WHAT is the threat?  | WHO is threatened?                                      | By WHOM?  | WHERE?           | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening? | How many victims? | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms  | Root causes  | Source   |
|----|--|---|---|------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|---|--|--|
|    |  |   |   |                  |                            |                   |                   |  |   |  | <a href="http://europeandcis.undp.org/index.cfm?menu=p_search/p_result/p_documents&amp;DocumentID=3792;">http://europeandcis.undp.org/index.cfm?menu=p_search/p_result/p_documents&amp;DocumentID=3792;</a> <a href="http://www.seesac.org/reports/SALWpercent20Surveypercent20BiH.pdf">www.seesac.org/reports/SALWpercent20Surveypercent20BiH.pdf</a> |
| T7 | Influence of organized crime on political groups                                     | Citizens; political groups                              | Criminal structures; mafia  | Whole country    | Serious                    | No                | N/A               | Perceived  | Corruption; instability; nepotism; physical threats against politicians or citizens; feeling of insecurity among population; strengthening of ethnic cleavage | Weak judicial system; weak police and government             | Human Security in Europe: Perspective East and West, Conference Report 2006, <a href="http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/ew-report.pdf">www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/pdf/ew-report.pdf</a>  |
| T8 | Kosovo status question and its influence on secession of Republika Srpska (scenario) | Minorities in Republika Srpska; Muslim-Croat Federation | Ethnic Serbs; nationalists living in Republika Srpska                               | Republika Srpska | Serious                    | Yes               | Scenario          | Imagined   | Independence of Republika Srpska; interconnection with Serbia; reprisals; banishment; violence; ethnic cleansing  | Ethnic antagonism, idea of interconnection with Serbia       | No concrete reference: threat selected according to author's appraisal   |
| T9 | Terrorism  | Local people; politicians                               | Terrorist groups; religious and other extremist groups; former paramilitary members | Whole country    | Serious                    | No                | N/A               | Perceived  | Assaults; violence; terror; destabilization; intimidation   | Political-military; economic; environmental; human dimension | <a href="http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/lu ge01.pdf">www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/lu ge01.pdf</a>   |

|     | WHAT is the threat?                           | WHO is threatened?                                 | By WHOM?   | WHERE?   | How serious is the threat? | Life threatening? | How many victims?        | Imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real threat? | Symptoms  | Root causes   | Source   |
|-----|---|--|--|--|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|--|---|---|--|
| T10 | Police system                                 | Population; ethnic minorities                      | Police   | Particular in Republika Srpska, but also in Bosniak-Croat Federation | Serious                    | No                | N/A                      | Real   | Police remain politicized; obstruction of implementation of DPA; cooperation with organized crime; numerous offences cannot be resolved; support of people indicted by ICTY | Two ( <i>de facto</i> three) different police systems in each entity; ethnic division                                       | <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/164_bosnia_stalled_police_reform_no_progress_no_eu.pdf">www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/164_bosnia_stalled_police_reform_no_progress_no_eu.pdf</a>   |
| T11 | War criminals                                 | Ethnic groups / minorities                         | War criminals  | Whole country  | Serious                    | No                | N/A                      | Perceived  | Instability; feeling of insecurity among population; pending post-war task; fosters the division along ethnic lines   | War   | No concrete reference: threat selected according to author's appraisal   |
| T12 | Bad governance                                | All citizens; minorities; poor people              | Government; international community                          | Entire country   | Serious                    | No                | N/A                      | Perceived; indoctrinated by nationalists           | Frustration; disaffection   | Lack of commitment; lack of capacity; ethnic division   | No concrete reference: threat selected according to author's appraisal   |
| T13 | Corruption; money laundering; organized crime | All citizens; public and private sector            | Criminals; criminal networks; mafia; corrupt business people | Entire country   | Serious                    | No                | N/A                      | Real   | Damage to economy; reduced economic growth; social and economic instability   | Unemployment; poor-quality education, weak economic growth; hopelessness especially among youth; intergenerational tensions | <a href="http://www.peacecenter.science-po.fr/">www.peacecenter.science-po.fr/</a> ; Human Security in Europe: Perspective East and West, Conference Report 2006, <a href="http://www.peacecenter.science-po.fr/pdf/ew-report.pdf">www.peacecenter.science-po.fr/pdf/ew-report.pdf</a> |
| T14 | Human trafficking                             | Particular young and vulnerable women and children | Traffickers; smuggling organizations                         | Northeastern Bosnia  | Very serious               | No                | None in 2000, 11 in 2004 | Real   | Massive human rights violations; organized crime  | Economic situation; poverty; lack of security   | <a href="http://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissenschaften/publikationen/publikation.php?id=321">www.bmlv.gv.at/wissenschaften/publikationen/publikation.php?id=321</a>   |

#### Step 4: Response measures

| <b>Threat:</b><br><b>Violence against minority groups</b> | <b>What has been done in the <u>past</u>?<br/>Which mitigation measure?</b>                     | <b>By whom?</b>   | <b>To whom?</b>   | <b>Feasibility?</b> | <b>Effectiveness?</b> |
|---|---|---|---|---------------------|-----------------------|
|   | DPA Annex 6, 1995   | Signed by Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian governments   | Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina  | N/A                 | N/A                   |
|   | Accession to several international human rights conventions committed within DPA (1995)         | Signed by Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian governments   | Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina  | N/A                 | N/A                   |
|   | Establishment of OHR  | International community   | Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina  | N/A                 | N/A                   |
|   | Establishment of Human Rights Ombudsman   | Foreign ombudsman   | Victims (individuals or organizations) of human rights violation  | N/A                 | N/A                   |
|   | Establishment of Human Rights Chamber   | 14 members (4 from Federation, 2 from Republika Srpska, 8 foreign nationalities nominated by Council of Europe) | Victims (individuals or organizations) of human rights violation  | N/A                 | N/A                   |
| <b>Threat:</b><br><b>Mines</b>                            | <b>What has been done in the <u>past</u>?<br/>Which mitigation measure?</b>                     | <b>By whom?</b>   | <b>To whom?</b>   | <b>Feasibility?</b> | <b>Effectiveness?</b> |
|   | DPA, 1995   | Former opposing sides   | Population, contaminated areas  | Very low            | Unsuccessful          |
|   | UN Mine Action Centre (minefield records, minefield database)                                   | UN, SFOR  | Population, contaminated areas  | Middle              | High                  |
|   | Establishing of Demining Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a national mine action structure | BHMAC   | Population  | Middle              | Middle                |
|   | Adoption of Demining Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina  | Legislation   | Population  | High                | High                  |
|   | Landmine impact survey, 2002–2003   | Funded by US Department of State, European Community and government of Canada through International Trust Fund  | 1,366 communities in BiH under mine threat, of which 154 classified as high-impact areas and 696 as medium-impact areas | Successful          | Successful            |

| Threat:<br>Small arms and light weapons | What has been done in the <u>past</u> ?<br>Which mitigation measure?  | By whom?   | To whom?   | Feasibility? | Effectiveness?  |
|---|---|--|--|--------------|---|
|   | Operation Harvest; collection programme in all Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998–2004 (active harvest, passive harvest and lottery harvest)  | NATO/SFOR; members of civil society; local government; local police; local CPA | Civilians in possession of weapons                       | High         | Successful  |
|   | Increasing awareness of schoolchildren (August–October 2005)  | NGO Centre for Security Studies  | Schoolchildren   | High         | High (1,500 children were involved)   |
|   | Establishment of Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH (SACBiH), which aims to sensitize population; enhance government authorities' capacity to increase and exercise improved SALW control; reduce risks of proliferation of SALW and ammunition and explosives by destroying surplus and unstable stocks; reduce ammunition storage requirements of the Armed Forces of BiH; support fulfilment of requirements created by restructuring the Armed Forces of BiH | UNDP   | Small Arms Control and Reduction Project in BiH (SACBiH) | High         | High  |
|   | Campaign against celebratory gunfire  | NGO Centre for Security Studies  | Civilians in possession of weapons                       | High         | High (reducing celebratory gunfire casualties from 14 in 2004/2005 to 2 in 2005/2006) |



| Threat:<br>Violence against<br>minority groups | What is being done <u>now</u> ? Which<br>mitigation measure?         | By whom?   | To whom?  | Feasibility? | Effectiveness?  |
|--|--|--|---|--------------|---|
|  | Implementation of DPA  | Government, local authorities  | Population  | High         | Weak in regard to<br>minority rights  |
|  | OHR still in force   | International community  | Population  | High         | Successful  |
|  | Human Rights Ombudsman   | Foreign ombudsman  | Victims (individuals or organizations) of<br>human rights violation | High         | Low; because of<br>low enforcement<br>capacity, rulings<br>often disregarded  |
|  | Human Rights Chamber   | 14 members (4 from Federation, 2<br>from Republika Srpska, 8 foreign<br>nationalities nominated by Council of<br>Europe) | Victims (individuals or organizations) of<br>human rights violation | High         | Implementation is<br>low because court<br>is not part of<br>Bosnian legal<br>system (only about<br>60% of verdicts<br>have been<br>implemented) |
|  | Framework Convention for Protection<br>of National Minorities (2000) | Government   | Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina                                | High         | Middle  |
|  | 2003 law on uniform school material<br>(textbooks, curricula, etc.)  | Government; legislative bodies   | Schoolchildren  | High         | High  |

| Threat:<br>Mines | What is being done <u>now</u> ? Which mitigation measure? | By whom?   | To whom?  | Feasibility?              | Effectiveness?   |
|------------------|---|--|---|---------------------------|--|
|                  | High-level dimension                                      | Demining Commission  | High-level politicians; international organizations | High                      | High   |
|                  | Grassroots dimension                                      | BHMAC  | Mine action organizations; population               | High                      | High   |
|                  | Revised mine action strategy for each year, 2005–2009     | BHMAC  | Ulice-Brcko community                               | Middle                    | Middle   |
|                  | Mine clearance operations                                 | More than 35 accredited mine action organizations and NGOs   | Population  | Time-consuming, expensive | Middle   |
|                  | Mine risk education training                              | BHMAC; Civil Protection of Federation BiH; NGOs (e.g. Handicap International, Norwegian People's Aid, Anti-minska inicijativa Brčko)     | All at-risk population and schoolchildren           | Feasible                  | Middle   |
|                  | Landmine victim assistance                                | BHMAC in cooperation with landmine survivors network; NGOs (HOPE 87, UDAS Amputees Association, Stop Mines, CIR Tuzla, Eco Sports Group) | Victims of mines                                    | Feasible                  | Middle   |
|                  | Stockpile destruction                                     | Government   | Military  | Feasible                  | Completed under terms of Ottawa Convention for stockpile destruction |

| Threat:<br>Small arms and light weapons | What is being done <u>now</u> ? Which mitigation measure?  | By whom?   | To whom?                        | Feasibility? | Effectiveness?   |
|---|--|--|---------------------------------|--------------|--|
|   | Operation Harvest (continual amnesty for those who surrender illicit weapons); collection campaigns (one-month lottery with prizes to encourage civilians to turn in their weapons)                            | EUFOR  | Civilians in possession of SALW | Feasible     | High (2,500 weapons collected and destroyed as a result of Operation Harvest, 2005 and 2006) |
|   | Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South East Europe  | UN, OSCE, EU, NATO   | Southeastern European countries | High         | N/A  |
|   | EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (2002)  | EU   | Government                      | High         | N/A  |
|   | OSCE Document on SALW (2000); OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (2003); OSCE Decision on MANPADS (2003); OSCE Decision on End User Certificates (2004); OSCE Decision on Brokering (2004) | OSCE   | Government                      | High         | N/A  |
|   | UN Firearms Protocol; UN Programme of Action on SALW (2001); UN Register of Conventional Arms (1999)   | UN   | Government                      | High         | N/A  |
|   | SALW awareness activities (public information campaigns)   | EUFOR; civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina                     | Civilians in possession of SALW | High         | N/A  |
|   | Educational training in schools  | Handicap International (in cooperation with Ministry of Education) | Schoolchildren                  | High         | N/A  |
|   | Grassroots awareness-raising campaign  | UNDP (SACBiH)  | Entire population               | High         | N/A  |

