



# DCAF

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## Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions

### Report of the Expert Workshop

Convened by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and with support from the Governments of Switzerland and the United Kingdom

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The views expressed do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or represented in this paper.

## Executive Summary

1. UN peacekeeping missions are under increasing pressure from Member States to show the impact of their rule of law and security institutions initiatives. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) convened an Expert Workshop on ‘Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions’ on 12 March 2012 in New York to explore how best to develop a coherent and coordinated approach to measuring the contribution of its field activities to mandate implementation and positive and sustainable change in the host country. The workshop was organised in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and with the support of the Governments of Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
2. In preparation for the workshop, DCAF developed a mapping study on impact assessment methodologies which was then presented to the participants, and DPKO OROLSI developed a draft set of core rule of law and security institutions (ROLSI) indicators for discussion.
3. On the question of the possibility of efficiently assessing the impact of UN field missions, and the resources required to do so, the consensus of the experts was:
  - a. The UN system lacks capacity to conduct impact assessments. Specialist expertise is required to design an assessment of the impact of a peacekeeping initiative on the national RoL institutions or on the level of stability, peace and security in the host country.
  - b. There is no money earmarked for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in peacekeeping assessed budgets.
  - c. Were the UN system to have the resources to engage the requisite specialist skill sets to design and conduct impact assessments, available methodologies range from those that measure ‘attribution’ to those that assess ‘contribution’.
  - d. The UN should consider ‘real world’ approaches to evaluations that do not necessarily require statistical counterfactuals and that may entail mixed methods.
4. Experts discussed the purpose of evaluating the impact of UN ROLSI initiatives. It was agreed that:
  - a. A balance must be struck between the use of evaluations to ensure accountability on the one hand and to advance real time learning and programme adjustments on the other.
  - b. Member States’ views on the ‘impact stories’ they are looking for must be considered prior to the development of methodologies and indicators.
5. Experts were asked to advise on the utility of the draft ROLSI indicators for assessing progress towards programme objectives across ROLSI initiatives. Experts agreed that:
  - a. The list should be adapted to reflect two levels of indicators: one that shows the general direction the country is taking and the other to track change in specific areas supported by peacekeeping missions in order to enable programme adjustments in real time. The current indicators as presented do not achieve either goal.
  - b. The draft indicators cannot yield insight into the functioning of national RoL or security institutions, nor assess progress across missions towards shared objectives.

- c. One possible use of such indicators is to track trends in the country and to use the information for advocacy purposes.
  - d. The current draft indicators do not reflect a methodology that will allow DPKO to compare progress across missions or to adjust specific programmes in real time.
6. On the question of the desirability and feasibility of promoting a sector-wide approach to measuring impact:
    - a. A sector-wide approach was considered beneficial because it would enable the pooling of resources, recognise that actors working collectively in a sector cumulatively contribute to impact, and reduce stress on the recipient government by easing coordination.
    - b. Obstacles identified included bureaucratic disincentives, different institutional cultures and timelines, and the reality that Member States may prefer to account for the impact of each actor individually in relation to the amount of resources invested.
  7. The expert workshop was useful in identifying challenges and opportunities in measuring impact, as well as clarifying the next steps that may be taken. In particular, some key concerns need to be considered before moving forward:
    - *Achieve clarity from Member States on what type of impact they expect peacekeepers to have.* Is accountability to Member States more important than learning lessons in real time? Can we or should we formulate a methodology that measures impact from the perception of the donor Member States and of the host country? Such questions will set the tone for the type of impact assessment methodologies to be piloted, as well as the type of indicators that should be developed.
    - *Enable clarity on the purpose of the core OROLSI indicators.* A decision needs to be made about the main purpose of these indicators. If they are intended to be a quick measure of trends in a host country then they can be used for advocacy purposes with national and international stakeholders. However, if the intention is to support efforts to measure the impact of RoL and security-related peacekeeping initiatives on national institutions or on host country stability, then more reflection on the development of these indicators is needed, as well as on the resources available to subsequently implement them.
    - *Recognize that indicators on their own are not a substitute for robust methodologies for measuring impact.* Indicators are useful for monitoring purposes, but they do not provide adequate toolsets for assessing impact because they are not able to demonstrate attribution or plausible contribution. The focus should therefore be on embedding them *within* a proper methodological approach to measuring impact.
    - *Consider the type of resources needed to move forward.* Reflection is needed on how resources would be obtained to implement the core ROLSI indicators and future approaches to measuring impact. Designing the methodology, collecting and analysing data are specialist skills, not currently available in DPKO-DFS. Enhanced efforts need to be made to get M&E in peacekeeping contexts onto the agenda of UN budgetary and policy discussions.

