

The Politics of EU Civilian Interventions and the Strategic Deficit of CSDP

Catriona Gourlay



DCAF
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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)



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Visit us at www.dcaf.ch.

DCAF Brussels Office

Place du Congrès 1
1000 Brussels,
Belgium
Tel: +32 (2) 229 39 66
Fax: +32 (2) 229 00 35

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International Security Information Service, Europe

Rue Archimède, 50
1000 Brussels,
Belgium
Tel: +32 (2) 230 74 46
Fax: +32 (2) 230 6113
email: info@isis-europe.eu

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Executive Summary

This paper provides an overview of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) decision-making relating to civilian CSDP missions to date, focusing on the early political consultation and planning phases. Its conclusions confirm the top-down nature of CSDP. Operations are typically reactive in so far as they require a request for assistance from a host state or International Organisation coupled with leadership from one or more member states – often those holding the EU Presidency. In short, civilian CSDP missions have required internal leadership by a member state in response to external demand.

The paper argues that the criteria of visibility, protecting EU decision-making autonomy, and the strategic benefit to CSDP have been privileged over criteria such as added value and impact in the host state in CSDP decision-making. This political bias privileges autonomous actions and militates against engagement with other institutional actors internal to the EU as well as external to it in the early planning stages. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty reforms will influence the PSC decision-making dynamic, particularly given the end of the rotating Presidency system. It also assesses the extent to which the integration of CSDP institutional structures within the European External Action Service may affect the quality of CSDP decision-making.

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGS	Council General Secretariat
CIVCOM	Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMP	Crisis Management Procedures
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for Development Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
EU COPPS	European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EU HR	European Union High Representative
EU HR/VP	European Union High Representative/Vice President
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPT	European Union Planning Team
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PNC	Police Nationale Congolaise
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UN DPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UN IPTF	United Nations International Police Task Force
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

1. Introduction: The Political Drivers of CSDP

This paper intends to provide insights into the principal drivers behind member states' decisions to launch civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹ missions.² As such it focuses on the early political dialogue that precedes any decision to launch a mission as well as the interaction between the political masters of CSDP—the member states—and other relevant actors. These include actors that introduce requests for assistance and internal actors, notably the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and/or heads of fact-finding missions whose interventions help frame the debate on the political and operational utility of a potential mission. As such, this “reality check” aims to reveal to what extent the inter-governmental decision-making culture of CSDP is linked to political assessments of need and opportunity and is strategically coordinated with other actors.

Writing in 2006, Pedro Serrano, the then Head of DG E IX (then responsible for civilian crisis management planning) in the Council General Secretariat of the EU (now integrated into the External Action Service (EEAS)), reflected on the criteria that should guide a strategic approach to CSDP. He argued that:

Up to now the EU has undertaken the ESDP missions that have been, in some way or another, offered to it, maybe without reflecting sufficiently on the general impact/value of those missions on/for CFSP or, more broadly, on the global political objectives and interests of the EU. (Serrano 2006, 39)

A number of aspects of his assessment are telling. On an empirical level, it points to the essentially reactive nature of CSDP decision-making, whereby proposals are typically introduced to the PSC by a member state, often in response to a request from a ‘third’ state or international organisation. While these reactive processes are common to most crisis management organisations there is, at least in theory, also the possibility that proposals for action are “home grown,” generated through internal political analysis and working groups. Indeed, this is foreseen in the EU crisis management procedures (CMPs). These provide for early-warning information gathered in the Situation Centre to be translated into proposals for action by inter-governmental Council working groups supported by Council Secretariat staff. If ESDP is essentially reactive, however, Serrano rightly notes that any strategic direction must be ensured through the quality of decision-making procedures in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Unlike humanitarian decisions, for instance, which are explicitly guided by the criteria of ‘need,’ there are no established criteria guiding political decisions made by member states in the PSC. A possible exception relates to cooperation with other organisations, whereby the Gothenburg Council in 2001 made reference to four “guiding principles.” These were “visibility, decision-making autonomy, interoperability and added value” (European Council 2001b). The absence of more explicit guidance, Serrano argues, results in decisions that are insufficiently ‘strategic’ (Serrano 2006, 39).

The charge that there is a strategic deficit in crisis management decision-making is not new and is common to a number of crisis management organisations. In the UN context, the Secretary General’s 2001 report *No exit without strategy* first called for a more comprehensive and strategic approach to consolidating security, strengthening political institutions and promoting economic and social reconstruction (United Nations, 2001). More recently, Gowan has shown how the drive since 2001 to promote a more integrated approach to UN operations

¹ The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) changed to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Therefore quotes and references prior to 2009 use the term ESDP. For simplicity, the term CSDP is used through the text, even if it refers to missions which were called ESDP missions at the time.

² For a full list of CSDP missions with a graphic outline of their timelines see Annex 1.

was linked to a strategy-making process (Gowan, 2008: 453). This is reflected in the UN definition of an Integrated Mission as “one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level” (United Nations, 2006: 3). The UN discourse on the need for a more “strategic culture” has therefore been linked to achieving a “context-driven” approach to peace operations in which form follows function.

Whereas calls for more strategic UN actions have been made in relation to impact at country level, Serrano’s critique argues that CSDP is insufficiently strategic in regard to “the global political objectives and interests of the EU.” He thereby suggests that the value of potential CSDP missions be judged on their impact on CFSP rather than their impact on the country in question. This is not to say that Serrano views local impact as unimportant. However, it is revealing that none of the criteria he suggests that PSC decision-makers consider relate to the potential impact of the mission on the country in question. Rather, he argues that missions should be selected on the basis of their ‘fit’ with the key characteristics and types of CSDP mission, bearing in mind resource constraints and privileged regions that are of particular strategic interest for Europe.³

This chapter aims to test to what extent PSC decision-making has reflected these criteria. The hypothesis is that while decision-making has been ‘reactive,’ member states have nevertheless privileged ‘visibility’ and “good for CSDP?” criteria, along with other obvious considerations of how potential interventions serve national interests, over the criteria of value added in decisions regarding potential CSDP engagements.

