

Chapter 1

Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction

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Introduction

Since the late 1990s, security sector reform (SSR)¹ has emerged as a key concept, which has become widely accepted by development practitioners, security experts and, to a lesser extent, democracy advocates. It is a relatively ambiguous concept, which refers to a plethora of issues and activities related to the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of external and internal security. SSR is essentially aimed at the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance.² Although SSR is still an evolving and, therefore, contested concept and lessons learned from practical experiences are still rather scarce, it increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation and democracy promotion.

In practical terms, SSR varies substantially according to the specific reform context. There is general agreement that no common model of SSR exists and that, in principle, each country adopting SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context. However, for analytical purposes, broad SSR contexts may be distinguished which contain a number of similar cases – depending on the criteria for categorisation. In this chapter, three such broad contexts of SSR will be discussed, each reflecting a different rationale for reform. First, SSR has been adopted by international development donors as an instrument to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance.³ Second, SSR has become a tool to facilitate the practical coordination and conceptual integration of defence and internal security reforms in post-authoritarian states, particularly in post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.⁴ Third, SSR has gained most practical relevance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of so-called ‘failed states’ and states emerging from violent internal or inter-state conflict, as evidenced by a wide variety of cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, SSR is viewed by peacekeepers and development actors as key to success in the overall reconstruction effort. Security sector reconstruction, that is security sector reform in post-conflict contexts, exhibits a number of specific features which are distinct from other SSR settings.⁵

This volume traces the emergence of regional approaches to SSR in the post-9/11 era in the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly in the Western Balkans, West Africa and the Arab Middle East – regions in which the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is active to a greater or lesser extent. It then looks at a series of specific post-conflict settings where security sector reform, or rather reconstruction, mostly under international auspices, has become a distinct feature – including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq.

This chapter sets out to conceptualise security sector reform and security sector reconstruction as two closely interrelated concepts in order to provide a broad framework for analysis of the problems and challenges that are discussed in the following chapters. It starts with a broad definition of ‘security sector’ in the framework of a deepening and widening notion of

security. This is followed by a discussion of what SSR means in general and in the specific reform contexts mentioned above. It will show that while security sector reform and security sector reconstruction can be distinguished for analytical purposes, overlaps are manifold. This chapter therefore suggests that security sector reconstruction is conceptualised as a variation of the theme – or a specific context – of security sector reform, which has become an important dimension of global security.

Security and the Security Sector

Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a substantive widening and deepening of the concept of security. On one hand non-military security issues such as political, economic, societal and environmental aspects are now broadly accepted as component parts of a meaningful security agenda. Furthermore, military threats and the way states respond to them have changed, as illustrated by the events of 9/11 and its aftermath. Asymmetrical threats and warfare, as well as the blurring of the lines between different dimensions of traditional and new security issues, have emerged as characteristic features. The US-led ‘war on terror’ is particularly illustrative of the changing nature of military security as well as the increasing ‘securitisation’ of non-military issues. On the other hand, the primacy of national security has been undermined by the logic of globalisation and the corresponding changes in the role of the state. With the proliferation of intra-state wars and the privatisation of conflict in poorly governed and ‘failing states’ the international community began to recognise that more often than not it is individuals and social groups which need to be protected rather than the state whose dysfunctionality is often the primary cause of insecurity. This led to the emergence of new security concepts such as ‘societal security’ and ‘human security’. The latter, which has gained much recognition in the international arena, illustrates best the paradigmatic change from the primacy of national (and international) security to the growing importance of transnational, sub-national and individual security. Although still an ill-defined and contested concept, human security covers a wide range of threats to the security of individuals and social groups such as anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, child soldiers, trafficking in women as well as, in its wider notion, all aspects of human development such as economic, food, health and environmental insecurity. In sum, what makes these problems ‘new’ security issues, shaping a new or transformed international security agenda, is not that they are truly novel phenomena but rather that they are ‘securitised’, which means that they are explicitly characterised and treated as security concerns.⁶

As security is a contested concept, one might assume that the same holds true for the notion of the security sector. There are almost as many definitions as there are scholars and institutional actors trying to define what the ‘security sector’ comprises. This notwithstanding, there seems to be a certain convergence on a general definition which may vary in scope according to the perspective adopted (see Table 1.1.). Throughout the chapters in this book, however, a case is made for adoption of a broad definition of the security sector.