| Threat:                                 | What needs to be done in the <u>future</u> ?<br>Which mitigation measure? | By whom?   | To whom?                     | Feasibility?            | Effectiveness/<br>Indicators? |
|---|---|--|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Violence against minority groups</b> | Fostering nation-building process   | Government, international community  | Ethnic groups                | N/A                     | High                          |
|   | Establishment of legal system with enough competency                      | Government; international community; OHR                                   | Ethnic groups; individuals   | Middle                  | High                          |
|   | Economic perspective and exchange; economic growth                        | Government; international community  | Population                   | Long term               | High                          |
|   | Closer exchange between ethnic groups                                     | Government   | Ethnic groups                | Middle                  | Middle                        |
|   | Abandonment of prejudice  | Ethnic groups  | Ethnic groups                | N/A                     | High                          |
|   | Stop segregation  | Government; international community; population                            | Ethnic groups                | N/A                     | N/A                           |
|   | Fostering reconciliation process  | NGOs; INGOs; government  | Victims and their relatives  | Middle                  | High                          |
|   | Prospect of EU membership/EU integration                                  | EU   | Bosnia and Herzegovina       | High                    | Very high                     |
| <b>Mines</b>                            | More investments in infrastructure and equipment                          | International community  | BHMAC                        | High                    | High                          |
|   | Extension of training in schools and kindergarten                         | Government   | Pupils and students          | High; relative low cost | Middle                        |
|   | Mine clearance operations not only by NGOs                                | Military   | Population                   | High; relative low cost | High                          |
| <b>Small arms and light weapons</b>     | Continuation/intensification of collection programmes                     | EUFOR; members of civil society; local government; local police; local CPA | Population                   | Middle                  | High                          |
|   | Intensification of campaigns/awareness building                           | Government; NGOs; media  | Population                   | Feasible                | Middle                        |
|   | Observation/monitoring of SALW  | SACBiH   | People in possession of SALW | Feasible                | High                          |

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Daniel Trachsler, "Menschliche Sicherheit: Klärungsbedürftiges Konzept, vielversprechende Praxis", *Bulletin 2003 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, 10, 2003, pp. 71–72.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 22–46).

<sup>3</sup> See Trachsler, note 1 above, pp. 72–74.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP, note 2 above, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> Trachsler, note 1 above, p. 76.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83–87.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>12</sup> Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now", CHS, New York, 2003, [www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy\\_library/data/01077/\\_res/id=sa\\_File1/](http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01077/_res/id=sa_File1/).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> See Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", *International Security*, 26(2), 2001, pp. 87–102.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>17</sup> Trachsler, note 1 above, p. 77.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>19</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, "NCCR North-South: Proposal for a Transversal Package (TP) Project – Guidelines and Forms to Be Filled", swisspeace, Bern, 2005, p. 8.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>21</sup> The term "coping capacity" refers to "The manner in which people and organisations use existing resources to achieve various beneficial ends during unusual, abnormal and adverse conditions of a disaster phenomenon or process." See Mark Pelling, Andrew Maskrey, Pablo Ruiz and Lisa Hall (eds), *Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development* (New York: UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2004, p. 135).

<sup>22</sup> The research for this chapter was carried out between February and July 2007.

<sup>23</sup> European Commission, "Enlargement: Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina", 2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/bosnia\\_and\\_herzegovina/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/bosnia_and_herzegovina/index_en.htm).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> UNDP, "National Human Development Report 2007: Social Inclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina", UNDP BiH, Sarajevo, 2007, p. 70, [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/bosniaherzegovina/BOSNIA\\_AND\\_HERCEGOVINA\\_2007\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/bosniaherzegovina/BOSNIA_AND_HERCEGOVINA_2007_en.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 74–75, 163, 177.

<sup>28</sup> Criteria such as "How serious is the threat?", "Is the threat imagined, perceived, indoctrinated or real?", "Symptoms" and "Source" are not included in this table. For more details see the annex.

- <sup>29</sup> UNDP, note 2 above, particularly chapter 2, pp. 22–46.
- <sup>30</sup> Albrecht Schnabel, “Internationale Organisationen und Konfliktbearbeitung”, seminar, University of Bern, summer semester 2007.
- <sup>31</sup> Florian Bieber, *Post-War Bosnia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006, p. 1).
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## CHAPTER 13

### Challenges in operationalizing human security:

#### Lessons from preparing and implementing the OPHUSEC project

Albrecht Schnabel

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to raise and respond to some of the challenges experienced by researchers of the OPHUSEC project during its implementation. These experiences might prove useful when planning and preparing a project that follows some or all of the approaches provided by OPHUSEC.

The chapter provides guidance particularly to readers who are interested in replicating the OPHUSEC methodology. Naturally, anyone implementing parts of this project will experience different challenges of varying degrees. While the challenges outlined here are based on this particular version of the project, they point to similar obstacles that might be encountered when applying the OPHUSEC approach in different versions and contexts.

The following pages address issues that were considered crucial during the planning, implementation and evaluation of the methodology, structure, process and intent of the project. They also incorporate challenges that were discussed in the original project proposal, suggestions made by external reviewers of the proposal and lessons learned by team members throughout the project's implementation and periodic internal evaluations. Suggested responses to these challenges by and large reflect the recollections and experiences of the project leader (the present author) as well as feedback from the project team. Whenever certain issues are addressed in more detail elsewhere in this publication, cross-references are provided.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section offers a brief summary of the project's objectives, structure and methodology, as well as challenges and lessons that relate specifically to the OPHUSEC project. Although discussed in other chapters, it is considered useful to repeat this information here to set the stage for the second section of the chapter – a broad set of general lessons for human security threat and mitigation assessment exercises. These lessons build on a number of key challenges experienced when defining human security; when analysing threats and mitigation options; when determining the context of analysis; when developing response strategies; and when generating and implementing research results. The lessons are informed by the experiences and feedback of the project researchers as well as the stakeholder involved in the project's consultation meetings.

## OPHUSEC-SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

### *Recalling key project objectives and activities*

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the formal title of the project is “Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection: Analysis, Monitoring and Mitigation of Existential Threats by and for Local Communities”. The project pursued two main goals: the advancement of the scientific conceptualization of human – individual and population-centred – security; and exploring the practical utility of the human security concept for the definition, early detection and effective mitigation of vulnerability to human security threats. The first objective was to be achieved through publications and presentations; the second with the help of context-specific studies and applied policy research papers.

The practical implementation of the project was to strengthen the protection of affected populations’ security and livelihoods, and foster collaborative activities between community organizations, civil society actors and official institutions (at local, national and international levels) to advance shared understanding and responses to salient human security threats. The practical implementation phase was, however, something that remained beyond the scope of this initial project, and will hopefully be pursued in earnest by others working on the same topic,

### *Geographic focus*

Given the structural set-up of the overarching research programme in which this project was undertaken, it was situated in three so-called “joint areas of case studies” (JACS) of the Swiss National Centre for Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South project. The three case study regions were Central America and the Caribbean (with a focus on Caracas), Central Asia (focusing on Kyrgyzstan) and the Horn of Africa (focusing on Ethiopia). In each JACS case study the project highlighted one specific geographic context of the NCCR North-South project: in Caracas it focused on the urban and peri-urban context, in Kyrgyzstan on the highland-lowland context and in Ethiopia on the semi-arid context. As far as possible, in each region the research team hoped to pay specific attention to the other contexts, gain more comprehensive insights into each country’s human security situation and allow for cross-regional comparisons within specific threat patterns that would appear in more than one geographic context.

### *Structure and approach*

The project activities in all three case studies – Caracas, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia – followed the same process. For each study, a small team of researchers was assembled. In a first step, the team was asked to conduct context-relevant research on the causes and effects of human insecurity in the form of a mapping exercise. The teams were also asked to examine past and ongoing mitigation measures by state, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international actors. They were tasked to gather a wider group of representatives from all major stakeholders, which would conduct the same mapping of human (in)security and examination of mitigation measures in the context of a participatory multistakeholder workshop (MSW). The research teams would then integrate the findings of the workshop with the results of their own research.

In a second step, the research teams were asked to select key threats – existential threats – based on specific vulnerability criteria. The resulting “human insecurity cluster” consisted of core threats that would need to be monitored and addressed in an effort to preserve basic livelihood security and the survival of the population in a given specific geographic context. Thereafter the teams were asked to develop response measures to be taken by local, national and international actors to reduce threats identified in the human



insecurity cluster and strengthen the capacity of affected populations to cope with the negative consequences of these threats. The same tasks were then tackled by participants in the MSW group.

In a third step, the research teams and multistakeholder groups were asked to design indicators and measures to monitor both the evolution of core threats and the degree to which response measures have been taken to reduce populations' human insecurity (existential vulnerability). The primary focus at this stage was expected to be the development of strategies to share the project's findings and recommendations with local, national and international actors – and to encourage the continuation of the project's activities by an interested local actor.

A number of challenges have influenced the process and extent of the project's implementation. These included definitional, analytical and contextual challenges, as well as challenges in terms of the most relevant response strategies and practical obstacles facing the research teams. Before discussing those general challenges, this section continues with an assessment of specific ones faced by the OPHUSEC project. Similar exercises might benefit from these experiences.

### ***Main accomplishments***

The OPHUSEC project evolved slowly but steadily after its inception, particularly as far as the three main, locally conducted case studies are concerned. The three empirical studies (Caracas, Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia) were meant to test and inform the theoretical work and thus serve two main purposes: first, help advance the academic contribution of the project, and second, test the practical applicability of the OPHUSEC approach. Work did not progress as quickly as anticipated, mainly due to the local case study teams' slow pace for a range of reasons that are developed later. This could have been avoided if the project had been pursued over a shorter period of time and as a full-time engagement for all project members.

To offset the slow progress of the local teams, the Swiss team produced a number of case studies of its own. These are featured in this publication alongside the original, field-based case studies. As a result, project results are based mostly on work conducted by the Swiss team, experiences from MSWs conducted in the case study locations and draft versions of background studies provided by the case study teams. Funding was not a problem (as it often is), as the project was concluded under budget. In fact, funds reserved for case study research team activities, related meetings and travel were only partly used. The project team is convinced that further lessons could have been learned about the project's utility had all case studies been completed as originally anticipated. Nevertheless, the achievements attained offer ample evidence of the usefulness of the OPHUSEC approach and encourage its replication in other contexts where human security threats need to be mitigated with greater precision and impact.

Each case study was to consist of three separate studies: *first*, a human security/insecurity assessment; *second*, the identification and analysis of a cluster of core human security threats and recommended responses; and *third*, a practical implementation strategy in partnership with local/national stakeholders. The first set of studies for Ethiopia and Caracas were completed by the local research teams and were to be revised after peer reviews. Work on the first drafts of the second studies had started, but was not completed. The local teams could not utilize their work time allowance due to other commitments and thus were not in a position to conclude all their assignments. Moreover, they could not simply be replaced halfway through the project. Instead, the Swiss team began to undertake case studies of its own – on Laos, Bosnia, Kyrgyzstan and Nepal. In addition to the comprehensive case studies carried out as part of the OPHUSEC project (shorter versions of which are featured in Part III of this publication), several brief case studies were written as seminar papers by students as part of a political science seminar on

international organizations and conflict management, taught by the author of this chapter. The overall very high quality of these papers shows that solid and useful background studies, in adherence to the OPHUSEC methodology, can be carried out with limited investment in terms of time and personnel, particularly if the OPHUSEC “template” is used as guidance. Although these case studies were shorter than the originally anticipated studies undertaken by local research teams, they became available at an early stage of the project and thus helped the Swiss team put the theoretical assumptions of the project into empirical perspective. Based on the substantial lessons – both positive and negative – learned throughout the project, the Swiss team assembled a toolkit, which is included in this publication and is meant to allow interested institutions and individuals to replicate the project’s approach in various more or less elaborate formats. After the conclusion of the project, the Swiss core team, together with a number of individuals who had joined as research assistants and project associates at different stages, united in this effort to turn the records of the project’s various activities into the present summary publication. The objective was to share OPHUSEC’s experiences and findings with a wider audience.

