Making Intelligence Accountable : Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies

Authors: Hans Born and Ian Leigh Bibliographic Details: DCAF / University of Durham / Parliament of Norway, 2005. ISBN: 978-92-9222-017-4 Series: DCAF Handbook Buy Now: (EUR 15.00 ) Download Full Document - English  [697 KBytes] Translated Versions: Albanian [770 KBytes] Arabic [1.0 MBytes] Bulgarian [2.0 MBytes] Croatian [763 KBytes] Dari [942 KBytes] Georgian [1.0 MBytes] Indonesian [1.0 MBytes] Macedonian [1.0 MBytes] Russian [868 KBytes] Serbian [790 KBytes] Pushto [966 KBytes] Spanish [464 KBytes] Turkish [675 KBytes] Ukrainian [494 KBytes]

Abstract

Establishing a system of intelligence service accountability that is both democratic and efficient is one of the most daunting challenges faced by modern-day states. This arduous task is indispensable, however, as political guidance and direction to the reform of intelligence services contributes to the avoidance of abuses as well as to the enhancement of efficiency for all participating branches of government.

Little systematic international comparison of democratic accountability over intelligence services has been carried out; as a result, no set of international standards for democratic intelligence accountability has evolved. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee and the Human Rights Centre of the University of Durham have teamed up to produce this publication which seeks to fill this gap by cataloguing and evaluating the legal standards that currently exist regarding democratic accountability of intelligence services. In doing so, this report also identifies and recommends best practice applicable to both transition countries and well-established democracies.

These standards and examples of best practice do not make the assumption that there is a single model of democratic oversight which works for all countries. Rather, the system of democratic oversight of intelligence services depends on a country’s history, constitutional and legal system as well as its democratic tradition and political culture.

The rules and practices that are accepted and effective in one place may be less relevant in another. Given these different realities, some of the suggestions within the handbook will inevitably appear unsuitable for some countries. This said, from a democratic governance point of view, the oversight of the intelligence services is a shared responsibility of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. A sound system of checks and balances is necessary, in which the executive does not have the exclusive privilege of overseeing the intelligence services. Thus, the intelligence agencies themselves, national parliaments, as well as external review bodies all havea role to play in this endeavour.

It is hoped that this publication will enhance public awareness of this complex and important field of governance and that it will contribute to ensuring that security policy and practices genuinely reflect the aspirations of the people they are meant to serve.

Book Review: Intelligence & National Security, 21:4, (2006), 631 - 649

"In essence, Making Intelligence Accountable is an admirable addition to the literature regarding accountability and democratic oversight. Its strengths lie not so much within the policy implementation areas covered, but more dramatically within the number and variety of countries analyzed. Rarely, if ever, has a book integrated examples of positive oversight measures and best practices from so many country experiences: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Turkey, the UK and the US are all included. The authors also adeptly integrate norms and standards for democratic oversight of intelligence services from such diverse sources as the UNDP, OECD, EU and OSCE. Furthermore, the authors take a refreshingly nuanced approach. Instead of providing a simple blueprint, Born and Leigh’s clearly expressed recommendations and relevant examples are meant to be taken as ‘a set of principles from which particular national rules may be developed’ (p.23)."

Description

List of Contents

Section I Introduction

Defining Democratic Oversight of Security and Intelligence Services

The Need for Oversight of the Security and Intelligence Services

In Search of Legal Standards and Best Practice of Oversight: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

Section II The Agency

Defining the Mandate

Appointing the Director

Authorising the Use of Special Powers

Information and Files

Internal Direction and Control of the Agency

Section III The Role of the Executive

The Case for Executive Control

Ministerial Knowledge and the Control of Intelligence

Control over Covert Action

International Cooperation

Safeguards against Ministerial Abuse

Section IV The Role of Parliament

The Case for Parliamentary Oversight

The Mandate of Parliamentary Oversight Bodies

The Composition of a Parliamentary Oversight Body

Vetting and Clearance of the Oversight Body

Parliamentary Powers to Obtain Information and Documents

Reporting to Parliament

Budget Control

Section V: The Role of External Review Bodies

Resolving Citizens' Grievances

Oversight of Agencies within the Administration by Independent Authorities

Independent Audit Offices

Overview of Best Practice


Acknowledgements
Assistance rendered by third parties is gratefully acknowledged.

Albanian
Funding for translations provided by OSCE. Printing facilitated by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in Albania.

Croatian
Printing costs co-funded by OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

English
Printing and distribution sponsored by the Norwegian Parliament.

Russian
Printing and distribution sponsored by the Norwegian Parliament.

Spanish
Funding for translation and publication costs provided by the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), Argentina.