From a *security perspective*, the security sector reflects the broad notion of security (see above) because it does not cover the military alone, but acknowledges the importance and in some countries the predominant role of non-military security forces in the provision of public security, internal or external. Accordingly, the security sector encompasses all those state institutions, which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion such as the armed forces (domestic and foreign), the police, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and customs guards as well as judicial and penal institutions. Given the prevalence of private and other non-statutory security actors in an increasing number of states, however, forces such as guerrilla and liberation armies, non-state paramilitary organisations as well as private military and security companies have to be considered either as part of the *de facto* security sector or at least as

important actors shaping security sector governance. Thus, the security sector – as defined from a broad security perspective – would include statutory and non-statutory security forces.

Table 1.1: Definitions of the ‘Security Sector’

Perspectives	Definition A ⁷	Definition B ⁸	Definition C ⁹	Definition D ¹⁰	Focus
Narrow	Security forces	Groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence	Core security actors	Organisations authorised to use force	State-centric
	Civilian management and oversight bodies	Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring	Security management and oversight bodies	Civil management and oversight bodies	
Broader		Judiciary, penal system, human rights ombudsmen	Justice and law enforcement institutions	Justice and law enforcement institutions	Human-centric
			Non-statutory security forces	Non-statutory security forces	
				Non-statutory civil society groups	

From a *governance perspective*, the security sector covers the elements of the public sector responsible for the exercise of the state monopoly of coercive power and has traditionally been a key feature of the modern nation-state. This includes the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for management and control of the security forces, such as the executive government, the relevant ministries (so-called ‘power ministries’, particularly the ministries of defence and of the interior), the parliament and its specialised committees. Like any other part of the public sector, the security sector should be subject to the principles of good governance such as accountability, transparency and democratic participation. Given the broad notion of security and the increasing importance of internal security issues, particularly in the wake of 9/11 and its aftermath, justice and law enforcement institutions are viewed as relevant actors for security sector governance. Thus, judiciary and ministries of justice, criminal investigation and prosecution services, prison regimes, ombudspersons and human rights commissions should be considered as a component part of the security sector if defined in the broad notion of the term. Given the importance of civil society for democratic governance, non-statutory civil society groups such as the media, research institutions and non-governmental organisations play, or should play, an important role in security sector governance. Thus, the security sector, as defined from a democratic governance perspective, would include a wide range of civil society actors in addition to the state institutions tasked with security sector management and oversight.

Considering civil society actors and non-statutory forces as component parts of the security sector in its broad sense helps to transcend the essentially state-centric nature of the concept which, in an increasing number of cases, wrongly assumes that the monopoly over the means of coercion rests solely with the state and its institutions. From a security and a governance perspective, one would assume that limited involvement by non-statutory security forces and a strong role of non-statutory civil society actors are more desirable than the contrary.

Not only is the essentially state-centric notion of the security sector transcended by the relevance of civil society and private security actors, but security sector governance also tends to

have a regional and trans-regional dimension. Most countries are part of a regional security complex, and many security challenges are often transnational and therefore cannot be dealt with by national means alone. It thus makes sense to think in terms of sub-regional, regional and trans-regional security sectors, which are constituted by multilateral military, policing and intelligence capacity, intergovernmental security organisations, their inter-parliamentary assemblies and supranational judicial bodies. Even transnational private security forces such as international militia and terrorist groups as well as transnational civil society actors such as international non-governmental organisations (INGO) would find their place in a regionally or trans-regionally conceived security sector. The Euro-Atlantic region, particularly the European Union, may be viewed as the strongest expression of such a security sector beyond the national level (Chapter 2). Even in a conflict-prone area such as the Western Balkans, elements of a sub-regional security sector are emerging, as illustrated by the Ohrid process, which is intended to establish an integrated border security management system for the region (Chapter 7). In West Africa, too, indications of an emerging sub-regional security sector can be witnessed – as evidenced by the growing security role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the creation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in particular (Chapter 4). ECOWAS is playing a central role in the post-conflict rehabilitation of two of its member states, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 8). In this context, the Arab Middle East – plagued by serious democratic and security deficits – seems to constitute a strong counterfactual argument though the nascent SSR debate tends to be framed in a regional context (Chapter 5).