Overall, the theoretical and conceptual components of the project were accomplished and positively received by academic and policy communities, based on feedback received at various briefings and presentations. Numerous presentations and publications have emerged from methodological discussions on operationalizing the concept of human security to assess context-relevant threats and risks. Several opportunities have materialized for the project team to integrate the approach into training (at the levels of states, international organizations and NGOs) and education (university teaching and student thesis work). All those involved in OPHUSEC, including those who had to leave due to changing or conflicting professional engagements and opportunities, benefited from the project as it exposed them to new disciplinary approaches towards analysing and mitigating threats to human well-being, livelihoods and security.

### ***Challenges and lessons: The case for an intensive, full-time project***

All OPHUSEC contributors were expected (and remunerated) to spend 25 per cent of their work time on the project, spread over four years. After the project had been extended twice, the allocated work time translated into approximately 15 per cent spread across the entire project duration. This means that the contributors spent about 15 per cent of their professional work time on the project, and 85 per cent on regular duties in their employment. As a result, expectations for career development were modest once the final project modalities had been negotiated, as none of the contributors was funded to pursue the project as a full-time research assignment or a main professional occupation, with full institutional backing by their employers.

Pursuing the OPHUSEC project with full-time engagement of all researchers involved, along with a much shorter duration, would likely have resulted in three major improvements over the original project design. First, the momentum initially created among team members as well as MSW participants (and others consulted by the researchers) would have likely been maintained throughout the entire project period; second, the results would have been more timely, up to date and thus relevant; and third, the project participants would not have been distracted by other, more pressing, commitments.

It was hoped that the eventual continuation and use of the OPHUSEC project by the case study teams as an ongoing applied research and policy support activity would translate into improvements in the way local threats are identified and state and non-state organizations cooperate in mitigating threats and their consequences for the population. As the project was not rolled out and institutionalized in the case study locations, this intention could not be achieved. The project team therefore decided to invest in

continuing efforts to compile, analyse and disseminate the results, which are hoped to trigger interest among readers to debate, examine and experiment with the approach towards operationalizing human security proposed by the OPHUSEC project.

### ***Learning by doing: The need for translating lessons into “tools”***

In particular, the third workshop in Ethiopia, during which the project's practical utility for threat and mitigation assessment and implementation was discussed, revealed considerable interest by all represented stakeholders in preparing a set of “tools” that would allow interested parties to apply the project's methodology in initiating, fine-tuning and prioritizing threat and response assessments. However, it became clear, not least based on the contributions made by the case study teams, that OPHUSEC's basic yet ambitious methodology of combining in-depth case studies with broad-based multistakeholder consultations would be too unwieldy and time- and resource-heavy for many real-life applications. Thus Cahier 21 offers various ways in which the methodological approach can be implemented with different degrees of effort and investment in terms of financial and human resources.

Moreover, multistakeholder meetings were considered by participants to be rare opportunities for potential key partners in threat mitigation to exchange views on common approaches to common problems, regardless of the formal outcomes of such meetings in the shape of written reports and policy recommendations.

Participants identified as a main added value of the project's approach the ability to consider threats and response strategies outside their own competencies and official mandates. This allowed them to put the results of their assessments in a much broader and, eventually, appropriate perspective given the diverse nature of threats and the requirements for multi-actor collaboration in threat mitigation.

Moreover, both project teams and multistakeholder groups commented on the potential of OPHUSEC's focus on transdisciplinary and non-sectoral threat and mitigation assessments for sectoral human security providers – such as development assistance, humanitarian and security sector communities.

### ***Challenges in defining human security***

The project has intended to engage closely with the concept of human security – and advance its practical relevance. As a result, debates surrounding this concept also led to discussions on the relevance, appropriateness and utility of the project itself. The academic and policy debates on human security have been characterized by quarrels over the definition and meaning of this concept. Despite its innovations, such as the expressed focus on the individual (and the population) as the referent object of security, the concept builds on many of the trademarks inherent to the new security debate of the 1990s.

The concept reflects a new way of thinking about national and international politics and policies. The broader definitions of human security share this particular vision by positioning human security within wider debates on justice and legitimacy, structural violence and positive peace. On the other hand, narrower definitions are concerned primarily with public order and stability, and focus on the impact of direct violence on individuals. Such approaches to human security may be achieved without specific reference to justice and legitimacy and outside the context of a positive peace. However, particularly in transitional societies, efforts to suppress direct violence (such as street violence or inter-communal clashes) might in fact strengthen a state's hold over the population and control of its security institutions, whose

powers may be considered the guarantors of peace on the streets – and sidestep efforts to advance positive peace.

The Commission on Human Security's definition comes closest to how the concept was used in this project. The commission's report, *Human Security Now*, equates human security with the protection of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment".<sup>1</sup> The commission further argues:

Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, according to the Commission on Human Security, "What people consider to be 'vital' – what they consider to be 'of the essence of life' and 'crucially important' – varies across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must be dynamic. And that is why we refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security."<sup>3</sup>

In accordance with this vision, this project attempted to propose mechanisms through which local communities could lead efforts in defining what should be identified – in their context, experience and reality – as "the vital core" of human life, what qualifies as "critical and pervasive threats," and how processes and structures could be strengthened and/or built within the community and its governing institutions, in order to permit effective and sustained mitigation of those threats.

The following sections offer summaries of challenges and lessons experienced by project members throughout OPHUSEC's implementation. They are expected to guide those interested in pursuing similar exercises in developing applied threat and mitigation assessment projects.

## **GENERAL CHALLENGES AND LESSONS FOR HUMAN-SECURITY-FOCUSED THREAT ASSESSMENT EXERCISES**

The project highlighted a number of issues that would need to be resolved before meaningful analysis of threats, insecurity and security provision can be achieved.

### ***Defining the geographic context***

When defining human security threats and appropriate response mechanisms, one needs to be specific about the context of the analysis. How are the spatial (borders) and social (specific groups) contexts of human security threats and concerns defined? Is there something specific to particular geographic conditions, such as OPHUSEC's urban/peri-urban, arid/semi-arid and highland/lowland contexts?

At the very outset of a project, the spatial borders of the chosen context should be clear (and clearly communicated) to all involved participants, namely the researchers, multistakeholders, donors and those who are expected to formulate and implement recommended mitigation measures. Moreover, research will likely reveal that "subcontexts" play significant roles in our analyses, as the nature of some threats and mitigation measures deviates from the larger context. Examples include urban areas and border

regions, where inhabitants face unique threat dynamics, meaning unique mitigation measures might be available or need to be put in place.

### ***Managing diverse conceptions of key concepts***

*Do local communities understand “peace” and “security” as processes, conditions and/or goals?* It is important to define carefully what local communities and their government authorities perceive as “peace”, “crisis/conflict” and “security”. Which factors do they consider to be important components of a peaceful, secure environment? Do they approach peace and security as political, social or economic processes in which they and other actors need to invest? Or do they consider them to be conditions for development, stability and the well-being of individuals and societies? How do they intend to achieve such conditions? Who are expected to be the main beneficiaries of a peaceful and secure environment – individuals, communities, societies or states?

Unless local communities themselves understand and agree on what peace and security mean to them, while researchers and multistakeholders properly interpret such understandings and awareness, a project like this would not be able to assess the factors that either threaten or support peace and security.

### ***Managing diverse conceptions of threat perceptions***

How do stakeholders (including local communities and state, non-state and international actors) define factors, standards and risks of human security and insecurity? Which are the processes used to examine human security needs? In the context of this project a number of approaches were chosen. It was considered to be of great importance to map the general security environment as thoroughly as possible. To achieve this, it was important to identify and consult numerous reports and assessments conducted by various NGOs, international organizations, individuals and others on the broader national and, if available, human security situation of the country or region in question. These may be called “vulnerability assessments”, “human security reports”, “security mapping”, “livelihood surveys”, “human development reports” or similar. Each such study has its own focus – some focus more on either military security, security sector governance or reform, human rights, human needs, economic development or environmental issues, vulnerabilities or other themes. While some analyses study a single issue, some consider a multitude. Some attempt to compare and establish relationships and interdependencies between various issues and factors that threaten the ability of individuals and communities to survive and thrive.

Of course, communities living in different contexts vary in their perception of their respective security needs and levels of security requirements. For instance, the lack of access to free education may be less important in contexts where mere survival is the main challenge. On the other hand, limited access to healthcare is an issue when all other basic needs are satisfied. Moreover, the qualification of what basic needs are in a specific context (i.e. what is considered to be “basic” and what is considered more than basic) undoubtedly influences perceptions and assessments of security. Thus one should assess each given context according to which needs should be prioritized from the view of the researcher, the view of other external or local actors studying in and about the community and, most importantly, the view of directly affected stakeholders. This should be done during the research stage preceding MSWs and as part of the MSWs themselves. Subsequently, a consolidated version of research before and during the MSWs needs to establish which fulfilled and unfulfilled human needs are critical for the assessment of a community’s security perception.

### *Demystifying the complex nature of threats*

*How do we demystify the complex nature of a threat?* In our analysis we differentiate between a “type” of threat and the “nature” of a threat. The “type” refers to the sources of a threat – an environmental threat, health threat, military threat, etc., or a combination thereof. Usually these types of threat feed off each other – one type of threat will have a direct effect on the rise and extent of another threat, while rarely will any emerge and persist in isolation from other threats. Their interaction is inextricably linked to the levels and perspectives of security and insecurity experienced by individuals and communities, as well as by those responsible for governing and protecting. The “nature” of a threat refers to its depth and severity – how many people are affected, either directly or indirectly? Does the threat directly or indirectly affect populations in a particular geographic context? Are we referring to an existing, future or potential threat? Does one need to prepare for a threat that has been repelled, but which is feared to reoccur?

In terms of existing or evolving threats, responses must be immediate and can only affect the timing and severity of the impact. In terms of a potential threat, one should be in a preventive mode, address its root causes and thus affect the speed or severity with which the threat might eventually manifest itself, if it does at all. Moreover, one can prepare for the eventual occurrence of a threat by strengthening people’s and authorities’ coping strategies, and alerting those internal and external actors who are in a position to mitigate the symptoms of the threat.

Particularly in cases of potential threats, one faces a common dilemma – why invest in the mitigation of potential threats and prepare for their eventual occurrence if one cannot even muster the resources, political will and capacity to address existing, already unravelled threats? There are good reasons for doing so: potential threats can be as frightening as actual threats (if not more so), as the consequences are not known and cannot be estimated or put in perspective. At the same time, preparing for potential threats is more difficult than reacting to existing threats. One does not exactly know what to prepare for, what challenges to tackle – and investing scarce resources in the prevention of potential threats and their root causes is a very difficult “sell” when a society is already plagued by numerous other, seemingly more urgent issues. On the other hand, waiting until a threat materializes is not a solution either, as the damage and other negative consequences may be irreversible. One needs to address this issue in the research work, the MSWs and analytical work subsequent to the workshops.

It is important to clarify if one’s (and stakeholders’) analysis is based on current or potential threats and – as different levels of severity are ascribed to each threat – to what extent estimates of threat impacts are plausible. This has implications not only for the nature (severity) of the human security mapping, but also for the nature of eventual response strategies and recommendations.

Moreover, as not all threats can be considered for mitigation measures, it is important to agree on threshold criteria for serious, existential human security threats, compared to less severe threats that will at best be addressed indirectly through the mitigation of related but more serious ones. For this project it seemed helpful to distinguish first between life-threatening and non-life-threatening threats, both actual and potential. Only then could one work on life-threatening threats (later called the “human insecurity cluster”).

Nevertheless, although the application of a threshold means distinguishing between more and less serious threats and thus seemingly promoting mitigation of “higher-level threats” at the expense of “lower-level threats”, OPHUSEC is designed to temper such discrimination. The project proposes that it does not greatly matter if life-threatening or non-life-threatening threats are addressed. Why is that so? The project hypothesizes that the root causes of both life-threatening and non-life-threatening threats are the same in

many cases – or at least that there is a great overlap of root causes between them. If one focuses on the alleviation of root causes and is successful in doing so, then both types of threats will be diminished.