2. CSDP Police Missions

2.1 EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina

Although civilian CSDP was first developed to address an executive security enforcement gap, the operational development of CSDP began with a succession of non-executive missions designed to strengthen security sector reform processes. This category of missions includes the first police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM). The French introduced the proposal for the mission arguing that it would be a good fit with EU capabilities and geographic interests and an ideal opportunity to launch civilian CSDP. Arguments in favour of the mission included: its feasibility – with a relatively long lead-time for planning, drawing on the experience of the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF); its location – in a geographical priority area (the Western Balkans); and its fit with CSDP capacity building priorities (police). Moreover, its legitimacy was uncontested given that the UN Secretary General had called for regional actors to assume responsibility for the follow-up to the IPTF (United Nations, 2001b). Indeed, in this case the potential importance of the mission as a means of building CSDP trumped other considerations including value added vis-à-vis other actors. Given that the OSCE had declared that it was ready to conduct the mission and had elaborated

³ For example, he argues that in light of limited resources and in order to focus on the scenarios of greatest strategic interest (for the EU) the EU’s engagement should be measured against the potential added value of operating in other competing scenarios and against the potential added value of other actors (Serrano 2006, 40). He also identifies a number of pre-conditions that any potential mission must meet. Firstly, it should capitalize on the overt political pressure that a CSDP intervention can bring. To this end he argues that “ESDP actions should be undertaken when the Council wants to retain the political control and strategic direction ... particularly ... where political pressure from the Council has to be exercised regularly on local actors in order to achieve the desired results” (Serrano, 2006: 41). He notes, furthermore, that CSDP missions will typically have an intrusive and result-oriented mandate where “generally this type of operation cannot be entrusted to private operators” (Serrano, 2006: 41). Finally, Serrano argues that given the EU’s limited resources “preference should be given to short and medium term actions” whereby in those regions where the EU has key interests (such as the Middle East and the Balkans) the EU could consider longer-term engagements.

a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) in 2001, the “added value” of the mission over a potential OSCE mission was questionable.

The UN’s request for a regional actor to take over was important not only for the mission’s legitimacy, but also because it helped generate member state confidence in the feasibility of the proposal. This was in turn reflected by the EU’s early emphasis on continuity with the previous IPTF mission. Although alternative combined civil-military operations had been suggested by the US, the French proposal was keen to pursue the proposals advanced by the UN’s IPTF mission.⁴ Significantly, in order to ensure continuity, Sven Fredericksen who headed the UN’s IPTF mission in its final phase was appointed to the position of leader of the mission’s planning team and later to the Head of Mission position. He successfully argued for a mission mandate that continued the work of the UN IPTF mission. EUPM therefore inherited the same strategic priorities as IPTF although modified the approach in order to increase local participation in the reform process.⁵ In order to further promote continuity, over a quarter of the mission staff (119) were recruited from the IPTF.⁶

2.2 EUPOL Proxima

In contrast with EUPM, the second EU police mission (EUPOL) *Proxima*, which was deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYRoM) from 15 December 2003, had neither the luxury of a long lead-time for planning nor the option of drawing on an established police reform programme. The Head of Mission, General Bart D’Hooge, later commented that although *Proxima* was the second CSDP police mission “it was the first to start from a concept to a fully operational mission” (D’Hooge, 2004). However, the mission was in a symbolic sense a continuation of previous EU engagement, notably of the first CSDP military mission ‘Concordia’ which took over from NATO’s operation Allied Harmony on 31 March 2003 and concluded notably as EU *Proxima* was launched on 15 December 2003. This chronological continuity enabled the EU to frame the mission in terms of a continuation of the EU’s commitment to promoting security in the fYRoM and it enabled the Macedonian authorities to re-frame EU civilian engagement as paving the way for EU accession. While the Macedonian authorities had made it clear that they wanted Concordia out “because it considered the presence of any international peacekeeping force stigmatising” (Ioannides, 2006: 74) they recognized that a uniformed police mission would address the demands of the ethnic Albanians for a visible external police presence and could, more importantly, be framed as contributing to the Europeanisation agenda. It was in this context that the Macedonian authorities introduced a request to the EU, OSCE and US for further support in the area of police in 2003, a request which was transmitted to the PSC via the then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

When the PSC agreed to launch a combined Commission/Council fact-finding mission in early 2003, the debate focused on the potential impact of the mission for the EU and its role in the region rather than on the purpose of the mission. The fact-finding team produced comprehensive list of outstanding weaknesses in the Macedonian police and justice system without

⁴ In 2002 the US had argued that the follow-on from the IPTF should have a military police component to be used as a back-up for local police so as to reduce the demand on NATO’s SFOR (Merlinen and Ostrauskaite, 2006: 152). The French proposal followed suggestions for a civilian police mission made by UNMIBH (UNMIBH, 2001).

⁵ For instance, the mission created a Police Steering Board and working groups in the mission priority areas in which the mission consulted with local police on reform priorities and projects. The mandate of the mission also differed in some respects. For instance, the EUPM did not have the authority to decertify Bosnian police officers.

⁶ The flipside of the close association with the preceding UN mission, however, was that it was difficult, in practice, for the new mission to innovate and distinguish itself from the IPTF’s mandate (Merlinen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 61).

clearly identifying the value added of potential CSDP efforts to address them. This assessment was then translated into a broad mission mandate. The mission's task of translating a broad mandate into concrete short-term actions was complicated by 'overcrowding' in the police aid sector. Given the number of actors—both internal and external to the EU—engaged in the sector “it was simply difficult to find a niche for the newcomer” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 91). This resulted in delays and it was only in July 2004 that the mission began to engage the local police on basis of a clearly defined agenda for action. When the issue of extending the mission mandate was discussed by the PSC in the autumn of 2004, the EU Special Representative, Michael Sahlin, argued successfully that the mission should be extended in a more limited form, addressing a reduced number of issues that were not the subject of other interventions. The subtext of this decision was that the Council and member states

“did not want to withdraw a mission that was widely perceived as having failed to live up to expectations. The idea was that the extension of the mandate and a new head of mission would allow Proxima to get its act together [and] ...transform itself into a success story.” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 97)

When the PSC debated whether to extend or conclude the mission a year later in 2005, the political options for continued CSDP actions were further constrained given the Macedonian authorities' judgment that a CSDP mission was not appropriate for an EU candidate country. The authorities finally agreed—providing that it would not compromise their European perspective—on the deployment of small “Police Advisory Team” (EUPAT), which was to serve a bridging function until the launch of an extensive European Commission police reform programme in mid 2006.

2.3 EUPOL COPPS

EUPOL COPPS involved the extension and re-framing of the activities of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) that had previously been established in April 2005 as part of the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East, Marc Otte. The office was responsible for coordinating EU material and technical assistance requested by the Palestinian Authorities. And prior to the EUSR office, the UK had supported projects which provided similar (coordination of) technical assistance functions. The proposal that EU support should rather take the form of an CSDP mission was introduced by the UK during its Presidency and announced at a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in July 2005. This decision to transform existing police support efforts into a CSDP mission was driven by considerations of promoting the visibility of the EU's support – both vis-à-vis the US and the local authorities with the rationale that this would, in turn, strengthen the EU's influence with both parties. The decision was also motivated by an interest to extend operational CSDP to a priority geographical area for the EU. Hence, although this mission reflected a widely held political consensus among member states in favour of EU police support to the Palestinian Authorities, the decision to frame this support in terms of a CSDP operation was clearly informed by its perceived value for the development of CSDP and the promotion of the EU's visibility in the region. While the Commission supported the mission's mandate to support police capacity-building, it argued against a broader mandate on the grounds that judicial assistance could be better provided by other actors.