## 1. Introduction

Member States are increasingly interested in measuring the impact of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, and are routinely asking for evidence of both progress towards stated objectives and of impact at the national level. To-date, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) does not have one coherent and coordinated approach to measuring the contribution of its field activities to supporting positive and sustainable change in the host country. As a first step towards a more consistent approach, an examination is required of which methodologies exist for measuring impact and, more specifically, how these can be adapted for use by OROLSI field components.

Against this background, an Expert Workshop on ‘Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions’ was held on 12 March, 2012, in New York. The workshop was an initiative of DPKO OROLSI, in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and with the support of the Governments of Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The workshop gathered approximately 50 participants including representatives from bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, non-UN experts on impact assessment from academia and research institutes, and independent consultants. In attendance from the UN system were practitioners in charge of assessment, planning and monitoring and evaluation functions as well as those charged with supporting ROLSI components at Headquarters.

The main focus of the workshop was on approaches to measuring ‘impact’ as opposed to broad approaches to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The objectives of the workshop were to seek expert advice on how DPKO OROLSI might assess the impact of both Headquarters and field-based rule of law and security institutions-related initiatives. In order to support discussions at the workshop, DCAF developed a mapping study on impact assessment methodologies which was circulated to workshop participants ahead of time.<sup>1</sup> DPKO OROLSI also shared with participants a draft set of core rule of law and security institutions (ROLSI) indicators for UN Field Missions, which were developed separate from the mapping study.

The workshop was opened by representatives of Switzerland, DPKO OROLSI and the United Kingdom. First, Ambassador Paul Seger, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN highlighted the increasing pressure on international actors to deliver results. Second, Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant-Secretary General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions noted that UN peacekeeping recently adopted an internal strategy on early peacebuilding that encourages UN Field Missions to focus on fewer tasks but to do them better. Mr. Titov went on to underline OROLSI’s desire to gather empirical evidence of improvements in the situation on the ground as a result of UN Field Missions. Finally, Mr. Mark White, Head of the Security and Justice Group at the UK Department of International Development (DFID) reminded participants of the limited influence one actor can have on security and justice institutions in the host country.

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<sup>1</sup> Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Mapping of Methodologies for Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions Issues in the Host Country, draft as of 1 March 2012. Available at: <http://www.dcaf.ch/Partner/United-Nations>

This report outlines the main areas of agreement among experts on key questions posed at the workshop. It is divided up according to the five thematic sessions at the workshop. The conclusion sums up the discussions and provides an overview of some of the main recommendations emerging from the workshop.

### **Definitions**

*Impact:* ‘positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.’<sup>2</sup> Impacts can be relatively short-term or longer term.<sup>3</sup>

*Rule of law and security institutions (ROLSI) field components:* refers to police; justice; corrections; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); and mine action components in UN Field Missions led, or backstopped, by DPKO

## **2. The Challenge of Assessing the Impact of UN Field Missions**

The first session examined the challenges faced by UN field missions in assessing the impact of their support. While significant challenges were highlighted in relation to conducting M&E in peacekeeping contexts, participants cautioned that these should not be used as an excuse to sideline the visible need to learn from interventions and enhance accountability.

*On the question of the possibility of efficiently assessing the impact of UN field missions, and the capacities required to do so, the consensus of the experts was:*

- a. Specialist expertise is required to design and conduct an impact assessment.
- b. The UN system lacks the capacity to conduct impact assessments. While there are various entities within the UN system that have an evaluation mandate (e.g. OIOS, JIU), in practice the evaluation function is limited by their size and mandate.
- c. The burden of evaluation lies on DPKO field components, but the personnel in these field components lack: the skills to undertake extensive evaluations, the time to perform simple monitoring activities such as data collection, and guidance on the approach to evaluations that they should be taking.
- d. The UN’s weak culture of programme design and planning further compounds the capacity challenges. Results based budget frameworks are useful in theory, but in practice they are inflexible instruments that lock peacekeeping missions into yearly planning and reporting.