However, the focus on life-threatening issues for priority mitigation action is strategically more promising, as it raises more awareness and stresses a sense of urgency, while it is likely to generate greater willingness for action among national and external actors. Thus the root cause analysis – and how root causes of various threats are interrelated – is particularly important for raising awareness about the feasibility and potential impact of this project's approach to threat mitigation, as well as raising attention and support among potential (and potent) security providers.

### ***Identifying a "human security threshold"***

Where is the "human security threshold", what qualifies as a human security concern or threat, and who determines such distinctions? Which of the many threats identified in a given context are clearly deemed life threatening and which are not? In the OPHUSEC project frequent reference is made to the "object of security provision", which is identified as both individuals and communities. Who is the main object of security provision – individuals or communities? What happens when some individuals do not agree on which security threats are most vital to the overall community?

Whose security is more important – the individual's or that of the community to which he/she belongs? Is it possible to serve both – all individuals and the community at large? What if community security is pursued at the expense of individual security and threatens some of the community's members? What if government or international development aid priorities are, for instance, directed at the alleviation of one particularly vicious threat to the community, and other less significant threats that are considered far more serious by a small number of community members are disregarded in the process?

The MSW might not offer much assistance in this regard, especially if agreements about the main threats and alleviation methods follow compromises based on lowest common denominators (i.e. the minimal issues that most stakeholder participants can agree on). Careful pre-workshop analyses as well as the research team's own intuition and assessments need to be combined with the perceptions, feelings and agreements of the MSW groups. Finally, it is important to be selective, focusing on key threats while not abandoning the real fears of subgroups or individual members of the community about the validity of other, less central and far-ranging threats.

However, as long as diverse threats have similar root causes, and root cause alleviation is a priority approach within response strategies, then a wide range of concerns will inevitably be addressed, directly or indirectly. Showing these links to those whose fears have not been directly taken into account will be important to gain support from all members (and stakeholders) of a community. The selection of key threats (or, in the jargon of this project, the "human insecurity cluster") is a significant and sensitive moment in this project, requiring effective communication strategies to assure the buy-in of all or most stakeholders.

It is also important that data on the impact of threats are disaggregated to analyse effects not only on the population at large, but on individuals living in certain geographic locations (including cities and rural areas), on different genders (impact on boys and girls, men and women), age groups and groups or classes identified by other common criteria. We need to know how everyone is affected in order to design response strategies that are effectively tailored to the needs of those parts of the population that are most severely affected.

When trying to address potential threats, it helps to design scenarios that include escalation and threshold factors. For example, if recurring droughts are a major killer of harvests, livestock and people,

scenarios should show how such a threat develops, the factors that indicate the escalation of a situation, the coping strategies that are or are not in place, and the point at which this threat escalates from non-life threatening to life threatening.

It is crucial to think about indicators of various threats, as well as ways to measure them continuously. This will become important when suitable monitoring and early warning mechanisms are designed. The means should be put in place to allow a small team of trained individuals to manage such monitoring continuously at minimum cost.

### ***Diverse perceptions and realities of threats and fears***

*How does one accommodate differences between perception and reality of threats and fears? From a sociological perspective, how does one differentiate between real and imagined threats? Making these distinctions is a difficult undertaking. Particularly within a group of differently affected individuals, threat perceptions and estimations about the impact of a threat might vary dramatically. Also, different groups, particularly those with less political, economic and other power (for example women, the poor or the elderly) may have a much greater perception of threats than those groups who feel less affected. This also affects coping strategies. Those with economic, political and other powers might be better able to cope with a particular threat than individuals in their community who are less endowed with resources and power.*

Again, it will be important to disaggregate the ways particular threats affect individuals, how different groups may differ in their capacity to cope with threats, and how past mitigation measures have brought relief to different groups.

Yet disaggregation is often omitted, and researchers simply refer to a population as though it were one homogeneous set of people, with the same experiences, needs and aspirations. The fact that this is rarely the case must be reflected in both the threat analysis and mitigation strategies.

### ***Addressing imagined threats***

*How does one respond to imagined threats that may well be more destabilizing and, in the long run, act more as the causes of actual structural and direct violence than many obvious and existing threats? If for instance some imagined threats appear to have a highly destabilizing effect on society, mitigation should be designed to address the root causes of misinformation and misunderstanding. Thus in such a case, rather than the threat itself, the false perceptions about its existence or potential development and escalation would be mitigated.*

### ***Analysing threats in fluid environments***

*How does one ensure constant monitoring, analysis and adjustment of the nature and level of threats, given continuously changing political, economic, social or environmental contexts, possibly in response to changes triggered by the implementation of project recommendations? Chapter 14 offers a number of versions of this assessment exercise – ranging from a desk study and brief brainstorming workshop with affected stakeholders to more elaborate exercises that might translate threat analyses into implementable mitigation measures, which are then carried out and monitored for their impact. Ideally, an initial academic exercise can be followed up with operational implementation, accompanied by continuous academic analysis, evaluation and operational improvement of practical mitigation measures.*

In brief, implementing the full range of approaches inherent to this project would require a number of steps. For each chosen context (a village, city, region, or an entire country), a team of trained analysts



would have to be put in place to monitor the human insecurity cluster generated by the project, monitor and analyse the threats contained in the cluster and determine the level of threat posed to the population; monitor and assess the failure and success of any response strategies that are in place to mitigate those human security threats; continuously promote (i.e. lobby for) the adoption of additional required mitigation strategies generated by the project for adoption by state, non-state and intergovernmental actors; and maintain close contacts with the stakeholders involved in the project for feedback purposes.

Installing a team of several researchers and support staff (depending on the extent and frequency of tasks and outputs) requires financial support. As for the current OPHUSEC project, beyond the research and pilot phases, no further funds could be secured to continue work in its three case study countries or replicate it in additional places. However, interest in the implementation of a human security threat analysis and mitigation system may be much greater if requested by a local institution.

### ***Assuring multistakeholder, representative participation***

*How does one ensure that the analysis is conducted in a genuine multistakeholder approach with the participation of representatives of all affected and involved communities?* The multistakeholder processes, approaches and workshops are analysed in greater detail by Daniel Michel in Chapter 4, who examines theoretical frameworks and other organizations' and projects' experiences with multistakeholder processes, best and worst practices, and suggestions to avoid pitfalls. He concludes with a proposed approach for an ideal-case MSW for application in the OPHUSEC project, which could be followed by other similar projects. One of the most critical issues in assembling multistakeholder groups is picking the right number of suitable participants. They need to be interested, motivated and representative of their groups, as well as willing to engage in deliberative dialogues and committed to join all MSWs organized within the context of a project. Ideally they would also be committed to the implementation of project results in collaboration with other multistakeholder communities and fellow participants.

It is important to note that the spirit of drawing on multistakeholder inputs and consultations should determine the research team's work before and after MSWs. The research should be drawn not only from secondary sources (such as reports, studies and statistics), but also on interviews with representatives of stakeholder communities. Interview partners should be chosen as carefully as the participants of the workshops, with the objective that all affected populations' needs, fears, perceptions, interpretations and experiences find their way into the human security mapping exercises and all follow-up activities.

### ***Assuring ongoing multistakeholder commitment***

*How does one ensure ongoing collaboration with multistakeholder actors, as well as their continued and firm grip on the opinions and perceptions of the communities they represent?* Only careful selection of multistakeholder participants can ensure that these individuals are representative of their communities and will commit themselves to participation throughout and possibly beyond a project's duration. Only if the make-up of the multistakeholder group remains approximately the same across meetings can positive and constructive attitudes as well as increasing knowledge and long-term commitment develop among the diverse participants of the MSWs. Moreover, individual participants need to remain well connected to their communities to maintain a healthy awareness of the community's experiences, opinions and expectations.

### ***Accommodating group-interest dynamics***

*How does one respond to and incorporate the dynamics of mobilizing group-interest formation in the identification and mitigation of threats?* Group interests are important dynamics during the analysis of the sources and roots of specific threats – particularly as regards perceptions about potential, future threats whose likely consequences cannot yet be observed. Local ownership and support are necessary for the implementation of mitigation measures. Such support might not already be in place and will have to grow. This means that success must be viewed and communicated as a realistic option to those whose support is required. Moreover, the results should be communicated to the wider population as the product of work that has been conducted by – and through consultations with – their very own representatives.

An important issue is the ability to convince particularly those parties who object to the need to address threats and actively resist the implementation of mitigation strategies – and those who object to specific mitigation strategies as their interests might in turn be compromised. In many contexts it becomes evident rather quickly that knowledge about key threats exists even at the highest levels of decision-making. Nevertheless, there may be little interest in mitigating those threats – either because the necessary resources are not available, because the government prefers to spend available resources on other issues, or because some key stakeholders benefit from the continuation of conditions that cause the threats (for instance, in cases of corruption, war profiteering or medical patent profiteering).

In some cases, those benefiting from a lack of mitigation might have to be offered compensation. For instance, if corruption among police or medial doctors is considered to be a root cause of suffering, then levels of corruption might drop only if low salaries of public servants are raised while control mechanisms are sharpened, thus making it less attractive (and less tolerable) for public officials to engage in bribe-taking. Although compensating those benefiting from the suffering of others may seem an unethical proposition, it might be necessary for ensuring all stakeholders' agreement with mitigation measures.

Generating support from those who oppose change (or who are likely to do so) is a key challenge in human security threat mitigation.

## **CHALLENGES OF MITIGATION AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES**

A number of key issues need to be taken into consideration in identifying suitable response strategies to specific human security threats.

### ***Analysing past, current and required mitigation measures***

*How does one sequence the analysis of past, current and required response strategies, rather than analysing all three at once?* The OPHUSEC project calls for separate considerations of past, ongoing and required response strategies. In reality, and particularly during consultations with MSW representatives, it might prove difficult to sequence strictly the analysis of past and current records as well as future needs. At the same time it is clearly difficult to judge past and existing response strategies if no thought has been given to suggestions for new response strategies.

### ***Responses to human security versus normal threats***

How does one differentiate between responses to “human security” threats and “normal” threats? What is implied by the human security label? For the purpose of the OPHUSEC project, a human security “label”

implies that a threat is very serious, threatens the survival of at least part of the population and requires the utmost and immediate attention of local, national and international actors. Lack of response would only escalate the actual or potential life-threatening situation, cause further suffering and destabilization, while eventually jeopardizing the community's very existence and its political, economic and social structures. "Normal" threats do not meet some or all of these conditions.

*What is the difference between security infrastructures that address human security concerns and those that address other concerns and threats?* The main difference is not necessarily related to the nature of the security provider, but to the way it defines its own tasks and roles in contributing to the provision of human security. The threat (and the necessity to alleviate its source) defines response strategies that may need to draw on conventional and/or on new and innovative coalitions of security providers. Existing security infrastructures (security institutions including police, military, judiciary, border control, etc.) are primarily tasked with defence against external or internal armed violence and crime. Human security infrastructures consist of a much greater variety of actors that do not necessarily fit the category of traditional security providers. They include research institutions, health centres, businesses (and other private sector actors), civil society organizations, religious organizations, the media, government at all levels, international actors, etc. Each threat in each context and at each level of response will require input from a different set of actors. Ideally, all relevant actors will be present in MSWs that support – and later ideally accompany and advise – efforts to identify key threats and responses. This necessitates advance analysis of the respective threat profiles and security providers, and the identification of likely key actors in implementing suitable mitigations strategies.

Thus the concept of "security governance" will have to be rethought in terms of "human security governance", a concept that will likely benefit from a "whole-of-government" approach. All government and non-governmental actors may at some point be called upon to provide services in a coordinated response to manage major threats to the survival and safety of part or all of society. This can take the form of an emergency measure or, more indirectly, efforts to alleviate proximate and root causes.