2.4 EUPOL Kinshasa

The EU police mission in the DRC was the first civilian CSDP mission in Africa. It was designed to establish, equip and train an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) tasked with protecting the transition institutions, in accordance with the Sun City peace agreement of 2002 and the Memorandum on Security and the Army of 2003. Although the establishment of IPUs was

originally conceived as an integrated alternative to military guards, it soon became apparent that the leaders of the transition authorities wanted to maintain their separate, loyal militia or “military guards.” The role of the IPU therefore shifted to providing security for the nascent institutions of the DRC. This meant that the establishment of the IPU did not directly affect existing armed bodies. This had the benefit of ensuring that the establishment of the IPU was relatively uncontroversial, but it also did little to address rebel groups in Kinshasa. EUPOL was established in April 2005 after EC assistance had provided material assistance in preparation of the deployment.

The genesis of the EUPOL mission resulted from a ‘model’ process of EU-UN cooperation. The EU and UN shared the strategic priority of securing the transition to democracy and the mission was conceived of in cooperation with the UN and the transitional government. This involved a pragmatic, joint assessment of how the EU could best help address some of the most strategic gaps in security. More precisely, in 2003, the objectives of the international community in the DRC were aligned with the goal of successfully implementing the ‘Sun City’ power-sharing peace deal – the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and the March 2003 Memorandum on Security and the Army. In relation to Police, MONUC was indirectly engaged at the operational level of the *Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC)* and took the lead in efforts to build its capacity, including through a number of “train the trainers” and specialised training programmes.⁷ In 2003, MONUC was not, however, in a position to provide the training, equipment and monitoring required for the specialist Integrated Police Units foreseen in the Sun City Agreement. Training and equipment of specialised, ‘elite’ police units clearly required support from other actors. Hence, the UN had previously welcomed the bi-lateral interventions of Angola and France in training Rapid Reaction Police in Kinshasa and encouraged the EU to play a complementary role in training the Integrated Police Unit that was to be dedicated to securing state-institutions. The idea for this EU mission was first raised in 2003 in a meeting of the *Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT)*. This was a mechanism agreed at Sun City that comprised the transition government and international actors and effectively enabled the key international donors “to steer the domestic political process in the DRC” (Keane, 2007: 220). The proposal resulted from discussions between the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General William Swing, the EC Head of Delegation and the representative of the EU Presidency. Therefore, as with the first EU military mission in DRC—*Artemis*—the EU’s first civilian CSDP mission in Africa was generated in response to a request from the UN, although in this case the request was informal and first discussed at field level rather than between capitals. Formally, the EU mission was launched in response to an invitation from the Congolese authorities, and this also served as its legal base.

In Brussels, the mission’s mandate to build police capacity to secure the nascent democratic institutions of the DRC was also relatively clear, limited and uncontroversial with member states. The French served as champions of the idea within the PSC, while the Secretary General/High Representative Solana ‘sold’ the idea as evidence of the continued EU commitment, following *Artemis*, to providing security in the DRC and supporting the political transition process. The PSC agreed to support the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in December 2003. However, pre-planning of the mission was not entirely smooth. The Commission argued in favour of a small “Commission mission,” using contracted agents managed by the Commission with long-term involvement, while the Council preferred a more robust but shorter intervention in line with the “crisis management approach” (Hoebeke, Carette and

⁷ From January 2005, the focus of the MONUC police training effort was on securing the 2006 election. To this end it provided basic training to 50,000 territorial officers, in conjunction with efforts supported by a UNDP-managed \$48 million fund to provide the equipment and training to secure the election process.

Vlassenroot 2007). The compromise was a sequenced multi-phase operation rather than an integrated effort.

2.5 EUPOL Afghanistan

The EU's CSDP mission to Afghanistan was politically contentious from its inception, reflecting the broad spectrum of the member states actual (military and civilian) engagement in Afghanistan. The proposal that the EU consider a CSDP mission was first actively considered by Finland in the context of the preparations for their Presidency, in response to mounting pressure by EU member states, notably the UK, that more be done to support the international stabilization effort in Afghanistan. Since 2002 the lead EU actor in police training in Afghanistan was Germany which led international efforts to train the Afghan police through the German Police Project Office. Although the potential EU mission, which was to build on the German-led engagement, was internally contested within Germany, by 2006 Germany had bought into the idea and in July the PSC agreed to send an exploratory assessment mission. Its report to the PSC in October proved, however, to be unconvincing. It was supposed to identify the strategic impact of a potential mission, but Council officials and member states were not persuaded by any of the three possible planning scenarios that the assessment mission identified. While this in part reflected divergent interests in the political value of engaging in Afghanistan in general, some officials identified the "poor quality" of the respective proposals as a key factor. Others stated less critically that the proposals were not fully developed. Pressure for the EU to act mounted following the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006 at which NATO amplified earlier US calls for greater EU engagement. This prompted a second round of planning with another CSDP fact-finding mission sent to Afghanistan in December 2006 to develop one of the three initial proposals. CIVCOM's discussion of the mission's report fed into the Council General Secretariat's draft Crisis Management Concept, which was approved by EU ministers in February 2007. Despite reports that a number of member states remained unconvinced of the added value of the mission (Gya, 2007: 2) the Joint Action authorizing an initial complement of 160 personnel was agreed in May 2007.

The start-up of the Afghanistan mission was beset with delays. Some of these were political, including a delay in the Afghan authorities formal invitation of the mission because of disagreements over strategy and immunity for mission personnel (Gya and Jacquemet, 2008: 3).⁸ Others related to EU capabilities, especially the ability of EU member states to attract and train candidates for the mission.⁹ There have also been a number of operational challenges, often linked to how the EUPOL relates to and is supported by the International Security Assistance Force Provincial Reconstruction Teams for logistics and protection. What began as technical challenges, however, became increasingly strategic and political. The US and some member states, notably the UK, argued against EUPOL's longer-term approach to police capacity building at the strategic level in favour of an approach offering police short courses of hostile environment training. The UK also initially proposed that the mission include a counter-narcotics element.

It was against this backdrop and after President Karzai and the US called for the EU to step up its support for the Afghan police in June 2008 that the PSC revisited the question of the mission's mandate. A number of member states argued that the mission had failed and that the EU should exit, while others argued for increased engagement but in line with the US approach to police training. The third, and ultimately successful option was to step up the EU's

⁸ As of June 2008, the mission still had no legal basis since no Status of Mission Agreement was signed with the Afghan authorities.

⁹ As of June 2008, and despite 12 calls for force generation, only 156 of the 231 authorized posts had been filled.

commitment, building on the mission's existing approach. Hence, in May 2008 EU Foreign Ministers declared that the Mission was to double in size. This compromise reflected Germany and France's interest in reinforcing the existing operation and the CSDP approach. Significant internal drivers included competitive pressure to demonstrate the utility of the CSDP approach, which, in turn, was closely linked to considerations of protecting national reputation by those member states that were most engaged in the operation, in particular Germany.