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<sup>2</sup> OECD DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (Paris: OECD, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> OECD DAC, *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Working Draft, a joint project of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation (Paris: OECD, 2008).

This provides a disincentive to evaluations that are intended to support timely readjustments within missions.

*On the question of financial means for measuring impact, the experts noted that:*

- a. There is no money earmarked for M&E in peacekeeping assessed budgets. Enhancing the measurement of impact of peacekeeping missions requires dedicated financial resources.
- b. The cost of M&E is negligible compared to the amount of money that is currently lost on peacekeeping activities that do not achieve their objectives. Significant funds can be saved by making activities more relevant, effective, efficient and focused on meeting stated objectives. A strong argument based on cost-effectiveness could therefore be made in favour of evaluations.
- c. The emerging recognition of the importance of M&E needs to be translated into its inclusion as a topic in UN budgetary discussions. It should be recognised that the standard amount reserved for M&E recommended by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) is 1 percent of the total programme budget.

### **3. Overview of Impact Assessment Methodologies**

The session on ‘overview of impact assessment methodologies’ was based on the presentation of the DCAF study on the mapping of impact assessment methodologies.<sup>4</sup> Awareness of the methodological options available was considered an important first step towards understanding the opportunities for OROLSI to measure the impact of the activities of its peacekeeping components.

*On the question of what can realistically be measured and how, the experts highlighted that:*

- a. Were the UN system to have the resources to engage the requisite specialist skill sets to design and conduct impact assessments, available methodologies range from those that can support ‘attribution’ through the use of counterfactuals and control groups (i.e. impact evaluation and theory-based impact evaluation) to those that can demonstrate ‘contribution’ on the basis of theory-based and participatory approaches (i.e. contribution analysis; outcome mapping; RAPID outcome assessment; and most significant change).
- b. While some of the methodologies can be costly and time-consuming to conduct, a majority of them can be adapted to reduce time and human resource costs.
- c. Member States should accept that the most scientifically rigorous approaches are not always possible or desirable to implement in peacekeeping contexts.
- d. The UN should consider ‘real world’ approaches to evaluations that recognises that while it is impossible to assess program effects without a counterfactual, a counterfactual does not have to be measured statistically. It can also be measured by creatively looking for comparison groups using, for example:
  - Different comparison groups for different program components
  - Theory-based approaches
  - Participatory approaches

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<sup>4</sup> DCAF, *mapping study*. See note 1.



## 4. Measuring Impact: Opportunities and Constraints

This session examined why OROLSI should be measuring impact and what that entails.

*Experts discussed the purpose of evaluating the impact of UN ROLSI initiatives. It was agreed that:*

- a. A balance must be struck between the use of evaluations to ensure accountability on the one hand and to advance real time learning and programme adjustments on the other.
- b. Clarity is needed on whether OROLSI should be measuring what is important to the UN, to OROLSI itself, to Member States or to the local/national stakeholders and beneficiaries? Accountability to donor Member States should be disconnected from that to the population. The evaluation of impact needs to take place on two levels: strategic objectives of the peacekeeping missions mandate and goals and expectations of the host country.
- c. Member States and DPKO OROLSI leadership must understand the difference between ‘rigorous’ evaluations and ‘quick’ evaluations. There is a trade-off between resources and rigor. Given significant resource constraints, a clear story on how the evaluation would benefit the peacekeeping missions is needed.
- d. A conversation is required with Member States on what they are seeking to learn or show through the measurement of peacekeeping impact. There is a need to first answer these essential questions before turning to methodologies and indicators.

*On the question of who should measure impact and what skills are required, experts noted that:*

- a. Conducting evaluations and assessments requires special skills and expertise for which relevant experts have to be hired (on a consultancy basis or as part of one’s regular staff). The type of skill sets needed to conduct impact assessments depends on the type of approach adopted. The scientific-experimental approach entails the use of quantitative skill sets that are rarer than qualitative skill sets.
- b. Working with national groups can help make evaluations more affordable. Efforts should be made to enhance support to national actors while recognising challenges such as potential bias.
- c. The aims of various capacity-building initiatives should not be mixed up. Building the capacity of judges in the areas of integrity, confidentiality etc. should not necessarily entail training on how to conduct evaluations. There is a general misconception that capacity building in the area of evaluation can be added on to any type of training initiative. A clearer separation is needed between capacity building for justice and security sector officials on the one hand and capacity building for evaluation and data collection experts and institutions on the other.