### ***Comprehensive versus community-level responses***

*How feasible are prospects for comprehensive, multi-actor, multi-policy responses to key security threats? Can simpler approaches offer alternative solutions, such as response measures at the community level?* When designing policy responses and strategies, it is important to create and nurture necessary "coalitions of willing stakeholders" who are interested in and will actively support the implementation of mitigation measures. Those benefiting from an environment characterized by human suffering and conflict may need to be offered alternative options to pursue at least some of their interests through legal activities and without repeating the damage done to the society's security and peace. Providing those actors with the possibility to receive amnesty for previous illegal and irresponsible activities may serve as an effective, although ethically questionable, incentive to support mitigation measures and reform activities.

Of course, sustainable mitigation can rarely be accomplished by one actor alone. Multi-actor, multi-issue and multi-policy measures are required to address multiple root causes. This makes it all the more important to ensure that the composition of a multistakeholder consultation group includes representatives of those groups that may be expected to offer active support in the implementation of mitigation measures. If persons, groups and/or organizations that do not immediately benefit from human security improvements cannot be convinced of their own (spillover) benefits, they might end up spoiling implementation efforts. While this may in the first instance be the subject of discussions at a later stage of the project, past and existing response strategies should be analysed on this basis as well: to what degree do they reflect multi-

actor strategies – and which strategies might not have been successful or are currently not succeeding because some key stakeholders are withholding support?

Response strategies at the community level are a double-edged sword: although possibly easier and quicker to implement, they can be used by official actors to leave what should be their responsibility for the community to resolve. Examples are family and community support structures that compensate for a lack of governmental social policies. Nevertheless, when we speak of multi-actor responses, this includes government and non-government, official, community and household-level actors and strategies. In addition, the OPHUSEC approach focuses on both root cause alleviation and symptom alleviation and control. To alleviate symptoms of threats, immediate assistance operations may be necessary alongside efforts to build communities' capacity to cope with and survive threats that will not be mitigated for the time being.

### ***Responding to actual and potential threats***

*How does one design, and who should be involved in developing, strategies to mitigate actual and potential (including imagined) threats?* Mitigation strategies have to reflect both desirable and feasible measures. On the one hand, they should address the lack of coping strategies by affected populations and formal security providers. Coping capacities must be strengthened. They should furthermore remove or weaken root causes. Root cause alleviation is key to a successful mitigation strategy. However, it is not always easy or possible to establish a direct link between a certain root cause and a key threat to the population's survival. (For instance, why is poor education partly responsible for the spread of epidemic diseases? This explains why it might be important to hire more and better-trained teachers to address this key threat.) It must be clear and obvious which root causes are responsible in which way for the escalation of a particular threat. Only then can one design promising mitigation strategies that can convincingly be communicated to those responsible and willing to alleviate the causes of major threats.

In this context, the difference between actual and potential – or even imagined – threats is worth raising. Actual threats are easily visible; their immediate short-term impact is mostly known and has been experienced; long-term impacts can be foreseen; the level of vulnerability in light of existing or lacking coping strategies can be assessed; and response measures can be relatively readily identified based on knowledge about the threat and its causes. This should make it easier to design and implement effective response strategies. On the downside, however, once threats have reached this level of apparent immediacy, mitigation is possible only to a very limited extent. At this point one might more appropriately talk about “damage control” – much of the damage has been done, but the potential for further escalation or recurrence of such a threat can be brought under control with quick and decisive action. When addressing actual threats one is primarily addressing the symptoms and impacts, and not the root causes.

The prevention of potential threats is more useful and effective: if addressed, potential threats might not materialize. However, potential threats are by definition those that have not yet happened. How can one be sure they will ever materialize, and with what consequences? The political gambler will take that risk, as investment in potential risks cannot be convincingly justified if there is no real sense of urgency and no means of measuring the success of preventive action. After all, the threat might never happen, with or without mitigation measures. In post-crisis/catastrophe situations, however, the fear of potential threats (and the perceived need to respond) might be considerably greater, as the consequences of inaction have just recently been experienced. In these situations there may be greater willingness to invest in long-term stabilization and the alleviation of potential threats. It is thus important to analyse and describe the current

situation along a crisis or threat escalation time line. Which stage of a threat's escalation defines the current context? Is the threat a potential one, is it already affecting society, or has it subsided but might re-emerge?

### ***Division of labour in mitigation strategies***

*At which level of government and by which actor should local human security threats be addressed? If multiple levels – and actors – are involved in proposed mitigation strategies, how should labour be divided among them?* The nature and scope of a threat will define the level at which it needs to be addressed. It is reasonable to assume that any threat above the village level would need to consider mitigation measures taken at higher levels of government. However, the more geographically defined the context, the more accurate the threat definition, and the greater the chance for suitable and “tailored” responses. In most cases, particularly if involving threats with national reach, mitigation measures will have to draw on various government and intergovernmental levels.

Although difficult unless mitigation measures are fully designed, the need for eventual and coordinated divisions of labour between various security providers should be considered from the very beginning of a threat and mitigation analysis. All those actors who would eventually be asked to contribute to mitigation measures should be part of the multistakeholder consultation process. Who would possibly be best suited to respond to a certain threat? Who would most likely be interested or motivated to do so? Which capacities do various actors possess, and which not? What capacities would need to be provided by other actors? Ideally, all involved actors would be interested in addressing those facets of a threat and applying those mitigation measures for which they are best suited. Comparative advantages and capacities – as well as comparative willingness – to respond to a certain threat will have to be identified at an early stage of the assessment and should guide these actors' activities. For instance, some issues are more effectively addressed at the village level, some better at the national government level and others at the international level. If actors at several levels are called upon to take part in mitigation measures, cooperation and coordination become very important issues that require a high degree of planning and commitment.

### ***Evaluating mitigation strategies and measures***

*How can one ensure that one is on the “right track” when analysing and determining the nature of human insecurity and appropriate mitigation measures – and who should be involved in evaluating mitigation strategies?* Evaluating the impact or effectiveness of response measures will indicate if they are suitable for meeting the challenges posed by a threat. If suggested mitigation measures are taken with little or no improvement, either the chosen measures are wrong, they are targeted at the wrong actor, or the implementation is faulty and thus ineffective. All these issues can be addressed and corrected over time. But while adjustments can be made, they need to be based on solid and accurate analyses of the reasons for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of mitigation measures. However, the monitoring and analysis of mitigation measures, and timely warning of their failure, should ideally not be provided by persons who are involved in implementation work. Those individuals need to be free from any personal attachments to the mitigation activities they are tasked to assess.

### ***Working towards sustainable response strategies***

*How does one secure and ensure the sustainability of response strategies?* It is very difficult to determine who could and who should be responsible for ensuring the implementation of sustainable mitigation measures. The researchers who are generating the information that is used to analyse key threats and relevant response strategies and measures can only be responsible for providing reliable information,

drawn from thorough analysis and inclusive multistakeholder consultation processes. They can also be held responsible for suggesting evidence-based and feasible response strategies and measures, and for communicating those in sensible language to the most appropriate security providers. Thus for those involved in the assessment exercise, the key is to generate the right information, translate it into helpful policy prescription and transfer this information to the most relevant actors. These are difficult tasks that require solid research skills, analytical rigour, academic freedom, independence from the political pressures driving policy responses and keen knowledge of policy needs, options and dynamics. The timely generation of reliable information is therefore an important ingredient of sustainable mitigation strategies, but information alone is not enough.

Sustainability requires the ability to secure long-term implementation of effective mitigation strategies and measures. Such implementation has to be assured by those who carry the project beyond analysis and policy prescription. There needs to be continuous mutual exchange between those responsible for analysis, policy prescription, implementation and monitoring.

The implementation of any mitigation measures, let alone those that might turn out to be “sustainable”, rests upon a culture of continuous analysis and response – an operational regime focused on the alleviation of key human security threats. At the front end this necessitates that assessment teams are put in place to continue with the work piloted by OPHUSEC: to monitor and assess the human security situation, continue to identify human insecurity clusters, assess the performance of past and current responses and develop new strategies and measures, and work with response actors (human security providers) to ensure that current strategies are strengthened and new ones initiated. It is absolutely critical that response agents (civil society, government and international actors) are interested and willing to take the project’s recommendations on board. Not only do they need to know about and be involved in its various activities, but they also need to appreciate its value and support it. Without such support – or worse, in the face of open opposition by human security providers – such an activity will not have much positive impact. In fact, as experienced in the OPHUSEC project, the contrary might be the case: expectations might be raised at local or national levels about the potential of the project’s contributions to build capacity in managing human security threats, while very little might be achieved in the long run. Thus the feasibility of the impact of such assessment activities as well as the expectations they raise needs to be considered.

Due to a lack of required funding and the inability to locate suitable project partners in the case study locations, the original OPHUSEC project did not evolve beyond an academic research phase. Helping this project move beyond academic analysis is a considerable challenge. Methods and instruments that make the project attractive for long-term implementation have to be created. There is a real chance that those committed to the realization of OPHUSEC objectives might facilitate real long-term change as to the ways and means in which security, peace and stability are provided in societies plagued by threats to their well-being and survival.

### ***Pursuing “do-no-harm” strategies in mitigation activities***

*How does one ensure that selected response strategies do not worsen existing threats or create new threats to other communities? In other words, how does one integrate a “do-no-harm” approach into response mechanisms?* Recommended response strategies must not only be feasible, but also trigger overall positive change. This presumes that a response strategy addressing a particular root cause or symptom of human insecurity should not at the same time create another threat – or, at minimum, that “collateral damage” of human security provision is smaller than the benefits gained.

To judge the potential damage caused by particular mitigation measures, a “do-no-harm” approach needs to be included in the analysis of the consequences inherent to implemented response strategies. It is important that human security provision for some should not endanger the human security of others, as this might create resistance to a human security strategy within the larger population. Thus an analysis of required responses to prevent human insecurity must be accompanied by an assessment of the potential effects linked to their implementation.

Nevertheless, some trade-offs will likely be unavoidable, as aid, support and assistance provided to one community may cause a shortage of similar support offered to another. Here the “severity” of the issue at stake is important, as well as the ability to communicate differences in severity to communities benefiting – and suffering – from a particular measure that is meant to address the root causes and symptoms of one or more threats. In the context of the threshold definition of human insecurity used in the OPHUSEC project – existential threats to the survival of people – “inconveniences” caused by an effective instrument to preserve life are acceptable, but the creation of new threats is not acceptable.

*Is it therefore justified to apply response strategies that secure the survival of one community, but as a consequence deteriorate livelihood conditions (yet do not jeopardize survival) of another community? How do we incorporate relevant correction mechanisms?* As argued above, if the survival of a community is at stake, then their immediate needs (those that help secure their survival and address life-threatening dangers) are paramount to those of other groups and communities who are eager to fulfil non-existential needs short of issues threatening their survival. In the “do-no-harm” spirit, however, all precautions should be taken to ensure that advancements made for one community will not be to the detriment of others. Again, communication plays an important role – as does a healthy degree of cross-community solidarity.

#### CHALLENGES IN GENERATING AND IMPLEMENTING RESEARCH: THE RESEARCHER, THE RESPONDENT COMMUNITIES AND STAKEHOLDERS<sup>4</sup>

##### *Managing objectivity*

*An important challenge concerns the research team’s ability to generate analysis based on objective criteria – particularly in the context of strong threat perceptions, objective analyses and assessments are crucial.* A researcher tends to operate within a specific context, against the background of a specific biography, experiences, training, political and ideological heritage and preferences. This can tilt the way the researcher selects consultation partners, interprets findings and issues recommendations. Both internal and external researchers are subject to such potential limitations, making it all the more important to seek feedback from “third-party” peers outside the project to assess the methods and results of their work.

Similarly, participants in MSWs might only be able to reflect primarily on their own experiences, although their opinions and assessments might be balanced by their interactions with representatives from other stakeholder groups. MSWs tend to be relatively brief events and participants will base their discussions on the level and depth of knowledge they bring to the meeting, and reactions and arguments that draw to a greater extent on intuition than on thorough analysis. Stakeholder meetings will focus on personal reflections of threats and their underlying causes. Discussions will likely reflect passionate interpretations of threats and focus on missed opportunities by security providers inside and outside the affected community.