3. CSDP Rule of Law Missions

3.1 EUJUST Themis in Georgia

Unlike the previous police missions, the EU's first 'strengthening' mission in the priority area of "Rule of Law," EUJUST Themis in Georgia was introduced by member state representatives to CIVCOM rather than the PSC. The idea was first raised informally by Estonia in December 2003 and then formally introduced by Lithuania to CIVCOM which subsequently tabled the suggestion that the EU begin pre-planning through the launch of a fact-finding mission. The discussions within CIVCOM and the PSC were reflected in the Council's background documents. These noted that the rationale for the mission was to send a clear political signal to the Georgian leadership about EU support for its reform agenda. They also stressed that the mission was "a good opportunity to test civilian crisis management capabilities in the field of rule of law, in a relatively stable area, with a small-scale mission" (European Council, 2005). In addition, in discussions in CIVCOM, Baltic member states in particular stressed that the mission would be an important test for EU relations with Russia (Helly, 2006: 91). This was, in turn, an important part of the Georgian leadership's interest in the mission. Following a written request for assistance, a Georgian Minister made the case for the mission directly in the PSC. For the EU, the importance of the mission as an opportunity to further 'test' CSDP was reflected in the EU High Representative's statement to the Georgian authorities at the launch of the mission: "I am very pleased that the third civilian ESDP operation—and the first in the field of Rule of Law—is opening today in Tbilisi. EUJUST THEMIS is a milestone for the EU and for you" (European Council, 2004).

3.2 EUJUST LEX Iraq

Discussions in the PSC over a potential civilian mission for Iraq were controversial. Some of those present have characterized the discussions as "a proxy for a debate on Iraq" (Gourlay and Monaco, 2005). Political pressure to "do something" in Iraq came from those member states that had actively supported the war effort, notably the UK and the Dutch, just as those that had argued against the invasion, notably France, were most resistant to the idea. The early discussions of the potential mission thereby closely mirrored member states' various levels of engagement in the war effort. Support for the mission increased greatly, however, after the fact-finding mission proposed an operation 'for' Iraq, but not in it, given security concerns linked to operating in Iraq. The fact-finding mission proposed a small staff in Iraq to identify suitable Iraqi candidates that would participate in rule of law training, mostly in Europe, by member states. Many member states that had not supported the war, including Germany, were keen to support such a civilian mission, also because a CSDP mission for Iraq was seen as an important milestone in healing rifts in the EU over Iraq and re-building what was widely perceived as a broken CFSP. In this case, therefore, CSDP decision-making was itself a form of internal crisis management and reconciliation. Indeed, a number of those interviewed stressed the importance of the mission for CSDP over its operational value.

3.3 EULEX Kosovo

It is in Kosovo that CSDP faced its biggest operational challenge with the largest and most ambitious civilian CSDP operation, EULEX Kosovo, which conducts a mix of executive and supportive tasks in the area of police, justice and customs. It is also the mission with the longest lead-time and biggest planning team. Although pre-planning for this mission dates back to 2005 and a robust planning team—the EU Planning Team (EUPT) was deployed to Pristina in April 2006 to help design the EU mission that was intended to follow-on from the UN—the EU only took over the majority of UNMIK’s mandate in late 2008. Moreover, while EULEX is operational there has been no formal transition in so far that EULEX still operates under the legal ‘umbrella’ of UNMIK. The Kosovo case therefore also represents the lengthiest, most complicated and most incomplete ‘transition’ from a UN to an EU mission.

Ambassadors to the PSC had discussed Kosovo on a number of occasions in 2005, and there was broad consensus that the EU should play a leading role in efforts to build Kosovo’s self-governance capacity post settlement. It was, however, already evident that there were a wide range of views within EU member states on the status issue and public pronouncements on a possible future civilian presence stressed that contingency planning would not prejudice the outcome of the talks. After the Ahtisaari status talks began, it was agreed that the EU should deploy a sizable planning team (EUPT) to explore the design of a potential CSDP mission covering the rule of law and possible other areas based on the assumption that the Ahtisaari talks would conclude in December 2006. A Joint Action authorizing the EUPT was agreed in April 2006. The EUPT initially consisted of 30 staff, including member state experts in police and justice.

The EULEX mission was planned on the assumption that the transition from UNMIK to EULEX would be authorized by a new UN Security Council resolution, providing a clear legal framework for an EU operation which was designed to support state-building rather than execute the functions of a state, as UNMIK had been authorized to by the UNSC Resolution 1244 of 1999. Not only did these negotiations take longer than initially envisaged but they were inconclusive in so far that they did not result in an agreement, but rather a UN Special Envoy ‘recommendation’ for conditional independence for Kosovo and a “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (the Ahtisaari Plan). Since neither of these options was acceptable to Serbia and its ally Russia, they did not form the basis for a new UN Security Council resolution that would have paved the way for the transition to EULEX. Neither did Kosovo’s subsequent unilateral Declaration of Independence in February 2008 clarify the situation. Rather, it divided the international community, including the EU, and increased tensions over whether and on what basis the EU could take over the operational functions of UNMIK. Since the EU role in Kosovo had been planned on the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan for conditional independence it was not considered “status neutral.” Indeed, in his 15 July 2008 report to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon acknowledged that there is no “status neutral” option if Pristina wants UNMIK to go and Belgrade wants UNMIK to stay. Likewise, where Belgrade wants EULEX out and Pristina wants EULEX in, no matter how the mission defines itself, it is not perceived as status neutral. Therefore the EULEX mission was jeopardised in so far as it was seen as a party to the conflict over Kosovo’s status. This not only delayed operationalisation, while the UN negotiated a plan to ‘re-configure’ UNMIK’s role and provide a new legal framework for EULEX, but fuelled fears that EULEX would not be able to deploy in the Serbian North of Kosovo. With hindsight, therefore, the EU and UN planning assumptions appear naïve and the case reveals that the EU and UN do not always share common purpose and strategy upon which effective operational partnerships depend. By the same token, however, it demonstrates that despite substantial differences within the EU over the issue of Kosovo’s status, the EU nevertheless managed to

maintain sufficient political will to launch and sustain the EU's largest civilian mission in a region that was accepted by all EU members as a strategic priority for the EU.

4. CSDP Monitoring Missions

4.1 Aceh Monitoring Mission

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) differed from previous civilian CSDP missions in a number of respects. It was the first CSDP 'monitoring' mission, and thereby did not have a capacity-building role. Nor was it typically 'civilian' in nature in so far as it deployed principally military personnel to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, particularly those aspects that related to disarmament and demobilization.¹⁰ The genesis of the mission also differed from other CSDP missions since the proposal was not the result of a request from a member state, a 'host' country or an International Organisation. Rather, it was introduced via direct talks between the former Finnish President Ahtisaari, acting in his capacity as the Chair of the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), with the UK Presidency and the EU High Representative, Javier Solana. These took place during CMI's mediation of the peace agreement, which was supported by the Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism. Ahtisaari later also played a critical persuasive role in PSC deliberations (Grevi, 2005; Gourlay, 2006: 22), convincing member states who questioned whether an EU action in Asia was appropriate given the EU's geographical priorities. Others have also identified the skillful chairing and support of the UK Presidency as well as indications that the mission could rely on deployments from ASEAN countries as key factors in the decision to launch the AMM.