In sum, the definition of what constitutes the security sector is multi-faceted, evolving, and therefore debatable. However, in response to the new security agenda resulting from post-Cold War and post-9/11 developments, there seems to be a tendency to broaden the scope of the security sector beyond its state-centric core. This results in (1) the consideration of non-statutory private security and civil society actors as parts of the security sector and (2) the conceptualisation of the security sector on regional and trans-regional levels.

Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction

A dysfunctional security sector is the point of departure for security sector reform (Chapter 2). A security sector can be considered as dysfunctional if it does not provide security to the state and its people in an efficient and effective way or, even worse, if it is the cause of insecurity. Moreover, as a consequence of the aforementioned broad definition, a security sector cannot be viewed as functional if it is deficient in terms of governance. Thus, SSR is meant to reduce security deficits (inefficient and ineffective provision of security or even provision of insecurity) as well as democratic deficits (lack of oversight over the security sector) which result from dysfunctional security sectors. In other words, SSR is a means that serves the objective of providing ‘security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control’.¹¹ In an address to the World Bank staff in October 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a strong case for security sector reform. Referring to the concept of good governance, he noted that ‘another very important aspect is the reform of public services – including the security sector, which should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other service’.¹² A recent authoritative definition of SSR stems from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which states that ‘security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework’.¹³ The SSR agenda

favours a holistic approach to the provision of security in a double sense. First, it integrates all those partial reforms such as defence reform, police reform, intelligence reform and justice reform, which in the past were generally seen and conducted as separate efforts. Second, given its normative commitment to consolidation of democracy, promotion of human rights and implementation of the principles of good governance such as accountability and transparency, it aims at putting the security sector and its parts under democratic governance.¹⁴

What all these attempts at defining SSR have in common is that they contain two normative elements which constitute the core of the SSR concept, namely the development of (1) affordable security bodies capable of providing security (operational effectiveness and efficiency aspect) and (2) effective oversight mechanisms consistent with democratic norms (democratic governance aspect).¹⁵ The task of providing both security (state and human security) and democratic governance is difficult, even for consolidated democracies, not to speak of developing, transition and post-conflict countries. In case of the latter, the challenge is even greater given the fact that SSR has to tackle a third objective, namely to address the legacies of past conflict including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, judicial reform in the form of transitional justice, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and anti-personnel landmines.¹⁶ These two – and in the case of post-conflict environments – three objectives, are widely recognised as the core elements of SSR.¹⁷

As has been mentioned elsewhere, the SSR debate suffers from an imbalance between the broad acceptance of this rather recent concept and the relatively little consideration and investigation of specific reform contexts. In other words, it suffers from a ‘conceptual-contextual divide’,¹⁸ which has

Table 1.2: Contexts of Security Sector Reform

	Developmental context	Post-authoritarian context	Post-conflict context
Key criteria	Level of economic development	Nature of political system	Specific security situation
Key problem	Development deficit	Democratic deficit	Security and democratic deficits
Key reform objective	Development	Democratisation	Peace-building / nation-building
General reform process	Transition from underdeveloped to developed economy	Transition from authoritarian to democratic system	Transition from violent conflict to peace
Nature of external involvement	Development assistance coupled with political conditionality	Accession to multilateral institutions as incentive for reform	Military intervention / occupation; mostly UN-led peace support operations
Key external actors	Development/financial actors: multilateral donors (e.g. OECD, UNDP, World Bank); bilateral donors; non-state actors	Security actors: international (e.g. EU, NATO, OSCE); governments; non-state actors (e.g. INGOs, PMCs)	Security actors: intervention forces; peacekeeping forces under international auspices; non-state actors (e.g. PMCs)