Although the dynamics of brief MSWs can produce valuable insights, owing to the considerably greater time and resources available to researchers, they are likely to be in a better position to judge, for instance, the severity of threats or the effectiveness of past mitigation measures based on thorough analyses of available data and in-depth study of affected populations' perceptions and experiences. Yet the research teams need to compare their own (perhaps somewhat detached) findings with those more intuitive MSW discussions. The most appropriate analyses, findings and recommendations will flow from the interaction between the experiences and demands of the affected and the "detached" (or, in the case of insider researchers, semi-detached) research groups. This underscores the necessity to base threat and mitigation assessments not only on "quick-and-dirty" stakeholder consultations, but precede, accompany and reflect on them with more thorough and comprehensive analyses carried out by research teams.

### ***Combining insider and outsider expertise***

*How do we successfully select and combine insider and outsider competence and knowledge to generate objective analysis?*<sup>5</sup> The OPHUSEC project has been set up to incorporate insider and outsider observation, knowledge and analysis through close collaboration and cooperation between a Swiss-based team and local teams. Continuous contact between the researchers and joint meetings were expected to allow for constant exchange of experiences and observations gathered throughout the project. Where such meetings took place, the participants benefited from the exchanges; where they did not take place, the smooth pursuit of joint project objectives became more challenging.

The MSWs helped in balancing the competence and knowledge of affected and involved populations against the less affected and involved research teams. Both experiences needed to be merged to result in better analysis.

### ***Understanding and interpreting local response analyses***

*Yet how does one interpret the responses of the analysed populations, who are bound to perceive and feel insecurity in a highly diverse manner?* Each affected population will differ in its interpretation of the same events and developments. Each needs to express its voice, to be heard (and listened to) and to have its feelings reflected in the researchers' work, analysis and recommendations. Getting this balance right is not easy, but it is important to accomplish. Local judgements on the nature of acknowledged and perceived insecurity/security threats largely depend on a number of variables, including levels of external threat and risk; levels of vulnerability (resistance and resilience); perceived sense of vulnerability, which influences the experienced impact of human security threats and thus the level of physical and psychological damage; previous experience and expectations of threats and their potential impact (integral to vulnerability); the role, weight and interpretation of history, myths and preconceptions; and the presence or absence of a sense of entitlement to certain levels of security and security provision.

The objectivity versus subjectivity dilemma is also affected by a number of credibility problems. The credibility of local insider academics and practitioners needs to be critically assessed. While both groups might possess excellent local knowledge and experience, in turn this might influence their judgement and analysis. The same applies to the credibility of (non-local) input from other, perhaps similar, contexts. The credibility of external academics and practitioners, possibly with experiences in similar threat situations, may also be unreliable, particularly if their exposure to the local context in question has been – as is so often the case – far too brief and marginal to be meaningful.



The answer to these challenges lies in the combination of local and external expertise, exchange and collaboration. Careful joint reflection allows all participants in a threat and mitigation analysis exercise to contribute as objectively as they can to this joint effort.

### ***Conducting mapping exercises***

*A thorough mapping exercise is a crucial first step for researchers to uncover most facets of the context and nature of threats.* Carrying out a mapping exercise requires the researcher to explore all possible perspectives and angles of a specific issue, listen to all involved parties and take seriously all expressed opinions, approaches and observations. Human security mapping means collecting and gathering as much information as possible for all possible threats and mitigation strategies – both those tested and those untested. Human security mapping also means uncovering what is working in preventing and mitigating threats, and what is not. Where does what happen to whom, by whom, why, how and with which consequences, in terms of both the threat and the response activities?

Human security mapping also means collecting experiences, feelings and perceptions from different groups of people – each of whom might perceive a threat very differently. There will be different stories and experiences based on different contexts and perceptions. All have to be recorded and put into proper perspective by the researcher, who herself or himself is also situated in only one of many possible parallel contexts of time, space and perception. Thus objectivity and openness to different people's stories and experiences are paramount during human (in)security mapping exercises. The researcher has to be careful to not see the situation only or primarily through his or her own eyes, but to remain open to interpretations of fact and truth that might be quite different. Only then will the mapping and analysis yield results that are representative of a particular population's experiences.

Moreover, only context-specific and context-true analysis will serve as a solid foundation for context-relevant and tailored response mechanisms. One and the same threat might require drastically different responses in communities living not far from one another, but facing different threat environments. Staying attuned to local dynamics is an important skill of the successful human (in)security researcher and policy designer.

### ***Developing objective criteria***

*Who can and should provide objective criteria, data and indicators for human (in)security assessments?* These are tasks for the researchers. Criteria, data and indicators for human (in)security measurement must be generated from within the context and the local situation. They might also change over time, particularly if and when improvements take place and root causes for human insecurity are addressed, people's coping capacities have been strengthened or threats may have diminished. These measurement criteria, data and indicators should be generated by internal and external project participants who are familiar with monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment methodologies.

### ***Relevance of comparative experiences***

*How relevant are experiences from similar human security situations in different geographic, political or cultural contexts? Is it possible to learn from these experiences?* Comparisons with other contexts are always useful and educational. For instance, another geographic, cultural or political context may offer lessons that might be relevant across contexts. At the same time, as contexts differ and thus both roots and expressions of human insecurity vary, there are limits to transferring and applying lessons and conclusions drawn from

one to another context.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, comparisons are helpful both in defining and describing threats and their consequences and in assessing the likely (and elsewhere perhaps already experienced) application of response measures.

We do have to be careful, however. Each case is distinct and should be treated as such. What seems to be (or even has been experienced as) helpful in one case may not work or even be damaging in another if transferred indiscriminately without significant adjustment. No attempt should be made to transfer any lessons automatically across case studies.

## CONCLUSION

The deliberations in this chapter drew extensively on the experiences of designing and implementing the OPHUSEC project. The intent was to highlight a number of challenges that might be applicable to similar exercises carried out elsewhere by other researchers. The challenges discussed, along with occasional suggestions for meeting them, should be treated as significant “issues to consider” when replicating all or parts of this project in other contexts, but for the similar purpose of human security threat and mitigation assessments. The companion publication *Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human-Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments* (Cahier 21) attempts to turn these lessons into guidance for replicating different versions of the OPHUSEC approach. Several versions of the approach are presented, from rudimentary assessment exercises to much more ambitious and resource-intensive activities. A number of tips and hints draw on positive and negative lessons learned from the original OPHUSEC project to help others avoid some of the pitfalls that have been experienced during the project’s conceptualization and pilot phase, many of which are discussed in this chapter.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> For more information on the topic see Albrecht Schnabel, "One Size Fits All? Focused Comparison and Policy-Relevant Research on Violently Divided Societies", in Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson (eds), *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues* (London and Tokyo: Pluto Press/United Nations University Press, 2001, pp. 193–206); Albrecht Schnabel, "Preventing and Managing Violent Conflict: The Role of the Researcher", in Elisabeth Porter, Gillian Robinson, Marie Smyth, Albrecht Schnabel and Eghosa Osaghae (eds), *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005, pp. 24–43).

<sup>5</sup> For initial attempts to answer some of these questions see *ibid* (both publications). See also Yves Pedrazzini, "Le barrio, la rue, les gangs: une critique de la sociologie urbaine", in Michel Bassand, Vincent Kaufmann and Dominique Joye (dirs), *Enjeux de la sociologie urbaine* (Lausanne: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 2001, pp. 39–61).

<sup>6</sup> Schnabel, "One Size Fits All?", note 4 above.



## CHAPTER 14

### Operationalizing human security: From theory to implementation to institutionalization

Albrecht Schnabel and Yves Pedrazzini

#### INTRODUCTION

The OPHUSEC project attempted to explore the operationalization of human security as a bridge between mitigating structural and direct violence (see Chapter 2). For reasons of academic and practical expedience, OPHUSEC focused in the first instance on life-threatening dangers. In addition to offering a practically useful threat assessment and mitigation approach, the project attempted to show that through addressing root causes, alleviating the most serious threats would inevitably have a positive impact on the alleviation of other, less serious threats. Moreover, focusing on mitigation measures and strategies for less politically sensitive threats (a requirement of great practical importance in the politically charged environments in which the project was carried out), where cooperation can be secured relatively easily, has proven to open pathways towards the alleviation of numerous other more serious or more politically sensitive threats.

The key objective of OPHUSEC is to use a human security approach to improve security provision for affected populations. This can be achieved without first demonizing governments over their shortcomings in security provision – for which they may or may not be responsible – and as a consequence risking their opposition to and oppression of mitigation measures pursued by other actors. This observation highlights the utility of the OPHUSEC approach to provide a tool for carrying out threat analysis and mitigation in environments that would usually be highly unfavourable to such exercises in sustainable human security provision. It is this practical utility that is hoped to elevate OPHUSEC's findings from a purely academic exercise to one of practical usefulness.

Therefore, in the context of this project it was important to identify the right, most “opportune” threats – or combination of threats – as the basis for further mitigation action. The OPHUSEC approach asks for the identification of threats that are serious, yet preventable. They have to be linked to numerous other, possibly more sensitive, threats. Moreover, a context-focused approach regarding the nature and scope of threats and the most effective response strategies allows one to develop analyses and suggestions that most properly fit realistic threat scenarios and dynamics. This approach helps identify and understand even diverse and complex yet always interrelated and multidimensional threats. If the complex nature of threats is properly understood, which is possible if one applies a systematic threat analysis, opportunities abound to match that complexity and diversity with feasible and effective response measures.

Once threats have been identified, they need to be monitored, analysed and, if conditions worsen, translated into early warning and early response measures. In that regard, OPHUSEC engaged in research to discuss human-security-based early warning activities (see Chapter 5). Moreover, as a follow-up to the identification of threats and responses, security provision by security and development providers, including the security sector and the development assistance community, has been explored (see the companion Cahier 21).

## CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OPHUSEC PROJECT

The OPHUSEC project's main conceptual approach and hypotheses have not changed fundamentally during its approximately five years of activity. However, over time it became clear that the project's basic yet ambitious methodology of combining in-depth case studies with broad-based multistakeholder consultations needs to be implementable in a variety of ways to accommodate different levels of resource (and political) commitment to carrying out and implementing threat and response analyses.

Particularly the third multistakeholder workshop in Ethiopia, with participants having attended not only the two preceding workshops but also a preparatory pilot workshop in 2006 during which the OPHUSEC approach was first tested before the project was officially launched later that year, focused in detail on the practical utility of the approach. The workshop revealed considerable interest by all participants in a set of "tools" that would allow interested parties to apply OPHUSEC's methodology of initiating, fine-tuning and prioritizing threat and response assessments. That particular feedback was incorporated into Chapter 13 and Cahier 21, which now offer guidance on how and when to select and implement individual OPHUSEC components, according to different levels of need and resource commitment.

Moreover, both the case study teams and the multistakeholder groups recognized the potential of the OPHUSEC approach's focus on and relevance for transdisciplinary and non-sectoral threat and mitigation assessments for sectoral human security providers – such as development assistance, humanitarian or security sector communities. The opportunity to consider threats and response strategies outside their own competencies and official mandates evolved as a considerable added value of the project's approach for those communities. They found themselves in a situation in which they could put the results of their assessments in a much broader and, eventually, appropriate perspective, given the necessity for multi-actor collaboration in both threat assessments and threat mitigation. The need for follow-up workshops for individual sectoral communities of human security providers has thus been incorporated into the toolbox (see Step 5 on "capacity-building workshops").

## REVISITING KEY QUESTIONS

The OPHUSEC project initially posed a number of key questions, which will now be briefly revisited. These key questions point to the main added value that we hoped to provide with the OPHUSEC approach to threat and mitigation assessments. The first question asks *if the context-driven threat analyses do in fact point to the need to address different threats than those typically addressed as a result of traditional risk and conflict analyses*. At this point the project team believe that the threat analyses produced by following the OPHUSEC approach do point to different, more relevant and realistic threat scenarios than those that merely focus on livelihood threats, the risk of armed violence or other very specific types of threats (such as environmental, economic or social threats and insecurity).