4.2 EU BAM Rafah

CSDP's second monitoring mission monitored the Palestinian-controlled border crossing point between Gaza and Egypt, and, more specifically, how the Palestinian Authorities implement the agreed principles for border crossing set out in the "Agreement on Movement and Access." This was signed on 15 November 2004 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and included the proposal, introduced by the US, that its compliance be monitored by a "Third Party." The EU High Representative (EU HR) Solana and the UK Presidency argued successfully in the PSC that the EU should take on the mission given the EU's strategic interest in the Middle East. This followed informal discussions between the HR, the Palestinian Authority and Israel and is a case where the EU was pro-active rather than reactive in so far as the HR played a key role in instigating and arguing for the proposal. The operational phase of the mission began on 30 November 2005 with the deployment of twenty international staff. The Rafah crossing point was last opened with the presence of EUBAM Rafah on 9 June 2007. Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip the mission has been suspended.

4.3 EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine

The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine) is an example of further opportunism and innovation in monitoring missions. As with other border missions, it is a non-executive mission, aiming to provide technical capacity-building assistance to Moldova and Ukraine and build confidence through activities to monitor the border along the Transnistrian region of Moldova. Although the approach and activities are similar to CSDP missions, EUBAM is not technically a CSDP mission. Its legal basis is a

¹⁰ Although the mission's mandate authorized monitoring of human rights as well as disarmament and demobilization, the mission focused mostly on the latter ostensibly, according to the Head of Mission Pieter Feith, for lack of appropriate capacity in the former.

Memorandum of Understanding between the two governments and the European Commission and it was initially financed by the Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism¹¹ (rather than the CFSP budget) although, as in other CSDP operations, member states seconded personnel to it. Discussions about a potential mission were initiated by a joint letter sent on 2 June 2005 by the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine to both the EU High Representative Solana and European Commission (EC) President Barroso. This called for additional EU support for capacity building for border management for the whole Moldova-Ukraine border as well as "an international customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring mechanism on the Transnistrian segment..."¹² It followed earlier efforts by the EC to foster bilateral cooperation on border management in line with the commitments made by both countries in their respective European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans or Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with the EU. As with the Aceh Monitoring Mission, although this mission followed actions supported by the EC, PSC discussion were not triggered by a proposal from the EC directly. Rather, they were triggered by external requests for assistance, in this case from two host countries following their preparatory discussions with the EC.

Both the EC and the High Representative advocated that the PSC respond positively to the request and argued that the request represented a unique opportunity to address the Transnistrian "frozen conflict" and to reduce illicit flows of drugs and weapons and human trafficking. The joint fact-finding mission dispatched in August subsequently proposed a mission mandate that corresponded to the request. Discussions within the PSC focused more on the form of the mission than its content. Some member states argued that, given the EC lead and technical nature of the mission, it should be an EC project rather than an EC-led EU 'mission.' Others, however, stressed that given its functional equivalence to other CSDP missions, and the political benefit of a highly visible presence for confidence-building along the Transnistrian border, it should have the form of an EU mission. These arguments were ultimately convincing and after Moldova and Ukraine formally agreed to the mandate and tasks of the mission in October 2005, the PSC agreed to launch the mission in November 2005, authorizing 19 core international staff paid by the Commission and 50 seconded experts.

The non-CSDP status of the mission was reflected in subsequent mission planning and implementation. Although the mission used the key CSDP planning documents and procedures from Concept of Operations to Operational Plan, these were prepared by the EC rather than the CGS planning staff. Nor was the CGS responsible for mission support and the CSDP decision-making bodies such as CIVCOM had no oversight authority over the mission.¹³ Rather than being a CSDP mission, EUBAM is more properly described as a hybrid EC-UN mission. This is because the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as the "implementing partner" for the mission, providing logistical and administrative support. EUBAM is therefore arguably the first integrated EU-UN mission, albeit in a non-traditional and unforeseen sense, whereby the mission is not a CSDP mission and the UN partner is not DPKO, but rather the EC's principal partner in crisis contexts – the UNDP.

4.4 EUMM Georgia

The political decision to launch the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia was taken in the Extraordinary European Council on 1 September 2008. The French Presidency of the EU introduced the proposal for a mission to monitor stabilization and the implementation of the six-point Agreement brokered by French President Sarkozy. The mission is thereby mandated to monitor 'normalization,' including the return of internally displaced persons, and is intended

¹¹ Thereafter it was funded by the Commission's TACIS programme.

¹² Copy of letter in author's possession.

¹³ Although the EC regularly briefed CIVCOM on progress.

to build confidence between the parties. The relatively rapid deliberations between the beginning of the conflict on 7 August 2008 and the decision to launch a monitoring mission on 1 September 2008 were characterized by strong political leadership by France backed by widespread support to ‘do something’ among member states, with little time for reflection on operational options. The political imperative for a rapid and highly visible response left little space or time for the consideration of operational alternatives based on needs assessments, impact analysis and/or synergies with other international activities, including by the UN and OSCE. The UN and OSCE were not consulted in early pre-planning discussions and no consideration was given to strengthening the role of the then existing border support team of the EUSR (EUSR BST/South Caucasus), established in September 2005 to develop contacts in the conflict regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with a view to preparing future conflict resolution actions.¹⁴ Nevertheless, while the mission was explicitly an autonomous one, its mandate stated that it was to work in close coordination with the OSCE mission, operational in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict since 1992, and the UN mission, active in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict since 1993. Although clearly driven by the French and initially with indications of support from only five EU member states, support from member states grew in large part because of the mission’s symbolic significance. It is one of the few EU missions in which offers of material assistance (vehicles) and personnel exceeded expectations and initial planning assumptions.

5. CSDP Security Sector Reform Missions

5.1 EUSEC RD Congo

Unlike the EU police mission in the DRC, EUPOL Kinshasa, the mandate of the EUSEC RD Congo mission was broader and more politically intrusive. Its objective was to assist in the reform of the defence sector by providing assistance for the creation of the new integrated Congolese army, the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC). Also, unlike EUPOL, the idea for the mission did not originate in-theatre and in close cooperation with the UN, but rather was the product of a French-Belgium initiative, in the form of a joint non-paper transmitted to the PSC in late 2004. More precisely, the initiative was led by the Belgian Foreign Ministry who felt that an EU mission would not only have more legitimacy than on-going Belgian bi-lateral efforts, but might also help mobilise additional European assistance for Security Sector Reform (SSR). Although the idea was not supported by the Ministry of Defence in Belgium, which preferred the bi-lateral approach, the Foreign Ministry ‘won the day’ after securing the support of the French.