Specific security sector problems	Excessive military spending; poorly managed / governed security sector leads to ineffective provision of security, thereby diverting scarce resources from development	Oversized, over-resourced military-industrial complex; strong state, but weak civil society institutions; deficiencies in implementing SSR policies	Government and civil society institutions collapsed; displaced populations; privatisation of security; possibly pockets of armed resistance; abundance of small arms and anti-personnel mines
Possibilities for SSR	Mixed (depending on political commitment to reform, strength of state institutions, role and state of security forces, regional security environment, donor approach to SSR, etc.)	Rather good (strong state institutions, professional security forces, broader democratisation process), even better if external incentives available (e.g. accession to EU or NATO)	Rather poor (weak and contested state institutions, privatisation of security, dependence on peace support / intervention forces)

to be bridged if the study of SSR is to facilitate the design and implementation of SSR programmes. There is a widely held view that reform contexts matter, and that SSR differs from country to country in the sense that, in addition to specific historical conditions, the level of economic development, the nature of the political system and the security environment will heavily influence the pattern of the reform process. For analytical purposes, a number of very general reform contexts can be identified, which exhibit a degree of commonality depending on the criteria applied. If the level of economic development, the nature of the political system and the specific security situation are used as points of departure, three different SSR contexts may be distinguished each of which has contributed to shaping the SSR debate in its own way: (1) the developmental context, (2) the post-authoritarian (primarily post-communist) context and (3) the post-conflict context (see Table 1.2).¹⁹

Before discussing these three SSR contexts, it must be underlined that highly developed countries, consolidated democracies and states which are internally and externally secure, also face pressures to reform their security sectors, particularly in response to new security requirements accentuated by 9/11 and its aftermath²⁰ or to deficiencies in international security governance related to the effects of globalisation.²¹ These pressures are not specific to a given reform context but are more generally applicable. All states are challenged by this new security agenda, irrespectively if they are developed or developing countries, transition states or consolidated democracies, post-conflict societies or those countries which are part of the 'democratic peace' area.²²

Developmental Context

As mentioned above, the origins of the SSR concept stem from the development community, who have increasingly acknowledged the importance of linking development with security, emphasising the crucial role a well governed, efficient security sector plays in the provision of security and as a precondition of sustainable economic development. Conversely, if poorly managed and governed, the security sector can act as a spoiler of development efforts. Initially concentrating on the reduction of excessive military expenditures, in the late 1990s the development community began to embrace the SSR concept permitting at least some donors to justify greater involvement in security-related issues.²³ Since then, the concept has gained much wider recognition, particularly in the debate about increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance.²⁴ In other words, SSR in a developmental context is an externally,

particularly donor-driven process, which may be used as an incentive, or a political condition, for the provision of development assistance.

The SSR agenda pursued by the development donors makes the concept problematic from the perspective of recipient countries. Other than in post-conflict countries, SSR programmes are still quite the exception in developing countries which, although in principle in need of SSR, are not haunted by the legacy of recent violent conflict and therefore not forced to rely on external involvement for the provision of public security.

Post-Authoritarian Context

SSR has also become an issue for post-authoritarian states, who have embarked on a transition to democracy. This holds particularly true for post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and for post-Soviet states, which undertook or are still undertaking efforts to democratise their public sector, including the security sector. However, until recently, SSR has not been widely used as an operational concept within the Euro-Atlantic region. Earlier in the 1990s, SSR-related objectives such as good governance, efficiency and effectiveness were usually conceived by the transition states only in terms of democratic control of armed forces, defence reform and/or defence modernisation. Post-authoritarian experiences, however, and post-communist legacies in particular, such as continued authoritarian leadership, nepotism, corruption and unaccountable segments of the security apparatus, have led many analysts and practitioners to think more holistically about key aspects of security sector governance. External involvement also matters in the post-authoritarian SSR context as illustrated by the roles played by NATO and the EU in the transition of post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond. Whereas NATO still exhibits a preference for the more traditional armed forces and defence reform agenda, the emergence of the EU as an, albeit constrained, security actor in the region, concentrating on various aspects of internal security reform (policing, border management, refugee and asylum policies), has been a key factor in broadening the debate to include all aspects of the SSR agenda. Still today, these two multilateral institutions shape the SSR agenda each according to their own statutory preferences – defence reform (NATO), internal security reform (EU).²⁵