## 5. Core ROLSI Indicators for UN Field Missions

The session on indicators examined the draft core ROLSI indicators that were developed by DPKO OROLSI. Experts were asked to advise on the utility of these indicators for assessing progress towards programme objectives across ROLSI initiatives.

*On the question of whether the indicators provide meaningful information for decision-making, the experts highlighted that:*

- a. The draft indicators currently cannot yield insight into the functioning of national ROLSI institutions, nor assess progress across missions towards shared objectives. A choice needs to be made to determine the primary objective of the indicators: If the main aim is to track trends in the country in order to use the information for advocacy purposes, then fixed (global) indicators could be helpful. If the main aim is to use the information from indicators to adjust programmes, then developing context-specific indicators as opposed to fixed indicators would be preferable.
- b. Fixed indicators such as the ROLSI core indicators may prove less useful than indicators developed on a case-to-case basis. Fixed indicators may create incentive structures for the type of work that is undertaken in the field. There is a risk that missions will prioritize activities that are measured by these indicators, at the expense of other equally important activities that are not reflected by a specific indicator. Also, fixed indicators that enable comparisons with other countries are inappropriate because the findings in one case may mean something totally different in another.

*Experts discussed whether the indicators could be part of a sector-wide approach to measuring impact. It was agreed that:*

- a. The current draft indicators do not reflect a methodology that will allow DPKO to measure impact in order to adjust specific programmes in real time. Indicators must be designed to complement and not replace robust programme evaluation tools.
- b. There is a risk of producing yet another set of indicators which requires significant resources when UN Field Missions are already overburdened and required additional personnel is difficult to recruit. The resources available to implement this list of core indicators needs to be carefully considered, and OROLSI should take advantage of other work that is being done.

*On the question of what is the best way to collect and analyse data, it was noted that:*

- a. Many of the indicators require public surveys or experts surveys – which UN peacekeeping does not have the skills to do.
- b. Population surveys are not ideal for data collection because confidence intervals are too broad.
- c. Peacekeeping missions need to be more inventive on how to collect such information, for example, including certain items in Technical Assessment Missions. Assessment missions should be used not just to help understand the context and needs but also to gather the much needed baseline data.
- d. National institutions specialized in data collection such as national observatories for violence should be supported.

*On the question of how the phrasing of the indicators could be improved, the experts found that:*

- a. The list should be adapted so that it is guided by a general analytical framework. Examples suggested included: Logical framework model (output, outcome, impact); OECD criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability); Participatory approach (determining what credible evidence is needed to show that the programme is working).
- b. Some of the indicators are too general because they are set at too high a level or because they are measuring aspects far removed from the control of the UN. The list should be adapted to reflect two levels of indicators; one that shows the general direction the country is taking and

the other to track change in specific areas supported by peacekeeping missions in order to enable programme adjustments in real time. While the general indicators can stay as an indication of changes in the situation in the country, a set of specific and realistic sub-indicators should be developed that are more closely related to the specific areas of work of peacekeeping missions.

- c. The indicators should be adapted to ‘only measure what you do’ – some of the indicators do not reflect issues that the UN can necessarily control. For example, the indicator on ‘prison overcrowding’ does not incorporate possible alternative explanations for the situation. Hypothetically, overcrowded prisons could result from misguided incentives for police to arrest more people and not inadequate infrastructure. A negative trend on the ‘prison overcrowding’ indicator may have little to do with the quality of UN support.
- d. Indicators should be adapted to show meaningful progress rather than superficial improvements that has little or no bearing on the overall situation in the country. An example is the indicator on the ‘Extent to which sector-wide coordination for the security sector has improved’. The proposed indicator is based on whether the government sets up a national coordination body to identify sector-wide priorities and coordinate reform activities. However, this only shows the existence of such a body, without saying anything about whether the members of the committee are actually working together.

## **6. Sector-wide Approaches to Measuring Impact**

This session examined how various actors working in one sector might join forces to measure the impact of work towards shared objectives. It was clarified that ‘sector’ should be understood as multiple actors working in the same area towards presumably shared objectives.