Within the DRC, reform of the security sector in line with the ambition agreed in 2003 to create 18 integrated professional brigades, had been contested and fraught with delays (Keane, 2007; Hoebeke et al., 2007; Onana and Taylor, 2008; Dahrendorf, 2008). There were a number of difficulties in implementing the *brassage* (or mixing) process that involved the mixing and integration of various former warring parties from across the DRC territory into new integrated brigades. For instance, although the DDR process was conceived as an entirely voluntary process, this was compromised by Congolese transition leaders’ insistence on imposing an inflated quota system for army integration in order to maintain their leverage within a partisan national army. This spurred continued and often forced recruitment of new combatants (Onana and Taylor, 2008: 505). While this Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) effort was problematic, it was relatively well financed through the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. In contrast, support for efforts to build army capacity was limited. One of the few efforts that existed in 2004 was the Belgian initiative to train the first integrated brigade in Kisangani “Operation Avenir,” with the

¹⁴ The EUSR BST finished on 28 February 2011.

support of France and Luxembourg. Frustrated by the slow progress, the Belgians persuaded the French to support the EUSEC RD Congo idea on the assumption that it would generate greater EU assistance and enhance EU political leverage on issues related to SSR.

The mission, as it was originally conceived, was small in terms of human resources – an advisory mission with a team of eight experts, but its scope and political ambition were large. The EU Joint Action of 2 May 2005 mentioned that the mission provide “technical expertise” on command and control, budgetary and financial management, training, accountancy and dealing with contracts and tenders (European Council, 2005b). The eight experts were to be seconded to the private office of the Minister of Defence, the general military staff, including the Integrated Military Structure, the staff of the land forces, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER), and the Joint Operation Committee.

Although EUSEC RD Congo was established following an official request by the DRC government and, indeed, the letter of invitation forms the legal basis for the mission, the letter arrived “at the last possible moment” after ‘difficult’ discussions. From its inception therefore, the sensitivity of the mission’s mandate has meant that cooperation with the host-government could not be assumed. Similarly, internal fragmentation even within the Belgian government—the sponsor of the mission—suggested that the buy-in of some of the key European states was uncertain.

5.2 EU SSR Guinea Bissau

The proposal that the EU should provide support, in the framework of CSDP, to Guinea Bissau was introduced to the PSC by the Portuguese EU Presidency in 2007. The Portuguese pointed to the historic window of opportunity presented by the government’s elaboration of a National Security Strategy and request, in 2006, for international assistance in its implementation. It stressed the strategic relevance of the mission to EU security interests, given that Guinea Bissau had become a drug trafficking hub and was in danger of becoming a narco-state if a reform programme was not pursued. Moreover, the EU Presidency noted that the mission would be a good ‘fit’ and test for the new EU SSR concept¹⁵ and integrated approach to planning in so far as it could field a range of civilian and military experts dealing with military, police and judicial reforms. Within the PSC, the EU Presidency received support for the idea from the UK, which was also an active member of the “Friends of Guinea-Bissau Group,” and the PSC agreed to send a fact-finding mission (FFM) in May. The FFM received encouragement for an EU intervention from army and civilian leadership in Guinea Bissau. The decision to launch an EU SSR mission in the framework of CSDP was made in November 2007. Following the receipt of a formal letter of invitation, the Joint Action authorising a 12 month mission comprising 15 military and civilian advisors was agreed in February 2008 (European Council 2008).

Despite the enthusiastic response that the FFM had received, the Head of Mission, Spanish General Estaban Verastegui, and his advance team were not welcomed by the armed forces they were supposed to assist when they arrived in April 2008. As Reuters reported, Verastegui said his overtures to win the confidence of military chiefs, including the armed forces head General Batista Tagme Na Wai, had encountered some suspicion. “They don’t really understand why we’re here, they think we’ve come to tell them what to do,” Verastegui told Reuters (Fletcher, 2008). Similarly, the mission was planned without consulting key international actors, including SSR advisory teams from the Commission and EU member states (the UK) and the local UN team UNOGBIS. Given that any serious reform efforts would require

¹⁵ For an overview of the EU’s SSR policies and practice, see Bloching, 2011.

significant material resources from the international community as well as political buy-in from all interested parties, the political groundwork for the mission was arguably ill-prepared. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Council ‘warned’ in June 2008 that the success of SSR in Guinea Bissau (and the EU’s mission there) would depend on local political will and international funding. However, support to extend the mission was not forthcoming¹⁶ and it was terminated on 30 September 2010.

5.3 EUPOL RD Congo

Although often described as an evolution of EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL RD Congo, launched in July 2007, was a separate mission with a distinct and broader mandate to support the reform of the whole police force *Police Nationale Congolaise* (PNC) and to strengthen its relationship with the justice sector. It is therefore categorised here as a Security Sector Reform mission. The perception of continuity is based on the fact that EUPOL RD Congo followed-on directly from EUPOL Kinshasa and was initially led by the same Head of Mission. The mission is headquartered in Kinshasa and initially focused on supporting the work of the police reform monitoring committee (Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police, CSRP). The new mission was conceived collaboratively, during consultations between the Head of Mission for EUPOL Kinshasa and the French and Belgian capitals. The idea was introduced to the PSC by Belgium with the support of France.

In 2008 the mission’s mandate was revised to include technical support to the PNC in the areas of Border Police and the Audit Police Service. It also opened up an office in Goma, North Kivu and Bukavu, South Kivu, to support the implementation of the January 2008 Goma agreements between the government and various groups operating in the Kivus. Despite reservations from a number of member states who questioned the mission’s value for money and highlighted the lack of government support for the police reform process, the expansion of the mission’s mandate was successfully championed by Belgium and France within the PSC in 2008 and, again, in 2010.

6. Conclusions on the Supply-side Politics of EU Civilian Missions

Given that the pre-planning phases of CSDP missions are shrouded in secrecy, this attempt at a “reality check,” which is based principally on interviews with a selection of officials who were privy to discussions in the PSC and CIVCOM, has obvious limitations. It does not capture the full complexity of different member states motivations and the interaction between member states in producing CSDP decisions by consensus. Nor does it reflect the real-time linkage between missions, whereby, for instance, member states trade support for operations that they are not that interested in for support for operations in which they have a strong interest. For example, support for EU missions for Iraq and in the DRC involved informal deals between the UK and France, guaranteeing reciprocal support.

Officials also attest to the impact of the (former) EU Presidency dynamic on CSDP decision-making. Countries that are soon to hold the EU Presidency are said to be more compliant and less obstructive within the PSC on the basis that this will help them secure support during their EU Presidency. In the words of one official “objections tend not to come from countries sitting on the right of the chair” (i.e. countries that are next in line to hold the EU Presidency).

¹⁶ For an account of the termination of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau see Bloching 2010.

Figure 1. Source of initial request and proposal for civilian CSDP missions.

([×] A check in brackets indicates a relatively less critical role in initiating inter-governmental discussions on the proposal.)