A particular asset of the approach could be the fact that it does not fall into a common trap of many conflict disaster management instruments, which often merely and in the first instance consider factors that contribute to the outbreak and escalation of violent conflict. A focus on armed-conflict-inducing developments as core problems is a shortcoming of many political conflict analysis and warning tools. This tendency to "securitize" threat assessments and subsequently also prevention and mitigation measures often discounts in particular structural violence that, in the medium to long term, is not necessarily expected

to lead to an escalation of armed conflict (see also Chapter 2).<sup>1</sup> The OPHUSEC approach shows that armed conflict is (merely) a symptom of underlying threats that need to be addressed in their own right, because of the intrinsic risk they pose to the survival of affected individuals. Focusing mitigation primarily on symptoms of insecurity is irresponsible: the record on investments in armed conflict prevention is poor – and waiting until a threat becomes “important” enough to trigger armed violence will rarely help resolve a conflict, nor sustainably remove the underlying threats. Instead, identifying all relevant threats and their actual and potential impact in consideration of past and current mitigation records puts human security provision into practice.

The second, related question ponders *if past responses have been suitable and successful in addressing threats adequately – and if current measures are effective in doing so*. On that count OPHUSEC analyses tended to reveal that in many instances past responses have not been successful, while current measures were also not particularly suitable to address the threats at hand effectively. The reason can be found at least partly in poor threat assessments and subsequently inadequate response measures. The project hypothesized that *OPHUSEC-type threat and mitigation analyses (re)define conventional response measures – and thus unearth new, potentially more effective mitigation options*. As the project’s threat analyses focus on the needs of and impact on individuals and populations, they point to different threats than those identified by conventional conflict analyses. They also suggest new and different responses to those so far emphasized. Moreover, such an approach shows that threats do not have to be contributing factors to violent conflict to be considered important and mitigation-worthy.

Finally, at the outset of the project we were curious to find out *if it is possible to identify certain key threats that are linked to other threats through common root causes and subsequently allow one to alleviate a variety of threats by focusing primarily on such key threats*. To provide a definitive answer to this question, more empirical data would have to be generated on the “spillover” effect of mitigating a particular threat. Yet this answer can provisionally be in the affirmative when observing initial findings and qualitative assessments of the merit of focusing on human insecurity clusters that are identified in part because of their link with other threats sharing the same root causes. As argued in many of the multistakeholder groups, for instance, each core threat is in fact closely connected to a cluster of further threats, linked by common root causes. Addressing one of these threats will ultimately contribute to the reduction of that particular common root cause. This can in turn have a positive and constructive impact on the evolution of the other threats. As a security provider one can thus “economize” in the design of mitigation measures not only so far as financial investments are concerned, but also in terms of political investments (and subsequently various types of risks to the security provider!). It should therefore be possible, we initially hypothesized, *that politically delicate threats can be addressed indirectly by focusing in the first instance on alleviating other less sensitive threats*. For instance, one case study showed that addressing health threats such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis as the most lethal diseases in that particular context helps resolve numerous other diseases and related problems, including issues such as social exclusion and government corruption and incompetence – threats that cannot be put at the forefront of core mitigation strategies. It is also possible to work on sensitive threats without open admission, even in cooperation with implicated actors. Moreover, this allows those responsible for certain threats to collaborate with other stakeholders on mitigating them – without admitting their role in the generation and mitigation of particular threats. The perpetrator saves face while he/she consciously or unconsciously collaborates in changing his/her own role in the creation of that threat. The desired multiplier effect generated by taking this approach means that shared causes allow human security providers to plug more easily into root cause alleviation via addressing politically less sensitive, acceptable threats, thus considerably raising the chances that mitigation action will have a positive effect on the situation of affected populations.

In sum, the most significant and – particularly by practitioners – appreciated aspects of the OPHUSEC method include its approach to conducting human security analyses from an interdisciplinary perspective and developing realistic and context-relevant threat assessments; the ability to define priority threats whose mitigation is indirectly mitigating other, “hidden” threats; and the ability to use this information to explore mitigation records and requirements and develop realistic and feasible strategies that can be readily used by a variety of actors in choosing their own contributions towards mitigating the most relevant threats to the communities they serve.

As an added advantage of OPHUSEC multistakeholder consultations, particularly civil society organizations (and the international organizations with which the project’s approach and findings have been shared) considered it to be uniquely opportune and advantageous in developing a more holistic view of threats and appropriate mitigation requirements: they could gain a better understanding of overall threat situations and response requirements beyond their own narrow focus of activity and expertise; they would receive guidance on whom to collaborate with in order to affect a wider range of threats, thus assuring the sustainability of their own contributions; and – with limited resources and abilities to mitigate more than a small number of threat and root cause dynamics – they would be assisted in making more informed decisions about the priority areas they should pursue, whether on their own or in partnership with other actors. While researchers tended to show more interest in the OPHUSEC methodology of identifying threat and mitigation priorities, action-oriented practitioner communities tended to be particularly curious about the practical results of the OPHUSEC-based human security threat and response analysis.

## **CONCLUSION: TRACING THE PROJECT’S IMPACT SO FAR**

So far, the project’s impact has mostly been academic in nature, or in the form of practically focused presentations to a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments and regional organizations which are active in providing development and peacebuilding assistance. Numerous participants in multistakeholder consultation workshops have repeatedly expressed their willingness to integrate in their daily work the findings of the local research teams’ case study reports, the project’s summary report and practical guidelines. Many also welcomed the eventual development of initiatives towards institutionalizing the OPHUSEC approach in the form of ongoing threat and mitigation assessments and advice, as suggested in Chapters 4 and 12.

Throughout the project’s implementation, numerous opportunities arose to discuss the approach with academic, policy and project-level audiences in Venezuela, Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland and other locations where contributors were offered the chance to present the project design and initial results. This came in addition to official reviews and evaluations within the context of the NCCR North-South framework. The project’s various publications (see Annex 1), some of which are included in this volume, invitations to speak to academic and policy audiences and opportunities to integrate the OPHUSEC idea in a number of practical training activities on threat assessment and prevention for representatives of governments, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations demonstrate that this approach might indeed hold considerable potential as a useful contribution to effective and context-relevant threat analyses and mitigation activities (see Annex 2).

The OPHUSEC approach to researching security needs and providing security assistance (including the methodology and worksheets presented in Cahier 21) was used in designing and delivering an early warning training workshop for representatives of the African Union, the Economic Community of



Central African States, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African Development Community, held at the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism headquarters in Addis Ababa, 16–18 November 2006. The OPHUSEC methodology was furthermore used in designing and delivering a training course for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) officers designated as future lecturers at the Dr. Garang Memorial Military Academy in Juba, Sudan, 10–13 November 2008. The methodology was also used as the basis of inputs to a training workshop on “Security Sector Development: National Priorities and Regional Approaches” for senior inter-agency officials and civil society representatives from the Maldives, Mongolia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka responsible for overseeing and managing their country's security sector, organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, 16–20 August 2010, and a similar workshop on 4–8 April 2011 with delegations from Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal. Finally, the multistakeholder workshops organized as part of the OPHUSEC project in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (16–18 May 2007 and 8–9 September 2010), Lake Issyk-kul, Kyrgyzstan (5–8 June 2007), Caracas, Venezuela (27–29 June 2007 and 28–30 January 2008) and Debrezeit, Ethiopia (5–7 December 2007) exposed numerous local and national representatives of civil society, community groups, academic and research communities and governments to the OPHUSEC approach to threat and mitigation assessments and captured their professional and experience-based feedback.

The OPHUSEC project has served as the basis of a semester-length seminar on “International Organisations and Conflict Management” at the University of Bern in 2007. Students examined, debated and applied the OPHUSEC approach to a series of country analyses. One of these case studies was eventually transformed into a BA thesis (University of Bern, 2007) that focused on human security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, two MA theses were written in the context of OPHUSEC – on deliberative democracy and the application of multistakeholder workshops within the project (University of Bern, 2006), and on youth gangs and insecurity (EESP, Lausanne, 2006) – and became the subject of numerous guest lectures (see Annex 1). The leader of the Ethiopian research team was able to integrate the project's methodology and results in his own teaching and consultancy activities for local NGOs.

The project's publications and presentations have triggered considerable interest within the academic community. There have been requests for collaboration and the chance to join the project and its follow-up activities. In some cases the project team was able to accommodate such collaborative efforts, but in most cases these opportunities to expand the project beyond its core team could not be seized due to lack of time and financial resources. Still, such expressions of interest can be interpreted as a positive response from both academic and policy communities.

The contributors to this volume hope that with this publication the conceptual discussions and practical findings of the OPHUSEC project can be shared with a larger audience – and that among the readers some will pick up from where we left off in further developing the OPHUSEC approach and using its methodology to improve their own threat and mitigation efforts.

## ANNEX 1 - PROJECT PUBLICATIONS

Albrecht Schnabel and Yves Pedrazzini (eds), *Operationalizing Human Security: Concept, Analysis, Application*, Cahier du LaSUR 20 (Lausanne: EPFL, 2014).

Albrecht Schnabel, *Operationalizing Human Security: Tools for Human Security-Based Threat and Mitigation Assessments*, Cahier du LaSUR 21 (Lausanne: EPFL, 2014).

Albrecht Schnabel, "Human Security and Security Sector Reform: Mutually Reinforcing Approaches Towards People-centred Security Provision," in Paul Jackson (ed.), *Handbook of International Security and Development* (Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, forthcoming in 2014).

Albrecht Schnabel and Anara Tabyshalieva (eds), *Escaping Victimhood: Children, Youth and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2013).

Albrecht Schnabel and Anara Tabyshalieva (eds), *Defying Victimhood: Women and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012).

Albrecht Schnabel, Andres Antillano, Indira C. Granda Alvarez and Yves Pedrazzini, "Operationalising Human Security in an Urban Setting: The Experience of Caracas", in Urs Wiesmann and Hans Hurni (eds), with international group of co-editors, *Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives*, Perspectives of Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, University of Bern, Vol. 6 (Bern: Geographica Bernensia, 2011, pp. 607–621).

Albrecht Schnabel, "Mainstreaming Human Rights in Responding to the Conflict Cycle: The Role of NGOs", in Omar Grech and Monika Wohlfeld (eds), *Human Rights and the Conflict Cycle* (Msida MSD: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 2010, pp. 83–114).

Albrecht Schnabel and Heinz Krummenacher, "Towards a Human Security-Based Early Warning and Response System", in Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, John Grin, Czeslaw Mesjasz, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou and Heinz Krummenacher (eds), *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Vol. 4 (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2009, pp. 1253–1264).

Albrecht Schnabel, "Improving Early Warning and Response Systems: Learning from Human Security, Preparing for Climate Change", in Andrea Ricci (ed.), *From Early Warning to Early Action? The Debate on the Enhancement of the EU's Crisis Response Capability Continues* (Brussels and Luxembourg: European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations/Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009, pp. 387–398).

Albrecht Schnabel, "The Human Security Approach to Direct and Structural Violence", in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 87–96).

Albrecht Schnabel, "Menschliche Sicherheit und Friedensförderung: Perspektivenwechsel und Machtfragen", in Barbara Müller im Gespräch mit Cordula Reimann und Albrecht Schnabel, *security check: Sicherheitsdebatten feministisch durchleuchtet*, cfd-Dossier 2007, cfd-Blatt Nr. 422, 60, Jahrgang (Bern: cfd Christlicher Friedensdienst, 2007, pp. 26–41).

## ANNEX 2: PROJECT PRESENTATIONS

Yves Pedrazzini, “Violence of Urbanization”, lecture at EPFL Doctoral School of Architecture, Lausanne, 6 October 2010.

Yves Pedrazzini, “Architecture, Urbanism and Security: How the Cities Are Built and Destroyed and Built Again”, lectures for ENAC faculty course “Habitat and Urban Development”, EPFL Section of Architecture, Lausanne, 30 September, 11 November and 18 November 2008, 5 October and 7 December 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Security Sector Reform, Security Sector Governance, Human Security and the Ethiopian Context”, presentation at multistakeholder consultation workshop on Operationalizing Human Security, Addis Ababa, 8–9 September 2010.