*Experts discussed the advantages of joint sector-wide approaches to measuring impact. It was suggested that:*

- a. Sector-wide approaches should be promoted because it: supports the pooling of resources in the face of numerous budgetary constraints; recognises that numerous actors are collectively working in a sector and contribute cumulatively to a specific impact; can reduce stress on the recipient government by easing the coordination of the interaction with international actors as well as take some of the burden off national actors who often face multiple, simultaneous requests for information; and, can encourage the joint implementation of findings.

*Experts discussed the challenges to supporting joint approaches. It was highlighted that:*

- a. Member States may be reluctant to pursue joint evaluations that cannot attribute the effect of the activities they have assisted distinctly from the cumulative impact of all UN-related activities in the intervention.
- b. Other challenges include bureaucratic disincentives (e.g. institutions being rewarded for serving their own institution’s objectives rather than serving inter-agency objectives); different institutional cultures and timelines; and the preference of international actors to safeguard their exclusive relations with the government rather than working multilaterally.

*On the question of how might various actors working in one sector join forces to measure the impact of work towards shared objectives, it was noted that:*

- a. It is easier to support a joint approach to monitoring than it is to evaluations. Opportunities for collaboration at this level would include sharing data collection costs and combining efforts to undertake surveys. Simple efforts such as informing other actors of an intention to undertake a perception survey and allowing them to contribute to or subsequently use it can reduce costs.
- b. It is more feasible to jointly commission an evaluation rather than to jointly conduct one. If joint commissioning of evaluations is pursued, there is still a need for very clear terms of reference. This may require initial investment in negotiation to ensure that objectives are clearly understood and agreed.

## **7. Conclusion and Recommendations**

A crucial message emerging from the expert workshop was that while there are numerous challenges to measuring impact, these should not inhibit evaluations that support lesson-learning and enhance accountability. The workshop highlighted the importance of engaging in a discussion on measuring impact in a bid to reduce the confusion regarding its purpose, which methodologies to use, who the supposed beneficiary of interventions are ('impact for whom?') and who the target audiences of assessment results are ('assessment for whom?'). This confusion can partly be linked to the many layers of conversation taking place at the same time. There are different understandings of impact – one that looks at the cumulative effects of support to a sector in the country, and one that examines the effects in a sector that can be attributed to a specific intervention. A related element of confusion arises from the question of whether the impact to be measured should be defined by the host country or by the donor Member States. These are crucial aspects that need to be answered in order to move forward in developing a DPKO OROLSI approach to measuring impact.

It was recognised that there are abundant ways to measure impact that vary depending on the level of available resources. While multiple options for measuring impact were identified and discussed, it was noted that the choice of methodology rests on whether Member States are willing to accept 'contribution' or prefer to see 'attribution'. However, it was noted that scientific-experimental approaches that prove attribution are not necessarily the most appropriate ways of measuring impact in peacekeeping contexts. In fact, international actors are increasingly recognising the merits of approaches that belong to the category of contribution. It was therefore suggested that quantitative approaches may only be appropriate when measuring small components within a broader qualitative assessment that addresses the larger questions that OROLSI would seek to answer through its evaluations.

Another important issue raised at the workshop is that a very clear distinction needs to be made between monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring relates to reviewing early indications of progress towards achieving expected accomplishments, while evaluation examines longer-term results focusing on what has or has not worked, and why. In this context, it was noted that the draft OROLSI core indicators might be more suitable for monitoring exercises. It was recognized that indicators alone cannot replace evaluations for measuring impact, as they are only one part of the 'impact story'. Furthermore, there needs to be absolute clarity on the level at which these

indicators are set and on their specific objectives. For example, indicators cannot be both a ‘quick fix’ and a ‘reliable’ way of measuring effectiveness and impact at the same time.

There were calls from participants to ensure that Member States understand how the rigorousness of M&E efforts is proportional to the resources invested in them. For example, procuring the necessary capacity and specialised skill sets both at the design and implementation stages of M&E can be costly. Concern over the current lack of resources led to calls for M&E to be integrated into UN budgetary discussions. It was noted that the cost of M&E is negligible compared to the amount of money that is currently lost on activities that do not achieve their expected results. A strong argument based on cost-effectiveness therefore needs to be made to ensure that M&E finds its way onto the agenda at UN budgetary meetings.