Mission code name and country	External driver			Internal driver		
	Host state	International organisation	Non-state actor	EU member state(s)	The HR/SG	EC support
EUPM Bosnia Herzegovina		×		× (France)		
EUPOL Proxima FYROM	×	×			×	
EUJUST Themis Georgia	×			× (Baltic states)		-
EUPOL Kinshasa DRC	×	×		× (France/Belgium)		+/-
EUSEC DR Congo				× (France/Belgium)		
EUJUST LEX Iraq				× (UK, NL)		-/+
AMIS EU Supporting Action		×		× (UK Presidency)		
AMM Aceh			×	× (UK Presidency)	×	
EU BAM Rafah	×			× (UK Presidency)	×	
EU BAM Ukraine-Moldova						+
EUPOL COPPS Palestine	× (PA)			× (UK Presidency)	×	+/-
EUPT/EULEX Kosovo		×		×	×	
EUPOL RD Congo				× (Belgium/France)		
EUPOL Afghanistan	×			× (Finnish and German Presidencies)		-
EU SSR Guinea Bissau	[×]			× (Portuguese Presidency and UK)		
EUMM Georgia	[×]			× (French Presidency)		

Nor does the above overview capture the data about proposals for operations that were not ultimately translated into action. A review of the agendas of PSC meetings confirms that contingency plans were discussed in relation to a number of situations including in Haiti, Lebanon, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh. While it is beyond the scope of this study to reveal why these potential interventions were judged not to be feasible, interviews reveal that considerations of “added value” were critical in some cases. For instance, while an autonomous EU operation in Lebanon was considered in 2006, it was decided to deploy in the context of a UN operation (UNIFIL II) because this was viewed as more politically acceptable. Similarly, it was decided that an EU intervention would provide limited added value to UN and US-led efforts to assist with post-Earthquake recovery in Haiti.

Despite the limited data set it is, however, possible to offer some observations and tentative conclusions about the key drivers and factors that have shaped CSDP decision-making.

To further assess the role of the EU Presidency in generating political momentum for CSDP missions as well as Serrano’s 2006 claim that CSDP decision-making is essentially reactive, Figure 1 above provides an overview of the source of the initial proposal to consider each civilian CSDP mission. It suggests that CSDP missions are reactive in so far as the majority of CSDP missions have been triggered by requests for assistance from the governments of affected states or international organizations engaged in crisis management. Although an invitation of the host nation or authorization by the UN Security Council are formal conditions for civilian CSDP missions and form a critical source of their legitimacy, this table is not intended simply to indicate the legal basis of the mission. In some cases, for example EUSEC in DRC, in which a letter of invitation constitutes the legal basis of the mission, the mission was clearly not triggered by a host-nation request. Indeed, in this and a number of other cases, the formal invitation is received “at the last minute.” Moreover, in some cases, such as EUPOL Afghanistan, a mission goes ahead without a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the government. The absence of a formal request by the Afghan authorities delayed the launch of the mission and, in the absence of a SOMA, the legal basis of the mission remains the Joint Action and an exchange of letters with the Afghan authorities.

Figure 1 also makes clear that internal leadership or ‘champions’ are required for external requests to be translated into a proposal for member states to consider. In other words, CSDP decision-making is pro-actively reactive, requiring in most cases high-level leadership from one or more member states. In the sixteen civilian missions reviewed above, the EU Presidency (UK, Finnish, Portuguese and French) played a critical leadership role in securing the decision to launch the mission in half the cases (8 missions). This highlights the importance of the former rotating EU Presidency as a source of political will in the area of CSDP. Indeed, some officials argue that the political activism of the EU Presidency in the area of CSDP has been linked to the desire of member states holding the EU Presidency to demonstrate tangible political accomplishments during their term. They argue that the steady stream of new missions (one or two missions during each EU Presidency)—up until the beginning of 2010 when the Lisbon Treaty changes began to come into effect—can be partly explained by the ‘traditionally’ pro-active role of the EU Presidency. This, in turn, begs the question of whether the implementation of Lisbon Treaty reforms which replace the rotating EU Presidency with a permanent President, will result in a less active CSDP, with member states not driven by the occasional significant combination of pressure and opportunity to “make their mark” during their short turn at the helm.

Conversely, and unlike military CSDP, the overview suggests that while the UK and France have been important drivers of civilian missions, a number of smaller member states have played a critical role in initiating civilian missions, notably the Baltic States in the case of EUJUST Themis and Portugal in Guinea Bissau. These missions therefore reflect national

geographical interests and point to the critical ‘opportunity’ that the EU Presidency system presented to member states to shape CSDP priorities.

The above overview also points to the role of the former High Representative/Secretary General in transmitting requests for assistance from other international organizations. Approximately one third of EU civilian missions were triggered by a request from another international organization, and in one case (AMM) – a non-governmental actor. By the same token, the historical review does not indicate that the former High Representative Solana was himself a critical ‘champion’ for CSDP mission. While Solana was clearly enthusiastic about CSDP interventions, and was deeply engaged in preparing some of them, such as EU BAM Rafah and the Aceh Monitoring Mission, this review does not suggest that the role of the High Representative was critical to initiating or gaining approval for the vast majority of missions. This, in turn, suggests that current fears within the EU’s crisis management structures that the new HR/VP Ashton’s relative lack of engagement constitutes a death blow for CSDP are overstated. Just as was the case for past CSDP missions, CSDP still requires that member states champion new initiatives.

It is also striking that no proposals for CSDP missions have resulted from assessments undertaken at the working-level in the European Commission or Council Secretariat, possibly with the exception of the EC-led EU BAM Moldova mission, which is technically not a CSDP operation. Similarly, in only one case, EU JUST *Themis*, was the proposal for a mission first introduced by member states in CIVCOM rather than at Ambassadorial level in the PSC. This informs the widespread impression amongst officials that CSDP decision-making is essentially top-down and that proposals for new missions “cascade down” to the Council working committees and General Secretariat. Conversely, it confirms the political difficulty of using CSDP as a tool of conflict prevention. Even if internal risk assessments and analysis across the EU institutions suggest a need and opportunity for preventive engagements, translating this into a proposal for the PSC requires member state sponsorship which is often difficult in the absence of an overt crisis.

In short, this chapter supports Serrano’s observation that CSDP is reactive in so far as CSDP decisions do not build on internal procedures which are meant to translate early-warning to early (proposals for) action. Nor are they typically linked-in to conflict analysis, needs assessments and planning processes of other actors, including those within the EU, which aim to identify gaps and opportunities for action. The exception of the Aceh Monitoring Mission appears to prove this rule in so far that the suggestion for a CSDP mission was introduced through high-level contacts between former President Ahtisaari and the HR/SG and the UK Presidency, rather than through the EC, which had financed the peace talks or the Council early warning mechanisms. Similarly, there is relatively little evidence of early consultations with external actors—notably the UN—in the political, pre-planning phase of civilian operations. Only in the cases where the EU is taking over from UN missions (EUPM and EUPT/EULEX) were there extensive consultations at an early stage. Of the cases where EU civilian missions were deployed in countries in which the UN had active missions (the DRC, Afghanistan, and Georgia), the only mission that was significantly shaped by early consultations with the UN (in-country) was the first EU police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa. This suggests that CSDP decision-making has often privileged the principle of “decision-making autonomy” over the principle of “added value” and the EU’s strategic preference for “effective multilateralism.” It also highlights the dominance of internal political drivers over considerations of external coherence of action.