If SSR is viewed as having been more successful in European post-communist states than in developing states, then this is probably due to the significant leverage the EU and NATO have to encourage comprehensive SSR in candidate states. If states wish to accede to these Western institutions they have to meet a number of requirements, some of them related to democratic governance of the security sector. At the same time, however, the relatively rapid accession of a great number of former communist states – boosting NATO to twenty-six and the EU to twenty-five member states – might result in a loss of the leverage NATO and EU hold over these countries in the post-accession era.²⁶ Whether the policy of using engagement with and the option of accession to NATO and EU as an incentive for SSR-related transformation will work in the Western Balkans remains to be seen. It will most certainly turn out to be a more complex, time-consuming and resource-intensive process given the post-conflict setting that inhibits SSR in that sub-region (Chapter 7).

Post-Conflict Context

A third area where SSR has found growing acceptance are post-conflict societies emerging from internal or inter-state conflict, embarking on a process of reconstructing all parts of the public sector which had been destroyed or become dysfunctional during the past conflict (Chapter 6). Among the activities currently subsumed under the heading of SSR, most of them take place in post-conflict settings. Clearly, engaging in SSR in post-conflict environments poses special challenges, and also presents particular opportunities. One the one hand, SSR seems to be particularly difficult in an adverse environment such as a post-conflict setting, usually

characterised by weak state institutions, a fragile inter-ethnic or political situation, with influential armed and other security forces, both statutory and non-statutory, and precarious economic conditions.²⁷ On the other hand, given the quite obvious need to ‘rightsized’ the security sector and reform or even reconstruct it after the end of the conflict, post-conflict situations represent ‘windows of opportunity’ for security sector reform or, in many cases, security sector reconstruction programmes.²⁸ Generally speaking, in such societies there is a strong will to accept external support for all kinds of reforms, even in the most sensitive areas such as the security sector. This holds true only for the cases of civil war and internal conflict prior to the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In cases where an inter-state war such as a foreign military intervention aimed at regime change and resulting in a transitional occupation preceded post-conflict reconstruction efforts, the security environment may simply be too adverse to implement a comprehensive and effective SSR programme as evidenced in Afghanistan (Chapter 9) and particularly so in Iraq, where armed resistance means that SSR is taking place under combat conditions (Chapter 10). Even without armed resistance against the intervention troops, irrespectively if their presence is legitimised by a UN mandate or not, post-conflict contexts pose the most formidable challenges to SSR.

As mentioned above, SSR in post-conflict settings, or security sector reconstruction, follows the same two key principles as SSR in other contexts, namely (re-)establishing security forces which are able to provide public security in an effective and efficient manner and in the framework of democratic, civilian control. What makes security sector reconstruction different from security sector reform, however, is the fact that it has to deal with the specific legacy of past conflict. This may include oversized armed forces, both statutory and non-statutory, that need to be downsized, surplus weapons that need to be removed, anti-personnel landmines that need to be cleared, large numbers of perpetrators that need to be prosecuted. Thus, more often than not, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, judicial capacity-building to permit for transitional justice, curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and clearance of anti-personnel landmines are viewed as key elements of security sector reconstruction, but not necessarily of security sector reform activities in developmental and post-authoritarian contexts.

Three further points may be added to make a case for an analytical distinction between security sector reconstruction and security sector reform. First, post-conflict settings are characterised by a need for the immediate provision of public security, which may undermine, or at least delay, the tackling of longer-term issues of security sector governance (Chapters 6 and 8). Second, the tensions between external imposition and local ownership of SSR has special relevance in the context of post-conflict security sector reconstruction because more often than not physical security will have to be provided by international actors while sufficient local capacity is gradually being built up – a process which may take a very long time. Finally, the need to provide immediate security through international means, to (re-)construct state security institutions and to establish effective and legitimate security governance mechanisms poses a difficult challenge in post-conflict settings where private security actors (or non-statutory security organisations) throw into question the state’s or, in a transitional phase, the international authority’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The role of non-statutory security forces in the Kosovo conflict (Chapter 7), the proliferation of irregular forces recruiting child soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 8), the continued authority of regional warlords in Afghanistan (Chapter 9), the existence of a variety of local militias in Iraq (Chapter 10) and the role of often unaccountable private military and security companies in conflict and post-conflict environments are good cases in point to illustrate the adverse implications of the privatisation of security.