Finally, another concern was the ‘limited culture of evaluation’ of both Member States and the UN. If Member States want the UN to measure impact then they need to be clear on their willingness to foster a learning story (and not just to tell a ‘good story’). This implies confronting one’s own culture. Similarly, it was underlined that in the context of UN peacekeeping, more efforts need to be made to underline the benefits of evaluation (and take away fears of negative repercussions of less than flattering evaluation results). This would increase the likelihood that staff invest in data collection and identify evaluation opportunities, thus preparing the ground for subsequent investment in impact assessments.

The expert workshop was useful in identifying challenges and opportunities in measuring impact, as well as clarifying the next steps that may be taken. In particular, some key concerns need to be considered before moving forward:

- *Achieve clarity from Member States on what type of impact they expect peacekeepers to have.* That is to say, is accountability to Member States more important than learning lessons in real time? Can we or should we formulate a methodology that measures impact from the perception of the donor Member States and of the host country? Such questions will set the tone for the type of impact assessment methodologies to be piloted, as well as the type of indicators that should be developed.
- *Enable clarity on the purpose of the core OROLSI indicators.* A decision needs to be made regarding the main purpose of these indicators. If they are intended to be a quick measure of trends in a host country then they can be used for advocacy purposes with national and international stakeholders. However, if the intention is to support efforts to measure the impact of RoL and security-related peacekeeping initiatives on national institutions or on host country stability, then more reflection is needed on the development of these indicators, as well as on the resources available to subsequently implement them.
- *Recognize that indicators on their own are not a substitute for robust methodologies for measuring impact.* Indicators are useful for monitoring purposes, but they do not provide adequate toolsets for assessing impact because they are not able to assess attribution or plausible contribution. The focus should therefore be on embedding them *within* a proper methodological approach to measuring impact.

- *Consider the type of resources needed to move forward.* The trade-off between rigour and resources should be recognised. It is important to reflect on whether adequate resources can be obtained to implement the core ROLSI indicators and future approaches to measuring impact. Designing the methodology, collecting and analysing data are specialist skills, not currently available in DPKO-DFS. Moreover, enhanced efforts need to be made to get M&E in peacekeeping contexts onto the agenda of UN budgetary and policy discussions.

## *Annex A: Workshop Programme*

### **Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions**

*Expert Workshop convened by the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and with support from the Governments of the United Kingdom and Switzerland*

#### **Background**

Member States are increasingly interested in monitoring progress and measuring the impact of UN peacekeeping missions, and are routinely asking for evidence of both progress towards stated objectives and of impact at the national level. For instance, in January of this year, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General “to provide a follow-up report within 12 months to consider the effectiveness of the UN system’s support to the promotion of the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations<sup>5</sup>.” Such information on results and impact would support the timely identification of necessary changes in the mandate, activities and size of the mission and may offer a rational basis for resource requests. In recent years, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has repeatedly requested evidence of the impact that the creation of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in DPKO has had on the delivery of rule of law mandates.<sup>6</sup>

In his 2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the Secretary-General asked for regular reviews of Secretariat-based institutional arrangements to “...assess progress against defined and agreed benchmarks, particularly the extent to which the arrangements have resulted in faster and more effective results on the ground...”<sup>7</sup> As part of these reviews, the Policy of the Committee of the Secretary-General asked in December 2011 for an assessment of the impact achieved in strengthening justice and security institutions in one peacekeeping setting, one special political mission setting and one conflict area without a mission<sup>8</sup>.

In this context OROLSI is seeking expert advice on how peacekeepers might assess the impact of both Headquarters and field-based rule of law and security institutions-related initiatives. To-date, OROLSI does not have one coherent and coordinated approach to measuring the contribution of its field activities to supporting positive and sustainable change in the host country.<sup>9</sup> Greater clarity is required on which methodologies exist for measuring impact and,

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<sup>5</sup> S/PRST/2012/1 dated 19 January 2012

<sup>6</sup> A/63/19 at para. 104 (and subsequent reports of the C-34)

<sup>7</sup> A/63/881-S/2009/304 of 11 June 2009 (paragraph 57)

<sup>8</sup> Decision No. 2011/27 – Review of rule of law arrangement in peacebuilding, Policy Committee of the Secretary-General (20 December 2011)

<sup>9</sup> For recent initiatives and studies see: ‘UN Practitioners Handbook for Peace Consolidation Benchmarking’ United Nations (in cooperation with the FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre), ‘Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners Guide to

more specifically, how these can be adapted for use by OROLSI field components. To this end, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) conducted a desk-based mapping of existing impact assessment methodologies and is supporting the expert workshop in New York.