Ina Amann, “TPP Human Security Analysis in Nepal and Kyrgyzstan”, presentation at multistakeholder consultation workshop on Operationalizing Human Security, Addis Ababa, 8–9 September 2010.

Yves Pedrazzini, “Human Security Analysis in the Urban Context of Caracas”, presentation at multistakeholder consultation workshop on Operationalizing Human Security, Addis Ababa, 8–9 September 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Is Crisis Prevention Possible? Armed Conflict, Human Security and Early Warning and Response Systems”, seminar lecture for Interdisciplinary Programme on Humanitarian Action, University of Geneva and Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Development Studies, Geneva, 27 April 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Priorities for Comprehensive Capacity Building for Regional Arrangements to Address Emerging Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Threats”, presentation at international seminar on “Common Strategy for the Asia Pacific Region: Regional Arrangement for the Emerging Challenges”, Bangkok, 30 March–2 April 2010.

Yves Pedrazzini, “Violences urbaines, violence de l'urbanisation et urbanisme de la peur”, presentation at CFC Gestion des politiques de sécurité urbaine – module: ‘ville et violence: les territoires de la sécession urbaine’, Geneva, 26 March 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Human Security – New Paradigm or the Emperor’s New Clothes?”, keynote address at “Comprehensive Human Security”, Geneva International Model United Nations, Geneva, 16 March 2010.

Yves Pedrazzini, “The Gang of the Barrio: Globalization of a Latin-American Urban Popular Culture”, presentation at “Transnational Latinoamericanisms: Liminal Places, Cultures and Power (T)here”, Institute for Latin American Studies, Columbia University, New York, 3–4 March 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Mainstreaming Human Rights in Responding to the Conflict Cycle: The Role of NGOs”, presentation at seminar on “Human Rights and the Conflict Cycle”, Human Dimension Programme and German Chair in Peace and Conflict Prevention, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, Msida MSD, 12 February 2010.

Albrecht Schnabel, “Towards a Human Security-Based Early Warning and Response System”, presentation at book launch of Hans Günter Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, John Grin, Czesław Mesjasz, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chourou and Heinz Krummenacher (eds), *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Vol. 4 (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2009), swisspeace, Bern, 10 December 2009.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Violence des villes, violence de l'urbanisation et urbanisme de la peur: des projets urbains pour l'environnement détruit", presentation at colloque "Contre le projet urbain, pour des projets urbains!", Société Française des Architectes et CNRS, Paris, 13–14 November 2009.

Albrecht Schnabel, "A Thematic Approach to Human Security", keynote address at UN Day conference on "Comprehensive Human Security – From Theory to Practice", Geneva International Model United Nations and Non-Governmental Liaison Office of United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 23 October 2009.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Is Crisis Prevention Possible? Armed Conflict, Human Security and Early Warning and Response Systems", seminar lecture for Interdisciplinary Programme on Humanitarian Action, University of Geneva and Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Development Studies, Geneva, 26 February 2009.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Human Security and Security Sector Reform", presentation at a consultative workshop on "Security Sector and Constitution Building", International IDEA and Interpeace, Stockholm, 8–10 August 2008.

Albrecht Schnabel, "The Concept of Human Security: Theory and Application", guest lecture at University of Liberia, Monrovia, 26 June 2008.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Urban Violence and Security Policies", presentation at First Symposium ACIS – Association of Colombian Researchers in Switzerland, Lausanne, 17 May 2008.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalising Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect", lecture for course on "International Organisations and Conflict Management", University of Bern, Bern, 14 May 2008.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection in Central America and the Caribbean", presentation at JACS CCA site visit, Autonomous University of Honduras, Tegucigalpa, 24 April 2008.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Das Konzept der menschlichen Sicherheit: Geeignet als europäisches Sicherheitskonzept? [The Concept of Human Security: Appropriate as a European Security Concept]?", presentation at conference "Friedensfähigkeit auf dem Prüfstand: 10 Jahre Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung", Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung & Evangelische Akademie im Rheinland, Haus der Begegnung, Bonn, 4–6 April 2008.

Yves Pedrazzini, "The Social Actors of Human Security and the Urbanism of Fear", presentation at masters course on "Territory Development", Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Barcelona, 31 March 2008.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security: Background, Goals, Experiences", presentation at BICC expert dialogue on "Relevance of 'Human Security' for German Policy", SEF Symposium 2007 on "'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P): Progress, Empty Promise or a Licence for 'Humanitarian' Intervention?", Deutsche Welle, Bonn, 29–30 November 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Towards Systematic, Consultative, Feasible Early Warning Partnerships", presentation at conference "From Early Warning to Early Action: Developing the EU's Response to Crisis and Longer-term Threats", European Commission, Brussels, 12–13 November 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security", presentation at International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 12 October 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Climate Change, Human (In-)Security and Stability", presentation at international conference on "Climate Change and Security", Singapore, 11–12 October 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Human Security", guest lecture for "Swiss Peacebuilding" training course, Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Spiez, 7 September 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Friedenskonsolidierung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften: 'Window of Opportunity' für Konfliktprävention und menschliche Sicherheit", guest lecture for graduate seminar on "Theory and Politics of Security Governance", University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 30 April 2007.

Moges Shiferaw, "Human Security and Property Rights: The Theory and Policy Implications", presented at annual conference of Ethiopian Society of Agricultural Economics, Addis Ababa, 24–25 February 2007.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Teenagers and Schools: Architecture and Security for a New Way of Life?", presentation at Fri-Art, Fribourg, 15 February 2007.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Human Security in Caracas", presentation at Casa del Profesor Universitario, Caracas, 9 February 2007.

Andres Antillano, Yves Pedrazzini and Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalization of Human Security in Caracas", presentation at Andrés Bello Catholic University, Caracas, 6 February 2007.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Human Security in Caracas", presentation at Institute of Penal and Criminological Sciences, Venezuela Central University, Caracas, 1 February 2007.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Human Violence/Urban Security", presentation at Course GLOPP – LASUR Lesson 2 and Course Habitat and Urban Development, ENAC-EPFL, Lausanne, 16 January 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalisierung von Menschlicher Sicherheit", presentation at Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, 4 January 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Krisenprävention und menschliche Sicherheit", guest lecture at course on "Krisenprävention, Staatszerfall, Krisenintervention, Nation-Building", Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften, Hamburg, 3 January 2007.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security", presentation at NGO CAMP Ala-Too, Bishkek, 23 October 2006.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection: Analysis, Monitoring and Mitigation of Existential Threats by and for Local Communities", presentation at JACS CCA Workshop, Mexico City, 3–6 October 2006.

Moges Shiferaw, "Human Security and Economic Security: Linkages and Development Policy Implications", presentation to MA students, Local and Regional Development Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, June 2006.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Les bibliothèques et les incendiaires: la culture face à 'l'insécurité' dans les banlieues", presentation at "Models in Crisis" session of "Demain, la bibliothèque..." workshop, Centenary Congress of Association of French Libraries, Porte de Versailles, Paris, 9–11 June 2006.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Pauvreté, violence et gangs en Amérique du Sud", presentation at international workshop "Bandes de jeunes: des blousons noirs à nos jours", Center for Sociological Research on Rights and Penal Institutions, Paris, 8–10 June 2006.

Albrecht Schnabel, "The World in 2030: Factors and Dynamics of Social and Political Instability", presentation at roundtable on "The World in 2030: Development, Governance, Security", Military Centre for Strategic Studies, Rome, 27–28 April 2006.

Yves Pedrazzini, "Urban Violence: A Crucial Issue for Human Security Research in Latin America", presentation at international workshop "In Search of Human Security for Africa", NCCR North-South and HUSEC/swisspeace, Addis Ababa, 27 February–1 March 2006.

Albrecht Schnabel, "Operationalizing Human Security for Livelihood Protection: Analysis, Monitoring and Mitigation of Existential Threats by and for Local Communities", presentation at JACS Horn of Africa Second Regional Workshop, Bahar Dar, Ethiopia, 21–25 February 2006.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Albrecht Schnabel, “The Security-Development Discourse and the Role of SSR as a Development Instrument”, in Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (eds), *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012, pp. 29–73).





## ANNEX

Worksheet: Threat and Response Analysis

**WORKSHEET: THREAT AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS**

Threat analysis

What is the threat? Who is threatened by whom, when and where? How serious is the threat – is it life threatening? What is the magnitude of the threat – how many people are threatened? Is it a potential future threat or is the threat already being felt? Are there triggers that have helped or might help escalate the threat? What are recognizable symptoms? What are identifiable causes and root causes? If the threat is addressed, what will be the likely outcome? If the threat is not assessed, what will be the likely outcome?

| <b>What is the threat?</b><br>(Name of threat) | <b>Who is threatened?</b><br>(Section of society) | <b>By whom?</b><br>(Source/<br>perpetrator) | <b>Where and when?</b><br>(Location and<br>time/duration) | <b>Life threatening?</b><br>(Threat to survival<br>of individuals?) | <b>How many victims?</b><br>(Numbers, estimates,<br>levels) | <b>Potential and/or actual threat?</b><br>(Threat expected in future or<br>already felt) |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|
|  |   |   |   |   |   |  |
|  |   |   |   |   |   |  |

| <b>Triggers</b><br>(Unexpected events<br>triggering escalation) | <b>Symptoms</b><br>(Visible evidence of<br>the threat) | <b>Root causes</b><br>(Underlying<br>reasons) | <b>How serious is the threat?</b><br>(Credible threat or product of fear) | <b>Good scenario</b><br>(Positive trend if threat<br>is addressed) | <b>Bad scenario</b><br>(Negative trend if threat remains<br>unaddressed) |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|
|   |  |   |   |  |  |
|   |  |   |   |  |  |

Response analysis

- What has been done/is being done/still needs to be done to mitigate and/or address each threat?
- Which mitigation measure has been (or should be) put in place, by whom and directed at whom?
- How feasible or realistic has the measure been/will the measure likely be?
- How effective has the measure been/will the measure likely be in addressing the threat?
- Which indicators have been/could be used to measure the effectiveness of the mitigation measure?

| Name of threat | <b>What has been done and concluded in the past?</b><br>Which mitigation measure? | By whom? | To whom? | Feasibility? | Effectiveness | Indicators |
|----------------|---|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|------------|
|                |   |          |          |              |               |            |

| Name of threat | <b>What is being done now?</b><br>Which mitigation measure? | By whom? | To whom? | Feasibility? | Effectiveness | Indicators |
|----------------|---|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|------------|
|                |   |          |          |              |               |            |

| Name of threat | <b>What needs to be done in the future?</b><br>Which mitigation measure? | By whom? | To whom? | Feasibility? | Effectiveness | Indicators |
|----------------|--|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|------------|
|                |  |          |          |              |               |            |



## Sponsoring Institutions



### National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South

The NCCR North-South is an innovative research programme in the fields of global change and sustainable development. Headquartered in Switzerland and encompassing a robust

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NCCR North-South Management Centre, Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), Institute of Geography, Hallerstrasse 10, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland

[www.north-south.unibe.ch](http://www.north-south.unibe.ch)



**swisspeace**

The Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) is an action-oriented peace research institute with headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. It aims to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts and to enable sustainable conflict transformation. swisspeace is an associated institute of the University of Basel and a member of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences.

swisspeace, Sonnenbergstrasse 17, PO Box, CH-3000 Bern 7, Switzerland

[www.swisspeace.org](http://www.swisspeace.org)

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### EPFL-LaSUR

Situated within the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) and the ENAC Faculty (Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering), the Laboratory of Urban Sociology (LaSUR) researches the social conditions that produce and appropriate cities or territories, collaborating intensively with its partners in engineering and architecture. The LaSUR confronts urban phenomena through the mobility capacities of its actors. In this perspective, the principal research themes are daily mobility, residential history, the dynamics of suburbanization and gentrification, public space and network management.

EPFL-ENAC-INTER-LASUR, Bâtiment BP, Station 16, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

<http://lasur.epfl.ch/>



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### Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. DCAF develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes.

DCAF, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland

[www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