What the developmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts have in common, is that SSR tends to be characterised by a greater or lesser involvement of external actors – not necessarily as principal actors of reform, but certainly as its initiators. In all three contexts, there are tensions between external imposition and local ownership of SSR. This seems to be a crucial

issue, both because of questions around sustainability of reforms and because, in exporting Western reform models, there has been a ‘missionary tendency’ around Western approaches to SSR. The difficulties of finding a balance between international best practices in this area and domestic political cultures of reforming states are raised throughout the chapters of this volume although without necessarily leading to specific recommendations on how this could best be solved. This tension is inherent in the SSR concept itself and is thus not amenable to easy solutions.

Challenges of Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction

This volume sets out to improve our conceptual and empirical understanding of security sector reform and reconstruction, to identify major challenges in this policy field and to outline specific policy recommendations where appropriate. As developed in this chapter, security sector reconstruction is understood as a specific context of security sector reform – SSR in a post-conflict environment. For analytical purposes, a distinction is made in the structure of this book between security sector reform (part II) and security sector reconstruction (part III). This, however, does not preclude the contributors from using the terms ‘security sector reform’ and ‘security sector reconstruction’ in an interchangeable way – in the end, it is the reform context that matters and not the terms used for addressing context-specific issues. Part II addresses approaches to security sector reform in a regional context, with emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic area in general (Chapter 2) and Central and Eastern Europe in particular (Chapter 3), on West Africa (Chapter 4) and the Arab Middle East (Chapter 5). Part III looks into one of the three SSR contexts discussed earlier – that of post-conflict reconstruction. It starts with the development of an analytical framework for empirical research on post-conflict reconstruction of the security sector under the auspices of international institutions (Chapter 6). This is followed by four case studies with two chapters concentrating on a number of cases in two sub-regions, namely the Western Balkans (Chapter 7) and West Africa (Chapter 8), and two chapters focusing on more recent cases of security sector reconstruction, both resulting from post-9/11 military interventions, namely Afghanistan (Chapter 9) and Iraq (Chapter 10).

The volume concludes with a review of the main issues and challenges of security sector reform and reconstruction based on the findings of the previous chapters. While not particularly optimistic either of past experience or future prospects for SSR, this volume effectively lays out the complex challenges faced by both external and internal actors in this area, and in this sense it may make a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on SSR – standing for both security sector *reform* and security sector *reconstruction*.