### **Workshop objectives**

The workshop will take place on Monday 12 March 2012 and will be dedicated to identifying recommended approaches to measuring the impact of rule of law and security-related initiatives in peacekeeping settings. The workshop will examine a number of questions: What is OROLSI trying to measure and for what purpose? What can realistically be measured? How can the impact of rule of law and security components in UN Field Missions be captured given the range of actors and variables influencing national outcomes in the rule of law and security sectors? Can impact be attributed to specific actors? Who should be involved and what skills are needed to conduct impact assessments? What information on impact can a set of core rule of law and security institutions indicators for UN Field Missions provide? How frequently should impact be assessed? What are the cost implications? Should a sector-wide approach be used to measure the impact of UN Field Missions on rule of law and security institutions? Both a mapping study on impact assessment methodologies by DCAF and a draft set of core rule of law and security institutions indicators for UN Field Missions will be circulated to workshop participants ahead of time.

### **Definitions**

Impact is defined in the UN Secretary-General's bulletin on 'Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation' as: "an expression of the changes produced in a situation as the result of an activity that has been undertaken" (ST/SGB/2000/8). This is further detailed in the OECD DAC's 'Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management' which defines impacts as "positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended." (OECD DAC, Glossary, 2002). Impacts can be relatively immediate or longer term<sup>10</sup>.

The term "ROLSI field components" refers to police, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and mine action components in UN Field Missions led, or backstopped, by DPKO.

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Benchmarking', 2010; United Nations Rule of Law Indicators instrument; Stimson Centre, 'Impact Study of UN Police, Justice and Corrections Components in Peacekeeping and Select Special Political Missions', forthcoming 2012.

<sup>10</sup> OECD DAC Glossary, 2002 p.41



## **Participants**

Workshop participants include:

- Non-UN experts on impact assessment from academia, research institutes as well as practitioners, who can advise on the way in which ROLSI field components might assess the impact of their work in dynamic, post-conflict settings.
- Representatives from bilateral donors and multilateral organisations who are aware of the utility of impact assessments at the policy level and/or have experience in assessing the impact of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.
- Personnel from DPKO and the Department of Field Support in charge of assessment, planning and monitoring and evaluation functions as well as those charged with supporting ROLSI components at Headquarters.
- Other UN entities working in post-conflict environments who have undertaken impact assessments and/or developed a core set of indicators to measure impact across programmes or in a sector.

## **Expected Output**

- A workshop report that summarises the views of experts on the main questions posed and outlines the recommendations developed by participants on the extent to which, and how, OROLSI can move forward in measuring progress towards stated objectives and impact at the national level, as well as specific recommendations on the utility and uses of a draft set of core rule of law and security institutions indicators.

**Draft Workshop Programme on**  
***Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions***  
**12 March 2012**

**Location:** Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN (29th floor, 633 Third Avenue, btwn 40/41<sup>st</sup> St.)

**09.00 – 09.15 Registration and coffee**

**09.15 – 09.30 Welcome and opening**

- **Mr. Paul Seger**, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN
- **Mr. Mark White**, Head, Security and Justice Group, UK Department of International Development (DFID)
- **Mr. Dmitry Titov**, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO

**09.30 – 09.50 The challenge of assessing the impact of UN Field Missions**

- **Ms. Anna Shotton**, Strategic Planning Officer, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
- **Mr. Sebastian Einsiedel**, Political Affairs Officer, Policy and Planning Unit, Policy and Mediation Division, Department of Political Affairs and **Mr. Marc Jacquand**, Consultant for the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University

This session will lay out the challenges and incentives that DPKO confronts in seeking to develop an approach to assess the impact of peacekeeping operations on rule of law and security institutions, as well as some remarks on a recent impact assessment study by the Department of Political Affairs.