By the same token, the above analysis reveals that PSC decision-making is not strategic vis-à-vis intended impact on the ground. There is little evidence to suggest that the pre-planning phase, including the work of fact-finding missions, provided strategic guidance based on

context and conflict analysis to inform analysis of the added value of the mission. Rather, the pre-planning methodology was technical in its approach – seeking to take stock of institutional weaknesses and EU civilian capabilities, and proposing CSDP action where supply appeared to meet technical rather than political demand. Subsequent discussions tended to refine what was politically feasible in terms of member state contributions and to adapt mission size and mandates accordingly. Thus, arguably CSDP decision-making was insufficiently politically strategic with regard to local politics in the host country. A focus on internal EU political motivations and capacities often resulted in clear indications of mission size and type but relatively vague mandates with regard to programming priorities and approach. This further suggests that intra-EU politics have privileged considerations of the mission’s potential impact on CSDP over its impact in theatre – which tends to be assumed rather than explored in the political CSDP decision-making phase.

The essentially top-down and EU-centric nature of CSDP decision-making does not, however, mean that it is insufficiently strategic with respect to CSDP and EU interests as Serrano contended. On the contrary, CSDP decision-making bodies privileged consideration of to what extent a potential mission would benefit CSDP and EU interests. In politically contested missions such as Aceh, Iraq and Afghanistan, the controversy reflected in large part different interpretations of the strategic interest of the country for the EU and the potential benefits and risks—material and reputational—of launching an EU mission there.

The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty introduces a number of significant innovations that have the potential to impact the quality of CSDP decision making. In brief, it replaces the rotating EU Presidency system in external relations with the position of a permanent President of the European Council and introduces institutional streamlining in the EU’s structures for external action. Specifically, the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) now serves as an institutional arch between the two pillars of community and inter-governmental external action. As Commissioner for External Relations and Commission Vice President, Baroness Catherine Ashton is responsible for the communitarised (European Community) areas of external relations. As Chair of the newly established Foreign Affairs Council, she will prepare and ensure implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in support of the HR/VP also brings together the EU’s crisis management structures with political and most of the aid instruments formerly associated with CFSP or European Commission external action and assistance.

Given the important role that the rotating EU Presidencies had in driving past decisions to launch civilian CSDP missions in the past, the end of this system is likely to have an impact on the dynamics of CSDP decision-making “in the room.” The Swedish diplomat Olof Skoog was chosen as the first permanent chair of the PSC on account of his excellent reputation for fostering consensus based decision making rather than adventurous ambitions for CSDP. It remains to be seen, however, whether the end of the rotating EU Presidency results in a reduction in political appetite for new missions or, rather, adaptation on the part of member states as to how they go about preparing and introducing initiatives.

To assess the impact of the institutional context on CSDP decision-making, it is first necessary to clarify what will change in practice. Despite the promise of the EEAS serving to bridge institutional divides through greater integration, it is already clear that the cleavage between CSDP and geographical directorates associated with the EU’s political and development instruments will be largely maintained within the structure. All CSDP decision-making bodies will be transferred intact to the EEAS and will report directly to the HR/VP. In con-

trast, CFSP will be largely integrated with first pillar external action in a series of geographic directorates as well as directorates for global and thematic issues. These include four thematic directorates on: 1) multilateral relations and global governance; 2) human rights and democracy; 3) conflict prevention and security policy; and 4) non-proliferation and disarmament.

However, it remains far from clear how PSC decision-making will draw on input from the geographical or thematic directorates within the EEAS. One procedural innovation that was being explored in early 2011, was the establishment of regular conflict prevention meetings involving crisis management, geographic and thematic expertise expressly for the purpose of commonly identifying risks, and risk mitigation initiatives. Many suspect however, that the institutional cleavage between CSDP and CFSP and aid programming will be largely maintained and that PSC decision-making will remain characterized by the supply-side politics of crisis response. Moreover, the EEAS has created new lines of cleavage, notably between the EC Directorate General for Development (DG DEVCO), which still controls the majority of EU external action budget and the EEAS which is formally responsible for the first stages of strategic programming, notably the development of Country Strategy Papers.

Thus, despite the potentially far-reaching decision to streamline EU external action through the creation of the EEAS, it is not clear if the new institutional context will provide new entry points for intra- and inter-institutional cooperation in the early stages of planning EU CSDP interventions. Similarly, although the new structures are intended to deliver more coherence, it is unclear if and how the new institutions will serve to privilege system-wide coherence as an important criterion in PSC decision-making. There is, in short, little to suggest that the new post-Lisbon institutional environment will change the supply-driven nature of CSDP decision-making. Rather, CSDP will likely continue to be driven by a combination of external demand for EU interventions and support from key member states. The scope of the EU's CSDP ambition is therefore likely to remain a product of the interplay of EU member state interests and capabilities, albeit in a fiscal environment that is far less conducive to relatively expensive overseas interventions.

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
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About the Author

Dr. Catriona Gourlay currently works as an independent consultant, providing research support and advice for organisations working in conflict-affected contexts. From 2005 to 2009 she was the Marie Curie Research Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), where she conducted projects on EU and UN crisis management and peacebuilding. Previously, from 1995 to 2005, she was the (founding) Executive Director of the International Security Information Service, Europe, an independent research organization based in Brussels working on European Security and Defence Policy. She has written extensively on the development of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding capacities and policies, and has worked as a consultant for the European Commission, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Development Programme, a number of EU Member States and a range of Non Governmental Organisations active in mediation and peacebuilding. She holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from Lancaster University (UK), a Masters in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania (US) and one in Politics, Philosophy and Economics from the University of Oxford (UK).

Annex 1: Chart of CSDM missions to date, September 2012

(as published by ISIS Europe, www.isis-europe.eu. Also available at www.csdmpmap.eu. © Giji Gya)



NB - from 1 December 2009 with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the system of the 6 month Presidency and its role have changed. The PSC now has a permanent chair and the new HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs Council.

- Legend**
- Border mission
 - Police mission
 - Military mission
 - Rule of Law mission
 - SSR mission
 - Assistance mission
 - Planning mission
 - Monitoring mission

Mission mandate extensions: perpendicular lines within the horizontal chronological mission line.
Upcoming missions: dotted borders

* Note the EUMM in former Yugoslavia began in 1991 as EUCM W. Balkans and then transitioned to EUMM in 2003.

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DCAF Brussels

Place du Congrès 1
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Tel: +32 (2) 229 39 66
Fax: +32 (2) 229 00 35

ISIS Europe

Rue Archimède 50
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Tel: +32 (0)2 230 7446
Fax: +32 (0)2 230 6113