Notes

- ¹ 'Security sector reform' is the term of choice in this chapter because it is most commonly used by practitioners as well as analysts. Reference is made, however, to alternative terms such as 'security system reform', used by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 'justice and security sector reform', introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 'security sector transformation', which is increasingly being used in the African context to underline the need for fundamental change in governance processes in the security sector (see Chapter 4).
- ² On the concept of security sector reform see, for example, Born, H., Caparini, M., Fluri, P., (eds.), *Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2002); Bryden, A., Fluri, P., (eds.), *Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2003); Brzoska, M., *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, DCAF Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2003); Ball, N., *Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP* (9 October 2002); Ball, N., Fayemi, K., Olonisakin, F., Williams, R., *Governance in the security sector*, in Van de Walle, N., Ball, N., Ramachandran, V., (eds.), *Beyond Structural Adjustment. The Institutional Context of African Development* (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2003), pp. 263-304; Chalmers, M., *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective* (Saferworld and the Conflict Prevention Network: London, 2000); Chanaa, J., *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*, Adelphi Papers, no. 344 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002); Cooper, N., Pugh, M., *Security Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies*, CDSG Working Paper no. . (King's College: London, 2002); Edmunds, T., *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*, DCAF Working Paper no. 3 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2002); Germann, W., Edmunds, T., (eds.), *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe. A Framework for Assessment* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2003); Hendrickson, D., *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, CSDG Working Paper no. 1 (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College: London, 1999); Hendrickson, D., Karkoszka, A., 'The Challenges of Security Sector Reform', *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002); Karkoszka, A., 'The Concept of Security Sector Reform', in *Security Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development* (United Nations Office at Geneva and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2003), pp. 9-15; Lilly, D., Von Tangen Page, M., *The Privatisation of Security and Security Sector Reform* (International Alert: London, 2002); *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice. A DAC Reference Document* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]: Paris, 2004); Smith, C., 'Security Sector Reform: Developmental Breakthrough or Institutional Re-engineering', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001); *Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate*, Occasional SSR Paper no. 1 (Clingendael, International Alert, Saferworld: The Hague, London, August 2002); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace', *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 85-100; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach* (UNDP; New York, 2002); Winkler, T., *Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order*, DCAF Occasional Paper no. 1 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2002); Wulf, H., *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries* (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ]: Eschborn, 2000); Wulf, H., *Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries*, paper prepared for the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Resolution (forthcoming).
- ³ Brzoska, *Development Donors*.
- ⁴ Cottey, A., Edmunds, T., Forster, A., 'The second generation problematic: rethinking democracy and civil-military relations', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 29, no. 1 (December 2002).
- ⁵ Cooper/Pugh, *Security Sector Transformation*.
- ⁶ Hänggi, H., 'Making Sense of Security Sector Governance', in Hänggi, H., Winkler, T., (eds.), *Challenges of Security Sector Governance* (LIT: Münster, 2003), pp. 5-6.
- ⁷ Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, *Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]: Paris, 2000), p. 8.
- ⁸ Hendrickson, *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, p. 29; Greene, O., 'Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional Perspectives', *Journal of Security Sector Management*, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2003), p. 2.
- ⁹ *Security System Reform*, pp. 16-17; Karkoszka/Hendrickson, *The Challenges*, p. 179.
- ¹⁰ UNDP, *Democratizing Security*, p. 87; *Towards a Better Practice*, pp. 3-4.
- ¹¹ Edmunds, *Security Sector Reform*, pp. 3-4.
- ¹² Annan, K., 'Peace and Development – One Struggle, Two Fronts', Address of the United Nations Secretary-General to World Bank Staff, October 19, 1999, p. 5.

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- ¹³ *Security System Reform*, p. 16.
- ¹⁴ Brzoska, *Development Donors*, p. 16.
- ¹⁵ Ball, *Enhancing Security Sector Governance*, pp. ii, 5.
- ¹⁶ *Security System Reform*, pp. 16, 17;
- ¹⁷ Hänggi, *Making Sense*, pp. 17-18.
- ¹⁸ Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform*, p. 61.
- ¹⁹ There are a number of contexts in which SSR is problematic if not impossible and which, therefore, are not considered in this chapter: (1) lapsing or stalled democracies where there is no commitment to reform; (2) conflict-prone and war-torn societies or civil war settings where the legitimacy of the authorities is contested by armed insurgency or other forms of violent opposition, and (3) developing countries under authoritarian rule with the military or other security forces being key pillars of state power. See Brzoska, *Development Donors*, p. 40; Wulf, *Security Sector Reform*, p. 6.
- ²⁰ Reference is made to the increased salience after 9/11 of intelligence, police, law enforcement and border security, the blurring of lines between internal and external security, and the need to find a new balance between increased powers of the security sector and the existing oversight mechanisms. See Slocombe, W., 'Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism: Their Impact on Security Sector Reform and Basic Democratic Values', in Bryden/Fluri, *Security Sector Reform*, pp. 291-301.
- ²¹ Reference is made to deficiencies in the accountability of national armed forces being deployed under the auspices of international institutions. See Born, H., Hänggi, H., (eds.), *The 'Double Democratic Deficit'. Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force Under International Auspices* (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2004).
- ²² For the 'democratic peace' proposition, see Russett, B., *Grasping the Democratic Peace; Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1993).
- ²³ Brzoska, *Development Donors*, pp. 20-22.
- ²⁴ Karkoszka, 'The Concept', pp. 10-11.
- ²⁵ Caparini, M., 'Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement', in Hänggi/Winkler, *Challenges of Security Sector Governance*, pp. 55-84.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.
- ²⁷ Karkoszka, 'The Concept', p. 11.
- ²⁸ Brzoska, *Development Donors*, p. 32, see also pp. 10-13.