**09.50 – 11.00 Session 1: Overview of impact assessment methodologies**

- **Ms. Vincenza Scherrer**, Programme Manager, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
- **Mr. Michael Bamberger**, Consultant
- Questions and Answers

This session will provide an overview of impact assessment methodologies and approaches taken by international actors to measure the impact of specific interventions in conflict- and post-conflict environments.

**11.00 - 11.15 Coffee break**

**11.15 – 13.00 Session 2: Why measure impact? What can realistically be measured?  
How can impact be attributed to specific actors? Who should measure impact and what skills are required?**

- Introductory remarks by **Ms. Melanne Civic**, Senior Rule of Law Advisor, Office of Learning and Training, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, US State Department
- Discussion

This session will examine the purpose of measuring impact, the extent to which impact can be measured and attributed to specific actors, and the feasibility of OROLSI relying on different impact assessment

methodologies/techniques to obtain evidence of both progress towards stated objectives and of impact at the national level, taking into consideration constraints relating to resources, skills, and capacities required.

#### **13.00 – 13.45 Lunch (cold buffet provided at venue)**

#### **13.45 – 15.00 Session 3: Core ROLSI indicators for UN Field Missions: Do the indicators provide meaningful information for decision-making? What is the best way to collect and analyse the data? Could the indicators be part of a sector-wide approach to measuring impact? How can the phrasing of the indicators be improved?**

- **Ms. Anna Shotton and Ms. Annika Hansen**, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
- Discussion

This session will provide a brief introduction to the draft set of core rule of law and security institutions indicators under development by OROLSI to measure progress towards, or achievement of, programme objectives on police, justice, corrections, DDR, SSR and mine action issues. These were distributed in advance to participants. Participants will be asked to provide feedback on the questions mentioned above.

#### **15.00 – 15.45 Session 4: How might various actors working in one sector join forces to measure the impact of work towards shared objectives?**

- Introductory remarks by **Mr. Babu Rahman**, Multilateral Policy Directorate, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and **Mr. Edric Selous**, Director, Rule of Law Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- Discussion

This session will consider whether a broader sector-wide approach to measuring impact is recommended, involving both the UN Field Mission and other relevant actors.

#### **15.45 – 16.00 Coffee break**

#### **16.00 – 17.20 Conclusions**

- Summary of key points by workshop facilitator and DPKO/OROLSI
- Tour-de-table

This session will draw the conclusions from the four sessions and provide specific recommendations for OROLSI on approaches to measuring impact, including recommendations on the utility and uses of the draft set of core ROLSI indicators.

#### **17.20-17.30 Closure of Workshop**

**Workshop Facilitator: Mr. Albrecht Schnabel, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)**

## ***Annex B: List of Participants***

### **Non-UN Experts**

**Michael Bamberger**  
Independent Consultant

**Robert Blair**  
PhD candidate, Yale University

**William Durch**  
Senior Associate, Stimson Centre

**Heiner Hänggi**  
Assistant Director and Head of Research, Geneva  
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces  
(DCAF)

**Marc Jacquand**  
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**John Karlsrud**  
Research Fellow, NUPI

**Fiona Mangan**  
Research Analyst, Stimson Centre

**Jim Parsons**  
Director and Lead Researcher,  
Vera Institute of Justice

**Cyrus Samii**  
Assistant Professor,  
New York University (NYU)

**Vincenza Scherrer**  
Programme Manager, Geneva Centre for the  
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

**Eric Scheye**  
Independent Consultant

**Albrecht Schnabel**  
Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic  
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

**Svein Eric Stave**  
Researcher, FAFO

**Monica Thornton**  
Director, Vera Institute of Justice

### **Member State Representatives**

**Melanne Civic**  
Senior Rule of Law Advisor, Office of Learning and  
Training, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization  
Operations, US State Department

**Alain Germaux**  
Legal Advisor,  
Government of Luxembourg

**Babu Rahman**  
Senior Principal Research Officer,  
Multilateral Research Group, Multilateral Policy  
Directorate, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**Gilles Rivard**  
Deputy Permanent Representative,  
Government of Canada

**Paul Seger**  
Ambassador,  
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN

**Jack Van Baarsel**  
Deputy Military Adviser,  
Government of the Netherlands

**Mark White**  
Head, Security and Justice Group, UK/DFID,  
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Director, Rule of Law Unit, Executive Office of the  
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